Sabarimala Indu Malhotra J Judgment PDF

Bar & Bench (www.barandbench.
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 373 OF 2006
Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. …Petitioners
Versus
State of Kerala & Ors. …Respondents
JUDGMENT
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed in public interest by a registered
association of Young Lawyers. The Intervenors in the Application for
Intervention have averred that they are gender rights activists working in
and around the State of Punjab, with a focus on issues of gender equality
and justice, sexuality, and menstrual discrimination.
The Petitioners have inter alia stated that they learnt of the practise of
restricting the entry of women in the age group of 10 to 50 years in the
Sabarimala Temple in Kerala from three newspaper articles written by
Barkha Dutt (Scent of a Woman, Hindustan Times; July 1, 2006), Sharvani
Pandit (Touching Faith, Times of India; July 1, 2006), and Vir Sanghvi
(Keeping the Faith, Losing our Religion, Sunday Hindustan Times; July 2,
2006).
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The Petitioners have challenged the Constitutional validity of Rule 3(b)
of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)
Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1965 Rules”), which restricts
the entry of women into the Sabarimala Temple as being ultra vires Section
3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act,
1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1965 Act”).
Further, the Petitioners have prayed for the issuance of a Writ of
Mandamus to the State of Kerala, the Travancore Devaswom Board, the
Chief Thanthri of Sabarimala Temple and the District Magistrate of
Pathanamthitta to ensure that female devotees between the age group of 10
to 50 years are permitted to enter the Sabarimala Temple without any
restriction.
2. SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS AND INTERVENORS
The Petitioners and the Intervenors were represented by Mr. R.P.
Gupta, and Ms. Indira Jaising, Senior Advocate. Mr. Raju Ramachandran,
learned Senior Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae who supported the
case of the Petitioners.
(i) In the Writ Petition, the Petitioners state that the present case
pertains to a centuries old custom of prohibiting entry of women
between the ages of 10 years to 50 years into the Sabarimala Temple
of Lord Ayyappa.
The customary practise, as codified in Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules
read with the Notifications issued by the Travancore Devaswom
2
Board dated October 21, 1955 and November 27, 1956, does not
meet the tests of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
This exclusionary practise violates Article 14 as the classification
lacks a Constitutional object. It is manifestly arbitrary as it is based
on physiological factors alone, and does not serve any valid object.
(ii) The customary practise violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution as it
is based on ‘sex’ alone.
The practise also violates Article 15(2)(b) since the Sabarimala
Temple is a public place of worship being open and dedicated to the
public and is partly funded by the State under Article 290A.
(iii) Article 25 guarantees the Fundamental Right to an individual to
worship or follow any religion.
The 1965 Act has been passed in furtherance of the goals
enshrined in Article 25(2)(b) as a ‘measure of social reform’. The Act
contains no prohibition against women from entering any public
temple.
(iv) Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is ultra vires the Act insofar as it
prohibits the entry of women.
(v) The Petitioners contend that a religious denomination must have the
following attributes:
• It has its own property & establishment capable of succession by
its followers.
• It has its distinct identity clearly distinguishable from any
established religion.
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• It has its own set of followers who are bound by a distinct set of
beliefs, practises, rituals or beliefs.
• It has the hierarchy of its own administration, not controlled by
any outside agency.
It was contended that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not
constitute a religious denomination under Article 26 as they do not
have a common faith, or a distinct name. The devotees of Lord
Ayyappa are not unified on the basis of some distinct set of practises.
Every temple in India has its own different set of rituals. It differs
from region to region. A minor difference in rituals and ceremonies
does not make them a separate religious denomination.
The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not form a religious
denomination since the tests prescribed by this Court have not been
satisfied in this case. Even assuming that the devotees of Lord
Ayyappa constitute a religious denomination, their rights under
Article 26(b) would be subject to Article 25(2)(b) in line with the
decision of this Court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of
Mysore & Ors.1.
It was further submitted that there are no exclusive followers of
this Temple except general Hindu followers visiting any Hindu
temple.
Reliance was placed on the judgments of this Court in Sardar
Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay2, Raja Bira Kishore
1 1958 SCR 895 : AIR 1958 SC 255

2 1962 Supp (2) SCR 496 : AIR 1962 SC 853
4
Deb, Hereditary Superintendent, Jagannath Temple, P.O. and District
Puri v. State of Orissa3, and in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors.4.
(vi) Even if the Sabarimala Temple is taken to be a religious
denomination, the restriction on the entry of women is not an
essential religious practise.
The prohibition on women between the ages of 10 to 50 years
from entering the temple does not constitute the core foundation of
the assumed religious denomination. Any law or custom to be
protected under Article 26 must have Constitutional legitimacy.
(vii) The exclusionary practise is violative of Article 21, as it has the
impact of casting a stigma on women as they are considered to be
polluted, which has a huge psychological impact on them, and
undermines their dignity under Article 21.
The exclusionary practise is violative of Article 17 as it is a direct
form of “Untouchability”. Excluding women from public places such
as temples, based on menstruation, is a form of ‘untouchability’.
This Article is enforceable both against non-State as well as State
actors.
(viii) Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned Amicus Curiae, submitted that the
Sabarimala Temple is a place of public worship. It is managed and
administered by a statutory body i.e. the Travancore Devaswom
Board. According to him, a public temple by its very character is
established, and maintained for the benefit of its devotees. The right
3 (1964) 7 SCR 32 : AIR 1964 SC 1501

4 (1983) 1 SCC 51
5
of entry emanates from this public character, and is a legal right
which is not dependent upon the temple authorities.
The Travancore Devaswom Board is a statutorily created
authority under the Travancore – Cochin Hindu Religious
Institutions Act, 1950, and receives an annual payment from the
Consolidated Fund of India under Article 290A. It would squarely fall
within the ambit of “other authorities” in Article 12, and is duty
bound to give effect to the Fundamental Rights.
(ix) The Fundamental Right to worship under Article 25(1) is a non-
discriminatory right, and is equally available to both men and
women alike. The right of a woman to enter the Temple as a devotee
is an essential aspect of her right to worship, and is a necessary
concomitant of the right to equality guaranteed by Articles 15.
The non-discriminatory right of worship is not dependent upon
the will of the State to provide for social welfare or reform under
Article 25(2)(b).
Article 25(2)(b) is not merely an enabling provision, but provides a
substantive right. The exclusion of women cannot be classified as an
essential religious practise in the absence of any scriptural evidence
being adduced on the part of the Respondents.
(x) The exclusionary practise results in discrimination against women as
a class, since a significant section of women are excluded from
entering the Temple. Placing reliance on the “impact test” enunciated
by this Court in Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India &
6
Ors.5, he submitted that the discrimination is only on the ground of
“sex” since the biological feature of menstruation emanates from the
characteristics of the particular sex.
(xi) Article 17 prohibits untouchability “in any form” in order to abolish
all practises based on notions of purity, and pollution. The exclusion
of menstruating women is on the same footing as the exclusion of
oppressed classes.
(xii) The term “morality” used in Articles 25 and 26 refers to
Constitutional Morality, and not an individualised or sectionalised
sense of morality. It must be informed by Articles 14, 15, 17, 38, and
51A.
(xiii) Mr. Ramachandran, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that Rule 3(b)
of the 1965 Act is ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act insofar as it
seeks to protect customs and usages, which Section 3 specifically
over-rides. The justification for Rule 3 cannot flow from the proviso
to Section 3, since the proviso can only be interpreted in line with
the decision of this Court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v.
State of Mysore & Ors. (supra). It is ultra vires Section 4 since it
provides that the Rules framed thereunder cannot be discriminatory
against any section or class.
3. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
The State of Kerala was represented by Mr. Jaideep Gupta, Senior
Advocate. The Travancore Dewaswom Board was represented by Dr. A.M.
5 (1972) 2 SCC 788
7
Singhvi, Senior Advocate. The Chief Thanthri was represented by Mr. V.
Giri, Senior Advocate. The Nair Service Society was represented by Mr. K.
Parasaran, Senior Advocate. The Raja of Pandalam was represented by Mr.
K. Radhakrishnan. Mr. J. Sai Deepak appeared on behalf of Respondent
No. 18 and Intervenor by the name of People for Dharma. Mr.
Ramamurthy, Senior Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae who supported
the case of the Respondents.
4. The State of Kerala filed two Affidavits in the present Writ Petition.
The State of Kerala filed an Affidavit dated November 13, 2007
supporting the cause of the Petitioners. The State however prayed for the
appointment of an “appropriate commission” to submit suggestions/views
on whether entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years should be
permitted. Some of the averments made in the said Affidavit are pertinent
to note, and are being reproduced herein below for reference:
“…As such, Government cannot render an independent direction

against the present prevailing custom, regard being had to the finality
of the said judgment [Kerala High Court’s decision in S. Mahendran
(supra)] over the disputed questions of facts which requires the
necessity of adducing evidence also…
…Thus, Government is of the opinion that no body should be
prohibited from their right to worship, but considering the fact that the
matter of entry to Sabarimala is a practise followed for so many years
and connected with the belief and values accepted by the people and
since there is a binding High Court judgment in that regard,
Government felt that this Hon'ble Court may be requested to appoint
an appropriate commission consisting of eminent scholars with
authentic knowledge in Hinduism and reputed and uncorrupt social
reformers to submit suggestions/views on the issue whether it is open
to all women, irrespective of their age to enter the temple and make
worship…”
(Emphasis supplied)
8
In the subsequent Additional Affidavit dated February 4, 2016 filed by
the State, it was submitted that the assertions made in the previous
Affidavit dated November 13, 2007 erroneously sought to support the
Petitioners. It was submitted that it was not open for the State Government
to take a stand at variance with its position before the Kerala High Court in
S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board,
Thiruvananthapuram & Ors.6 and in contravention of the directions issued
therein. It was asserted that the practise of restricting the entry of women
between the ages of 10 to 50 years is an essential and integral part of the
customs and usages of the Temple, which is protected under Articles 25
and 26 of the Constitution. Being a religious custom, it is also immune
from challenge under other provisions of Part III of the Constitution in light
of the ruling of this Court in Riju Prasad Sharma & Ors. v. State of Assam &
Ors.7.
However, during the course of hearing before the three-Judge Bench at
the time of reference, it was submitted that the State would be taking the
stand stated in the Affidavit dated November 13, 2007.
5. The submissions made by the Respondent No.2 – Travancore Devaswom
Board, Respondent No. 4 – the Thanthri of the Temple, Respondent No. 6 –
the Nair Service Society, Respondent Nos. 18 and 19 are summarised
hereinbelow:
6 AIR 1993 Ker 42

7 (2015) 9 SCC 461
9
(i) The Sabarimala Temple, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, is a prominent
temple in Kerala which is visited by over twenty million pilgrims and
devotees every year. As per a centuries old tradition of this temple,
and the ‘acharas’, beliefs and customs followed by this Temple,
women in the age group of 10 to 50 years are not permitted to enter
this Temple.
This is attributable to the manifestation of the deity at the
Sabarimala Temple which is in the form of a ‘Naishtik Bramhachari’,
who practises strict penance, and the severest form of celibacy.
According to legend, it is believed that Lord Ayyappa, the
presiding deity of Sabarimala had his human sojourn at Pandalam
as the son of the King of Pandalam, known by the name of
Manikandan, who found him as a radiant faced infant on the banks
of the river Pampa, wearing a bead (‘mani’) around his neck.
Manikandan’s feats and achievements convinced the King and others
of his divine origin.
The Lord told the King that he could construct a temple at
Sabarimala, north of the holy river Pampa, and install the deity
there. The King duly constructed the temple at Sabarimala and
dedicated it to Lord Ayyappa. The deity of Lord Ayyappa in
Sabarimala Temple was installed in the form of a ‘Naishtik
Brahmachari’ i.e. an eternal celibate.
Lord Ayyappa is believed to have explained the manner in which
the pilgrimage to the Sabarimala Temple is to be undertaken, after
observing a 41-day ‘Vratham’.
10
It is believed that Lord Ayyappa himself undertook the 41-day
‘Vratham’ before he went to Sabarimala Temple to merge with the
deity. The whole process of the pilgrimage undertaken by a pilgrim
is to replicate the journey of Lord Ayyappa. The mode and manner of
worship at this Temple as revealed by the Lord himself is chronicled
in the ‘Sthal Purana’ i.e. the ‘Bhuthanatha Geetha’.
The 41 day “Vratham” is a centuries old custom and practise
undertaken by the pilgrims referred to as ‘Ayyappans’. The object of
this ‘Vratham’ is to discipline and train the devotees for the evolution
of spiritual consciousness leading to self-realization. Before
embarking on the pilgrimage to this shrine, a key essential of the
‘Vratham’ is observance of a ‘Sathvic’ lifestyle and ‘Brahmacharya’ so
as to keep the body and mind pure. A basic requirement of the
‘Vratham’ is to withdraw from the materialistic world and step onto
the spiritual path.
When a pilgrim undertakes the ‘Vratham’, the pilgrim separates
himself from the women-folk in the house, including his wife,
daughter, or other female members in the family.
The “Vratham” or penance consists of:
• Forsaking all physical relations with one’s spouse;
• Giving up anything that is intoxicating, including alcohol,
cigarettes and ‘tamasic’ food;
• Living separately from the rest of the family in an isolated
room or a separate building;
11
• Refraining from interacting with young women in daily life,
including one’s daughter, sister, or other young women
relatives;
• Cooking one’s own food;
• Observing cleanliness, including bathing twice a day before
prayers;
• Wearing a black mundu and upper garments;
• Having only one meal a day;
• Walking barefoot.
On the 41st day, after puja, the pilgrim takes the irimudi
(consisting of rice and other provisions for one’s own travel,
alongwith a coconut filled with ghee and puja articles) and starts the
pilgrimage to climb the 18 steps to reach the ‘Sannidhanam’, for
darshan of the deity. This involves walking from River Pampa,
climbing 3000 feet to the Sannidhanam, which is a climb of around
13 kilometres through dense forests.
As a part of this system of spiritual discipline, it is expressly
stipulated that women between the ages of 10 to 50 years should not
undertake this pilgrimage.
(ii) This custom or usage is understood to have been prevalent since the
inception of this Temple, which is since the past several centuries.
Reliance was placed on a comprehensive thesis by Radhika Sekar on
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this Temple.8 Relevant extracts from the thesis are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“The cultus members maintain the strictest celibacy before they

undertake their journey through the forests to the Sabarimala
shrine. This emphasis on celibacy could be in order to gain
protection from other forest spirits, for as mentioned earlier,
Yaksas are said to protect “sages and celibates…
…Though there is no formal declaration, it is understood that
the Ayyappa (as he is now called) will follow the strictest
celibacy, abstain from intoxicants and meat, and participate
only in religious activities. He may continue to work at his
profession, but he may not indulge in social enterprises.
Ayyappas are also required to eat only once a day (at noon)
and to avoid garlic, onion and stale food. In the evening, they
may eat fruit or something very light. As far as the dress code
is concerned, a degree of flexibility is allowed during the vratam
period. The nature of one’s profession does not always permit
this drastic change in dress code. For example, Ayyappas in
the army or police force wear their regular uniforms and change
into black only when off duty. Black or blue vestis and
barefootedness are, however, insisted upon during the actual
pilgrimage…
…The rule of celibacy is taken very seriously and includes
celibacy in thought and action. Ayyappas are advised to look
upon all women older than them as mothers and those younger
as daughters or sisters. Menstrual taboos are now strictly
imposed….. Sexual cohabitation is also forbidden. During the
vratam, Ayyappas not only insist on these taboos being rigidly
followed but they go a step further and insist on physical
separation. It is not uncommon for a wife, daughter or sister to
be sent away during her menses if a male member of the
household has taken the vratam….”
(Emphasis supplied)
In the Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States
written by Lieutenants Ward and Conner, reference has been made
regarding the custom and usage prevalent at Sabarimala Temple.
The Memoir of the Survey was originally published in two parts in
1893 and 1901 giving details of the statistical and geographical
8 Radhika Sekar, The Process of Pilgrimage: The Ayyappa Cultus and Sabarimalai Yatra
(Faculty of Graduate Studies, Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton
University, Ottawa, Ontario; October 1987)
13
surveys of the Travancore and Cochin States. Reference was sought
to be made to the following excerpt from the survey:
“…old women and young girls, may approach the temple, but
those who have attained puberty and to a certain time of life
are forbid to approach, as all sexual intercourse in that vicinity
is averse to this deity…” 9
(iii) Dr. Singhvi submitted that a practise started in hoary antiquity, and
continued since time immemorial without interruption, becomes a
usage and custom. Reliance, in this regard, was placed on the
judgments of Ewanlangki-E-Rymbai v. Jaintia Hills District Council &
Ors.10, Bhimashya & Ors. v. Janabi (Smt) Alia Janawwa 11, and
Salekh Chand (Dead) by LRs v. Satya Gupta & Ors.12.
The custom and usage of restricting the entry of women in the
age group of 10 to 50 years followed in the Sabarimala Temple is pre-
constitutional. As per Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution, “law”
includes custom or usage, and would have the force of law.
The characteristics and elements of a valid custom are that it
must be of immemorial existence, it must be reasonable, certain and
continuous. The customs and usages, religious beliefs and practises
as mentioned above are peculiar to the Sabarimala Temple, and have
admittedly been followed since centuries.
(iv) The exclusion of women in this Temple is not absolute or universal.
It is limited to a particular age group in one particular temple, with
the view to preserve the character of the deity. Women outside the
9 Lieutenants Ward and Conner, Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States
(First Reprint 1994, Government of Kerala) at p. 137
10 (2006) 4 SCC 748
11 (2006) 13 SCC 627
12 (2008) 13 SCC 119
14
age group of 10 to 50 years are entitled to worship at the Sabarimala
Temple. The usage and practise is primary to preserve the sacred
form and character of the deity. It was further submitted that the
objection to this custom is not being raised by the worshippers of
Lord Ayyappa, but by social activists.
(v) It was further submitted that there are about 1000 temples
dedicated to the worship of Lord Ayyappa, where the deity is not in
the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. In those temples, the mode and
manner of worship differs from Sabarimala Temple, since the deity
has manifested himself in a different form. There is no similar
restriction on the entry of women in the other Temples of Lord
Ayyappa, where women of all ages can worship the deity.
(vi) Mr. Parasaran, Senior Advocate submitted that the restriction on
entry of women is a part of the essential practise of this Temple, and
the pilgrimage undertaken. It is clearly intended to keep the pilgrims
away from any distraction related to sex, as the dominant objective of
the pilgrimage is the creation of circumstances in all respects for the
successful practise of the spiritual self-discipline.
The limited restriction on the entry of women from 10 to 50 years,
in the Sabarimala Temple is a matter of ‘religion’ and ‘religious faith
and practise’, and the fundamental principles underlying the
‘prathishtha’ (installation) of the Sabarimala Temple, as well as the
custom and usage of worship of the deity - Lord Ayyappa.
(vii) With respect to the contention that the custom is violative of
women’s right to gender equality, Mr. V. Giri, Senior Advocate inter
15
alia submitted that if women as a class were prohibited from
participation, it would amount to social discrimination. However,
this is not so in the present case. Girls below 10 years, and women
after 50 years can freely enter this Temple, and offer worship
Further, there is no similar restriction on the entry of women at the
other Temples of Lord Ayyappa.
The classification of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years,
and men of the same age group, has a reasonable nexus with the
object sought to be achieved, which is to preserve the identity and
manifestation of the Lord as a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’.
(viii) It was submitted by the Respondents that in order to preserve the
character of the deity, and the sanctity of the idol at the Sabarimala
Temple, the limited restriction is imposed on the entry of women only
during the period notified by the Travancore Devaswom Board. There
is no absolute restriction on women per se. Such practise is
consistent with the ‘Nishta’ or ‘Naishtik Buddhi’ of the deity. This
being the underlying reason behind the custom, there is no
derogation of the dignity of women. It is only to protect the
manifestation and form of the deity, which is sacred and divine, and
preserve the penance undertaken by the devotees.
(ix) It was further submitted that it is the duty of the Travancore
Devaswom Board under Section 31 of the Travancore - Cochin Hindu
Religious Institutions Act, 1950 to administer the temple in
accordance with the custom and usage of the Temple.
16
(x) It was submitted that issues of law and fact should be decided by a
competent civil court, after examination of documentary and other
evidence.
(xi) Mr. Parasaran, Senior Advocate further submitted that religion is a
matter of faith. Religious beliefs are held to be sacred by those who
have faith. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Swamiar Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt (supra)
wherein the definition of religion from an American case was
extracted i.e. “the term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his
relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for His Being and character and of obedience to His Will”.
Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the case of Sri
Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. (supra)
wherein it was observed as follows:
“The Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them and their

worship at home and in temples is ordained as certain means of
attaining salvation.”
In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan &
Ors.13, emphasis was laid on the mode of worship adopted when
Lord Krishna was worshipped in the form of a child.
Religion does not merely lay down a code of ethical rules for its
followers to accept, but also includes rituals and observances,
ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral
parts of the religion.
13 (1964) 1 SCR 561 at 582 : AIR 1963 SC 1638
17
(xii) The words ‘religious denomination’ in Article 26 of the Constitution
must take their colour from the word “religion”; and if this be so, the
expression ‘religious denomination’ must satisfy three conditions as
laid down in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors. (supra):
“80. (1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system

of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their
spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
(2) common organisation; and
(3) designation by a distinctive name.”
Religious maths, religious sects, religious bodies, sub-sects or
any section thereof have been held to be religious denominations.
Reliance was placed on the judgments in Commissioner., Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra); Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed
Hussain Ali & Ors.,14 and Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N. &
Ors.15.
Relying on the judgment in Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v.
State of Mysore & Ors. case (supra), Dr. Singhvi submitted that
religion, in this formulation, is a much wider concept, and includes:
• Ceremonial law relating to the construction of Temples;
• Installation of Idols therein;
• Place of consecration of the principle deity;
• Where the other Devatas are to be installed;
• Conduct of worship of the deities;
• Where the worshippers are to stand for worship;
14 (1962) 1 SCR 383 : AIR 1961 SC 1402

15 (2014) 5 SCC 75
18
• Purificatory ceremonies and their mode and manner of
performance;
• Who are entitled to enter for worship; where they are entitled
to stand and worship; and, how the worship is to be
conducted.
(xiii) It was categorically asserted by the Respondents that the devotees of
Lord Ayyappa constitute a religious denomination, who follow the
‘Ayyappan Dharma’, where all male devotees are called ‘Ayyappans’
and all female devotees below 10 years and above 50 years of age are
called ‘Malikapurams’. A devotee has to abide by the customs and
usages of this Temple, if he is to mount the ‘pathinettu padikal’ and
enter the Sabarimala Temple.
This set of beliefs and faiths of the ‘Ayyappaswamis’, and the
organization of the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa constitute a distinct
religious denomination, having distinct practises.
(xiv) It was further submitted that the status of this temple as a religious
denomination, was settled by the judgment of the Division Bench of
the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore
Devaswom Board & Ors. (supra). The High Court decided the case
after recording both documentary and oral evidence. The then
Thanthri – Sri Neelakandaru, who had installed the deity was
examined by the High Court as C.W.6, who stated that women
during the age group of 10 to 50 years were prohibited from entering
the temple much before the 1950s.
19
This judgment being a declaration of the status of this temple as
a religious denomination, is a judgment in rem. The said judgment
has not been challenged by any party. Hence, it would be binding on
all parties, including the Petitioners herein.
The following observation from the judgment of this Court in Dr.
Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (supra) was relied
upon:
“The declaration that Dikshitars are religious denomination or

section thereof is in fact a declaration of their status and making
such declaration is in fact a judgment in rem.”
(Internal quotations omitted)
(xv) Unlike Article 25, which is subject to the other provisions of Pat III of
the Constitution, Article 26 is subject only to public order, morality,
and health, and not to the other provisions of the Constitution. As a
result, the Fundamental Rights of the denomination is not subject to
Articles 14 or 15 of the Constitution.
With respect to Article 25(1), it was submitted that the
worshippers of Lord Ayyappa are entitled to the freedom of
conscience, and the right to profess, practise and propagate their
religion. The right to profess their faith by worshipping at the
Sabarimala Temple, can be guaranteed only if the character of the
deity as a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’ is preserved. If women between the
age of 10 to 50 years are permitted entry, it would result in changing
the very character/nature of the deity, which would directly impinge
on the right of the devotees to practise their religion guaranteed by
Article 25(1) of the Constitution.
20
The right of the devotees under Article 25(1) cannot be made
subject to the claim of the Petitioners to enter the temple under
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, since they do not profess faith
in the deity of this Temple, but claim merely to be social activists.
(xvi) Article 25(2)(b) declares that nothing in Article 25(1) shall prevent the
State from making any law providing for social welfare and reform or
the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public
character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The ‘throwing open’
to ‘all classes and sections of Hindus’ was intended to redress caste-
based prejudices and injustices in society.
Article 25(2)(b) cannot be interpreted to mean that customs and
usages forming an essential part of the religion, are to be overridden.
Article 25(2)(b) would have no application since there is no ban,
but only a limited restriction during the notified period, based on
faith, custom and belief, which has been observed since time
immemorial.
(xvii) The Respondents submitted that the plea of the Petitioners with
reference to Article 17, was wholly misconceived. The object and core
of Article 17 was to prohibit untouchability based on ‘caste’ in the
Hindu religion. No such caste-based or religion-based untouchability
is practised at the Sabarimala Temple.
The customs practised by the devotees at the Sabarimala Temple
do not flow from any practise associated with untouchability under
Article 17. The custom is not based on any alleged impurity or
disability. Hence, the contention was liable to be rejected.
21
6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
We have heard the arguments of the Counsel representing various
parties, and perused the pleadings and written submissions filed by them.
6.1. The issues raised in the present Writ Petition have far-reaching
ramifications and implications, not only for the Sabarimala Temple in
Kerala, but for all places of worship of various religions in this
country, which have their own beliefs, practises, customs and
usages, which may be considered to be exclusionary in nature. In a
secular polity, issues which are matters of deep religious faith and
sentiment, must not ordinarily be interfered with by Courts.
6.2. In the past, the Courts, in the context of Hindu temples, have been
asked to identify the limits of State action under Articles 25 and 26
on the administration, control and management of the affairs of
temples, including the appointment of archakas. For instance, in the
case of Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam & Ors. v. Government
of Tamil Nadu & Anr.16, this Court was asked to consider the issue of
appointment of archakas in Writ Petitions filed by an association of
archakas and individual archakas of Sri Meenakshi Amman Temple
of Madurai.
The present case is a PIL filed by an association of lawyers, who
have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court to review certain
practises being followed by the Sabarimala Temple on the grounds of
16 (2016) 2 SCC 725
22
gender discrimination against women during the age-band of 10 to
50 years.
7. MAINTAINABILITY & JUSTICIABILITY
7.1. Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons the freedom
of conscience, and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate
religion. This is however subject to public order, morality and health,
and to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
7.2. The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 32 for violation of
Fundamental Rights, must be based on a pleading that the
Petitioners’ personal rights to worship in this Temple have been
violated. The Petitioners do not claim to be devotees of the
Sabarimala Temple where Lord Ayyappa is believed to have
manifested himself as a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. To determine the
validity of long-standing religious customs and usages of a sect, at
the instance of an association/Intervenors who are “involved in social
developmental activities especially activities related to upliftment of
women and helping them become aware of their rights”17, would
require this Court to decide religious questions at the behest of
persons who do not subscribe to this faith.
The right to worship, claimed by the Petitioners has to be
predicated on the basis of affirmation of a belief in the particular
manifestation of the deity in this Temple.
17 Paragraph 2 of the Writ Petition.
23
7.3. The absence of this bare minimum requirement must not be viewed
as a mere technicality, but an essential requirement to maintain a
challenge for impugning practises of any religious sect, or
denomination. Permitting PILs in religious matters would open the
floodgates to interlopers to question religious beliefs and practises,
even if the petitioner is not a believer of a particular religion, or a
worshipper of a particular shrine. The perils are even graver for
religious minorities if such petitions are entertained.
Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Senior Advocate appeared on behalf of the
Travancore Devaswom Board, and submitted an illustrative list of
various religious institutions where restrictions on the entry of both
men and women exist on the basis of religious beliefs and practises
being followed since time immemorial.18
7.4. In matters of religion and religious practises, Article 14 can be
invoked only by persons who are similarly situated, that is, persons
belonging to the same faith, creed, or sect. The Petitioners do not
state that they are devotees of Lord Ayyappa, who are aggrieved by
the practises followed in the Sabarimala Temple. The right to equality
under Article 14 in matters of religion and religious beliefs has to be
viewed differently. It has to be adjudged amongst the worshippers of
18 Annexure C-8 in the Non-Case Law Convenience Compilation submitted by Dr. A.M.
Singhvi, Senior Advocate enlists places of worship where women are not allowed. This list
includes the Nizamuddin Dargah in New Delhi, Lord Kartikeya Temple in Pehowa, Haryana
and Pushkar, Rajasthan; Bhavani Deeksha Mandapam in Vijaywada; Patbausi Satra in
Assam; Mangala Chandi Temple in Bokaro, Jharkhand.
Annexure C-7 in the Non-Case Law Convenience Compilation submitted by Dr. A.M.
Singhvi, Senior Advocate enlists places of worship where women are not allowed. This list
includes the Temple of Lord Brahma in Pushkar, Rajasthan; the Bhagati Maa Temple in
Kanya Kumari, Kerala; the Attukal Bhagavathy Temple in Kerala; the Chakkulathukavu
Temple in Kerala; and the Mata Temple in Muzaffarpur, Bihar.
24
a particular religion or shrine, who are aggrieved by certain practises
which are found to be oppressive or pernicious.
7.5. Article 25(1) confers on every individual the right to freely profess,
practise and propagate his or her religion.19 The right of an
individual to worship a specific manifestation of the deity, in
accordance with the tenets of that faith or shrine, is protected by
Article 25(1) of the Constitution. If a person claims to have faith in a
certain deity, the same has to be articulated in accordance with the
tenets of that faith.
In the present case, the worshippers of this Temple believe in the
manifestation of the deity as a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The devotees
of this Temple have not challenged the practises followed by this
Temple, based on the essential characteristics of the deity.
7.6. The right to practise one’s religion is a Fundamental Right
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, without reference to
whether religion or the religious practises are rational or not.
Religious practises are Constitutionally protected under Articles 25
and 26(b). Courts normally do not delve into issues of religious
practises, especially in the absence of an aggrieved person from that
particular religious faith, or sect.
In Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail,
Calcutta & Ors.20, this Court held that a person can impugn a
particular law under Article 32 only if he is aggrieved by it.
19 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India : A Critical Commentary, Vol. II (4th Ed., Reprint
1999), at Pg. 1274, para 12.35.
20 (1955) 1 SCR 1284 : AIR 1955 SC 367.
25
7.7. Precedents under Article 25 have arisen against State action, and not
been rendered in a PIL.
An illustrative list of such precedents is provided hereinbelow:
(i) In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri
Lakshimdra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra), this
Court had interpreted Articles 25 and 26 at the instance of the
Mathadhipati or superior of the Shirur Mutt who was in-charge
of managing its affairs. The Mathadhipati was aggrieved by
actions taken by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, which
he claimed were violative of Articles 25 and 26.
(ii) In Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore &
Ors.(supra), this Court dealt with the question whether the
rights under Article 26(b) are subject to Article 25(2)(b), at the
instance of the Temple of Sri Venkataramana and its trustees
who belonged to the sect known as Gowda Saraswath
Brahmins.
(iii) In Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, The Special Officer In Charge of
Hindu Religious trust & Ors.21, this Court considered the
Constitutional validity of actions taken by the Bihar State Board
of Religious Trusts under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act,
1950 as being violative of the Fundamental Rights of Mahants of
certain Maths or Asthals guaranteed, inter alia, under Articles
25 and 26.
21 1959 Supp (2) SCR 563 : AIR 1959 SC 942
26
(iv) In Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.
(supra), this Court was called upon to decide the
Constitutionality of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955 in view
of Articles 25 and 26, inter alia, at the instance of Khadims of
the Tomb of Khwaja Moin-ud-din Chisti of Ajmer. The Khadims
claimed to be a part of a religious denomination by the name of
Chishtia Soofies.
(v) In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay
(supra), this Court was called upon to test the Constitutionality
of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949 on the
ground that it violated Fundamental Rights guaranteed under
Articles 25 and 26 to the petitioner who was the Dai-ul-Mutlaq or
Head Priest of the Dawoodi Bohra Community.
(vi) In Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.22, three
children belonging to a sect of Christianity called Jehovah’s
Witnesses had approached the Kerala High Court by way of Writ
Petitions to challenge the action of the Headmistress of their
school, who had expelled them for not singing the National
Anthem during the morning assembly. The children challenged
the action of the authorities as being violative of their rights
under Articles 19(1)(a) and Article 25. This Court held that the
refusal to sing the National Anthem emanated from the genuine
and conscientious religious belief of the children, which was
protected under Article 25(1).
22 (1986) 3 SCC 615
27
In a pluralistic society comprising of people with diverse faiths,
beliefs and traditions, to entertain PILs challenging religious
practises followed by any group, sect or denomination, could cause
serious damage to the Constitutional and secular fabric of this
country.
8. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 14 IN MATTERS OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS PRACTISES
8.1. Religious customs and practises cannot be solely tested on the
touchstone of Article 14 and the principles of rationality embedded
therein. Article 25 specifically provides the equal entitlement of every
individual to freely practise their religion. Equal treatment under
Article 25 is conditioned by the essential beliefs and practises of any
religion. Equality in matters of religion must be viewed in the context
of the worshippers of the same faith.
8.2. The twin-test for determining the validity of a classification under
Article 14 is:
• The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia;
and
• It must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the impugned law.
The difficulty lies in applying the tests under Article 14 to
religious practises which are also protected as Fundamental Rights
under our Constitution. The right to equality claimed by the
Petitioners under Article 14 conflicts with the rights of the
worshippers of this shrine which is also a Fundamental Right
28
guaranteed by Articles 25, and 26 of the Constitution. It would
compel the Court to undertake judicial review under Article 14 to
delineate the rationality of the religious beliefs or practises, which
would be outside the ken of the Courts. It is not for the courts to
determine which of these practises of a faith are to be struck down,
except if they are pernicious, oppressive, or a social evil, like Sati.
8.3. The submissions made by the Counsel for the Petitioners is premised
on the view that this practise constitutes gender discrimination
against women. On the other hand, the Respondents submit that the
present case deals with the right of the devotees of this denomination
or sect, as the case may be, to practise their religion in accordance
with the tenets and beliefs, which are considered to be “essential”
religious practises of this shrine.
8.4. The Petitioners and Intervenors have contended that the age group of
10 to 50 years is arbitrary, and cannot stand the rigours of Article
14. This submission cannot be accepted, since the prescription of
this age-band is the only practical way of ensuring that the limited
restriction on the entry of women is adhered to.
8.5. The right to gender equality to offer worship to Lord Ayyappa is
protected by permitting women of all ages, to visit temples where he
has not manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahamachari’,
and there is no similar restriction in those temples. It is pertinent to
mention that the Respondents, in this context, have submitted that
there are over 1000 temples of Lord Ayyappa, where he has
manifested in other forms, and this restriction does not apply.
29
8.6. The prayers of the Petitioners if acceded to, in its true effect,
amounts to exercising powers of judicial review in determining the
validity of religious beliefs and practises, which would be outside the
ken of the courts. The issue of what constitutes an essential religious
practise is for the religious community to decide.
9. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 15
9.1. Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits differential treatment of
persons on the ground of ‘sex’ alone.
The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified
age-group but in the deep-rooted belief of the worshippers that the
deity in the Sabarimala Temple has manifested in the form of a
‘Naishtik Brahmachari’.
9.2. With respect to the right under Article 15, Mr. Raju Ramachandran,
Amicus Curiae had submitted that the Sabarimala Temple would be
included in the phrase “places of public resort”, as it occurs in Article
15(2)(b).
In this regard, reference may be made to the debates of the
Constituent Assembly on this issue. Draft Article 9 which
corresponds to Article 15 of the Constitution, is extracted for ready
reference:
“9. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race,

caste or sex – The State shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of
them
(1) In particular, no citizen shall, on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex or any of them, be subject to
30
any disability, liability, restriction or condition with

regard to—
a. access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places
of public entertainments, or
b. the use of wells, tanks, roads and places of public
resort maintained wholly or partly out of the revenues
of the State or dedicated to the use of the general
public.
(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for women and
children.”23
Professor K.T. Shah proposed Amendment No. 293 for
substitution of sub-clauses (a) & (b) as follows:
“any place of public use or resort, maintained wholly or partly

out of the revenues of the State, or in any way aided,
recognised, encouraged or protected by the State, or place
dedicated to the use of general public like schools, colleges,
libraries, temples, hospitals, hotels and restaurants, places of
public entertainment, recreation or amusement, like theatres
and cinema-houses or concert-halls; public parks, gardens or
museums; roads, wells, tanks or canals; bridges, posts and
telegraphs, railways, tramways and bus services; and the
like.”24
(Emphasis supplied)
The Vice-President took up Amendment No. 296 for vote, which
was moved for addition to sub-clause (a). The Amendment was
proposed as under:
“After the words of Public entertainment the words or places of

worship be inserted.”25
(Emphasis supplied and internal quotations omitted)
23 Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India

(Manager Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1948) available at
http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/966/7/Fundamental%20Rights%
20%285-12%29.pdf
24 Statement of Professor K.T. Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)
25 Statement of Vice-President, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)
31
Amendment No. 301 was also proposed by Mr. Tajamul Hussain
for inclusion of: “places of worship”, “Dharamshalas, and
Musafirkhanas” at the end of sub-clause (a).26
All these proposals were voted upon, and rejected by the
Constituent Assembly.27 The Assembly considered it fit not to include
‘places of worship’ or ‘temples’ within the ambit of Draft Article 9 of
the Constitution.
The conscious deletion of “temples” and “places of worship” from
the Draft Article 9(1) has to be given due consideration. The
contention of the learned Amicus Curiae that the Sabarimala Temple
would be included within the ambit of ‘places of public resort’ under
Article 15(2) cannot be accepted.
10. ROLE OF COURTS IN MATTERS CONCERNING RELIGION
10.1. The role of Courts in matters concerning religion and religious
practises under our secular Constitutional set up is to afford
protection under Article 25(1) to those practises which are regarded
as “essential” or “integral” by the devotees, or the religious
community itself.
In Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra), this
Court noted that the personal views of judges are irrelevant in
ascertaining whether a particular religious belief or practise must
receive the protection guaranteed under Article 25(1). The following
26 Statement of Mr. Mohd. Tahir, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)
27 Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)
32
observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. are instructive in
understanding the true role of this Court in matters of religion:
“19…We may refer here to the observations of Latham, C.J. in

Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. The
Commonwealth, a decision of the Australian High Court quoted
by Mukherjea, J. in the Shirur Mutt case. Latham, C.J. had
said:
The Constitution protects religion within a community
organised under a Constitution, so that the continuance of
such protection necessarily assumes the continuance of
the community so organised. This view makes it possible
to reconcile religious freedom with ordered government. It
does not mean that the mere fact that the Commonwealth
Parliament passes a law in the belief that it will promote
peace, order and good government of Australia precludes
any consideration by a court of the question whether that
question by Parliament would remove all reality from the
constitutional guarantee. That guarantee is intended to
limit the sphere of action of the legislature. The
interpretation and application of the guarantee cannot,
under our Constitution, be left to Parliament. If the
guarantee is to have any real significance it must be left to
the courts of justice to determine its meaning and to give
effect to it by declaring the invalidity of laws which
infringes it and by declining to enforce them. The courts
will therefore have the responsibility of determining
whether a particular law can fairly be regarded, as a law
to protect the existence of the community, or whether, on
the other hand, it is a law for prohibiting the free exercise
of any religion…
What Latham, C.J. has said about the responsibility of the court
accords with what we have said about the function of the court
when a claim to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article
25 is put forward…
…20…In Ratilal’s case we also notice that Mukherjea, J. quoted
as appropriate Davar, J.’s following observations in Jamshed Ji
v. Soonabai:
If this is the belief of the Zoroastrian community, - a
secular Judge is bound to accept that belief – it is not for
him to sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to
interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift
in favour of what he believes to be the advancement of his
religion and the welfare of his community or mankind.
We do endorse the view suggested by Davar, J.’s observation
that the question is not whether a particular religious belief is
genuinely and conscientiously held as a part of the profession
or practise of religion. Our personal views and reactions are
33
irrelevant. If the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held it

attracts the protection of Article 25 but subject, of course, to the
inhibitions contained therein.”
(Emphasis supplied; internal quotations and footnotes omitted)
10.2. At this juncture, it would be apposite to deal with certain
observations made by Gajendragadkar, J. in Durgah Committee,
Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors. (supra), and Tilkayat Shri
Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (supra).
In Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.
(supra), a reference was made as to how practises emanating from
superstition “…may in that sense be extraneous, and unessential
accretions to religion itself…”.28
Similarly, in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of
Rajasthan & Ors. (supra), an argument was made by Senior Advocate
G.S. Pathak relying on the statement of Latham, C.J. in Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. The Commonwealth
(supra) that “…what is religion to one is superstition to another…”29.
The argument was rejected by Gajendragadkar, J. as being “…of no
relevance…”.30
Mr. H.M. Seervai, well-known Constitutional expert and jurist, in
his seminal treatise titled ‘Constitutional Law of India: A Critical
Commentary’, has remarked that the observations of
Gajendragadkar, J. in Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed
Hussain Ali & Ors. (supra) are obiter. It is inconsistent with the
observations of Mukherjea, J. in the previous decision of a
28 (1962) 1 SCR 383 : AIR 1961 SC 1402 : at paragraph 33

29 (1964) 1 SCR 561 : AIR 1963 SC 1638, at paragraph 59
30 (1964) 1 SCR 561 : AIR 1963 SC 1638, at paragraph 59
34
Constitution Bench of seven Judges in Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra), and a Constitution Bench of five Judges in
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors.31. Mr.
Seervai comments as under:
“12.18…Although it was wholly unnecessary to do so,

Gajendragadkar, J. said:
…it may not be out of place incidentally to strike a note of
caution and observe that in order that the practises in
question should be treated as a part of religion they must
be regarded by the said religion as its essential and
integral part; otherwise even purely secular practises
which are not an essential or an integral part of religion
are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make
a claim for being treated as religious practises within the
meaning of Article 26. Similarly, even practises though
religious may have sprung from merely superstitious
beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and
unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such
practises are found to constitute an essential and integral
part of a religion their claim for the protection under Article
26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words,
the protection must be confined to such religious practises
as are an essential and an integral part of it and no other.
It is submitted that the above obiter runs directly counter to the
judgment of Mukherjea, J. in the Shirur Mutt Case and
substitutes the view of the court for the view of the
denomination on what is essentially a matter of religion. The
reference to superstitious practises is singularly unfortunate, for
what is ‘superstition’ to one section of the public may be a
matter of fundamental religious belief to another. Thus, for
nearly 300 years bequests for masses for the soul of a testator
were held void as being for superstitious uses, till that view
was overruled by the House of Lords in Bourne v. Keane. It is
submitted that in dealing with the practise of religion protected
by provisions like those contained in s. 116, Commonwealth of
Australia Act or in Article 26(b) of our Constitution, it is
necessary to bear in mind the observations of Latham C.J.
quoted earlier, namely, that those provisions must be regarded
as operating in relation to all aspects of religion, irrespective of
varying opinions in the community as to the truth of a particular
religious doctrine or the goodness of conduct prescribed by a
31 1954 SCR 1055 : AIR 1954 SC 388
35
particular religion or as to the propriety of any particular

religious observance. The obiter of Gajendragadkar J. in the
Durgah Committee case is also inconsistent with the
observations of Mukherjea J. in Ratilal Gandhi Case, that the
decision in Jamshedji v. Soonabai afforded an indication of the
measure of protection given by Article 26(b).”32
(Emphasis supplied)
Mr. Seervai also criticised the observations of this Court in
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(supra) as follows:
“12.66 In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji v. Rajasthan

Gajendragadkar J. again adverted to the rights under Arts.
25(1) and 26(b) and stated that if a matter was obviously
secular and not religious, a Court would be justified in rejecting
its claim to be a religious practise, as based on irrational
considerations. It is submitted that the real question is whether
the religious denomination looks upon it as an essential part of
its religion, and however irrational it may appear to persons
who do not share that religious belief, the view of the
denomination must prevail, for, it is not open to a court to
describe as irrational that which is a part of a denomination’s
religion. The actual decision in the case, that the right to
manage the property was a secular matter, is correct, but that
is because, as pointed out by Mukherjea J., Art. 26(b) when
constrasted with Art. 26(c) and (d) shows that matters of
religious belief and practises are distinct and separate from the
management of property of a religious denomination. The
distinction between religious belief and practises which cannot
be controlled, and the management of the property of a religious
denomination which can be controlled to a limited extent, is
recognised by the Article itself and must be enforced. But this
distinction is not relevant to the question whether a religious
practise is itself irrational or secular.”33
(Emphasis supplied)
J. Duncan M. Derrett, a well-known Professor of Oriental Laws,
highlights the problems in applying the “essential practises test” in
his book titled ‘Religion, Law and State in Modern India’ as follows:
32 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India : A Critical Commentary, Vol. II (4th Ed., Reprint
1999), paragraph 12.18 at p. 1267-1268
33 Id. at paragraph 12.66 at p. 1283
36
“In other words the courts can determine what is an integral

part of religion and what is not. The word essential is now in
familiar use for this purpose. As we shall there is a context in
which the religious community is allowed freedom to determine
what is ‘essential’ to its belief and practise, but the individual
has no freedom to determine what is essential to his religion,
for if it were otherwise and if the law gave any protection to
religion as determined on this basis the State’s power to protect
and direct would be at an end. Therefore, the courts can
discard as non-essentials anything which is not proved to their
satisfaction – and they are not religious leaders or in any
relevant fashion qualified in such matters—to be essential, with
the result that it would have no Constitutional protection. The
Constitution does not say freely to profess, practise and
propagate the essentials of religion, but this is how it is
construed.”34
10.3. The House of Lords in Regina v. Secretary of State for Education and
Employment & Ors.35, held that the court ought not to embark upon
an enquiry into the validity or legitimacy of asserted beliefs on the
basis of objective standards or rationality. The relevant extract from
the decision of the House of Lords is reproduced hereinbelow:
“It is necessary first to clarify the court’s role in identifying a

religious belief calling for protection under article 9. When the
genuineness of a claimant’s professed belief is an issue in the
proceedings the court will enquire into and decide this issue as
a question of fact. This is a limited inquiry. The Court is
concerned to ensure an assertion of religious belief is made in
good faith: neither fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an
artifice, to adopt the felicitous phrase of Iacobucci J in the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest
v. Amselem (2004) 241 DLR (4th) 1, 27, para 52. But,
emphatically, it is not for the Court to embark on an inquiry into
the asserted belief and judge its validity by some objective
standard such as the source material upon which the claimant
founds his belief or the orthodox teaching of the religion in
question or the extent to which the claimant’s belief conforms to
or differs from the views of others professing the same religion.
Freedom of religion protects the subjected belief of an
individual. As Iacobucci J also noted, at page 28, para 54,
34 J. Duncan M. Derett, Religion, Law and the State in India (1968), at p. 447
35 [2005] UKHL 15
37
religious belief is intensely personal and can easily vary from

one individual to another. Each individual is at liberty to hold
his own religious beliefs, however irrational or inconsistent they
may seem to some, however surprising. The European Court of
Human Rights has rightly noted that in principle, the right to
freedom of religion as understood in the Convention rules out
any appreciation by the State of the legitimacy of religious
beliefs or of the manner in which these are expressed:
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (2002) 35 EHRR
306, 335, para 117. The relevance of objective factors such as
source material is, at most, that they may throw light on
whether the professed belief is genuinely held.”
10.4. In Eddie C. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division36, the U.S. Supreme Court was dealing with a case
where the Petitioner, who had terminated his job on account of his
religious beliefs which forbade him from partaking in the production
of armaments, was denied unemployment compensation benefits by
the State. The Court noted that the determination of what constitutes
a religious belief or practise is a very “difficult and delicate task”, and
noted as follows about the role of a Constitutional Court:
“…The determination of what is a religious belief or practise is

more often than not a difficult and delicate task…However, the
resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial
perception of the particular belief or practise in question;
religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection…
…The Indiana court also appears to have given significant
weight to the fact that another Jehovah’s Witness had no
scruples about working on tank turrets; for that other Witness,
at least, such work was scripturally acceptable. Intrafaith
differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a
particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religious
Clauses…Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the
36 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
38
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of

scriptural interpretation.”
(Emphasis supplied; internal quotations, and footnotes omitted)
This view was re-iterated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
following decisions:
• United States v. Edwin D. Lee37, wherein it was held as follows:
“…It is not within the judicial function and judicial

competence, however, to determine whether appellee or
the Government has the proper interpretation of the
Amish faith; courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation…”
(Emphasis supplied; internal quotations omitted)
• Robert L. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue38,
wherein the Court noted:
“…It is not within the judicial ken to question the

centrality of particular beliefs or practises to a faith or the
validity of particular litigants interpretations of those
creeds...”
• Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Alfred L. Smith39, wherein Scalia, J. noted as follows:
“…It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the

centrality of religious beliefs before applying a compelling
interest test in the free exercise field, than it would be for
them to determine the importance of ideas before
applying the compelling interest test in the free speech
field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear
to contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is
central to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of
different religious practises is akin to the unacceptable
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims…As we reaffirmed only last Term, it is
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
37 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
38 490 U.S. 680 (1989)
39 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
39
particular beliefs or practises to a faith, or the validity of

particular litigants interpretations of those
creeds…Repeatedly and in many different contexts we
have warned that courts must not presume to determine
the place of a particular belief in a religion or the
plausibility of a religious claim…”
10.5. The observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors.
v. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra) are instructive in understanding the
nature of the protection afforded under Article 25, and the role of the
Court in interpreting the same. The relevant extract from the opinion
of Chinnappa Reddy, J. is extracted hereinbelow:
“18. Article 25 is an article of faith in the Constitution,

incorporated in recognition of the principle that the real test of a
true democracy is the ability of even an insignificant minority to
find its identity under the country’s Constitution. This has to
borne in mind in interpreting Article 25…”
10.6. A reference to the following extracts from the judgment of Khehar,
C.J.I. in Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors.40 is also instructive
with respect to the role of Courts in matters concerning religious
faiths and beliefs:
“389. It is not difficult to comprehend what kind of challenges

would be raised by rationalist assailing practises of different
faiths on diverse grounds, based on all kinds of enlightened
sensibilities. We have to be guarded lest we find our conscience
traversing into every nook and corner of religious practises, and
Personal Law. Can a court, based on a righteous endeavour,
declare that a matter of faith be replaced, or be completely done
away with?...This wisdom emerging from judgments rendered
by this Court is unambiguous namely, that while examining the
issues falling in the realm of religious practises or Personal
Law, it is not for a court to make a choice of something which it
considers as forward-looking or non-fundamentalist. It is not for
a court to determine whether religious practises were prudent
or progressive or regressive. Religion and Personal Law, must
be perceived, as it is accepted by the followers of the faith…”
40 (2017) 9 SCC 1
40
10.7. The following extract from the concurring judgment of Chinnappa
Reddy, J. in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) is pertinent
with respect to the approach to be adopted by Courts whilst dealing
with matters concerning religion:
“2…What is religion to some is pure dogma to others and what

is religion to others is pure superstition to some others…But my
views about religion, my prejudices and my predilections, if
they be such, are entirely irrelevant. So are the views of the
credulous, the fanatic, the bigot and the zealot. So also the
views of the faithful, the devout, the acharya, the moulvi, the
padre and the bhikhshu each of whom may claim his as the
only true or revealed religion. For our purpose, we are
concerned with what the people of the Socialist, Secular,
Democratic Republic of India, who have given each of its
citizens freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess,
practise and propagate religion and who have given every
religious denomination the right to freely manage its religious
affairs, mean by the expressions religion and religious
denomination. We are concerned with what these expressions
are designed to mean in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
Any freedom or right involving the conscience must naturally
receive a wide interpretation and the expression religion and
religious denomination must therefore, be interpreted in no
narrow, stifling sense but in a liberal, expansive way.”
10.8. The Constitution lays emphasis on social justice and equality. It has
specifically provided for social welfare and reform, and throwing open
of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus through the process of legislation in Article
25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Article 25(2)(b) is an enabling provision
which permits the State to redress social inequalities and injustices
by framing legislation.
It is therefore difficult to accept the contention that Article
25(2)(b) is capable of application without reference to an actual
41
legislation. What is permitted by Article 25(2) is State made law on
the grounds specified therein, and not judicial intervention.
10.9. In the present case, the 1965 Act is a legislation framed in
pursuance of Article 25(2)(b) which provides for the throwing open of
Hindu places of public worship. The proviso to Section 3 of the 1965
Act carves out an exception to the applicability of the general rule
contained in Section 3, with respect to religious denominations, or
sect(s) thereof, so as to protect their right to manage their religious
affairs without outside interference.
Rule 3(b) gives effect to the proviso of Section 3 insofar as it
makes a provision for restricting the entry of women at such times
when they are not by custom or usage allowed to enter of place of
public worship.
10.10. The Respondents claim the right to worship in the Sabarimala
Temple under Article 25(1) in accordance with their beliefs and
practises as per the tenets of their religion. These practises are
considered to be essential or integral to that Temple. Any interference
with the same would conflict with their right guaranteed by Article
25(1) to worship Lord Ayyappa in the form of a ‘Naishtik
Brahmachari’.
10.11. In other jurisdictions also, where State made laws were challenged
on grounds of public morality, the Courts have refrained from
striking down the same on the ground that it is beyond the ken of
the Courts.
42
10.12. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah,41 an animal cruelty law made by the City
Council was struck down as being violative of the Free Exercise
clause. The Court held:
“The extent to which the Free Exercise clause requires

Government to refrain from impeding religious exercise defines
nothing less than the respective relationships in our
Constitutional democracy of the individual to Government, and
to God. ‘ Neutral, generally applicable ’ laws, drafted as they
are from the perspective of the non-adherent, have the
unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a choice
between God and Government. Our cases now present
competing answers to the question when Government, while
pursuing secular ends may compel disobedience to what one
believes religion commands.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10.13. Judicial review of religious practises ought not to be undertaken, as
the Court cannot impose its morality or rationality with respect to
the form of worship of a deity. Doing so would negate the freedom to
practise one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs. It would
amount to rationalising religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside
the ken of Courts.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY IN MATTERS OF RELIGION IN A SECULAR POLITY
11.1. The Petitioners have contended that the practise of restricting women
of a particular age group runs counter to the underlying theme of
equality and non-discrimination, which is contrary to Constitutional
Morality. Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules has been challenged as being
violative of Constitutional Morality.
41 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
43
11.2. India is a country comprising of diverse religions, creeds, sects each
of which have their faiths, beliefs, and distinctive practises.
Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would comprehend the
freedom of every individual, group, sect, or denomination to practise
their religion in accordance with their beliefs, and practises.
11.3. The Preamble to the Constitution secures to all citizens of this
country liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship.
Article 25 in Part III of the Constitution make freedom of conscience
a Fundamental Right guaranteed to all persons who are equally
entitled to the right to freely profess, practise and propagate their
respective religion. This freedom is subject to public order, morality
and health, and to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
Article 26 guarantees the freedom to every religious
denomination, or any sect thereof, the right to establish and
maintain institutions for religious purposes, manage its own affairs
in matters of religion, own and acquire movable and immovable
property, and to administer such property in accordance with law.
This right is subject to public order, morality and health. The right
under Article 26 is not subject to Part III of the Constitution.
11.4. The framers of the Constitution were aware of the rich history and
heritage of this country being a secular polity, with diverse religions
and faiths, which were protected within the fold of Articles 25 and
26. State interference was not permissible, except as provided by
Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, where the State may make law
providing for social welfare and reform.
44
11.5. The concept of Constitutional Morality refers to the moral values
underpinning the text of the Constitution, which are instructive in
ascertaining the true meaning of the Constitution, and achieve the
objects contemplated therein.
11.6. Constitutional Morality in a pluralistic society and secular polity
would reflect that the followers of various sects have the freedom to
practise their faith in accordance with the tenets of their religion. It is
irrelevant whether the practise is rational or logical. Notions of
rationality cannot be invoked in matters of religion by courts.
11.7. The followers of this denomination, or sect, as the case may be,
submit that the worshippers of this deity in Sabarimala Temple even
individually have the right to practise and profess their religion
under Article 25(1) in accordance with the tenets of their faith, which
is protected as a Fundamental Right.
11.8. Equality and non-discrimination are certainly one facet of
Constitutional Morality. However, the concept of equality and non-
discrimination in matters of religion cannot be viewed in isolation.
Under our Constitutional scheme, a balance is required to be struck
between the principles of equality and non-discrimination on the one
hand, and the protection of the cherished liberties of faith, belief, and
worship guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 to persons belonging to all
religions in a secular polity, on the other hand. Constitutional
morality requires the harmonisation or balancing of all such rights,
to ensure that the religious beliefs of none are obliterated or
undermined.
45
A Constitution Bench of five-Judges in Sahara India Real Estate
Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India
& Anr.42 had highlighted the role of this Court as an institution
tasked with balancing the various Fundamental Rights, guaranteed
under Part III. It was noted that:
“25. At the outset, it may be stated that Supreme Court is not

only the sentinel of the fundamental rights but also a balancing
wheel between the rights, subject to social control…under our
Constitution no right in Part III is absolute. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute value under our Constitution. It
must not be forgotten that no single value, no matter exalted,
can bear the full burden of upholding a democratic system of
government. Underlying our constitutional system are a number
of important values, all of which help to guarantee our liberties,
but in ways which sometimes conflict. Under our Constitution,
probably, no values are absolute. All important values,
therefore, must be qualified and balanced against other
important, and often competing, values.”
The Constitutional necessity of balancing various Fundamental
Rights has also been emphasised in the decision of this Court in
Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Ors.43.
In Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji
Maharaj & Ors. v. The State of Gujarat & Ors.44, a Constitution
Bench, in the context of Article 26, noted that it is a duty of this
Court to strike a balance, and ensure that Fundamental Rights of
one person co-exist in harmony with the exercise of Fundamental
Rights of others.
42 (2012) 10 SCC 603

43 (2016) 7 SCC 221
44 (1975) 1 SCC 11
46
It is the Constitutional duty of the Court to harmonise the rights
of all persons, religious denominations or sects thereof, to practise
their religion according to their beliefs and practises.
12. RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION
12.1. Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom to every
religious denomination, or sect thereof, the right to establish and
maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, and to
manage their own affairs in matters of religion. The right conferred
under Article 26 is subject to public order, morality and health, and
not to any other provisions in Part III of the Constitution.
12.2. A religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy
in matters of deciding what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of that religion. The only restriction imposed
is on the exercise of the right being subject to public order, morality
and health under Article 26.
The Respondents assert that the devotees of the Sabarimala
Temple constitute a religious denomination, or a sect thereof, and are
entitled to claim protection under Article 26 of the Constitution.
12.3. Article 26 refers not only to religious denominations, but also to sects
thereof. Article 26 guarantees that every religious denomination, or
sect thereof, shall have the right inter alia to manage its own affairs
in matters of religion. This right is made subject to public order,
morality, and health.
47
The Travancore Devaswom Board, and the other Respondents
have asserted that the followers of the Sabarimala Temple constitute
a religious denomination having a distinct faith, well- identified
practises, being followed since time immemorial. The worshippers of
this shrine observe the tenets of this faith, and are addressed as
“Ayyappans.” The Notifications issued by the Travancore Devaswom
Board in 1955 and 1956 refer to the devotees of the Sabarimala
Temple as “Ayyappans”.
Given the identical phraseology, only the Notification dated
November 27, 1956 is set out herein below for ready reference:
“ NOTIFICATION
In accordance with the fundamental principles underlying the
Prathishta (installation) of the venerable holy and ancient
temple of Sabarimala, Ayyappans who had not observed the
usual vows as well as women who had attained maturity were
not in the habit of entering the above mentioned temple for
Darsan (worship) by stepping the Pathinettampadi. But of late,
there seems to have been a deviation from this custom and
practise. In order to maintain the sanctity and dignity of this
great temple and keep up the past traditions, it is hereby
notified that Ayyappans who do not observe the usual Vritham
(vows) are prohibited from entering the temple by stepping the
pathinettampadi and women between the ages of ten and fifty
five are forbidden from entering the temple.
Ambalapuzha
27-11-‘56 Assistant Devaswon Commissioner.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The worshippers of Lord Ayyappa at the Sabarimala Temple
together constitute a religious denomination, or sect thereof, as the
case maybe, follow a common faith, and have common beliefs and
practises. These beliefs and practises are based on the belief that
Lord Ayyappa has manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtik
48
Brahmachari’. The practises include the observance by the
Ayyappans of the 41-day ‘Vratham’, which includes observing
abstinence and seclusion from the women-folk, including one’s
spouse, daughter, or other relatives. This pilgrimage includes bathing
in the holy River Pampa, and ascending the 18 sacred steps leading
to the sanctum sanctorum.
The restriction on women between the ages of 10 to 50 years from
entering the Temple has to be understood in this context.
12.4. The expression “religious denomination” as interpreted in
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra), was “a
collection of individuals classed together under the same name : a
religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and
designated by a distinctive name”.45 The Court held that each of the
sects or sub-sects of the Hindu religion could be called a religious
denomination, as such sects or sub-sects, had a distinctive name.
12.5. In S.P. Mittal v. Union of India & Ors. (supra), this Court, while relying
upon the judgment in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Swamiar Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt
(supra), held that the words ‘religious denomination’ in Article 26 of
the Constitution must take their colour from the word ‘religion’, and
if this be so, the expression ‘religious denomination’ must satisfy
three conditions:
45 1954 SCR 1005, at paragraph 15
49
“80. (1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system

of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their
spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
(2) common organisation; and
(3) designation by a distinctive name.”
12.6. On a somewhat different note, Ayyangar, J. in Sardar Syedna Taher
Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (supra) in his separate judgment,
expressed this term to mean identity of its doctrines, creeds, and
tenets, which are intended to ensure the unity of the faith which its
adherents profess, and the identity of the religious views which bind
them together as one community.
12.7. The meaning ascribed to religious denomination by this Court in
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments case (supra), and
subsequent cases is not a strait-jacket formula, but a working
formula. It provides guidance to ascertain whether a group would fall
within a religious denomination or not.
12.8. If there are clear attributes that there exists a sect, which is
identifiable as being distinct by its beliefs and practises, and having
a collection of followers who follow the same faith, it would be
identified as a ‘religious denomination’.
In this context, reference may be made to the concurring
judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in the decision of this Court in S.P.
Mittal v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) wherein he noted that the
judicial definition of a religious denomination laid down by this Court
is, unlike a statutory definition, a mere explanation. After observing
that any freedom or right involving the conscience must be given a
50
wide interpretation, and the expressions ‘religion’ and ‘religious
denomination’ must be interpreted in a “liberal, expansive way”:
“21…the expression religious denomination may be defined

with less difficulty. As we mentioned earlier Mukherjea, J.,
borrowed the meaning of the word denomination from the
Oxford Dictionary and adopted it to define religious
denomination as a collection of individuals classed together
under the same name, a religious sect or body having a
common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive
name. The followers of Ramanuja, the followers of
Madhwacharya, the followers of Vallabha, the Chistia Soofies
have been found or assumed by the Court to be religious
denominations. It will be noticed that these sects possess no
distinctive names except that of their founder-teacher and had
no special organisation except a vague, loose – un-knit one. The
really distinctive feature about each one of these sects was a
shared belief in the tenets taught by the teacher-founder. We
take care to mention here that whatever the ordinary features
of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not
of equal importance and surely the common faith of the
religious body is more important than the other
features…Religious denomination has not to owe allegiance to
any parent religion. The entire following of a religion may be no
more than the religious denomination. This may be particularly
be so in the case of small religious groups or developing
religions, that is, religions in the formative stage.”
12.9. The Respondents have made out a strong and plausible case that the
worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple have the attributes of a
religious denomination, or sect thereof, for the reasons enumerated
hereinbelow:
i. The worshippers of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala Temple
constitute a religious denomination, or sect thereof, as the case
maybe, following the ‘Ayyappan Dharma’. They are designated by
a distinctive name wherein all male devotees are called
‘Ayyappans’; all female devotees below the age of 10 years and
above the age of 50 years, are called ‘Malikapurnams’. A pilgrim
51
on their maiden trip to Sabarimala Temple is called a ‘Kanni
Ayyappan’. The devotees are referred to as ‘Ayyappaswamis’. A
devotee has to observe the ‘Vratham’, and follow the code of
conduct, before embarking upon the ‘Pathinettu Padikal’ to enter
the Temple at Sabarimala.
ii. The devotees follow an identifiable set of beliefs, customs and
usages, and code of conduct which are being practised since time
immemorial, and are founded in a common faith. The religious
practises being followed in this Temple are founded on the belief
that the Lord has manifested himself in the form of a ‘Naishtika
Brahmachari’. It is because of this nishtha, that women between
the ages of 10 to 50 years, are not permitted to enter the temple.
The practises followed by this religious denomination, or sect
thereof, as the case maybe, constitute a code of conduct, which is
a part of the essential spiritual discipline related to this
pilgrimage. As per the customs and usages practised in the
Sabarimala Temple, the 41-day ‘Vratham’ is a condition precedent
for undertaking the pilgrimage to the Sabarimala Temple.
The Respondents submit that the beliefs and practises being
followed by them have been imparted by the deity himself to the
King of Pandalam who constructed this Temple. The teachings of
the Lord are scripted in the Sthal Purana of this Temple, known
as the ‘Bhuthanatha Geetha’.
Reference to the custom and usage restricting the entry of
women belonging to the age group of 10 to 50 years is
52
documented in the Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and
Cochin States46 published in two parts in 1893 and 1901 written
by Lieutenants Ward and Conner.
iii. This Temple owned vast landed properties from which the Temple
was being maintained. These were taken over by the State,
subject to the obligation to pay annuities to the Temple from the
coffers of the State, as is evident from the Devaswom
Proclamation47 dated 12th April 1922 issued by the Maharaja of
Travancore, on which reliance was placed by Mr. J. Sai Deepak,
Advocate.
When the erstwhile State of Travancore merged with the
Union of India, the obligation of paying annuities for the landed
properties, was transferred to the Government of India.
iv. The Temple is managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board. It
does not receive funds from the Consolidated Fund of India,
which would give it the character of ‘State’ or ‘other authorities’
under Article 12 of the Constitution.
In any event, Article 290A does not in any manner take away
the denominational character of the Sabarimala Temple, or the
Fundamental Rights under Article 26.
12.10. The issue whether the Sabarimala Temple constitutes a ‘religious
denomination’, or a sect thereof, is a mixed question of fact and law.
It is trite in law that a question of fact should not be decided in writ
46Supra note 9
47Annexure I, Written Submissions by J. Sai Deepak, learned Advocate on Behalf of K.K.
Sabu (Respondent No. 18), and People for Dharma (Intervenor).
53
proceedings. The proper forum to ascertain whether a certain sect
constitutes a religious denomination or not, would be more
appropriately determined by a civil court, where both parties are
given the opportunity of leading evidence to establish their case.
In Arya Vyasa Sabha & Ors. v. Commissioner of Hindu
Charitable and Religious Institutions & Endowments, Hyderabad &
Ors.48, this Court had noted that the High Court was correct in
leaving the question open, of whether the petitioners constituted a
religious denomination for determination by a competent civil court
on the ground that it was a disputed question of fact which could not
be appropriately determined in proceedings under Article 226.
12.11. This Court has identified the rights of a group of devotees as
constituting a religious denomination in the context of a single
temple, as illustrated hereinbelow:
In (supra), the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky was
considered to be a denominational temple, and the Gowda
Saraswath Brahmins were held to constitute a religious
denomination.
Similarly, in Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu
(supra) the Podhu Dikshitars were held to constitute a religious
denomination in the context of the Sri Sabanayagar Temple at
Chidambaram.
12.12. The contention of the Petitioners that since the visitors to the temple
are not only from the Hindu religion, but also from other religions,
48 (1976) 1 SCC 292
54
the worshippers of this Temple would not constitute a separate
religious sect.
This argument does not hold water since it is not uncommon for
persons from different religious faiths to visit shrines of other
religions. This by itself would not take away the right of the
worshippers of this Temple who may constitute a religious
denomination, or sect thereof.
12.13. The Constitution ensures a place for diverse religions, creeds,
denominations and sects thereof to co-exist in a secular society. It is
necessary that the term ‘religious denomination’ should receive an
interpretation which is in furtherance of the Constitutional object of
a pluralistic society.
13. ESSENTIAL PRACTISES DOCTRINE
This Court has applied the ‘essential practises’ test to afford protection
to religious practises.
13.1. The ‘essential practises’ test was formulated in Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar
of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra).
Before articulating the test, this Court drew on the words
“practise of religion” in Article 25(1) to hold that the Constitution
protects not only the freedom of religious belief, but also acts done in
pursuance of a religion. In doing so, it relied on an extract from the
decision of Latham, C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Incorporated v. The
55
Commonwealth.49 The original extract relied upon has been
reproduced hereinbelow:
“5. It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of

freedom of religion that, though the civil government should not
interfere with religious opinions, it nevertheless may deal as it
pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious
belief without infringing the principle of freedom of religion. It
appears to me to be difficult to maintain this distinction as
relevant to the interpretation of s. 116. The section refers in
express terms to the exercise of religion, and therefore it is
intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth
laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion. Thus the
section goes far beyond protecting liberty of opinion. It protects
also acts done in pursuance of religious belief as part of
religion.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court then went on to formulate the ‘essential practises test
in the following words:
“20…what constitutes the essential part of a religion is

primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of
that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the
Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the
idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies
should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the
year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or
oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as
parts of religion…all of them are religious practises and should
be regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of Article
26(b)…
…23. Under Article 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or
organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of
deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside
authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in
such matters.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13.2. The ‘essential practises test’ was reiterated in Ratilal Panachand
Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors.50, where the narrow definition
49 67 CLR 116
50 (1954) SCR 1055 : AIR 1954 SC 388
56
of “religion” given by the Bombay High Court was discarded. It was
held that all religious practises or performances of acts in pursuance
of religious beliefs were as much a part of religion, as faith or belief
in particular doctrines. This Court re-iterated the ‘essential practises
test’ in the following words:
“13…Thus if the tenets of the Jain or the Parsi religion lay down
that certain rites and ceremonies are to be performed at certain
times and in a particular manner, it cannot be said that these
are secular activities partaking of commercial or economic
character simply because they involve expenditure of money or
employment of priests or the use of marketable commodities. No
outside authority has any right to say that these are not
essential parts of religion and it is not open to the secular
authority of the State to restrict or prohibit them in any manner
they like under the guise of administering the trust estate…We
may refer in this connection to the observation of Davar, J. in
the case of Jamshed ji v. Soonabai and although they were
made in a case where the question was whether the bequest of
property by a Parsi testator for the purpose of perpetual
celebration of ceremonies like Muktad bag, Vyezashni, etc.,
which are sanctioned by the Zoroastrian religion were valid and
charitable gifts, the observations, we think, are quite
appropriate for our present purpose. If this is the belief of the
community thus observed the learned judge, and it is proved
undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian community, - a
secular judge is bound to accept that belief – it is not for him to
sit in judgment on that belief, he has no right to interfere with
the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in favour of what he
believes to be the advancement of the religion and the welfare
of his community or mankind. These observations do in our
opinion afford an indication of the measure of protection that is
given by Article 26(b) of our Constitution.”
13.3. In Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.
(supra), the ‘essential practises test’ was discussed by a Constitution
Bench in the following words:
“33…Whilst we are dealing with this point it may not be out of

place incidentally to strike a note of caution and observe that in
order that the practises in question should be treated as a part
of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its
57
essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular

practises which are not an essential or an integral part of
religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may
make a claim for being treated as religious practises within the
meaning of Article 26. Similarly, even practises though religious
may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in
that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion
itself. Unless such practises are found to constitute an essential
and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection
under Article 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other
words, the protection must be confined to such religious
practises as are an essential and an integral part of it and no
other.”
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court affirmed the ‘essential practises test’ as laid in the
previous decisions in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt
(supra), and Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay & Ors.
(supra) insofar as it emphasised on the autonomy of religions to
identify essential or integral practises.
13.4. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(supra), it was clarified that courts will intervene where conflicting
evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as to competing
religious practises. It was held that:
“57. In deciding the question as to whether a given religious

practise is an integral part of the religion or not, the test always
would be whether it is regarded as such by the community
following the religion or not. This formula may in some cases
present difficulties in its operation. Take the case of a practise
in relation to food or dress. If in a given proceeding, one section
of the community claims that while performing certain rites
white dress is an integral part of the religion itself, whereas
another section contends that yellow dress and not the white
dress is the essential part of religion, how is the Court going to
decide the question? Similar disputes may arise in regard to
food. In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect
of rival contentions as to competing religious practises the Court
may not be able to resolve the dispute by a blind application of
58
the formula that the community decides which practise in [sic]

an integral part of its religion, because the community may
speak with more than one voice and the formula would,
therefore, break down. This question will always have to be
decided by the Court and in doing so, the Court may have to
enquire whether the practise in question is religious in
character, and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral
or essential part of the religion, and the finding of the Court on
such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced
before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of
its religion…”
(Emphasis supplied)
13.5. In Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra), this Court
emphasised that for a religious practise to receive protection under
Article 25(1) it must be “genuinely”, and “conscientiously” held by
persons claiming such rights. This Court had noted that such
religious beliefs and practises must be consistently and not “idly”
held, and should not emanate out of “perversity”. In doing so, it re-
affirmed that the Constitutional fabric of our country permits
religious beliefs and practises to exist, regardless of whether or not
they appeal to the rational sensibilities of this Court, or others.
It would also be instructive to refer to the decision of the
Supreme Court of Alaska in Carlos Frank v. State of Alaska51 wherein
the use of moose meat at a funeral potlatch, a religious ceremony,
was held to be a practise deeply rooted in religion, based on the
evidence adduced before the District Court. The Court had noted that
the State of Alaska had failed to illustrate any compelling interest
which would justify its curtailment, with the result that the case was
remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint against Frank
51 604 P.2d 1068 (1979)
59
for unlawful transportation of moose meat. The Court had
underscored the importance of the sincerity of Frank’s religious
belief, and held that it would be sufficient that a practise be deeply
rooted in religious belief for it to receive the protection of the free
exercise clause under the U.S. Constitution.
13.6. Reference is required to be made to the doctrines and tenets of a
religion, its historical background, and the scriptural texts to
ascertain the ‘essentiality’ of religious practises.
The ‘essential practises test’ in its application would have to be
determined by the tenets of the religion itself. The practises and
beliefs which are considered to be integral by the religious
community are to be regarded as “essential”, and afforded protection
under Article 25.
The only way to determine the essential practises test would be
with reference to the practises followed since time immemorial, which
may have been scripted in the religious texts of this temple. If any
practise in a particular temple can be traced to antiquity, and is
integral to the temple, it must be taken to be an essential religious
practise of that temple.
13.7. The Temple Thanthri, the Travancore Devaswom Board, and
believers of Lord Ayyappa have submitted that the limited restriction
on access of women during the notified age of 10 to 50 years, is a
religious practise which is central and integral to the tenets of this
shrine, since the deity has manifested himself in the form of a
‘Naishtik Brahmachari’.
60
13.8. The practise of restricting the entry of women belonging to the age-
group of 10 to 50 years, was challenged as being violative of Articles
15, 25, and 26 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the
Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore
Devaswom Board, Thiruvanathapuram & Ors. (supra).
The Court held that the issue whether the practises were an
integral part of the religion or not had to be decided on the basis of
evidence. The High Court relied on the decision of this Court in
Tilkayat Shri Govindalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan (supra) wherein
it was held that the question whether the practise is religious in
character, and whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential
part of the religion, will depend upon the evidence adduced before a
court, with respect to the tenets of the religion.
The High Court held that the restriction on the entry of women
between the ages of 10 to 50 years was in accordance with the
practise prevalent since time immemorial, and was not violative of
Articles 15, 25, and 26 of the Constitution.
A religion can lay down a code of ethics, and also prescribe
rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship. These
observances and rituals are also regarded as an integral part of
religion. If the tenets of a religion lay down that certain ceremonies
are to be performed at certain times in a particular manner, those
ceremonies are matters of religion, and are to be protected as a
religious belief.
61
The High Court took into consideration the testimony of three
persons who had direct and personal knowledge about the practises
of the temple. One of them was the then Thanthri of the Temple, who
could authoritatively testify about the practises of the temple. His
personal knowledge extended to a period of more than 40 years. The
second Affidavit was affirmed by the Secretary of the Ayyappa Seva
Sangham who had been a regular pilgrim of the shrine for a period of
60 years. A senior member of the Pandalam Palace also testified
about the practise followed, and the views of the members of the
Palace who have constructed the Temple. The testimony of these
witnesses established that the practise of restriction on the entry of
women during the notified age-group was being followed since the
past several centuries.
The High Court recorded that a vital reason for imposing this
restriction on young women as deposed by the Thanthri of the
Temple, as well as other witnesses, was that the deity at the
Sabarimala Temple was in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’ which
means a student who has to live in the house of his preceptor, and
studies the Vedas, living the life of utmost austerity and discipline.
The deity is in the form of a ‘Yogi’ or ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The High
Court noted that this practise of restricting the entry of women is
admitted to have been prevalent since the past several centuries.
The High Court concluded by holding:
“Our conclusions are as follows:

(1) The restriction imposed on women aged above 10 and
below 50 from trekking the holy hills of Sabarimala and
62
offering worship at Sabarimala Shrine is in accordance

with the usage prevalent from time immemorial.
(2) Such restriction imposed by the Devaswom Board is not
violative of Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of
India.
(3) Such restriction is also not violative of the provisions of
Hindu Place of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)
Act, 1965 since there is no restriction between one
section and another section or between one class and
another class among the Hindus in the matter of entry to
a Temple whereas the prohibition is only in respect of
women of a particular age group and not women as a
class.”
In view of the conclusions summarised above, the High Court
directed the Travancore Devaswom Board not to permit women
belonging to the age-group of 10 to 50 years “… to trek the holy hills
of Sabarimala in connection with the pilgrimage…”. The Judgment of
the Kerala High Court was not challenged any further, and has
attained finality.
The findings contained in the Judgment of the Kerala High Court
deciding a Writ Petition under Article 226 were findings in rem, and
the principle of res judicata would apply.52
In this context, it is pertinent to note that this Court, in Daryao &
Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.53, had held as follows:
“26. We must now proceed to state our conclusion on the

preliminary objection raised by the respondents. We hold that
if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 is
considered on the merits as a contested matter and is
dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to
bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by
appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the
Constitution. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said
judgment and move this Court under Article 32 by an original
52 Dr Subramaniam Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 75.
53 (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457
63
petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or
similar orders or writs.”
Thus viewed, such findings of fact ought not to be re-opened in a
Petition filed under Article 32.
13.9. The practise of celibacy and austerity is the unique characteristic of
the deity in the Sabarimala Temple.
Hindu deities have both physical/temporal and philosophical
form. The same deity is capable of having different physical and
spiritual forms or manifestations. Worship of each of these forms is
unique, and not all forms are worshipped by all persons.
The form of the deity in any temple is of paramount importance.
For instance, Lord Krishna in the temple at Nathdwara is in the form
of a child. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan
(supra), this Court noted that Lord Krishna was the deity who was
worshipped in the Shrinathji Temple in Nathdwara. It was noted that:
“…believing in the paramount importance and efficacy of

Bhakti, the followers of Vallabha attend the worship and
services of the Nidhi Swaroops or idols from day-to-day in the
belief that such devotional conduct would ultimately lead to
their salvation.”
In Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors.
(supra), this Court had observed that Gods have distinct forms
ascribed to them, and their worship at home, and in temples, is
ordained as certain means of salvation.
Worship has two elements – the worshipper, and the worshipped.
The right to worship under Article 25 cannot be claimed in the
64
absence of the deity in the particular form in which he has
manifested himself.
13.10. Religion is a matter of faith, and religious beliefs are held to be
sacred by those who share the same faith. Thought, faith and belief
are internal, while expression and worship are external
manifestations thereof.
13.11. In the case of the Sabarimala Temple, the manifestation is in the
form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The belief in a deity, and the form
in which he has manifested himself is a fundamental right protected
by Article 25(1) of the Constitution.
The phrase “equally entitled to”, as it occurs in Article 25(1), must
mean that each devotee is equally entitled to profess, practise and
propagate his religion, as per the tenets of that religion.
13.12. In the present case, the celibate nature of the deity at the Sabarimala
Temple has been traced by the Respondents to the Sthal Purana of
this Temple chronicled in the ‘Bhuthanatha Geetha’. Evidence of
these practises are also documented in the Memoir of the Survey of
the Travancore and Cochin States54 written by Lieutenants Ward and
Conner published in two parts in 1893 and 1901.
13.13. The religious practise of restricting the entry of women between the
ages of 10 to 50 years, is in pursuance of an ‘essential religious
practise’ followed by the Respondents. The said restriction has been
consistently, followed at the Sabarimala Temple, as is borne out from
the Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States
54 Supra note 9
65
published in two parts in 1893 and 1901. The Kerala High Court in
the case of S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom
Board, Thiruvananthapuram & Ors. (supra) has recorded as follows:
“The testimony of three persons who have direct and personal

knowledge about the usage in the temple is therefore available
before this Court. Of them one is the Thanthri of the temple
who can authoritatively speak about the usage followed in the
temple. His knowledge extends to a period of more than 40
years. The Secretary of the Ayyappa Seva Sangham had been
a regular pilgrim to Sabarimala shrine for a period of 60 years.
A senior member of the Pandalam palace has also testified
about the practise followed and the view of the members of the
palace to which the temple at one time belonged. The
testimony of these witnesses would therefore conclusively
establish the usage followed in the temple of not permitting
women of the age group 10 to 50 to worship in the temple. It
necessarily flows that women of that age group were also not
permitted either to enter the precincts of the temple or to trek
Sabarimala for the purpose of pilgrimage.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13.14. In the present case, the character of the temple at Sabarimala is
unique on the basis of centuries old religious practises followed to
preserve the manifestation of the deity, and the worship associated
with it. Any interference with the mode and manner of worship of
this religious denomination, or sect, would impact the character of
the Temple, and affect the beliefs and practises of the worshippers of
this Temple.
13.15. Based on the material adduced before this Court, the Respondents
have certainly made out a plausible case that the practise of
restricting entry of women between the age group of 10 to 50 years is
an essential religious practise of the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at the
Sabarimala Temple being followed since time immemorial.
66
14. ARTICLE 17
14.1. The contention of the Petitioners that the restriction imposed on the
entry of women during the notified age group, tantamounts to a form
of ‘Untouchability’ under Article 17 of the Constitution, is liable to be
rejected for the reasons stated hereinafter.
14.2. All forms of exclusion would not tantamount to untouchability.
Article 17 pertains to untouchability based on caste prejudice.
Literally or historically, untouchability was never understood to
apply to women as a class. The right asserted by the Petitioners is
different from the right asserted by Dalits in the temple entry
movement. The restriction on women within a certain age-band, is
based upon the historical origin and the beliefs and practises of the
Sabarimala Temple.
14.3. In the present case, women of the notified age group are allowed
entry into all other temples of Lord Ayyappa. The restriction on the
entry of women during the notified age group in this Temple is based
on the unique characteristic of the deity, and not founded on any
social exclusion. The analogy sought to be drawn by comparing the
rights of Dalits with reference to entry to temples and women is
wholly misconceived and unsustainable.
The right asserted by Dalits was in pursuance of right against
systematic social exclusion and for social acceptance per se.
In the case of temple entry, social reform preceded the statutory
reform, and not the other way about. The social reform was
spearheaded by great religious as well as national leaders like Swami
67
Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi. The reforms were based upon
societal morality, much before Constitutional Morality came into
place.
14.4. Article 11 of the Draft Constitution corresponds to Article 17 of our
present Constitution.55 A perusal of the Constituent Assembly
debates on Article 11 of the Draft Constitution would reflect that
“untouchability” refers to caste-based discrimination faced by
Harijans, and not women as contended by the Petitioners.
During the debates, Mr. V.I. Muniswamy Pillai had stated:
“…Sir, under the device of caste distinction, a certain section

of people have been brought under the rope of untouchability,
who have been suffering for ages under tyranny of so-called
caste Hindus, and all those people who style themselves as
landlords and zamindars, and were thus not allowed the
ordinary rudimentary facilities required for a human being… I
am sure, Sir, by adoption of this clause, many a Hindu who is
a Harijan, who is a scheduled class man will feel that he has
been elevated in society and has now got a place in
society…”56
Dr. Monomohan Das, quotes Mahatma Gandhi while undeniably
accepting the meaning of “Untouchability” as intended under the
Constitution:
“…Gandhiji said I do not want to be reborn, but if I am reborn,

I wish that I should be born as a Harijan, as an untouchable,
so that I may lead a continuous struggle, a life-long struggle
against the oppressions and indignities that have been
heaped upon these classes of people.
55 “11. “Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The
enforcement of any disability arising out of “Untouchability" shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with law.”
Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India
(Manager Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1948) available at
http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/966/7/Fundamental%20Rights%
20%285-12%29.pdf
56 Statement of Shri V.I. Muniswamy Pillai, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29,
1948)
68
… Not only Mahatma Gandhi, but also great men and

philosophers of this ancient land, Swami Vivekananda, Raja
Ram Mohan Roy, Rabindranath Tagore and others, who led a
relentless struggle against this heinous custom, would also be
very much pleased today to see that independent India, Free
India, has at last finally done away with this malignant sore
on the body of Indian Society.”57
Mr. Seervai, in his seminal commentary, states that
“Untouchability” must not be interpreted in its literal or grammatical
sense, but refers to the practise as it developed historically in India
amongst Hindus. He further states that Article 17 must be read with
the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, which punishes offences
committed in relation to a member of a Scheduled Caste.58
Professor M.P. Jain also interprets Article 17 in a similar manner.
He states:
“Therefore, treating of persons as untouchables either

temporarily or otherwise for various reasons, e.g., suffering
from an epidemic or a contagious disease, or social
observances associated with birth or death, or social boycott
resulting from caste or other disputes do no come within the
purview of Art. 17. Art. 17 is concerned with those regarded
untouchables in the course of historic developments.”59
14.5. It is clear that Article 17 refers to the practise of Untouchability as
committed in the Hindu community against Harijans or people from
depressed classes, and not women, as contended by the Petitioners.
14.6. Explaining the background to Article 17, this Court in Sri
Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Ors. (supra)
observed:
57Statement of Dr. Monomohan Das, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 29, 1948)
58 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India : A Critical Commentary, Vol. I (4th Ed., Reprint
1999), paragraph 9.418 at p. 691
59 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (6th Ed., Revised by Justice Ruma Pal and
Samaraditya Pal; 2010), at p. 1067
69
“23. …. one of the problems which had been exercising the

minds of the Hindu social reformers during the period
preceding the Constitution was the existence in their midst of
communities which were classed as untouchables. A custom
which denied to large sections of Hindus the right to use public
roads and institutions to which all the other Hindus had a
right of access, purely on grounds of birth could not be
considered reasonable and defended on any sound
democratic principle, and efforts were being made to secure its
abolition by legislation. This culminated in the enactment of
Article 17, which is as follows: “Untouchability” is abolished
and its practise in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of
any disability arising out of ‘Untouchability’ shall be an
offence punishable in accordance with law.”
14.7. Not a single precedent has been shown to interpret Article 17 in the
manner contended by the Petitioners.
It is also relevant to mention that the Counsel for the State of
Kerala did not support this submission.
15. RULE 3(B) OF THE 1965 RULES IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE ACT
15.1. Section 3 of the 1965 Act reads as follows:
“3. Places of public worship to be open to all sections and

classes of Hindus:- Nothwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law for the time being in force or any
custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of
any such law or any decree or order of court, every place of
public worship which is open to Hindus generally or to any
section or class thereof, shall be open to all sections and
classes of Hindus; and no Hindu of whatsoever section or
class shall, in any manner, be prevented, obstructed or
discouraged from entering such place of public worship, or
from worshipping or offering prayers thereat, or performing
any religious service therein, in the like manner and to the like
extent as any other Hindu of whatsoever section or class may
so enter, worship, pray or perform:
Provided that in the case of a place of public worship which is

a temple founded for the benefit of any religious denomination
or section thereof, the provisions of this section shall be
subject to the right of that religious denomination or section, as
70
the case may be, to manage its own affair in matters of

religion”
(Emphasis supplied)
The relevant extract of Rule 3 of the 1965 Rules is also
reproduced hereinbelow:
“Rule 3. The classes of persons mentioned here under shall

not be entitled to offer worship in any place of public worship
or bath in or use the water of any sacred tank, well, spring or
water course appurtenant to a place of public worship whether
situate within or outside precincts thereof, or any sacred place
including a hill or hill lock, or a road, street or pathways which
is requisite for obtaining access to the place of public worship-
(a) …..
(b) Women at such time during which they are not by custom
and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship.
(c)…..
(d)….
(e)…..
(f)…..
(g)….”
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(b) of the 1965 Act provides that every place of public
worship which is open to Hindus generally, or to any section or class
thereof, shall be open to all sections and classes of Hindus; and no
Hindu of whatsoever section or class shall, in any manner be
prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of
public worship or from worshipping or from offering prayers there or
performing any religious service therein, in the like manner and to
the like extent as any other Hindu of whatsoever section or class may
enter, worship, pray or perform.
The proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act carves out an exception
in the case of public worship in a temple founded for the benefit of
any religious denomination or section thereof. The provisions of the
main section would be subject to the right of a religious
71
denomination or section to manage its own affairs in the matters of
religion.
Section 2(c)60 of the 1965 Act, defines “section or class” to include
any division, sub-division, caste, sub caste, sect, or denomination
whatsoever. Section 4(1)61, empowers the making of regulations for
the maintenance of orders and decorum in the place of public
worship and the due observance of the religious rites and ceremonies
performed therein. The proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act provides
that no such regulation shall discriminate in any manner
whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he belongs to a
particular section or class.
15.2. The proviso carves out an exception to the Section 3 itself. The
declaration that places of public worship shall be open to Hindus of
all sections and classes is not absolute, but subject to the right of a
religious denomination to “manage its own affairs in matters of
religion”. Section 3 must be viewed in the Constitutional context
where the legislature has framed an enabling legislation under Article
25(2)(b) which has been made expressly subject to religious practises
peculiar to a denomination under Article 26(b).
60 “2. Definitions –
…(c) “section or class” includes any division, sub-division, caste, sub-caste, sect or
denomination whatsoever.”
61 “4. Power to make regulations for the maintenance of order and decorum and the due
performance of rites and ceremonies in places of public worship –
(1) The trustee or any other person in charge of any place of public worship shall have
power, subject to the control of the competent authority and any rules which may be
made by that authority, to make regulations for the maintenance of order and
decorum in the place of public worship and the due observance of the religious rites
and ceremonies performed therein…”
72
15.3. Rule 3(b) is a statutory recognition of a pre-existing custom and
usage being followed by this Temple. Rule 3(b) is within the ambit of
the proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act, as it recognises pre-existing
customs and usages including past traditions which have been
practised since time immemorial qua the Temple. The Travancore
Devaswom Board submits that these practises are integral and
essential to the Temple.
15.4. The Petitioners have not challenged the proviso to Section 3 as being
unconstitutional on any ground. The proviso to Section 3 makes an
exception in cases of religious denominations, or sects thereof to
manage their affairs in matters of religion.
15.5. The Notification dated November 27, 1956 issued by the Travancore
Devaswom Board restricts the entry of women between the ages of 10
to 55 years as a custom and practise integral to the sanctity of the
Temple, and having the force of law under Article 13(3)(a) of the
Constitution. The High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary,
Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram & Ors. (supra)
noted that this practise of restricting the entry of women is admitted
to have been prevalent since the past several centuries. These
practises are protected by the proviso to Section 3 of the 1965 Act
which is given effect to by Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules.
15.6. The contention of the Petitioners that Rule 3(b) is ultra vires Section
3 of the 1965 Act, fails to take into consideration the proviso to
Section 3 of the 1965 Act. Section 3 applies to all places of public
worship, whereas the proviso applies to temples founded for the
73
benefit of any religious denomination or sect thereof. Hence, the
contentions of the Petitioners that Rule 3(b) is ultra vires Section 3 of
the 1965 Act is rejected.
16. The summary of the aforesaid analysis is as follows:
(i) The Writ Petition does not deserve to be entertained for want of
standing. The grievances raised are non-justiciable at the behest of
the Petitioners and Intervenors involved herein.
(ii) The equality doctrine enshrined under Article 14 does not override
the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 25 to every individual
to freely profess, practise and propagate their faith, in accordance
with the tenets of their religion.
(iii) Constitutional Morality in a secular polity would imply the
harmonisation of the Fundamental Rights, which include the right of
every individual, religious denomination, or sect, to practise their
faith and belief in accordance with the tenets of their religion,
irrespective of whether the practise is rational or logical.
(iv) The Respondents and the Intervenors have made out a plausible case
that the Ayyappans or worshippers of the Sabarimala Temple satisfy
the requirements of being a religious denomination, or sect thereof,
which is entitled to the protection provided by Article 26. This is a
mixed question of fact and law which ought to be decided before a
competent court of civil jurisdiction.
(v) The limited restriction on the entry of women during the notified age-
group does not fall within the purview of Article 17 of the
Constitution.
74
(vi) Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules is not ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965
Act, since the proviso carves out an exception in the case of public
worship in a temple for the benefit of any religious denomination or
sect thereof, to manage their affairs in matters of religion.
17. In light of the aforesaid discussion and analysis, the Writ Petition cannot
be entertained on the grounds enumerated hereinabove.
It is ordered accordingly.
…..……….………..J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi;
September 28, 2018
75

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Bar & Bench (www.barandbench.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. …Petitioners

State of Kerala & Ors. …Respondents

association of Young Lawyers. The Intervenors in the Application for

and justice, sexuality, and menstrual discrimination.

restricting the entry of women in the age group of 10 to 50 years in the

Sabarimala Temple in Kerala from three newspaper articles written by

Barkha Dutt (Scent of a Woman, Hindustan Times; July 1, 2006), Sharvani

The Petitioners have challenged the Constitutional validity of Rule 3(b)

of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)

Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1965 Rules”), which restricts

3 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act,

1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1965 Act”).

Further, the Petitioners have prayed for the issuance of a Writ of

Mandamus to the State of Kerala, the Travancore Devaswom Board, the

Chief Thanthri of Sabarimala Temple and the District Magistrate of

Pathanamthitta to ensure that female devotees between the age group of 10

to 50 years are permitted to enter the Sabarimala Temple without any

2. SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS AND INTERVENORS

The Petitioners and the Intervenors were represented by Mr. R.P.

learned Senior Advocate appeared as Amicus Curiae who supported the

case of the Petitioners.

pertains to a centuries old custom of prohibiting entry of women

between the ages of 10 years to 50 years into the Sabarimala Temple

The customary practise, as codified in Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules

read with the Notifications issued by the Travancore Devaswom

meet the tests of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

This exclusionary practise violates Article 14 as the classification

lacks a Constitutional object. It is manifestly arbitrary as it is based

(ii) The customary practise violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution as it

is based on ‘sex’ alone.

The practise also violates Article 15(2)(b) since the Sabarimala

Temple is a public place of worship being open and dedicated to the

public and is partly funded by the State under Article 290A.

(iii) Article 25 guarantees the Fundamental Right to an individual to

worship or follow any religion.

The 1965 Act has been passed in furtherance of the goals

enshrined in Article 25(2)(b) as a ‘measure of social reform’. The Act

contains no prohibition against women from entering any public

prohibits the entry of women.

• It has its own property & establishment capable of succession by

• It has its distinct identity clearly distinguishable from any

beliefs, practises, rituals or beliefs.

• It has the hierarchy of its own administration, not controlled by

any outside agency.

It was contended that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not

constitute a religious denomination under Article 26 as they do not

have a common faith, or a distinct name. The devotees of Lord

from region to region. A minor difference in rituals and ceremonies

does not make them a separate religious denomination.

The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not form a religious

satisfied in this case. Even assuming that the devotees of Lord

Ayyappa constitute a religious denomination, their rights under

Article 26(b) would be subject to Article 25(2)(b) in line with the

decision of this Court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v. State of

Mysore & Ors.1.

It was further submitted that there are no exclusive followers of

this Temple except general Hindu followers visiting any Hindu