Suez Heg

The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis
Author(s): Elie Podeh

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 91-110
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the
Suez Crisis
ELIE PODEH
Since the Suez affair Nasser, the Egyptian president, has become some-
thing of a myth in the eyes of the public and scholars alike. Consequently
the facts concerning his political victories have, at times, been blurred by
the magnitude of his image.' The material recently released in Western
archives reveals that although he eventually established himself as the
pre-eminent leader of the Arab world, this was achieved only after
fierce battle in regional Arab politics. The long-standing struggle bet-
ween Egypt and Iraq over Arab hegemony did not peter out after the
Suez Crisis, as some scholars have claimed; rather the old ruling oligarchy
in Iraq temporarily succeeded in overcoming the internal strife, and re
asserting its dominance in Arab politics. The foundation of 'the Royalis
coalition' (including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan) in 1957 was mainly
directed against Nasser's rising prestige. However, the merger betwee
Egypt and Syria in February 1958 - the United Arab Republic (UAR)
heralded a complete triumph for his brand of Arab nationalism, thu
ensuring his superiority in the Arab world. The purpose of this article
then, is to analyze the struggle for Arab hegemony and to shed a new ligh
on the fluctuations in regional Arab politics from the Suez Crisis until the
establishment of the UAR.
The future of the Baghdad Pact was the main focus of the struggle
between Egypt and Iraq before the Suez Crisis. On 24 February 1955,
Iraq and Turkey signed a military pact, which served as the basis for the
formation of the Baghdad Pact, including also Britain, Pakistan and
Iran.2 Originally, the pact was part of a Western build-up (in conjunction
with NATO and SEATO), designed to protect the Middle East from the
Soviet menace. However, Nasser, who saw Iraq's leading role in the pact
as a challenge to Egypt's hegemony, relentlessly attempted to dissuade
the Arab states from adhering to it. In the struggle which ensued between
Iraq and Egypt, the latter succeeded in winning over Syria and Saudi
Arabia; Syria vacillated for a short period before yielding to Egyptian
pressure; Saudi Arabia enthusiastically supported Egypt, owing to the
age-old rivalry between the Hashemites and the Saudis. Although Egypt
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1. January 1993, pp. 91-110
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
92 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
succeeded in crystallizing a camp which opposed Iraq's role in the

Baghdad Pact, she failed to establish a rival Arab pact, which would
isolate Iraq. Thus Nasser had to content himself with signing interlocking
military agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia during October 1955.
Meanwhile, Britain and Iraq tried to persuade Jordan to join the
Baghdad Pact. Such a venture - so it was hoped - would tip the scales in
favour of Iraq, and stimulate other Arab states to follow suit. The
struggle reached its climax in December 1955, when Britain and Iraq
pressed King Husayn not to succumb to the Egyptian and Saudi pressure
but to stick to his former decision to join the pact. The riots which spread
across Jordan, hotted up by the Egyptian media and Saudi money,
convinced Husayn that by adhering to the pact he would seal his own fate.
His refusal proved to be a fateful turning point for the Baghdad Pact; for,
even though the struggle in the Arab world over the pact did not cease, it
was clear that no Arab state would dare join it. The Jordanian episode led
to the isolation of Iraq, leaving her to face the tripartite coalition, while
Jordan and Lebanon were straddling the fence. Yet, while the Egyptian-
Syrian bond was slowly tightening, the Egyptian-Saudi axis was gradually
disintegrating owing to the different nature of the two regimes. With
Western encouragement, Iraq attempted to erode Nasser's influence by
detaching Saudi Arabia from Egypt; however, the nationalization of the
Suez Canal Company temporarily suspended this process, and ushered in
a new era in inter-Arab relations.
Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, on 26 July 1956,

perceived as a victory of Arab nationalism over Western imperialism, was
received with great enthusiasm throughout the Arab world. Syria was
quick to call for a meeting of the Arab League political committee in
order to obtain a declaration of unequivocal support for Egypt's action.3
Iraq was the only Arab state to oppose vehemently the Syrian initiative;
ironically, the news of the nationalization reached King Faysal and Nuri
al-Said, as they were dining with the British Prime Minister, Anthony
Eden. Nuri's spontaneous reaction, recorded by Hugh Thomas, the
Sunday Times' correspondent, was 'hit him, hit him hard and hit him
now'.4 Indeed, Nuri perceived the nationalization as an excellent pretext
for the British to eliminate the Egyptian leader,5 but he was forced to
yield to public opinion in the Arab world. Accordingly, the Iraqi cabinet
issued a public statement declaring, inter alia, that the nationalization was
Egypt's 'indisputable right', and expressed its hope for a reasonable
settlement of the dispute.6
While Syria was exerting its efforts to convene the Arab League, Nuri
was furiously working to undermine Syria's draft proposal.7 His diplo-
matic skill was indeed manifested by his success in convincing Lebanon,
ARAB HEGEMONY AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS 93
Saudi Arabia, Libya and Sudan to accept a more moderate resolution.8

Considering the circumstances, the Political Committee's resolution, on
12 August was an impressive victory for Iraq: first, the Syrian proposal
which was supported, if not initiated, by Nasser, was successfully
blocked; second, the resolution did not explicitly support the nationaliza-
tion, but expressed general support for Egypt's policy; and, finally, even
if the severance of diplomatic relations with the West, and the imposition
of an embargo, were discussed in the proceedings, these proposals were
excluded from the final resolution.9 This compromise satisfied both
Egypt, enabling her to claim 'wide Arab support', as well as Iraq, which
was not compelled to pay more than lip service to Egypt.°1
On 16 August Eden opened the London Conference, convened by the
Western powers, in order to find a diplomatic solution to the nationaliza-
tion crisis. The Arab world noted it with five minutes of silence in protest
and a general strike. The protest was meant to express their contempt for
what Nasser called an 'imperialist conspiracy against freedom'.1 This
unprecedented demonstration of solidarity was a genuine expression of
the widespread support Nasser enjoyed among the masses. Another
expression of support was the creation of the 'Arab Syrian Committee for
Aiding Egypt', formed by representatives from various political parties in
Syria to coordinate aid for Egypt.12 The committee invited delegations
from different Arab organizations and political parties, who supported
the Egyptian nationalization, to attend a conference in Damascus. The
assembly, which met on 18 September in the Syrian Parliament building,
chose the Lebanese Hamid Franjieh as its president, and decided to open
branches in the Arab states, with a central liaison committee in Cairo.
With the exception of declarations supporting Egypt, the conference did
not achieve much else.13
In contrast to the vast support of the Arab masses, most of the leaders
saw the nationalization as a dire threat to the stability of their regimes;
yet, while they could hardly express any criticism publicly, they
denounced Nasser's move behind the scenes. The most vehement opposi-
tion, as was to be expected, came from Nuri and the Royal Palace. Great
anxiety concerning the Egyptian president's rising prestige was also
expressed by King Saud, President Chamoun and to a lesser extent by
King Husayn; even Quwatly, Egypt's staunchest ally, seemed to be
occasionally dissatisfied with Nasser's independent decisions. This con-
tradiction was a permanent feature of Arab politics: Arab rulers were
forced to respond to public opinion by an overt expression of solidarity
with Egypt, even though it undermined their own interests; these leaders
were apprehensive lest the waves of enthusiasm would stimulate radical
Arab nationalism, which would lead to their downfall. Thus, 'the power-
ful wave of Arab support for Egypt', as it is often portrayed by scholars,'4

was not joined by all Arab rulers.
The reluctance of Nuri and the Palace to accept any compromise with
Egypt was unequivocally expressed to British officials; the key sentence
frequently repeated was that Nasser should not 'get away with it', or
rather, be able to 'save his face'. There was no room for compromise, as
this was the last possible ditch: 'Either Nasser was successful and British
influence and Nuri were lost for ever,' concluded the British Charge, 'or
Nasser was got rid of and we and Nuri succeeded.'"s The issue at stake was
not just the fate of the Baghdad Pact, or the leadership of the Arab world,
but the very survival of the Iraqi ruling elite and British influence. Nuri
emphatically claimed that the operation against Nasser should be 'swift,
short and successful'. He argued that Nasser was profiting from the
passage of time as the possibility of a military response was gradually
decreasing. He added that if the Egyptian president were to reject the
proposals offered by the London Conference then Britain should resort
to force (with or without the United States), and compel him either to
surrender or to wage war. Nuri and the Minister of Interior were
convinced that if force were applied against Egypt, they would be able to
maintain internal order by imposing martial law.16
Nuri's interventions were not confined solely to Britain; he also
attempted to diminish Nasser's stature in the Arab world by detaching
Saudi Arabia from Egypt, and by drawing Jordan closer to Iraq. The idea
of detaching Saudi Arabia from Egypt was proposed by the State
Department as early as March 1956. The underlying assumption was that
Egypt's ties with the Soviet Union, coupled with the disturbing influence
of Arab nationalism, would create a solid basis for cooperation between
Iraq and Saudi Arabia.17 The nationalization gave greater impetus to the
Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement, which had begun in spring 1956. Although
Saud was compelled to support publicly Nasser's move, he was irritated
by the decision which, in contrast to their military agreement, had not
been coordinated with him. As Saud was dependent on Western aid, he
was anxious lest the nationalization force him to support Egypt against
the West.'8 Nuri, quick to take advantage of the widening rift between
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, dispatched the Amir Zayd, Iraq's Ambassador
in London, to Riyad. 19 Sending Zayd, the fourth and only surviving son of
King Husayn, who was evicted by the Saudis from the Hijaz, was
intended to open a new era between the two dynasties.20 The Iraqi-Saudi
rapprochement was further consolidated after the meeting between the
two kings in Dammam in September 1956. During the deliberations,
Saud promised the young King Faysal of Iraq not to be drawn into
hostilities against the West, nor to rely on 'dictators and presidents', but
rather to base his future policy on 'cooperation with the sister monarchy,
Iraq'.21 As soon as Faysal concluded the visit, the Syrian and Egyptian
presidents unexpectedly arrived in Riyadh.2 The timing of their visit was
carefully planned; it was undoubtedly intended to diminish the tremen-
dous impact of the meeting between the two kings; indeed, as the British
Ambassador in Jedda, Parkes, lamented: 'I am afraid that the good effect
from King Faisal's visit, if not entirely lost, was heavily overlaid.'23
Nevertheless, the meeting between Faysal and Saud was a handsome
victory for Iraq, and later served as the basis for the Royalist axis in inter-
Arab politics.
Simultaneously, Iraq attempted to patch up the differences with its
fellow Hashemite state - Jordan. The latter's refusal to join the Baghdad
Pact (December 1955), and its insistence on maintaining a neutral
position in the Arab world, had soured relations between the two states,
while a major obstacle for improving the relations was the amount of
military and financial aid Iraq was willing to allocate to Jordan.24 The
nationalization, however, made Iraq more forthcoming in her willingness
to aid Jordan; thus, when Husayn, alarmed by Israel's latest incursions
into his territory, invited on 14 September 1956 an Iraqi division, his
request met with approval.25 Although the reply was considered an
expression of Arab solidarity against the common enemy, Nuri made it
plain to Israel through Wright, the British ambassador in Baghdad, that
his primary goal was to detach Husayn from Nasser.26 The Israeli Foreign
Ministry estimated, therefore, that the dispatch of Iraqi forces was
'initially to prevent Egyptian domination of Jordan, and, at a later stage,
to draw her into the Baghdad Pact'.27 Nasser, however, was not deceived:
in his conversation with Hare, the American ambassador, he remarked
that he did not believe that the entrance of the Iraqi forces was aimed at
defending Jordan from Israel, but part of a combined British-Iraqi
conspiracy to detach Jordan from Egypt.28 Despite the favourable Iraqi
response, the negotiations with Jordan were stalled over the question of
the expeditionary force's command. Consequently, Abd al-Ilah left for
Amman on 14 October; his arrival, no doubt, was a genuine expression of
Iraq's concern over the Jordanian question. Eventually, Jordan withdrew
her request, as it was agreed that the Iraqi forces would stay near the
Jordanian frontier, and move in only if Jordan were attacked and upon
her formal request.2
As soon as the Israeli forces invaded Sinai, Syria, Saudi Arabia and
Jordan offered Egypt military support. While expressing his apprecia-
tion, Nasser, who had already ordered his troops to retreat from Sinai,
declined the offer, fearing that it might serve as a pretext for the Western
powers to invade Syria, and to inflict further humiliation. The Egyptian
president preferred Quwatly to proceed with his planned visit to Moscow

(1-3 November) in order to ensure Soviet assistance, if that should be
required.30 However, when the transmitters of Sawt Al-Arab, the main
Egyptian propaganda station, were destroyed by the British Royal Air
Force, Radio Damascus replaced the Egyptian Radio.31 Meanwhile, in
response to a formal invitation, Syrian, Saudi, and Iraqi units entered
Jordan in order to protect her from a possible Israeli attack. In addition,
Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia severed their diplomatic relations with
Britain and France.
The main focus of criticism in the Arab world during and after the war
was Iraq. From the beginning of the war, anti-Western demonstrations
were held in Syria and Jordan, calling on Iraq to withdraw from the
Baghdad Pact and demanding Nuri's resignation. The new Jordanian
Parliament (under the nationalist Nabulsi's cabinet) even sent a telegram
in this spirit to the Iraqi Parliament.32 However, the most significant
action was the Syrian blowing up of three pumping stations along the
Iraqi pipeline from Kirkuk to Tripoli. This action, which stopped the oil
flow for six months, severely damaged Iraq's economy.33 Yet, under
British pressure, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) allocated a credit
of 25 million pounds, which enabled Iraq to overcome the budget deficit
caused by loss of oil revenues.34 Although the sabotage was coordinated
with Mahmud Riad, the Egyptian ambassador in Damascus, it seemed
that the Egyptian president opposed it.35 According to Heikal, his closest
advisor, 'in those days [of the war] everybody in the Arab world was
acting on his own initiative; any attempt to coordinate strategy or tactics
would have been impossible'. Moreover, such an action might trigger
British or Iraqi intervention in Syria.36 However, there was no doubt that
the sabotage was aimed solely at Iraq and Britain, since the Tapline (a
Saudi-American interest) remained intact.37 Riad feared that Britain and
Iraq would pump oil through the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline, which had not
been used since the establishment of Israel. Consequently, he convinced
Haj Amin Al-Husseini, the Palestinian leader, to send a Fidayyin unit to
discover whether it was indeed being used.38
After the war started, the Lebanese president made efforts to convene
a conference of all Arab leaders. Chamoun's motives were unclear; he
either wanted to become a moderating power in the Arab world, or he
strove to strengthen his position at home.39 Eventually, the conference
was convened in the aftermath of the war (13 November), with the
participation of all the Arab kings and presidents, except Nasser who
delegated the Egyptian ambassador in Beirut to represent him. The main
topic on the agenda was the question of Arab diplomatic relations with
Britain and France. Quwatly claimed that all the Arab states should
follow Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in severing their diplomatic

relations with Britain and France; King Faysal was adamantly opposed to
severing relations with Britain, although he had done so with France;
Lebanon, Libya and Sudan supported the Iraqi position by displaying a
moderate stance; Egypt did not share Syria's extremist attitude as she was
apprehensive of further alienating the Western powers. The resolution
which was finally adopted by the conference was relatively moderate; it
declared general support of Egypt's policy, denounced the tripartite
collusion, and hinted that each Arab state could make any political step it
deemed necessary.'4 At the conclusion of the conference, the general
feeling was that its results 'could have been worse', and that in spite of
Syria's extremism, the Lebanese president had succeeded in riding out
the storm.4'
As a consequence of the Suez War, Britain's allies in the Arab world
found themselves in an extremely difficult position: not only had a
Western power attacked a sister Arab state, but the attack was carried out
in collusion with their arch-enemy - Israel. Of all the Arab states, Iraq's
situation was the most difficult; its special ties with Britain as well as their
joint membership in the Baghdad Pact made Iraq, and her rulers, the
target of Arab attacks. The grave situation in Iraq led Western officials to
believe that a coup was inevitable, and that her withdrawl from the
Baghdad Pact was imminent. Nuri and the palace were not so much
disturbed by the British attack as by the unexpected involvement of Israel
in the operation. In order to cope with a deterioration of the internal
situation, the cabinet decided on 31 October to impose martial law.42
Nevertheless, Nuri remained skeptical as to his ability to maintain
internal order; he told Wright that it was impossible to ensure Iraq's
stability for more than 'five or six days' and emphasized that within this
period Britain must achieve a ceasefire and demand Israel's retreat.43 The
ambassador was shocked by the repercussions of the war: 'almost all we
have built up here over many years and with such pains', he exclaimed,
'has been shaken nearly beyond repair'.44
Troubles at home notwithstanding, Nuri did not neglect the Arab
world; he now hastened, for instance, to respond to Husayn's request to
send troops ('up to a division') to Jordan.45 Previously, the question of
command was one of the problems which had hindered the troops'
entrance to Jordan; now, however, both parties were too troubled to
disagree on this point. Nuri was weary of possible Arab accusations that
he had refrained from assisting a sister state, while Husayn was perturbed
by the possibility of an Israeli attack. Therefore, it was hastily agreed that
the Iraqi forces would enter under joint command, headed by Jordan's
deputy chief-of-staff, Ali Al-Hiyari.46 Nuri assured Britain that the Iraqi
units would not fight Israel, unless the latter attacked Jordan, and that
they would be stationed in Mafraq, far from the Israeli border.47
Arab criticism against Iraq was focused on her membership in the
Baghdad Pact alongside Britain. Yet Nuri refused to surrender to
demands voiced both in Iraq and the Arab world which required with-
drawal from the pact; he also tried to use the pact as a lever to enhance
Iraq's position in the Arab world. On 3 November Nuri left for Teheran
in order to participate in a conference of the Muslim members of the pact.
Nuri's visit, in spite of the tense situation in his country, clearly indicates
the importance he attached to the results of the conference.4 At Tehran,
Nuri hoped to play an active role in ending the war, and to advance a
solution for the Palestine problem - the everlasting panacea for shifting
Arab attention. Nuri arrived with a four-point proposal, approved by his
cabinet aiming: to ensure Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity; to
ensure Israel's retreat to the ceasefire lines; to repatriate all prisoners of
war; and to reach a comprehensive solution of the Palestine problem.49
Nuri's purpose was twofold: first, to prove that the Baghdad Pact had
played a crucial role in ending the war; second, to shift public attention
from the Suez Crisis to the Palestine issue in which Iraq could play a
major role. Much to Nuri's disappointment, the conference opened only
on 8 November, by which time a ceasefire had already been declared.
Nevertheless, in the final communique it was stated that the appeal of the
Muslim members to Britain had influenced her decision to accept a
ceasefire.50
Following the conference, Iraq decided to sever its diplomatic relations
with France, and to restrict the Baghdad Pact's meetings to its Muslim
members (that is, exclude Britain from the activities of the pact).5' These
decisions indicate that the Tehran conference achieved little in satisfying
the Iraqi domestic and regional problems. The first move was primarily
symbolic, as Iraq's ties with France were negligible; while the second
move, made without prior consultation with the members of the pact, was
rather surprising and revealed the sinister political implications of the
Suez crisis on Iraq.52 Britain and Turkey were reconciled to the Iraqi
decision out of understanding for her predicament, while assuming that
the suspension would be temporary (as Iraq privately admitted); Pakistan
and Iran strongly protested against Iraq's unilateral decision, but were
unable to change it.53 By suspending Britain from the pact (even tem-
porarily) Iraq achieved two goals: first, she averted public criticism;
second, she presented the pact as a genuine regional defense organization
made up of Muslim states, aimed against Israel (not only against the
Soviets) and open to Muslim Arab members.
There was another drastic twist, however, in Iraqi foreign policy; on 13
November, Iraq adopted a new radical position concerning the Palestine

question, calling for the liquidation of the state of Israel and the return of
the Palestinian refugees.54 It marked a radical shift from a fairly moderate
stance, which accepted the Partition Plan (Nov. 1947) as a basis for the
solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, to an Arab extremist attitude of
eliminating Israel. The timing of this change was highly significant; Iraq
exploited the fact that the Palestine problem had not been discussed at
the Beirut conference, to demonstrate that she was the genuine represen-
tative of the Palestinians, who had been neglected by the Arab states.55
Once again, the Palestine problem was used as a lever in inter-Arab
politics in order to achieve internal and regional gains.
On 17 November, shortly after the Suez War ended, the Muslim
members of the Baghdad Pact reconvened at Baghdad, to discuss the
future of the pact. They concluded that Britain should remain a member
of the pact despite her involvement in the war; furthermore, they agreed
to invite the United States to join the pact, an offer which was politely
rejected by the State Department.5 As before, Nuri hoped to utilize the
conference to promote Iraqi interests; yet the conference was a disastrous
mistake, as student demonstrations, fueled by the Egyptian propaganda,
spread across the country.57 In addition, on 23 November Syria
announced the uncovering of an Iraqi plot to topple the Syrian govern-
ment.5 The conspiracy, which was ineptly planned and doomed from the
start,59 had a disastrous effect on Iraq: the very fact that she had plotted
with Western allies against an Arab state, and especially the timing of the
coup (planned innocently for 29 October, the day the Suez operation
began), justified unprecedented attacks by Syria and Egypt, which
claimed that Iraq had colluded with the Western powers and Israel
against Syria.60
While Iraq was gradually becoming isolated in the Arab world, the
Egyptian president astonishingly discerned that the Baghdad Pact -
despite so many blunders - had not as yet withered away; rather, the new
tactic - the pact as a seemingly Islamic organization - posed a new threat
to Egypt, as it could theoretically induce other Arab states to adhere to
the pact. This fear was clearly shown in Nasser's letter, dated 19 Novem-
ber, to King Saud, who was considered by many as a potential candidate
for joining the pact. Although the pact was apparently frozen, the
Egyptian president wrote, 'Britain and her allies are thinking of trying to
convert it into an Islamic pact which will attract all Islamic countries not
already members of the pact.' In this context, he expressed his fear that
this policy was intended to isolate Egypt from Saudi Arabia, Syria and
Jordan.61 Actually, this fear was quite justified the members of the pact
sent the Pakistani president to Riyadh and his prime minister to Beirut in
order to advance cooperation with these countries, mainly against com-

munism, but also to hear their position (especially the Saudi stance)
concerning the adherence to the 'Islamic Pact'.62 Saud, claimed Heikal,
promised Nasser that he would not even contemplate such a venture.63
Iraq's isolation in the Arab world led Nuri, for the first time since their
talks in September 1954, to send feelers to Nasser. Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi,
Iraq's former prime minister and Nuri's confidant, was instructed to send
a discreet message to Nasser, proposing a private meeting. Nuri justified
this move to the British ambassador by saying that 'after all, disputes
between nations seldom lasted indefinitely'. He added that it was un-
desirable to neglect the possibility of convincing the Egyptian president
to cooperate against communism and towards the solution of the Pales-
tine problem.64 Although Nuri's initiative, no doubt, stemmed from his
growing isolation in the Arab world, he approached Nasser at a time
when various Arab sources reported that the mounting resentment within
the Egyptian army, and Egypt's financial problems could endanger the
latter's rule.65 In light of these difficulties, Nuri thought that the Egyptian
president would become more flexible.
The Foreign Office, and Eden in particular, were alarmed by the
possible reconciliation between the two; in a telegram bearing Eden's
personal imprint, it was emphasized that there was no reason to believe
that Nasser's ambition 'to become the dictator of the Arab world' has
changed, and that in order to achieve this goal, he seeks to destroy the
Iraqi regime which he regards as the biggest stumbling block in his path.
The British emphasized that Nuri should not rely on Nasser but rather
should await his downfall, which would enable Iraq to emerge 'as the
leader of the Arabs, a position in which we should like to see her'.6 This
last sentence, written in late December 1956, showed more than anything
else Eden's lack of insight regarding Iraq's position in the Arab world.
However, the British need not have worried; Nuri had not changed his
position towards the Egyptian president, but was exploring a new device
in order to circumvent his own problems in the Arab world. Yet, the issue
never came to a head as Nasser ignored Suwaidi's message.67
Although Nuri effectively subdued the domestic strife, his abortive
manoeuvres in the Arab world contributed to Iraq's isolation and made
him the most despised Arab leader. The change of policy regarding the
Palestine question and the endeavour to turn the Baghdad Pact into a
Muslim pacts were intended to arrest the decline in Iraq's influence in the
Arab world. However, these actions did not improve her position; Iraq
was in dire need of external intervention, and it came with the Eisen-
hower Doctrine.
At the end of 1956 Iraq was almost completely isolated in the Arab
world; yet, as early as February 1957 the most prominent Arab news-
paper, Al-Hayat predicted the formation of a new axis: 'the Saudi-Iraqi-
Jordani-Sudani axis'.68 By March 1957 it seemed that Nuri had regained
much of his confidence, as he assured Wright that Nasser was now losing
ground in the Arab world',69 and he agreed to resume the Baghdad Pact's
meetings on all levels. At the same time, Hare, in Cairo, assessed that one
of the targets of the Egyptian president was 'to counter growing Egyptian
isolation'.70 How, then, did the new coalition emerge so swiftly, and what
were the dynamics which brought about Egypt's and Syria's isolation in
the Arab world in early 1957?
At the beginning of 1957 Egypt found itself increasingly isolated; given
the political ramifications of the Suez Crisis, this development was
unexpected and was related to the greater involvement of the United
States in the Middle East. The Americans became increasingly involved
in the region owing to their fear that the Soviets would seize the
opportunity to fill the power vacuum caused by the British withdrawal.
As a result, in January 1957 the Eisenhower doctrine was proclaimed,
which was in essence intended to deter communist aggression in the
Middle East, and which made provision for a special economic and
military grant in the sum of two hundred million dollars. At the heart of
the proposal was the declaration that 'overt armed aggression from any
nation controlled by international communism would be met by the
armed forces of the United States'.71
The Eisenhower Doctrine divided the Arab world into two camps: one
included Egypt and Syria, who rejected Western support, being more
inclined towards neutralism; while the other consisted of the rulers who
feared communist penetration and were convinced that their future was
tied up with the West, both ideologically and economically. The forma-
tion of the Royalist axis, however, was neither easy nor swift; the first
actual sign was in early February 1957, when the Iraqi crown prince met
King Saud in Washington. The meetings between Abd Al-Ilah and Saud
(6-7 February), more than anything else, symbolized the conclusion of a
long and bitter conflict between the two royal dynasties.72 The discussions
considerably improved Iraqi-Saudi relations and led Saud to adopt a
more conciliatory approach towards the Baghdad Pact. Saud's
favourable attitude towards the Eisenhower Doctrine as well as his
willingness to extend the Dhahran Airbase lease for five years left the
impression that the deliberations in Washington had succeeded in dis-
tancing further Saud from Nasser.7-
The Saudi drift away from Egypt was also manifested by her growing
interest in Jordanian affairs; this was clearly shown by the dispatch of a
Saudi contingent to Jordan during the Suez War. Even more signi-
ficantly, Saud signed the 'Arab Solidarity Pact' in January 1957, in which
he committed himself to pay Jordan (at this stage still cooperating with
Egypt and Syria) an annual subsidy of LE 12.5m for a period of ten years
to replace the British subsidy.74 The rift became evident during the Cairo
conference in February 1957 which was divided upon the question of the
Eisenhower Doctrine; while Nasser and Quwatly opposed it, Saud and
Husayn enthusiastically endorsed it.75 However, Jordan was not yet free
to become party to a Royalist coalition; though Husayn had already
shown his symphathy for Saud's position, his freedom of action was
somewhat circumscribed by the nationalist cabinet, headed by Suleiman
al-Nabulsi. The friction between the King and his cabinet came to a head
in April 1957 when Husayn, with American and Saudi support, suc-
ceeded in ousting Nabulsi.76 This episode ushered in a new period for
Jordan; her short-lived flirtation with Egypt and Syria ended and Husayn
was free to take his place in what a British official termed as 'the
Monarchistic Trade Union'.77
Saud's arrival for his first official visit in Baghdad since the beginning of
the rapprochement (May 1957) was a further step towards the consolida-
tion of the Royalist coalition. The Arab press attached great significance
to this meeting in terms of inter-Arab relations. The belief that great
changes were about to occur led an Iraqi official categorically to deny
rumours about the alleged intention of Iraq to withdraw from the
Baghdad Pact and to form a 'new Arab Alliance' with Saudi Arabia,
Jordan and, eventually Lebanon.78 During his visit, Saud left no room for
doubt concerning his position towards Nasser, especially after having
discovered an Egyptian plot to assassinate him a few days earlier.79 'I gave
him [Nasser] forty million dollars and other help besides,' complained
Saud, 'and in return he tried to assassinate me.'8 The latter asked Nuri to
convey unofficially to the British that he wished them to refrain from
lending financial or economic support to the Egyptian president; as Saud
stated, Nasser must remain 'as poor as possible'. He hoped that the latter
would then be compelled to turn to him for assistance, a scenario which
would allow Saud to use his financial leverage to mitigate Nasser's pro-
Soviet leanings.8'
During his deliberations, Saud also expressed his willingness to estab-
lish a 'new alignment' in the Arab world; he proposed to convene an
Islamic conference in which Nasser - if he agreed to come at all - would be
in a minority. Saud proposed that, 'among the objects would be agree-
ment upon [the] collective right of self-defence under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, and recognition that the Baghdad Pact was in accordance
with this principle and was of advantage to the Muslim world'. Saud
further clarified that although he had no intention of committing his
country to this pact, he now understood its raison d'etre and its aims.
Moreover, he hoped to achieve some cooperation in the conference
between the Islamic countries against communism.82 However, Saud
made it clear that, owing to his fear of Nasser's propaganda machine, his
new policy would have to be developed 'cautiously and slowly'.83
The crystallization of the new alignment, which included the three
monarchies and Lebanon (and to a lesser degree Morocco, Tunisia,
Sudan and Libya), indicated Egypt's and Syria's isolation in the Arab
world.84 This process reached its climax in June 1957, with Saud's visit to
Amman, and Husayn's to Baghdad.85 In his assessment of the develop-
ments, Charles Johnston, the British ambassador in Amman, concluded
that Saud's visit was 'a further step towards the new alignment in the Arab
world by which Jordan is linked with Saudi Arabia, and less strictly with
Iraq and the Lebanon, in opposition to Egypt and Syria'. 'The new "Arab
caravan",' he added, 'is a much more homogeneous collection of animals
than the group which came together with such enthusiasm last January
and February [in the Cairo conferences] and disintergrated so spec-
tacularly in April and May.'86
The new atmosphere in the Arab world was clearly manifested by the
replacement of Nuri who had been prime minister during the previous
three years; in June 1957, at the climax of this process, the palace felt
secure enough in its position, as Wright wryly lamented, 'to revert to the
normal Iraqi system of allowing the fruits of office to be enjoyed from
time to time by different groups of politicians.'87 Although in his own
country and throughout the Arab world Nuri was unpopular, in Western
eyes he was still considered a prominent leader: 'Nuri is not dead yet,
either physically or politically,' Wright remarked in early July 1957 and
added that if Egypt would 'regain some of the impetus that it has now lost
in the hearts of Arab Nationalists, not only Iraq but the Western world as
a whole may well need him.'88 His evaluation proved to be a prophecy.
Thus Egypt's first bid for the dominance of the Arab world in the wake of
the Suez War had been thwarted.
It should be emphasized, however, that the Royalist coalition was
never a homogeneous body; Saudi Arabia's attachment to this alignment
was tenuous, sometimes even dubious; as long as Saudi interests were not
jeopardized, Saud saw himself as part of the alliance. At the same time he
refrained from taking any steps that would expose his vulnerable monar-
chy to Egypt's subversive activities. Therefore, Saud preferred not to
take a stand in inter-Arab conflicts but rather served as the eternal
mediator enjoying the trust and support of all the parties involved. In this
context, one must view Saud's visits to Damascus and Beirut in Septem-
ber 1957, born as they were out of the desire to allay tensions in Syria,
which had deteriorated nearly to the point of open hostilities.89 'Despite

his growing bitterness against the Egyptian and Syrian regimes,' Wright
concluded, 'King Saud appears still to wish to maintain his position
somewhat au dessus de la melee and to keep his lines out to all the Arab
countries.90
By mid-1957 Nasser's position had completely changed; internally, the
repercussions of the Suez crisis were still strongly felt, at least economi-
cally; while externally, the Eisenhower Doctrine brought about Egypt's
isolation in the Arab world. An illustrative example was the absence of
Arab-country contingents in the annual military parade held in Cairo on
23 July 1957.91 Just the year before, even Iraq had to send a token
representation in order to arrest Arab criticism.92 In addition to Nasser's
isolation among the Arab leaders (except Quwatly), there was some
measurable decline in his popularity among the masses. In fact, Dek-
mejian has clearly shown that Nasser's 'centrality' in the media at that
time was the lowest since mid-1954, while he also observed a slight
decline in the manifestations of Arab nationalism.93 It seemed, therefore,
that the influence of the Egyptian leader had been 'contained' - a phrase
taken from the cold war terminology - at least in the Arab world. 'Nasser
has confined his recent efforts in the Arab field to trying to mend his
fences with Saudi Arabia', wrote a British official, 'and to trying to keep
Syria aligned with him without accepting commitments there.' However,
the African Department correctly judged that Nasser's ultimate aim of
achieving hegemony in Egypt's three circles (Arab, African and Muslim)
remained unchanged, and that 'he is simply waiting for suitable oppor-
tunities to pursue his old objectives.'94 The assessment proved to be
accurate, for within six months the Egyptian president partially ac-
complished his aims, at least in the Arab circle.
A new threat loomed over Egypt during the summer of 1957, as her
only ally - Syria - fell victim to the struggle between East and West over
control in the Middle East. On 12 August the Syrians expelled three
American diplomats after an American plot to overthrow the regime in
Damascus was uncovered. The United States, with the cooperation of
Turkey and Iraq, tried by different means to bring down the pro-Soviet
regime, fearing that Syria might become a 'victim of international Com-
munism' - a phrase in accordance with the conditions set out for activat-
ing the Eisenhower Doctrine.95 Just as Syria was the hinge around which
the struggle between the superpowers turned, so was she also the focus of
the struggle over Arab hegemony. Nasser understood perfectly that any
Western victory there would likely end Egypt's claim for Arab hegemony
and that only by controlling Syria could he aspire to regional leadership.96
Consequently, on 13 October Egyptian troops landed in Latakiyya,
thereby formally activating the Defence Pact signed in 1955.97 Although

by that time much of the crisis had dissipated, the Egyptian president
firmly re-established that he was the sole arbiter of the Syrian question in
the Arab world, and he clearly showed that Syria was still within Egypt's
sphere of influence.
The establishment of the United Arab Republic in February 1958,
which came to many as a surprise, transformed the Arab political system.
From 1955, and especially through 1957, Egypt and Syria had negotiated
various unification schemes, yet it was not expected that Syria would
completely surrender her sovereignty to Egypt. Moreover, the merger
was not in accordance with the traditional Egyptian policy, which
preferred to maintain the independence of the Arab states under her
influence.9 The conventional explanation was that the Syrian officers and
the Ba'th Party forced the union on Nasser as a result of the chaotic
situation in Syria. This explanation, propagated by the Egyptian presi-
dent and his advisors, has been accepted by some scholars.9 Neverthe-
less, it seems that the importance of the Syrian pressure has been
overestimated, while Egypt's motivation for the merger, which was no
less significant, has been played down. Analysing the reasons for the
creation of the UAR is beyond the scope of this article; however, in order
to comprehend the change in the Arab political pendulum in favour of
Egypt, it is necessary to explain Nasser's motivation for the merger.
The military intervention in Syria did not extricate Egypt from her
isolation in the Arab world; moreover, the Egyptian president regarded
the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact as potential threats to his
position. No wonder, therefore, that the annual conference of the
Baghdad Pact in Ankara (January 1958), attended by Dulles, intensified
Egypt's fears concerning the revitalization of the pact or its association
with NATO.'1° This anxiety was clearly manifested in the Egyptian
media: the editor of the weekly Al-Mussawar, for example, wrote that the
reasons for the merger were the Suez War, the NATO conference in
Paris, 'and after that, the most salient factor is the Baghdad Pact
[conference] in Ankara'.10' Ahmad Said, in his propaganda broadcasts,
claimed that 'every meeting of the Baghdad Pact is followed by a plot
against the Arabs, and the union between Syria and Egypt is the shield
which protects Arabism against any aggression'02. Nasser's growing
isolation in the Arab world, and his fear of an American and a Baghdad
Pact conspiracy against him, perhaps by using NATO or by implementing
the Eisenhower Doctrine, compelled him - among other things - to unite
with Syria. The UAR, therefore, was not only a 'shield' for protecting
Arabism and Syria, but also for protecting Egypt.
In addition to the above-mentioned considerations, the creation of the
UAR, like the military intervention, was intended to maintain Egypt's

influence over Syria and display Nasser's leading role within the Arab
world. As Syria, on the verge of collapse as a political community, was
falling prey to super power rivalries, Egypt grasped the opportunity to
counteract her isolation in the Arab world by 'rescuing' Syria. Further-
more, the Egyptian president saw the union as a means of obtaining a
stronger foothold in the Fertile Crescent against the Hashemites in Iraq
and Jordan.103 It is true that the union was not in accordance with Nasser's
traditional policy of maintaining the independence of Arab states; how-
ever, it was consistent with his policy 'to hold tenaciously to the initiative,
to counter-attack whenever in danger of being out-manoeuvered and
isolated within the Arab world.'04
The establishment of the UAR undoubtedly displayed Nasser's great
tactical skill; first, he finally succeeded in breaking Egypt's isolation, and
in coming out victorious in the struggle for Arab hegemony; second, he
reasserted himself as the eponym of Arab Nationalism in the eyes of the
masses. 'In early 1958,' wrote Dekmejian, 'all indications were that Abd
al-Nasir was at the zenith of his popularity among Arab masses.'105 The
last efforts of Arab conservative elites to struggle against the tide of Arab
nationalism were doomed: the establishment of the 'Arab Union'
between Iraq and Jordan on 14 February was no more than a poor
imitation of the UAR; Saudi Arabia was quick to abandon the sinking
Royalist ship; the military coup in Iraq (July 1958), which eliminated the
Hashemite dynasty, and the civil war in Lebanon (May 1958), were all
sparked by the Nasserist wave which flooded the Arab world. Thus 1958
marked the climax of Nasser's quest for power in the Middle East. A new
era in Arab politics had begun, but the struggle between Egypt and Iraq
for Arab hegemony - although with different protagonists - remained a
central feature of inter-Arab relations for years to come.
NOTES
1. Rashid Khalidi, for example, in a recent study, wrote that after the Suez crisis Abd Al-
Nasser firmly established himself as 'the pre-eminent Arab leader until the end of his
life, and Arab nationalism as the leading Arab ideology for at least that long'. See
'Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World', in R. Louis and R. Owen (eds).
The Suez 1956, the Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford 1989), p.377: see also M.
Shemesh, 'Egypt: From Military Defeat to Political Victory', in S. I. Troen in M.
Shemesh (eds.), The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal (London,
1989), p.160.
2. Most of the details concerning this period are taken from my doctoral thesis. 'The
Quest for Arab Hegemony: The Struggle Over the Baghdad Pact. 1954-58', (Dec.
1990), Tel Aviv University [Hebrew].
3. Al-Hayat, 1 Aug. 1954, p.2: see also Mudhakkirat Khaled AI-Azm [The Memo
Khaled Al-Azm], Vol.2. Ch.12.
4. H. Thomas. The Suez Affair (London, 1986), p.38.
5. On Nuri's views in this respect, see Wright's minute [Wright was British ambassador in
Baghdad], 30 July 1956, VQ1051/43, F0371/121662. Henceforth, unless otherwise
mentioned, all the documents are taken from F0371. See also; Wright to FO, Tel.
914, 20 Aug. 1956, JE10393/2, 118857; Tel. 951,29 Aug 1956, ES1021/53, 120756. This
was also the view of the Crown Prince, see Amery to Lloyd, 1 Aug. 1956, VQ1051/44,
121662.
6. Al-Hayat, 7 Aug. 1956.
7. Gardner (Damascus) to FO, Tel. 452, 11 Aug 1956, JE14211/632, 119100; for a slight
different version, see Al-Hayat 10 Aug. 1956.
8. Wright to FO, Tel. 876; 11 Aug. 1956, JE14211/632, 119099.
9. Al-Hayat, 14 Aug. 1956, Trevelyan (Cairo) to FO, Tel. 1526, 12 Aug. 1956, JE14211/
660, 119100; Tel. 1551, 13 Aug 1956, JE4211/691, 119101.
10. More details on the Arab League meeting, see Trevelyan to FO, Tel. 1545, 13 Aug.
1956, JE14211/687, 119101.
11. Al-Hayat, 17 Aug. 1956.
12. Ibid., 15 Aug. 1956; 25 Aug. 1956.
13. For the names of the delegates, see al-Hayat, 19 Sept. 1956.
14. Khalid. p.377, is just one recent example.
15. Wright to Ross. 29 Aug. 1956, JE10393/5, 118857; Wright to FO, Tel. 955, 31 Aug.
1956, JE10393/3, 118857.
16. Wright to FO, Tel. 914, 20 Aug. 1956, JE10393/2, 118857; Tel. 951, 29 Aug. 1956,
ES1021/53, 120756.
17. W. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of NuriAs-Said, 1954-1958
(Baltimore, 1964), p.151; see also Shuckburgh's Minute, 6 March 1956, VQ10325/3,
121655.
18. Parkes (Riyadh) to FO, Tel. 241,8 Aug. 1956, JE14211/474, 119094; Parkes to Lloyd,
Despatch No.57. 11 Aug. 1956, ES10316/10, 120759; see also M. H. Heikal, Cutting
the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (London: 1986), pp.133, 155-7 (hen-
ceforth Heikal).
19. Parkes to FO, Tel. 249. 18 Aug. 1956, ES1021/49, 120756; Parkes to Lloyd, Despatch
No.65, 3 Oct. 1956, ES1021/102, 120758.
20. Wright to FO, Tel. 29 Aug. 1956, ES1021/53,120756; Tel. 970, Sept. 1956, ES1021/57,
120756. On Zayd's visit to Riyadh, see Wright to FO, Tel. 951. 29 Aug. 1956,
ES1021/53, 120756; Tel.954, 30 Aug. 1956, ES1021/55, 120756; Walmsley's Minute,
10 Sept. 1956, ES1021/75, 120757.
21. Accounts concerning the Saud-Faysal meeting, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1049, 15 Sept
1956, ES1021/72, 120757; Tel.1085, 23 Sept. 1956, ES1021/81, 120757; Parkes to FO,
Tel.303, 23 Sept. 1956, ES1021/84, 120757; Parkes to Lloyd, Despatch No.65, 3 Oct.
1956, ES1021/102, 120758.
22. Most of the material concerning the tripartite meeting is taken from Heikal, pp. 158-9.
23. Parkes to FO, Tel. 318, 2 Oct. 1956, ES1021/94. 120757.
24. Duke (Amman) to FO, Tel.1138, 18 Aug. 1956, VJ10393/54, 121486, Wright to FO,
Tel.945, 28 Aug. 1956, VJ10393/55, 121486.
25. FO to Baghad, Tel. 1948, 28 Sept. 1956, VJ10393/69, 121486.
26. Wright to FO, Tel. 1097, 27 Sept. 1956, VJ10393/68, 121486.
27. 'Israel and the entrance of Iraqi army to Jordan' [Hebrew], 18 Oct. 1956. The Israeli
Archives, File 2453/10.
28. Trevelyan to FO, Tel.2480, 17 Oct. 1956, JE1053/87, 118865.
29. On the results of Abd Al-Ilah's visit, see Wright to FO, Tel. 1187, 17 Oct 1956,
VJ10393/146, 121489; Duke to FO, Tel. 1490, 18 Oct. 1956, VJ10393/161, 121489;
Duke to FO, Tel. 1490, 18 Oct. 1956, VJ10393/161, 121489; Wright to FO, Tel. 1187,
17 Oct. 1956, VJ10393/146, 121489.
30. M. Riad, Mudhakkirat Mahmud Riad. al-Amn al-Qaumi bayna al-injaz wal-fashal
[The Memoirs of Mahmud Riad: National Security between Success and Failure]
(Cairo, 1986), p.155 (henceforth Riad).
31. BBC, No.92, 8 Nov. 1956, II.
32. Riad, p.155; BBC, No.93, 9 Nov. 1956, I.
33. Al-Hayat, 4 Nov. 1956, 7 Nov. 1956.
34. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.181, 11 July 1957, VQ1051/34, 128057.
35. Riad, pp.155-7: Heikal, pp.189-91.
36. Ibid, p.191.
37. Riad, p.157.
38. Ibid.
39. Middelton (Beirut) to FO, Tel. 1074, 8 Nov. 1956, VL1022/8, 121608.
40. Middelton to Lloyd, Despatch No.188, 27 Nov. 1956, VL1022/13, 121608; Wright to
FO, Tel. 1416, 17 Nov. 1956, VL1022/11, 121608.
41. Middelton to Lloyd, Despatch No.188, 27 Nov. 1956, VL1022/13, 121608.
42. BBC, No.87, 2 Nov. 1956, II.
43. Wright to FO, Tel. 1263, 2 Nov. 1956, VQ1015/94, 121646; Tel. 1250, 2 Nov. 1956,
VR1091/484, 121785.
44. Wright to FO, Tel. 1287, 4 Nov. 1956, VR1091/523, 121786.
45. Wright to FO, Tel. 1238, 1 Nov. 1956, VJ10393/176, 121489.
47. Wright to FO, Tel. 1280, 3 Nov. 1956, VJ10393/182, 121489.
49. Stevens (Tehran) to FO, Tel. 871, 4 Nov. 1956, VR1091/590, 121788; Stevens to
Lloyd, Despatch No.125, 15 Nov. 1956, V1073/405, 121266.
50. See the text of the final communique, Stevens to FO, Tel. 920, 8 Nov. 1956,
VR1091/766, 121793.
51. Al-Hayat, 10 Nov. 1956; Wright to FO, Tel. 49 Saving, 10 Nov. 1956, VQ1094/3,
121682; Tel. 1476, 26 Nov. 1956, VQ1015/108, 121647.
52. Wright to FO, Tel. 1348, 9 Nov. 1956, V1073/387, 121265.
53. On Iran's reaction, see Stevens to FO, Tel. 932, 10 Nov. 1956. V1073/387, 121265;
concerning Pakistan's reaction, see High Commissioner (Karachi) to Commonwealth
Relations Office, Tel. 1878, 13 Nov. 1956, 121265; and, Turkey's reaction, see
Bowker (Ankara) to FO, Tel. 954, V1073/399, 121266.
54. Al-Hayat, 14 Nov. 1956; BBC, No.98, 15 Nov. 1956, pp.7-8.
55. Al-Hayat, 16 Nov. 1956;
56. See the text of the final communique. Ibid; 24 Nov. 1956.
57. BBC, No.105, 23 Nov. 1956, p.8; No.106, 24 Nov. 1956, I
58. P. Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958 (New
Edition, London: 1986), pp.270-82 (henceforth Seale).
59. For more details concerning the Iraqi plot, see the memoirs of W. C. Eveland, Ropes
of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York, 1980), pp. 181-233; and, FO
to Baghdad, Tel. 2255, 11 Sept. 1957, VY1015/186, 128227. See also two articles,
recently published: D. Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and
Syria, 1945-1958,' Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No.l (Winter 1990), pp.51-75; A.
Gorst and W. S. Lucas, 'The Other Collusion: Operation Straggle and Anglo-
American Intervention in Syria, 1955-56,' Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 4,
No.3 (July 1989), pp.576-95.
60. Ibid., pp.224-7.
61. Heikal, p.209.
62. Wright to FO, Tel. 1444, 21 Nov. 1956, V1022/2, 121223; Tel. 1449, 21 Nov. 1956,
V1022/3, 121223.
63. Heikal, pp.210-11.
64. Wright to FO, Tel. 1655, 24 Dec. 1956, JE1015/107, 118835.
65. See for example, Middelton to FO, Tel. 1513, 24 Dec. 1956, JE1015/106, 118838;
Wright to FO, Tel. 9, 2 Jan. 1957, JE1015/2, 125411; Tel. 74, 17 Jan. 1957, JE1023/3,
125426; Tel. 20, 4 Jan. 1957, JE1015/6, 125411; Bailey to Watson, 19 Jan. 1957,
JE1015/41, 125412.
66. Eden's Minute, 26 Dec. 56, JE1015/115, 118836; see also the text sent to Baghd
Tel. 3182, 27 Dec. 1956, 118836. On this version Eden wrote 'Excellent'.
67. Wright to FO, Tel. 9, 2 Jan. 1957, JE1015/2, 125411; Tel. 74, 17 Jan. 1957, JE1023
125426.
68. Al-Hayat, 16 Feb. 1957.
69. Wright to FO, Tel. 299, 7 March 1957, VB1072/46, 128823.
70. FO to Washington, Tel. 1030, 4 March 1957, V1022/13, 127724.
71. On the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Seale, pp.285-9.
72. Wright to FO, Tel. 62, 15 Jan. 1957, V010325/1, 128047; Morris (Washingto
Hadow, 26 Jan. 1957, VQ10325/2, 128047.
73. On the visits of Saud and Abd al-Ilah, and the meeting between them, see Cac
(Washington) to Lloyd, Despatch No.42, 15 Feb. 1957, ES10345/18, 127155; Bailey
Rose, 13 Feb. 1957, VQ10325/7, 128052; Beaumont to Lloyd, Despatch No.116,
May 1957, VQ10325/7, 128047.
74. For the text of the Arab Solidarity Pact, see Khalil, pp.287-9.
75. Most of the details concerning the 'second Cairo Conference', are taken from
Hayat, 11 March 1957; Having no other available source, even the foreign amba
sadors had to base their accounts on Al-Hayat's version. See, for example, Middleto
to FO, Tel. 8 Saving, 1 March 1957, V1022/11, 127724; For the text of the offic
communique, see BBC, No.185, March 1957, pp.l-2; Khalil, pp.921-2.
76. For an account of the Jordanian crisis, see the memoirs of the British Ambassado
Amman, C. Johnston, The Brink of Jordan (London: 1972), pp.34-74.
77. Beaumont (Baghdad) to Lloyd, Despatch No.116, 10 May 1957, VQ10325/7, 1280
78. Al-Hayat, 8 May 1957.
79. On the attempt on Saud's life, see the summary of the Lebanese newspapers, 4
1957, ES1015/4A, 127150; Wright to FO, Tel. 39 Saving, 8 May 1957, ES1015/
127150.
80. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.140, 30 May 1957, VQ10325/13, 128047.
81. Wright to FO, Tel. 632, 15 May 1957, JE1152/13, 125471. The Foreign Office duly
promised that he had no intention of helping Nasser, FO to Baghdad, Tel. 1326, 21
May 1957, JE1152/13, 125471.
82. Wright to FO, Tel. 633, 15 May 1957, VQ10325/8, 128047.
83. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.140, 30 May 1957, VQ10325/13, 128047;
See also, Wright to FO, Tel. 633, 15 May 1957, VQ10325/8, 128047.
84. Al-Hayat, 16 June 1957.
85. On Saud's visit to Jordan, see Johnston to FO, Tel. 1046, 14 June 1957, VJ10325/11,
127892; Johnston to Lloyd, Despatch No.37, VJ10325/14, 127892; on Husayn's visit to
Iraq, see al-Hayat, 23 June 1957.
86. Johnston to Lloyd, Despatch No.37, 14 June 1957, VJ10325/14, 127892.
87. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.42, 11 March 1958, VQ1015/28, 134198.
88. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.176, 9 June 1957, VQ1015/34, 128041; on Nuri's
stature in Western eyes, see the article in Time magazine, quoted in Al-Hayat, 16 June
1957; and J. Alsop's article, 'The Pasha', New York Herald Tribune, 27 May 1957.
89. Most of the details concerning the Syrian crisis in Summer 1957 are not publicly
available yet; a good account is found in Seale, pp.289-306. See also Little, pp.69-74.
90. Wright to Lloyd, Despatch No.301, 28 Dec. 1957, VQ10325/1, 134039; Crawford
(Baghdad) to FO, Tel. 143, 31 Jan. 1958, VY10316/17, 134386.
91. K. Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis (London: 1960), p.252.
92. Wright to FO, Tel. 665, 14 June 1956, VQ10316/61A, 121651.
93. H. Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (London: 1972),
p.112 (Figure 6), pp.94-5 (Figures 4-5).
94. 'A General Survey of Nasser's Foreign Policy', 30 Aug. 1957, JE1023/24, 125427.
95. Wheelock, p.254.
96. Seale, p.313.
97. Ibid., p.305; Riad, p.188.
98. Seale, pp.312-4; Riad, p.199.
99. Seale, pp.307-21; Riad, pp. 193-223; Heikal, M

in Syria] (Cairo, 1962), pp. 15-40.; E. Childers, Th
Arab Relations (London, 1962), pp.337-42; N. Sa
Israeli Conflict, 1948-1967 (New York, 1969), p
100. For examples of such allegations in the Egy
Dec. 1957, p.3; No.426, 13 Dec. 1957, I; No.429
1957, pp.2-3; No.439, 2 Jan. 1958, p.3.
101. Al-Mussawar, No.1738, 31 Jan. 1958.
102. BBC, No.458, 24 Jan. 1958, p.1.
103. P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generations
104. M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: GamalAbdAl-N
1981), p.32.
105. Dekmejian, p.58; see also, Vatikiotis. pp.234-6.

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The Struggle over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis

Author(s): Elie Podeh

succeeded in crystallizing a camp which opposed Iraq's role in the

Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, on 26 July 1956,

Saudi Arabia, Libya and Sudan to accept a more moderate resolution.8

ful wave of Arab support for Egypt', as it is often portrayed by scholars,'4

president preferred Quwatly to proceed with his planned visit to Moscow

follow Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia in severing their diplomatic

November, Iraq adopted a new radical position concerning the Palestine

order to advance cooperation with these countries, mainly against com-

which had deteriorated nearly to the point of open hostilities.89 'Despite

thereby formally activating the Defence Pact signed in 1955.97 Although

UAR, like the military intervention, was intended to maintain Egypt's

99. Seale, pp.307-21; Riad, pp. 193-223; Heikal, M

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