LABOR LAW

G.R. No. 226578 January 28, 2019

AUGUSTIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, INC.vs. ELFRENITO B. BARTOLOME and
RUMBY L. YAMAT

Labor Law; Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter vis – a – vis Dispute Settlement Provision in Employment Contract:
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042, as amended by RA 10022 provides that notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.Settled is the rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be acquired or waived by agreement of the
parties. The dispute settlement provision in respondents’ employment contracts cannot divest the LA of its jurisdiction
over the illegal dismissal case.

PERLAS – BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: Respondents Bartolome and Yamat were hired as carpenter and tile setter by Golden
Arrow Company Ltd. (Golden Arrow) which had its office in Khartoum, Republic of Sudan,
through petitioner AICI, an employment agency providing manpower to foreign corporations. Their
employment contracts stated that they would render services for a period of not less than 24
months. Also, it included a provision on dispute settlement which reads:

14. Settlement of disputes: All claims and complaints relative to the employment
contract of the employee shall be settled in accordance with Company policies,
rules[,] and regulations. In case the Employee contests the decision of the employer,
the matter shall be settled amicably with [the] participation of the Labour
Attaché or any authorised representative of the Philippines Embassy nearest
the site of employment.

Upon arrival in Sudan, Bartolome and Yamat were transferred by Golden Arrow to its sister
company, Al Mamoun Trading and Investment Company (Al Mamoun) which terminated their
services after a year due to abandonment of duties. Respondents then filed a complaint before the
NLRC for illegal dismissal, breach of contract and payment of unexpired portion of the contract
against AICI and Al Mamoun. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the respondents. Upon
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA which led AICI and Al Mamoun to file a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The latter denied the petition holding that AICI and Al
Mamoun failed to comply with procedural and substantive due process in dismissing the
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LA correctly took cognizance of the case despite the presence of a
provision in the employment contract on dispute settlement.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) 8042, as amended by RA 10022,

explicitly provides that LA’s have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising out of
employer-employee relations or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be
acquired or waived by agreement of the parties. As herein applied, the dispute settlement provision
in respondents’ employment contracts cannot divest the LA of its jurisdiction over the illegal
dismissal case. Hence, it correctly took cognizance of the complaint filed by respondents before it.

Moreover, issues not raised in the previous proceedings cannot be raised for the first time at a late
stage. In this case, the Court observes that AICI failed to raise the issue of respondents’ supposed
non-compliance with the dispute settlement provision before the LA, as well as before the NLRC.
In fact, AICI only mentioned this issue for the first time before the CA in its motion for
reconsideration. Therefore, such argument or defense is deemed waived and can no longer be
considered on appeal. Hence, the Court rules that the LA properly took cognizance of this case.
G.R. No. 214906 January 16, 2019
ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORP, CIDO SHIPPING COMPANY LTD., and ALEX
ESTABILLO vs. DANTE SEGUI

Labor Law; Permanent and Total Disability Benefits: In the case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc v. Quiogue,
the Court summarized the rule in awarding permanent and total disability benefits. It provided that (1) the company-
designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120
days from the time the seafarer reported to him and (2) if the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and
total.

J.C. REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS: Respondent Segui, after being declared fit to work, was hired by petitioners as a seaman for
the vessel M/V Grand Quest. During his employment, which was covered by an ITF IBF JSU
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent was on duty for more than 12 hours a day
resulting to extreme fatigue and exhaustion. Eventually, he was admitted to several medical facilities
in South Africa, Colombia, and Panama, wherein he was diagnosed with lumbar disc problem and
was recommended to be repatriated. Upon arrival in Manila, he went to Manila Doctors Hospital
and was told that he was suffering from Lumbar Spondylosis. He underwent surgery and was
confined for 3 weeks. Despite the treatment, respondent’s pain and discomfort persisted, thus, he
sought another treatment and opinion from an independent physician, Dr. Escutin. After a
thorough examination, Dr. Escutin concluded that respondent’s injury rendered him permanently
and totally unable to work as a seafarer which led him to ask petitioners to pay his total and
permanent disability, but to no avail. Respondent then filed a complaint for monetary claims.
Petitioners alleged that respondent is entitled only to the compensation corresponding to the
assessment made by the company-designated physician and that there is no basis to claim permanent
total disability compensation. The Labor Arbiter held that applying the terms and conditions of the
POEA – Standard Employment Contract incorporated to respondent’s employment contract, he is
entitled to maximum disability benefit for work-related injury/illness sustained during the term of
the contract. Also, it ruled that between the declaration of the company-designated physician and
respondent’s own physician, the latter’s medical certificate clearly detailing the nature of his liability
and extent of capacity should prevail. Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA. Undaunted,
petitioners elevated the case to the CA which affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to receive permanent and total disability benefits.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. In the case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc v. Quiogue, the Court
summarized the rule in awarding permanent and total disability benefits. It provided that the
company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability
grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him and that if the
company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total.

The records reveal that from Segui's repatriation and immediate referral to the company-designated
physician on December 2, 2010 until the 120-day period on March 31, 2011, the latter did not issue
a medical assessment on Segui's disability grading. It was only on the 219th day or on July 8, 2011,
when Seguireached the maximum medical cure, that the company-designated physician issued a
disability rating of "Grade 8 disability — moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power of
the trunk." The company-designated physician failed to issue a medical assessment within the 120-
day period from the time Segui reported to him, and there was no justifiable reason for such failure.
Likewise, there was no sufficient justification to extend the 120-day period to 240 days. Thus,
following the rules, Segui's disability becomes permanent and total, and entitles him to permanent
and total disability benefits under his contract and the collective bargaining agreement.
G.R. No. 221967 February 6, 2019
RAMIRO LIM & SONS AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ET. AL. vs. ARMANDO
GUILARAN, ET. AL.

Labor Law; Regular Seasonal Workers: Although respondents do not work throughout the year and their
employment depends upon a specific season, like for instance, milling seasons; and for only a specific task like, weeding,
plowing, fertilizing, to name a few, inasmuch as they have been performing services necessary and desirable to private
respondents' business, serve as badges of regular employment. The fact that respondents "do not work continuously for
one whole year but only for the duration a season does not detract from considering them regular employees. It is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence that seasonal workers who are called from time to time and are temporarily laid off
during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed.

Same; Task basis engagement or pakyaw; Compensation: A distinguishing characteristic of a task basis engagement
or pakyaw, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a
payment by pakyaw basis, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned in terms of
completion of the work, not in terms of the number of hours spent in the completion of the work. Article 124 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines which provides that all workers paid by result, including those who are paid on
piecework, takay, pakyaw or task basis, shall receive not less than the prescribed wage rates per eight (8) hours of
work a day, or a proportion thereof for working less than eight (8) hours. In Pulp and Paper, Inc. v. NLRC, the
Court held that in the absence of wage rates approved by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the appropriate
time and motion studies, the ordinary minimum wage rates are applicable to piece-rate workers.

Same; Same; Amount of Backwages: To determine the amount of backwages for piece-rate or pakyaw workers, there
is a need to determine the varying degrees of production and days worked by each worker.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Respondents were agricultural workers paid on a mixed pakyaw and daily basis on the 84 –
hectare hacienda owned by petitioners. Upon asking to be paid based on the rates prescribed by the
prevailing Wage Order, they were dismissed by the petitioners which prompted them to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and non-payment of allowance, separation
pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Petitioners argued that when respondents’
attention was called to the plan to conduct stricter measures to prevent wastage and production
losses, respondents refused to return to work, paralyzing the business of petitioners. Due to such,
the latter considered respondents to have abandoned their respective jobs. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
and the NLRC dismissed the complaints, ruling that respondents were considered to have
abandoned their work. Upon elevation of the case to the CA, it held that petitioners failed to prove
the existence of abandonment and granted respondents’ reinstatement and payment of full
backwages based on the latest Wage Order in the region since the they have been performing
services necessary and desirable to the business which are badges of regular employment. The case
was remanded to the LA for the computation of back wages from 19 July 2000 up to the date of
reinstatement. The LA adopted the computation of the Fiscal Examiner who awarded to
respondents their backwages in the amount of P5,058,264.64 based on the mandated rates provided
by law for the period from 2000 until December 2009, and was limited to six months of work per
year, considering that sugarcane farming is not continuous the whole year round. However, upon
appeal, the NLRC set aside the order of the LA and upheld the validity of the Work Summary of
Workers and the payrolls submitted by petitioners, which showed that as pakyaw workers,
respondents did not observe the regular eight hour work daily. Thus, the straight computation based
on six months per year or 13 days per month could not be applied because it requires that service
was rendered for at least six months in a given year. Records show that not all of the respondents
worked for at least six months in the last six years prior to their dismissal. The NLRC also held that
the payrolls, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity. Upon
elevation of the case to the CA, the latter reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the
order of the LA.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not respondents are considered as regular workers.

(2) Whether or not the LA correctly computed the backwages due to the respondents.

HELD: (1) AFFIRMATIVE. Although respondents do not work throughout the year and their
employment depends upon a specific season, like for instance, milling seasons; and for only a
specific task like, weeding, plowing, fertilizing, to name a few, inasmuch as they have been
performing services necessary and desirable to private respondents' business, serve as badges of
regular employment. The fact that respondents "do not work continuously for one whole year but
only for the duration a season does not detract from considering them regular employees. It is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence that seasonal workers who are called from time to time and are
temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely
considered on leave until re-employed. Respondents were regular seasonal workers, paid on a
pakyaw basis, who were entitled to their backwages and reinstatement.

(2) AFFIRMATIVE. A distinguishing characteristic of a task basis engagement or pakyaw, as

opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a
payment by pakyaw basis, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned in
terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the number of hours spent in the completion of
the work. To determine the amount of backwages for piece-rate or pakyaw workers, there is a need
to determine the varying degrees of production and days worked by each worker. It has been
recognized by jurisprudence that the season of sugar cane industries lasts for periods of six to eight
months. Although the payrolls submitted by the petitioners show that most of the respondents
rendered service for less than one month per year, such payrolls lacked credibility and their
genuineness is doubtful.

The method used by the LA in determining the amount of backwages was based on law and
jurisprudence. Article 124 of the Labor Code of the Philippines which provides that all workers paid
by result, including those who are paid on piecework, takay, pakyaw or task basis, shall receive not
less than the prescribed wage rates per eight (8) hours of work a day, or a proportion thereof for
working less than eight (8) hours. In Pulp and Paper, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court held that in the
absence of wage rates approved by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the appropriate time
and motion studies, the ordinary minimum wage rates are applicable to piece-rate workers.
Petitioners herein failed to adduce any evidence on the agreed amount of payment for work based
on pakyaw basis, and whether such amount was determined and approved by the Secretary of Labor.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter was correct in applying the minimum wage rates based on the applicable
Wage Orders to determine the amount of backwages due to respondents.
G.R. No. 231658 December 5, 2017
REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL LAGMAN et al vs. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Declaration of Martial Law; Requirements:The parameters for determining the
sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion.

Same; Same; Same; Sufficiency of factual bases.:In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not
piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation
and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported
to him due to the urgency of the situation.To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly
burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216 in its July 4, 2017
Decision finding sufficient factual bases for its issuance. Petitioners filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Constitution requires sufficiency of factual basis, not accuracy. To
recall, the Supreme Court held that "the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis
are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements
must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion
or invasion." Moreover, the Court stated in the assailed Decision that "the phrase 'sufficiency of
factual basis' in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for
judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus."

As the Court explained in its July 4, 2017 Decision: In determining the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or
totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect
absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the
President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due
to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would
unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making.Such a requirement will
practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of the reports
submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also defeat the very
purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice
Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to 'immediately put an end to the root cause of the emergency'.
Possibly, by the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it
would be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is
hard, if not impossible, to curtail.

Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence reports of military officers as
credible evidence that the President can appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment, as
appears to be the case here.Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being too late before
declaring martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does
not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called to act as public
safety requires.

Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and written report
are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as
there are other facts in the proclamation and the written report that support the conclusion that
there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or
suspension.