THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 2019

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Refotm
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Cummings:

I write in response to your letter of April 1, 2019 concerning the White House security
clearance process. As I discussed in my letters of January 31, February 25, and March 4, 2019,
we will continue to work through the constitutionally mandated accommodation process under
which both the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch are obligated to seek means to
accommodate the Committee's legitimate oversight interests while at the same time respecting the
separation of powers and the constitutional authority of the President.

Unfortunately, contrary to all prior applicable precedent, including your own prior
statements, the Committee continues to insist on pursuing access to individual FBI background
investigation files. Obviously, the Committee's demands fall well outside the realm oflegitimate
congressional infmmation requests. It has long been recognized on both sides of the political aisle
that there is no legitimate need for access to such sensitive information about individuals. In fact,
there was a time when you agreed with and vigorously defended the very position the
Administration is taking now. Indeed, the Committee's current requests directly contradict your
prior longstanding commitment to the principle that "FBI records containing sensitive background
security information provided to the White House" should be "properly protected for privacy and
security." Additional and Minority Views, H. Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, H.R. Rep.
No. 104-862, at 117 (1996) (signed by Congressman Elijalt E. Cummings and other members of
the Committee). You even supported legislation to "enact procedural safeguards so that
individuals could be certain their confidential background files would not be disseminated without
their permission." Id Nothing has changed since you espoused that view, except that the current
President is a member of a different political party. Similarly, during the Clinton Administration,
then-Special Counsel to the President Lloyd Cutler explained in a response to inquiries into the
process for issuing White House passes and security clearances that, "under no circumstances
would we permit review of individual background investigations or any other information that
would violate the legitimate privacy interests of White House personnel." Letter from Lloyd N.
Cutler, Special Counsel to President Clinton, to Rep. Frank R. Wolf (July 21, 1994). The
Committee's insistence on securing individual background investigation files with absolutely no
legal support does serious hatm to settled confidentiality interests of the Executive Branch and
raises individual privacy concerns that you have previously acknowledged as paramount.
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page2

In addition, the Committee's recent conduct in pursuing this protected information

demonstrates a total disregard for individual privacy, for the legitimate confidentiality interests of
the Executive, and for the accommodation process that mandates a cooperative approach to
exploring avenues for sharing information. We recently learned that, without any notice, the
Committee staff conducted an on-the-record interview of a current employee of the Executive
Office of the President on a Saturday, obtained information that was not authorized to be disclosed,
and apparently promptly released this information to the press. This caused media organizations
to link specific information from background files to particular named individuals. It appears in
this case that the Committee has completely disregarded the privacy and welfare of federal
employees in order to advance a partisan political agenda, and we fear that the Committee's self­
professed attempt to target "specific individuals" who decided to serve our country in various
government roles will not only cause unfair harm to those good people, but will also deter qualified
people from answering the call to service. See Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter at 1. This
Administration would never publicly broadcast the personal information of congressional staff or
members of the federal judiciary who have subjected themselves to background investigations in
order to serve our country. Executive Branch employees should be afforded the same
confidentiality protection by Congress. This is not only a matter of law and longstanding practice,
but of basic decency.

Despite the Committee's departures from proper process and gross breaches of privacy
principles, and the various misleading statements of the Committee to the contrary, the White
House has already provided substantial accommodations in response to the Committee's requests.
We have provided detailed info1mation regarding the White House security clearance process,
including at an April 11, 2018 briefing by the Deputy Counsel to the President and a March 20,
2019 briefing by the head of the White House Personnel Security Office. We also made
confidential White House documents concerning the security clearance process available to the
Committee. Despite our efforts to find avenues for providing information, the Committee has not
acknowledged any legitimate Executive Branch confidentiality interests and has made no attempt
to limit the Committee's information demands to respect those interests. To the contrary, the
Committee continues to insist that it will be satisfied with nothing less than full access to the highly
confidential background investigation files of targeted, named individuals.

Notwithstanding the Committee's conduct, we continued to explore accommodations to

address the Committee's information requests. On April 1, we agreed to provide the prior Director
of the White House Personnel Security Office, Carl Kline, "to discuss, voluntarily and on the
record, the security clearance procedures in effect throughout his tenure as Personnel Security
Director." Letter from Michael M. Purpura, Deputy Counsel to the President, to Chairman Elijah
E. Cummings (Apr. 1, 2019); see also Letter from Robert N. Driscoll to Chairman Elijah E.
Cummings (Apr. 1,2019). In response to that accommodation, the Committee again rejected any
semblance of willingness to abide by the constitutionally mandated process that requires the
Executive and Legislative Branches to explore avenues for mutually agreed methods of
info1mation sharing and, instead, proceeded to issue an unnecessary subpoena to compel Mr. Kline
to testify regarding internal White House security clearance deliberations and individual security
clearance files. The use of compulsory process is premature, raises serious constitutional concerns,
and violates the constitutionally mandated accommodation process. There is simply no valid
reason to subpoena or publicly threaten a good and honorable career public servant after he agreed
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page 3

to appear voluntarily. We are pleased that on April 27, 2019 the Committee agreed to move
forward with Mr. Kline's interview based on the reasonable accommodation offer that we had
made over three weeks ago, after Ranking Member Jordan agreed to the offer the day before.
Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings to Carl Kline (Apr. 27, 2019).

As you know, the Committee's inquiry is also legally unsupportable for several reasons.
Its self-described effmt to "investigat[e]" the background files of "specific individuals" is
improper, has no valid legislative purpose, and clearly is a mere pretext to harass and intimidate
dedicated public servants. Apr. 1, 2019 Cutnrnings Letter at 1. The Committee is also attempting
to obtain confidential information relating to the President's exercise of his authority as
Commander-in-Chief to grant or deny security clearances and to choose his advisors.
Respectfully, it is not within the authority of Congress to second guess how the President selects
his advisors or who has access to the information necessary to provide the President with fully­
informed advice. Indeed, it is difficult to fathom a situation in which the President is entitled to
greater constitutional protection from congressional intrusion.

This Administration's efforts to protect the confidentiality of core Executive Branch

information and materials are right in line with the positions that previous administrations adopted
when faced with similar congressional requests. In response to a congressional subpoena, for
example, the Obama Administration correctly argued that, "[a]s comts have long recognized, the
Executive Branch's role in enforcing the law requires that some materials remain confidential so
that the Executive's proper functioning under the Constitution is preserved and protected." Mem.
in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Surnm. J. at 14, Comm. on Oversight & Gov'/ Reform v. Holder, No.
12-cv-1332, 2014 WL 12662665 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2014). Similarly, the Counsel to President
Obama emphasized the need to "preserv[e] the President's independence and autonomy, as well
as his ability to obtain candid advice and counsel to aid him in the discharge of his constitutional
duties." Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, Counsel to President Obama, to Chairman Darrell E. Issa
(July 15, 2014).

As I have repeatedly stated, the Administration respects the authority of Congress to

conduct legitimate oversight and will work with the Committee through the constitutionally
mandated accommodation process to provide the Committee with information it can properly seek.
However, to be clear, no employee of the Executive Branch is or has been authorized to disclose
to the Committee information about individual security clearance files or background
investigations. My office's response to the Committee's requests will always be guided by the
law and longstanding precedent, protecting both the institutional interests of the Executive as a co­
equal branch of govermnent and the robust privacy to which all government employees are
entitled.

I. The Committee's Self-Described Effort To "lnvestigat[e]" "Specific Individuals" Is

Improper.

I am troubled by the startling but telling new admission in your letter that an inquiry that
putported to address the security clearance process at the White House is actually an effort to
"investigat[e]" "specific individuals." Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter at 1 ("You have refused to
provide any information about the specific individuals the Committee is investigating .... "). The
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page4

Committee is not a law enforcement agency, and it is improper for it to be targeting and
intimidating individual Americans under the guise of congressional oversight. See Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (explaining that Congress is not "a law enforcement or
trial agency"); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (Congress's "power to investigate
must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement; those powers are assigned under
our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary"). Harassing and seeking to punish political
opponents based on their political beliefs is not a valid exercise of Congress's investigative powers.
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 ("Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible.").

Similarly, Congress does not have power to target individuals for the sake of "exposing"
alleged derogatory information to the public. The Supreme Court long ago made clear that "there
is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure," and there is no "general power to
expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals."
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200; see also Quinn, 349 U.S. at 161 (congressional investigations "cannot
be used to inquire into private affairs unrelated to a valid legislative pmpose").

Your recent position regarding security clearances directly contradicts your own previously
stated and co!Tect position that the government should "ensure that FBI records containing
sensitive background security inf01mation provided to the White House are properly protected for
privacy and security." Additional and Minority Views, H. Comm. on Gov't Refonn and Oversight,
H.R. Rep. No. 104-862, at 117 (1996). No administration, Republican or Democratic, would
facilitate further improper disclosures of protected info1mation by allowing the Committee the
unrestricted access it cunently demands to the security clearance files of named individuals.

II. The Committee's Request For Individual Security Clearance Files And Information
From Those Files Has No Legitimate Legislative Purpose.

Congress's investigative powers are limited. Indeed, Congress may "only investigate into
those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, [and] it cannot inquire into matters
which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Gove1mnent."
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959). With regard to security clearance
dete1minations for White House personnel, the Committee's authority to investigate is limited
because its authority to legislate is limited. As you acknowledge in your letter, it is "the
President's authority to grant security clearances." Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter at 4 (emphasis
added); see also Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to Chairman Elijah E.
Cunnnings 2-6 (Feb. 25, 2019) (explaining that "[t]he Constitution vests the President with plenary
authority over national security info1mation"). Thus, contrary to the assertions in the attachment
to your letter, any congressional enactments to "generally prohibit[] the grant of security
clearances" or dictate the "protocols and procedures for adjudicating security clearances" in certain
situations would unconstitutionally impair the President's "authority to classify and control access
to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trnstworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will give that person access to such
info1mation." Dep 't ofNavy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (noting that this authority "exists
quite apmi from any explicit congressional grant"); Access to Classified Information, 20 Op.
O.L.C. 402, 404 (1996) ("[T]he President's roles as Commander in Chief, head of the Executive
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page 5

Branch, and sole organ of the Nation in its external relations require that he have ultimate and
unimpeded authority over the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence and other
national security inf01mation in the Executive Branch." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

As previously explained in my February 25, 2019 letter, the oversight examples cited by
the Committee do not support-and in fact contradict-a claim of authority or the existence of a
legitimate legislative purpose to review individual security clearance decisions. The 2007
investigation into the leak of a f01mer CIA agent's identity, for instance, was designed to address
an alleged security violation that had already occu!Ted. In that case, the Director of the White
House Security Office testified regarding a particular incident and the steps taken (or not taken) in
response. Here, the Committee-not the Executive Branch-is encouraging leaks by seeking to
disseminate protected information. Indeed, the Committee has already acted recklessly by
releasing a memorandum that led certain media organizations to associate information allegedly
obtained from confidential background investigation files without authorization with specific,
named individuals. See H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform Staff Mem. (Apr. I, 2019). This
conduct is particularly outrageous given that there have been no allegations that the individuals
targeted by the Committee's investigation have mishandled protected information. The results of
the Committee's efforts to end-rnn the accommodation process with a secretive Saturday interview
have simply highlighted why we must redouble our efforts to protect the valid confidentiality
interests of the Executive Branch.

In addition, other precedents cited by the Committee are misleading or i1Televant, including
the 1996 disclosure by the Clinton Administration of certain materials associated with security
clearance files. Indeed, contemporaneous documents relating to that disclosure-that you are
either unaware of or have chosen to ignore-are available from the National Archives and strongly
suggest that security clearance materials were inadvertently included in a production to Congress.
See 2006-0946-F - Staffing of the White House Travel Office (investigations) [Segment 1] at 41,
Clinton Digital Library, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/14782 ("[I]t was never
discussed; no one knew that the FBI file was being produced until after it was gone. We were
caught by surprise ...."); id. at 43 (explaining that relevant White House personnel "did not know
that FBI material was included"). The Committee cannot rely on an unauthorized production as
binding precedent here. When viewed in this context, it is clear that this Administration's position
is not novel. To the contrary, it is entirely consistent with the positions of prior administrations of
both political parties and-in fact-with your own position, which we respectfully ask you to
reaffirm.

The Committee's citations to various inapplicable legal precedents are also unpersuasive.
See Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter Attach. at 1-2. For instance, Barenblatt-which involved an
investigation of a private party, not the Executive Branch-actually stands for the proposition that
Congress may "only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate." 360 U.S. at 111-12. The Court did not hold, as the Committee suggests, that
Congress can impair the President's exercise of powers constitutionally assigned to the Executive.
Apr. 1, 2019 Cunnnings Letter Attach. at 1. The Committee's citation to Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017), is also misplaced. Although Congress has a limited role in "[n]ational­
security policy," see id. at 1861 (citing U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8), the Court has made clear that the
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page 6

authority to grant security clearances belongs to "the President as head ofthe Executive Branch,"
Egan, 484 U.S. at 527.

The Committee also claims that the White House misreads Egan. That is incorrect. The
Egan Court discussed the absence ofstatutory language governing judicial review for security
clearance denials and explained that "general proposition[s] ofadministrative law" do not apply
where, as here, they involve "a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call [that] is
committed by law to the ... Executive Branch." 484 U.S. at 527. And, as discussed, Egan makes
clear that the President's authority with regard to national security infmmation "exists quite apart
from any explicit congressional grant." Id.

Even ifthe Committee were to articulate a legitimate legislative purpose relating to security
clearances, there is no need for the Committee to examine past security clearance determinations
for particular individuals. As the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the District ofColumbia Circuit has
explained, "legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of
proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction ofpast
events." See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
732 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane) (contrasting the proper scope ofcongressional "fact-finding" with
a grand jury's "need for the most precise evidence"). Thus, employee-specific information is
certainly not required, or even necessary, to assess "whether Congress should amend cun-ent laws
to improve national security and enhance transparency over these decisions," as the Committee
suggests. Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter at 4.

The Committee's list of potential legislative options does not change the analysis, but
instead powerfully proves our point. See Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter Attach. at 3-4. For
instance, ifthe Committee's goal is to truly consider "[l]egislation creating or amending criminal
penalties for the improper disclosure or possession ofnational security information," id. at 3, there
is no conceivable need to assess the contents of any pmticular individual's security clearance
application or file. That is particularly hue in light of(i) your claim during the Committee's April
2, 2019 hearing that the Committee is simply focused on "investigating the process"; (ii) the fact
that the White House has already provided process-related documents and briefings, while offering
additional testimony by a former official, to the Committee; and (iii) your previously-stated belief
that federal employees should "be ce1tain their confidential background files" are not
"disseminated without their pennission." Full Committee Business Meeting Before the H Comm.
on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (Apr. 2, 2019); Additional and Minority Views, H. Comm.
on Gov't Reform and Oversight, H.R. Rep. No. 104-862, at 117 (1996).

III. The Committee Is Requesting Documents That Are Not Subject To Disclosure Under
Settled Legal Principles.

As discussed, it has long been recognized by the courts and adminisu·ations ofboth political
pmties that strong confidentiality protections are essential for the proper functioning of the
Executive Branch. See Obama Admin. Mem. in Supp. ofDef.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 14, Comm.
on Oversight & Gov't Reform v. Holder, No. 12-cv-1332, 2014 WL 12662665 (D.D.C. Aug. 20,
2014) ("As courts have long recognized, the Executive Branch's role in enforcing the law requires
The Honorable Elijah E. Cunnnings
Page 7

that some materials remain confidential so that the Executive's proper functioning under the
Constitution is preserved and protected.").

Despite the numerous concerns expressed in my prior correspondence, the Committee has
refused to modify the scope of its information requests at all. Apr. 1, 2019 Cunnnings Letter at 3.
Instead, it is simply "prioritizing the production" of certain materials. Id But even those
"prioritz[ed]" requests appear to seek four categories of materials that are protected from
disclosure.

First, the Committee's requests cover connnunications to and from the President­
connnunications at the heart of executive privilege. For example, the requests seek documents
"drafted by or for" the President's most senior advisors, including the White House Chief of Staff,
Deputy Chief of Staff, and Counsel to the President. Id. The President has a constitutionally
grounded interest in being able to consult with his advisors in a confidential manner, and the
Connnittee is not entitled to the documents it seeks to the extent they reflect connnunications with
the President. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 68 3, 705 (1974) ("The [presidential
connnunications] privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution."); cf Immunity ofthe Assistant to the President
and Director of the Office of Political Strategy and Outreach From Congressional Subpoena,
38 Op. O.L.C. _, at *6 (July 15, 2014) ("[S]ubjecting an immediate presidential adviser to
Congress's subpoena power would threaten the President's autonomy aud his ability to receive
sound and candid advice.").

Second, the Committee seeks numerous documents reflecting the kind of internal
Executive Branch deliberations that have been consistently recognized as protected
connnunications. For example, the fourth "prioritiz[ed]" request in the Connnittee's letter seeks
security clearance "[a]djudication sunnnaries" for nine current and former White House
employees. Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter at 3. By definition, these sunnnaries reflect judgments
and recommendations by Executive Branch employees regarding whether a particular individual
should receive a security clearance. Protections ensuring that the deliberative process can remain
confidential apply to these types of materials. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (documents that reflect "advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated" are
protected (quotation and citation omitted)); Assertion of Executive Privilege Over Documents
Generated in Response to Congressional Investigation into Operation Fast and Furious,
36 Op.O.L.C. _, at *3 (June 19, 2012) ("The threat of compelled disclosure of confidential
Executive Branch deliberative material can discourage robust and candid deliberations .. ..");
Assertion of Executive Privilege Over Communications Regarding EPA 's Ozone Air Quality
Standards and California's Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2008)
("Documents generated for the purpose of assisting the President in making a decision are
protected" and these protections also "encompass[] Executive Branch deliberative
communications that do not implicate presidential decisionmalcing"); Assertion of Executive
Privilege Regarding White House Counsel's Office Documents, 20 Op. O.L.C. 2, 3 (1996) ('The
Supreme Court has expressly (and unanimously) recognized that the Constitution gives the
President the power to protect the confidentiality of White House communications.").
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page 8

Third, the Committee has requested materials from individual security clearance files­
including adjudication summaries-that consist, in large part, of information gathered and
prepared by the FBI, the disclosure of which would risk undermining the ability of law
enforcement agencies to conduct future security clearance investigations. Releasing information
prepared by the FBI in connection with a security clearance review would undeimine the
investigative process, expose sensitive information that could jeopardize the FBI's ability to
conduct future investigations, and raise serious separntion of powers concerns. Cf Assertion of
Executive Privilege Concerning the Special Counsel's Interviews of the Vice President and Senior
White House Staff, 32 Op. O.L.C. 7, 10 (2008). Indeed, releasing confidential security clearance
files would likely hinder future cooperation with background investigations. Third parties would
be more reluctant to provide information for background investigations if they understood that the
info1mation being gathered would not be kept confidential but instead would be released to a
partisan congressional committee inappropriately investigating individuals and then promptly
leaked to the media. See id at 11. This Administration will not be a party to efforts that would
weaken the Executive Branch's ability to secure full, candid cooperation with background checks
and thereby weaken America's national security.

Fourth, the Committee seeks infmmation regarding security clearance determinations that
implicate sensitive information. For instance, the Committee's fifth "prioritiz[ed]" request seeks
documents "memorializing the circumstances under which security clearances were granted or
denied." Apr. 1, 2019 Cummings Letter at 3. The Supreme C0111t has explained that the President
as Commander-in-Chief should be afforded the "utmost deference" in the context of protecting
national security information. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11; see also Memorandum from William H.
Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and John R. Stevenson, Legal
Adviser, Dep't of State, Re: The President's Executive Privilege to Withhold Foreign Policy and
National Security Information at 7 (Dec. 8, 1969) ("[N]ational security and foreign relations
considerations have been considered the strongest possible basis upon which to invoke the
privilege of the executive."). The Committee is not legally entitled to these highly sensitive
materials.

IV. The Committee Appears To Be Putting Public Servants At Risk In Order To Advance
A Partisan Political Agenda.

As a matter of basic courtesy and respect for a co-equal branch of our government, I again
request that your staff work through my office to request information from current or former White
House officials. Prior administrations of both political paities have made the same request.
See, e.g., Letter from Kathryn H. Ruemmler, Counsel to President Obama, to Chairman Fred
Upton, Chairman Cliff Stearns, Chairman Joseph Pitts, and Vice Chairman Michael Burgess (Nov.
14, 2011) ("[A]ny requests from Committee or Committee staff to speak with current or fmmer
White House officials about their official responsibilities at the White House should be directed to
the Office of the White House Counsel."). Consulting with my office will ensure that the
Committee efficiently obtains access to the information and individuals to which it is entitled and
that any disclosure of privileged information to Congress is properly authorized.

Much of the information requested by the Committee is subject to protections from

disclosure by law. See, e.g., Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Exec. Order No. 12,968 § 7.2 (limiting
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Page 9

the dissemination ofinfonnation obtained in connection with security clearance reviews); Standard
Form 86 ("The collection, maintenance, and disclosure of background investigative information
are governed by the Privacy Act."); Assertion ofExecutive Privilege With Respect to Prosecutorial
Documents, 25 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (2001) ("The Constitution clearly gives the President the power to
protect" infmmation subject to executive privilege).

It is highly improper for the Committee to induce or encourage the unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information in order to launch public political attacks on individuals as part of
advancing a pmtisan political agenda. As discussed, the Committee's activities may also
discourage individuals from pursuing careers in the government or from otherwise pmticipating in
the security clearance process. I respectfully urge the Committee to cease these improper methods
of obtaining information to which it is not legally entitled.
* * *

As I have said numerous times, my office will work with the Committee through the
constitutionally mandated accommodation process to provide the Committee with materials it can
properly request. We are disappointed that the Committee has chosen to unnecessarily escalate
this dispute without engaging my office in additional negotiations following our recent substantial
accommodations. I welcome the opportunity to discuss any of these points at your convenience.

at A. Cipollone
Counsel to the President

cc: The Honorable Jim Jordan, Ranking Member