938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

93

FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and
JULIAN VILLEGAS, NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS,
GEMINIANO VILLEGAS, CESAR VILLEGAS, MAXIMO
MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS MATIAS, ANA MARIE V.
MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Estates; Civil Law; Wills; Probate of the will;

Appointment of special administrator, basis of.—Under the above
rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator
should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from
the allowance of disallowance of a will. Subject to this
qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in
the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be
sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity
or legal principle. The basis for appointing a special administrator
under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason
for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or
in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in
cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves.
Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be
immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Appointment of special
administrator, reasons for.—It is obvious that the phrase “by any
cause” includes those incidents which transpired in the instant
case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the
will and that the granting of letters testamentary will
consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate
appointment of a special administrator. The reasons for the
appointment of a special administrator are: “The reason for the
practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact
that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protected
litigation, thereby being exposed to

________________

* FIRST DIVISION

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VOL. 96, MARCH 31, 1980 939

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect

the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occassion for
such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such
as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed. No temporary administration can be
granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting,
however.” “Principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors
and heirs.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of office of a
special administrator.—The respondent judge opined that there is
no need for the appointment of a special administrator in this
case because the respondents are already in possession of the
properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has failed to
distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that
of the neutral possession of the special administrator under the
Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is
regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties
suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of
the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. The
accountability which attaches to the office of a special
administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the
personal possession of private respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory construction;
Phrase “by any cause” in Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court,
interpreted.—It is obvious that the phrase “by any course”
includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case
clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and
that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be
prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special
administrator.

PETITION for certiorari of the order of the Court of First

Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     C.C. Paralejo for petitioner.
     A.R. Reyes respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari instituted by Feliciano de

Guzman against Honorable Teofilo Guadiz, Jr., Judge of
the
940

940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan,

and Julian Villegas, Natividad Villegas, Geminiano
Villegas, Cesar Villegas, Maximo Matias, Rosario Villegas
Matias, Ana Marie V. Matias, and Lourdes V. Matias,
seeking the following relief:

“WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays:

a) That respondents be ordered to answer this petition;

b) That after hearing the Order of respondent Judge dated
December 23, 1977 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Appointment of a Special Administrator and consequently,
the Order dated July 15, 1978 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration be annulled and that said respondent
Judge be declared to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing the appointment of the Special Administrator;
c) That respondent Judge be directed to appoint a Special
Administrator pending the probate of the Last Will of
Catalina Bajacan.

Petitioner respectfully prays for such either relief just and

equitable in the premises. 1
Manila, Philippines, August 14, 1978.”

On August 31, 1978, without giving due course to the

instant petition, this Court adopted a resolution directing
the respondents to 2comment thereon within ten (10) days
from notice thereof.
 The respondents filed on 3 October 10, 1978 their
comment dated October 9, 1978.
Meanwhile, on September 29, 1978, the petitioner
submitted a Constancia manifesting that the respondent
judge cancelled the hearing on the petition for probate of
the will scheduled on September 20, 1978 “pending
4
the
outcome of the case before the Supreme Court.”
On October 18, 1978, this Court resolved: a) to GIVE
DUE COURSE to the petition; and b) to REQUIRE (1) the
peti-

________________

1 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

2 Rollo, p. 45.
3 Rollo, pp. 60-79.
4 Rollo, pp. 49-50.

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VOL. 96, MARCH 31, 1980 941

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

tioner to deposit P80.40 for costs and clerk’s commission

within five (5) days from notice thereof, and (2) both parties
to submit simultaneous
5
memoranda within thirty (30) days
from notice thereof.
Both petitioner and6 respondents having filed their
respective memoranda, on December 6, 1978, this 7
Court
resolved to declare this case submitted for decision.
The record discloses that on March 16, 1977, the
petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Branch
8
V, Gapan, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 865 for the probate of a will alleged to have
been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the
herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming
him as executor; that Catalina Bajacan died on February 3,
1977; that on May 10, 1977, the private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among
others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are
now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter-
vivos executed on June 19, 1972 9 by Arcadia Bajacan and
Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that on September 30,
1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on
the said motion to dismiss10 until the parties shall have
presented their evidence; that a 11 motion for the
appointment of a special administrator was filed by the
petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the
unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the
probate of the will and the appointment of an executor;
that the decedent’s estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of
first class agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice
a year; that somebody representing the estate should
collect and receive the palay harvests pending

________________

5 Rollo, p. 159.
6 For Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 161-169; and for Respondents, Rollo, pp. 171-
186.
7 Rollo, p. 189.
8 Annex “A”, Petition, Rollo, p. 12.
9 Annex “B”, Petition, Rollo, p. 17.
10 Rollo, p. 7.
11 Annex “C” Petition, p. 30.

942

942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

the probate of the will; that on December 23, 1977, the

respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for
appointment of a special administrator, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

“The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the

necessity of enabling somebody to take care of the properties
where there is a considerable delay in the appointment of a
regular administrator. In the present case, since the properties
covered by the will are undoubtedly in the possession of the
oppositors who claim to be the owners thereof, the Court sees no
necessity of appointing a special administrator.
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby
denies the motion for the appointment of a special administrator
12
filed by the petitioner dated September 22, 1977 x x x” ;
that on June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a 13motion for
reconsideration, of the order dated December 23, 1977 ; that said
motion was also denial by the respondent judge in an order dated
June 9, 1978 which states:
“In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on June
5, 1978 praying for a reconsideration of the Order dated Dec. 23,
1977, which denied the motion for appointment of a Special
Administrator filed by him, it in alleged that the Court made a
premature determination of ownership and possession of the
oppositors over the properties of the estate of Catalina Bajacan.
This assertion is not accurate. What the Court merely stated in
said Order is that the oppositors, who claim to be the owners, are
in possession of the properties covered by the Will.
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby:

x      x      x      x

(b) denies the

14
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on
June 5, 1978.”

The main issue in this case is whether the respondent

judge presiding the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch

________________

12 Annex “D”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 32 33.

13 Annex “E”, Petition, Rollo, p. 34.
14 Annex “F”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 38-40.

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De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

V, Gapan, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated
December 23, 1977 denying petitioner’s motion for the
appointment of a special administrator and the order dated
June 9, 1978, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
It is the petitioner’s contention that the respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction because the facts warrant the
appointment of a special administrator of the estate of
Catalina Bajacan.
Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Section 1—Appointment of Special Administrator—When there is

delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a
will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed.”

Under the above rule,15

the probate court may appoint a
special administrator should there be a delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special 16
administrator lies in the
discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be
sound, that is, not whimsical,
17
or contrary to reason, justice,
equity or legal principle.

________________

15 A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed

by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor
or general administrator is appointed. (Jones vs. Minnesota Transfer R.
Co. NW 606, cited in Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965, ed., p. 106, cited
in Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189, 201.)
16 Relucio vs. San Jose, 91 Phil. 365; Junquera vs. Borromeo, 99 Phil.,
276; Atcasid vs. Samson, 102 Phil., 735; Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189.
17 Ozaeta vs. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416; Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189.

944

944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

The basis for appointing a special administrator under the

Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for
the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is being
carried on in the same or in another court, or where there
is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of
an executor or administrator, or18in cases where the parties
cannot agree among themselves.
Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special, administrator
may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of
the deceased. It is obvious that the phrase “by any cause”
includes those incidents which transpired in the instant
case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of
the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will
consequently he prolonged necessitating the immediate
appointment of a special administrator.
The facts justifying the appointment of a special
administrator are:

(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate

of the will.
(2) The basis of the private respondents’ claim to the
estate of Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the
 probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June
19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased
Catalina Bajacan and 19
her late sister Arcadia
Bajacan in their favor.

There is an immediate need to file an action for the

annulment of such deed of donation in behalf of the estate.
Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, against
the herein private respondents. The case was dismissed by
the respondent judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 on the
ground that the petitioner has no personality to file the
action because although he 20is named heir in the will, the
said will is not yet probated. In

________________

18 Garcia Fule vs. CA, 74 SCRA 189.

19 Exhibit “FFF”, Memorandum for Respondents, Rollo, pp. 179-186.
20 Annex “G”, Petition, Rollo, pp. 41-42.

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De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

the meantime there is nobody to sue in order to protect the

interest of the estate considering that the probate of the
will and the appointment of an executor will take time.
Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on
motion of the private respondents, postponed the hearing of
the probate of the will which was then scheduled on August
23, 1978 to September 20, 1978. Again, in view of the
motion for reconsideration of the private respondents dated
September 4, 1978, the respondent judge issued an order
dated September 12, 1978, which in part reads: “x x x the
hearing of this case scheduled on September 20, 1978 is
hereby cancelled 21pending the outcome of the case before the
Supreme Court.”
The reasons for the appointment of a special
administrator are:

“The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator

rests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become
involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great
waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the
debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for
such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such
as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed. No temporary administration can be
granted where
22
there is an executor in being capable of acting,
however.”
“Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is
to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person 23fully
authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.”

It appears that the estate the properties registered under

the Torrens system in the name of the deceased Catalina
Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class
agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 hectares
produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a
year. Obvious-

________________

21 Constancia of Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 49-50; Annexes “B” and “C”, Rollo,
pp. 53-57, respectively.
22 Griffith vs. Frazier, 8 Cranch (U.S.) 9 3L. ed. 471 (South Carolina
Law Applied); 21 Am. Jur. 831, in Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. V-B, pp.
45-46.
23 Barfield v. Miller, Tex. Giv. App. 70 S.W. 2d 632, Ibid.

946

946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

ly there is an immediate need for a special administrator to

protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special
administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for
the appointment of a special administrator in this case
because the respondents are already in possession of the
properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has
failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of
litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special
administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a
special ad-ministator is regarded, not as a representative of
the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as
the administrator in24 charge of the estate, and in fact, as an
officer of the court. The accountability which attaches to
the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the
court is absent from the personal possession of private
respondents.
 The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation
in favor of the private respondents is to appoint a special
administrator who will have the personality to file the
corresponding action.
In view of all the foregoing, the respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner’s motion for appointment of a special
administrator.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is
hereby granted and the Order of the respondent judge
dated December 23, 1977, denying petitioner’s motion for
appointment of a special administrator and the order dated
June 9, 1978 denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration are set aside. The respondent judge is
ordered forthwith to appointment a special administrator
pending the probate of the last will of Catalina Bajacan in
Special Proceeding No. 865, without pronouncement as to
costs.

________________

24 21 Am. Jur. 832 in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol.
V-B, p. 45.

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De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

     Teehankee (A.C.J.), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro

and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Notes.—The preterition of the surviving spouse who

conformed thereto does not produce intestacy. (Balanay, Jr.
vs. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452).
The intestate court’s approved of the inventory of the
assets of the deceased is not conclusive of what assets
really belonged to the estate. (Sebial vs. Sebial, 64 SCRA
385).
The probate court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of
a will before passing upon its formal validity. (Balanay vs.
Martinez, 64 SCRA 452).
Testate proceedings on the estate of a person takes
precedence over intestate proceedings thereon. (Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360).
 A proceeding for the probate of the will is one in rem,
such that the corresponding publication of the petition the
courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said
will or in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. (Abut
vs. Abut, 45 SCRA 326).
The “jurisdictional facts” in probate proceedings are the
death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate
in such province. (Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA
360).
Testate proceedings for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose. (Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53
SCRA 360).
The appointment of an ancillary administrator is
committed to the wisdom of the trial court. (Macias vs.
Cruz, 49 SCRA 80).
Contracts entered by administrator is binding upon his
successor. (Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguda, 54 SCRA 243).

——o0o——

948

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