Autonomy
Autonomy
Autonomy
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution
as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
Void for vagueness exists when a statute or act lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and differ as to its application.
There is a defect of vagueness when:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health
promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care;
(2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse
or a midwife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health
care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and
who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .
Third, in the same Section 7, petitioners claim that it is also unclear that
hospitals operated by religious groups are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(1) or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2) if they are already
exempt from rendering reproductive health service and modern family
planning methods.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by
Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
Lastly, as to the failure of the framers of the law to clearly define what
constitutes “incorrect information”. The RH Law defines “incorrect
information” in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health as mentioned in Section 23 of the RH Law:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private,
who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the
dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice
and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning methods.
Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as
it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They
posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-
government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of
pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary
servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against
their will.
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono
RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons:
First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of
the people.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono services, there is no imposable penalty
if they do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide
it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will.
Therefore, there is no constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. There is no compulsion, force or threat made upon them to render
pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary
incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it
should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this
provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them
to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.