Federal Aviation Administration

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Rotorcraft Issue Area

JAR/FAR 27 and 29 Harmonization Working Group
Task 1 – Category A Performance
Task Assignment
 58848 Federal Regi9ter Vol. 57, No. 239 I Friday, Detwnbar 11. .Ml2 I NotiC81

I
subcommittee held following
AvlMlon Rulem9ldng Advleory The JAR/FAR 27 and 29
publication of this notice.
CommlttN; Aolorcnft SUbcalMIIIIN; Harmonization Working Group is
B. Give a detailed conceptual
JAR/FAA 27 Md 21 Harmonization charged with making recommendations
to the Rotorcraft Subcommittee · presentation on each task to the
Woning Group Subcommittee before proceeding with
concerning the FAA disposition of the
AGENCY: Federal Aviation fol1owing subjects recently coordinated the work stated under items C and D,
Adminiatration (FAA), DOT. below. If tasks 1-9 require the
between the JAA and the FAA:
~ : Notice of establimment of JAW development of more than one Notice of
Task 1-Peifonnance: Category A Proposed Rulemaking, identify what
FAR 27 and 29 Harmonization Working performance of normal category
Group. proposed amendments will be i~cluded
rotorcraft (FAR. 27.1 and Appendix C). in each notice.
IUIIIWIY: Notice la given of the Task Z-Rotor Drive System: Design C. Draft a Notice of Proposed
establishment of the JAR/FAR 27 md 29 1l118111Dent of the rotor drive systems , Rulemaking for tub 1-9 proposing new
Harmoniutioo Working Group of the which are conaistent with the present· or revised requirements, a supporting
Rotoraaft Subcommittee. Thii notice state of the design ut (FAR 29.547, economic analysis, and other required
informs the public of the ac:tiYiti• of 29.917, AC 29-2A). analysis, with any other collateral
the Rotorcn.ft Subcommittee of the Task 3-Critical Pmu: Identification of documents (such u Advisory Circulars)
Aviation Rulem•Jdns Advilory the critical parts for consideration the Working Group determines to be
Committee. under design, production and needed.
l'OR PURTHER IIIORIIATION CONTMm maintenance, eccording to a critical D. Draft a change to Advisory Circular
Mr. William J. Uoe) Sullivan, Executive parta plan to be prepared by the 2~2A for tasb 2 and 10-12 rroviding
Director, Rotorcraft Subcommittee, manufacture (FAR 27.602, 29.602). appropriate advisory materia for each
Aircraft Certification Service (AIR-3), Task 4-0il Pressure Indicator: An oil task.
800 Independence Avenue SW., pressure indicator to be provided for E. Give a status report on each task at
Washington, DC 20591, Telephone: p1811W8-lubricated gear boxes to each meeting of th~ Subcommittee.
(202)267-9554;FAX:(202)287-6384. inform the crew in time that oil The JAR/FAR 27 and 29
IUPPLEIEHTARY INFORMATION: Tbe p1811W'8 is abnormal (FAR 27.1305, Harmonization Working Group will be
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 29.1305). comprised of experts from those
established an Aviation R.ulern•Jdng Task 5-Perfonnance • Propulsion: organizations having an interest in the
Adviaory Committee (58 FR 2190, Miscellaneous performance and tasb auigned. A Working Group
January 22, 1991) which held its &nt propulsion requirements for transport member need not necessarily be a
meeting on Mey 23, 1991 (58 FR 20492, category rotorcraft (FAR 29.67, representative of one of the
29.923, 29.1587). organizations of the parent Rotorcraft
Mey 3, 1991). The Rotorcra.ft
Subcommittee WU Nlabliabed el thll Task 6-Flutter: Update the flutter Subcommittee or of the full Aviation
meeting to provide advice end substantiation methodology and Rulemaking Advisory Committee. An
recommendations to the Director, documentation requirements for individual who has expertise in the
Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, transport category rotorcraft (FAR subject matter and wishes to become a
29.629). member of the Working Group should
reguding the eirworthinesa stmderda
for normal and transport catepy Task 1-Lighting and Bonding: Update write the person listed under the
rotmaaft in parts 27 and 29 of the lighting and bonding requirements for caption FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
Fedenl Aviation R.egulatiom (14 CFR. transport category rotorcraft (FAR. CONTACT expressing that desire,
29.610, 29.1309). describing his or her interest in the task,
~27end29).
The FAA announced et the ,Joint Task B-Bird Strike: Determine the need and the expertise he or she would bring
Aviation Authorities UAA)-Fedenl for bird strike protection for transport to the Working Group. The request will
Aviation Administration (FAA) category rotorcraft (FAR 29.631). be reviewed with the Subcommittee and
Harmonization Conr.renoe in Toronto, Task 9-Battery Endurance: Reuse11 Working Group Chair, and the
Ontuto, Canada, Uune 2-a, 1992) thll it battery endurance requirements individual will be advised whether or
would consolidate within the Avietton relative to different modas of not the request can be accommodated.
Rulemeking Advilory Committee _ operation and to varying The Secretary of Transportation has
structure an ongoing objective to environments for transport category determined that the information and use
"humanize" the Joint Aviatioa rotorcraft (FAR 29.1351). of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Task 10-Fire DfJtection: Reduce
Requirements OAR) and the Federal probability of false fire detector Committee and its subcommittees are
Aviation Regulations (FAR). Coincident warning for transport category necessary in the public interest in
with that announcement, the FAA · rotorcraft (AC 29-2A; ref. FAR connection with tl:e performance of
auigned to the Rotorcraft Subcommittee 29.1203). duties of the FAA by law. Meetings of
those projects related to JARIFAR 27 Task 11-Vibrations: Update advisory the full Committee and any
and 29 Harmonization which were then material of Appendix A of FAR 29 to subcommittees will be open to the
in the proceu of being coordinated provide guidance on basic vibration public except u authorized by section
between the JAA and the· FAA. The data to be provided for service 10(d) of the Federal Advisory
Harmonization process included the (continuingairworthineu)use(AC Committee Act: Meetings of the JARJ
intention to present the results of JAAJ 29-2A; ref. FAR 29 Appendix A). FAR 27 and 29 Harmonization Working
FAA coordination to the public in the Task 12-Rotor Drive System and Group will not be open to the public
form of either a Notice of Proposed Fatigue Gear Substantiation: Identify except to the extent that individuals
Rulemaking or an advisory circular-an. acceptable compliance methodology with an interest and expertise are
objective comparable to and compatible I for gear teeth fatigue (AC 29-2A; ref. selected to participate. No public
with that auigned to the Aviation FAR 29.571, 29.901). . announcement of Working Group
Rulemaking Advisory Committee. The meetings will be made.
Rotorcraft Subcommittee, conaequently,
Reports
l11Ued in Waahington, DC, on December 4,
established the JAR/FAR. 27 and 29 A. Recommend time line(s) for 1992.
Harmonization Working Group. i completion of each task, including William J. S111lin11,
Specifically, the Working Group's rationale, for Subcommittee
Executive Director, Roton:roft Subcommittee.
tasb are the following: consideration at the meeting of the Aviation Rulemaldng Advisory Committee.
IFR Doc. 92-30128 Filed 12-to-92; 8:45 am)
8ILUNQ CODE eli._ts-tl
Recommendation Letter
 Please direct responses
to:
A~ 1101 Naugatuck Avenue

IIHelicopter
Association
Milford,CT 06460-2317
Tel: 203-878-1943
Fax: 203-878-2544
~ International
1635 Prince Street. Alexandria. Virginia 22314-2818 Telephone. (703) 683-4646 Fax (703) 683-4745

June 30,1994 r,
Mr. Anthony J. Broderick
Associated Administrator for Regulation and Certification (AVR-1)
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Avenue,SW
Washington,DC 20591

Dear Mr. Broderick:

The JAR/FAR 27 and 29 Harmonization Working Group of the Aviation

Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) has completed the task assigned
to it by the FAA, the substance of which was published in the "Fed-
eral Register" on December 11,1992. The ARAC has reviewed the re-
sults of their effort, as contained in the documents attached, and
hereby recommends that they be processed so as to affect changes
to Federal Aviation Regulation parts 27 and 29.

The rotorcraft community of the ARAC believe that this rulemaking

package is a prime candidate for being processed in accordance
with one of the procedures discussed during the JAA/FAA Harmoni-
zation meeting in Boston, namely, going directly to final rule with-
out the use of a formal Notice of Rulemaking:
. The draft NPRM contained in this package has been undergoing
negotiation by the FAA, JAA and industry for about five years
and were elevated to official "Harmonization" status in 1992 .
. It has experienced several iterations with the offices of
the General Counsel and Rulemaking .
. It has been accepted without exception by all of the rotor-
craft interests on the ARAC in public meeting and through a
follow-up vote.

It must be note~~ however, that Enclosure (1) has been harmonized

with the understanding of the ARAC that the NPRM's listed below
would have progressed to final rules by the time of this recommen-
dation. Such rules are still not publicly available in spite of
their being given full recognition by the FAA and JAA managements
during the meeting In Toronto in 1992 but also, we understand, el-
evated into the top-ten priorities of FAA rulemaking.

NPRM 89-26 Parts 27 and 29 New Rotorcraft 30-Second/

Docket No.26018 2-Minute One-Engine-Inop-
erative Power Ratings.

De d, cat e d to t,11 e a C1 van c e e1 e !': o I tr e c, \ , : 11 e ! , co ct e · ., :: "s, · \

 - 2 -

NPRM 89-29A Part 29 Turboshaft Engine Rotor

Docket No.26037 Burst Protection.

NPRM 90-1 Part 29 Transport Category Rotor-

NPRM 90-lA craft Performance.
Docket No.24802

NPRM 90-24 Parts 27 and 29 Crash Resistant Fuel Sys-

Docket No.26352 tem.

I have been advised that the JAA has already included the sub-
stance of the above listed NPRM's and the enclosed recommended
NPRM into JAR 27 and 29 to the satisfaction of the FAA.

Respectfully yours,
/"
~--z,·rr,
._,, i-- 0/ •----\'- Lu~ {cv..."i- --
T.E.Dumont
Assistant Chair for Rotorcraft Issues
FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee

Enclosures: (1) Draft NPRM

(2) Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation
(3) Executive Summary

cc: William H. Schultz

Chris A. Christie
Eric Bries
Giffen A. Marr
Frank L. Jensen,Jr.
 800 Independence Ave .. S.W.
US. Department Washington. D.C. 20591
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

JUL 2 I 1994
Mr. T. E. Dumont
Assistant Chair , Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee
1101 Naugatuck Avenue
Milford, CT 06460-2317

Dear Mr. Dumont:

Thank you for your June 30 letter forwarding the Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committ ee's (ARAC) recommendation to harmonize the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) rotorcraft type certification requirements
with the European Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR) .

You have requested that the draft notice of p roposed rulemaking be

processed as a direct final rule . We will take your recommendation
under consideration and notify you when a decision has been reached.

I would like to thank the aviation community for its commitment to ARAC
and its expenditure of resources to develop the recommendation. We in
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pledge to process the
document expeditiously as a high-priority action.

Again, let me thank the ARAC and, in particular, the JAR/FAR 27 and 29
Harmonization Working Group for its dedicated efforts in completing the
task assigned by the FAA.

Sincerely,

for
Regulation and Certification
43952 Federal Register I Vol. 61, No. 167 I Tuesday, August 27, 1996 I Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 27 and 29
[Docket No. 28008; Amdt. 27-33, 29-40]
RIN 2120-AF65

Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based

on European Joint Airworthiness
Requirement; Correction
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document contains a

correction to the final rule published in
the Federal Register on May 10, 1996
(61 FR 21904). That final rule amended
the airworthiness standards for normal
and transport category rotorcraft under
parts 27 and 29 of Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) relating to
performance sys1ems, propulsion and
airframes.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Carroll Wright, (817) 222-5120.
Need for Correction
In the final rule document (FR Doc.
96-11493) published in the Federal
Register on May 10, 1996, (61 FR
21904), on page 21908, at the end of the
first column. Item No. 14 is corrected to
read as follows:
14. Section 29.1305 is amended by
redesignating existing paragraphs (a)(6)
through (a)(25) as paragraphs (a)(7)
through (a)(26), by adding a new
paragraph (a)(6), and by changing the
words " paragraph (a)(13)" in the text of
redesignated paragraph (a)(13) to read as
"paragraph (a)(14)".
S29.1305 [Corrected]
(a) • • •
(6) An oil pressure inrucator for each
pressure-lubricated gearbox.
• • •
(13) A tachometer for each engine
that, if combined with the applicable
instrument required by paragraph
(a)(14) ofthis section, indicates rotor
r.p.m. during autorotation.
• • • * •
Issued in Washington, DC. on Augu,t 22,
1996.
Donald P. Byrne,
Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations.
(FR Doc. 96-21853 Filed 8-26-96; 8:45 am)
BILLING COOE 481 ~ 1 ~
Recommendation
 ENCLOSURE 1

(4910-13]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 27 and 29

[Docket No. ; Notice No. 93-

RIN: 2120-AC27

Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based on European Joint Aviation Requirements

Proposals

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This notice proposes changes to the type certification requirements

for both normal and transport category rotorcraft. The changes would revise

airworthiness standards for performance, systems, propulsion, and airframes

and would introduce safety improvements, clarify existing regulations, and

standardize terminology. The changes are based on standards that have been

adopted by the European Joint Aviation Authorities for Joint Aviation

Requirements (JAR) 27 and 29. These proposed changes are intended to

harmonize the Federal Aviation Regulations rotorcraft type certification

requirements with the European JAR.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before [insert date 90 days after date

of publication in the Federal Register].

ADDRESSES: Comments on this notice should be mailed in triplicate to:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Office of the Chief Counsel, Attention:

Rules Docket (AGC-10), Docket No. ; 800 Independence Avenue SW,

Washington, DC 20591. Comments delivered must be marked Docket No.

Comments may be examined in Room 915G weekdays between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,

except on Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Carroll Wright, Rotorcraft Directorate,

Aircraft Certification Service, Regulations Group, ASW-111, FAA, Fort Worth,

Texas 76193-0111, telephone number (817) 222-5120.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, or

arguments on this proposed rule. Comments relating to the environmental,

energy, federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the

proposals in this notice are also invited. Substantive comments should be

accompanied by cost estimates. Comments should identify the regulatory docket

number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the

caption "ADDRESSES." All comments received on or before the closing date for

comments will be considered before taking action on this proposed rule. The

proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments

received. All comments received will be available, both before and after the

closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested

persons. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA

personnel concerned with this rulemaking will be filed in the docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted

in response to this notice must include a preaddressed, stamped postcard on

which the following statement is made: "Comments on Docket No. II

The postcard will be date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

2
Availability of NPRH's

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Office of Public Affairs, Attention: Public Inquiry Center, APA-200,

800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling

(202) 267-3484. Communications must identify the notice number of this NPRM.

Persons interested in being placed on a mailing list for future NPRM's

should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular No. ll-2A,

NPRM Distribution System, which describes the application procedure.

Background

At a meeting between FAA representatives and the European Airworthiness

Authorities Steering Committee (AASC) in Washington, DC, in April 1983, the

aviation manufacturing industry requested that the certification rules of

Europe and the United States be standardized. The AASC agreed to provide the

FAA with a comprehensive list of recommended changes for the regulations in

part 29 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). These changes

would make part 29 acceptable to AASC members for adoption as airworthiness

standards. The AASC subsequently established a Joint Aviation Requirements

(JAR) 29 group to develop transport category rotorcraft airworthiness

standards for the issuance of European type certificates. The JAR 29 group

was tasked with providing a list of recommended changes for part 29. The FAA

solicited comments on key issues. The initial responses to that solicitation

were published in the Federal Register (49 FR 19309, May 7, 1984). On

September 15, 1984, the AASC submitted a more comprehensive list of 92

suggested changes to part 29. An FAA review found that 34 of these proposals

had either been incorporated, in whole or in part, in part 29 or were being

considered in active rulemaking projects. Of the 58 proposals remaining, 25

3
were rejected for various reasons involving failure to meet Executive Order or

Department of Transportation rulemaking requirements. The FAA provided the

results of the review to the JAR 29 group including a summary of the status of

the proposals being considered in active rulemaking projects.

During further review of the remaining AASC proposals not included in

existing rulemaking projects, the FAA determined that several of the proposals

warranted public discussion. Accordingly, the FAA held a public meeting in

Fort Worth, Texas, May 1-2, 1986 (51 FR 4504, February 5, 1986). Over 50

persons attended the meeting, which remained in session until each proposal

not already in rulemaking had been discussed. The FAA subsequently issued

NPRM No. 89-10 (54 FR 17396; April 25, 1989), which addressed the AASC

proposals and resulted in the issuance of Amendments 27-27 and 29-31 (SS FR

38964; September 21, 1990).

The AASC activities were absorbed by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA), and the JAA established the Helicopter Airworthiness Study Group (HASG)

to formulate JAR 27 and 29 for use by the 19 JAA countries. The JAA invited

the FAA and industry groups to participate in HASG meetings on March 20-21,

1990. Members of Association Europeenne des Constructeurs de Materiel

Aerospatial (AECMA) represented the European manufacturers at the HASG

Meetings, and AECMA invited members of the Aerospace Industries Association of

America (AIA) to represent U.S. manufacturers. The HASG was chartered to

formulate JAR 29, and subsequently JAR 27, to parallel as closely as possible

part 29 as amended through Amendment 29-31 effective September 21, 1990, and

part 27 as amended through Amendment 27-27 effective September 21, 1990. The

JAR 29 includes FAA NPRM's 89-26 (54 FR 39086, September 22, 1989) which

proposes a new 30 second/2 minute One Engine Inoperative power rating, 89-29

4
(54 FR 42716, October 17, 1989) which proposes rotorburst protection, 90-1

(55 FR 698, January 8, 1990) which proposes new performance requirements, and

90-24 (55 FR 41000, October 5, 1990) which proposes a Crash Resistant Fuel

System; JAR 27 is to also include NPRM's 89-26 and 90-24.

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Considerations

By announcement in the Federal Register (57 FR 58846,

December 11, 1992), the JAR-FAR 27 and 29 Harmonization Working Group was

chartered by the ARAC. The working group included representatives from four

major rotorcraft manufacturers (normal and transport) and representatives from

AIA, AECMA, Helicopter Association International (HAI), JAA, and the FAA

Rotorcraft Directorate. This broad participation is consistent with FAA

policy to have all known interested parties involved as early as practicable

in the rulemaking process.

The Harmonization Working Group was tasked with making recommendations

to the ARAC concerning the FAA acceptance or rejection of JAA Notice of

Proposed Amendments (NPA's) recently coordinated between the JAA and the FAA.

The ARAC subsequently recommended that the FAA revise the certification

standards for normal and transport category rotorcraft as now contained in

JAR 27 and 29.

FAA Evaluations of ARAC and JAA Proposals

The FAA has evaluated the ARAC recommendations and proposes changes to

the rotorcraft certification rules in both parts 27 and 29. These proposed

changes have evolved from the FAA-JAA industry meetings of 1990-1992 and the

ARAC recommendations of 1993. These proposed changes would (1) incorporate

current design and testing practices into the rules by requiring additional

performance data, additional powerplant and rotor brake controls, and bird-

5
strike protection, and (2) harmonize the certification requirements between

the FAR and JAR. The proposals for part 27 include JAA's harmonized NPA's

27-basic and 27-1; and the proposals for part 29 include NPA's 29-basic and

29-1 through 29-5. All sections of the harmonized NPA's are included in these

proposals except for§ 27.602 of NPA 27-basic and§ 29.602 of NPA 29-4. Those

JAR sections include a critical parts plan that would control the design,

substantiation, manufacture, maintenance, and modification of critical parts.

While the JAA prescribes manufacturing and maintenance requirements in JAR 29,

the FAA does not do the same in part 29. Part 21 of Title 14 addresses

manufacturing requirements; part 43 of Title 14 prescribes maintenance

requirements. Part 29 contains the airworthiness requirements for rotorcraft

certification; part 29 addresses maintenance standards only to the extent that

it mandates that the type certificate holder prepare Instructions for

Continued Airworthiness, which includes the maintenance manual or section and

maintenance instructions, and the Airworthiness Limitations section.

Accordingly, the FAA may propose critical parts requirements in a separate

rulemaking, which may also propose changes to parts 21 and 43.

General Discussion of the Proposals

These proposals would introduce safety improvements, clarify existing

regulations, and standardize terminology with the JAR's by revising the

airworthiness standards for rotorcraft performance, systems, propulsion, and

airframes. These proposed changes are based on requirements that have been

adopted by JAA for JAR 27 and 29. The part 27 proposals would require

all-engines-operating (AEO) climb performance data, powerplant controls to

maintain any set position, and rotor brake control standards. The proposals

would also provide an option for the certification of part 27 rotorcraft to

6
Category A; i.e., one engine inoperative (OE!) requirements. The part 29

proposals would provide standards for electrical bonding of airframe

components to protect against lightning and precipitation static discharge, a

design assessment of rotors and drive train, and bird-strike protection.

Additional powerplant instruments are proposed. The part 29 proposals would

also clarify performance requirements for Category A, flutter and divergence

applicability, and emergency electrical power supply requirements.

Discussion of Specific Proposals

Section 27.1 Applicability

Proposed new§ 27.l(c) would provide an optional basis for normal

category multiengine rotorcraft to be certificated to Category A requirements

by meeting those design and performance requirements of part 29 as specified

in a new appendix C to part 27.

Section 27.65 Climb: all engines operating.

This proposed revision of§ 27.65(b)(2) would require a determination of

AEO climb performance for all rotorcraft. Currently rotorcraft AEO climb

performance is required only for ambient conditions where the never-exceed

speed (Vne) is less than the speed for the best rate of climb (Vy). Climb

performance information is necessary for operational planning for rotorcraft,

e.g., planning for obstacle clearance. Manufacturers have historically

provided this information even though it is not required by the existing

regulations. This change would incorporate that current practice as a

requirement in the FAR.

Section 27.1141 Powerplant controls: general

This proposed new§ 27.114l(d) would add to part 27 the requirement of

FAR§ 29.114l(d) that powerplant controls must maintain any set position. The

7
proposed requirement states that each control "must be able to maintain any

set position without constant attention or tendency to creep due to control

loads or vibration." "Must be able to," in this regard, would require that

the rotorcraft have identifiable design features that keep the controls from

moving. This requirement would improve safety by reducing pilot work load for

part 27 rotorcraft. Because most rotorcraft manufacturers already comply

voluntarily with this standard, this should require no significant design or

manufacturing effort.

Section 27.1151 Rotor brake controls

This proposed new section would add to part 27 the requirements of FAR

§ 29.1151 on rotor brake controls. These proposed requirements are necessary

for the safe operation of any rotorcraft equipped with a rotor brake.

Requirements to prevent inadvertent application of rotor brakes in flight are

necessary to prevent possible damage or fire due to rotor brake application.

Current rotorcraft rotor brake installations normally incorporate these design

features; no significant design or manufacturing effort should be necessary.

Appendix C to part 27

This proposed new appendix would provide a list of part 29 Category A

standards that are directly related to the continued safe powered flight

capability of a multiengine rotorcraft in the event of engine or other system

failure. The proposed standards would be required to be met for an optional

Category A approval for a part 27 rotorcraft.

Section 29.547 Main and tail rotor structures

Proposed new§ 29.547(b) would require a design assessment that

identifies the critical components of the main and tail rotor structures. The

design assessment must also identify the means (such as scheduled inspection,

8
removal, and replacement of components) that minimize the likelihood of

failure for each critical component.

Section 29.610 Lightning and static electricity protection

The word "structure" would be added to current§ 29.610 (a) to clarify

that these requirements address the rotorcraft structure and not equipment,

systems, and installations that are adequately covered under the requirements

of§ 29.1309. The proposed addition of the word "structure" to paragraph (a)

is intended to clarify that the metallic components and nonmetallic components

of paragraphs (b) and (c) are structural components. Proposed new paragraph

(d) would require electrical bonding of the rotorcraft components for

protection against hazardous effects from lightning and discharge of static

electricity. In this regard, the reference to the bonding and protection

"be[ing] such as to" would require that the rotorcraft have identifiable

design features that achieve the standards required in paragraphs (d)(l)

through (4). Part 29 does not currently provide electrical bonding

requirements, and experience has shown that inadequate bonding can result in

hazardous conditions due to discharge of static electricity. The proposed new

paragraph (d)(4) would require electrical bonding and protection against

lightning and static electricity that would reduce the effects on the

functioning of essential electrical and electronic equipment to an acceptable

level (as determined by§§ 29.1309 and 29.1431).

Section 29.629 Flutter and divergence

This proposed revision of§ 29.629 would add the words "and divergence"

to the title and text of the section. This proposal would extend the

requirements to cover aeroelastic instability other than flutter of

aerodynamic surfaces. This proposal would require the use of rational

9
analysis, tests, or a combination of analysis and tests to demonstrate freedom

from aeroelastic instability for the basic design. Most manufacturers

currently do this type of analysis or test; this change would require formal

documentation and approval of that analysis or test.

Section 29.631 Bird strike

This proposed new section would require bird-strike protection for

transport rotorcraft. Rotorcraft, as well as airplanes, are exposed to the

possibility of collision with a bird. With the potential for higher speeds by

modern transport rotorcraft designs and the changes in material technology,

the possibility of increased damage from bird strikes exists. In addition,

the effects of bird strikes on new materials used in rotorcraft must be

evaluated. The FAA has determined that a requirement for protection against

catastrophic effects from impact with a 2.2 pound (1 kilogram) bird is

reasonable for rotorcraft certificated in the transport category (part 29). A

2.2 pound bird represents the typical size for intended structural capability;

therefore, such protection is being proposed. Proposed§ 29.631 would require

that the rotorcraft be designed to assure capability of continued safe flight

and landing (for Category A) or safe landing (for Category B) after bird

strike. In this regard, "capability" means that the design has features that

assure continued safe flight and/or landing, as would be required. Proposed

§ 29.631 would also require that substantiation of the design be based on

tests or analysis of tests carried out on sufficiently representative

structures of design similar to that of the design to be approved. In this

regard, "sufficiently" means that the structures at least represent the design

to be approved.

10
Section 29.917 Design

A new§ 29.917(b) is proposed for this section, and redesignation of

existing paragraph (b) as (c) is proposed. This proposed new§ 29.917(b)

would require a design assessment that identifies critical components of the

rotor drive system. The design assessment would also identify the means that

minimize the likelihood of failure for each critical component (such as

scheduled inspection, removal, and replacement of components). This proposed

section is a companion to the rotor structure proposal of§ 29.547.

Section 29.923 Rotor drive system and control mechanism tests

This proposed revision to§ 29.923(b)(3)(i) would increase the testing

for 2 minute OE! power from one to two runs per cycle. The JAA are concerned

that a possible inconsistency exists in the current rule. Using one run per

cycle, a higher and potentially more damaging power rating could be

substantiated by less testing at the 2-minute OE! power than at the 2 1/2

minute OEI power. The FAA agrees and increased testing for 2 minute OEI power

is proposed.

Section 29.1305 Powerplant instruments

The current rule requires an oil pressure warning device, which could be

a simple light, for each pressure-lubricated gearbox. Proposed new

§ 29.1305(a)(6) would add a requirement for an oil pressure indicator for each

pressure-lubricated gearbox. This change would provide the crew with an early

warning of oil pressure problems and confirm that the oil pressure warning is

valid. The proposed addition of a new§ 29.1305(a)(6) would necessitate

renumbering of existing paragraphs (a)(6) through (a)(23) as (a)(7) through

(a)(24) and paragraphs (a)(24) and (a)(25).

11
Section 29.1309 Systems, equipment, and installations

Section 29.610 was referenced in§ 29.1309(h) to require protection

against a catastrophic systems failure due to lightning. Since§ 29.1309(h)

applies to lightning protection of systems and equipment, it is unnecessary to

reference§ 29.610, which applies to lightning protection of structures.

Therefore, this proposed change would delete the reference to§ 29.610 in

§ 29.1309(h).

Section 29.1351 General

The proposed changes to§§ 29.13Sl(d) and 29.135l(d)(l) would clarify

that the regulation applies to the normal electrical power generating system

and would editorially change the§ 29.13Sl(d) heading. The§ 29.135l(d)

heading would change from, "Operation without normal electrical power" to

"Operation with the normal electrical power generating system inoperative,"

and "generating system" would be added after electrical power in

§ 29.135l(d)(l).

The proposed additions to§ 29.13Sl(d)(2) would provide requirements for

the emergency electrical power system for Category A rotorcraft.

Section 29.135l(d)(2) is entitled "Category A Aircraft." The proposed new

§ 29.135l(d)(2)(i) would require that emergency electrical power be provided

to those systems necessary for continued safe flight and landing for

rotorcraft certificated to Category A requirements. Consideration of the

possible duration of flight time to reach a suitable landing site and make a

safe landing would be required. A minimum of 30 minutes flight time is

necessary for continued safe flight and landing for Category A rotorcraft.

Proposed new§ 29.13Sl(d)(2)(ii) would require that loss of both normal and

emergency electrical power systems be shown to be extremely improbable. This

12
will ensure that no single failure (such as effects of fire or loss of

junction box) will result in the disabling of both the normal and emergency

electrical power systems. Finally, a new§ 29.135l(d)(2)(iii) would require

that the emergency electrical power system include independent, automatic

features for electrical load shedding to conserve the emergency electrical

power (batteries) after loss of the normal electrical power generating system.

The intent is to allow the flight crew time to take corrective actions for

engine fire, cockpit fire, or other in-flight emergencies common to situations

resulting in loss of the normal electrical power generating system without

being distracted by a need to manually switch off or shed electrical power.

In this regard, "immediate" refers to those systems that, if they did not

continue to operate, would necessitate the attention of the flight crew.

Section 29.1587 Performance information

Proposed new§ 29.1587(a)(6) would require that the climb gradient

information necessary for the pilot to determine the allowable maximum takeoff

weight to clear any obstacle in the takeoff path be added to the Rotorcraft

Flight Manual for Category A rotorcraft. Because the data are already

available from the other requirements, the only additional requirement would

be to incorporate this data into the Rotorcraft Flight Manual.

Appendix B to Part 29 Airworthiness Criteria for Helicopter Instrument Flight

The proposed addition of a section VIII(b)(6) to Appendix B would

provide a reference to new§ 29.135l(d)(2) to clarify that requirements for

operation with the normal electrical power generating system inoperative apply

to Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) certificated rotorcraft. When the emergency

electrical power source provided for an IFR certificated rotorcraft is time

limited; e.g., a battery, the required duration will depend on the type and

13
role of the rotorcraft. However, an endurance of less than 30 minutes would

not be acceptable.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

Introduction

Proposed changes to federal regulations must undergo several economic

analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs Federal agencies to promulgate

new regulations or modify existing regulations only if the potential benefits

to society outweigh the potential costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility

Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory

changes on small entities. Finally, the Office of Management and Budget has

directed agencies to assess the effects of regulatory changes on international

trade. In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this

proposed rule (1) would generate benefits exceeding its costs and is neither a

significant regulatory action as defined in the Executive Order nor

significant as defined in DOT's Policies and Procedures, (2) would not have a

significant impact on a substantial number of small entities, and (3) would

lessen restraints on international trade. These analyses, available in the

docket, are summarized below.

Costs and Benefits

All of the proposed changes to part 27 and all but four of the proposed

changes to part 29 would impose no or insignificant costs on rotorcraft

manufacturers because they reflect current design practices. In recent years,

manufacturers have incorporated engineering and structural improvements into

rotorcraft designs that exceed the minimum regulatory requirements with the

aim of increasing operating efficiencies, payload capabilities, and

marketability in world markets. Most new rotorcraft designs are based on

14
existing designs. Many of these improvements have also improved safety.

Codification of these improvements and other proposed changes would ensure

that these features are incorporated in all future rotorcraft designs.

Additionally, adoption of the proposed changes would increase

harmonization and commonality between U.S. and European airworthiness

standards. Harmonization would eliminate differences between airworthiness

requirements, thus reducing manufacturers' costs for dual certification.

Based on experience in a recent certification, one rotorcraft manufacturer

indicated that complying with different FAA/JAA requirements resulted in

several hundred thousand dollars in excessive certification costs. Aside from

the benefits of enhanced safety levels as described above, the benefits of

certification cost savings would, by themselves, outweigh the relatively

modest increase in certification costs that the amendments would impose.

Following is a brief summary of the four proposed changes to part 29

that would impose additional costs totalling approximately $150,000 per type

certification. The safety benefits of these proposed changes are expected to

easily exceed the incremental costs.

Section 29.547 - Main and tail rotor structure. While manufacturers

currently perform the proposed design assessment as an integral part of the

design requirements of§ 29.917, there would be some incremental costs to

formalize the existing information. These costs are included in the cost

estimates of proposed§ 29.917 summarized below. Formal identification and

assessment of critical component failures would increase safety by providing

more comprehensive maintenance information to operators. The benefits of

averting a single catastrophic accident would exceed the relatively low

incremental costs of compliance.

15
 Section 29.631 - Bird strike. Manufacturers indicate that present

rotorcraft structures can withstand impacts from a 2.2 pound bird; therefore,

no incremental manufacturing costs are anticipated to implement new designs.

Nonrecurring testing and analysis costs of the proposed requirement are

estimated to be $100,000 per type certification. A review of National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data for the period 1983-1991 reveals two

rotorcraft accidents caused by bird strikes. One accident resulted in one

serious injury, one minor injury, and substantial damage to the rotorcraft

(tail rotor separation); in the other accident the rotorcraft was destroyed

but there were no injuries. There is at least an equal probability of such

accidents and the resultant damage in the future, given the tendencies towards

higher operating speeds and use of composite materials. The benefits of

averting a single catastrophic accident would exceed the incremental costs.

Section 29.917 - Design. The incremental costs to formalize existing

design information for the rotor structure (proposed§ 29.547 above) and drive

system are estimated to total $44,000 per type certification. Formal

assessment and identification of critical components of the rotor drive system

would increase safety by providing more comprehensive maintenance information

to operators. The benefits of averting a single catastrophic accident caused

directly or indirectly by a lack of relevant data would easily exceed the

incremental costs of providing that data.

Section 29.1587 - Performance information. Because the required climb

gradient data would already be available from the results of flight tests

required to obtain performance information, the only additional costs would be

those associated with incorporating the data into the Rotorcraft Flight

Manual, estimated to total $5,500 per certification. Although NTSB accident

16
records do not include any accidents directly attributable to lack of

performance data, there were a few accidents in which such data were ignored

or misinterpreted. The availability and accuracy of such data would enhance

operational safety. The benefits of averting a single catastrophic accident

caused directly or indirectly by a lack of relevant performance information

would easily exceed the incremental costs of providing that data.

International Trade Impact Analysis

The proposed rule would not constitute a barrier to international trade,

including the export of American rotorcraft to foreign countries and the

import of foreign rotorcraft into the United States. Instead, the proposed

changes on rotorcraft certification procedures, harmonized with those of the

JAA, would lower dual certification costs, thereby enhancing free trade.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 was enacted by Congress to

ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily and disproportionately

burdened by government regulations. The RFA requires a Regulatory Flexibility

Analysis if a rule would have a significant economic impact, either

detrimental or beneficial, on a substantial number of small entities. Based

on the criteria of FAA Order 2100.14A, Regulatory Flexibility Criteria and

Guidance, the FAA has determined that the proposed rule would not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, including the findings in the

Regulatory Flexibility Determination and the International Trade Impact

Analysis, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in

conjunction with the FAA has determined that this proposed regulation is not a

17
significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, was

not subject to centralized regulatory review by the OIRA. In addition, the

FAA certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic

impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under

the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. This proposal is considered

to be nonsignificant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR

11034; February 26, 1979). An initial regulatory evaluation of the proposal,

including a Regulatory Flexibility Determination and Trade Impact Analysis,

has been placed in the docket. A copy may be obtained by contacting the

person identified under "FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT."

List of Subjects

14 CFR Parts 27 and 29

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

Accordingly, the FAA proposes to amend parts 27 and 29 of the Federal

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR parts 27 and 29) as follows:

PART 27--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT

1. The authority citation for part 27 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1344, 1354(a), 1355, 1421, 1423, 1425, 1428, 1429,

and 1430; 49 U.S.C.106(g).

2. Section 27.1 is amended by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as

follows:

§ 27.1 Applicability.

* * * * *
(c) Multiengine rotorcraft may be type certificated as Category A

provided the requirements of appendix C of this part are met.

18
 3. Section 27.65 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2) and (b)(2)(ii)

to read as follows:

§ 27.65 Climb: all engines operating.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) The steady rate of climb must be determined -

(ii) Within the range from sea level up to the maximum altitude for

which certification is requested;

* * * * *
4. Section 27.1141 is amended by redesignating existing paragraphs (c)

and (d) as paragraphs (d) and (e) and by adding a new paragraph (c) to read as

follows:

§ 27.1141 Powerplant controls: general.

* * * * *
(c) Each control must be able to maintain any set position without -

(1) Constant attention; or

(2) Tendency to creep due to control loads or vibration.

* * * * *
5. Section 27.1151 is added to read as follows:

§ 27.1151 Rotor brake controls.

(a) It must be impossible to apply the rotor brake inadvertently in

flight.

(b) There must be means to warn the crew if the rotor brake has not

been completely released before takeoff.

6. Part 27 is amended by adding a new appendix C to read as follows:

19
APPENDIX C TO PART 27--CRITERIA FOR CATEGORY A

C27.1 General. 29.901(c) - Powerplant:

A small multiengine rotorcraft may Installation.
not be type certificated for 29.903(b)(c) and (e) - Engines.
Category A operation unless it meets 29.908(a) - Cooling fans.
the design installation and 29.917(b) and (c)(l) - Rotor drive
performance requirements contained system: Design.
in this appendix in addition to the 29.927(c)(l) - Additional tests.
requirements of this part. 29.953(a) - Fuel system
independence.
C27.2 Applicable part 29 sections. 29.1027(a)-Transmission and
The following sections of part 29 gearboxes: General.
of this chapter must be met in 29.1045(a)(l),(b),(c),(d), and (f) -
addition to the requirements of this Climb cooling test procedures.
part: 29.1047(a) - Takeoff cooling test
procedures.
29.45(a) and (b)(2) - General. 29.1181(a) - Designated fire zones:
29.49(a) - Performance at minimum Regions included.
operating speed. 29.1187(e) - Drainage and
29.51 - Takeoff data: General. ventilation of fire zones.
29.53 - Takeoff: Category A. 29.1189(c) - Shutoff means.
29.55 - Takeoff decision point: 29.1191(a)(l) - Firewalls.
Category A. 29.1193(e) - Cowling and engine
29.59 - Takeoff path: Category A. compartment covering.
29.60 - Elevated heliport takeoff 29.1195(a) and (d) - Fire
path: Category A. extinguishing systems (one shot).
29.61 - Takeoff distance: 29.1197 - Fire extinguishing agents.
Category A. 29.1199 - Extinguishing agent
29.62 - Rejected takeoff: containers.
Category A. 29.1201 - Fire extinguishing system
29.64 - Climb: General. materials.
29.65(a) - Climb: AEO. 29.1305(a)(6) and (b) - Powerplant
29.67(a) - Climb: OEI. instruments.
29.75 - Landing: General. 29.1309(b)(2)(i) and (d) -
29.77 - Landing decision point: Equipment, systems, and
Category A. installations.
29.79 - Landing; Category A. 29.1323(c)(l) - Airspeed indicating
29.81 - Landing distance (Ground system.
level sites): Category A. 29.133l(b) - Instruments using a
29.85 - Balked landing: power supply.
Category A. 29.135l(d)(2) - Electrical systems
29.87(a) - Height-velocity envelope. and equipment: General (operation
29.547(a) and (b) - Main and tail without normal electrical power).
rotor structure. 29.1587(a) - Performance
29.571 - Fatigue evaluation of information.
structure. AC Material only:
AC 29-2A Item 230 Paragraph 10. 3. In complying with the paragraphs
29.861(a) - Fire protection of listed in paragraph 2 above,
structure, controls, and other relevant material in AC 29-2A should
parts. be used.

20
PART 29--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT

7. The authority citation for part 29 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1344, 1354(a), 1355, 1421, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1428,

1429, and 1430; 49 U.S.C. 106(g).

8. Section 29.547 is amended by changing the title; revising paragraph

(a); adding a new paragraph (b); deleting the word "main" in the introductory

text of paragraphs (c), (d), and (e); and revising paragraph (e)(l)(ii) to

read as follows:

§ 29.547 Main and tail rotor structure.

(a) A rotor is an assembly of rotating components, which includes the

rotor hub, blades, blade dampers, the pitch control mechanisms, and all other

parts that rotate with the assembly.

(b) Each rotor assembly must be designed as prescribed in this section

and must function safely for the critical flight load and operating

conditions. A design assessment must be performed, including a detailed

failure analysis to identify all failures that will prevent continued safe

flight or safe landing, and must identify the means to minimize the likelihood

of their occurrence.

(c) The rotor structure***

* * * * *
(d) The rotor structure***

* * * * *
(e) The rotor structure***

(1) * * *

(ii) For the main rotor, the limit engine torque***

* * * * *
21
 9. In§ 29.610 the title is changed; the word "structure" is added

between the words "rotorcraft" and "must" in paragraph (a); and a new

paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:

§ 29.610 Lightning and static electricity protection.

(a) The rotorcraft structure must***

* * * * *
(d) The electrical bonding and protection against lightning and static

electricity must be such as to ---

(1) Minimize the accumulation of electrostatic charge;

(2) Minimize the risk of electrical shock to crew, passengers, and

service and maintenance personnel using normal precautions;

(3) Provide an electrical return path, under both normal and fault

conditions, on rotorcraft having grounded electrical systems; and

(4) Reduce to an acceptable level the effects of lightning and static

electricity on the functioning of essential electrical and electronic

equipment.

10. Section 29.629 is revised to read as follows:

§ 29.629 Flutter and divergence

Each aerodynamic surface of the rotorcraft must be free from flutter and

divergence under each appropriate speed and power condition.

11. A new§ 29.631 is added to read as follows:

§ 29.631 Bird Strike.

The rotorcraft must be designed to assure capability of continued safe

flight and landing (for Category A) or safe landing (for Category B) after

impact with a 2.2 lb (1.0 kg) bird when the velocity of the rotorcraft

(relative to the bird along the flight path of the rotorcraft) is equal to VNE

22
or V8 (whichever is the lesser) at altitudes up to 8,000 feet. Compliance

must be shown by tests or by analysis based on tests carried out on

sufficiently representative structures of similar design.

12. Section 29.917 is amended by redesignating existing paragraph (b)

as (c) and adding a new paragraph (b) to read as follows:

§ 29.917 Design.

* * * * *
(b) Design assessment. A design assessment must be performed to ensure

that the rotor drive system functions safely over the full range of conditions

for which certification is sought. The design assessment must include a

detailed failure analysis to identify all failures that will prevent continued

safe flight or safe landing and must identify the means to minimize the

likelihood of their occurrence.

* * * * *
13. Section 29.923 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read

as follows:

§ 29.923 Rotor drive system and control mechanism tests.

* * * * *
(b) ***
(3) ***
(i) Immediately following any one 5-minute power-on run required by

paragraph (b)(l) of this section, simulate a failure for each power source in

turn, and apply the maximum torque and the maximum speed for use with

30-second OEI power to the remaining affected drive system power inputs for

not less than 30 seconds. Each application of 30-second OEI power must be

followed by two applications of the maximum torque and the maximum speed for

23
use with the 2 minute OE! power for not less than 2 minutes each; the second

application must follow a period at stabilized continuous or 30 minute OE!

power (whichever is requested by the applicant). At least one run sequence

must be conducted from a simulated "flight idle" condition.

* * * * *
14. Section 29.1305 is amended by redesignating existing paragraphs

(a)(6) through (a)(25) as paragraphs (a)(7) through (a)(26) and adding a new

paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:

§ 29.1305 Powerplant instruments

* * * * *
(a) ***
(6) An oil pressure indicator for each pressure-lubricated gearbox.

* * * * *
15. Section 29.1309 is amended by revising paragraph (h) to read as

follows:

§ 29.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.

* * * * *
(h) In showing compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,

the effects of lightning strikes on the rotorcraft must be considered.

16. Section 29.1351 is amended by revising the title of paragraph (d),

redesignating the introductory text of paragraph (d) as (d)(l) and adding the

words "generating system" in new (d)(l), redesignating paragraphs (d)(l),

(d)(2), and (d)(3) as (d)(l)(i), (d)(l)(ii), and (d)(l)(iii), and adding a new

paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:

§ 29.1351 General

* * * * *
24
 (d) Operation with the normal electrical power generating system

inoperative.

(1) ***for a period of not less than 5 minutes, with the normal

electrical power generating system (electrical power sources excluding the

battery) inoperative,***

(2) Additional requirements for Category A Rotorcraft.

(i) Unless it can be shown that the loss of the normal electrical power

generating system is extremely improbable, an emergency electrical power

system, independent of the normal electrical power generating system, must be

provided, with sufficient capacity to power all systems necessary for

continued safe flight and landing.

(ii) Failures, including junction box, control panel, or wire bundle

fires, which would result in the loss of the normal and emergency systems,

must be shown to be extremely improbable.

(iii) Systems necessary for immediate safety must continue to operate

following the loss of the normal electrical power generating system, without

the need for flight crew action.

17. Section 29.1587 is amended by adding a new paragraph (a)(6),

removing "and" from end of paragraph (a)(4), and adding "and" to end of

paragraph (a)(5).

§ 29.1587 Performance Information

* * * * *
(a) * * *

(5) * * * and

25
 (6) The steady gradient of climb for each weight, altitude, and

temperature for which takeoff data are to be scheduled, along the takeoff path

determined in the flight conditions required in§ 29.67(a)(l) and (a)(2):

(i) In the flight conditions required in§ 29.67(a)(l) between the end

of the takeoff distance and the point at which the rotorcraft is 200 feet

above the takeoff surface (or 200 feet above the lowest point of the takeoff

profile for elevated heliports).

(ii) In the flight conditions required in§ 29.67(a)(2) between the

points at which the rotorcraft is 200 and 1000 feet above the takeoff surface

(or 200 and 1000 feet above the lowest point of the takeoff profile for

elevated heliports).

* * * * *
18. Part 29 Appendix Bis amended by adding a new paragraph VIII

(b)(6).

APPENDIX B TO PART 29--AIRWORTHINESS CRITERIA FOR HELICOPTER INSTRUMENT FLIGHT

* * * * *
VIII ***
(b) ***
(6) In determining compliance with the requirements of

§ 29.13Sl(d)(2), the supply of electrical power to all systems necessary for

flight under IFR must be included in the evaluation.

Issued in Washington, DC, on

26
 ENCLOSURE 2

U.S. Department
of Transportation

FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION

Washington, D.C. 20591

PRELIMINARY REGULATORY EVALUATION,

INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY DETERMINATION,
AND TRADE IMPACT ASSESSMENT

FOR

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING:

ROTORCRAFT REGULATORY CHANGES BASED ON

EUROPEAN JOINT AIRWORTHINESS
REQUIREMENTS PROPOSALS

OFFICE OF AVIATION POLICY, PLANS, AND MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS

AIRCRAFT REGULATORY ANALYSIS BRANCH, AP0-320
Arnold J. Hoffman
May 1993
(revised June 1994)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

I. Introduction ...................................................... . 1

II. Costs and Benefits 1

A. Part 27 2

B. Part 29 4

III. Regulatory Flexibility Determination ............................... 10

IV. International Trade Impact Assessment .............................. 10

 Executive Summary

This regulatory evaluation examines the impacts of several proposed changes to

parts 27 and 29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's). Part 27

prescribes airworthiness standards for type certification of normal category

rotorcraft (maximum weight of 6,000 pounds) and part 29 prescribes

corresponding standards for transport category rotorcraft. The changes would

revise the airworthiness standards for performance, systems, propulsion, and

airframes by introducing safety improvements, clarifying existing regulations,

and standardizing terminology. The amendments are based on changes that are

being proposed by the European Joint Airworthiness Authorities (JAA) for

incorporation into Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) parts 27 and 29, and are

intended to promote harmonization between FAA and JAA regulations.

Harmonization would eliminate unnecessary duplication of airworthiness

requirements, thus reducing manufacturers' certification costs.

All of the proposed changes to part 27 and most of those to part 29 would

impose no or negligible costs on rotorcraft manufacturers since they largely

reflect current design practices. However, four of the proposed changes to

part 29 would impose incremental costs totalling approximately $150,000.

These changes relate to: (1) identification and failure-assessment of critical

components in the main and tail rotor structure; (2) bird strike protection;

(3) identification of critical components of the rotor drive system; and (4)

inclusion of performance information in the Flight Manual. The safety

benefits of these four provisions are expected to easily exceed the

incremental costs.
The proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on small

entities. In addition, it would not constitute a barrier to international

trade, including the export of American rotorcraft to foreign countries

and the import of foreign rotorcraft into the United States. Instead, the

proposed changes in rotorcraft certification procedures, harmonized with those

of the JAA, would lessen restraints on trade.

ii
I. Introduction

This regulatory evaluation examines the impacts of several proposed changes to

parts 27 and 29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's). Part 27

prescribes airworthiness standards for type certification of normal category

rotorcraft (maximum weight of 6,000 pounds) and part 29 prescribes

corresponding standards for transport category rotorcraft. The changes would

revise the airworthiness standards for performance, systems, propulsion, and

airframes by introducing safety improvements, clarifying existing regulations,

and standardizing terminology. The amendments are based on changes that are

being proposed by the European Joint Airworthiness Authorities (JAA) for

incorporation into Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) parts 27 and 29, and are

intended to promote harmonization between FAA and JAA regulations.

II. Costs and Benefits

Most of the proposed changes would impose no or negligible costs on rotorcraft

manufacturers since they largely reflect current design practices. In recent

years, manufacturers have incorporated engineering/structural improvements

into rotorcraft designs exceeding minimum FAR requirements with the aim of

increasing operating efficiencies, payload capabilities, and marketability in

world markets. Many of these improvements have also inherently improved

safety. Codification of these improvements and other proposed changes would

ensure continuation of enhanced safety levels in future rotorcraft designs.

Four of the proposed changes to part 29 would impose incremental costs

totalling approximately $150,000. These changes relate to: (1) identification

 - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - ~ ----

and failure-assessment of critical components in the main and tail rotor

structure; (2) bird strike protection; (3) identification of critical

components of the rotor drive system; and (4) inclusion of performance

information in the Flight Manual. The safety benefits of these four

provisions are expected to easily exceed the incremental costs.

Additionally, adoption of the proposed changes would increase harmonization

and commonality between American and European airworthiness standards.

Harmonization would eliminate unnecessary duplication of airworthiness

requirements, thus reducing manufacturers' certification costs. Based on

experience in a recent certification, one rotorcraft manufacturer indicated

that complying with different FAA/JAA requirements resulted in several hundred

thousand dollars of excessive certification costs. Aside from the benefits of

sustained safety levels as described above, the benefits of certification

cost-savings would, by themselves, outweigh the relatively modest increase in

certification costs that the amendments would impose.

Following is a brief description of the proposed changes and FAA's estimates

of their costs and benefits.

A. Part 27

1. Section 27.1 - Applicability

This section would be amended to permit type certification of normal

multiengine rotorcraft as Category A (rotorcraft with guaranteed stay-up

2
capability) when such rotorcraft are constructed with the engine and system

isolation requirements of part 29. A new Appendix C to part 27 would require

that manufacturers provide a list of part 29 Category A standards related to

stay-up capability of the rotorcraft in the event of engine or system failure,

which must be addressed for a Category A option approval. This amendment

would be cost-beneficial by its very nature since manufacturers would elect to

seek certification to more stringent standards only if they perceive it in

their interests to do so.

2. Section 27.65 - Climb, all engines operating

The proposed change to this section would require determination of all engine

operating climb performance for all rotorcraft. Currently, climb performance

is only required for certain conditions (for details see preamble of the

NPRM). Since manufacturers have provided this information even though not

required by existing regulations, the change would merely codify current

practices and would impose no incremental costs. The proposed change would

ensure that manufacturers continue providing the data in future type

certifications. Benefits would be reduced risks of accidents attributable to

insufficient climb performance data.

3. Section 27.1141 - Powerplant controls, general

The proposed change to this section would add the requirement that powerplant

controls be able to maintain any set position without constant attention and

without the tendency to creep due to control loads or vibration. Since this

3
change reflects current design practice, it would impose no incremental costs.

The change would ensure that powerplant controls in future rotorcraft designs

include this safety feature. Benefits would be reduced risks of accidents

caused by failure of the powerplant controls to maintain a set position.

4. Section 27.1151 - Rotor brake controls

This proposed new section would mandate controls which would prevent

inadvertent application of the rotor brake. Since this change reflects

current practice, it would impose no incremental costs. Further, it would

ensure that future rotorcraft designs include this safety feature. Benefits

would be reduced risks of accidents caused by inadvertent application of the

rotor brake.

B. Part 29

1. Section 29.547 - Main and tail rotor structure

The proposed change to this section would require (1) identification of

critical components of the major tail and rotor structure, and (2) a design

assessment that specifies all critical component failures that would prevent

continued safe flight or safe landing and that identifies means to minimize

the likelihood of such failures occurring. Currently, manufacturers perform

such an assessment, which is integral to the design requirements of

4
§ 29.917. There are, however, some incremental costs to formalize the

existing information. These costs are included in the cost estimates of

proposed§ 29.917 discussed later in this evaluation.

Formal identification and failure-assessment of critical components would

increase safety by providing more comprehensive maintenance information to

operators. The benefits of averting a single aligned accident would exceed

the relatively low incremental costs of compliance.

2. Section 29.610 - Lightning and static electricity protection

The word "structure" would be added to this section to clarify that the

requirements apply to the rotorcraft structure and not to other systems that

are adequately covered under the requirements of§ 29.1309. Additionally,

precipitation static electricity requirements would be introduced covering

design aspects for electrical bonding of the rotorcraft structure. These

requirements would impose no incremental costs since manufacturers currently

include structural lightning protection in their designs. The proposed change

would ensure that future rotorcraft designs include appropriate lightning

protection. Benefits would be reduced risks of accidents caused by

insufficient lightning protection.

3. Section 29.629 - Flutter and divergence

The proposed changes to this section would add the word "divergence" and

extend the requirements to cover aeroelastic instability other than flutter of

5
aerodynamic surfaces (flutter is unwanted oscillation set up by natural

forces; divergence occurs when damping capacity is exceeded, the oscillation

intensifies, and the resulting stress causes the structure to fail). The use

of rational analysis and/or tests to demonstrate freedom from aeroelastic

instability in the basic design would be required. Manufacturers currently

conduct this type of test or analysis; any additional documentation would

impose negligible incremental costs. The proposed changes would ensure that

manufacturers continue conducting these tests and/or analyses. Benefits would

be reduced risks of accidents attributable to aeroelastic instability.

4. Section 29.631 - Bird Strike

This proposed new section would require that the rotorcraft be designed to

ensure capability of continued safe flight and landing (for Category A) or

safe landing (for Category B) after impact with a 2.2 pound bird. The risks

of damaging bird strikes have increased with the higher speeds of modern

transport rotorcraft and changes in material technology (e.g., composites).

Manufacturers indicate that present rotorcraft structures can withstand

impacts from a 2.2 pound bird; therefore, no incremental manufacturing costs

are anticipated. Nonrecurring testing and analysis costs of the proposed

requirement are estimated to be $100,000 per type certification.

A review of National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data for the period

1983-1991 reveals two rotorcraft accidents caused by bird strikes. One

accident resulted in one serious injury, one minor injury, and substantial

damage to the rotorcraft (tail rotor separation), and in the other accident

6
the rotorcraft was destroyed but there were no injuries. There is at least an

equal probability of such accidents in the future, given the tendencies

towards higher operating speeds and use of composite materials. The benefits

of averting a single accident would exceed the incremental costs.

5. Section 29.917 - Design

The proposed change to this section would require a design assessment that

identifies critical components of the drive system and means available to

minimize the likelihood of failures. This proposal is a companion to the

rotor structure proposal of§ 29.547. The incremental costs to formalize the

existing information for the rotor structure and drive system are estimated to

total $44,000 per type certification.

Formal assessment and identification of critical components of the rotor drive

system would increase safety by providing more comprehensive maintenance

information to operators. The benefits of averting a single accident caused

directly or indirectly by a lack of relevant data would easily exceed the

incremental costs.

6. Section 29.923 - Rotor drive system endurance test

The proposed change to this section would apply to multiengine turbine-powered

rotorcraft for which use of a 30 second, 2 minute one engine inoperative (OEI)

power rating is requested. The new standard would increase the required

testing for 2 minute OEI power from one run per cycle [as would be mandated by

7
a pending rulemaking] to two runs per cycle. The purpose of the change is to

negate an inconsistency in the current rule [pending] in that a higher and

potentially more damaging power rating would be substantiated by less testing

at 2 minute OEI power than at the 2 1/2 minute OEI power. Incremental testing

costs would be insignificant and offset by the benefits of reduced risk of

engine or component damage caused by improper testing.

7. Section 29.1305 - Powerplant instruments

The proposed change to this section would require an oil pressure indicator

for each pressure-lubricated gearbox. Currently, only an oil pressure warning

device is required. The indicator would provide the crew with an early

warning of oil pressure deficiencies and would provide confirmation that the

oil pressure warning is not false. Good manufacturing design criteria dictate

that an oil pressure indicator be included with the oil pressure warning

device. Although a few older-design rotorcraft lack such indicators,

rotorcraft of current designs include such devices as standard equipment. The

incremental costs of providing the indicator device would be relatively low

and would be easily exceeded by averting a single accident caused by a late

warning of an oil-pressure problem.

8. Section 29.1309 - Systems, equipment, and installations

The proposed change to this section would delete reference to§ 29.610 in

subparagraph (h). Since§ 29.1309 addresses systems and equipment, it is

inappropriate to reference§ 29.610 here, which addresses structural

8
requirements. The costs and benefits of this clarification would be

inconsequential.

9. Section 29.1351 - General (under "Electrical Systems and

Equipment")

Proposed additions to this section applicable to Category A and/or rotorcraft

operating under IFR conditions would require that emergency electrical power

be available to essential systems in the event of loss of the normal

electrical power generating system or of all engines. No incremental costs

would be incurred since this requirement formalizes current design practices

which are inherent in present§ 29.1309 (Systems, equipment, and

installations). Specification of emergency electrical power system

requirements in§ 29.1351 is more appropriate and definitive, and thus would

ensure that future rotorcraft designs continue to include sufficient emergency

electrical power. Benefits would be reduced risks of accidents caused by

power failures.

10. Section 29.1587 - Performance information

This section would be amended to require that manufacturers include climb

gradient information for the pilot to determine the maximum takeoff weight

possible to clear any obstacle in the takeoff path. Since the data are

already available from the results of flight tests required to obtain

performance information, the only additional costs would be those incurred in

9
incorporating the data into the Rotorcraft Flight Manual, estimated to total

$5,500.

Although NTSB accident records do not include any accidents directly

attributable to lack of performance data, there were a few accidents in which

such data were ignored or misinterpreted. The availability and accuracy of

such data is paramount to operational safety. The benefits of averting a

single accident caused directly or indirectly by a lack of relevant

performance information would easily exceed the incremental costs.

III. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by Congress to ensure

that small entities are not unnecessarily and disproportionately burdened by

government regulations. The RFA requires a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis if

a rule would have a significant economic impact, either detrimental or

beneficial, on a substantial number of small entities. Based on the criteria

of implementing FAA Order 2100.14A, Regulatory Flexibility Criteria and

Guidance, the FAA has determined that the proposed rule would not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small manufacturers or

operators.

IV. International Trade Impact Assessment

The proposed rule would not constitute a barrier to international trade,

including the export of American rotorcraft to foreign countries and the

10
import of foreign rotorcraft into the United States. Instead, the proposed

changes in rotorcraft certification procedures, harmonized with those of the

JAA, would lessen restraints on trade.

11
 ENCLOSURE 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based on European Joint Aviation

Requirements Proposals

SUMMARY: This notice proposes changes to the type certification requirements

for both normal and transport category rotorcraft. The changes would revise
airworthiness standards for performance, systems, propulsion, and airframes
and would introduce safety improvements, clarify existing regulations, and
standardize terminology. The changes are based on proposals that are being
incorporated by the European Joint Aviation Authorities for the Joint Aviation
Requirements (JAR) 27 and 29. These proposed changes are intended to
harmonize the Federal Aviation Regulations rotorcraft type certification
requirements and the European JAR.

BACKGROUND: At a meeting between FAA representatives and the European

Airworthiness Authorities Steering Committee (AASC) in Washington, DC, in
April 1983, the aviation manufacturing industry requested that the
certification rules of Europe and the United States be standardized. The AASC
agreed to provide the FAA with a comprehensive list of recommended changes for
the regulations in part 29 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR). These changes would make part 29 acceptable to AASC members for
adoption as airworthiness standards. The AASC subsequently established a
Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) 29 group to develop transport category
rotorcraft airworthiness standards for the issuance of European type
certificates. The JAR 29 group was tasked with providing a list of
recommended changes for part 29. The FAA solicited comments on key issues.
The initial responses to that solicitation were published in the Federal
Register (49 FR 19309, May 7, 1984). On September 15, 1984, the AASC
submitted a more comprehensive list of proposals for part 29. The 92
proposals contained in the revised list suggested changes to part 29 as
amended through Amendment 29-16, October 5, 1978. An FAA review found that 34
of these proposals had either been incorporated, in whole or in part, in part
29, as revised by Amendments 29-17 through 29-24 or were being considered in
active rulemaking projects. Of the 58 proposals remaining, 25 were rejected
for various reasons involving failure to meet Executive Order 12866 or
Department of Transportation rulemaking requirements. The FAA provided the
results of the review to the JAR 29 group including a summary of the status of
the proposals being considered in active rulemaking projects.

During further review of the remaining AASC proposals not included in

existing rulemaking projects, the FAA determined that several of the proposals
warranted public discussion. Accordingly, the FAA held a public meeting in
Fort Worth, Texas, May 1-2, 1986 (51 FR 4504, February 5, 1986). Over 50
persons attended the meeting, which remained in session until each proposal
not already in rulemaking had been discussed. The FAA subsequently issued
NPRM No. 89-10 (54 FR 17396; April 25, 1989), which addressed the AASC
proposals and resulted in the issuance of Amendments 27-27 and 29-31 (55 FR
38964; September 21, 1990).

The AASC activities were absorbed by the Joint Aviation Authorities

(JAA), and the JAA established the Helicopter Airworthiness Study Group (HASG)
to formulate JAR 27 and 29 for use by the 19 JAA countries. The JAA invited
the FAA and industry groups to participate in HASG meetings on March 20-21,
1990. Members of Association Europeenne des Constructeurs de Materiel
Aerospatial (AECMA) represented the European manufacturers at the HASG
Meetings, and AECMA invited members of the Aerospace Industries Association of
America (AIA) to represent U.S. manufacturers. The HASG was chartered to
formulate JAR 29, and subsequently JAR 27, to parallel as closely as possible
part 29 as amended through Amendment 29-31, September 21, 1990, and part 27 as
amended through Amendment 27-27, September 21, 1990. The JAR 29 includes FAA
NPRM's 89-26 (54 FR 39086, September 22, 1989) that proposes a new 30 second/
2 minute One Engine Inoperative power rating, 89-29 (54 FR 42716, October 17,
1989) that proposes rotorburst protection, 90-1 (55 FR 698, January 8, 1990)
that proposes new performance requirements, and 90-24
(55 FR 41000, October 5, 1990) that proposes a Crash Resistant Fuel System;
and JAR 27 includes NPRM's 89-26 and 90-24.

SIGNIFICANT ISSUES: Following an announcement in the Federal Register

(57 FR 58846, December 11, 1992), the JAR-FAR 27 and 29 Harmonization Working
Group was chartered by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). The
Harmonization Working Group was charged with making recommendations to the
ARAC concerning disposition of JAA Notice of Proposed Amendments (NPA's)
recently coordinated between the JAA and the FAA. The working group and
subsequently the ARAC recommended that the FAA revise the certification
standards for normal and transport category rotorcraft as proposed in the
NPA's. The FAA has evaluated the ARAC recommendations and proposes changes to
the rotorcraft certification rules in both parts 27 and 29.

WHO WILL BE AFFECTED: Rotorcraft manufacturers and occupants of normal and

transport category rotorcraft.

COSTS AND BENEFITS: Each of the proposed regulatory changes contained in this
notice has been determined to have negligible or no economic impact. These
proposed changes either edit, clarify, or codify current industry or
certification practice and procedure.

ENERGY IMPACT: The energy impact of the notice of proposed rulemaking has
been assessed in accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), P.L. 94-163, and Interim Agency Guidelines. It has been determined
that the notice of proposed rulemaking is not a major regulatory action under
the provisions of the EPCA.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: The environmental impact of the notice of proposed

rulemaking has been assessed in accordance with FAA Order 1050.lD, and it has
been determined that the notice of proposed rulemaking is not a major Federal

c~
action significantly affecting the environment.

Eric Bries
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service

29
 800 Independence Ave .. S.W.
U.S.Deportment Washington, O.C. 20591
of Tronsporrolion
Fe deral A'(iation
Administration

JUN 2 2 1995

.~·
. r·,.-
. l
Mr. Thebdore E. Dumont
Assistant Chair for Rotorcraft Issues
Aviation .~ulemaking Advisory Conunittee
1101 Naugatuck Avenue
,Milford, CT 06460-2317

Dear Mr. Dumont:

In response to the task. announced in the Federal Register on

December 11, 1992 (56 FR 63545), the Aviation Rul emaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC) developed a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to
amend airworthiness standards for normal and transport category
rotorcraft to harmonize with the Joint Aviation Requirements 27 and 29 .
Comments received in response to the NPRM were considered to be
non-substantive; consequently, the final action will be developed
internally by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Again, let me thank ARAC and, in particular, the JAR-FAR 27 and 29

Harmonization Working Group for its dedicated efforts in completing the
task assigned by the FAA.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Mark Schilling at

(817) 222-5110.

S(lincerely,
.•

An ·: . Bro rick
Associate Administrator for
Regulation and Certification
I'

Wednesday
December 28, 1994

Part Ill

Department ·of
Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

.14 CFR Parts 27 and 29

Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based on
European Joint Airworthiness
Requirements Proposals; Proposed Rule
., 5;068 Federal Register I Vol. 59, No. 248 I Wednesday. December 28, 1994 I Proposed Rules

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION submitted in triplicate to the address Federal Register (49 FR 19309, May 7,
specified under the caption ADDRESSES. 1984). On September 15, 1984, the
Federal Aviation Administration All comments received on or before the AASC submitted a more comprehensive
closing date for comments will be list of 92 suggested changes to part 29.
14 CFR Parts 27 and 29 considered before taking action OJ) this An FAA review found that 34 of these
[Docket No. 28008; Notice No. 94-36) proposed rule. The proposals contained proposals had either been incorporated,
in this notice may be changed in light in whole or in part, in part 29 or were
RIN: 2120-AC27 of the comments received. All being considered in active rulemaking
Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based comments received will be available, projects. Of the 58 proposals remaining.
on European Joint Airworthiness both before and after the closing date for 25 were rejected for various reasons
Requirements Proposals comments, in the Rules Docket for involving failure to meet Executive
examination by interested persons. A Order or Department of Transportation
AGENCY: Federal Aviation report summarizing each substantive rulemaking requirements. The FAA
Administration, DOT. public contact with FAA personnel provided the results of the review to the
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking . concerned with this rulemaking will be JAR 29 group including a summary of
(NPRM). • filed in the docket. Commenters wishing the status of the proposals being
the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their considered in active rulemaking
SUMMARY: This notice proposes changes comments submitted in response to this projects.
to the type certification requirements for notice must include a preaddressed, During further review of the
both normal and transport category stamped postcard on which the remaining AASC proposals not included
rotorcraft. The changes would revise following statement is made: in existing rulemaking projects, the FAA
airworthiness standards for "Comments on Docket No. 28008." The determined that several of the proposals
performance, systems, propulsion, and postcard will be date stamped and warranted public discussion.
airframes. The changes would increase mailed to the commenter. Accordingly, the FAA held a public
the regulatory safety level. clarify meeting in Fort Worth, Texas, May 1-
existing regulations, and standardize Availability ofNPRM's . 2, 1986 (51 FR 4504, February 5, 1986).
terminology. The changes are based on Any person may obtain a copy of this Over 50 persons attended the meeting,
standards that are being incorporated by NPRM by submitting a request to the which remained in session until each
the European Joint Aviation Authorities FAA, Office of Public Affairs, Attention: proposal not already in rulemaking had
for the Joint Aviation Requirements Public Inquiry Center, APA-200, 800 been discussed. The FAA subsequently
(JAR) 27 and 29. These proposed · Independence Avenue, SW, issued NPRM No. 89-10 (54 FR 17396;
changes are intended to harmonize the Washington, DC 20591, or by calling April 25, 1989), which addressed the
Federal Aviation Regulations rotorcraft (202) 267-3484. Communications must AASC proposals and resulted in the
type certification requirements and the identify the notice number of this issuance of Amendments 27-27 and 29-
European JAR. NPRM. 31 (55 FR 38964; September 21, 1990).
DATES: Comments must be received on Persons interested in being placed on The AASC activities were absorbed by
or before March 28, 1995. a mailing list for future NPRM's should the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA},
request from the above office a copy of and the JAA established the Helicopter
ADDRESSES: Comments on this notice
Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, NPRM Airworthiness Study Group (HASG) to
should be mailed in triplicate to: Distribution System, which describes
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), formulate JAR 27 and 29 for use by the
Office of the Chief Counsel, Attention: the application procedure. 19 JAA countries. The JAA invited the
- Rules Docket (AGC-10), Docket No. Background FAA and industry groups to participate
in HASG meetings on March 20-21,
28008; 800 Independence Avenue SW, At a meeting between FAA 1990. Members of Association
Washington, DC 20591. Comments . representatives and the European Europeene des Constructeurs de
delivered must be marked Docket No. Airworthiness Authorities Steering- Materiel Aerospatial (AECMA)
28008. Comments may be examined in Committee (AASC) in Washington, DC, represented the European manufacturers
Room 915G weekdays between 9 a.m, in April 1983, the aviation at the HASG Meetings, and AECMA
and 5 p.m., except on Federal holidays. manufacturing industry requested that invited members of the Aerospace
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. the certification rules of Europe and the Industries Association of America (AIA)
Carroll Wright, Rotorcraft Directorate, United States be standardized. The to represent U.S. manufacturers. The
Aircraft Certification Service, AASC agreed to provide the FAA with HASG was chartered to formulate JAR
Regulations Group, ASW-111, FAA, a comprehensive list of recommended 29, and subsequently JAR 27, to parallel
Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0111, changes for the regulations in part 29 of as closely as possible part 29 as
telephone number (817) 222-5120. Title 14 of the Code of Federal amended through Amendment 29-31
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Regulations (CFR). These changes effective September~!. 1990, and part
would make part 29 acceptable to AASC 27 as amended through Amendment 27-
Comments Invited members for adoption as airworthiness 27 effective September 21, 1990. The
Interested persons are invited to standards. The AASC subsequently JAR 29 includes FAA NPRM's 89-26 (54
submit \\Titten data, views, or established a Joint Aviation FR 39086, September 22, 1989) which
arguments on this proposed rule. Requirements (JAR) 29 group to develop proposes a new 30 second/2 minute One
Comments relating to the transport category rotorcraft Engine Inoperative power rating, 89-29
environmental, energy. federalism, or airworthiness standards for the issuance (54 FR 42716, October 17, 1989) which
economic impact that might result from of European type certificates~ The JAR proposes rotorburst protection, 90-1 (55
adopting the proposals in this notice are 29 group was tasked with providing a FR 698, January 8, 1990) which
also invited. Substantive comments list of recommended changes for part proposes new performance
should be accompanied by cost 29. The FAA solicited comments on key requirements, and 90-24 (55 FR 41000,
estimates. Comments should identify issues. The initial responses to that October 5, 1990) which proposes a
the regulatory docket numher and be solicitation were published in the Crash Resistant Fuel System; JAR 27 is
 Federal Register I Vol. 59, No. 248 I Wednesday, December 28, 1994 I Proposed Rules 67069
••
to also include NPRM's 89-26 and 90- prescribes maintenance requirements. less than the speed for the best rate of
24. Part 29 contains the airworthiness climb (Vy). Climb performance
requirements for rotorcraft certification; information is necessary for operational
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
part 29 &cl.dresses maintenance planning for rotorcraft, e.g., planning for
Committee (ARAC) Considerations
standards only to the extent that it obstacle clearance. Manufacturers have
By announcement in the Federal mandates that the type certificate holder historically provided this information
Register (57 FR 58-846, December 11, prepare Instructions for Continued even though it is not required l>y the
1992). the JAR-FAR 27 and 29 Ainvorthiness, which includes the existing regulations. This change would
Harmonization Working Group was maintenance manual or section and incorporate that current practice as a
chartered by the ARAC. The working maintenance instructions, and the requirement in the FAR.
group included representativE!s from Airworthiness Limitations section.
four major rotorcraft manufacturers Section 27.1141 Powerplant controls:
Accordingly, the FAA may propose general
(normal and transport) and critical parts requirements in a separate
representatives from AJA, AECMA, rulemaking, which may also propose This proposed new§ 27.1141(dj
Helicopter Association International changes to parts 21 and 43; would add to part 27 the ~equirement of
(HAI), JAA, and the FAA Rotorcraft § 29.114 l(d) that powerplant controls
Directorate. This broad participation is General Discussion of the Proposals must maintain any set position. The
consistent with FAA policy to have all These proposals would introduce proposed requirement states that eadi
known interested parties involved as safety improvements, clarify existing control "must be able to maintain any
early as practicable in the rulemaking regulations, and standardize set position without constant attention
process. terminology with the JAR's by revising or tendency to creep due to control
The Harmonization Working Group the airworthiness standards for loads or vibration." "Must be able to,"
was tasked with making rotorcraft performance, systems, in this regard, would require that the
recommendations to the ARAC propulsion, and airframes. These rotorcraft have identifiable design
concerning the FAA acceptance or proposed changes are based on features that keep the controls from
rejection of JAA Notice of Proposed requirements that have been adopted by moving. This requirement would
Amendments (NPA's) recently JAA for JAR 27 and 29. The part 27 improve safety by reducing pilot work
coordinated between the IAA and the proposals would require all-engines- load for part 27 rotorcraft. Because most
FAA. The ARAC subsequently operating (AEO) climb performance rotorcraft manufacturers already comply
recommended that the FAA revise the data, powerplant controls to maintain voluntarily with this standard, this
certification standards for normal and any set position, and rotor brake control should require no significant design or
tr,rnsport category rotorcraft as now standards. The proposals would also manufacturing effort.
contained in JAR 27 and 29. provide an option for the certification of Section 27.1151 Rotor broke controls
FAA Evaluations of ARAC and JAA part 27 rotorcraft to Category A; i.e., one
Proposals engine inoperative {OEI) requ:irements. This-proposed new section would add
The part Z9 proposals would provide to part 27 the requirements of§ 29.1151
The FAA has evaluated the ARAC on rotor brake eontrols. These proposed
recommendations and proposes changes standards for electrical bonding of requirements are necessary for the safe
to the rotorcraft certification rules in · airframe components to protect against operation of any rotorcraft equipped
both parts 27 and 29. These proposed lightning and precipitation static
discharge, a design assessment of rotors with a rotor brake. Requirements to
changes have evolved from the FAA- prevent inadvertent application of rotor
JAA industry meetings of 1990-1992 and drive train, and bird-strike
protection, Additional powerplant brakes in flight are necessary to prevent
and the ARAC recommendations of possible damage or fire due to rotor
1993. These proposed changes would instruments are proposed. The part 29
proposals would also clarify brake application. Current rotorcraft
(1) incorporate current d~ign and rotor.brake installations normally
testing practices into the rules by performance requirements for Category
A, flutter and divergence appw.cability. incorporate these design features; no
requiring additional performance data, significant design or manufacturing.
additional powerplant and rotor brake and emergency electrical power supply
effort should be necessary.
controls. and bird-strike protection, and requirements.
(2) harmonize the certification Discussion of Specific Proposals Appendix C to Part 27
requirements between Title 14 and the This proposed new appendix would
JAR. The proposals for part 27 include Section 27.l Applicability provide a list of part 29 Category A
JAA's harmonized NPA's 27-basic and Proposed new §27 l(c) would provide standards that are directly related to. the
27-1: rnrl the proposals for part 29 an optional basis for normal category continued safe powered flight capability
include NP A's 29-basic and 29-1 - multiengine rotorcraft to be certificated of a multiengine rotorcraft in the event
through 29-5. All sections of the to Category A requirements by meeting · of engine or other system failure. The
harmonized NPA's are included in these those design and performance proposed standards would be required
proposals except for§ 27.602 of NPA 27- requirements of part 29 as specified in to be met for an optional Category A
basic and § 29.602 of NPA 29-4. Those a new appendix C to part- 27 approval for a part 27 rotorcraft.
JAR sections include a critical parts
plan that would control the design, Section 27.65 Climb: all engines Section 29.547 Main and tail rotor
substantiation, manufacture, operating structures
maintenance, and modification of . This proposed revision of Proposed new§ 29.547(b} would
critical parts. While the JAA. prescribes § 27.65(b)(2) would require a require a design assessment that
manufacturing and maintenance determination of AEO climb identifies the critrcal components ofthe
requirements in JAR 29, the FAA does performance for all rotorcraft. Currently main and tail rotor structures. The
not do the same in part 29. Part-21 of rotorcraft AEO climb perfonnance is design assessment must also identify the
Title 14 addresses manufacturing required only for ambient conditions means (such as scheduled inspection,
rnquirements; part 43 of Title 14 where the never-exceed speed lV.,.,) is removal. and replacement of
•• 6i070 Federal Register I Vol. 59, No. 248 I Wednesday. December 28. 1994 I Proposed Rules

components) that minimize the possibility of increased damage from § 29.1305(al(6) would add a requirement
likelihood of fail~re for each critical bird strikes exists. In addition, the for an oil pressure indicator for each
component. effects of bird stri.kes on new materials pressure-lubricated gearbox. This
Section 29.610 Lightning and static used in rotorcraft must be evaluated. change would provide the crew with an
electricity protection The FAA has determined that a early warning of oil pressure problems
requirement for protection against and confirm that the oil pressure
The word "structure" would be added catastrophic effects from impact with a warning is valid. The proposed addition
to current§ 29.610(a) to clarify that 2.2 pound (1 kilogram) bird is of a new§ 29.1305(a)(6) would
these requirements address the reasonable for rotorcraft certificated in necessitate renumbering of existing
rotorcraft structure and not equipment. the transport category (part 29). A 2.2 paragraphs (al(6) through (a)(25) as
systems, and installations that are · pound bird represents the typical size (al(?) through (a)(26).
adequately covered under the for intended structural capability;
requirements of§ 29.1309. The therefore. such protection is being Section 29.1309 Systems. equipment.
proposed addition of the word proposed. Proposed § 29.631 would and installations
"stmcture" to paragraph (a) is intended require that the rotorcraft be designed to Section 29.610 was referenced in
to clarify that the metallic components assure capability of continued safe flight § 29.1309(h) to require protection
and nonmetallic components of and landing (for Category A) or safe against a catastrophic systems failure
paragraphs (b) and (c) are structural landing (for Category B) after bird strike. due to lightning. Since§ 29.1309(h)
cornponents. Proposed new paragraph In this regard. "capability" means that applies to lightning protection of
(d) would require electrical bonding of the design has features that assure systems and equipment, it is
,he rotorcraft components for protection continued safe flight and/or landing, as unnecessary to reference§ 29.610,
against hazardous effects from lightning would be required. Proposed § 29.631 which applies to lightning protection of
and discharge of static electricity. In this would also require that substantiation of structures, Therefore, this proposed
regard. the reference to the bonding and the design be based on tests or analysis change would delete the reference to
protection "be[ingl such as to" would of tests carried out on sufficiently § 29.610 in§ 29.1309(h).
require that the rotorcraft have representati\'e structures of design Section 29.1351 General
identifiable design features that achieve similar to that of the design to be
the standards required in paragraphs (d) approved. In this regard, "sufficiently" The proposed changes to
(1) through (4). Part 29 does not means that the structures at least §§ 29.1351(d) and 29.1351(d)(l) would
currently provide electrical bonding represent the design to be approved. clarify that the regulation applies to the
requirements. and experience has normal electrical power generating
shown that inadequate bonding can Section 29.917 Design system and would editorially change the
result in hazardous conditions due to A new § 29. 91 ?(b) is proposed for this § 29.1351(d) heading. The§ 29.1351(d)
discharge of static electricity. The section. and redesignation of existing heading would change from, "Operation
proposed new paragraph (d)(4) would paragraph (b) as (cl is proposed. This without normal electrical power'' to
require electrical bonding and proposed new§ 29.917(h) would require "Operation with the normal electrical
protection against lightning and static a design assessment that identifies power generating system inoperative,"
electricity that would reduce the effects critical components of the rotor drive and "generating system" would be
on the functioning of essential electrical system. The design assessment would added after electrical power in
and electronic equipment to an also identify the means that minimize § 29.1351(dl(l). '
acceptable level (as determined by the likelihood of failure for each critical The proposed additions to
§§ 29.1309 and 29.1431). component (such as scheduled § 29.1351(d)(2) would provide
inspection, removal, and replacement of requirements for the emergency
Section 29.629 Flutter and divergence electrical power system for Category A
components). This proposed section is a
This proposed revision of§ 29.629 companion to the rotor structure · · rotorcraft. Section 29.1351(d)(2) is
would add the words "and divergence" proposal of§ 29.547. entitled "Category A Aircraft." The
to the title and text of the section. This proposed new§ 29.1351(d)(Z)(i) would
proposal would extend the requirements Section 29.923 Rotor drive system and require that emergency electrical power
to cover aeroelastic instability other control mechanism tests be provided to those systems necessary
than flutter of aerodvnamic surfaces. This propo~ed revision to for continued safe flight and landing for
This proposal would require the use of § 29.923(b)(3)(i) would increase the rotorcraft certificated to Category A
rational analysis, tests. or a combini!tion testing for 2 minute OEI power from one requirements. Consideration of the
of analysis and tests to demonstrate to two runs per cycle. The JAA are possible duration of flight tinrn to reach
freedom from aeroelastic instability for conceri1ed that a possible inconsistency a suitable landing site a!)d make a safe
the basic design. Most manufacturers exists in ·the current rule. Using one run landing would be required. A minimum
currently do this type of analysis or test; per cycle. a higher and potentially more of 30 minutes flight time is necessary for
this change would require formal damaging power rating could be · continued safe flight and landing for
documentation and approval of that substantiated by less testing at the 2· Category A rotorcraft. Proposed ne\\.
analysis or test. minute OEI power than at the zth § 29.1351(d)(2)(ii) would require that
minute OEI power. The FAA agrees a11d loss of both normal and emergency
Section 29.631 Bird strike increased testing for 2 minute OEI · electrical power systems he shown to be
This proposed new section would power is proposed. extremely improbable. This will ensure
require bird-strike protection for that no single failure (such as effects of
transport rotorcraft. Rotorcraft, as \,;·ell Section 29.1305 Powerplant fire or loss of junction box) will result
as airplanes. are exposed to the instruments in the disabling of both the normal and
possibility of collision with a bird. With The current rule requires an oil emergency electrical power systems.
the potential for higher speeds by pressure warning ~evice. which could Finally. a new§ 29.1351(d)(2)(iii) would
modem transport rotorcraft designs and be a simple light, for each pressure- require that the emergency electrical
the changes in material technology. the luhricated gearbox. Proposed new power system include independent.
,, 1''!deral Register I Vol. 59, No. 248 I Wednesday, December 28, 1994 I Proposed Rules 67071

automatic features for electrical load this proposed rule (1) would generate included m the cost estimates of
shedding to conserve the emergency benefits exceeding its costs and is proposed§ 29 917 summarized below.
electrical power (batter1esJ after loss of neither a significant regulatory action as Formal identification and assessment of
the normal electrical power generating defined in the Executive Order nor critical component failures would
system. The intent is to allow the flight significant as defined in OOT's Policies increase safety by providing more
crew time to take corrective actions for and Procedures, (2) would not have a comprehensive maintenance
engine fire. cocki;5it fire. or other in· significant impact on a substantial · . information to operators. The beneffts of
flight emergencies common to situations number of small entities, and (3) would averting a single catastrophic accident
resulting in loss of the normal electrical lessen restraints on international trade. would exceed the relatively low
power generating system without being These analyses, available in the docket, incremental costs of compliance.
distracted by a need to manually switch are summarized below. Section 29.631-Bird strike.
off or shed electrical power. In this ?k'fanufacturers indicate that present
Costs and Benefits rotorcraft structures can withstand
regard, "immediate" refers to those
systems that, if they did not continue to All of the proposed changes to part 27 impacts from a 2.2 pound bird;
operate, would necessitate the attention and all but four of the proposed changes therefore, no incremental manufacturing
of the flight crew. to part 29 would impose no or costs are anticipated to implement new
significant costs on rotorcraft designs. Nonrecurring testing and
Section 29.1587 Performance manufacturers because they reflect analysis costs of the proposed
information current design practices. In recent years, requirement are estimated to be
Proposed new§ 29.1587(a)(6) would manufacturers have incorporated $100,000 per type certification. A
require that the climb gradient engineering and structural review of National Transportation
information necessary for the pilot to improvements into rotorcraft designs Safety Board (NTSB) data for the period
determine the allowable maximum that exceed the minimum regulatory 1983-1991 reveals two rotorcraft
takeoff weight to clear any obstacle in requirements with the aim of increasing accidents caused by bird strikes. One
the takeoff path be added to the operating efficiencies, payload_ accident resulted in one serious injury,
Rotorcraft Flight Manual for Category A capabilities, and marketability in world one minor injury, and substantial
rotorcraft. Because the data are already markets. Most new rotorcraft designs are damage to the· rotorcraft (tail rotor
a\'ailable from the other requirements, based on existing design.s. Many of these separation); in the other accident the
the only additional requirement would improvements have also improved rotorcraft was destroyed but there were
be to incorporate this data into the safety. Codification of these no injuries. There is at least an equal
Rotorcraft Flight Manual. improvements and other proposed probability of such accidents and the
changes would ensure that these resultant damage in the future, given the
Appt>ndix B to Part 29 Ainrnrthiness features are incorporated in all future tendencies toward higher operating
- Criteria for Helicopter Instrument Flight rotorcraft designs. speeds and use of composite materials.
The proposed addition of a section Additionally, adoption of the The ben.efits of averting a single
VIII(b)(6) to Appendix B would provide proposed changes would increase catastrophic accident would exceed the
a reference to new §29.1351(d)(2) to harmonization and commonality incremental· costs.
crarify that requirements for operation between U.S. and European Section 29.917-Design. The
with the normal electrical power airworthiness standards. Harmonization incremental costs to formalize existing
generating system inoperative apply to would eliminate differences between design information for the rotor
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) airworthiness requirements, thus structure (proposed§ 29.547 above) and
certificated rotorcraft. When the reducing manufacturers' cost for dual drive system are estimated to total
emergency electrical power source certification. Based on experience in a $44,000 per type certification. Formal
provided for an IFR certificated recent certification, one rotorcraft assessment and identification of critical
rotorcraft is time limited; e.g .. a battery, manufacturer indicated that complying components of the rotor drive system
the required duration will depend on with different FAA/JAA requirements would increase safety by providing
the type and role of the rotorcraft. resulted in several hundred thousand more comprehensive maintenance
However, an endurance of less than 30 dollars in excessive certification costs. information to operators. The benefits of
minutes would not be acceptable. Aside from the benefits of enhanced averting a single catastrophic accident
safety levels as described above, the caused directly or indirectly by a lack of
Regulatory Evaluation Summary benefits of certification cost savings relevant data would easily exceed the
would, by themselves, outweigh the incremental costs of providing that data.
Introduction Section 29.1587-Performance
relatively modest increase in
Proposed changes to federal certification costs that the amendments information. Because the required climb
regulations must undergo several would impose. · gradient data would already be available
economic analyses. First. Executive Following is a brief summary of the from the results of flight tests required
Order 12866 directs Federal agencies to four proposed changes to part 29 that to obtain performance information, the
promulgate new regulations or modify would impose additional costs totalling only additional costs would be those
_ existing regulations only if the potential approximately $150,000 per type associated with incorporating the data
benefits to society outweigh the certification. The safety benefits of these into the Rotorcraft Flight Manual,
potential costs. Second, the Regulatory proposed changes are expected to easily estimated to total $5,500 per
Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies exceed the incremental costs. certification. Although NTSB accident
to analyze the economic impact of Section 29.547-Main and tail rotor records do not include any accidents
regulatory changes on small entities. structure. While manufactures currently directly attributable to lack of
Finally. the Office of Management and perform the proposed design assessment performance data, there were d few
Budget has directed agencies to assess as an integral part of the design accidents in which such data were
the effects of regulatory changes on requirements of§ 29.917, lhere would ignored or misinterpreted. The
international trade. In conducting these be some incremental costs to formalize. availability and accuracy of such data ·
analyses. the FAA has determined that the existing information. These costs are would enhance operational safety The
,,
67072 Federal Register I Vol. 59. No. 248 I Wednesday. December 28, 1994 I Proposed Rules

benefits of averting a single catastrophic List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 27 and Appendix Clo Part 27-Criteria for Category
m:ddent caused directly or indirec;tly by 29 A
a lack of relevant performance Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation C27.1 General.
information would easily exceed the safety, Rotorcraft, Safety. A small multiengine rotocraft may not be
incremental costs of providing that data. type certificated for Category A operation
The Proposed Amendments unless it meets the design installation and
International Trade Impact Analysis performance requirements contained in this
Accordingly. the FAA proposes to
appendix in addition to the requirements of
The proposed rule would not amend parts 27 and 29 of the Federal this part.
constitute a barrier to international Aviation Regulations (14 CFR parts 27 C27.2 Applicable part 29 sections.
trade. including the export of American and 29) as follows: The following sections of part 29 of this
rotorcraft to foreign countries and the chapter must be met in addition to the
PART 27-AIRWORTHINESS
import of foreign rotorcraft into the requirements of this part:
STANDARDS:NORMALCATEGOBY
United States. Instead, the proposed ROTORCRAFT 29.45(a) and (b)(2~neral.
changes on rotorcraft certification 29.49(a)-Performance at minimum operating
procedures, harmonized with those of 1. The authority citation for part 27 speed.
the JAA, would lower dual certification continues to read as follows: 29.51-.Takeoff data: General.
29.53-Takeoff: Category A.
costs, thereby enhancing free trade. Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1344, 1354(a}, 1355, 29. 55-Takeoff decision point: Category A.
1421,1423.1425.1428,1429,and1430:49 29.59-Takeoff path: Category A.
Regulatory Flexibility Determination u.s.c. 106(g). 29.60-Blevated heliport takeoff path:
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 2. Section 27.1 is amended by adding Category A.
of 1980 was enacted by Congress to a new paragraph (c) to read as follows: 29.61-Takeoff distance: Category A.
ensure that small entities are not 29.62-Rejected takeoff: Category A.
§ 27.1 Applicability. 29.64-Climb: General.
unnecessarily and disproportionately 29.65(a)-Climb: AEO.
burdened by government regulations. * • • • 29.67(a)-Climb: OEI.
The RF A requires a Regulatory (cl Multiengine rotorcraft may be type 29.75--Landing: General.
Flexibility Analysis if a rule would have certificated as Category A provided the 29.77-Landlng decision point: Category A.
a significant economic impact, either requirements of appendix C of this part 29.79-Landing: Category A.
detrimental or beneficial, on a are met. 29.81-Landing distance (Ground level sitc>sl:
substantial number of small entities. 3. Section 27.65 is amended by Category A.
revising paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(2}(ii) 29.85--Balked landing: Category A.
Based on the criteria of FAA Order 29.87(a)-Height-velocity envelope.
to read as follows:
2100.14A, Regulatory Flexibility Criteria 29.547(a} and (b)-Main and tail rotor
and Guidance, the FAA has determined § 27.65 Climb: all engines operating. structure.
that the propos~d rule would not have * * • * * 29.571-Fatigue evaluation of structure. AC:
a significant economic impact on a (b) • • • Material only: AC29-2A Item 230
substantial number of small entities. Paragraph 10.
(2) The steady rate of climb must be
29.861(a)-Fire protection of structure.
Conclusion determined- controls, and other parts.
• • * • • 29.901(c)-Powerplant: Installation.
For the reasons discussed above, (ii) Within the range from sea level up 29.903(h)(c) and (el-Engines.
including the findings in the Regulatory to the maximum altitude for which 29.908(a)-Cooling fans.
Flexibility Determination and the certification is requested; 29.917(b) and (c)(t)-Rotordrive system:
International Trade Impact Analysis, the * * * * * Design.
29.927(c)(1)-Additional tests.
Office of Information and Regulatory 4. Section 2 7.1141 is amended by 29.953(a)-Fuel system independence.
Affairs (OIRA) in conjunction with the redesignating existing paragraphs (c) 29.1027(a]-Transmission and ge.arboxes:
FAA has determined that this proposed and (d) as paragraphs (d) and (e) and by General.
regulation is not a significant regulatory adding a new paragraph (c) to read as 29.1045(a)(1), (b), (c), (d), and (f)-Climb
action under Executive Order 12866 follows: cooling test procedures.
and, therefore, was not subject to 29.1047(a)-Takeoffcooling test procedures.
centralized regulatory review by the ! 27·1141 Powerplantcontrols: general. 29.118l(a)-Dosignated fire zones: Regions
included.
OIRA. In addition. the FAA certifies that * * * * 29. l 187(e)-Drainage and ventilation of fire
this regulation will not have 8 (c) Each control must be able to zones.
significant economic impact, positive or maintain any set position without- 29. l 189(c)-Sfmtoff means.
negative, on a substantial number of (1) Constant attention; or 29.1191 (a)(l)-Firewalls.
small entities under the criteria of the (Z) Tendency to creep due to control 29.1 l 93(el-Cowling and engine
loads or vibration. compartment covering.
Regulatory Flexibility Act. This
proposal is considered to be * • * * 29. l 195(a) and (d)-Fire extinguishing
5. Section 27.1151 is added to read as systems {one shot).
nonsignificant under OOT Regulatory 29.1197-Fire extinguishing agents.
Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; follows:
29.1199-Extinguishing agent containers.
February 26, 1979). An initial regulatory § 27.1151 Rotor brake controls. 29.1201-Fire extinguishing system
evaluation of the proposal, including a (a) It must be impossible to apply the materials. ·
Regulatory Flexibility Determination 29.1305(a)(6) and (b)-Powerplant
rotor brake inadvertently in flight. instruments.
and Trade)mpact Analysis, has been (b) TI1ere must be means to warn the 29.1309(b)(2)(i) and (d)-Equipment.
placed in the docket. A copy may be crew if the rotor brake has not been systems, and installations.
ubtained by contacting the person completely released before takeoff. 29.1323(c)(l)-Airspeed indicating system.
identified under FOR FURTHER 6. Part 27 is amended by adding a 29.1331(b)-lnstruments using a power .ii
!NFORMATION CONTACT new appendix C to read as follows: supply. , ~-1
...d.·'
•• c.'deral Register I Vol. 59, No. 248 I Wednesday, De_cember 28, 1994 I Proposed Rules 67073

29.1351(d)(2)-Electrical systems and (4) Reduce to an acceptable level the torque and the maximum speed for use
equipment: General (operation without effects of lightning and static electricity with the 2 minute OEI power for not
normal electrical power). on the functioning of essential electrical less than 2 minutes each; the second
29.1587(a)-Performance information. and electronic equipment. application must follow a period at
3. In complying with the paragraphs listed 10. Section 29.629 is revised to read stabilized continuous or 30 minute OEI
in paragraph 2 above, relevant material in AC as follows: power (whichever is requested by the
29-2A should be used.
applicant). At least one run sequence
§ 29.629 Flutter and divergence. must be conducted from a simulated
PART 29-AIRWORTHINESS
STANDARDS:TRANSPORT
Each aerodynamic surface of the "flight idle" condition.
rotorcraft must be free from flutter and • * * * *
CATEGORY ROTORCRAn
divergence under each appropriate 14. Section 29.1305 is amended by
7. The authority citation for part 29 speed and power condition. redesignating existing paragraphs (a)(6)
continues to read as follows: 11. A new § 29.631 is added to read through (a)(25) as paragraphs (a)(7)
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1344, 1354(a), 1355, as follows: through (a)(26) and adding a new
1421, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1428, 1429,and § 29.631 Bird strike. paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:
1430; 49 u.s.c. 106(g).
The rotorcraft must be designed to §29.1305 Powerplant Instruments.
8. Section 29.547 is amended by assure capability of continued safe flight * * * * *
revising the heading; revising paragraph and landing (for Category A) or safe (a) • • *
(a): adding a new paragraph (b); )anding (for Category Bl after impact (6) An oil pressure indicator for each
removing the word "main" in the with a 2.2 lb (1.0 leg) bird when the pressure-lubricated gearbox:
introductory text of paragraphs (c), (d), velocity of the rotorcraft (relative to the * * * * *
and (e); and revising paragraph (e)(l)(ii) bird along the flight path of the
to read as follows: 15. Section 29.1309 is amended by
rotorcraft) is equal to VNE or VH revising paragraph (h) to read as
§ 29.547 Main and tall rotor structure: (whichever is the lesser) at altitudes up follows:
(a) A rotor is an assembly of rotating to 8,000 feet. Compliance must be
components, which includes the rotor shown by tests or by analysis based on §29.1309 Equipment, systems, and
tests carried out on sufficiently Installations.
hub, blades, blade dampers, the pitch
control mechanisms, and all other parts representative structures of similar * * * * *
that rotate with the assembly. design. (h) In showing compliance with
(b) Each rotor assembly must be 12. Section 29.917 is amended by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,
designed as prescribed in this section redesignating existing paragraph (b) as the effects of lightning strikes on the
and must function safely for the critical (c) and adding a new paragraph (b) to rotorcraft must be considered.
flight load and operating conditions. A · read as follows: · 16. Section 29.1351 is amended by
design assessment must be performed, revising the heading of paragraph (d),
§ 29.917 Design. redesignating the introductory text of
including a detailed failure analysis to • * *
identify all failures that will prevent * * paragraph (d) as (d)(l) and adding the
continued safe flight or safe landing, (b) Design assessment. A design words "generating system" after the
and must identify the means to assessment must be performed to ensure words "normal electrical power" in new
minimize the likelihood of their that the rotor drive system functions (d)(l), redesignating paragraphs (d)(l),
occurrence. safely over the full range of conditions (d)(2), and (d)(3) as (d)(l)(i), (d)(l)(ii),
for which certification is sought. The and (d)(l)(iii), and adding a new
* * * * design assessment must include a paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:
(e) * * * detailed failure analysis to identify all
(1) * * * §29.1351 General.
(ii) For the main rotor, the limit failures that will prevent continued safe
engine torque specified in§ 29.361. flight or safe landing and must identify * * * * *
the means to minimize the likelihood of (d) Operation with the normal
* * * * * their occurrence. electrical power generating system
9. In§ 29.610 the heading is revised; inoperative. * * *
the word "structure" is added between * * * * *
the words "rotorcraft" and "must" in 13. Section 29.923 is amended by * * • * *
revising paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read as (2) Additional requirements for
paragraph (a); and a new paragraph (d) Category A Rotorcraft.
is added to read as follows: follows:
(i) Unless it can be shown that the
§ 29.610 Lightning and static electricity § 29.923 Rotor drive system and control loss of the normal electrical power
protection. mechanism tests. generating system is extremely
* * * * * * • * • * improbable, an emergency electrical
(d) The electrical bonding and (b) * * • power system, independent of the
protection against lightning and static (3) * * -~ normal electrical power generating
electricity must be such as to- (i) Immediately following any one 5· system, must be provided, with
(1) Minimize the accumulation of minute power-on run required by sufficient capacity to power all systems
electrostatic charge; paragraph (b)(l) of this section, simulate necessary for continued safe flight and
(2) Minimize the risk of electrical a failure for each power source in turn, landing. _
shock to crew, passengers, and service and apply the maximum torque and the (ii) Failures, including junction box,
and maintenance personnel using maximum speed for use with 30-second control panel, or wire bundle fires,
normal precautions; OEI power to the remaining affected which would result in the loss of the
(3) Provide an electric.al return path, drive system power inputs for not less normal and emergency systems, must be
under both normal and fault conditions, than 30 seconds. Each application of 30· shown to be extremely improbable.
on rotorcraft having grounded electrical second OEI power must be followed by (iii) Systems necessary for immediate
systems; and two applications of the maximum safety must continue to operate .,,,
..
- Fedt?ral Register I Vol. 59, No. 248 I Wednesday, December 28, 1994 I Proposed Rules

following the loss of the nonnal

electrical power generating system,
(i) In the flight conditions required in Appendix B to Part 29-Airworthlness
§ 29.67(a)(t) between the end of the Criteria for Helicopter Instrument
without the need for flight crew action. takeoff distance and the point at which Flight
17. Section 29.1587 is amended by the rotorcraft is 200 feet above the
adding a new paragraph (a}(6), removing takeoff surface (or 200 feet above the * * * * •
"and" from end of paragraph (a)(4), and lowest point of the takeoff profile for vm. * * *
adding "and" to end of paragraph (a)(5). (bl •••
elevated heliports).
(6) In detenniniog compliance with the
§ 29.1587 Performance Information. (ii) In the flight conditions required in requirements of§ 29.135t(d)(2), the supply of
* * * * * § 29.67(a)(2) between the points at electrical power to all systems necessary for
which the rotorcraft is 200 and 1000 feet flight under IFR must be included in the
(a) * * * evaluation.
above the takeoff surface (or 200 and
{6) The steady gradient of climb for Issued in Washington, OC, on December
each weight, altitude, and temperature 1000 feet above the lowest point of the 12, 1994.
for which takeoff data are to be takeoff profile for elevated heliports).
Thomas E. McSweeny,
scheduled, along the takeoff path * * * * * Director, Aircraft Certif,cation Service.
determined in the flight conditions 18. Part 29 Appendix Bis amended by [FR Doc. 94-31311 Filed 12-27-94; 8:45 am)
required in § 29.67 (a)(l) and (a)(2): adding a new paragraph VIIl(b)(6). BILLING CODE ••10-1M1
21904 Federal Register I Vol. 61. No. 92 I Friday. May 10. 1996 I Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION participation is consistent with FAA been removed since AC material is
policy to involve all known interested advisory only. A note has been added
Federal Aviation Administration parties as early as practicable in the that informs the reader that there is
rulemaking process. appropriate guidance material available.
14 CFR Parts 27 and 29 The Harmonization Working Group Further, the requirement to meet
[Docket No. 28008; Amendment No. 27--33, was tasked with making § 29.571 standards for certification as a
29--39) recommendations to the ARAC part 2 7 Category A rotorcraft has been
regarding JAA Notices of Proposed removed from the Appendix C listing.
RIN 2120-AF65 Amendment (NPA's). The ARAC The FAA has determined that the
Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based subsequently recommended that the current§ 27.571 contains sufficient
on European Joint Aviation FAA revise the airworthiness standards certification standards to maintain an
Requirements for normal and transport category adequate level of safety for part 27
rotorcraft to those currently in the JAR Category A rotorcraft, and an additional
AGENCY: Federal Aviation 27 and 29. requirement of testing to § 29.571
Administration, DOT. The FAA evaluated the ARAC standards is unnecessary.
ACTION: Final rule. recommendations and proposed
changes to the rotorcraft airworthiness Discussion of Comments
SUMMARY: The Federal Aviation standards in 14 CFR parts 27 and 29 Interested persons have been afforded
Administration (FAA) is amending the (parts 27 and 29). These proposed an opportunity to participate in the
airworthiness standards for normal and changes evolved from the FAA, JAA, making of these amendments. Due
transport category rotorcraft. The and industry meetings of 1990-1992 consideration has been given to the
changes revise airworthiness standards and the ARAC recommendations of comments received. Comments were
for performance, systems, propulsion, 1993. The changes proposed to (1) received from the JAA, HAI, Transport
and airframes. The changes increase the incorporate current design and testing Canada, and the United Kingdom Civil
regulatory safety level. clarify existing practices into the rules by requiring Aviation Authority (UKCAA).
regulations, and standardize additional performance data, (2) The JAA agrees with the proposed
terminology. The changes are based on incorporate additional powerplant and rule and the effort to harmonize
standards incorporated by the European rotor brake controls requirements, (3) certification regulations of the U.S. and
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) for incorporate bird-strike protection the European communities. To fulfill
Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) 27 requirements, and (4) harmonize the harmonization objectives, the JAA
and 29. These changes are intended to certification requirements between parts prepared an NP A identical to the NPRM
harmonize the U.S. rotorcraft 27 and 29 and the JAR. The proposals and will publish the JAR final rule at
airworthiness standards with the for part 27 included JAA's harmonized the same time as this time as this final
European JAR. NP A's 27-Basic and 27-1, and the rule for parts 27 and 29.
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 8, 1996. proposals for part 29 included NPA's HAI comments that the proposals
29-Basic and 29-1 through 29-5. This faithfully reflect the recommendation
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: made to the FAA by the ARAC on
Carroll Wright, Regulations Group rule contains the harmonized rule
language of those sections of the NPA's rotorcraft regulatory changes. HAI
Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft further comments that the NPRM
Certification Service, Federal Aviation except for§ 27.602 of NPA 27-Basic and
§ 29.602 of NPA 29-4. reflects prudent rulemaking to increase
Administration, Fort Worth, Texas In proposed rule, NPRM 94-36, there safety, economic viability. and
76193--0111, telephone (817) 222-5120. were several instances in which a few harmonization within realistic
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: descriptive words were proposed to requirements and urges the adoption of
either be removed from or added to the proposal.
Background Transport Canada comments that the
regulatory text. These word changes
These amendments are based on were adequately described in the NPRM was not the same as the ARAC
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) amendatory language to NPRM 94-36 recommendations in that there were
No. 94-36 published in the Federal when that proposal was published in changes in the nonregulatory sections
Register on December 28, 1994 (59 FR the Federal Register. However, at least (preamble) and in the proposed text of
67068). That notice proposed to amend one commenter misunderstood the the rule. The commenter states that
the airworthiness standards for both amendatory language. Therefore, to these changes cause concern because
normal and transport category rotorcraft avoid possible misunderstanding about the discrepancies may lead to different
based on recommendations from the the final rule language, the paragraphs interpretations. The commenter notes
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory with the minor rule language changes that the meaning of§ 29.547 was
Committee (ARAC). By announcement are reproduced in their entirety in this changed because the word "main" had
in the Federal Register (57 FR 58846, final rule. Also, the numbering of other been removed in the ARAC
December 11, 1992), the "JAR/FAR 27 regulations referenced in recommendations but was not removed
and 29 Harmonization Working Group" §§ 29.1587(a)(4) and (a)(5) has been in the NPRM. This commenter also
was chartered by the ARAC. The changed, and a new § 29.1587(a)(6) has states that the requirements of§§ 29.547
working group included representatives been added. The current § 29.1587(a)(6), and 29.917 are redundant because
from four major rotorcraft manufacturers which is being redesignated in this rule § 29.571 also requires the identification
(normal and transport) and as § 29.1587(a)(7), was added by the of the principal structural elements
representatives from Aerospace Transport Category Rotorcraft (PSE) that includes rotors and rotor
Industries Association of America, Inc. Performance Rule published elsewhere drive systems with the establishment of
(AIA), Association Europeene des in this issue of the Federal Register. the inspections and replacement times
Constructeurs de Material Aerospatial In this final rule, under the heading for those PSE's. Additionally, the
(AECMA), Helicopter Association "Appendix C to Part 27-Criteria for commenter says that§ 29.610 should
International (HAI), JAA, and the FAA Category A," the NPRM 94-36 cites to state that it addresses only "direct
Rotorcraft Directorate. This broad Advisory Circular (AC) material have effects" of lightning and electricity and
 Federal Register .i Voi. 61. No. 92 I Friday. \fay 10, 1996 I Rules and Regulations 21905

that indirect effects are covered structures. The commenter's proposal to The sentence was adopted in
elsewhere in§§ 29.954, 29.863, 29.1309, retain the reference to§ 29.610 is not Amendment 29-34 due to a
etc. This commenter also states that adopted. commenter's statement that if the 5-
§ 29.1309 should retain the reference to The FAA disagrees with this minute takeoff power run to qualify the
§ 29.610. This commenter also suggests commenter's suggestion that a new drive system is conducted as part of the
adding a new requirement and requirement and paragraph be added to endurance run, and the 30-second/2-
paragraph to Appendix B to part 29 that part 29, Appendix B, to require an minute OEI requirements are conducted
would require an additional, self- additional, self-powered third attitude on a bench test, then the takeoff power
powered third attitude indicator. indicator. Part 29, Appendix B, 5-minute run will be conducted twice
The FAA agrees with Transport paragraph VIII(a)(2) currently requires a on the same set of gears. The FAA did
Canada that editorial changes between standby attitude indicator that is not intend to duplicate the takeoff
the ARAC recommendations and the independent of the aircraft electrical power 5-minute run if the OEI
NPRM are a concern because the generating system. Additionally, part requirements are conducted on a bench
differences may lead to different 29, Appendix B, paragraph VIII(b)(5)(iii) test, and the sentence was adopted for
interpretations. To obviate this concern, states, "The equipment, systems, and clarification. Since the omission of the
editorial changes have been made in the installations must be designed so that sentence in NPRM 94-36 was
final rule language to make it consistent one display of the information essential inadvertent, since the reasons for
with the ARAC recommended language. to the safety of flight that is provided by including the sentence remain valid,
Also, the FAA agrees with Transport the instruments will remain available to and since the sentence is relieving in
Canada that the word "main" had been a pilot, without additional crew-member nature and does not place any
removed from the introductory action, after any single failure or additional burden on manufacturers, it
paragraph of§ 29.547(c), (d), and (e) in combination of failures that is not is unnecessary to solicit prior public
the ARAC recommended language but, shown to be extremely improbable comment. Therefore, the sentence is
as previously discussed, had not been * * *." Currently, the only practical restored as requested by the commenter.
shown as removed in the NPRM rule design to meet the extremely After considering all of the comments,
language. However, the word "main" is improbable (10- 9 ) requirement of part the FAA has determined that air safety
being removed from this final rule. 29, Appendix B, for the display of and the pubic interest support adoption
The FAA does not agree with this information essential to flight safety of the amendments with the changes
commenter that§§ 29.547, 29.571, and after a single failure or combination of noted.
29.917 are redundant in requiring failures is the design that uses a third
identification of principal structural Regulatory Evaluation Summary
attitude indicator powered by a source
elements (PSE's), which include rotors other than the aircraft electrical Proposed changes to federal
and rotor drive systems, and the generating system. However, the FAA regulations must undergo several
establishment of the inspections, does not wish to limit future alternative economic analyses. First, Executive
replacement times of those PSE's. designs that may meet the extremely Order 12866 directs that each Federal
Section 29.547(b) requires a design improbable standard without a third agency shall propose or adopt a
assessment for main and tail rotor attitude indicator. The suggestion of the regulation only upon a reasoned
structure components (rotor hub, blades, commenter to add a requirement for a determination that the benefits of the
pitch control mechanisms, etc);§ 29.571 self-powered third attitude indicator is intended regulation justify its costs.
requires fatigue evaluation of structural not adopted. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
components; and§ 29.917 requires a The UKCAA comments that Proposal of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the
design assessment of the rotor drive No. 13 in NPRM 94-36 proposed to economic effect of regulatory changes
system (drive shafts, transmission, amend § 29.923(b)(3)(i), to require two on small entities. Third, the Office of
gearboxes, etc). Therefore, these are non applications of 2-minute power Management and Budget directs
redundant requirements. The language following each application of 30-second agencies to assess the effect of
is adopted as proposed. power, instead of the one application of regulatory changes on international
The FAA agrees with the intent of this 2-minute power previously proposed. trade. In conducting these analyses, the
commenter's suggestion that§ 29.610 The UKCAA fully supports the FAA has determined that this rule: (1)
should clearly indicate that it addresses proposed changes in NPRM 94-36. would generate benefits that justify its
only "direct effects" of lightning and However, the UKCAA further comments costs and is not "a significant regulatory
electricity. However, this was achieved that since publication of NPRM 94-36, action" as defined in the Executive
in the NPRM by adding the word the FAA published Amendment 29-34 Order; (2) is nonsignificant as defined in
"structure" between the words (59 FR 47764, September 16, 1994) that DOT's Regulatory Policies and
"rotorcraft" and "must" in§ 29.610(a) to states in part, "When conducted on a Procedures; (3) would not have a
clarify that this paragraph applied to bench test, the test sequence must be significant impact on substantial
rotorcraft structure and not to systems conducted following stabilization at number of small entities; and (4) will
and equipment. Accordingly, the take-off power." The commenter states lessen restraints on international trade.
language is adopted as proposed. that the reason for adding this sentence, These analyses, available in the docket,
The FAA does not agree with this as stated in the preamble to Amendment are summarized below.
commenter that § 29.1309 should retain 29-34, remains valid, and this sentence
the reference to§ 29.610. The NPRM should therefore be included in the final Cost-Benefit Analysis
added the word "structure" to§ 29.610 rule developed from NPRM 94-36. All of the changes to part 2 7 and all
to clarify that the paragraph applied to The FAA concurs with the UK CAA but four of the changes to part 29 will
rotorcraft structure and not to systems that the reason for adding the sentence, impose no or insignificant costs on
and equipment. Since§ 29.1309(h) "When conducted on a bench test, the rotorcraft manufacturers since they
applies to lightning protection of test sequence must be conducted largely reflect current design practices.
systems and equipment, it is following stabilization at take-off In recent years, manufacturers have
inappropriate to reference§ 29.610, power" remains valid and the sentence incorporated engineering and structural
which applies to lightning protection of should be retained in§ 29.923(b)(3)(i). improvements into rotorcraft designs
 21906 Federal Register I Vol. 61, No. 92 I Friday, May 10, 1996 i Rules and Regulations

that exceed minimum regulatory were no injuries. There is at least an certification costs of the rule are less
requirements with the aim of increasing equal probability of such accidents in than $19,000.
operating efficiencies, payload the future, given the tendencies toward
capabilities, and marketability in world higher operating speeds. The benefits of International Trade Impact Assessment
markets. Many of these improvements averting a single accident will exceed The rule will not constitute a barrier
have also inherently improved safety the incremental costs of the amendment. to international trade, including the
codification of these improvement and Section 29.917-Design. The export of American rotorcraft to other
other changes will ensure continuation incremental costs to formalize existing countries and the import of rotorcraft
of enhanced safety levels in future design information for the rotor into the United States. Instead, the
rotorcraft designs. structure(§ 29.547 above) and drive changes will harmonize with
The changes will also increase system are estimated to total $47,000 certification procedures of the JAA and
harmonization and commonality per type certification. Formal thereby enhance free trade.
between U.S. and European identification and assessment of critical Conclusion
airworthiness standards. Harmonization component failures of the rotor drive
will eliminate the need to comply with system will increase safety by providing For the reasons discussed above,
different FAA and JAA airworthiness more comprehensive maintenance including the findings in the Regulatory
requirements, thus reducing information to operators. The benefits of Flexibility Determination and the
manufacturers' certification costs. Based averting a single accident caused International Trade Impact Analysis, the
on experience in a recent certification, directly or indirectly by a lack of FAA has determined that this regulation
one rotorcraft manufacturer indicated relevant data would easily exceed the is not a significant regulatory action
that complying with different FAA and incremental costs. under Executive Order 12866. In
JAA requirements resulted in several Section 29.1587-Performance addition, the FAA certifies that this
hundred thousand dollars of excessive information. Since the required climb regulation will not have a significant
certification costs (as related to all part gradient data are already available from economic impact, positive or negative,
, 27 and 29 requirements). The duplicate the results of flight tests required to on a substantial number of small entities
certification costs avoided by the obtain performance information, the under the criteria of the Regulatory
harmonized rule alone could outweigh Flexibility Act. This regulation is
only additional costs will be those
the relatively modest increase in considered nonsignificant under DOT
associated with incorporating the data
certification costs imposed by the few Order 2100.5. A final regulatory
into the Flight Manual, estimated to
new requirements. Following is a evaluation of the regulation, including a
total $6,000 per type certification. The
summary of the four changes to part 29 final Regulatory Flexibility
availability and accuracy of
that will impose additional costs Determination and International Trade
totaling approximately $160,000 per performance data are paramount to
operational safety. The benefits of Impact Analysis, has been placed in the
type certification. The safety benefits of docket. A copy may be obtained by
these changes are expected to easily averting a single accident caused
directly or indirectly by a lack of contacting the person identified under
exceed the incremental costs. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
Section 29.547-Main and tail rotor relevant performance information will
structure. While manufacturers easily exceed the incremental costs. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 27 and
currently perform the design assessment Regulatory Flexibility determination 29
as an integral part of the design Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
requirements of§ 29.917, there will be The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.
some incremental costs to formalize the (RF A) was enacted by Congress to
existing information. These costs are ensure that small entities are not The Amendments
included in the cost estimates of unnecessarily and disproportionately In consideration of the foregoing, the
§ 29.917 summarized below. Formal burdened by Federal Regulations. The Federal Aviation Administration
identification and assessment of critical RF A requires a Regulatory Flexibility amends parts 27 and 29 of Title 14,
component failures will increase safety Analysis if a proposed rule would have Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR
by providing more comprehensive "a significant economic impact on a parts 27 and 29) as follows:
maintenance information to operators. substantial number of small entities."
The benefits of averting a single Based on the criteria of FAA Order PART 27-AIRWORTHINESS
accident will exceed the relatively low 2100.14A, the FAA has determined that STANDARDS:NORMALCATEGORY
incremental costs of compliance. the rule will not have a significant ROTORCRAFT
Section 29.631-Bird strike. impact on a substantial number of small
Manufacturers indicate that present entities. 1. The authority citation for part 27
rotorcraft structures can withstand The rule will affect manufacturers of continues to read as follows:
impacts with 2.2 pound birds; therefore, future type-certificated normal (part 27) Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
no incremental manufacturing costs are and transport category (part 29) 44702, 44704.
anticipated. Nonrecurring testing and rotorcraft. For manufacturers, Order 2. Section 27.1 is amended by adding
analysis costs of the requirement are 2100.14A defines a small entity as one a new paragraph (cl to read as follows:
estimated to be $107,000 per type with 75 or fewer employees and a
certification. A review of National significant economic impact as § 27.1 Applicability.
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) annualized costs of $19,000 or more. * * * * *
data for the period 1983-1991 reveals The FAA has determined that the rule (c) Multiengine rotorcraft may be type
two rotorcraft accidents caused by bird will not have a significant economic certificated as Category A provided the
strikes. One accident resulted in one impact on a substantial number of small requirements referenced in appendix C
serious injury, one minor injury, and manufacturers since (1) no part 29 and of this part are met.
substantial damage to the rotorcraft (tail only two part 27 rotorcraft 3. Section 27.65 is amended by
rotor separation); in the other accident, manufacturers have 75 or fewer revising paragraphs (b)(2) introductory
the rotorcraft was destroyed but there employees, and (2) the annualized text and (b)(2)(ii) to read as follows:
 Federal Register I Vol. 61, No. 92 I Friday, May 10, 1996 I Rules and Regulations 21907

§ 27.65 Climb: all engines operating. 29.861(a)-Fire protection of structure, continued safe flight or safe landing,
controls, and other parts. and must identify the means to
(b) * * * 29.901(c)-Powerplant: Installation. minimize the likelihood of their
(2) The steady rate of climb must be 29.903(b) (c) and (el-Engines.
29. 908(a)-Cooling fans. occurrence.
determined- 29.917(b) and (c)(l)-Rotor drive system: (c) The rotor structure must be
* * * Design. designed to withstand the following
(ii) Within the range from sea level up 29.927(c)(1)-Additional tests. loads prescribed in§§ 29.337 through
to the maximum altitude for which 29.953(a)-Fuel system independence. 29.341 and 29.351:
certification is requested; 29.1027(a)-Transmission and gearboxes: *
General.
* * * *
* * * * (d) The rotor structure must be
29.1045(a)(1). (b), (c), (d). and (0-Climb
4. Section 27.1141 is amended by cooling test procedures.
designed to withstand loads
redesignating existing paragraphs (cl 29.1047(a)-Takeoff cooling test procedures. simulating-
and (d) as paragraphs (d) and (e) and by 29.1181(a)-Oesignated fire zones: Regions * * *
adding a new paragraph (c) to read as included. (e) The rotor structure must be
follows: 29.1187(e)-Drainage and ventilatio:1 0f fire designed to withstand the limit torque
zones. at any rotational speed, including zero.
§ 27.1141 Powerplant controls: general. 29.1189(c)-S:mtoff means. In addition:
* * * * 29.1191(a)(1)-Firewalls.
29.1193(e)-Cowling and engine (1) * * *
(c) Each control must be able to
maintain any set position without- compartment covering. * * * * *
(1) Constant attention; or 29.1195(a) and (d)-Fire extinguishing (ii) For the main rotor, the limit
(2) Tendency to creep due to control systems (one shot). engine torque specified in§ 29.361.
29.1197-Fire extinguishing agents.
loads or vibration. * * * * *
29.1199-Extinguishing agent containers.
* * * * 29.1201-Fire extinguishing system 9. Section 29.610 is amended by
5. New§ 27.1151 is added to read as materials. revising the heading; by revising
follows: 29.1305(a) (6) and (b)-Powerplant paragraph (a); and by adding a new
instruments. paragraph (d) to read as follows:
§ 27.1151 Rotor brake controls. 29.1309(b)(2) (i) and (d)-Equipment.
(a) It must be impossible to apply the systems, and installations. § 29.610 Lightning and static electricity
rotor brake inadvertently in flight. 29.1323(c)(1)-Airspeed indicating system. protection.
(b) There must be means to warn the 29.1331(b)-Instruments using a power (a) The rotorcraft structure must be
crew if the rotor brake has not been supply. protected against catastrophic effects
completely released before takeoff. 29.1351(d)(2)-Electrical systems and from lightning.
6. Part 27 is amended by adding a equipment: General (operation without
normal electrical power). * * * * *
new appendix C to read as follows: (d) The electric bonding and
29.1587(a)-Performance information.
Appendix C to Part 27-Criteria for Note: In complying with the paragraphs
protection against lightning and static
Category A listed in paragraph C27.2 above, relevant electricity must-
material in the AC "Certification of Transport (1) Minimize the accumulation of
C2 7. 1 General. Category Rotorcraft" should be used. electrostatic charge;
A small multiengine rotorcraft may not be (2) Minimize the risk of electric shock
type certificated for Category A operation PART 29-AIRWORTHINESS
unless it meets the design installation and
to crew, passengers, and service and
performance requirements contained in this STANDARDS:TRANSPORT maintenance personnel using normal
appendix in addition to the requirements of CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT precautions;
this part. 7. The authority citation for part 29 (3) Provide an electrical return path,
C27.2 Applicable part 29 sections. The continues to read as follows: under both normal and static electricity
following sections of part 29 of this chapter on the functioning of essential electrical
must be met in addition to the requirements Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, and electronic equipment.
of this part: 44702, 44704. (4) Reduce to an acceptable level the
29.45(a) and (b)(2)-General. 8. Section 29.547 is amended by effects of lightning and static electricity
29.49(a)-Performance at minimum operating revising the heading; by revising on the functioning of essential
speed. paragraph (a); by revising the electronic equipment.
29.51-Takeoff data: General.
introductory text in paragraphs (c), (d), 10. Section 29.629 is revised to read
29.53-Takeoff: Category A.
29.55-Takeoff decision point: Category A. and (e); by revising paragraph (e)(l)(ii); as follows:
29.59-Takeoff Path: Category A. and by adding paragraph (b) to read as
follows: § 29.629 Flutter and divergence.
29.60-Elevated heliport takeoff path:
Category A. Each aerodynamic surface of the
29.61-Takeoff distance: Category A. § 29.547 Main and tail rotor structure. rotorcraft must be free from flutter and
29.62-Rejected takeoff: Category A. (a) A rotor is an assembly of rotating divergence under each appropriate
29.64-Climb: General. components, which includes the rotor speed ·s.nd power condition.
29.65(a)-Climb: AEO. hub, blades, blade dampers, the pitch 11. Section 29.631 is added before the
29.67(a)-Climb: OE!. control mechanisms, and all other parts undesignated center heading, "Rotors"
29.75-Landing: General. that rotate with the assembly. to read as follows:
29.77-Landing decision point: Category A. (b) Each rotor assembly must be
29.79-Landing: Category A. § 29.631 Bird strike.
designed as prescribed in this section
29.81-Landing distance (Ground level sites):
Category A.
and must function safely for the critical The rotorcraft must be designated to
29.85-Balked landing: Category A. flight load and operating conditions. A ensure capability of continued safe
29.87(a)-Height-velocity envelope. design assessment must be performed, flight and landing (for Category A) or
29.547(a) and (b)-Main and tail rotor including a detailed failure analysis to safe landing (for Category Bl after
structure. identify all failures that will prevent impact with a 2.2-lb (1.0 kg) bird when
21908 Federal Register ! Vol. 61, .No. 92 I Friday, May 10. 1996 I Rules and Regulations

the velocity of the rotorcraft (relative to through (a)(25) as paragraphs (a)(7) necessary for continued safe flight and
the bird along the flight path of the through (a)(26) and by adding a new landing.
rotorcraft) is equal to VNE or VH paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows: (ii) Failures, including junction box,
(whichever is the lesser) at altitudes up control panel, or wire bundle fires,
to 8,000 feet. Compliance must be § 29.1305 Powerplant instruments
which would result in the loss of the
shown by tests or by analysis based on • • normal and emergency systems, must be
tests carried out on sufficiently (a) • • •
shown to be extremely improbable.
representative structures of similar (6) An oil pressure indicator for each
pressure-lubricated gearbox. (iii) Systems necessary for immediate
design. safety must continue to operate
12. Section 29.917 is amended by • • • following the loss of the normal
redesignating existing paragraph (b) as 15. Section 29.1309 is amended by
electrical power generating system,
(cl and by adding a new paragraph (b) revising paragraph (h) to read as
without the need for flight crew action.
to read as follows: follows:
17. Section 29.1587 is amended by
§ 29.917 Design. §29.1309 Equipment, systems, and redesignating (a)(6) as (a)(7). by
installations removing "and" from the end of
• • • • •
(b) Design assessment. A design • • • • * paragraph (a)(5). and by adding a new
assessment must be performed to ensure (h) In showing compliance with paragraph (a)(6) to read as follows:
that the rotor drive system functions paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,
§ 29.1587 Performance Information.
safely over the full range of conditions the effects of lightning strikes on the
rotorcraft must be considered. • • *
for which certification is sought. The
16. Section 29.1351(d) is revised to (a) • • •
design assessment must include a
detailed failure analysis to identify all read as follows: (6) The steady gradient of climb for
failures that will prevent continued safe each weight. altitude, and temperature
§ 29.1351 General
flight or safe landing and must identify for which takeoff data are to be
• * * • scheduled, along the takeoff path
the means to minimize the likelihood of (d) Operation with the normal
their occurrence. determined in the flight conditions
electrical power generating system required in§ 29.67(a)(1) and (a)(2):
• • • inoperative.
13. Section 29.923 is amended by (1) It must be shown by analysis, tests, (i) In the flight conditions required in
revising paragraph (b)(3)(i) to read as or both, that the rotorcraft can be § 29.67(a)(1) between the end of the
follows: operated safely in VFR conditions for a takeoff distance and the point at which
period of not less than 5 minutes, with the rotorcraft is 200 feet above the
§ 29.923 Rotor drive system and control
the normal electrical power generating takeoff surface (or 200 feet above the
mechanism tests. lowest point of the takeoff profile for
system (electrical power sources
• * • excluding the battery) inoperative, with elevated heliports);
(b) • • • (ii) In the flight conditions required in
(3) • • *
critical type fuel (from the standpoint of
flameout and restart capability). and § 29.67(a)(2) between the points at
(i) Immediately following any one 5- which the rotorcraft is 200 and 1000 feet
with the rotorcraft initially at the
minute power-on run required by above the takeoff surface (or 200 and
maximum certificated altitude. Parts of
paragraph (b)(l) of this section, simulate 1000 feet above the lowest point of the
the electrical system may remain on if-
a failure for each power source in turn, (i) A single malfunction, including a takeoff profile for elevated heliports);
and apply the maximum torque and the wire bundle or junction box fire, cannot and
maximum speed for use with 30-second result in loss of the part turned off and • * •
OEI power to the remaining affected the part turned on; 18. Part 29 Appendix Bis amended by
drive system power inputs for not less (ii) The parts turned on are adding a new paragraph VIII(b)(6) to
than 30 seconds. Each application of 30- electrically and mechanically isolated read as follows:
second OEI power must be followed by from the parts turned off; and
two applications of the maximum (iii) The electrical wire and cable Appendix B to Part 29-Airworthiness
torque and the maximum speed for use insulation, and other materials, of the Criteria for Helicopter Instrument
with the 2 minute OEI power for not parts turned on are self-extinguishing Flight
less than 2 minutes each; the second when tested in accordance with • • • *
application must follow a period at §25.1359(d) in effect on September 1, VIII*
stabilized continuous or 30 minute OEI 1977. (b) • • •
power (whichever is requested by the (2) Additional requirements for (6) In determining compliance with the
applicant). At least one run sequence Category A Rotorcraft. requirements of§ 29.1351(d)(2), the supply of
must be conducted from a simulated (i) Unless it can be shown that the electrical power to all systems necessary for
"flight idle" condition. When flight under !FR must be included in the
loss of the normal electrical power
conducted on a bench test, the test evaluation.
generating system is extremely
sequence must be conducted following Issued in Washington, DC. on May 2. 1996.
improbable, an emergency electrical
stabilization at take-off power. power system, independent of the David R. Hinson,
• • • normal electrical power generating Administrator.
14. Section 29.1305 is amended by system, must be provided, with [FR Doc. 96-11493 Filed 5-9-96; 8:45 am]
redesignating existing paragraphs (a)(6) sufficient capacity to power all systems BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
 U.S. Deportment
Advisory
ot Tronspo1ation
Federal Avkltton
Administration
Circular

Subject: CERTIFICATION OF TRANSPORT Date: 7/30/97 AC No: 29-28

CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT Initiated by: AS W-1 10 Change:

1. PURPOSE:

a. This is a total revision of AC 29-2A dated 9/16/87, with changes 1, 2, and 3, dated
4/24/89, 9/24/91, and 6/1/95 respectively, incorporated. In addition, new material plus changes to
existing paragraphs have been incorporated. This consolidated version is now renumbered as
AC 29-28 and replaces AC 29-2A in its entirety. This revises existing material in 25 paragraphs
and adds new material for 33 paragraphs.

b. b. This AC does not change regulatory requirements and does not authorize
changes in, or deviations from regulatory requirements. This AC establishes an acceptable
means, but not the only means of compliance. Since the guidance material presented in this AC
is not regulatory, terms having a mandatory definition, such as "shall" and "must," etc., as used in
this AC, apply either to the reiteration of a regulation itself, or to an applicant who chooses to
follow a prescribed method of compliance without deviation.

c. This advisory circular provides information on methods of compliance with

14 CFR Part 29, which contains the Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Rotorcraft. It
includes methods of compliance in the areas of basic design, ground tests, and flight tests.

2. CANCELLATION. AC 29-2A, Certification of Transport Category Rotorcraft, September 16.

1987, is canceled in its entirety.

3. BACKGROUND. Based largely on precedents set during rotorcraft certification programs

spanning the past 39 years, this AC consolidates guidance contained in earlier correspondence
among FAA headquarters, foreign authorities. the rotorcraft industry, and certificating regions.

4. PRINCIPAL CHANGES:

a. Paragraphs 31A, 32, 45, 47, 55, 57, 64, 69, 71, 72, 140A, 245, 337, 596, 618, 619,
621, 633, 641, 652, 653, 726, 765, 775, and 777 are revised to incorporate technical guidance.

b. New paragraphs 42A, 558, 56, 57A, SSA, 59, 60A, 66A, 67A, 70A, 71A. 72A, 1408,
152A,205A,2188,252A,254,3298,359A,3978,398C,421A,423C,447,4548,456A,459A,
4608, 5638, 6198, 619C, 7248, and 765A are added to Chapter 2.

c. New paragraph 781A is added to Chapter 3.

d. Paragraph 447, § 29.951, General, is renumbered to Paragraph 446. Paragraph 447

now addresses§ 29.952, Fuel Systems Crash Resistance.
 e. The following appendices have been added:

Appendix 2 One-Engine-Inoperative (OEI) Power Assurance

Appendix 3 Rotorburst

f. Use of the term "FAA/AUTHORITY" replaces "FAA" as appropriate. "FAA/AUTHORITY"

as used in this document means FAA or another airworthiness authority that has adopted this AC
as a means of compliance with the appropriate regulation referenced.

5. DEVIATIONS. As rotorcraft designs vary from conventional configurations, it may become

necessary to deviate from the methods and procedures outlined in this AC . These procedures
are only one acceptable means of compliance with Part 29. Any alternate means proposed by an
applicant will be given due consideration. Applicants are encouraged to use their technical
ingenuity and resourcefulness to develop more efficient and less costly methods of achieving the
objectives of Part 29. Regulatory personnel and designees should respond to such efforts by the
use of engineering judgment in fostering any such efforts as long as the letter and spirit of Part 29
and the Federal Aviation Act are respected. It is recommended that unusual or unique projects
be coordinated a sufficient time in advance with the Rotorcraft Standards Staff, ASW-110, or the
appropriate airworthiness authority, to ensure timely and uniform consideration.

6. APPLICABILITY. This material is not to be construed as having any legally binding status and
must be treated as advisory only. However, to ensure standardization in the certification process,
these procedures should be considered during all rotorcraft type certification and supplemental
type certification activities.

7. PARAGRAPHS KEYED TO FAR PART 29. Each paragraph has the applicable amendment to
Part 29 shown in the title . All of the original guidance material has been retained as appropriate,
even as changes are made to the regulations. This is accomplished through the use of "A," "B,"
etc., paragraphs which follow the original numbered paragraphs. These subsequent paragra.phs
provide updated guidance information or changes to policy that parallel a specific rule change.
The guidance material in the original paragraph (for earlier amendments) still applies and is
modified as explained in each of the later paragraphs for later amendments. The applicable
amendment number will only appear in the title line for the "A, " "B," etc., paragraphs. The
guidance material in the initial paragraph is intended to apply to all amendments except as
modified by the later paragraphs. Each ensuing "A," "B," etc., paragraph will be identified with an
amendment level to indicate the rule change that precipitated the policy change .

8. RELATED PUBLICATIONS. FAA Certification personnel and designees should be familiar

with Order 8110.4, Type Certification , and Order 8100.5, Aircraft Certification Directorate
Proced ures .

Eric Bries
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate
Aircraft Certification Service
7/30/97 AC 29-28
Appendix 3
APPENDIX 3
ADVISORY MATER.IAL FOR COMPLIANCE
WITH ROTORBURST RULE

1. PURPOSE. This advisory material sets forth a method of compliance with the
requirements of§§ 29.901, 29.903(b)(1), and 29.903(d)(1) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR) pertaining to design precautions taken to minimize the hazards to
rotorcraft in the event of uncontained engine rotor (compressor and turbine) failure. It is
for guidance and to provide a method of compliance that has been found acceptable.
As with all AC material, it is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation.

2. RELATED FAR/JAR SECTIONS. Sections 29.901 (c) and 29.903(d)(1) of the

FAR/JAR.

3. BACKGROUND. Although turbine engine manufacturers are making efforts to

reduce the probability of uncontained rotor failures, service experience shows that such
failures continue to occur. Failures have resulted in high velocity fragment penetration
of fuel tanks, adjacent structures, fuselage, system components and other engines of
the rotorcraft. Since it is unlikely that uncontained rotor failures can be completely
eliminated, rotorcraft design precautions should be taken to minimize the hazard from
such events. These design precautions should recognize rotorcraft design features that
may differ significantly from that of an airplane, particularly regarding an engine location
and its proximity to another engine or to other systems and components .

a. Uncontained gas turbine engine rotor failure statistics for rotorcraft are
presented in the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Report No.'s AIR 4003 (period
1976-83) and AIR 4770 (period 1984-89).

b. The statistics in the SAE studies indicate the existence of some failure modes
not readily apparent or predictable by failure analysis methods. Because of the variety
of uncontained rotor failures, it is difficult to analyze all possible failure modes and to
provide protection to all areas. However, design considerations outlined in this AC
provide guidelines for achieving the desired objective of minimizing the hazard to
rotorcraft from uncontained rotor failures. These guidelines, therefore, assume a rotor
failure will occur and that analysis of the effects or evaluation of this failure is
necessary. These guidelines are based on service experience and tests but are not
necessarily the only means available to the designer.

4. DEFINITIONS.

a. Minimize. Means to reduce to the least possible amount by means that can be
shown to be both technically feasible and economically justifiable.

Page A3- 1
 --.J
-..
w
0
-..
<O
--.J

FUEL
CONTROL FUEL FLOW
TRANSMITIER

FUEL PUMP

"Tl
G)
c
:::0 NEEDLE
m
)> VALVE
-u FUEL PRESSURE
x
N TRANSMITIER
'
.......

FUEL
FUEL
NOZZLE
PRESSURE
GAGE

COCKPIT FUEL AIRCRAFT

FLOW GAGE FUEL TANK
)>
"'"CJ "'C )>
w "'C
(1)
O
<.C :J N
(1)
a. <O
)> -·
>< NI
N N CJJ
I
<O INSTALLED ENGINE FUEL FLOW CAPACITY CHECK
AC 29-28 7/30/97
Appendix 3
b. Separation. Positioning of redundant critical structure, systems, or system
components within the impact area such that the distance between the components
minimizes the potential impact hazard. Redundant critical components should be
separated within the spread angles of a rotor by a distance at least equal to either a
% unbladed disk (hub, impeller) sector, or a 1/3 bladed disk (hub, impeller) sector with
1/3 blade height, with each rotating about its center of gravity (CG), whichever is
greater (See Figure APX3-6).

c. Isolation. A means to limit system damage so as to maintain partial or full

system function after the system has been damaged by fragments. Limiting the loss of
hydraulic fluid by the use of check valves to retain the capability to operate flight
controls is an example of "isolation." System damage is confined allowing the retention
of critical system functions.

d . Bmru. Rotor means the rotating components of the engine and APU that
analysis, test results, and/or experience has shown can be released during uncontained
failure with sufficient energy to hazard the rotorcraft.

The engine or APU manufacturer should define those components that constitute the
rotor for each engine and APU type design. Typical rotors have included, as a
minimum, disks, hubs, drums, seals, impellers. and spacers.

e . Uncontained Engine or APU Failure (or Rotorburst). For the purposes of

rotorcraft evaluations in accordance with this AC, uncontained failure of a turbine
engine is any failure which results in the escape of rotor fragments from the engine or
APU that could create a hazard to the rotorcraft. Rotor failures of concern are those in
which released fragments have sufficient energy to create a hazard to the rotorcraft.
Uncontained failures of APU's which are "ground operable only" are not considered
hazardous to the rotorcraft.

f. Critical Component (System). A critical component is any component or

system whose failure or malfunction would contribute to or cause a failure condition that
would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the rotorcraft. These
components (systems) should be considered on an individual basis and in relation to
other components (systems) that could be degraded or rendered inoperative by the
same fragment or by other fragments during any uncontained failure event.

g. Fragment Spread Angle. The fragment spread angle is the angle measured,
fore and aft, from the center of the plane of rotation of the disk (hub, impeller) or other
rotor component initiating at the engine or APU shaft centerline or axis of rotation (See
Figure APX3-1 ). The width of the fragment should be considered in defining the path of
the fragment envelope's maximum dimension.

h. Ignition Source. Any component that could precipitate a fire or explosion . This
includes existing ignition sources and potential ignition sources due to damage or fault

Page A3-2
7/30/97 AC 29-28
Appendix 3
from an uncontained rotor failure. Potential ignition sources include hot fragments,
damage or faults that produce sparking, arcing, or overheating above the auto-ignition
temperature of the fuel. Existing ignition sources include items such as unprotected
engine or APU surfaces with temperature greater than the auto-ignition temperature of
the fuel or any other flammable fluid.

5. SAFETY ASSESSMENT.

a. Procedure. Assess the potential hazard to the rotorcraft using the following
procedure:

(1) Minimizing Rotorburst Hazard. The rotorburst hazard should be reduced to

the lowest level that can be shown to be both technically feasible and economically
justifiable. The extent of minimization that is possible will vary from new or amended
certification projects and from design to design. Thus the effort to minimize must be
determined uniquely for each certification project. Design precautions and techniques
such as location, separation, isolation, redundancy, shielding, containment and/or other
appropriate considerations should be employed, documented, agreed to by the
certifying authority, and placed in the type data file. A discussion of these methods and
techniques follows .

{2) Geometric Layout and Safety Analysis. The applicant should prepare a
preliminary geometric layout and safety analysis for a minimum rotorburst hazard
configuration determination early in the design process and present the results to the
certification authority no later than when the initial design is complete. Early contact
and coordination with the certifying authority will minimize the need for design
modification later in the certification process. The hazard analysis should follow the
guidelines indicated in Paragraph 397c(2) in this Advisory Circular and (5)(f) of this
appendix. Geometric layouts and analysis should be used to evaluate and identify
engine rotorburst hazards to critical systems, powerplants, and structural components
from uncontained rotor fragments, and to determine any actions which may be
necessary to further minimize the hazard. Calculated geometric risk quantities may be
used in accordance with Paragraph (d) following, to define the rotorcraft configuration
with the minimum physical rotorburst hazard.

b. Engine and APU Failure Model. The safety analysis should be made using the
following engine and APU failure model, unless for the particular engine/APU type
concerned, relevant service experience, design data, test results or other evidence
justify the use of a different model. In particular, a suitable failure model may be
provided by the engine/APU manufacturer. This may show that one or more of the
considerations below do not need to be addressed.

(1) Single One-Third Disc Fragment. It should be assumed that the one-third
disc fragment has the maximum dimension corresponding to one-third of the disc with
one-third blade height and a fragment spread angle of ±3°. Where energy

Page A3- 3
AC 29-28 7/30/97
Appendix 3
considerations are relevant, the mass should be assumed to be one-third of the bladed
disc mass and its energy--the translational energy (i.e., neglecting rotational energy) of
the sector (See Figure APX3-2).

(2) Intermediate Fragments. It should be assumed that the intermediate

fragmerit has a maximum dimension corresponding to one third or the disc radius with
one-third blade height and a fragment spread angle of ±5°. Where energy
considerations are relevant, the mass should be assumed to be 1/30th of the bladed
disc mass and its energy--the translational energy (neglecting rotational energy) of the
piece traveling at rim speed (See Figure APX3-3).

(3) Alternative Engine Failure Model. For the purpose of the analysis, as an
alternative to the engine failure model of sections (1) and (2) above, the use of a single
one-third piece of disc having a fragment spread angle of ±5° would be acceptable,
provided that the objectives of the analysis are satisfied.

(4) Small Fragments. It should be assumed that small fragments have a

maximum dimension corresponding to the tip half of the blade airfoil and a fragment
spread angle of ±15°. Where energy considerations are relevant, the mass should be
assumed to be corresponding to the above fragment dimensions and the energy is the
translational energy (neglecting rotational energy) of the fragment traveling at the speed
of its CG location. The effects of multiple small fragments should be considered during
this assessment.

(5) Critical Engine Speed. Where energy considerations are relevant, the
uncontained rotor event should be assumed to occur at the engine shaft speed for the
maximum rating appropriate to the flight phase (exclusive of OEI ratings), unless the
most probable mode of failure would be expected to result in the engine rotor reaching
a red line speed or a design burst speed. For APU's, use the maximum rating
appropriate to the flight phase or the speed resulting from a failure of any one of the
normal engine control systems.

(6) APU Failure Model. Service experience has shown that some APU rotor
failures produced fragments having significant energy to have been expelled through
the APU tailpipe. For the analysis, the applicable APU service history and test results
should be considered in addition to the failure model as discussed in Paragraph 5(b)
above for certification of APU installations near critical items. In addition, the APU
installer needs to address the rotorcraft hazard associated with APU debris exiting the
tailpipe. Applicable service history or test results provided by the APU manufacturer
may be used to define the tailpipe debris size, mass, and energy. The uncontained
APU rotor failure model is dependent upon the design/analysis, test results and service
experience.

(A) For APU's in which rotor integrity and blade containment have been
demonstrated in accordance with TSO-C77a/JAR APU, i.e., without specific

Page A3-4
7130197 AC 29-28
Appendix 3
containment testing, paragraphs 5(b)(1), 5(b)(2), and 5(b)(4) or Paragraph 5(b)(3) and
5(b)(4) apply. If shielding of critical airframe components is proposed, the energy level
that should be considered is that of the tri-hub failure released at the critical speed as
defined in Paragraph 5(b)(5). The shield and airframe mounting point(s) should be
shown to be effective at containing both primary and secondary debris at angles
specified by the failure model.

(B) For APU rotor stages qualified as contained in accordance with the
TSO, an objective review of the APU location should be made to ensure the hazard is
minimized in the event of an uncontained APU rotor failure. Historical data shows that
in-service uncontained failures have occurred on APU rotor stages qualified as
contained per the TSO. These failure modes have included bi-hub and overspeed
failure resulting in some fragments missing the containment ring. In order to address
these hazards, the installer should use the small fragment failure model, or
substantiated in-service data supplied by the APU manufacturer. Analytical
substantiation for the shielding system if proposed is acceptable for showing
compliance.

c. Engine/APU Rotorburst Data. The engine or APU manufacturer should provide

the required engine data to accomplish the evaluation and analysis necessary to
minimize the rotorburst hazard such as:

(1) Engine failure model (range of fragment sizes, spread angles and energy).

(2) Engine rotorburst probability assessment.

(3) List of components constituting the rotors.

d. Fragment Impact Risks. FAA/AUTHORITY research and development studies

have shown that, for rotorcraft conventional configurations (one main rotor and one tail
rotor), the main and tail rotorblades have minimal risks from a rotorburst, and thus, they
require no special protection. However, unique main and tail rotor blade configurations
should be carefully reviewed. Certain zones of the tail rotor drive shaft and other critical
parts which may be necessary for continued safe flight and landing may not have
natural, minimal risk from uncontained rotor fragments.

e. Engine Service History/Design. For the purpose of a gross assessment of the

vulnerability of the rotorcraft to an uncontained rotorburst. it must be taken that an
uncontained engine rotor failure (burst) will occur. However, in determining the overall
risk to the rotorcraft, engine service history and engine design features should be
included in showing compliance with§ 29.903 to minimize the hazard from uncontained
rotor failures. This is extremely important since the engine design and/or the service
history may provide valuable information in assessing the potential for a rotorburst
occurring and this should be considered in the overall safety analysis.

Page A3- 5
AC 29-28 7/30/97
Appendix 3
Information contained in the recent SAE studies (see Paragraph (3)(a) should be
considered in this evaluation.

f. Certification Data File. A report, including all geometric layouts, that details all
the aspects of minimizing the engine rotorburst hazards to the rotorcraft should be
prepared by the applicant and submitted to the certification authority. Items which
should be included in this report are the identification of all hazardous failures that could
result from engine rotor failure strikes and their consequences (i.e., an FMEA or
equivalent analysis) and the design precautions and features taken to minimize the
identified hazards that could result from rotor failure fragment strikes. Thus an analysis
that lists all the critical components; quantifies and ranks their associated rotorburst
hazard: and clearly shows the minimization of that quantified, ranked hazard to the
"maximum practicable extent" should be generated and agreed upon during
certification. Critical components should all be identified and their rotorburst hazard
quantified, ranked, and minimized where necessary. Design features in which the
design precautions of this guidance material are not accomplished should be identified
along with the alternate means used to minimize the hazard . To adequately address
minimizing the hazards, all rotorcraft design disciplines should be involved in the
applicant's compliance efforts and report preparation.

6. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS. Practical design precautions should be used to

minimize the damage that can be caused by uncontained engine and APU rotor debris.
The following design considerations are recommended:

a. Consider the location of the engine and APU rotors relative to critical
components, or areas of the rotorcraft such as:

(1) Opposite Engine - Protection of the opposite engine from damage from 1/3
disc rotor fragments may not be feasible. Protection of the opposite engine from other
fragments may be provided by locating critical components, such as engine accessories
essential for proper engine operation (e.g . high pressure fuel lines, engine controls and
wiring, etc.), in areas where inherent shielding is provided by the fuselage, engine, or
other structure.

(2) Engine Controls - Controls for the remaining engine(s) that pass through
the uncontained engine failure zone should be separated/protected to the maximum
extent practicable.

(3) Primary Structure of the Fuselage.

(4) Flight Crew - The flight crew is considered a critical component.

(5) Fuel system components, piping and tanks, including fuel tank access
panels (NOTE: Spilled fuel into the engine or APU compartments, on engine cases or
on other critical components or areas could create a fire hazard.)

Page A3-6
7/30/97 AC 29-28
Appendix 3

(6) Critical control systems, such as primary and secondary flight controls,
electrical power cables, systems and wiring, hydraulic systems, engines control
systems, flammable fluid shut-off valves, and the associated actuation wiring or cables.

(7) Engine and APU fire extinguisher systems including electrical wiring and
fire extinguishing agent plumbing to engine and APU compartments.

(8) Instrumentation necessary for continued safe flight and landing.

(9) Transmission and rotor drive shafts.

b. Location of Critical Systems and Components. The following design practices

have been used to minimize hazards to critical components:

(1) Locate, if possible, critical components or systems outside the likely debris
impact areas.

(2) Duplicate and separate critical components or systems if located in debris

impact areas or provide suitable protection.

(3) Protection of critical systems and components can be provided by using

airframe structure where shown to be suitable.

(4) Locate fluid shutoffs so that flammable fluids can be isolated in the event of
damage to the system. Design and locate the shut-off actuation means in protected
areas or outside debris impact areas.

(5) Minimize the flammable fluid spillage which could contact an ignition
source.

(6) For airframe structural elements, provide redundant designs or crack

stoppers to limit the subsequent tearing which could be caused by uncontained rotor
fragments.

(7) Consider the likely damage caused by multiple fragments.

(8) Fuel tanks should not be located in impact areas. However, if necessitated
by the basic configuration requirements of the rotorcraft type to locate fuel tanks in
impact areas, then the engine rotorburst hazard should be minimized by use of design
features such as minimization of hazardous fuel spillage (that could contact an ignition
source by drainage or migration); by drainage of leaked fuel quickly and safely into the
airstream; by proper ventilation of potential spillage areas; by use of shielding; by use of
explosion suppression devices (i.e., explosion resistant foam or inert gases); and by
minimization of potential fuel ignition sources or by other methods to reduce the hazard.

Page A3- 7
AC 29-28 7/30/97
Appendix 3

(9) The rotor integrity or containment capability demonstrated during APU

evaluation to TSO-C77a, or JAR-APU should be considered for installation certification.

(10) The flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and emergency locator
transmitter, if required, should be located outside the impact zone when practical.

(11) Items such as human factors, pilot reaction time, and correct critical
system status indication in the pilot compartment after an uncontained engine failure
has occurred should be considered in design to permit continued safe flight and
landing.

c. Rotorcraft Modifications. Modifications made to rotorcraft certified to this rule

should be assessed with the considerations of this AC . These modifications include but
are not limited to re-engining installations (including conversion from reciprocating to
turbine powered), APU installations, fuselage stretch, and auxiliary fuel tank
installations. Auxiliary fuel tank(s) should be located as much as practical so as to
minimize the risk that this tank(s) will be hit by rotor failure fragments. The need to
remain within the approved CG limits of the aircraft will of necessity limit the degree to
which the risk may be minimized.

7. PROTECTIVE MEASURES. The following list is provided for consideration as

some measures which may be used to minimize effects of a rotorburst:

a. Powerplant Containment.

(1) Engine Rotor Fragment Containment. It should be clearly understood that

containment of rotor fragments is not a requirement. However, it is one of many options
which may be used to minimize the hazards of an engine rotorburst. Containment
structures (either around the engine, or APU, or on the rotorcraft) that have been
demonstrated to provide containment should be accepted as minimizing the hazard
defined by the rotor failure model for that particular rotor component. Contained rotor
in-service failures may be used to augment any design or test data. Containment
material stretch and geometric deformation should be considered in conjunction with
fragment energies and trajectories in defining the hazards to adjacent critical
components such as structures, system components, fluid lines, and control systems.
Data obtained during containment system testing along with analytical data and service
experience should be used for this evaluation.

(2) APU Containment. Rotor integrity or containment capability demonstrated

during APU TSO evaluation should be considered for installation certification. If rotor
containment option was shown by analysis or rig test an objective review of the APU
location should be made to ensure the hazard is minimized in the event of an
uncontained APU rotor failure.

Page A3-8
7/30/97 AC 29-28
Appendix 3
b. Shields and Deflectors. When shields, deflection devices, or intervening
rotorcraft structure are used to protect critical systems or components, the adequacy of
the protection should be shown by testing or analysis supported by test data, using the
impact area, fragment mass, and fragment energies based on the definitions stated
herein. Analytical methods used to compute protective armor or shielding thicknesses
and energy absorption requirements should reflect established methods, acceptable to
the certifying authority, that are supported by adequate test evidence. Protective
armor, shielding, or deflectors that stop, slow down, or redirect uncontained fragments
redistribute absorbed energy into the airframe. The resulting loads are significant for
large fragments and should be considered as basic load cases for structural analysis
purposes (reference§ 29.301). These structural loads should be defined and approved
as ultimate loads acting alone. The protective devices and their supporting airframe
structures should be able to absorb or deflect the fragment energies defined herein and
still continue safe flight and landing. If hazardous, the deflected fragment trajectories
and residual energies should also be considered.

c. Isolation or Redundancy.

(1) Other Engines -Although other engines may be considered critical, engine
isolation from rotorburst on multi-engine rotorcraft is not mandatory. Other methods of
minimizing the risk to the engine(s) may be acceptable.

(2) Other Critical Components - Isolation or redundancy of other critical

components, the failure of which would not allow continued safe flight and landing
should be evaluated relative to the risk of occurrence and where the risk is deemed
unacceptable isolation or shielding or other means of reducing the risk should be
in corpora ted.

d. Composite Materials. If containment devices, shields, or deflectors are chosen

by the applicant to be wholly or partially made from composites; they should comply
with the structural requirements of AC 20-107A, "Composite Aircraft Structure," and
Paragraph 788 of this AC, "Substantiation of Composite Rotorcraft Structure," (which
includes glass transition temperature considerations). Glass transition temperature
considerations are critical for proper certification of composite or composite hybrid
structures used in temperature zones that reach or exceed 200° to 250°F (93° to
121 °C) for significant time periods. Hot fragment containment is typically
accommodated in such protective devices by use of metal-composite hybrid designs
that use the metal component's properties to absorb the fragment heat load after the
entire hybrid structure has absorbed the fragment's impact load. These devices should
comply with§§ 29.609 and 29.1529 to ensure continued airworthiness.

Page A3- 9
AC 29-28 7/30/97
Appendix 3

\1/3RD AND LARGER BLADED MASS

~ {SEE FIGURE 2)

± 3 -I

±5
0

o I
...___~
..._____ ~ - 1/30 BLADED MASS
~ (INTERMEDIATE)
(SEE FIGURE 3)
± 15 °
~ SMALL FRAGMENTS
(SEE PARAGRAPH 58(4))

FRAGMENT SPREAD ANGLE IS THE ANGLE

MEASURED FORE AND AFT, FROM THE
CENTER OF THE PLANE OF ROTATION
INITIATING AT THE ENGINE OR APU SHAFT
CENTERLINE

NOTE: 1) THE POSSIBILITY OF TURBINE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

2) ALL ROTORS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE FULLY BLADED FOR
CALCULATING MASS.
3) FAILURE OF EACH ROTOR STAGE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

FIGURE APX3-1 . ESTIMATED PATH OF FRAGMENTS

Page A3-10
7/30/97 AC 29-28
Appendix 3

MAXIMUM DIMENSION

/
/
.,..,.

,,. ....
----
.,,,. .... -
--- -
- ....... ........
.........
/
''

Where R = disc radius

b = blade length
The CG is taken to lie on the maximum dimension as shown.

FIGURE APX3-2. SINGLE ONE-THIRD DISC FRAGMENT

Page A3- 11
AC 29-28 7/30/97
Appendix 3

.,,,. / '
....-----
/
/
/
"t 1/3 (R + b)

I
I
\
\
b ,...........___

Where R =disc radius

b = blade length

Maximum dimension= 1/3 (R + b)

Mass assumed to be 1/ 30th of bladed disc

CG is taken to lie on the disc rim

FIGURE APX3-3. INTERMEDIATE AND SMALL PIECES OF DEBRIS

Page A3-12
 --
-..J
t .,)
0
co
-..J

GEOMETRIC CG

T
1/3 X \M-IERE X =AIRFOIL LENGTH
(LESS BLADE ROOT & PLATFORM)
"Tl
(j)
c
;o
m
_l CG IS TAKEN TO LIE AT THE
)> CENTERLINE OF THE 1/3 FRAGMENT
"'O
x
c,J
I
x
~ FRAGMENT VELOCITY TAKEN AT
GEOMETRIC CG

FRAGMENT MASS ASSUMED TO BE

1/3 OF THE AIRFOIL MASS

~
"'C (")
)>
(D
""[J ::J N
m a. co
(C
(D
><° N
t.,) CJ
)>
t.,)
I
....... BLADE FRAGMENT DEFINITION
t.,)
AC 29-.26 7/30/97
Appendix 3

ROTATIONAL
KE= ~lw 2
TRANSLATIONAL
KE=~ mv2

- ---i--
100 1

--1-- -+- - +
90
I I I
80
- -+ ---+- - + - -t-
I I
.=--
z 70 --+-+-+-
w I I I
0
a::
w 60 - -+ -+---t-
a..
l I I
>-
Cl
0:::
w
50 --+-+- -
I I
zw
0 40 - -+- +
F I I
w
z
S2 30 --+--
1

20 - -t-- ~-__L_

10 - -1I - -- I

I
0
0 120 180 240 300 360

ROTATIONAL TRANSLATIONAL

FRAGMENT SIZE 8

FIGURE APX3-5. DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSLATIONAL AND ROTATIONAL

KINETIC ENERGY OF ROTOR-COMPONENT FRAGMENTS AS A FUNCTION
OF FRAGMENT SIZE8

Page A3-14
7/30/97 AC 29-28
Appendix 3

CG of Fragment Becomes
Center of Rotation of Fragment

For Separation Distance Calculations: ~

1/3 Rotor with ~'
1/3 Blade Height

FIGURE APX3-6. CROSS SECTION THROUGH AIRCRAFT AT PLANE

OF ROTATION OF THE ENGINE DISK FRAGMENT

Page A3- 15