UCPB VS LUMBO

FACTS:

 The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. To secure the performance of their
obligation, they constituted a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklan and all the
improvements thereon that they owned and operated as a beach resort known as Titay’s South Beach Resort.

 Upon their failure to settle the obligation, UCPB applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged
as the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale. The certificate of sale was issued on the same day, and UCPB
registered the sale in its name. The title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the
respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption period.

 Respondents brought against UCPB in the RTC an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting,
injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages (Civil Case No. 5920).

 During the pendency of Civil Case, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover
possession of the property. RTC granted the ex parte petition of UCPB, and issued the writ of possession directing the
sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place UCPB in the actual possession of the property. The writ of possession was
served on the respondents with a demand for them to peacefully vacate on or before January 31, 2002. Although the
possession of the property was turned over to UCPB, they were allowed to temporarily remain on the property for
humanitarian reasons.

 Respondents filed in the RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to
set aside the foreclosure sale. They included an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession.

 On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA.

 CA ruled by granting respondent’s petition and enjoining the RTC’s implementation of the writ of possession.

 However, records show that the petitioners have the legal course to file a petition for the cancellation of the writ of
possession bases on cited legal grounds that the mortgage was not violated or that the sale was not made in accordance
with the provisions of the law.

 Moreover, the respondent judge erred in declaring that he could not act on the application for injunctive relief because
the writ was issued by another court of coordinate jurisdiction. The petition was filed before the same branch of the
RTC of Kalibo, Aklan but was re-raffled to another branch and later on consolidated before the branch of the
respondent judge where the action for the annulment of the foreclosure sale is pending. Thus, the case, which
incidentally is a mere continuation of the de-parte proceeding before the same court though not before the same branch

ISSUE: WON the CA grossly erred in granting the respondents’ petition for certiorari and/ or mandamus, and in enjoining the
RTC from implementing the writ of possession in favor of UCPB.

HELD:

 YES. Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents’ application for injunction to
prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, its error related only to the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and such error is
reviewable only through an appeal taken in due course. In contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and such error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.
  Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction over both Civil Case and Special Proceedings, it
should follow that its consideration and resolution of the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ filed in Special
Proceedings were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as the registered owner of the
property was at that point unquestionably entitled to the full implementation of the writ of possession. In the absence of
any clear and persuasive showing that it capriciously or whimsically denied the respondents’ application, its denial of
the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.

AGG TRUCKING VS YUAG

FACTS:

 Petitioner Alex Ang Gaeid had employed respondent Melanio Yuag as a driver since 28 February 2002.His clients were
Busco Sugar Milling Co., Inc., operating in Quezon, Bukidnon; and Coca-cola Bottlers Company in Davao City and
Cagayan de Oro City.

 Petitioner noticed that respondent had started incurring substantial shortages. It was also reported that he had illegally
sold bags of sugar along the way at a lower price, and that he was banned from entering the premises of the Busco
Sugar Mill. Petitioner asked for an explanation from respondent who remained quiet.

 Alarmed at the delivery shortages, petitioner took it upon himself to monitor all his drivers, including respondent, by
instructing them to report to him their location from time to time through their mobile phones.He also required them to
make their delivery trips in convoy, in order to avoid illegal sale of cargo along the way.

 Respondent, along with 20 other drivers, was tasked to deliver bags of sugar from Cagayan de Oro City to Coca-Cola
Bottlers Plant in Davao City. All drivers, with the exception of Yuag who could not be reached through his cellphone,
reported their location as instructed. The Coca-Cola Plant in Davao later reported that the delivery had a suspiciously
enormous shortage.

 When confronted about the shortage and his failure to report his location, respondent did not respond to petitioner.
Thereafter he was instructed to "just take a rest" which respondent construed as a constructive dismissal. After
respondent demanded that his separation be made in writing, petitioner insisted that respondent return the next day and
take a rest. Respondent however, went to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and asked for his separation pay and 13th
month pay; alleging that he was dismissed based on his non-returned call.

 The Labor Arbiter however, sustained the dismissal for lack of substantial proof to sustain the allegation of illegal
dismissal and that parties were under an employer-employee relationship. Upon appeal with the NLRC, the LA
decision was reversed because respondent was deemed to be under preventive suspension without pay. A motion for
reconsideration was made but was denied for being filed out of the reglamentary period.

 On appeal through certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the court ruled on the existence of an employer-employee
relationship and reversed the NLRC decision by reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision instead with modification to the
award for damages.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN REVERSING THE NLRC DECISION
WITHOUT ANY FINDING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.

HELD:

 A writ of certiorari is a remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction, for which reason it must clearly show that the public
respondent has no jurisdiction to issue an order or to render a decision. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has instituted the
petition for certiorari to correct acts of any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions with
 grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This remedy serves as a check on acts, either of
excess or passivity, that constitute grave abuse of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial function

 Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is
one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.
Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

 The raison detre for the rule is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a situation,
the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province
of a special civil action for certiorari

 Petitioner is correct in its argument that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion and on what these acts were.In this case, the CA seemed to have forgotten that its function in resolving a
petition for certiorari was to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.The CA proceeded to review the records and to rule on issues that
were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.The pivotal issue before the NLRC was whether petitioners telling respondent to take a rest, or to have a
break, was already a positive act of dismissing him.

 Furthermore, the NLRC Resolution that reversed the LA Decision had nothing in it that was whimsical, unreasonable
or patentlyviolative of the law.It was the CA which erred in finding faults that were inexistent in the NLRC Resolution.

 In addition to this, the CA erroneously modified the NLRC decision when it can no longer be modified for being filed
out of time. It is not a mere technicality that the CA may brush aside. The NLRC Resolution sought to be set aside had
become final and executory 25 days before respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.Thus, subsequent
proceedings and modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and void.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of ROC, praying that the Decision of the Sandiganbayan acquitting private
respondents of the charge of Violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 be nullified and set aside.

 ABELARDO PANLAQUI, Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, RENATO B. VELASCO and ANGELITO
PELAYO, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator and the Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Sasmuan,
Pampanga, VICTORINO MANINANG being then the Barangay Captain of Malusac, Sasmuan, Pampanga, and hence
all public officers, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their position, committing
the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another and with WILFREDO
CUNANAN, the representative of J.S. Lim Construction, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with
evident bad faith cause undue injury to the Government and grant unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the
following manner: accused ABELARDO P. PANLAQUI, without being authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sasmuan, Pampanga, entered into a Contract of Lease of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented by
accused WILFREDO CUNANAN, whereby the municipality leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell
and one (1) unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a period of thirty (30) days, which
equipment items were to be purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers in
Sasmuan, Pampanga; thereafter accused caused it to appear that work on the said project had been accomplished and
100% completed per the approved Program of Work and Specifications and turned over to Barangay Malusac; as a
result of the issuance of the Accomplishment Report and Certificate of Project Completion and Turn-Over, payments of
P511,612.20 and P616,314.60 were made to and received by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN notwithstanding the
fact that no work had actually been done on the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers considering that J.S. Lim Construction had
no barge or any kind of vessel registered with the First Coast Guard District and that no business license/permit had
 been granted to the said company by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Guagua, Pampanga, which acts of the accused
caused undue injury to the Government and granted unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the total amount
of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY- SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX AND
80/100 PESOS (P1,127,926.80), Philippine Currency.

 Respondents were duly arraigned and pleading not guilty to the charge against them. Trial on the merits ensued, both
prosecution and defense were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their documentary exhibits.

 SB rendered decision : Acquittal of the accues

 Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the People, represented by OMB through the OSP.

ISSUE:

WON THE COURT A QUO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
(PD) NO. 1594

HELD:

No. It is fitting to reiterate the holding of the Court in People v. Tria-Tirona,[6] to wit:

 x x x it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where
there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.

 x x x Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and
its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.[7]

 It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go
as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include
an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is
merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to
cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.

 The foregoing is essentially an issue involving an alleged error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner has
not convincingly shown that the prosecution has indeed been deprived of due process of law. There is no showing that
the trial court hampered the prosecution's presentation of evidence in any way. On the contrary, the prosecution was
given ample opportunity to present its ten witnesses and all necessary documentary evidence. The case was only
submitted for decision after the parties had duly rested their case. Respondent trial court clearly stated in its decision
which pieces of evidence led it to its conclusion that the project was actually undertaken, justifying payment to the
contractor.Clearly, petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial resulting in denial of due process.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II

FACTS:

 Dominador Ong Treasurer of the Sun Ray Metal, Inc., was charged for violation of PD No. 115 (Trust Receipts Law)
and by defrauding the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
 The prosecution showed that Sun Ray Metal, Inc. purchased brass metals and aluminum wires separately through 2
letters of credit issued by the petitioner bank in favor of the supplier of the raw materials. To secure the obligation by
Sun Ray Metal, Inc. to the petitioner bank, the private respondent, in his capacity as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc.,
executed two (2) trust receipts in favor of the petitioner bank. He likewise personally bound himself, jointly and
severally with Sun Ray Metal, Inc., to petitioner bank in connection therewith. However, despite repeated demands, the
private respondent failed to pay the petitioner bank the proceeds of the sale of the raw materials or to turn over the said
materials in case of his failure to sell the same.
 The public respondent ratiocinated that the private respondent was not duly authorized to represent Sun Ray Metal, Inc.
considering that there were other high-ranking officers who could have negotiated the contract; that there was no
written authority from the board of directors of the said corporation authorizing the private respondent to execute the
trust receipts in its behalf in favor of petitioner bank. Moreover, the defense sufficiently proved that the restructuring
agreement effectively novated the obligation under the trust receipts.

ISSUE:

WON the public respondent judge gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the
latter acquitted the private respondent.

HELD:

The petition is not meritorious.

 We have thoroughly perused the records and carefully analyzed the cases relied upon by the petitioner and found no
cogent reason to depart from the judgment of the public respondent in the case at bar.
 In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its case and that there is
no indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of the trial court’s decision of
acquittal will put the private respondent in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment;
(2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant
was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. Consequently in such an event, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for
any offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. [
 The fairly recent case of Palu-ay v. Court of Appeals is instructive, to wit:

In the case at bar, a hearing was held during which the prosecution and the defense were heard on their
evidence. Thereafter, judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence presented. Consequently, any error made by
the trial court in the appreciation of the evidence was only an error of judgment but not of jurisdiction so as to render
the judgment void.

Indeed, the question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a factual question that cannot be reviewed not
only because the decision of the trial court is now final but also because a review of such question at the instance of the
prosecution would violate the right of the accused against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same
act.

Petitioner also contends that its petition for certiorari does not put the private respondent in double jeopardy since the
petition only seeks the nullification of the judgment of the public respondent and does not in any way place the private
 accused on trial again. The defense of double jeopardy, according to the petitioner, is therefore premature in these
proceedings.

 The record shows that the court a quo allowed both parties an exhaustive presentation and offer of evidence and
submission of their respective memoranda. If indeed public respondent has misappreciated certain evidence, as argued
by the petitioner in this petition, such are not jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a
certiorari proceeding. If at all, such alleged error by the public respondent was merely an error of judgment, but not an
error of jurisdiction.
 In this case, petitioner’s action does not concern the civil aspect of the case but the validity of the judgment
itself. Indeed, petitioner does not actually question the award of damages. What he contends is that the trial court
decided the case outside the issues made out by the pleadings and thereby deprived the prosecution of due process.

PEOPLE vs. ASIS

(1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial
court or at the appellate level.
(2) While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.
(3) An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of
jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.

 Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between him and the three offended
parties Montes, Calvez, and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the abdomen.
Montes escaped unhurt.
 Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of frustrated murder
 The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries
with regard to Majait, when it found no treachery and evident premeditation. Four mitigating circumstances were
appreciated in favor of Abordo. Abordo was acquitted with respect to the complaint of Montes.
 The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that Judge Asis of the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision of acquitting
Abordo in one case, only holding him liable for Serious Physical Injuries and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two
other cases.
 The CA dismissed the petition, saying that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. It said that as
the State was questioning the verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy
should have been an appeal.
 It said thus:
a. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the
remedy.
b. Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In filing the petition for
certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy.
c. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
d. The petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an
error of judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari..

HELD:

Yes.
Certiorari is the proper remedy

 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial
court or at the appellate level.
 Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy,
the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court.

Exception to Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine

 In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for
certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.
 In People v Louel Uy, the Court said that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate upon clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court in acquitting the accused:

(1) Committed reversible errors of judgment

 Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment void.

No double jeopardy

 When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via
certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy.

OSG’s petition for certiorari before the CA, however, is bereft of merit

 While the CA was erroneous of dismissing the petition, the OSG’s petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft of
merit.
 While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding
must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. A reading of the OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to
due process.
 Also, what the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating
Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari
cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised
in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission
of grave abuse of discretion.

Error of Judgment v Error of Jurisdiction

 Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.
An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
 An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
 Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law
LIGOT VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for
three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government"
took effect increasing the salary of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the
increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."

When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Court’s unanimous
decision in Philconsa v. Mathay:

"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional
mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution..” Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement
under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.

On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his
retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar
claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969.

On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a
recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-General’s adverse decision to Singson’s claim On January 20,
1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligot’s request for reconsideration.

Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that at the time of his retirement, the
salary for members of Congess “as provided by law” was already P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement
gratuity based on that salary increase.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the member of Congress

HELD: The petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 as amended by
RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based on the P32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The
Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during
their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed.

Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.”

SALIBI VS COMELEC

FACTS: a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was filed in the SC, seeking to annul
the Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due
course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of
Lipa City for the May 2010 elections
- When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated that he had been a resident of the city for
two (2) years and eight (8) months

- It’s undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family

were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

- Private respondent filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacyand to Disqualify a Candidate
for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification” against him before the COMELEC

- private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code

- both petitioner and respondent presented evidence as to prove their argument

- the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the
mayoralty post in Lipa City Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during
the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of
Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position

- the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the
Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him

- petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status
Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case

- the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that “all
resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation” in view of “the proximity of the
Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.”

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the
one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

HELD: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence.
However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence
become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.

2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty

3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations
in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be finaland non-reviewable.

5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment,
not of jurisdiction.

6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.