G.R. No. 180363 EDGAR Y.

TEVES, petitioner, versus THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, respondents.

Promulgated: April 28, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

CONCURRING OPINION

BRION, J.

I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Consuelo

Ynares-Santiago. I add these views to further explore the term moral turpitude a term
that, while carrying far-reaching effects, embodies a concept that to date has not been
given much jurisprudential focus.

I. Historical Roots

The term moral turpitude first took root under the United States (U.S.) immigration
laws.1[1] Its history can be traced back as far as the 17th century when the States of
Virginia and Pennsylvania enacted the earliest immigration resolutions excluding
criminals from America, in response to the British governments policy of sending convicts
to the colonies. State legislators at that time strongly suspected that Europe was
deliberately exporting its human liabilities.2[2] In the U.S., the term moral turpitude first
appeared in the Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, which directed the exclusion of persons
who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude; this marked the first time the U.S. Congress used the term moral turpitude
in immigration laws.3[3] Since then, the presence of moral turpitude has been used as a
test in a variety of situations, including legislation governing the disbarment of attorneys
and the revocation of medical licenses. Moral turpitude also has been judicially used as
a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses, in determining the measure of

1[1] Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).

2[2] Brian C. Harms, Redefining Crimes of Moral Turpitude: A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 261 (2001).

3[3] Id.
contribution between joint tortfeasors, and in deciding whether a certain language is
slanderous.4[4]

In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the term moral
turpitude in Jordan v. De George.5[5] The case presented only one question: whether
conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime involving moral
turpitude within the meaning of Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1919 (Immigration
Act). Sam De George, an Italian immigrant was convicted twice of conspiracy to defraud
the U.S. government of taxes on distilled spirits. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration
Appeals ordered De Georges deportation on the basis of the Immigration Act provision
that allows the deportation of aliens who commit multiple crimes involving moral turpitude.
De George argued that he should not be deported because his tax evasion crimes did not
involve moral turpitude. The U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinzon,
disagreed, finding that under an unbroken course of judicial decisions, the crime of
conspiring to defraud the U.S. is a crime involving moral turpitude.6[6] Notably, the Court
determined that fraudulent conduct involved moral turpitude without exception:

Whatever the phrase involving moral turpitude may mean in peripheral

cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.xxx
Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged.xxx We
therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the
statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is
deportation. 7[7]

Significantly, the U.S. Congress has never exactly defined what amounts to a crime
involving moral turpitude. The legislative history of statutes containing the moral turpitude
standard indicates that Congress left the interpretation of the term to U.S. courts and
administrative agencies.8[8] In the absence of legislative history as interpretative aid,
American courts have resorted to the dictionary definition the last resort of the baffled
judge.9[9] The most common definition of moral turpitude is similar to one found in the
early editions of Blacks Law Dictionary:

4[4] Supra note 1, p. 227.

5[5] Id.

6[6] Id., p. 229.

7[7] Id.. p. 232.

8[8] Derrick Moore, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Why the Void-For-Vagueness Argument
is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INTL L.J. 813, 816 (2008).

9[9] Id.
 [An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties
which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. xxx
Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral
standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present
in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. xxx The quality of a
crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community
as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.10[10]

In the Philippines, the term moral turpitude was first introduced in 1901 in Act No.
190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Actions and Special Proceedings.11[11] The
Act provided that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
lawyer by the Supreme Court upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.12[12]
Subsequently, the term moral turpitude has been employed in statutes governing
disqualifications of notaries public,13[13] priests and ministers in solemnizing
marriages,14[14] registration to military service,15[15] exclusion16[16] and naturalization
of aliens,17[17] discharge of the accused to be a state witness,18[18] admission to the

10[10] Id.

11[11] Effective September 1, 1901.

12[12] Now RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 27.

13[13] ACT NO. 2711, Section 234, March 10, 1917.

14[14] ACT NO. 3613, Section 45, December 4, 1929.

15[15] COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 1, Section 57, December 21, 1935.

16[16] COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473, Section 4, June 17, 1939.

17[17] COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 613, Section 29, August 26, 1940.

18[18] REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 119, Section 17.

bar,19[19] suspension and removal of elective local officials,20[20] and disqualification of
persons from running for any elective local position.21[21]

In Re Basa,22[22] a 1920 case, provided the first instance for the Court to define
the term moral turpitude in the context of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on
the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos S.
Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question
presented was whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446
of the Penal Code of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The Court, finding no exact definition
in the statutes, turned to Bouviers Law Dictionary for guidance and held:

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done

contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found
which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes
of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.

Thus, early on, the Philippines followed the American lead and adopted a general
dictionary definition, opening the way for a case-to-case approach in determining whether
a crime involves moral turpitude.

II. Problems with the Definition of Moral Turpitude

Through the years, the Court has never significantly deviated from the Blacks Law
Dictionary definition of moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.23[23] This definition is more

19[19] RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 2.

20[20] BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 337, Section 60, February 10, 1983; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160,
Section 60, January 1, 1992.

21[21] BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881, Section 12, December 3, 1985; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160,
Section 40, January 1, 1992.

22[22] 41 Phil. 275, 276 (1920).

23[23] Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 483,
487, citing Zari v. Flores, 94 SCRA 317, 323 (1979).
specific than that used in In re Vinzon24[24] where the term moral turpitude was
considered as encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or
good morals.25[25]

In the U.S., these same definitions have been highly criticized for their vagueness
and ambiguity.26[26] In Jordan, Justice Jackson noted that except for the Courts [majority
opinion], there appears to be a universal recognition that we have here an undefined and
undefinable standard.27[27] Thus, the phrase crimes involving moral turpitude has been
described as vague, nebulous, most unfortunate, and even bewildering. 28[28]

Criticisms of moral turpitude as an inexactly defined concept are not unwarranted.

First, the current definition of the term is broad. It can be stretched to include most kinds
of wrongs in society -- a result that the Legislature could not have intended. This Court
itself concluded in IRRI v. NLRC29[29] that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached once again confirming, as late as 1993 in IRRI, our
case-by-case approach in determining the crimes involving moral turpitude.

Second, the definition also assumes the existence of a universally recognized code
for socially acceptable behavior -- the private and social duties which man owes to his
fellow man, or to society in general; moral turpitude is an act violating these duties. The
problem is that the definition does not state what these duties are, or provide examples
of acts which violate them. Instead, it provides terms such as baseness, vileness, and
depravity, which better describe moral reactions to an act than the act itself. In essence,
they are conclusory but non-descriptive.30[30] To be sure, the use of morality as a norm
cannot be avoided, as the term moral turpitude contains the word moral and its direct

24[24] G.R. No. 561, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 815.

25[25] Cited in Rafael Christopher Yap, Bouncing Doctrine: Re-Examining the Supreme Courts
Pronouncements of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a Crime of Moral Turpitude (2006), p. 13
(unpublished J.D. thesis, Ateneo de Manila University, on file with the Professional Schools
Library, Ateneo de Manila University).

26[26] Supra note 8, p. 816.

27[27] Supra note 1, p. 235.

28[28] Supra note 8, p. 814.

29[29] G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993, 221 SCRA 760.

30[30] Nate Carter, Shocking The Conscience of Mankind: Using International Law To Define
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude In Immigration Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 955, 959
(2006).
connotation of right and wrong. Turpitude, on the other hand, directly means depravity
which cannot be appreciated without considering an acts degree of being right or wrong.
Thus, the law, in adopting the term moral turpitude, necessarily adopted a concept
involving notions of morality standards that involve a good measure of subjective
consideration and, in terms of certainty and fixity, are far from the usual measures used
in law.31[31]

Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails to inform anyone of what it

requires.32[32] It has been said that the loose terminology of moral turpitude hampers
uniformity since [i]t is hardly to be expected that a word which baffle judges will be more
easily interpreted by laymen.33[33] This led Justice Jackson to conclude in Jordan that
moral turpitude offered judges no clearer guideline than their own consciences, inviting
them to condemn all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than that we
disapprove it.34[34] This trait, however, cannot be taken lightly, given that the
consequences of committing a crime involving moral turpitude can be severe.

Crimes Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude35[35]

Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa,36[36] the Court has maintained its case-
by-case categorization of crimes on the basis of moral turpitude and has labeled specific

31[31] A similar concept is obscenity, whose standards have been in continuous development in
U.S. Supreme Court rulings. See Roth v. United States; Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
Only a decade after Roth, Justice Harlan observed that [t]he subject of obscenity has produced a
variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional
adjudication. As evidence, Justice Harlan noted that in the thirteen obscenity cases decided in the
decade after Roth, there were a total of 55 separate opinions among the Justices; Geoffrey R .
Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 1255, (1996 ed.) citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 704-705, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

32[32] Supra note 30, p. 959.

33[33] Supra note 8, p. 813, citing Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV.
117, 121 (1930).

34[34] Supra note 1, p. 242.

35[35] Supra note 25, pp. 20-21.

36[36] Supra note 22.

crimes as necessarily involving moral turpitude. The following is a list, not necessarily
complete, of the crimes adjudged to involve moral turpitude:

1. Abduction with consent37[37]

2. Bigamy38[38]
3. Concubinage39[39]
4. Smuggling40[40]
5. Rape41[41]
6. Estafa through falsification of a document42[42]
7. Attempted Bribery43[43]
8. Profiteering44[44]
9. Robbery45[45]
10. Murder, whether consummated or attempted46[46]
11. Estafa47[47]
12. Theft48[48]

37[37] Id.

38[38] In Re Marcelino Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 (1922).

39[39] In Re Juan C. Isada, 60 Phil 915 (1934); Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, A.C. No. 6148, February
27, 2004, 424 SCRA 42 citing Laguitan v. Tinio, A.C. No. 3049, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA
837.

40[40] In Re Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, 92 Phil. 128 (1952).

41[41] Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).

42[42] In the Matter of Eduardo A. Abesamis, 102 Phil.1182 (1958).

43[43] In Re Dalmacio De Los Angeles, 106 Phil 1 (1959).

44[44] Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines, 106 Phil. 727 (1959).

45[45] Paras v. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 954.

46[46] Can v. Galing, G.R. No. L-54258, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 663 citing In Re
Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. L-363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661.

47[47] In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, Admin. Case No. 561, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 815.

48[48] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. L-63652 October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 422.
 13. Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker49[49]

49[49] Id.
 14. Violation of BP Bldg. 2250[50]
15. Falsification of Document51[51]
16. Intriguing against Honor52[52]
17. Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law53[53]
18. Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Drug-pushing)54[54]
19. Perjury55[55]
20. Forgery56[56]
21. Direct Bribery57[57]
22. Frustrated Homicide58[58]

Zari v. Flores59[59] is one case that has provided jurisprudence its own list of
crimes involving moral turpitude, namely: adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of
income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium,
dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on
insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence, offenses
against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage, estafa,
falsification of public document, and estafa thru falsification of public document.60[60]

50[50] People v. Tuanda, A.M. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692; Paolo C. Villaber v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No.148326, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 126; Selwyn F. Lao
v. Atty. Robert W. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 227.

51[51] University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 89454, April 20,
1992, 208 SCRA 174.

52[52] Betguen v. Masangcay, A.M. No. P-93-822, December 1, 1994, 238 SCRA 475.

53[53] Supra note 23 at 483.

54[54] Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, A.M. No. P-94-1089, August 22, 1996, 260
SCRA 624.

55[55] People v. Sorrel, G.R. No. 119332, August 29, 1997, 278 SCRA 368.

56[56] Campilan v. Campilan Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-96-1100, April 24, 2002, 381 SCRA 494.

57[57] Magno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 495.

58[58] Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 1.

59[59] Adm. No. (2170-MC) P-1356, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 317, 323.

60[60] Supra note 25 at 21.

Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude61[61]

The Court, on the other hand, has also had the occasion to

61[61] Id.
categorically rule that certain crimes do not involve moral turpitude, namely:

1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)62[62]

2. Illegal recruitment63[63]
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of
firearms)64[64]
4. Indirect Contempt65[65]

III. Approaches and Standards.

Even a cursory examination of the above lists readily reveals that while the concept
of moral turpitude does not have one specific definition that lends itself to easy and ready
application, the Court has been fairly consistent in its understanding and application of
the term and has not significantly deviated from what it laid down in In re Basa. The key
element, directly derived from the word turpitude, is the standard of depravity viewed from
a scale of right and wrong.

The application of this depravity standard can be made from at least three
perspectives or approaches, namely: from the objective perspective of the act itself,
irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime; from the perspective of the crime itself,
as defined through its elements; and from the subjective perspective that takes into
account the perpetrators level of depravity when he committed the crime.

The Court best expressed the first approach in Zari v. Flores66[66] where the
Court saw the involvement of moral turpitude where an act is intrinsically immoral,
regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. The Court emphasized that moral
turpitude goes beyond being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must be inherently
immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the committed act itself be examined, divorced
from its characterization as a crime.

A ruling that exemplifies this approach is that made in the U.S. case In The Matter
of G---67[67] where, in considering gambling, it was held that:

62[62] Ng Teng Lin v. Republic, 103 Phil. 484 (1959).

63[63] Court Administrator v. San Andres, A.M. No. P-89-345, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 704.

64[64] People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350, October 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 20.

65[65] Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 27.

66[66] Supra note 59.

67[67] 1 I. & N. Dec. 59, 1941 WL 7913 (BIA).

 Gambling has been in existence since time immemorial. Card playing
for small stakes is a common accompaniment of social life; small bets on
horse racing and the policy or numbers games are diversions of the
masses. That such enterprises exist surreptitiously is a matter of common
knowledge. Many countries permit it under a license system. In ancient
times laws were enacted to discourage people from gambling on the theory
that the State had first claim upon their time and energy, and at later dates
antigambling laws were aimed especially at the activity as practiced by the
working classes. Present-day movements to suppress gambling are also
tinged with other considerations. In urban communities in the past few
decades the purely religious opposition to gambling has tended to become
less violent because certain activities, highly reputable according to
prevailing social standards, have come more and more to resemble it.
Prohibition against gambling has had something of a police rather than a
truly penal character. At all times an important fact in arousing antagonism
in gambling has been the association, almost inevitable, with sharp practice.
In established societies more or less serious attempts are everywhere
made, however, to prohibit or to regulate gambling in its more notorious
forms.

It would appear that statutes permitting gambling, such as those

under discussion, rest primarily on the theory that they are in the interest of
public policy: that is to regulate and restrict any possible abuse, to obviate
cheating and other corrupt practices that may result if uncontrolled.

From this discussion, the Court went on to conclude that gambling is a malum
prohibitum that is not intrinsically evil and, thus, is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

With the same approach, but with a different result, is Office of the Court
Administrator v. Librado,68[68] a case involving drug possession. Librado, a Deputy
Sheriff in MTCC Iligan City was convicted of possession of shabu, a prohibited drug. The
Office of the Court Administrator commenced an administrative case against him and he
was subsequently suspended from office. In his subsequent plea for reinstatement, the
Court strongly denounced drug possession as an especially vicious crime, one of the
most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society For those who become addicted
to it not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave
menace to the safety of law abiding members of society. The Court, apparently drawing
on what society deems important, held that the use of drugs amounted to an act so
inherently evil that no law was needed to deem it as such; it is an evil without need for a

68[68] Supra note 54.

law to call it evil69[69] - an immoral act in itself regardless of whether it is punishable or
not.70[70]

In People v. Yambot,71[71] the Court categorically ruled that the possession of a

deadly weapon does not involve moral turpitude since the act of carrying a weapon by
itself is not inherently wrong in the absence of a law punishing it. Likewise, the Court
acknowledged in Court Administrator v. San Andres72[72] that illegal recruitment does
not involve moral turpitude since it is not in itself an evil act being ordinarily an act in the
ordinary course of business in the absence of the a law prohibiting it.

The second approach is to look at the act committed through its elements as a
crime. In Paras v. Vailoces,73[73] the Court recognized that as a general rule, all crimes
of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude. This is the same
conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court made in Jordan, i.e., that crimes requiring fraud
or intent to defraud always involve moral turpitude.74[74]

Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections75[75] is a case in point that uses the

second approach and is one case where the Court even dispensed with the review of
facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime since Dela Torre did
not assail his conviction. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Comelec from running as
Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna on the basis of his conviction for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Dela Torre appealed to this Court
to overturn his disqualification on the ground that the crime of fencing is not a crime
involving moral turpitude. The Court ruled that moral turpitude is deducible from the third
element. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.

To be sure, the elements of the crime can be a critical factor in determining moral
turpitude if the second approach is used in the crimes listed above as involving moral

69[69] Supra note 25, p. 23.

70[70] Supra note 59, p. 323.

71[71] Supra note 64.

72[72] Supra note 63.

73[73] Supra note 45.

74[74] Supra note 1, p. 228.

75[75] Supra note 23.

turpitude. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections,76[76] the Court, by analyzing the
elements alone of the offense under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, held that the presence of
the second element manifest moral turpitude in that a drawer who issues an unfunded
check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
good morals. The same conclusion was reached by the Court in Magno v. Commission
on Elections,77[77] when it ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, thus:
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an
unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on
the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the
fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal
of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to
the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In
all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. [Emphasis
supplied]

The third approach, the subjective approach, essentially takes the offender and
his acts into account in light of the attendant circumstances of the crime: was he motivated
by ill will indicating depravity? The Court apparently used this approach in Ao Lin v.
Republic,78[78] a 1964 case, when it held that the use of a meter stick without the
corresponding seal of the Internal Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in
business for a long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of
a meter stick, not necessarily because the Government is cheated of the revenue involved
in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it manifests an evil intent on the part of
the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him in respect to the
measurement of the goods purchased.

In IRRI v. NLRC,79[79] the International Rice Research Institute terminated the

employment contract of Nestor Micosa on the ground that he has been convicted of the
crime of homicide a a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court refused to characterize
the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude in light of the circumstances of its
commission. The Court ruled:

These facts show that Micosas intention was not to slay the victim but only
to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating

76[76] Supra note 50, p. 134.

77[77] Supra note 57.

78[78] G.R. No. L-18506, January 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 27.

79[79] Supra note 29.

 circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Micosas
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [italics
supllied].

The Court stressed, too, not only the subjective element, but the need for the
appreciation of facts in considering whether moral turpitude exists an unavoidable step
under the third approach. Thus, the Court explained:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve
moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved
in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the surrounding circumstances. [Emphasis supplied]

In contrast, while IRRI refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of

moral turpitude, the recent case of Soriano v. Dizon80[80] held that based on the
circumstances, the crime of frustrated homicide committed by the respondent involved
moral turpitude. In Soriano, complainant Soriano filed a disbarment case against
respondent Atty. Manuel Dizon alleging that the crime of frustrated homicide involves
moral turpitude under the circumstances surrounding its commission, and was a sufficient
ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court
after noting the factual antecedents of IRRI held that

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and
his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the
aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions
clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further

indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when
the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly
shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his

80[80] Supra note 58.

 gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he
betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral

turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a
god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with
which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who
has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false
sense of superiority and to exact revenge. 81[81] [Emphasis supplied]

Laguitan v. Tinio,82[82] expressed in terms of the protection of the sanctity of

marriage,83[83] also necessarily looked at the subjective element because the offenders
concubinage involved an assault on the basic social institution of marriage. Another
subjective element case, in terms of looking at the damage wrought by the offenders act,
is People v. Jamero84[84] where the Court disregarded the appellants argument that the
trial court erred in ordering the discharge of Inocencio Retirado from the Information in
order to make him a state witness, since he has been previously convicted of the crime
of malicious mischief a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court said:

In the absence of any evidence to show the gravity and the nature of
the malicious mischief committed, We are not in a position to say
whether or not the previous conviction of malicious mischief proves
that accused had displayed the baseness, the vileness and the
depravity which constitute moral turpitude. And considering that under
paragraph 3 of Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, any deliberate act
(not constituting arson or other crimes involving destruction) causing
damage in the property of another, may constitute the crime of malicious
mischief, We should not make haste in declaring that such crime
involves moral turpitude without determining, at least, the value of the

81[81] Supra note 58, pp. 10-11.

82[82] Supra note 39.

83[83] Supra note 25, p. 24.

84[84] G.R. No. L-19852, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 206.

 property destroyed and/or the circumstances under which the act of
destroying was committed.85[85] [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, again, the need for a factual determination was considered necessary.

In sum, a survey of jurisprudence from the earliest case of In Re Basa86[86] to the

recent case of Soriano v. Dizon 87[87] shows that the Court has used varying
approaches, but used the same standard or measure the degree of attendant depravity.
The safest approach to avoid being misled in ones conclusion is to apply all three
approaches, if possible, and to evaluate the results from each of the approaches. A useful
caveat in the evaluation is to resolve any doubt in favor of the perpetrator, as a conclusion
of moral turpitude invariably signifies a worse consequence for him or her.

IV. The Approaches Applied to TEVES

The Objective Approach

The crime for which petitioner Teves was convicted (possession of pecuniary or
financial interest in a cockpit) is, at its core, related to gambling an act that by
contemporary community standards is not per se immoral. Other than the ruling
heretofore cited on this point,88[88] judicial notice can be taken of state-sponsored
gambling activities in the country that, although not without controversy, is generally
regarded to be within acceptable moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted that prior to
the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, mere possession by a public
officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not expressly prohibited. This bit of history
alone is an indicator that, objectively, no essential depravity is involved even from the
standards of a holder of a public office. This reasoning led the ponencia to conclude that
its illegality does not mean that violation thereof . . . makes such possession of interest
inherently immoral.89[89]

From the Perspective of the

Elements of the Crime

85[85] Id., pp. 245-246.

86[86] Supra note 22.

87[87] Supra note 58.

88[88] Supra note 67.

89[89] Ponencia, p. 9.
 Under this approach, we determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude
based solely on our analysis of the elements of the crime alone.

The essential elements of the offense of possession of prohibited interest (Section

3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law) for which the petitioner was convicted are:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract

or transaction; and

3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

From the perspective of moral turpitude, the third element is the critical element.
This element shows that the holding of interest that the law covers is not a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals; it is
illegal solely because of the prohibition that exists in law or in the Constitution. Thus, no
depravity immediately leaps up or suggests itself based on the elements of the crime
committed.

The Subjective Approach

This approach is largely the ponencias approach, as it expressly stated that a

determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered.90[90] In doing this, the ponencia firstly considered that the petitioner did not
use his official capacity in connection with the interest in the cockpit, not that he hid this
interest by transferring it to his wife, as the transfer took effect before the effectivity of the
law prohibiting the possession of interest. The ponencia significantly noted, too, that the
violation was not intentionally committed in a manner contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals, but due simply to Teves lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition. This,
in my view, is the clinching argument that no moral turpitude can be involved as no
depravity can be gleaned where intent is clearly absent.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, all three approaches point to the conclusion that no moral turpitude
was involved in the crime Teves committed, with the predominant reasons being the first
(or objective) and the third (or subjective) approaches. Analysis in this manner, with one
approach reinforcing another, results in clear and easily appreciated conclusions.

90[90] Id., p. 7.
 ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice