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Faculty Science And Technology

Semester January 2019

XBET 3103

ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL TOXICOLOGY

MATRICULATION NO : 911129015025-001
IDENTITY CARD NO. : 911129-01-5025
TELEPHONE NO. : 017-4620901
E-MAIL : [email protected]
LEARNING CENTRE : JOHOR BAHRU
 XBET 3103

Story of Bhopal tragedy

The night on December 3, 1984, poisonous gas leaked from the factory of Union
Carbide in Madhya Pradesh capital Bhopal killed thousands of people straight away. The
incident is now known as the Bhopal disaster or Bhopal gas tragedy. According to official
records, the Bhopal gas tragedy killed 3,787 people. The figures were officially updated by the
Madhya Pradesh government later as the immediate official estimate had put the death toll due
to gas leak from Union Carbide factory at 2,259.

However all the activists fighting for justice for Bhopal gas tragedy victims put the
figures of death between 8,000 and 10,000 In an affidavit, submitted in 2006, the government
said that the Bhopal gas leak caused 558,125 injuries that included approximately 3,900
severely and permanently disabling injuries.

The gas leak in the Union Carbide was reported after midnight on the intervening night of
December 2 and 3. The incident had taken place at the Plant Number C. As the cool morning
breeze picked up pace, it carried the poisonous gas leaking from the Union Carbide factory to
rest of the city and killing people. As per government's affidavit, about 3,000 people died of
poisonous gas within a few hours of the incident. Estimation is about 40 tonnes of methyl
isocyanate (MIC) gas and other chemicals leaked. Methyl isocyanate is extremely toxic and if its
concentration in air touches 21 ppm, it can cause death within minutes of inhaling the gas. In
Bhopal, the level was multiple times higher.

The leakage of gas was reported from Plant Number C. As per official record, methyl
isocyanate got mixed with water which is used for cooling. The mixture led to generation of
volumes of gases, which put tremendous pressure on Tank Number 610. The tank cover gave way to
building gaseous pressure releasing tonnes of the poisonous gas, which diffused over large area.
Approximately 500,000 people were exposed to the leakage of methyl isocyanate gas. The alarm
system of the Union Carbide did not work for hours, suddenly thousands of people started running to
hospitals on the morning of December 3 with their complaints.
 XBET 3103

Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) profile

METHYL ISOCYANATE is a colourless low-boiling liquid (boiling point 39 C) that is

denser than water. Flash point is less than – 6 C, very toxic by inhalation and it is easily absorbed
through the skin. Has a sharp odour, but the sense of smell cannot be relied upon to warn of the
presence of vapours at low concentrations. It is an organic compound with the molecular formula
CH3NCO. Synonyms are isocyanatomethane, methyl carbylamine and MIC.

Methyl isocyanate is an intermediate chemical in the production of carbamate pesticides

(such as carbaryl, carbofuran, methomyl, and aldicarb). It has also been used in the production
of rubbers and adhesives. As a highly toxic and irritating material, it is extremely hazardous to
human health. It is soluble in water to 6–10 parts per 100 parts, but it also reacts with water.
Methyl isocyanate reacts readily with many substances that contain N-H or O-H groups. With
water, it forms 1,3-dimethylurea and carbon dioxide with the evolution of heat, makes it an
exothermic reaction.

Methyl isocyanate is extremely toxic. The threshold limit value set by the American
Conference on Government Industrial Hygienists is 0.02 ppm. MIC is toxic by inhalation,
ingestion and contact in quantities as low as 0.4 ppm. Exposure symptoms include coughing,
chest pain, dyspnea, asthma, irritation of the eyes, nose and throat, as well as skin damage.
Higher levels of exposure, over 21 ppm, can result in pulmonary or lung edema, emphysema
and hemorrhages, bronchial pneumonia and death. Although the odour of methyl isocyanate
cannot be detected at 5 ppm by most people, its potent lachrymal properties provide an excellent
warning of its presence, at a concentration of 2–4 ppm, subject's eyes are irritated.

Proper care must be taken to store methyl isocyanate because of its ease of
exothermically polymerizing and its similar sensitivity to water. Only stainless steel or
glass containers may be safely used; the MIC must be stored at temperatures below 40 °C
and preferably at 4 °C.
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Toxicological effect of MIC

MIC is highly irritant to the skin, eyes and mucus membranes of the respiratory tract. The
intensely irritating effect of MIC on the cornea resulted in severe ocular burning, watering, pain
and photophobia (Anderson et al., 1988). Examination of the eye showed involvement of the
corneal and conjunctival epithelium with redness of the eye, corneal ulceration and lid swelling
(Andersson et al., 1984; Dwivedi et al., 1985). This is because of its reactivity with water and our
body is mostly made up of water, which enables it to penetrate tissues and interact with protein.
Absorption through the skin is known to occur (Irving, 1979). Clinical studies have shown
chronic illnesses such as pulmonary fibrosis, bronchial asthma, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD), emphysema, recurrent chest infections, keratopathy and corneal opacities in
exposed cohorts. Survivors continue to experience higher incidence of reported health problems
including febrile illnesses, respiratory, neurologic, psychiatric and ophthalmic symptoms. In
utero exposure to methyl isocyanate in the first trimester of pregnancy caused a persistent
immune system hyper responsiveness, which was in an evident way genetically linked with the
organic exposure (Mishra et al., 2009).

Acute symptoms of the respiratory tract were mainly due to the irritant action of MIC on
tissues. Because MIC is moderately soluble in water, lesions were seen in both the upper and
lower respiratory tract. Predominant symptoms were cough accompanied by frothy
expectoration, a feeling of suffocation, chest pain and breathlessness (Mishra et al., 1988). Other
symptoms included dryness and irritation of the throat and rhinorrhoea. Autopsies on 300 victims
revealed severe necrotizing lesions in the lining of the upper respiratory tract as well as in the
bronchioles, alveoli and lung capillaries. Enlarged and edematous lungs, consolidation,
hemorrhage, bronchopneumonia and acute bronchiolitis were seen (Indian Council of Medical
Research, 1985).
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MIC has effects on reproductive health were raised early in 1985 when reports indicated
that menstrual cycle disruption, leucorrhea and dysmenorrheal had occurred in gas-exposed
women (Bang and Sadgopal, 1990). Risk to the fetus was also considered not only because of
exposure to the chemical but other factors like stress, anoxia and ingestion of various prescribed
drugs like antibiotics, bronchodilators, and analgesics. An epidemiological survey by Varma
showed pregnancy loss and infant mortality to be high in gas-exposed women (Varma, 1987). In
a sample of 865 women who lived within 1 km of the plant and who were pregnant at the time of
the gas leak, 43% of the pregnancies did not result in a live birth. Of the 486 live births, 14% of
babies died in the first 30 days as compared to a death rate of 2.6 to 3% for previous deliveries
in the 2 years preceding the accident in the same group of women. Animal experiments
conducted by Schwetz exposing pregnant mice to MIC by inhalation showed that this exposure
does indeed have a fetotoxic effect (Schwetz et al., 1987). This finding was replicated by Varma
et al. (1987), who observed a concentration-dependant increase in embryo loss, decrease in fetal
and placental weights and a 20% reduction in mandible length and bones of the extremities.

Methyle isocyanate (MIC) was assayed in a number of in vitro and in vivo genetic
toxicity tests in mammalian cells to determine its ability to interact with DNA and to induce
genetic damage. In vitro tests included the mammalian microsome test gene mutation. In vitro
and in vivo tests provide convincing evidence that is capable of inducing chromosomal damage
and that this genetic toxicity is not strongly expressed in vivo, perhaps because of the selective
reactivity of MIC with proteins and up to now effects of MIC on bacterial DNA not documented
and it’s Possible that MIC may have caused mutations in bacteria, which may have led to their
capacity to cause previously undocumented morbidities related to infection caused by these
mutated bacteria. A population-based cancer registry has been established in Bhopal in 1986 to
study possible carcinogenic effects of the gas leak. Relative risks were found for lung,
oropharynx, and oral cavity cancers, respectively, for 1992 in comparison to the years 1987-90
and gas unaffected regions combined. Using a case-control design, cancer cases of the above
sites were selected from the registry and controls from a tobacco survey conducted in the
Bhopal population. A marginally increased risk was found only for oro pharyngeal cancer after
adjustment for age and tobacco use. No dose-response relationships were evident in the
geographic distribution of cases.
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Biochemical studies conducted by the ITRC, Lucknow , India, revealed that some multi
- systemic complaints were persistent and occurred even in those patients who did not have
significant respiratory damage (Gupta et al., 1988). In a sample from a gas exposed population
studies 3 MO after the accident biochemical indicators of stress response were observed, blood
ceruloplasmin levels were increased 200% over control values in more than 45% of those tested
(Srivastava et al., 1988). In these studies, urinary creatinine was significantly higher than in
controls. Blood glutathione was significantly depressed in approximately 40% of the population
examined. Buchner (Tice et al., 1987), in this review of the health effects research done on MIC,
states that if MIC is shown to bind to normal hemoglobin (Carbamoylation), this would provide
evidence that the chemical crosses the alveolar barrier and would, therefore, support MIC’s
potential for systemic exposure.

Following exposure to the gas in Bhopal, there was concern amongst the health
authorities that the population might experience an increased rate of infections. Immune function
was studied in exposed subjects from the ITRC sample two and a half months after exposure to
ascertain whether any change had occurred in the immune status (Saxena et al., 1988). Humoral
immunity was assessed by quantitation of immunoglobulins (IgG, IgM, IgA) in over 300
exposed and 10 non-exposed persons. Cell-Mediated Immunity (CMI) was assessed by
phagocytic activity of lymphocytes and quantitation of T-cell rosettes in 19 exposed and 8 non-
exposed persons. Results from this study showed that no difference in mean immunoglobulin
levels was found when compared to controls. The T-cell population (28%) was found to be less
than half that found normally in the Indian population (65%). Significant depression of
phagocytic activity of lymphocytes was found as compared to controls. Limitations of the
human studies include the relatively small sample sizes, choice of control groups and unclear
exposure ascertainment. The above limitations make it difficult to arrive at definitive
conclusions regarding immunotoxicity from MIC exposure for the gas victims.
 XBET 3103

Neuromuscular symptoms in Bhopal survivors have persisted since the gas leak. These
symptoms are mainly tingling, numbness, a sensation of pins and needles in the extremities and
muscle aches. To assess whether MIC was toxic to muscle, Anderson et al evaluated the effects
of MIC on rat muscle cells in culture (Anderson et al., 1988). At lower doses, the formation of
muscle fibers was prevented. At higher doses, death of fibroblasts and myoblasts was seen. The
findings suggested either an effect on muscle differentiation or selective toxicity to myobla sts.
There has been no evidence to support the second hypothesis that MIC is converted to a form of
cyanide in the body. Animals exposed to MIC by inhalation have not shown any evidence of
cyanide in the blood (Bucher et al., 1987). Ferguson and Alarie have demonstrated that there
may be a physiopathological basis for the persistence of multi-systemic symptoms in Bhopal
survivors (Ferguson et al., 1988). Their studies on experimental animals have shown that radio
- labeled MIC is capable of being absorbed and distributed throughout the body. These findings
have been confirmed by Bhattacharya et al who have shown that MIC binds covalently to tissue
proteins in its active form and not as its breakdown product, methylamine (Bhattacharya et al.,
1988). There is no known antidote for MIC toxicity.

In-depth molecular studies of ocular, respiratory, reproductive, immunological,

genetic and psychological health carried out so far have helped to understand the extent and
severity of long term effects associated with the disaster. Long-term monitoring of the affected
community and use of appropriate methods of investigation that include well-designed cohort
studies for such conditions, characterization of personal exposure and accident analysis have
helped to determine several clinical and epidemiological inadequacies, including poor study
design, bias and inaccurate exposure classification of studies conducted previously on victims of
the tragedy. Studies aimed at understanding increasing morbidity of MIC exposure carried out
on human cultured cellular model systems have provided a framework of understanding the
potential mechanism of toxicity of a host of other exposures and that might uncover unique
abnormalities in the survivors thereby stimulating efforts to design newer and more effective
diagnostic and therapeutic strategies for helping the survivors
 XBET 3103

Animal studies of MIC

LC50 values for guinea pigs, rats, and mice are summarized in Table below. Acute
lethality studies, including clinical effects where available, are discussed below by species.

Species (Gender) No. of animals LC 50 Duration Reference

(PPM) (hours)

Guinea pigs (male and 6/gender 5.4 6 Dodd et al. 1985, 1986
female)

Guinea pigs (not stated) Not stated 10.6 4 Mellon Institute 1970
Guinea pigs (male) 8 26.5 3 Ferguson and Alarie 1991
Rat (male and female) 6/gender 6.1 6 Dodd et al. 1985, 1986
Rat (not stated) 6 17.5 4 Mellon Institute 1970
Rat (male) 6 11.1 4 Fait and Dodd 1981

Rat (female) 6 11.0 4 Fait and Dodd 1981

Rat (not stated) 20 5 4 Kimmerle and Eben 1964
Rat (not stated) 6 27.4 2 Mellon Institute 1970
Rat (not stated) 20 21 2 Kimmerle and Eben 1964
Rat (not stated) 6 41.3 1 Mellon Institute 1970
Rat (male) 20 45.01 1 ManTech Environmental 1992
Rat (female) 4 171 0.25 Dodd et al. 1987
Mouse (male and female) 6 12.2 6 Dodd et al. 1985, 1986
Mouse (male) 8 - 41 26.8 3 Varma et al. 1988
Mouse (male) 6 112.4 0.5 Vijayaraghavan and Kaushik 1987
 XBET 3103

Two rabbits per group were exposed to MIC at 5.4 ppm for 6.75, 3.5, or 2 h or at 1.8 ppm for
7 h .Although the concentrations were listed as nominal, the report stated that the analytical method
was adequate for monitoring concentrations as low as 1.8 ppm. All animals exposed at
5.4 ppm died 1–2 week post exposure, apparently due to respiratory infections. Animals exposed
at 1.8 ppm survived. At 5.4 ppm for duration’s ≥3.5 h, the eyes were red and had evidence of
corneal injury when observed with fluorescein. Ocular damage was slight in animals exposed at
5.4 ppm for 2 h and equivocal in animals exposed at 1.8 ppm for 7 h. Male albino rabbits were
exposed in a flow-through chamber to a monitored concentration of MIC at 1,260 ppm for 30
min (Pant et al. 1987). Although numbers of deaths were not stated, it is unlikely most animals
survived exposure at this concentration. At necropsy, lung weights were increased 2- to 2.5-fold,
and the lungs had large hemorrhagic patches. Histologically, the epithelial lining of the
bronchioles was necrotic and sloughed, and the alveoli were edematous.
 XBET 3103

Groups of eight male English short-haired guinea pigs were exposed for 3 h to analytical
concentrations of MIC at 6, 13, 19, 27, or 37 ppm (Ferguson and Alarie 1991). Each animal was
held in a whole body plethysmograph attached to a primary chamber into which MIC was
delivered. A 3-h LC50 of 26.5 ppm was calculated. Pulmonary performance, as measured by
respiratory frequency, amplitude, coughing, flow-volume measurements, O2 uptake, and CO2
output, was evaluated for up to 1 y in the survivors. At 19 ppm and 37 ppm, 2/8 and 6/8 animals
exposed died within 48 h, respectively; no animals survived more than 24 h following exposure
at 27 ppm. Coughing was observed in animals exposed at ≥19 ppm; the frequency increased with
concentration and persisted in survivors for more than 5 d post exposure. Deterioration of
pulmonary performance was observed in animals exposed at 6 ppm and 13 ppm, but complete
recovery occurred within a few weeks. Because all measures of pulmonary performance in the 6
- and 13-ppm animals returned to normal, these groups were terminated at 1 and 2 month post
exposure, respectively. Gross necropsy was unremarkable in the animals exposed at 6 ppm and
13 ppm. In animals surviving exposure at 19 ppm or 37 ppm, impairment of pulmonary
performance, indicative of chronic obstructive lung disease, was observed after 1 year. These
higher exposure groups had concentration-related decreases in tidal volume and abnormal flow-
volume loops in response to CO2 challenge. At necropsy 1 year post exposure, the lungs from
the animals exposed at 19 ppm or 37 ppm showed large areas of scarring, and portions of the
lobes appeared atelectatic. Histologically, there was an increase in fibrous connective tissue in
the main bronchi, an increase in septal thickness of the alveoli, and destruction of the alveolar
walls, all of which were more severe at 37 ppm than at 19 ppm. In a companion study to the one
just described, no evidence of inhibition of oxygen utilization (cyanide-like effect) was reported
for the 37-ppm group (Alarie et al. 1987).
 XBET 3103

Groups of 20 male Fischer rats were exposed in whole-body, flow-through chambers for
1 hour to analysed concentrations of MIC at 22.7, 33.5, 46.5, 49.7, or 62.5 ppm (ManTech
Environmental 1992). Mortalities were 0, 4, 7, 16, and 16 animals, respectively, resulting in a
calculated 1-h LC50 of 45 ppm with 95% confidence limits of 38.62–52.46 ppm. Most rats in
all exposure groups exhibited dyspnoea, rales, salivation, lacrimation, and clear or red nasal
discharge upon removal from the chamber. Clinical signs during the 14 -d observation period
included redness around the nose and eyes, gasping, wheezing, cold to touch, rough hair coat,
diarrhoea, discolored inguinal fur, and emaciation. All surviving rats lost weight during the first
week postexposure, and survivors exposed at ≥33.5 ppm continued to have body-weight loss
during the second week. Gross findings in rats that died included red or pale puffy lungs, gas-
filled stomach, and yellow and gas-filled intestines. Puffy, pale or red lungs, tan or gray areas,
and/or red foci in the lungs were observed in all animals necropsied at the end of the obser
vation period.
 XBET 3103

Lesson learn from a tragedy

The lessons we learn from this horrendous accident have had a significant impact on
process safety and how we should be educated and trained to prevent future accidents such as,
we must embed safety culture in our working place, no safety measures that can prevent an
accident if there is not a safety culture that governs the behaviour of management and
employees. In Bhopal this basic pillar was not present or was weak, it was very common to
bypass any safety system due to the fact of saving money, when in reality it cost lives and
even cost more money to counter act the accident.

The application of the principles of intrinsically safe design is those that offer the best
results. In Bhopal the main cause of the disaster was unnecessary storage of large quantities of
MIC, which ultimately was what caused the mass poisoning. Basic knowledge and experience
in any factory is important, let alone a dangerous one. In this case unnecessary things are being
done when all it does is put everyone in more danger.

The Bhopal accident still provides valuable lessons after 30 years. Concepts such as
“zero accidents” or “total inherent safety” arose as a result of accidents in 1984 as well as what
was coined by Professor Trevor Kletz, one of the fathers of modern chemical safety: “Why
should we publish accident reports?”. Another lesson that can be learned is that the legal system
does not always work to protect victims. Bhopal has shown that sometimes corporations do not
have to pay for the crimes they commit. The polluter does not always have to pay.

The world’s worst industrial catastrophe has taught the world many things, but there are
many lessons that have not been learned yet. The most important lesson that has not been
learned is how to prevent future leaks. Safety measures reduce the chances of leaks, but many
leaks still occur all over the world. It makes one wonder if societies’ dependency on chemicals
really worth the risk.
 MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS
389 Methyl isocyanate
1. CHEMICAL IDENTITY
Chemical Name : Methyl isocyanate
Chemical Classification: Toxic, Flammable Trade Name :
Synonyms: Isocyanatomethane, Isocyanic acid,methyl ester, Methyl ester of isocyanic acid, MIC
Formula : C2H3NO CAS No: 624-83-9 UN No: 2480
Regulated Identification
Shipping Name : Methyl isocyanate Hazchem Code : 3WE
Codes / Label : Class 6.1, Toxic, Flammable Hazardous Waste ID No : 15
HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS C.A.S. No. HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS C.A.S. No.
1 Methyl isocyanate 624-83-9 3
2 4
2. PHYSICAL / CHEMICAL DATA
Boiling 39.5 Physical State: Liquid Appearance: Colourless
Pt. °C:
Melting 45 Vapour Pressure 348 mm Hg at 20 Odour: Sharp, unpleasant
Pt °C: @ 35°C mmHg: deg C odour
Vapour 1.42 Solubility in 10 g/100 ml at Others:
Density(Air =1): water at 30°C 15 deg C
g/100ml:
Specific Gravity (Water =1 ): 0.9230 g/cu cm at 27 deg C pH :
3. FIRE / EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA
Flammability : Yes LEL: 5.3 Flash Point °C in OC: <-15
TDG Flammability: 3 UEL: 26 Flash Point °C in CC:

Autoignition Temperature °C : 534

Explosion sensitivity to impact: Stable
Explosion sensitivity to static Electricity: Stable
Hazardous Combustion Products : Emits toxic fumes of NOx.
Hazardous Polymerization : Will not occur normally
Combustible Liquid: Yes Explosive Material: No Corrosive Material No
Flammable Material: Yes Oxidiser : No Others:
Pyrophoric Material: No Organic Peroxide : No
4. REACTIVITY DATA
Chemical Stability : Stable
Incompatibility with : Water, acid, alkali, amine, iron, tin, copper and their salts, other
other material catalysts.
Reactivity : Exothermic reaction with water. Reacts with oxidisers.
Hazardous :
Reaction Products
Methyl isocyanate Page 1 of 3
5. HEALTH HAZARD DATA
Routes of entry: Inhalation, Ingestion, Skin & Eyes.
Effects of Exposure / Symptoms:
Inhalation &. ingestion: Exposure to high concentrations of vapour can cause blindness, lung
damage including edema, permanent fibrosis emplussema and bronchitis, gynaecological
effects, respiratory paralysis. Eyes : Causes blindness. Skin: Severe irritation leading to
dermatitis.
Emergency Treatment :
Inhalation: Move victim to fresh air. Apply artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Do not
use mouth-to-mouth method
Skin: Remove and isolate contaminated clothing and shoes. Immediately flush with
running water for at least 20 minutes. For minor skin contact, avoid spreading
material on unaffected skin.
Eyes: Immediately flush with running water for at least 20 minutes.
Ingestion: Administer charcoal as a slurry (240 ml water/30 g charcoal). Usual dose: 25 to 100
g in adults/adolescents.
LD50 (oral-rat) mg/kg: 69 mg/kg STEL:
LC50 (rat) mg/kg: 0.012 mg/liter/4 hours Odour Threshold:
Permissible 0.02 ppm (0.05 TLV (ACGIH) : 0.02 ppm (0.05 mg/m3),
Exposure Limit: mg/m3), skin skin

NFPA Hazard Health Flammability Reactivity Special

Signals 3 4 2 W
6. PREVENTIVE MEASURES
Personal Protective : Avoid contact with liquid or vapour. Provide Self-contained breathing
Equipment apparatus or on air-line mask, side covered safety goggles I face shield,
rubber hand gloves, shoes, body overclothing.
Handling : All chemicals should be considered hazardous. Avoid direct physical
contact. Use appropriate, approved safety equipment. Untrained
individuals should not handle this chemical or its container. Handling
should occur in a chemical fume hood.
Storage : Keep cool, no sparks, flames. Store in areas separated from oxidizers.
store in stainless steel receptacles, nickel, or perfectly vitrified materials.
Precautions :
7. EMERGENCY / FIRST AID MEASURES
FIRE:
Fire Extinguishing Media : Dry chemical powder, CO2, foam and water spray.
Special Procedure : Keep the containers cool by spraying water if exposed to heat or
flame.
Unusual Hazards : Poisonous gases are produced in fire
EXPOSURE: First Aid Measures:
Inhalation: Move victim to fresh air. Apply artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Do not
use mouth-to-mouth method
Skin: Remove and isolate contaminated clothing and shoes. Immediately flush with
running water for at least 20 minutes. For minor skin contact, avoid spreading
material on unaffected skin.
Eyes: Immediately flush with running water for at least 20 minutes.
Methyl isocyanate Page 2 of 3
Ingestion: Administer charcoal as a slurry (240 ml water/30 g charcoal). Usual dose: 25 to 100
g in adults/adolescents.
Antidotes / Dosages:
SPILLS : : Shut off leaks if without risk. Contain the spillage on earth or sand.
Steps To Be Taken
Waste Disposal Method: Seal all lite waste in vapour tight plastic bags for eventual disposal.
8. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION / REFERENCES
A very dangerous fire hazard when exposed to heat, flame or oxidisers. An industrial accident in
the Carbaryl manufacturing plant in Bhopal (India) on December 3, 1984 resulted in the
emission of MIC in the air, causing many deaths and severely affecting a large number of
population.
9. MANUFACTURERS / SUPPLIERS DATA
NAME OF FIRM : Contact person
MAILING ADDRESS : in Emergency :
TELEPHONE / TELEX NOS : Local Bodies involved :
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS : Standard Packing :
OTHERS : Trem Card Details / Ref :
10. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable but no representation,
guarantee or warranties of any kind are made as to its accuracy, suitability for a particular
application or results to be obtained from them. It is up to the manufacturer/ seller to ensure that
the information contained in the material safety data sheet is relevant to the product
manufactured / handled or sold by him as the case may be. The Government makes no
warranties expressed or implied in the respect of the adequacy of this document for any
particular purpose.
End of document
Total No. of Pages: 3

Methyl isocyanate Page 3 of 3

The Bhopal Disaster of 1984

Roli Varma
University of New Mexico
Daya R. Varma
McGill University

The 20th anniversary of the Bhopal calamity fell on ter for Human Resources and Development, was the
December 3, 2004. The world’s worst industrial disas- Chief Minister of MP in 1984. Singh played a key
ter in Bhopal, India, happened because of inadequate role in having the agricultural office of Union
maintenance by Union Carbide and poor monitoring Carbide India Limited (UCIL) move from Bombay
by the Indian authorities. Malfunctioning safety mea- to Bhopal in 1968. It was supposed to help in the
sures, inappropriate location of the plant, and lack of development of MP. In 1969, the Bhopal plant was
information about the identity and toxicity of the gas built as the formula-tion plant: The Sevin Technical
worsened the effects of the accident on people and Concentrate was imported from the United States,
livestock. The Bhopal disaster has raised questions and the work of blending and grinding was done in
about the implications of the transfer of potentially Bhopal. The manu-facture of the pesticide Sevin
hazardous technology to the developing countries. using methyl isocyanate (MIC) was started in 1980.
Even after 20 years, Bhopal has not recovered. In this Within 4 years of operation, on December 2, 1984,
article, we present what happened and why and what 30 metric tons of highly poisonous MIC gas spewed
lessons can be learned at this terrible cost. from the UCIL plant. It is estimated that almost 20,000
people died, and nearly 200,000 people were exposed
Keywords: hazards; green revolution; methyl to the poisonous gas by varying degrees. The plant
isocyanate; multinationals; pesticides; poisonous closed after the accident, and Union Carbide became a
gas; safety failures; Union Carbide subsidy of Dow Chemical in 1999.

India became independent on August 15, 1947, and Given the magnitude of the tragedy, it is not surpris-
ing that the Bhopal disaster has continued to draw the
its first major problem was to deal with food shortage. attention of media, scholars, and activists throughout
The problem persisted by varying degrees until the the world. It has been the subject of several books
Green Revolution, a popular term referring mainly to (Cassels, 1993; Everest, 1985; Fortun, 2001; Jasanoff,
the tremendous increases in cereal grain production in
1994; Kuizman, 1987; Lapierre & Moro, 2001; Sufrin,
certain underdeveloped areas especially India, Paki-
stan, and the Philippines in the late 1960s through the 1985; Wilkins, 1987) and studies (Dhara & Dhara,
cultivation of hybrid strains and economic changes 2002; Mehta, Mehta, Mehta, & Makhijani, 1990;
brought by new agricultural rural practices in those Sriramachari, 2004; D. R. Varma, 1986; D. R. Varma
countries. For a number of years now, India is a food & Guest, 1993). In 2002, a play “Bhopal” was staged
surplus country. The change from traditional farming to in Canada as well as in India. The Nature of Things of
capitalist farming under the Green Revolution required the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation produced a
pesticides among other things. documentary released on the occasion of the 20th
Bhopal, capital of Madhya Pradesh (MP) in central anniversary of the Bhopal disaster WORDING
India, is a beautiful historic city. MP is a poor province OKAY?. The Bhopal issue has been taken up by
by Indian standards. Until very recently the Indian numerous organizations. Sambhavana Foundation,
National Congress Party (Congress) was in power in which came into being as a response to the disaster,
MP, and Mr. Arjun Singh, currently the federal Minis- operates a free clinic for the victims, does epidemio-
logical and environmental research, and is building a

Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, Vol. 23, No. X, Month 2003, 1-9
DOI: 10.1177/0270467604273822
Copyright © 2003 Sage Publications
2 BULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE / Month 2005

Figure 1.
Map of Bhopal PLEASE PROVIDE CAPTION FOR FIGURE

hospital. Rashida Bee and Champa Devi Shukla, two showing no mercy to people, animals, and plants. 1 The
survivors of the tragedy and activists of the Interna- exact human death toll is still to be unknown OR IS IT
tional Campaign for Justice in Bhopal, won KNOWN; however, it is estimated that nearly 5,000
prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in 2004. people died within 2 days, and the death toll eventually
In this article, we present what happened in Bhopal reached upward of 20,000. A total of 200,000 in a city
and why. We outline the double standard of Union of 800,000 (1984 population) were exposed to the gas.
Carbide toward safety measures, the corrupt practices More than 60,000 of them required long-term treat-
of India to hush the matter of hazardous operations, ment (D. R. Varma, 1986). The location of the UCIL
and structural inability of India to handle hazardous plant and areas most affected is shown in Figure 1.
technology. In the long shadow of the 20th anniversary India and the world were shocked in the morning of
of the Bhopal disaster, the article outlines lessons that December 3. “This may be how the world will end not
need to be learned WORDING OKAY? . with a bang (with obvious reference to Nagasaki and
Hiroshima) but with an ecological whimper,” wrote
The Shock and Awe Abu Abraham in Bombay’s Sunday Observer of De-
cember 23, 1984 (p. 1). “City of Death” was the front
It was just past midnight of December 2, 1984. cover of the December 31, 1984, issue of the fort-
Nearly 30 of the 42 metric tons of MIC stored in Tank nightly India Today. “India’s Disaster—The Night of
610 of the UCIL pesticide plant escaped with consid- Death” was displayed on the front cover of the Decem-
erable velocity within a matter of 45 minutes to 60 ber 14, 1984, issue of the Time magazine. The presti-
minutes. The dense cloud of the heavier-than-air gas gious journal Nature noticed that
soon settled on the shantytowns adjoining the plant
 Varma, Varma / BHOPAL DISASTER 3

the anguish vividly carried round the world by marked difference in the structure and toxicity of
the television cameras seems not to have these three groups of chemicals. The unfamiliarity
matured into the anger, even hysteria, there with these terms, and the popular belief that cyanide
would have been had the accident occurred on is the most toxic of all chemicals known, created a
the edge of a European city or in Connecticut great deal of confusion in Bhopal.
(the headquar-ters of Union Carbide).
(“Helping Out in Bhopal,” 1984, p. 579) Cyanates

The fear was so great among the people of Bhopal The general structure of cyanates is –CNO. Thus
that nearly one half the population left the city sodium cyanate is NaCNO, and methyl cyanate is
during Op-eration Faith (December 16 to December CH3CNO. Cyanates are the least toxic of the three
22, 1984) when the remaining MIC in the plant was groups of molecules and cannot be converted into
disposed off by making more of the pesticide Sevin. 2 cyanides in the body (Birch & Schultz, 1946). They
The general sentiment was that it was an unfortu- have been used for the treatment of sickle cell anemia.
nate accident, the probability of whose occurrence
Cyanides
should be minimized (“Bhopal’s Message,” 1984;
Diamond, 1985; Tcheknavorian-Asenbauer, 1984). Yet
The general structure of cyanides is –C=N. Potas-
many felt that the Bhopal tragedy, terrible as it was,
sium cyanide is KCN, sodium cyanide is NaCN, and
was the price to be paid for development, for the Green
hydrogen cyanide is HCN. HCN is the most toxic of all
Revolution. For instance, The Wall Street Jour-nal
cyanides by inhalation. KCN is less toxic than HCN
declared that “of those people killed, half would not
but much more toxic than NaCN. The faster is the dis-
have been alive today if it weren’t for that plant and the
sociation of the toxic moiety CN from the specific cya-
modern health standards made possible by wide use of
nide the greater is its toxicity. Because in sufficient
pesticides” (“The Bhopal Tragedy,” 1984, p. 26).
doses (by injection or oral ingestion) KCN can cause
Similarly, The New Republic echoed that pesti-cides
painless death in a very short time, it has been used for
manufactured by the Union Carbide plant in India
execution and suicide. Cyanide (–CN) has a very high
saved 10% of the annual crop that is enough to feed 70
affinity for cellular cytochrome oxidase, and inactiva-
to 80 million people (TRB, 1985, p. 42).
tion of this enzymes shuts off oxygen utilization by
cells; death results from absolute asphyxiation.
Union Carbide of India Limited (UCIL) Nonfatal quantities of –CN can be detected in the
blood of most people, specially among smokers. An
At the time of accident, UCIL was a 50.9% subsid-
enzyme that can inactivate cyanide ion is present in
iary of the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) of the
humans and animals; consequently, if a person does not
United States. In the Fortune 500 survey of the 500
die from cyanide poisoning within a few hours,
largest U.S. industrial corporations, the UCC was
survival is almost a rule. Cyanide poisoning is not
ranked as the third largest chemical manufacturing
known to result in long-term toxic effects. Studies with
company after Du Pont and Dow Chemical. The Eco-
MIC indicate that on a concentration basis it is much
nomic Times (India) ranked the UCIL 21 in India. The
more toxic than HCN, although death from MIC intox-
UCIL plant in Bhopal was a packaged transfer with no
ication takes much longer (hours and days) than after
Indian organization associated with any component of
cyanide poisoning (usually in minutes). Maximum
technology except for labor and some construction
allowable concentration of HCN is 10 parts per million
material. The entire package was put together by the
(ppm), at which concentration MIC is intolerable and
UCC who arranged for process licenses, undertook
will cause death in a proportion of affected individuals
engineering, construction, and start-up of the project
(D. R. Varma, 1989).
(R. Varma, 1986).
Isocyanates
Chemistry of Cyanates, Cyanide,
and Isocyanates Isocyanates are highly reactive members of the
heterocumelene family. Their general chemical struc-
Superficially, the terms isocyanates, cyanides, and ture is R-N=C=O. Methyl isocyanate (CH 3-N=C=O) is
cyanates appear to be related. However, there is a a monoisocyanate (in this case, R is CH3). The exis-
4 BULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE / Month 2005

tence of adjacent double bonds confers high reactivity claim that the accident was a result of sabotage by
to isocyanates by a cumulative action. That is why some disgruntled workers.
MIC is very toxic. All isocyanates are toxic, and their
toxicity is greater following inhalation than following Faulty Location
oral ingestion (D. R. Varma, 1986).
MIC is the most toxic member of the isocyanate The UCIL plant was built on the outskirts of the city
family. At room temperature, MIC is a colorless liq- barely one km from the railway station and 3 km from
uid. MIC is flammable; its molecular mass is 57.05, two major hospitals, Hamidia and Sultania (Figure 1).
specific gravity 0.96 relative to water at 20°C, vapor This was done against the advice of authorities. For
pressure 348 mm Hg (464 mbar) at 20°C and vapor example, the Bhopal Development Plan of August 25,
density 1.97 relative to air. The boiling point of MIC 1975, had already suggested that “obnoxious indus-
is 39.1°C, which implies that some MIC will tries” including manufacturing pesticides and insecti-
vaporize at a room temperature of 23°C and all of it cides be located to an industrial zone 25 km away. M.
can exist as vapor in Bhopal on certain hot days of N. Buch, then commissioner and director of town and
the summer. Because MIC is odorless, contact with country planning for the state, ordered the Union Car-
it is noted only because of toxicity (watering of eyes, bide plant to locate manufacturing of carbamates away
throat irritation). The Occupational Safety and from the city because the risks of a pesticide formula-
Health Administration in the United States has set tion plant are very different from a plant that manufac-
exposure limits to MIC as 0.02 ppm (or 0.05 mg/m 3) tures the basic material for pesticides. According to
over an 8-hour period (D. R. Varma, 1986). him, with such a plant, people should not live within
many miles of the plants (Reinhold, 1985; R. Varma,
Synthesis of Carbamate Pesticides 1986).

MIC was used as an intermediate in the manufac- Careless Handling of MIC

ture of a variety of carbamate pesticides as follows:
MIC was stored in three tanks, each with a capacity
1. Petroleum coke (2C) was reacted with oxygen of 15,000 gallons. All the three tanks were in use. It is
to produce 2CO. expected that one tank will be kept free for emergency
2. CO and chlorine were reacted to produce purposes. In the United States, Japan, and Germany,
phos-gene (COCl2) MIC was either used up as it was produced or stored
3. Phosgene and methylamine (CH3NH2) were only for brief periods and never in such huge quantities
re-acted to produce methylcarbamoyl chloride as in Bhopal. Tank 610 had 6.4 tons of MIC prior to
(CH3NHCOCl) plus HCl. October 7 to which was added MIC produced from
4. Methylcarbamoyl chloride was then pyrolyzed October 7 til October 22. Thus MIC was not only kept
to yield MIC (CH3NCO) and HCl. for 55 days, but the Tank 610 contained two separate
5. In the last step, MIC was reacted with a slight pools of MIC. It is expected that tanks should be no
excess of α-naphthol in the presence of a cata- more than half full; however, prior to the fateful night
lyst in carbon tetrachloride solvent to produce in Bhopal, the Tank 610 was 87% full, which is far
cabaryl. above the recommended capacity of 50% at the West
Virginia plant and 60% specification for the Bhopal
The Leak plant (Diamond, 1985; Reinhold, 1985; Varadarajan,
1985).
Reaction of MIC with water generates heat far Tanks containing MIC are required to be kept
above its boiling point. During the cleaning operation under refrigeration; this elementary caution was
in the night of December 2, 1984, a small quantity of violated at Bhopal. The Union Carbide manual
water went through the pipe into the MIC Tank 610. WHICH ONE? PROVIDE TEXT CITATION
The heat generated by the reaction between water and specifies that the alarm should respond whenever the
MIC transformed liquid MIC into gas. The pressure temperature goes above 11°C; in Bhopal it was set at
became sufficiently high rupturing the disc, and MIC 20°C. Most evi-dence suggests that MIC in Bhopal
spewed through the vent into the atmosphere (Dia- plant was gener-ally at or above 15°C.
mond, 1985). There is little substance to the UCIL
 Varma, Varma / BHOPAL DISASTER 5

Failure of Safety Devices wrote a long article along the same lines in a Hindi
daily newspaper Jansatta on June 16, 1984, and to
The scrubber and flare tower, which at their best the Chief Minister about the danger. His warnings
could handle minor leaks, were nonfunctional at the were largely derived from the problems cited by
time of the accident. The scrubber, if functional, can Union Car-bide’s safety report of May 1982.
neutralize MIC entering at 90 kg/hour at 35°C and a Serious attention should have been paid to criti-
maximum pressure of 15 pounds per square inch (psi); cisms of the UCIL operations because at least four
the pressure at which MIC escaped was approximately other mishaps happened in the past. For instance, the
200 times higher at 6 to 10 times the desired tempera- inquiry report of the phosgene accident of December
ture. Similarly, the flare tower can only burn miniscule 1981 in which a plant operator M. Ashraf died, was
amounts of MIC. The third main safety device, the submitted in March 1984. Nothing was done by the
water spraying system, was functional and turned on at Labor Department of India until October when two
1:00 AM in the morning of December 3; however, it senior officials finally learned about the report. They
could shoot water only up to a height of 12 meters to recommended improvements at the factory; however,
15 meters whereas MIC escaped at a height at approxi- no action was taken. Workers protested; instead of
mately 50 meters (Lepkowski, 1985; R. Varma, 1986). dealing with the accident, the management dismissed
two protesters on flimsy charges (Ramaseshan, 1984).
Shoddy Maintenance According to some journalists (Ram, 1984;
Vaidyanathan, 1985), such manner of functioning
There were serious lapses in the day-to-day opera- was possible mainly because of the relationship that
tions. The practice of employing degree holders as existed between the UCIL and Indian administration.
operators and providing them with a 6-month training The company’s guest house on Shyamla Hills was
was abandoned. Some operators were high school always at the disposal of the Chief Minister, state
graduates and brought from other plants. The staff was gov-ernment officials, and union ministers. Relatives
reduced from 12 operators, 3 supervisors, 2 mainte- of several ministers and senior bureaucrats were on
nance supervisors, and 1 superintendent per shift to 6 the company’s payroll.
operators, 1 supervisor, and no obligatory superinten- The most likely reason for negligence on the part of
dent (R. Varma, 1986). The plant was not automated to the UCIL was the dwindling market for its pesticide
monitor leaks, which used to be detected by workers by Sevin. A major drought struck India in 1977, which
irritation of eyes and throat. No effective public forced many farmers to borrow heavily from the gov-
warnings system was installed. The alarm was similar ernment. When these loans started to come due in
to those sounding for various other purposes. 1980, the farmers started buying pesticides produced
by small operations at almost one half the price of
Callousness Toward Warnings UCIL’s Sevin. The sales of Sevin dropped by 23% in
1983. As the profit of the UCIL shrunk, the manage-
Many of the problems, which ultimately led to the ment ignored safety measures and stopped upgrading
disaster, were identified as early as May 1982 by a of equipments (Bhargava, 1985).
team of American experts (L. K. Kail, J. M. Poulon,
C. S. Tyson) sent by the UCC. The team found Aggravating the Tragedy
instances of leaky valves, cleaning of filters without
inserting a slip blind, malfunctioning pressure Late and misleading warning about the MIC leak
gauges, malfunc-tioning spray water system and so increased the human cost of the disaster. The leak was
on (Union Carbide, 1982). It is doubtful that these detected at 11:30 PM of December 2; however, the
recommendations were implemented. warning signal was started 2 hours later at 1:30 AM of
Another noteworthy warning came from a local December 3. The actual duration of the MIC leak is
journalist Raj Kumar Keswani. In a Hindi weekly, estimated to be 45 minutes to 60 minutes. By the time
Saptahik of September 17, October 1, and October 8, the siren went into effect, people were already awak-
1982, Keswani warned policy makers and public with ened by the irritation in the eyes and throat. This, how-
prophetic headlines: “Save, Please Save This City,” ever, was ignored because minor leaks were common.
“Bhopal on the Mouth of a Volcano,” and “If You Around midnight, the operator noticed unusually high
Don’t Understand, You Will be Wiped Out.” He again pressure in Tank 610 and reported this to the produc-
6 BULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE / Month 2005

tion assistant (Diamond, 1985; R. Varma, 1986). A of phosgene leak instead of MIC found currency in
few minutes past midnight of December 3, the Bhopal (R. Varma, 1986).
produc-tion assistant noticed that the rupture disc In addition to suppressing information, continuous
and the safety valve (next in sequence) had burst. By misinformation started emanating by the administra-
1:00 AM CORRECT - WARNING WENT OFF AT tion with the help of scientific experts to cover up the
1:30? of December 3, MIC was escaping through real effects of the gas on people. The confusion was
the nozzle of the 33-meter high vent. magnified by statements made by a team of medical
The public siren was turned on around 2:00 AM of experts sent by Union Carbide immediately after the
December 3, 1984. Furthermore, the instructions pro- accident. The team comprising of Dr. Hans Weill (Pul-
vided by the administration proved worse than if no monary Division, Tulane Medical Center, New
instructions had been given. Because the police did not Orleans), Dr. Peter Halberg (professor of clinical oph-
know what had leaked and what to say, they blared thalmology, New York Medical College) and Dr.
with loud speakers: “Run! Run! Poison Gas Is Spread- Thomas L. Petty (School of Medicine, University of
ing!” Consequently, people ran and inhaled more of the Colorado) asserted that MIC will be rapidly degraded
poison than they would have had they not run. Only if on contact with body and will not produce any sys-
the evacuation of about 100,000 residents from the temic or long-term effect. The conjecture of this team
vicinity of the plant on the northeast side was done at was reiterated by Dr. James Melius, chief of the Haz-
the first sign of the MIC leak, the number of deaths that ard and Technical Assistance Branch of the National
followed could have been considerably less. When Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
MIC started spewing in huge quantities, the only use- in Cincinnati, who was invited along with three others
ful warning was to ask people not to run but rather lie by the government of India.
down on the ground and cover their faces with wet
cloths. Indeed Union Carbide’s (1978) manual clearly The Killer Gas
states that: “Methyl isocyanate is a hazardous material
by all means of contact. Vapors are extremely irritat- The immediate effect of the poisonous gas was irri-
ing . . . may cause fatal pulmonary edema” (p. 6). It is tation in the eyes and difficulty in breathing. By early
important to note that a large majority of all deaths morning of December 3, 1984, streets were littered
within the first 48 hours of the leak were due to with dead or dying humans, buffalos, cows, dogs and
pulmonary edema. other animals. Trees were denuded. It is interesting to
The Union Carbide headquarters and its West Vir- note, houseflies were unaffected by the gas, perhaps
ginia plant can be squarely blamed for aggravating the because they lay still at ground level. Those who could
tragedy by not informing or misinforming about the manage were rushing to the hospital. Deaths within the
nature and toxicity of the chemical that had leaked. The first 4 days of the leak were caused by pulmonary
first misinformation was given by Dr. B. H. Avashia of edema. The condition is identical to severe acute respi-
the West Virginia plant who implied that hydrogen ratory syndrome (SARS), which is caused by a virus
cyanide had leaked and people should be given the and which caused several deaths in China and Canada
cyanide antidote sodium thiosulfate; a gener-ous in 2003. In short, Bhopal suffered from an epidemic of
quantity of sodium thiosulfate was donated by the chemically induced SARS. There is no specific treat-
German toxicologist Dr. M. Daunderer. The confusion ment of such a condition; supporting therapy is needed.
was so great that demand to treat victims by sodium Even in the industrialized world, treatment would have
thiosulfate remained an issue for months. As men- been nearly impossible had SARS affected thousands
tioned earlier, if the chemical was hydrogen cyanide, on thousands of people within a very short time.
most deaths would have occurred within a few hours of
the leak, and sodium thiosulfate could not have saved
any lives days or months after. On the other hand, MIC Toxicity
sodium thiosulfate could improve tissue oxygenation
even months after by inactivating cyanide present in There was only one report on the toxicity of MIC in
the body for a number of reasons, notably smoking; the literature (Kimmerle & Eben, 1964) at the time of
therefore, there was neither a need to recommend nor the Bhopal disaster. This led the prestigious British
ban its use. Because UCIL officials grossly journal Lance to comment: “In a year’s time we will
underemphasized the toxicity of MIC, the possibility have learned a lot more about methyl isocyanate—at
 Varma, Varma / BHOPAL DISASTER 7

an appalling price” (“Calamity at Bhopal,” 1984, p. regarding compensation, and the Bhopal mayor signed
1379). Indeed, we did learn a lot in a few years’time. an agreement with American lawyer J. P. Coale to file a
The acute toxicity of the MIC leak included diffi- suit in a U.S. court on behalf of the municipal
culty in breathing, eye irritation, corneal damage, corporation. The government of India paid rupees,
vomiting, unconsciousness, fatigue, and death 10,000 (U.S. $800 at 1984 rate) for each dead individ-
(Anderson, Muir, & Mehra, 1984; Dhara & Dhara, ual and approximately $100 for each hospitalized
2002; Varma & Guest, 1993). During the years, it member of the family. The government of India
became clear that victims have developed other com- announced a relief fund of $4 million on December 24.
plications such as reduced lung capacity, psychiatric However, people were cremated or buried in mass, and
problems, cardiac and immunologic problems, and there remains to this day confusion about the number
damage to internal organs, and so on (Dhara & Dhara, and the identity of the dead.
2002; Kamat et al., 1992; Varma & Guest, 1993). More A settlement was reached between the
than 40% of pregnant women exposed to the gas failed government of India and the Union Carbide for $470
to deliver live babies (D. R. Varma, 1986, 1987, 1991). million, 4 years after the accident on February 14,
A more alarming long-term toxicity was reported by 1989. Part of this money was distributed to the
Ranjan et al. (2003): These authors found that boys victims; however, a substantial sum was retained by
born to parents exposed to the gas are signifi-cantly the Reserve Bank of India because of legal issues.
shorter than their unexposed cohorts, suggest-ing On July 19, 2004, the Supreme Court of India
possible genetic effects. Anecdotal reports suggest ordered that the remaining $327.5 million
menstrual problems in girls affected by the gas. (approximately 15 billion Indian rupees) be
Experimental data using mice and rats clearly distributed to the victims. It is not clear if victims
established that exposure to MIC at as low as 9 ppm will indeed get the money they rightfully deserve.
for 1 hour to 3 hours caused deaths in more than
50% of animals (Varma et al., 1987); it might be Conclusion
noted that hydrogen cyanide can rarely be fatal at
less than 30 ppm). Reproductive toxicity of methyl The Bhopal disaster has lessons for the
isocyanate as well as its metabolites have been developing and developed countries. The developing
reported in rats and mice (Guest & Varma, 1991, countries need modern technologies to meet the
1992; Varma, Ferguson, & Alarie, 1990). needs of the population and reach at par with the
developed coun-tries. Developments requiring
Water Pollution chemical and nuclear plants can never be absolutely
safe. However, if these plants are to be employed,
Bhopal’s underground water is polluted with toxic utmost care should be taken to ensure safety. Given
chemicals including mercury and is considered the technical demands of such modern production
unsafe for drinking. This pollution is caused by plants, safety measures should be more stringent in
activities of UCIL during several years of its developing than in developed countries.
operation and is not entirely due to the December 3 The Bhopal disaster undoubtedly has been the worst
disaster. A group of survivors led by Rashida Bee so far. However, warning signals have been there for a
and Champa Devi Shukla, who were awarded in while. Several accidental spills of dangerous chemical
May 2004 the presti-gious Goldman Environmental had taken place before the Bhopal episode. The
Prize, have been cam-paigning that Dow Chemical, cyclohexane explosion in Flixborough in 1974
the current owners of Union Carbide, undertake the prompted the establishment an Advisory Committee on
cleaning of the environment. Major Hazards in the United Kingdom. The Euro-pean
Economic Community Council Directive was triggered
Relief and Rehabilitation by the Italy’s Seveso accident of 1976 in which
trichlorophenol contaminated with dioxin was released
As soon as the news of the disaster reached the in the atmosphere (Regigiani, 1983). Yet Bhopal
world, hundreds of American lawyers descended to happened, which implies the need of more effective
Bhopal trying to enlist clients for cases to be filed in measures (Baxter, 1986). It is not unrealistic to assume
American courts. It was chaotic. Fortunately the gov- that sociopolitical situation in developing countries
ernment of India deemed it to be the sole authority would allow negligence. Therefore, it will be
8 BULLETIN OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE / Month 2005

appropriate that international bodies such as the Birch, K. M., & Schultz, F. (1946). Actions of cyanate. British
Inter-national Civil Aviation Organization under the Journal of Pharmacology, 1, 186-193.
Cassels, J. (1993). Uncertain promise of law: Lessons from
World Health Organization and International Labor Bhopal. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
Organizations be established. Dhara, V. R., & Dhara, R. (2002). The Union Carbide disaster in
The corporate world is not a humanitarian organiza- Bhopal: A review of health effects. Archives of
tion. Each undertaking by multinational corporations Environmental Health, 57, 391-404.
(MNC) is for profit, which requires cost cutting. This Diamond, S. (1985, January 28). The Bhopal disaster: How it
hap-pened. The New York Times, p. A1.
cannot change. Consequently in the developing and
Bhopal’s message [Editorial]. (1984, December 5). Christian
developed world, safe operation of hazardous indus- Sci-ence Monitor, p. 31.
tries require government control, intervention, and The Bhopal tragedy [Editorial]. (1984, December 10). The Wall
subsidies. The driving principle of India’s Street Journal, p. 26.
postindependence industrialization was massive state Calamity at Bhopal [Editorial]. (1984). Lancet, 2, 1378-1379.
intervention, though criticized by many as cost-inef- Everest, L. (1985). Behind the poison cloud. Chicago: Banner
Press.
fective. This policy should still be followed with
Fortun, K. (2001). Advocacy after Bhopal: Environmentalism,
respect to hazardous industries. At the same time, di-saster, new global orders. Chicago: University of Chicago
MNCs should take into consideration certain con- Press.
straints of the developing world in setting up hazard- Guest, I., & Varma, D. R. (1991). Developmental toxicity of
ous industries. In the case of Bhopal, the damage methylamines in mice. Journal of Toxicology and
Environmen-tal Health, 32, 319-330.
would have been much less had the factory been far
Guest, I., & Varma, D. R. (1992). Teratogenic and
away from the main city not only as it was in 1970s but macromolecular synthesis inhibitory effects of
what it was predictably going to be 10 or 20 years later. trimethylamine on mouse em-bryos in culture. Journal of
As well, rigorous inspections about safety must be Toxicology and Environmental Health, 36, 27-41.
done more frequently than it was done in Bhopal. Helping out in Bhopal [Opinion]. (1984). Nature (London),312,
579-580.
To sum up, what the developing countries need is
Jasanoff, S. (Ed.). (1994). Learning from disaster: Risk manage-
balanced development based on maximum exploita- ment after Bhopal. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
tion of their traditional skills, indigenous technology, Press.
and Western know-how that can be reliably adapted Kamat, S. R., Patel, M. H., Pradhan, P. V., Taskar, S. P., Vaidya, P.
to their needs. R., Kolhatkar, V. P., et al. (1992). Sequential respiratory, psy-
chologic, and immunologic studies in relation to methyl
isocyanate exposure over two years with model development.
Notes Environmental Health Perspectives, 97, 241-253.
Kimmerle, G., & Eben, A. (1964). Zur toxicitat von
1. Large settlements, many illegal, had taken place adjacent to methylisocyanat und dessen quantitativer bestimmung in der
the UCIL pesticide plant by the time of the disaster. The Chief luft [ ENGLISH TRANSLATION ]. Archiv fur Toxikologie,
Minister Arjun Singh had invited filmmakers Tapan Bose and 20, 235-241.
Suhasini Mulay to make a documentary on the transfer of the own- Kuizman, D. (1987). Inside the Bhopal catastrophe. New York:
ership of the hutments to their illegal occupants. The filming had not McGraw-Hill.
started, and the industrial disaster struck Bhopal. The filmmak-ers
Lapierre, D., & Moro, J. (2001). It was five past midnight in
made a documentary, Bhopal: Beyond Genocide. Bhopal. Delhi, India: Full Circle Publishing.
2. It may sound ludicrous but Dr. S. Varadarajan, the Indian Lepkowski, W. (1985). Bhopal. Chemical and Engineering
government’s chief scientist in the Bhopal disaster investigation News, 63, 16-26.
and the director of the India’s Council of Scientific and Mehta, P. S., Mehta, A. S., Mehta, S. J., & Makhijani, A. B.
Industrial Research (CSIR), held a sealed vial of MIC in his (1990). Bhopal tragedy’s health effects: A review of methyl
hands in front of the camera at a press conference to assure the isocyanate toxicity. Journal of American Medical
people that MIC after all can be contained. Association, 264, 2761-2787.
Ram, M. (1984, December 20). Counting the cost. Far Eastern
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environmen-tal disaster. Current Science, 86, 905-920. Varma, D. R., Guest, I., Smith, S., & Mulay, S. (1990). Dissocia-
Sufrin, S. C. (1985). Bhopal: Its setting, responsibility and chal- tion between maternal and fetal toxicity of methyl isocyanate
lenge. New Delhi, India: Ajanta. in mice and rats. Journal of Toxicology and Environmental
Tcheknavorian-Asenbauer, A. (1984, November/December). Health, 30, 1-14.
Bhopal: Lessons for all of us. United Nations Disaster and Varma, R. (1986). The Bhopal disaster: Implications for policy
Re-lief Organization News, pp. 5-6. making on hazardous technology in the third world. Unpub-
TRB. (1985, January 7-14). Bhopal in your court: Why lished master’s thesis, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New
American justice is bad for India. The New Republic, p. 42. York.
Union Carbide. (1978). Operating manual: Methylisocyanate Wilkins, L. (1987). Shared vulnerability: The media and American
unit. UNION CARBIDE’S CITY , CT: Author. perceptions of the Bhopal disaster. New York: Greenwood.
Union Carbide. (1982). Operational safety survey: Co/MIC/Sevin
units. UNION CARBIDE’S CITY , CT: Author. Roli Varma is an associate professor of public
Vaidyanathan, A. (1985, February 21). A sorry technological tale administra-tion at the University of New Mexico in
from India. New Scientist, p. 21. Albuquerque. She visited Bhopal in 1985 and interviewed
Varadarajan, S. (1985). A scientific enquiry into the methyl many victims. She can be reached at [email protected].
isocyanate leak in Bhopal. New Delhi, India: Council of
Scien-tific and Industrial Research.
Varma, D. R. (1986). Anatomy of the methyl isocyanate leak in Daya R. Varma is a professor of pharmacology at McGill
Bhopal. In J. Saxena (Ed.), Hazard assessment of chemicals University, Montreal, Canada. He first visited Bhopal
(pp. 233-289). Washington, DC: Hemisphere. within a month after the disaster and has conducted
Varma, D. R. (1987). Epidemiological and experimental studies on epide-miological and experimental studies on the toxicity
the effects of methyl isocyanate on the course of pregnancy. En- of methyl isocyanate (MIC). He was among the first to
vironmental Health Perspectives, 72, 153-157. ques-tion claims by the Union Carbide doctors that MIC
Varma, D. R. (1991). Pregnancy complications in Bhopal will not produce any effects on internal organs. More
women exposed to methyl isocyanate vapor. Journal of recently, he coauthored an article showing stunting of
Environmental Science and Health, A26, 1437-1447. boys born to gas-exposed parents and is conducting a
Varma, D. R. (1989). Hydrogen cyanide and Bhopal. Lancet, 2,
study on long term ef-fects of the gas on girls. He can be
557-558.
reached at e-mail: [email protected]