The Effects of Family Background and SCH PDF

The Effects of Family Background and School Quality
on Low and High Achievers:

Determinants of Academic Achievement in the Philippines
Marigee P. Bacolod*
University of California, Irvine
Elizabeth M. King
The World Bank
September 30, 2003
ABSTRACT
Quantile regressions are applied to Philippine data to estimate the differential impact of inputs on students
at various points on the conditional achievement distribution. Variation in the students who attend
schools outside their district, students who do not attend the nearest school, and students who transferred
schools are used to identify these differential impacts and control for selection. Results suggest a policy
of reducing student to teacher ratios has a positive effect on raising students’ math achievement, but may
benefit high achievers more than the average or low achievers. In contrast, the impact of class size on
English achievement is greater for the average or median student.
Keywords: education, school quality

JEL Classifications: I21, I28
*
Corresponding author. Please address comments to: UC Irvine, Department of Economics, 3151 Social Science
Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100. Tel (949) 824-1990. Fax (949) 824-2182. Email: [email protected]. We
would like to thank Jere Behrman, Janet Currie, Paul Glewwe, Joe Hotz, Ken Sokoloff and participants of the
UCLA Applied Microeconomics Proseminar and the Population Association of America 2000 Meetings for
comments on this paper. The views expressed herein are solely of the authors and not of The World Bank.
Education is increasingly viewed as an essential mechanism for raising incomes in developing
countries, both at the national and individual levels. A rich literature using data from many countries
provides estimates of the average or marginal effects of completed years of schooling on individual’s
earnings (see for example, Psacharopoulos 1994). The literature has also gone beyond estimates of the
relationship between earnings and number of years of schooling to estimates of the effect of learning
itself, as measured by student performance, on earnings (Behrman and Birdsall 1983). A number of
studies have also focused on estimating the effect of school inputs on later earnings (e.g. Card and
Krueger 1992, Grogger 1996, Betts 1995). This broad literature points to academic achievement as a good
predictor for later success in the labor market.
Since the Coleman Report (Coleman et. al. 1966) claimed that family background and the
characteristics of other students in the school are more important than school differences—in school
inputs and in how schools operate—toward explaining differences in student performance, a large and
growing literature has tried to isolate the impact of school quality. More recently, Glewwe (2002)
provides a comprehensive review of this literature, which have included reviews of past studies (Fuller
and Clark 1994 and Hanushek 1995), as well as what he considers the “best ‘conservative’ studies”
(Harbison and Hanushek 1992 on Brazil, Glewwe and Jacoby 1994 on Ghana, Glewwe et al. 1995 on
Jamaica, and Kingdon 1996 on India), those that have estimated education production functions. The
verdict on these studies is that they do not sufficiently address important estimation problems, such as
omitted variable bias, measurement errors, and sample selection problems that arise when, among other
things, parents and students choose their school, that could lead to misleading conclusions about
appropriate education policies or programs.
Glewwe (2002) also reviews studies that used randomized trials (Jamison et al. 1981 on
Nicaragua; Heyneman, Jamison and Montenegro 1984 and Tan, Lane and Lassibille 1999 on the
Philippines; Kremer et al. 1997, Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin 2001, and Glewwe et al. 2002 on Kenya1;
and Kagitcibasi, Sunar, and Bekman 2001 on Turkey) which are able to avoid many of the estimation
problems of the education production function studies but nonetheless face other problems. The primary
downside to these experimental studies is small samples, because these studies are costly to implement
and nonrandom sample attrition also leads to sample selection bias. These studies examined the effects of
a range of educational inputs on student performance—additional textbooks, pedagogical materials for
teachers, educational radio, pre-school programs, and school-feeding programs—but, in general, have not
yielded strong recommendations on these inputs. Two other sets of studies were reviewed: one that uses
1
A more recent related study is Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) which found that bonuses paid to teachers in
program schools yielded better student test scores, although students did not retain these gains after the
program ended, indicating that this incentive program primarily encouraged teachers to prepare students for the
test.
2
natural experiments to estimate the impact of student-teacher ratios (Case and Deaton 1999 on South
Africa) and class size (Angrist and Lavy 1999 on Israel) on student performance; and another that uses
quasi-experimental methods to measure the impact of changes in how schools are governed (Jimenez and
Sawada 1999 on El Salvador, and King and Ozler 2000 on Nicaragua).
This growing and improving literature, however, has focused on the average effects of programs
and policies. Yet, the provision of educational inputs that might not have a large or significant effect for
students at the median of the achievement distribution might be shown to have a larger effect at the tails
of the distribution, even after controlling for student characteristics and family background. This is the
hypothesis we test in this paper. In designing education policies, it is important to recognize and
understand why their effects may not be uniform across the conditional distribution of student
achievement, and therefore necessary to understand for whom inputs matter. There are several reasons for
this. For example, reducing class size may not matter in raising average test scores, but may be shown to
raise test scores for the lower tail of the conditional distribution. If so, then a central question would be: If
policymakers want to raise the average (by providing inputs that matter to the average student), should
they use compensating (by providing inputs that matter more to low achievers) or reinforcing (by
providing more inputs that matter to the high achievers) policies?
In this paper we find some differential impacts of school and teacher quality and parental inputs
on the conditional distribution of child cognitive outcomes.2 Utilizing a unique longitudinal dataset from
Cebu, Philippines, and quantile regression techniques with selection corrections for school choice in an
educational production framework, we find that certain inputs matter more to children at the upper part of
the achievement distribution than to those in the lower end.3 Teacher experience has a greater positive
impact at the top end of the conditional distribution, but student-to-teacher ratio has a larger impact at the
median of the conditional distribution for English language and at the upper tail for mathematics. These
results are robust to several model specifications and corrections for selection bias.
We have come across only one other study that uses quantile regressions to estimate the relation
between school quality and test performance. Eide and Showalter (1998) base their estimates on data from
the High School and Beyond and find results suggesting that the marginal dollar allocated towards per
pupil district expenditures raises Math test score gains at the bottom of the conditional distribution, yet it
doesn’t affect the average test score gains.
The paper is then organized as follows. Section II presents the data, highlighting what can be
learned from the CLHNS. Section III lays out our identification strategy and examines potential threats to
2
We explore outcomes as both achievement in levels and in test score gains.
3
We address parents’ endogenous school choice by using propensity scores and forming various non-experimental
control groups.
3
validity, after which Section IV presents the estimation results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper
and provides suggestions for further research.
II. DATA
We use data from the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey (CLHNS), which was
carried out in the Metropolitan Cebu area on the island of Cebu, Philippines.4 Metro Cebu includes Cebu
City, the second largest city in the Philippines, and several surrounding urban and rural communities. The
CLHNS tracks a sample of 3,080 children born between May 1, 1983 and April 30, 1984, in randomly
selected barangays (districts).5 The interviews began before birth, and health and nutrition data were
collected every two months for the first two years of the child’s life. In 1991-92 and 1994-95, follow-up
surveys of mothers and children were conducted. A third follow-up survey (1998-99) is currently
underway, when most adolescents are in their second or third year in high school. Data collection should
be complete by the end of 1999. Our study does not include the latest survey round.
In all the surveys, detailed information on socioeconomic and demographic information for each
household were collected, as well as community-level information on services, schooling, and labor
market opportunities. The later follow-up survey also gathered detailed information on all schools in the
Metro Cebu area, including academic inputs and GPS location. In addition, performance on the National
Elementary Assessment Test (NEAT) was also collected from the school’s administrative files. This is a
test designed to assess abilities and skills of Grade VI pupils in all public and private elementary schools.6
In 1994-95 and also in 1996-97, English reading comprehension and mathematics tests were developed
for the surveys based on official school curricula at various grades. The tests were administered to the
index children (that is, the children surveyed starting in the first round) and to their younger sibling of
schooling age. These follow-up surveys also collected detailed schooling history of each index child and,
if in school, his or her younger sibling.
Excluding children with missing test scores leaves us with 2186 index children and 1140 siblings
for our analysis.7 Means of some key variables are shown in Table 1.1 by age in 1996. Younger siblings
aged 8 or 9 have higher enrollment rates in school year 1996-97, greater than 95% relative to the older
4
The survey was jointly conducted by the Office of Population Studies at the University of San Carlos, Philippines,
the Nutrition Center of the Philippines, and the Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina
(Chapel Hill). See Appendix 1.1 for sample attrition and selection.
5
Our sample excludes multiple births. Inclusive would be 3289 children.
6
The NEAT consists of four subjects areas: Science, Mathematics, English and Heograpiya, Kasaysayan, Sibika
(HeKASi) which are based on minimum learning competencies. See http://www.fapenet.org/public/netrc.htm,
Philippine Dept of Education, Culture and Sports National Educational Testing and Research Center.
7
For more details on sample selection, see Appendix 1.1.
4
siblings and index children. Table 1.1 also shows that 29% of thirteen-year-old index children and 22-
27% of their siblings aged ten and older have delayed enrollment. In Cebu at the time these children
started to enter school, the minimum age of school enrollment was six and a half. We thus define a child
to be delayed if he or she first enrolls in first grade at seven and a half years of age or older.8
The high rates of delay among the thirteen-year-old index children relative to the twelve-year-
olds can be explained by the timing of the Philippine school year, which typically begins in late June.
These children were born later in the calendar year than the twelve-year-olds, so their parents may have
perceived them to be less ready for school at the time they could have first enrolled.9 There are also a
number of repeaters among the thirteen-year-old index children, with 27 percent having repeated a grade
at least once. The high rate of repetition and delay for this cohort probably explains why their average
grade level in school year 1996-97 was almost the same as the twelve-year-olds. Of the twelve-year-old
index children, 44 percent are in high school while only 33 percent of the thirteen-year-olds are.10
There is usually at least one public primary school in each barangay. Table 1.1 shows that around
45 percent of siblings aged nine to twelve attend schools outside their barangay, while only relatively few
of them attend private schools. The higher percentage of index children attending schools outside their
attendance district may be partly due to a lack of high school in their residence barangay. Similarly, only
about 50-55 percent of the sibling children attend the school nearest to their residence. We will attempt to
use these sources of variation as potential sources of identification and will discuss this in more detail in
the following section.
A majority of the children reside in single or extended nuclear families. Around 40-50 percent of
both fathers and mothers stopped schooling at elementary, 27 percent stopped at high school, and only 13-
14 percent reached college.
III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK: The Education Production Function

If learning is a principal goal of education, then measures of cognitive achievement are a direct
output of the educational process which involves a series of inputs applied in school, at home and the
community at large. Following Hanushek (1986), scholastic outcome at time t, Υt, is some function
Υt = f(Χt, Χt-1, Χt-2, ... , Χ0) (1)
8
This is also how Glewwe, Jacoby and King(1999) define delayed enrollment.
9
Recall that the 12 year olds were born in the early part of 1984 while the 13 year olds were born after May 1983.
10
The typical pre-college education in the Philippines includes 6 grades in primary school and 4 years of high
school.
5
where Χt, Χt-1, Χt-2, ... , Χ0 are the streams of family, community, school and teacher inputs obtained at
each time t. This is because attainment at any date will depend on the entire history of these inputs prior
to that date, although their value in explaining output may diminish over time. Since we also observe Υt -1,
we can rewrite (1) as
Υt = g(Χt, Υt -1) (2)
Most studies measure scholastic outcome (Υ) by achievement scores, dropout rates, grade repetition rates,
grade continuation rates, and transition rates to higher education cycles. In this paper, we focus on
standardized student test scores in math and language (English).
Notice that model (2), assuming Υt –1 enters linearly in g, is equivalent to the “gain” (or value
added) model with the restriction that the coefficient on Υt –1 equals 1. That is,
Υt = βΥt –1 + h(Χt)
is equivalent to
Υt - Υt –1 = h’(Χt) (3)
with the restriction that β = 1. We estimate both restricted and unrestricted models. Hereafter we refer to
(2) as the LEVELS model and (3) as the GAIN model. Under certain assumptions, the gain and level
estimators bracket the causal effect of our parameters of interest (see Appendix 1.2).
A central issue in estimating the education production relationship is that the levels of inputs
applied to the learning process are in themselves choice variables. In particular, while a student and her
parents may not directly affect inputs in any one school, by choosing one school over other schools, a
student and her parents are effectively selecting the amount and combination of inputs in the schooling
process. How relevant this issue is depends on the extent to which school choice exists. School choice
exists if there is more than one school (public or private) in the community or if a student is able to use
public schools outside the community of residence or if the student and her family can migrate closer to
the desired school. In any of these scenarios endogeneity bias is a problem because the school inputs that
determine cognitive achievement (or any other education outcome) are themselves systematically
influenced by the same household characteristics that influence achievement. In the Cebu area that we
study, 45 percent of enrolled students attend public schools that are located outside their barangay and 9.6
percent were enrolled in private schools.11 Hence, even ignoring the issue of who might have migrated in
order to be closer to preferred schools, school choice exists.12
11
Overall 52.6 percent of enrolled students (46.5 percent of all children) attend schools outside of their barangay.
12
There is relatively little migration across barangays over the surveys. Only 18.6 percent of the children reside in a
barangay in 1996 that is different from the one the index children were born in, and only 3.67 percent of all
children change barangay of residence between 1994 & 1996, the periods under study.
6
More formally, if we estimate
Οit = Χit’δ + u it (4)
where Οit = Υit in the levels model and Χit includes Υi,t-1, or Οit = Υit - Υi,t-1 in the gain model, the
endogeneity bias is given by13
plim δ-hat = δ + Qxxcov(u, Χ).
Where parents have reinforcing tastes in that they will choose high inputs (X↑) for high achieving or
highly-motivated children (u↑), the estimate for δ, δ-hat, is an overestimate since cov(u, Χ) > 0. Where
parents have compensating or equalizing tastes in that they will instead choose high inputs to compensate
for low ability children, we expect δ-hat to be an underestimate since cov(u, Χ) < 0. Hence, if parents
desiring more learning for their children choose schools so as to optimize access to better inputs, then part
of the effect of observed household characteristics on achievement is through their effect on school
choice.
A number of studies have handled this by explicitly modeling school choice as another equation,
as in two-stage least squares. The disadvantage with using instrumental variables is that unobserved
school characteristics that affect school choice may be correlated with unobserved student characteristics
that determine student performance. Furthermore, if the correlation between the instruments and school
inputs are weak, then even a small correlation between the instruments and unobserved student
characteristics can produce a large inconsistency in two-stage least squares (Bound, Jaeger and Baker
1995).14
There are alternative methods of dealing with the issue of endogeneity of school characteristics in
the education production function. The most common approach in the education production literature has
been to ignore the problem. When student achievement data are available for more than two years, one
approach has been to estimate a value-added function. Under the assumption that the unobserved variable
in student achievement is time-invariant, the unobservables are thus differenced out. Hence, the error in
the gain (or loss) in student achievement is not correlated with school choice (see for example Guryan
1999). One problem with this approach is that school choice is assumed to be set at the initial period,
whereas students may, in fact, reconsider school choice depending on their performance in each period.
When achievement data are available only for one year, one approach has been to model school
choice explicitly, such as the choice of attending a public or private school, and then to estimate the
production function with a school selection correction (e.g. Jimenez and Sawada 1999). The problem with
13
where Qxx=plim (X’X/n)-1 a positive definite matrix.
14
This is essentially what we find when we use the characteristics of the nearest schools or the average in the
barangay as instruments for characteristics of the school actually attended.
7
this method is finding an appropriate instrument that will identify the school choice equation, a problem
that is often unsatisfactorily addressed.
The ideal experiment to address this endogeneity would be to identify school effects over students
who are randomly distributed across schools, and hence the impact of school choice is isolated from the
impact of the school inputs themselves on achievement. A similar non-experimental method is to compare
students who have made a certain choice in school with a matched group of students who have made
other choices. This is the method we use in this paper.
In its simplest form the identification strategy in this approach of comparing matched samples is
to use a difference estimator.15 Applying this to the Philippine example, consider two children, A and B,
with similar observable individual and household characteristics. As illustrated in Figure 1.1 - Panel A,
child B lives in barangay Lahug but attends school in barangay Tisa, while child A resides and attends a
school in barangay Lahug. In addition, suppose that the predicted probabilities (i.e., propensity score,
which is described below) of child A and child B to attend a school outside their barangays are equal. We
then use the outcome of child A to represent what would have happened to child B had child B attended a
school in barangay Lahug. As an alternative, we also consider children who choose to attend a school
farther than the school they live the closest to.16 In this case, child A and B reside on the same GPS
coordinate, and while child A attends the nearest school, child B does not. The outcome of child A then
represents what would have happened to child B had child B attended the closer school.
We also consider children who transferred schools between periods t and t-1 as an alternative
source of identification. Suppose now that Child A and Child B, again with similar observable individual
and household characteristics, both attend School J in period t-1. Between period t and t-1, Child B
transfers schools and attends School K in period t, while Child A remains in School J (see Figure 1.1-C).
Suppose also that the predicted probabilities of Child A and Child B to transfer to a different school in
period t are equal. We then use the outcome of Child A to represent the outcome of Child B had Child B
remained in School J.
In our analysis, using evaluation terminology, there are essentially four different sets of matching
“treatment” and “control” groups, as further tabulated in Table 1.3:
In the first matching, we match children we refer to as MOVERS to children we refer to as NON-
MOVERS. The treatment group are all children who attend schools outside their barangay of
15
For an illustration, refer to diagrams A-D in Figure 1.1.
16
GPS readings of the household residence location as well as all schools in the Metro Cebu area were taken in the
1994/95 survey. Distances from the household residence to every school in Metro Cebu are then calculated as
straight lines connecting household and school coordinates.
8
residence in school year 1996-97, while the control are those who attend schools in their barangay of
residence in school year 1996-97.
In the second matching, we match children who attend the school nearest to where they live and who
we refer to as NEAR, to children we refer to as NOT-NEAR. The treatment group are children who
attend schools that is not the nearest in school year 1996-97, while the control are those who attend
the nearest school.
In the third matching, the treatment group are all children who transferred schools between school
year 1994-95 and school year 1996-97, referred to as TRANSFERS, while the control group are all
children who stayed in the same schools in both periods (NON-TRANSFERS), regardless of whether
they attend schools within or outside their residence barangay in either periods.
Finally, for a fourth matching, we use as treatment group all children who, between school years
1994-95 and 1996-97, transferred to schools located outside their barangay of residence
(TRANSFERS*MOVERS). These are the children whose indicator variable for transferring,
interacted with a dummy for attending a school in 1996-97 that is outside their barangay of residence,
equals 1. The control group then includes all children who didn't transfer schools between school
years 1994-95 and 1996-97, or who attend schools within their barangay of residence in school year
1996-97.
The empirical model to be estimated is then:
Οit = Χit’δ + αdit + u it (5)
INDEXit = Zit’η + vit (6)
where: dit = 1 iff INDEXit >0 and 0 otherwise
Οit = Υit (outcome in levels) and Χit includes Υi,t-1
or Οit = Υit - Υi,t-1 (outcome in gains)
Χit = student’s individual, household, and school characteristics
Zit = characteristics that determine school choice dit.17
We use propensity score analysis to estimate this model. First introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985), propensity score analysis is used to construct samples from non-experimental data so that these
samples behave like experimental data.18
17
In identifying over “movers”, Zit include i’s test scores from period t-1, grade in t, other individual and household
characteristics, and characteristics of schools in the barangay i resides in. In identifying over “not-near”, Zit also
include past achievement, other characteristics of i and his household, and characteristics of the nearest school to i.
For the “transfers”, Zit include i’s test scores from period t-1, grade in t-1, other household characteristics, and
characteristics of the school i attended in t-1.
9
In particular, we estimate the propensity to make choice d using a probit model:
Pr(dit = 1) = Φ(Zit’η)
Using the predicted probabilities of making choice d, we calculate a propensity score for each observation
and then drop from the sample those observations whose propensities are not within a given range. This
range is defined by the minimum propensity score in the “treatment” group (dit=1) and the maximum
propensity score in the “control” group (dit=0). The purpose of defining this limit is to identify students in
the sample who have a similar propensity as the treatment group to choose a school outside their
community of residence. Having obtained a sample of students with similar propensities in not attending
the nearest school or moving or transferring or transferring to a school outside their residence barangay,
we estimate (4) conditional on the predicted propensity score for each student.19
In including the propensity score as a regressor, our model is thus closer to those of selection-type
models than traditional matching, thereby controlling for correlation between the error terms in equations
(5) and (6). An advantage in using propensity scores is that we have overlapping support on the selection-
correction term, which is important for reducing biases and achieving identification. More importantly,
identification is achieved off of information on schools the child could have attended, not necessarily the
school the child attended.
IV. RESULTS
Our results include estimates of the effects of individual, household and school characteristics on
student performance. In the discussion we focus on the effects of school characteristics, as those are the
crux of the study. In general, the results regarding household background are as expected. Parents’
education has a positive effect on achievement levels in both English and math, with father’s years of
schooling having a larger effect than mother’s. Parents’ education, however, is not a generally significant
factor in explaining gains in achievement. To the extent that the aspiration index is a factor independent
of parents’ education, it exerts a positive effect on both achievement levels and gains.20 The coefficients
of household income, measured by log(consumption expenditure per capita), are significant only for
English achievement levels.
18
More recent work by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) looks at all matching estimators, including
nonparametric estimators.
19
We condition on the predicted propensity score in two ways. First we include the propensity score as a regressor.
We also divide the scores into five intervals or bins and estimate (4) separately for each bin. The results are
qualitatively similar at the corresponding bins & quantiles. Results reported include the propensity score as
regressor.
20
The aspiration index is a categorical variable asked of the parents, “What level of education do you want your
child to complete?”: 0=some elementary, 1=elementary graduate, and so on.
10
OLS results
Least squares estimates of our preferred specification are reported in Tables 1.2A-1.2B. In
specifications without teacher characteristics, attendance at a private school rather than a public school
means a higher average achievement level in English but a smaller gain. A negative but insignificant
effect is found for math scores in the levels and negative significant effect in the gains functions. Adding
teacher characteristics change these results. The effects of private school attendance on English
achievement levels, math achievement levels and gains are significantly negative.
Student-teacher ratios (approximately also equal to class sizes) are meant to measure the intensity
of teacher attention that students receive in the classroom. The expectation is that the higher this ratio, the
more diluted the attention and the poorer the learning experience is supposed to be. This ratio does not
affect average achievement level in English but positively affects the average gain. In math, reducing
class sizes is significant in raising both achievement levels and gains. Controlling for teacher
characteristics heighten the effects of this variable.
Younger teachers, conditional on experience, negatively influence average test scores and gains
in those levels. Conditional on age, more experienced teachers raise average test score levels though at a
decreasing rate, and have no effect on average gains in test scores.
Movers, transfers, and stayers

Table 1.2C shows OLS results including indicator variables for moving, not attending the nearest
school, transferring, and transferring to a school outside the residence barangay. The least squares
estimates of the effects of family background and school characteristic on achievement remain stable even
when controlling for these indicators. Attending a school outside one’s barangay of residence (mover) is
significantly positively related to English achievement. Meanwhile, not attending the nearest school is
significantly negatively related to math achievement levels. Conditional on individual, household, and
school characteristics, other indicators are insignificant on achievement.
Overall, descriptive statistics in Panels 4A-4D in Table 1.4 show that movers, not-near, and
transfers are strictly going to better schools, relative to the non-movers/near/non-transfers whom we refer
to simply as stayers.
Movers. There are a number of possible reasons why we observe movement of students across barangays.
One reason may be that a student or her parents are drawn by the possibility of attending a much better
school. Another possibility may be that a student’s parents’ workplace may be closer to the school of
attendance. A third possibility may be that a student’s home is on the border and closer to the school in
the neighboring barangay. Indeed, the nearest school for about 32 percent of movers is located outside
11
their barangay of residence, while this is the case for only 13.5 percent of stayers. Movers are also on
average further away from the nearest school located in their barangays of residence. Among movers, the
average distance to the nearest school in their barangay is 764.3 meters, while non-movers are on average
only 569.4 meters from the school nearest to them. How far a parent has to travel to take his or her child
to barangay schools may then be a factor leading the student to move.
Movers also attend schools in barangays with higher average performance on the NEAT. The
average NEAT score among schools in the barangay of residence for movers is only 90.2, and 106.9
among schools in the barangay of attendance. But then, the NEAT average for the school movers and
stayers actually attend is about equal (78.4 for non-movers and 79.7 for movers). There are also more
schools in the destination barangays than in the residence barangays for the movers, so the supply of
school places could also be a driving force in students’ choices. On average, movers reside in a barangay
with less number of schools (1.8) relative to non-movers (2.7) and attend barangays with 2.9 schools.
These means seem to indicate that movers are moving to try to equalize to those characteristics found in
the stayers’ barangays. In addition, movers attend schools in barangays with older schools. For movers
there are on average 1.4 schools in their barangay of attendance that were established before 1960, while
only 0.8 such schools in their barangay of residence. This suggests that school reputation, in that older
schools may have a more established standing, may also be driving students to move.
Overall, these unconditional means suggest movers are drawn to barangays with more
established, slightly better schools.21 In our probit regressions (reported below), we control for the
characteristics of the nearest school as well as all schools located in the residence barangay, to capture the
“push” factors that may be driving students to move, as well as the “pull” factors by controlling for the
characteristics of other schools in the choice set, that is the nearest school if the nearest is located outside
the residence barangay. Note, too, that a higher proportion of movers are in grade levels above sixth
grade (37 percent) compared to 15 percent among non-movers. As noted in Table 1.3, we estimate our
models separately for all children and for children in primary grades only.
21
In order to resolve if flows across barangays are in fact driven only by particular schools in particular
destinations, we looked at all school barangays where more than 3-4 percent of the children in our sample
attend. There are on average about the same number of movers and stayers among the barangays that attract
slightly more students than others. Given that only very few of the overall sample changed their barangay of
residence between when the children were born and 1996, using mover status to represent school choice seems
to be reasonable. The equal proportion of movers and stayers on average is partly driven by outliers amongst
these barangays that attract a disproportionate share of the students. For example, about 9 percent of all
enrolled children attend schools in Barangay Labangon, yet 86.2 percent of these children are stayers. On the
other end, 7 percent of all enrolled children attend schools in Barangay Basak, yet only 3.9 percent of these
children reside in that barangay. Most all (94 percent) of the flows into this barangay are students from two
neighboring barangays.
12
Not-near. Those who do not attend the nearest school (referred to as not-near) are on average not further
from the nearest school than those who decide to attend the nearest school(near). The choice between
attending a private versus public school does not seem to unconditionally drive the choice to attend the
closest school either. Among those who do not attend the nearest school, 42 percent reside nearest to a
private school, yet a greater proportion of this group (21 percent) attend a private school, relative to those
who do attend the school nearest to them. Only 2 percent of this latter group attends private schools.
Overall, those who choose not to attend the nearest school seem to driven by the possibility of attending a
better school—schools that are older, with higher enrollment and smaller class sizes, more experienced
teachers—but not by school performance in itself as indexed by the NEAT.
As in the movers matching group, more of the not-near group are in grade levels above sixth
grade in 1996 (41 percent) compared to 2.3 percent among the near group. In the probit regressions
below, we also estimate our models separately for all children and for children in primary grades only.
Transfers. A student may transfer schools either because the family moves residences, or the school he or
she is attending does not offer the next grade level, or parents can no longer afford to pay the tuition (if
the school is private), or are looking for a better school for their child, or the school itself refuses the
student continued admission. We find a substantial proportion of those who transfer had no choice but to
transfer (72.1 percent) and subsequently exclude them from the means reported in Table 1.4C.22 Of these
schoolchildren who transferred schools but had a choice, 17 percent changed barangay of residence
between 1994 and 1996. Since the GPS measures were taken in the 1994 survey, this may explain why
transfers are attending schools in 1996 that are on average further than the school they were attending in
1994. Among those who transfer, 23 percent also attend private schools in 1996 while only 16 percent
among this group were enrolled in private schools in 1994. None of the other school characteristics seem
to indicate, however, what is driving these children to transfer. Since 41 percent of those who transfer and
had a choice are in high school in 1996, we also do the analysis separately for all children and for those in
high school.
Transfer*Movers. Similar to what determines a student to transfer schools, a student may transfer to a
school outside the barangay of residence either because the family moves residences, or there are no
schools in the barangay that offer the next grade level, or his/her parents want their child to attend a better
school, or the parents find the cost of local private schools too high, or the school itself refuses the student
continued admission. The means reported in Table 1.4D indicate that part of the story is that lack of
private schools in their residence barangay lead parents to transfer their children to attend a school in
barangays also with more private schools. Among those who transfer to schools outside the residence
22
A student is defined as having no choice but to transfer if his/her grade level in 1994 is not the highest offered at
his/her school in 1994, nor is his/her grade level in 1995 not the highest offered at his/her school in 1995.
13
barangay and who had a choice, 31 percent attend private schools in 1996 while only 18 percent among
this group were enrolled in private schools in 1994. In addition, students who are transfer*movers on
average reside in barangays with fewer private schools (0.7) and attend a school in a barangay with more
private schools (1.03). None of the other school characteristics seem to indicate, however, what is driving
these children to transfer. Since 53 percent of those who transfer and had a choice are in high school in
1996, we also do the analysis separately for all children and for those in high school.
Propensity scores
Turn now to the estimates of the probit models; these are reported in Tables 1.5A-1.5D. Figure
1.2 also plots the propensity scores for each group in the propensity score samples. The probit models are
able to predict well moving, not attending the nearest school, and transferring for those in high school in
1996. There are also a good number of propensity score matches among the actual non-movers to match
with actual movers, as well as actual near and actual not-near school children. This is not the same for
transfers, however. In the propensity score sample, 92.9 percent of actual non-transfers have propensity
scores less than 0.2. This means that in the p-score interval between 0 and 0.2, we are matching 1,970
students who didn’t transfer to only 94 who transferred. In addition, there are few remaining treated
observations--only 9.7 percent of the propensity score sample transferred. The same problem arises in
matching transfer*movers to non-transfer*movers. Even excluding those who transferred schools clearly
because the schools they were attending prior to 1996 didn’t offer higher grades, there are obviously
problems in matching all students who transferred and had a choice, to non-transfers, as well as matching
all transfer*movers to non-transfer*movers.23 In light of this, we will focus only on matches using movers
and not-near in discussing our subsequent results.
Overall, the probit estimates confirm the story suggested by the conditional means in Tables
1.4A-1.4B and discussed in the previous section. Turning now to Table 1.5A, residing in an urban area
strongly predicts attending a school outside the residence barangay. Those who changed barangay
residences between 1994 & 1996 (3.5 percent of all enrolled children) are less likely to attend a non-local
barangay school, an indication that parents want to minimize disruption (less than 60 percent of those
who changed residences transferred schools). The supply of school places is also significantly driving
students to move. Students are more likely to move from barangays with fewer local schools. Conditional
on number of schools, students are also significantly more likely to stay in barangays with a greater
number of older schools and where PTAs are more active. Having smaller class sizes and more
23
Among the students who transferred, only 18 percent in school year 1994-95 and 19 percent in 1995-96 attended
schools that offered education beyond the primary grades (beyond grade six).
14
experienced teachers conditional on age, as well as better performance on the NEAT, also significantly
determine attending local schools in the barangay.
Residing in an urban area and having changed barangay residences also strongly predict
attending a school other than the nearest one (Table 1.5B). Perversely, the closer a student’s residence is
to the nearest school, and especially when that school is private, the more likely that student is to not
attend that school, conditional on other characteristics. Note that this regression was estimated including
controls for whether the nearest school should actually be in the feasible choice set of the student.24
Except for the nearest school’s performance on the NEAT in the probit estimated over the primary school
children sample, none of the other nearest school characteristics seem to significantly indicate what is
driving the choice to not attend the nearest school. The eventual results using the mover and not-near
propensity samples are very similar, however (see discussion below).
All in all, those who choose not to attend a local barangay school nor the nearest school seem to
driven by individual circumstance and by the possibility of attending a better school than are offered by
their local choices. Movers in particular are pushed by lack of schools, fewer private schools, and lower
average school quality as indicated by teacher characteristics and performance on the NEAT. Individual
circumstances for the most part seem to be determining whether students attend the school closest to
them.
Two-Stage Least Squares

We earlier pointed out in the discussion on empirical strategy that one advantage in using
propensity scores is that identification is achieved off of information on schools the child could have
attended, not necessarily the school the child attended. Another way such information could be utilized is
through two-stage least squares. In Tables 1.6A-1.6D Column 2, we report 2SLS estimates using the
characteristics of the nearest school as instruments for the characteristics of the school actually attended
by the student.25 Note that family background effects are in general stronger in the instrumental variables
regressions relative to OLS, while hardly any of the school characteristics are significant. The weak
second-stage results can be explained by the weak correlation between the characteristics of the nearest
24
Only the interaction for whether the nearest school offers grades 1 through 6 interacted with a dummy for whether
the student is above sixth grade is significant. Dropping the other interactions do not change the results and
some of these terms get dropped due to collinearity.
25
The implied assumption in the use of nearest school characteristics as instruments is that parents are not moving
residences to be closer to better schools. As noted earlier in footnote 12, very few residential migration across
barangays is going on. This suggests that most parents are sorting directly across schools, and not through
residences.
15
school and the school attended over the entire sample of students.26 For a sub-sample of students that did
attend the nearest school, this correlation is equal to one. Meanwhile, for the group that did not attend the
nearest school, the correlation is closer to negative one (recall that the characteristics of the nearest school
became “push” factors and were significant determinants in the decision to attend not-near schools).
Hence, while the use of the nearest characteristics as instruments has intuitive appeal, in this particular
context it is not empirically convincing.
Quantile regressions
Quantile regression estimates of the effect of family background and school characteristics for the
10 , 50 , and 90th percentiles are reported in Appendix 1.3 using the various matching groups. We also
th th
report a subset of the same estimates in Table 1.6 together with OLS and IV estimates for a comparison.
Results from matching across quantiles clearly provide more information than the least squares results. In
the following we will discuss quantile regression estimates for the effect of family background and school
characteristics on achievement using the mover and not-near matching groups separately.
A. Results using movers to control for selection.

Father’s and mother’s education have positive effects across the conditional English distribution
in levels (Table 1.6A). The positive effects of mother’s education on English increase the higher a child is
on the distribution, while the positive effects of father’s education on English levels are slightly stronger
for the tail ends of the distribution relative to the median. Father’s education also has a slightly stronger
effect on the tail ends of the conditional math achievement distribution in levels, while mother’s
education is insignificant across the distribution. The effects of parent education are insignificant on math
gains and father’s education is significant only for the lower quantile in English gains (Table 1.6B).
Parental aspiration also has a positive effect on English and math achievement levels and on math gains,
higher for the high achievers relative to the median and lower end. Per household member expenditure is
positive and significant only for the upper tail in English levels.
Higher student-to-teacher ratios have a significant negative effect on English achievement levels
and gains only for the median (Tables 1.6A & 1.6B). Meanwhile, higher student-to teacher ratios are
worse for the median to upper tails in math achievement levels and gains. We also find that streaming
significantly benefits only the low-achievers in conditional English gains. Conditional on age, a teacher
with more experience raises English outcome levels and gains and math levels at a diminishing rate from
the median to upper tail. This positive effect of experience increases from the median to 0.9 quantile.
26
See Bound, Jaeger, Baker (1995).
16
Teacher age, conditional on experience, has a strong negative effect on English test score levels and
gains, and on math levels for the median to lower tail and for the upper tail in math gains.
B. Results using not-near to control for selection

As in using non-movers as the control group, the positive effects of father’s education on English
and math levels are slightly stronger for the tail ends of the distribution relative to the median (Table
1.6C). The positive effect of mother’s education is significant only for the English high achievers in
levels. Parental aspiration also has a positive effect on math achievement levels and on math gains from
the median to the upper tail, higher for the high achievers relative to the median. In English achievement
in levels, parent aspiration is also strongly positive for the median. Per household member expenditure is
positive and significant only for the median to upper tail in English levels.
As in using non-movers as the control group, higher student-to-teacher ratios have a significant
negative effect on English achievement levels and gains only for the median (Tables 1.6C & 1.6D). In
math achievement levels and gains, higher student-to teacher ratios are worse for the median to upper
tails. Conditional on age, a teacher with more experience raises English outcome levels and gains and
math levels at a diminishing rate from the median to upper tail. This positive effect of experience
increases from the median to 0.9 quantile. Teacher age, conditional on experience, has a uniform strong
negative effect on English test score levels and gains, and a significant negative effect on math
achievement levels for the median to lower tail and for the upper tail in math gains. In addition, we also
find that streaming is positive and significant only for the low-achievers in English gains.
Negative streaming. Tables 1.6A-1.6D also show that a school policy of streaming hurts students most at
the middle to upper tail of the distribution in math achievement. Streaming is the practice of segregating
students into classes on the basis of perceived ability and past achievement. The negative effect on 1996
math test scores and on test score gain becomes larger the higher a student is on the achievement
distribution. In using not-near to control for selection (Table 1.6C or 6D), streaming is also negative and
significant for the 0.9 quantiles on English achievement. The mean corrected math and English scores in
schools that segregate based on ability are 26 and 22.2, respectively, while in schools that don’t segregate,
the means are 29.4 and 24.5.
Average class sizes are also bigger in schools that stream at 36.51 students per teacher compared
to 25.34 among schools that don’t stream. Since streaming is a policy that may or may not be practiced by
a school—and is thus endogenous—schools may be streaming because they are attracting low-achievers,
rather than causing low achievement. The unclear direction of causality may be leading to the negative
estimates.
17
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We began this paper by asking a policy question: for whom do school inputs matter. Most studies
on the determinants of academic achievement have focused on estimating effects on the mean or average
student. Using data from Cebu, Philippines, we apply quantile regressions to estimate the differential
impact of inputs on students at different points in the conditional achievement distribution. We control for
the endogeneity of school choice using propensity scores. We exploit variation in the students who attend
public schools outside their barangay of residence, students who do not attend the nearest school, and
students who transferred schools to identify these differential impacts.
We find that father’s and mother’s education have positive effects across the conditional English
achievement distribution in levels, with the effect of mother’s education increasing the higher a child is
on this distribution. Mother’s education does significantly affect math achievement. The positive effects
of father’s education are stronger for the tail ends of both the math and English levels distributions. The
effects of parent education are mostly insignificant on gains. Per capita household expenditure (in logs) is
significant only for the high achievers.
Our results also suggest a policy of reducing student to teacher ratios will have a positive effect
on raising students’ Math achievement in levels and gains, but may also benefit high achievers more than
the average or low achievers. In contrast, the impact of class size reductions on English achievement and
gain may impact the average or median student more, relative to the tails. Hiring more experienced
teachers have a stronger impact on the high achievers, both in English levels and gain and in Math levels.
Teacher age, conditional on experience, has an even negative impact across the distribution. We also find
streaming benefit only the low achievers in English gains and to have strong negative effects on Math
achievement in levels and gains, particularly for high achievers, which might be a result of the timing in
setting school policy. Further investigation of the mechanisms by which school quality is formed, and
how this may lead to the differential effects that we have estimated, may be warranted.
18
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20
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
ALL Index Children Younger Siblings

Age as of 1996 13 12 12 11 10 9 8
Number of Children 3326 1647 539 128 492 384 126 10
CHILD CHARACTERISTICS
Percent Male 52% 52% 52% 57% 53% 51% 48% 60%
Percent delayed 23% 29% 7% 27% 27% 22% 0% 0%
Number of years delayed 1.16 1.2 1.31 1.18 1.12 1 -- --
(mean for those who delayed)
Percent ever repeat any grade 19% 27% 11% 23% 14% 9% 2% 0%
Percent enrolled (SY 1996/97) 90% 86% 95% 93% 93% 92% 97% 100%
Grade in SY 1996/97 5.06 6.47 6.68 5.18 4.33 3.52 2.84 2.6
(mean for those enrolled)
Mean 1996 - 94 Math score 8.27 10.28 12.05 4.86 4.17 3.1 1.46 1.75
Mean 1996 - 94 English score 6.28 7.74 10.02 3.32 3.01 2.53 -0.92 -2.57
Attending a private school* in 9.6% 11.8% 13.5% 3.4% 4.6% 5.6% 4.8% 10.0%
SY 1996/97
Transferred schools between SY 26.6% 38.8% 46.4% 5.9% 6.3% 7.6% 9.8% 20.0%
94-95 & 96-97
Attends a school* outside 52.6% 53.9% 61.3% 44.5% 43.7% 43.7% 46.7% 20.0%
barangay of residence
Does not attend the nearest 61.4% 66.4% 76.3% 48.7% 49.3% 45.4% 45.1% 50.0%
school* (by distance)
Type of Household Structure in 1994

Singe-person Household 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% -- 0.2% 0.3% -- --
One nuclear family 68.5% 67.1% 65.1% 73.4% 72.4% 71.9% 69.8% 80.0%
Extended nuclear family 18.9% 19.7% 21.0% 19.5% 16.7% 15.6% 18.3% 10.0%
Household of unrelated persons 12.5% 13.1% 13.7% 7.0% 10.8% 12.2% 11.9% 10.0%
No. of siblings as of 1994 4.17 4.13 3.67 4.12 4.48 4.62 4.28 5.1
Mother's educational attainment

No Schooling 8.9% 2.3% 1.0% 0.9% 1.3% 3.0% 0.8% 10.0%
Elementary 50.1% 56.2% 48.0% 45.7% 55.7% 56.8% 57.0% 50.0%
High School 27.5% 27.8% 33.3% 37.9% 30.6% 27.7% 30.6% 20.0%
College or greater 13.0% 13.7% 17.7% 15.5% 12.3% 12.5% 11.6% 20.0%
Father's educational attainment
No Schooling 14.9% 2.4% 0.6% 1.8% 1.8% 0.6% 3.5% 0.0%
Elementary 44.4% 52.3% 47.4% 47.3% 51.0% 56.5% 43.0% 66.7%
High School 26.6% 30.2% 31.3% 36.4% 32.2% 28.1% 32.5% 11.1%
College or greater 14.0% 15.1% 20.7% 14.6% 15.0% 14.8% 21.0% 22.2%
Note: *Percentages taken over students enrolled in SY 1996-97.
21
Table 2A. OLS Results in ENGLISH ACHIEVEMENT
1996 English score 1996-94 English score

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past achievement
1994 Math score 0.235 0.215 0.213 0.211
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
1994 English score 0.449 0.400 0.395 0.390
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Student Characteristics in 1996
male -3.754 -4.174 -4.187 -4.168 -2.971 -2.993 -2.998 -2.969
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
age 0.291 0.691 0.623 0.574 0.681 0.760 0.822 0.796
(0.18) (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.02)* (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
grade 4 2.680 1.706 1.954 2.015 1.640 1.447 1.281 1.308
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.01)* (0.04)* (0.14) (0.13)
grade 5 6.014 4.764 5.127 5.253 4.361 4.130 3.903 3.964
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
grade 6 10.066 8.388 8.767 8.961 7.171 6.792 6.488 6.588
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
above grade 6 11.595 9.550 9.391 9.483 6.421 5.968 6.118 6.115
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Household Characteristics
aspiration index 1.133 1.148 1.191 0.579 0.576 0.592
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
father’s educ in yrs 0.280 0.276 0.287 0.100 0.112 0.117
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.15) (0.10) (0.09)
mother’s educ in yrs 0.177 0.160 0.182 -0.056 -0.035 -0.025
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.36) (0.56) (0.68)
log(per HH member 0.506 0.442 0.396 -0.054 -0.016 -0.046
expenditure) (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.73) (0.91) (0.76)
School Attended Characteristics

private 1.832 -0.547 -1.346 -2.845
(0.03)* (0.57) (0.11) (0.00)**
indicator if school -0.910 -0.514 -0.471 -0.216
streaming (0.12) (0.35) (0.32) (0.64)
student per teacher -0.009 -0.025 -0.019 -0.026
(0.37) (0.10) (0.03)* (0.03)*
Teacher Characteristics (School Avg)

Age -0.412 -0.253
(0.00)** (0.03)*
Experience 0.583 0.286
(0.00)** (0.09)
Experience2 -0.009 -0.003
(0.09) (0.50)
Adj. R-squared 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Notes:
1. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses.
2. Columns (1)-(4) using the LEVELS specification; (5)-(8) using the GAIN model.
3. * denote significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
4. Models estimated with robust standard errors assuming interdependence within schools, independence across.
5. All regressions include controls for missing values and a constant, and are based on a sample of 3326 children.
6. Base category: Female, in grades 1-3 or not enrolled.
22
Table 2B. OLS Results in MATH ACHIEVEMENT
1996 Math score 1996-94 Math score

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Past achievement
1994 Math score 0.392 0.382 0.381 0.379
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
1994 English score 0.275 0.253 0.251 0.245
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Student Characteristics in 1996

male -2.407 -2.582 -2.606 -2.603 -2.057 -2.022 -2.057 -2.050
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
age 0.561 0.779 0.881 0.832 1.156 1.130 1.439 1.406
(0.03)* (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.03)* (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
grade 4 3.420 2.914 2.645 2.712 2.142 2.202 1.180 1.222
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.03)* (0.03)* (0.11) (0.10)
grade 5 6.963 6.307 5.966 6.116 4.062 4.194 2.879 2.970
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
grade 6 12.686 11.803 11.290 11.481 7.931 8.078 6.454 6.556
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
above grade 6 12.717 11.687 11.815 11.935 5.631 5.901 6.401 6.376
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Household Characteristics
aspiration index 0.787 0.837 0.890 0.589 0.667 0.707
(0.04)* (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.12) (0.08) (0.05)
father’s educ in yrs 0.167 0.189 0.202 0.037 0.065 0.074
(0.01)* (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.59) (0.35) (0.27)
mother’s educ in yrs 0.027 0.046 0.069 -0.080 -0.043 -0.024
(0.59) (0.36) (0.19) (0.18) (0.48) (0.70)
log(per HH member 0.225 0.202 0.169 -0.302 -0.284 -0.318
expenditure) (0.18) (0.21) (0.29) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
private -0.560 -2.566 -2.372 -4.388
(0.51) (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.00)**
streaming (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.01)** (0.04)*
(0.03)* (0.00)** (0.01)* (0.00)**

Age -0.304 -0.295
(0.02)* (0.02)*
Experience 0.587 0.361
(0.01)** (0.09)
Experience2 -0.013 -0.006
(0.02)* (0.28)
Adj. R-squared 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
Notes:
5. All regressions include controls for missing values and a constant, and are based on a sample of 3326 children.
23
Table 2C. OLS results including controls for mover/transfer/not-near
English Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family Background
aspiration index 1.191 1.177 0.592 0.581
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.06) (0.05)
father’s educ in yrs 0.287 0.290 0.117 0.119
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.09) (0.09)
mother’s educ in yrs 0.182 0.183 -0.025 -0.022
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.68) (0.71)
log(per HH member 0.396 0.401 -0.046 -0.048
expenditure) (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.76) (0.75)
private -0.547 -0.681 -2.845 -2.946
(0.57) (0.48) (0.00)** (0.00)**
streaming (0.35) (0.30) (0.64) (0.60)
(0.10) (0.06) (0.03)* (0.01)*
Age -0.304 -0.422 -0.253 -0.268
(0.02)* (0.00)** (0.03)* (0.02)*
Experience 0.587 0.612 0.286 0.318
(0.01)** (0.00)** (0.09) (0.06)
Experience2 -0.013 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004
(0.02)* (0.06) (0.50) (0.39)
27
Indicator variables
Mover 0.842 0.711
(0.02)* (0.07)
Not attending -0.311 -0.564
nearest school (0.45) (0.15)
No choice but to 1.410 1.077
transfer (0.36) (0.42)
Transferred schools -0.928 -1.014
(0.35) (0.28)
Transfer*Mover -0.130 -0.171
(0.88) (0.84)
Adj. R-squared 0.63 0.65 0.12 0.11
Notes:
5. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, missing values and a constant, and are based on a
sample of 3326 children.
27
For definition of these variables, see Table 3 or discussion in text.
24
Con’t, Table 2C.
Math Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family Background
aspiration index 0.890 0.855 0.707 0.699
(0.02)* (0.01)** (0.05) (0.05)
father’s educ in yrs 0.202 0.205 0.074 0.071
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.27) (0.29)
mother’s educ in yrs 0.069 0.079 -0.024 -0.029
(0.19) (0.14) (0.70) (0.64)
log(per HH member 0.169 0.160 -0.318 -0.321
expenditure) (0.29) (0.32) (0.06) (0.06)
private -2.566 -2.465 -4.388 -4.239
(0.02)* (0.02)* (0.00)** (0.00)**
streaming (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.04)* (0.03)*
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Age -0.304 -0.332 -0.295 -0.306
(0.02)* (0.01)** (0.02)* (0.01)*
Experience 0.587 0.677 0.361 0.433
(0.01)** (0.00)** (0.09) (0.06)
Experience2 -0.013 -0.015 -0.006 -0.008
(0.02)* (0.01)** (0.28) (0.17)
Indicator variables1
Mover 0.950 0.899
(0.14) (0.14)
Not attending -1.414 -0.914
nearest school (0.02)* (0.14)
No choice but to 1.737 -0.135
transfer (0.45) (0.93)
Transferred schools -0.784 1.527
(0.34) (0.06)
Transfer*Mover 0.165 -0.585
(0.84) (0.54)
Adj. R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.12 0.11
Notes:
5. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, missing values and a constant, and are based on a
sample of 3326 children.
25
TABLE 3. DESCRIPTION OF MATCHING GROUPS
SAMPLE TREATED CONTROL

ENROLLED IN AY 1996/97 MOVER=1 if barangay of school NON-MOVER (n = 1452)
attended in AY 1996/97 is the
same as residence barangay
(n = 1547)
ENROLLED IN PRIMARY MOVER=1 if barangay of school NON-MOVER (n = 1237)
GRADES IN AY 1996/97 attended in AY 1996/97 is the
same as residence barangay
(n = 976)
ENROLLED IN AY 1996/97 NOT NEAR=1 if school attended NEAR (n = 1158)
in AY 1996/97 is NOT the
nearest
(n = 1841)
ENROLLED IN PRIMARY NOT NEAR=1 if school attended NEAR (n = 1131)
GRADES IN AY 1996/97 in AY 1996/97 is NOT the
nearest
(n = 1082)
ENROLLED IN AY’s 1994/95, TRANSFER=1 if transferred NON-TRANSFERS (n = 2027)
1995/96, 1996/97 schools anytime between AY
AND HAD A CHOICE TO 1994/95 & 1996/97
28 (n = 228)
TRANSFER
ENROLLED IN AY’s 1994/95, TRANSFER=1 if transferred NON-TRANSFERS (n = 83)
1995/96, 1996/97, schools anytime between AY
HAD A CHOICE TO 1994/95 & 1996/97
TRANSFER1 (n = 94)
AND IN HIGH SCHOOL IN
1996
ENROLLED IN AY’s 1994/95, TRANSFER*MOVER=1 if NON-TRANSFER*MOVER
1995/96, 1996/97 transferred to a school outside the (n = 2091)
AND HAD A CHOICE TO barangay of residence anytime
TRANSFER1 between AY 1994/95 & 1996/97
(n = 164)
ENROLLED IN AY’s 1994/95, TRANSFER*MOVER=1 if NON-TRANSFER*MOVER
1995/96, 1996/97, transferred to a school outside the (n = 90)
HAD A CHOICE TO barangay of residence anytime
TRANSFER1 between AY 1994/95 & 1996/97
AND IN HIGH SCHOOL IN (n = 97)
1996
28
That is, student’s grade level in 1994 is not the highest offered at his/her school in 1994, nor is his/her
grade level in 1995 not the highest offered at his/her school in 1995.
26
TABLE 4. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MATCHING GROUPS (See text for description of some variables.)
4A. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVERS vs. NON-MOVERS
non-mover mover non-mover mover
Index child 0.589 (0.492) 0.698 (0.459) Characteristics of schools in barangay of residence
Age 11.843 (1.284) 12.050 (1.173) no of schools in brgy 2.713 (1.729) 1.821 (1.315)
Male 0.521 (0.5) 0.495 (0.5) no of private schools in brgy 0.529 (0.88) 0.622 (0.698)
Grade enrolled in 1996/97 no established before 1960 0.982 (0.665) 0.747 (0.612)
grade1 0.008 (0.091) 0.008 (0.088) mean entrance fee (Phil. Peso) 19.758 (72.669) 146.646 (252.291)
grade2 0.008 (0.091) 0.008 (0.088) mean amt parents contribute to PTA 11.964 (13.039) 34.562 (49.739)
grade3 0.127 (0.334) 0.078 (0.269) mean % parents contribute to PTA 66.089 (25.72) 78.596 (23.141)
grade4 0.179 (0.384) 0.133 (0.34) avg % passing NEAT 70.280 (17.385) 81.749 (16.405)
grade5 0.183 (0.386) 0.144 (0.351) avg NEAT score 89.778 (36.814) 90.201 (29.074)
grade6 0.326 (0.469) 0.249 (0.432) avg student/teacher 36.375 (8.889) 31.559 (9.134)
grade > 6 0.148 (0.355) 0.370 (0.483) avg teacher experience 12.722 (4.648) 11.075 (5.319)
Test scores avg teacher age 36.599 (5.792) 34.244 (7.069)
IQ test score 65.690 (11.82) 68.530 (11.93) Characteristics of schools in barangay of attendance
1994 Math score 15.150 (14.01) 18.640 (14.82) no of schools in brgy 2.713 (1.729) 2.860 (1.314)
1994 English score 12.320 (12.65) 15.740 (14.32) no of private schools in brgy 0.529 (0.88) 0.830 (0.949)
Household characteristics no established before 1960 0.982 (0.665) 1.360 (0.903)
urban 0.650 (0.48) 0.780 (0.41) mean entrance fee (Phil. Peso) 19.758 (72.669) 49.884 (154.656)
=1 if changed brgy resided 94-96 0.024 (0.152) 0.034 (0.182) mean amt parents contribute to PTA 11.964 (13.039) 11.125 (17.348)
father's education (yrs) 7.170 (3.732) 8.492 (3.914) mean % parents contribute to PTA 66.089 (25.72) 51.339 (21.687)
mother's education (yrs) 6.837 (3.467) 8.173 (3.913) avg % passing NEAT 70.280 (17.385) 70.763 (18.168)
log(per capita hhold expenditure) 7.240 (1.23) 7.490 (1.33) avg NEAT score 89.778 (36.814) 106.895 (39.227)
avg student/teacher 36.375 (8.889) 29.304 (10.225)
Characteristics of school attended in 1996/97 avg teacher experience 12.722 (4.648) 13.297 (5.998)
distance in meters 629.557 (1178.266) 1391.230 (2256.264) avg teacher age 36.599 (5.792) 32.824 (11.328)
private 0.068 (0.253) 0.180 (0.384) Characteristics of nearest school in barangay of residence
established before 1960 0.640 (0.48) 0.785 (0.411) distance in meters 569.348 (1140.704) 764.229 (1803.067)
amount parents contribute to PTA 12.920 (14.93) 15.720 (26.55) private 0.052 (0.222) 0.461 (0.499)
% of parents making contributions 74.400 (31.38) 70.290 (25.37) % passing NEAT 75.300 (15.79) 85.560 (14.26)
student/teacher 41.040 (10.558) 38.540 (18.818) NEAT average 78.370 (2.35) 81.610 (4.58)
total enrollment 1213.500 (954.945) 2602.951 (1859.616) Characteristics of nearest school if nearest is not in barangay of residence
% passing NEAT 76.010 (16.1) 81.440 (12.01) =1 if nearest is NOT in brgy resid 0.135 (0.342) 0.324 (0.468)
average NEAT 78.420 (2.23) 79.740 (2.71) distance in meters 83.321 (332.636) 179.854 (333.764)
% teachers w/in-service training 87.717 (12.439) 93.310 (10.222) private 0.029 (0.167) 0.059 (0.236)
avg teacher experience 14.711 (6.554) 18.014 (6.94) % passing NEAT 10.120 (26.56) 26.450 (39.03)
avg teacher age 41.634 (6.847) 44.515 (8.347) NEAT average 10.570 (26.86) 25.820 (37.35)
Note: Means estimated over enrolled sample. Standard errors in parentheses. Means across schools within barangays are weighted by enrollment share in each school.
27
4B. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF NEAR GROUP
near not-near
Index child 0.517 (0.5) 0.726 (0.45)
Age 11.687 (1.33) 12.116 (1.13)
Male 0.537 (0.5) 0.489 (0.5)
Grade enrolled in 1996/97
grade1 0.012 (0.11) 0.005 (0.07)
grade2 0.012 (0.11) 0.005 (0.07)
grade3 0.145 (0.35) 0.075 (0.26)
grade4 0.213 (0.41) 0.119 (0.32)
grade5 0.205 (0.4) 0.136 (0.34)
grade6 0.363 (0.48) 0.238 (0.43)
grade > 6 0.023 (0.15) 0.413 (0.49)
Test scores
IQ test score 64.720 (11.64) 68.690 (11.91)
1994 Math score 13.760 (13.66) 18.960 (14.72)
1994 English score 10.670 (11.77) 16.230 (14.29)
Household characteristics
urban 0.570 (0.5) 0.810 (0.39)
=1 if changed brgy resided 94-96 0.011 (0.1) 0.041 (0.2)
father's education (yrs) 6.929 (3.68) 8.448 (3.89)
mother's education (yrs) 6.479 (3.37) 8.202 (3.85)
log(per capita hhold expenditure) 7.150 (1.23) 7.500 (1.31) near not-near
Characteristics of school attended in 1996/97 Selected characteristics of nearest school
distance in meters 450.796 (323.95) 1460.448 (2365.35) distance in meters 450.796 (323.95) 432.739 (382.24)
private 0.019 (0.14) 0.211 (0.41) private 0.019 (0.14) 0.421 (0.49)
established before 1960 0.609 (0.49) 0.795 (0.4) established before 1960 0.609 (0.49) 0.498 (0.5)
policy of streaming 0.562 (0.5) 0.743 (0.44) offers grades 1-6 only 0.871 (0.33) 0.590 (0.49)
amount parents contribute to PTA 12.290 (15.11) 15.950 (25.24) % passing NEAT 75.190 (16.25) 82.880 (15.41)
% of parents making contributions 69.050 (31.75) 75.710 (25.51) average NEAT 78.230 (2.16) 80.820 (4.5)
student/teacher 42.374 (18.65) 37.628 (9.98) % teachers w/in-service training 87.811 (12.78) 86.410 (20.53)
total enrollment 1244.221 (1086.62) 2402.066 (1781.07) avg teacher experience 14.876 (6.82) 13.004 (7.37)
% passing NEAT 75.190 (16.25) 81.650 (12.06) avg teacher age 42.181 (6.95) 38.838 (8.51)
average NEAT 78.230 (2.16) 79.790 (2.65)
% teachers w/in-service training 87.811 (12.78) 92.529 (10.35)
avg teacher experience 14.876 (6.82) 17.451 (6.8)
avg teacher age 42.181 (6.95) 43.654 (8.28)
Note: Means estimated over enrolled sample. Standard errors in parentheses.
28
4C. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSFERS
non-transfer transfer
Index child 0.536 (0.5) 0.667 (0.47)
Age 11.733 (1.29) 11.904 (1.29)
Male 0.509 (0.5) 0.566 (0.5)
grade1 0.002 (0.05) N/A
grade2 0.002 (0.05) N/A
grade3 0.128 (0.33) 0.114 (0.32)
grade4 0.208 (0.41) 0.118 (0.32)
grade5 0.210 (0.41) 0.154 (0.36)
grade6 0.391 (0.49) 0.180 (0.38)
grade > 6 0.041 (0.2) 0.412 (0.49)
Test scores
IQ test score 65.800 (11.74) 69.260 (12.12)
1994 Math score 15.230 (13.79) 18.440 (14.66)
1994 English score 12.280 (12.88) 16.960 (14.62)
Household characteristics
urban 0.710 (0.46) 0.880 (0.33)
=1 if changed brgy resided 94-96 0.020 (0.14) 0.133 (0.34)
father's education (yrs) 7.624 (3.87) 9.235 (4.04)
mother's education (yrs) 7.235 (3.65) 8.980 (4.13)
log(per capita hhold expenditure) 7.280 (1.26) 7.730 (1.34) non-transfer transfer
Characteristics of school attended in 1996/97 Characteristics of school attended in 1994/95
private 0.073 (0.26) 0.229 (0.42) private 0.073 (0.26) 0.164 (0.37)
established before 1960 0.713 (0.45) 0.643 (0.48) established before 1960 0.713 (0.45) 0.724 (0.45)
policy of streaming 0.657 (0.47) 0.637 (0.48) policy of streaming 0.657 (0.47) 0.650 (0.48)
entrance fee 28.850 (148.75) 87.680 (245.76) student/teacher 40.574 (15.86) 36.559 (6.91)
amount parents contribute to PTA 13.370 (21.46) 15.900 (19.71) % passing NEAT 78.340 (14.26) 81.210 (12.99)
% of parents making contributions 72.610 (28.68) 70.360 (30.98) average NEAT 78.970 (2.45) 79.620 (2.72)
student/teacher 40.574 (15.86) 37.645 (8.46) % teachers w/in-service training 90.277 (11.69) 93.260 (12.87)
total enrollment 1938.386 (1610.83) 1724.841 (1728.74) avg teacher experience 16.805 (6.53) 18.333 (7.11)
% passing NEAT 78.340 (14.26) 78.490 (15.89) avg teacher age 43.732 (7.05) 44.877 (8.38)
average NEAT 78.970 (2.45) 79.100 (2.69)
% teachers w/in-service training 90.277 (11.69) 90.036 (11.76)
avg teacher experience 16.805 (6.53) 15.201 (7.88)
avg teacher age 43.732 (7.05) 41.403 (8.73)
Note: Means estimated over continuously-enrolled sample and students whose grade level in 1994 is not the highest offered at his/her school in 1994, nor is his/her grade level in 1995 not
the highest offered at his/her school in 1995. Standard errors in parentheses.
29
4D. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSFER*MOVER
non-transfer*mover transfer*mover
index 0.535 (0.5) 0.732 (0.44)
age 11.726 (1.3) 12.055 (1.13)
male 0.509 (0.5) 0.579 (0.5)
grade1 0.002 (0.05) 0.000 (0.)
grade2 0.002 (0.05) 0.000 (0.)
grade3 0.131 (0.34) 0.073 (0.26)
grade4 0.208 (0.41) 0.085 (0.28)
grade5 0.209 (0.41) 0.146 (0.35)
grade6 0.387 (0.49) 0.140 (0.35)
grade > 6 0.044 (0.2) 0.530 (0.5) non-transfer*mover transfer*mover
Test scores Characteristics of schools in barangay of residence
IQ test score 65.820 (11.75) 70.320 (12.01) no of schools in brgy 2.298 (1.59) 2.009 (1.34)
1994 Math score 15.190 (13.78) 20.160 (14.88) no of private schools in brgy 0.546 (0.8) 0.698 (0.82)
1994 English score 12.370 (12.87) 17.590 (15.39) no established before 1960 0.876 (0.64) 0.897 (0.57)
Household characteristics mean entrance fee (Phil. Peso) 72.669 (184.42) 159.582 (240.67)
urban 0.710 (0.45) 0.910 (0.29) mean amt parents contribute to PTA 21.788 (35.84) 51.106 (62.99)
=1 if changed brgy resided 94-96 0.027 (0.16) 0.084 (0.28) mean % parents contribute to PTA 70.830 (25.75) 76.456 (26.25)
father's education (yrs) 7.636 (3.88) 9.678 (3.99) avg % passing NEAT 74.938 (18.17) 80.622 (18.31)
mother's education (yrs) 7.252 (3.66) 9.413 (4.1) avg NEAT score 87.039 (31.69) 102.777 (35.74)
log(per capita hhold expenditure) 7.280 (1.26) 7.900 (1.29) avg student/teacher 34.549 (9.44) 33.170 (8.88)
Characteristics of school attended in 1996/97 avg teacher experience 11.954 (4.98) 12.107 (5.63)
distance in meters 792.608 (1209.89) 3312.197 (5045.65) avg teacher age 35.603 (6.42) 36.014 (7.38)
private 0.074 (0.26) 0.313 (0.47)
established before 1960 0.710 (0.45) 0.656 (0.48) Characteristics of schools in barangay of attendance
policy of streaming 0.656 (0.48) 0.635 (0.48) no of schools in brgy 2.637 (1.57) 3.168 (1.35)
offers grades 1-6 only 0.823 (0.38) 0.667 (0.47) no of private schools in brgy 0.582 (0.91) 1.027 (1.02)
entrance fee 28.580 (147.17) 130.790 (300.67) no established before 1960 1.091 (0.75) 1.549 (1.03)
amount parents contribute to PTA 13.290 (21.19) 19.080 (23.94) mean entrance fee (Phil. Peso) 26.556 (101.02) 58.882 (159.9)
% of parents making contributions 72.600 (28.84) 69.150 (28.99) mean amt parents contribute to PTA 12.044 (15.55) 11.421 (17.67)
student/teacher 40.458 (15.67) 38.309 (9.58) mean % parents contribute to PTA 62.279 (24.82) 50.031 (23.86)
total enrollment 1921.831 (1600.96) 1947.146 (2000.77) avg % passing NEAT 69.563 (18.07) 71.630 (14.46)
% passing NEAT 78.230 (14.42) 81.260 (13.11) avg NEAT score 93.839 (37.61) 112.421 (41.7)
average NEAT 78.960 (2.45) 79.610 (2.77) avg student/teacher 34.788 (9.25) 32.432 (13.71)
% teachers w/in-service training 90.257 (11.71) 90.334 (11.34) avg teacher experience 13.453 (5.29) 11.391 (5.63)
avg teacher experience 16.740 (6.56) 15.628 (8.13) avg teacher age 36.697 (7.55) 28.863 (11.06)
avg teacher age 43.648 (7.08) 41.758 (9.29)
the highest offered at his/her school in 1995. Standard errors in parentheses. Means across schools within barangays are weighted by enrollment share in each school.
30
Con’t, 4D.
non-transfer*mover transfer*mover non-transfer*mover transfer*mover

Characteristics of school attended in 1994/95 Characteristics of nearest school in barangay of residence
private 0.075 (0.26) 0.178 (0.38) private 0.229 (0.42) 0.460 (0.5)
established before 1960 0.708 (0.45) 0.803 (0.4) % passing NEAT 79.580 (16.27) 87.380 (12.85)
policy of streaming 0.656 (0.48) 0.658 (0.48) NEAT average 79.740 (3.84) 82.510 (5.12)
offers grades 1-6 only 0.818 (0.39) 0.375 (0.49) Characteristics of nearest school if nearest is not in barangay of residence
student/teacher 40.513 (15.67) 35.709 (6.65) =1 if nearest is NOT in brgy resid 0.206 (0.4) 0.354 (0.48)
% passing NEAT 78.300 (14.37) 82.870 (10.28) distance in meters 119.657 (350.66) 155.626 (267.01)
average NEAT 78.980 (2.47) 79.810 (2.57) private 0.036 (0.19) 0.106 (0.31)
% teachers w/in-service training 90.335 (11.74) 93.687 (12.67) % passing NEAT 16.260 (32.79) 30.000 (41.4)
avg teacher experience 16.808 (6.53) 19.032 (7.16) NEAT average 16.300 (32.06) 28.590 (38.87)
avg teacher age 43.724 (7.06) 45.562 (8.63)
the highest offered at his/her school in 1995. Standard errors in parentheses. Means across schools within barangays are weighted by enrollment share in each school.
31
TABLE 5. PROBITS
TABLE 5A. Determinants of attending a school outside the barangay of residence in school year 1996/97
(MOVER)
(1) (2)
Other Household Characteristics
urban 0.154 0.139
(0.052)** (0.031)**
dummy=1 if changed barangay -0.210 -0.240
resided between 1994 & 1996 (0.094)* (0.06)**
Characteristics of schools in residence barangay
no. of schools in brgy -0.112 -0.097
(0.032)** (0.037)**
no. of private schools in brgy 0.034 0.089
(0.056) (0.063)
no. established before 1960 -0.212 -0.287
(0.052)** (0.060)**
mean amount parents contribute 0.005 0.005
to PTA (0.001)** (0.001)**
mean % parents contribute to PTA 0.004 0.004
(0.001)** (0.001)**
avg teacher experience 0.025 0.028
(0.012)* (0.013)*
avg student/teacher -0.005 -0.009
(0.003) (0.004)*
avg teacher age -0.021 -0.027
(0.008)* (0.009)**
avg % passing NEAT -0.007 -0.004
(0.002)** (0.002)
Characteristics of closest school in residence barangay
distance in meters 1.99e-05 1.59e-05
(1.1e-5) (1.2e-05)
private 0.288 0.439
(0.064) (0.11)**
% passing NEAT 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Characteristics of closest school if closest is not in residence barangay
dummy=1 if nearest school 0.145 0.321
is NOT in brgy of residence (0.065)* (0.244)
(1.26e-04) (1.23e-04)
private -0.057 -0.032
(0.085) (0.095)
% passing NEAT 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2999 1887
Pseudo R2 0.493 0.48
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, assuming interdependence within barangay of residence, independence
across.
2. Coefficients reported are derivatives (dF/dX).
3. Column (1) estimated over ALL enrolled children; (2) over children enrolled in primary grades only.
4. * denote significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
5. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, father’s and mother’s education in years,
log(household expenditure per capita), missing values and a constant.
32
TABLE 5B. Determinants of attending a school that is NOT the nearest by distance in school year
1996/97
(NOT-NEAR)
(1) (2)
Other Household Characteristics
urban 0.228 0.265
(0.092)* (0.113)*
dummy=1 if changed barangay 0.222 0.372
resided between 1994 & 1996 (0.039)** (0.053)**
Characteristics of nearest school
(7.11e-05)** (9.8e-05)**
private 0.446 0.679
(0.053)** (0.042)**
% passing NEAT -0.003 -0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
established before 1960 -0.009 -0.032
(0.033) (0.028)
established in the 1960s -0.011 -0.028
(0.075) (0.069)
offers grades 1-6 only -0.023 0.007
(0.086) (0.078)
(offers grade1-6)*(grade in 1996 > 6) 0.332
(0.063)**
Pseudo-R2 0.469 0.39
Notes:
across.
3. Column (1) estimated over ALL enrolled children; (2) over children enrolled in primary grades only.
33
TABLE 5C. Determinants of transferring schools between SY 1994/95 & 1996/97. (TRANSFER)
(1) (2)
Other household characteristics
urban 0.027 0.723
(0.024) (0.053)**
resided between 1994 & 1996 (0.068)** (0.197)
Characteristics of school attended in SY 1994/95
distance in meters 1.45e-05 -1.38e-05
(4.03e-06)** (7.31e-05)
% passing NEAT -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.012)
established before 1960 -0.047 -0.229
(0.019)* (0.179)
established in 1960s -0.035 0.080
(0.01)* (0.178)
established after 1985 0.072 0.485
(0.053) (0.046)**
private -0.044 -0.958
(0.01)* (0.037)**
student/teacher -0.002 -0.007
(0.001) (0.006)
offers grades 1-6 only -0.048
(0.027)*
Pseudo-R2 0.282 0.58
Notes:
across.
3. Column (1) estimated over ALL enrolled children; (2) over children enrolled in secondary level only.
34
TABLE 5D. Determinants of transferring to a school outside the barangay of residence between SY
1994/95 & 1996/97 (TRANSFER*MOVER)
(1) (2)
Other household characteristics
urban 0.012 dropped (predicts 0 perfectly)
(0.01)
resided between 1994 & 1996 (0.032) (0.148)
Characteristics of school attended in SY 1994/95
distance in meters 5.446e-06 -4.79e-05
(2.33e-06)* (7.33e-05)
% passing NEAT -3.64e-05 -0.053
(4.01e-04) (0.024)*
private -0.019 -0.757
(0.009) (0.193)*
established before 1960 -0.014 0.580
(0.016) (0.28)
established in 1960s -0.022 0.402
(0.007)* (0.216)
established after 1985 0.017 0.444
(0.007)* (0.057)**
student/teacher -0.001 -0.019
(0.001) (0.011)
Characteristics of schools in residence barangay
no. of schools in brgy 2.3e-05 -0.329
(0.007) (0.147)*
no. of private schools in brgy 0.003 0.356
(0.011) (0.232)
no. established before 1960 -0.020 0.344
(0.011) (0.261)
mean amount parents contribute 2.67e-04 -0.004
to PTA (1.39e-04)* (0.003)
mean % parents contribute to PTA 6.48e-05 -0.003
(2.17e-04) (0.005)
avg teacher experience 0.001 -0.016
(0.002) (0.066)
avg student/teacher 2.94e-04 -0.038
(0.001) (0.026)
avg teacher age 3.0e-04 0.059
(0.002) (0.043)
avg % passing NEAT -1.36e-04 -0.014
(3.7e-04) (0.012)
Characteristics of closest school in residence barangay
(1.82e-06)* (1.09e-04)
private -0.006 -0.486
(0.012) (0.217)*
% passing NEAT 3.47e-04 0.038
(0.001) (0.010)**
Characteristics of closest school if closest is not in residence barangay
dummy=1 if nearest school 0.028 -0.646
is NOT in brgy of residence (0.036) (0.768)
distance in meters -1.11e-05 -4.5e-04
(1.02e-05) (1.8e-04)*
private -0.008 -0.641
(0.013) (0.109)**
% passing NEAT 3.53e-05 0.010
(3.28e-04) (0.014)
Pseudo-R2 0.376 0.57
Notes:
1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, assuming interdependence within barangay of residence.
3. Column (1) estimated over ALL enrolled children; (2) over children enrolled in secondary level only.
35
TABLE 6. OLS, IV, and QUANTILE REGRESSIONS for select matching groups
A. Using ALL MOVERS as treatment (LEVELS MODEL)

ENGLISH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) MATH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV q10 q50 q90 OLS IV q10 q50 q90
Household Characteristics Household Characteristics
father’s educ in yrs 0.287 0.428 0.313 0.200 0.399 father’s educ in yrs 0.202 0.389 0.230 0.172 0.275
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.01)** (0.01)*
mother’s educ in yrs 0.182 0.516 0.081 0.147 0.251 mother’s educ in yrs 0.069 0.458 0.027 0.041 0.089
(0.00)** (0.07) (0.55) (0.07) (0.04)* (0.19) (0.18) (0.79) (0.59) (0.42)
aspiration index 1.191 1.140 0.695 1.153 1.289 aspiration index 0.890 0.966 -0.354 1.003 1.328
(0.00)** (0.04)* (0.27) (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.11) (0.44) (0.01)** (0.02)*
log(per HH member 0.396 1.160 0.248 0.301 0.816 log(per HH member 0.169 0.802 -0.032 0.212 0.286
expenditure) (0.00)** (0.20) (0.39) (0.14) (0.00)** expenditure) (0.29) (0.48) (0.89) (0.34) (0.28)
School Attended Characteristics School Attended Characteristics
private -0.547 -31.207 -3.798 -1.143 0.169 private -2.566 -35.034 -1.747 -3.619 0.311
(0.57) (0.23) (0.11) (0.32) (0.94) (0.02)* (0.29) (0.23) (0.00)** (0.83)
indicator if school -0.514 0.356 -0.036 -0.687 -1.186 indicator if school -1.925 -9.174 -0.158 -2.064 -3.038
streaming (0.35) (0.97) (0.96) (0.21) (0.16) streaming (0.02)* (0.43) (0.82) (0.00)** (0.00)**
student per teacher -0.025 -0.130 -0.067 -0.036 -0.022 student per teacher -0.052 -0.227 -0.031 -0.069 -0.043
(0.10) (0.66) (0.20) (0.10) (0.26) (0.00)** (0.51) (0.02)* (0.00)** (0.04)*
Teacher Characteristics (School Avg) Teacher Characteristics (School Avg)
Experience 0.583 1.075 0.197 0.538 0.788 Experience 0.587 1.544 0.253 0.466 0.501
(0.00)** (0.46) (0.44) (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.40) (0.34) (0.00)** (0.06)
Experience2 -0.009 -0.014 0.001 -0.007 -0.018 Experience2 -0.013 -0.014 -0.001 -0.014 -0.019
(0.09) (0.69) (0.93) (0.13) (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.73) (0.91) (0.01)** (0.00)**
Age -0.412 -0.644 -0.327 -0.422 -0.327 Age -0.304 -0.938 -0.389 -0.218 0.003
(0.00)** (0.39) (0.04)* (0.00)** (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.39) (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.99)
Observations 3326 3326 3232 3232 3232 Observations 3326 3326 3232 3232 3232
R-sqd / Pseudo R2 0.65 0.45 0.32 0.43 0.43 R-sqd / Pseudo R2 0.63 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.36
Notes:
1. Column (1) report OLS estimates; (2) report IV estimates using characteristics of the
nearest school as instruments for the characteristics of the school actually attended by the 3. * denote significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
student (including distance and performance on the NEAT of the nearest school); (3) – 4. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, missing values
(5) report quantile regression estimates at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile, respectively, and a constant, and are estimated on propensity score samples (see text for discussion of
using propensity score matched sample. how each sample was generated).
2. Standard errors for cols (3)-(5) were estimated via bootstrap and p-values are reported in 5. Base category: Female, in grades 1-3 or not enrolled.
parentheses above.
B. Using ALL MOVERS as treatment (GAIN MODEL)
ENGLISH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) MATH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.09) (0.69) (0.05)* (0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.62) (0.44) (0.66) (0.32)
mother’s educ in yrs -0.025 -0.122 -0.215 0.060 0.070 mother’s educ in yrs -0.024 0.050 -0.076 -0.032 0.005
(0.68) (0.71) (0.05) (0.50) (0.62) (0.70) (0.90) (0.50) (0.67) (0.98)
aspiration index 0.592 0.601 -0.123 0.449 0.906 aspiration index 0.707 0.584 0.360 0.694 2.228
(0.06) (0.19) (0.82) (0.22) (0.17) (0.05) (0.23) (0.45) (0.03)* (0.00)**
log(per HH member -0.046 -0.415 -0.274 0.040 0.176 log(per HH member -0.318 -0.297 -0.594 -0.410 0.023
expenditure) (0.76) (0.67) (0.23) (0.85) (0.66) expenditure) (0.06) (0.79) (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.96)
private -2.845 6.286 -4.848 -4.519 -0.384 private -4.388 -9.814 -2.907 -3.917 -7.977
(0.00)** (0.81) (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.89) (0.00)** (0.75) (0.16) (0.01)* (0.00)**
indicator if school -0.216 -5.549 1.515 -0.263 -1.656 indicator if school -1.450 -7.417 -0.774 -1.399 -3.393
streaming (0.64) (0.45) (0.02)* (0.66) (0.18) streaming (0.04)* (0.37) (0.31) (0.01)* (0.01)**
(0.03)* (0.70) (0.95) (0.07) (0.27) (0.00)** (0.29) (0.21) (0.04)* (0.01)**
Experience 0.286 1.217 -0.263 0.342 1.142 Experience 0.361 1.100 0.323 0.265 0.271
(0.09) (0.32) (0.27) (0.04)* (0.00)** (0.09) (0.38) (0.31) (0.20) (0.44)
Experience2 -0.003 -0.027 0.018 -0.006 -0.029 Experience2 -0.006 -0.011 -0.001 -0.008 0.005
(0.50) (0.35) (0.01)** (0.25) (0.00)** (0.28) (0.69) (0.95) (0.15) (0.65)
Age -0.253 -0.321 -0.388 -0.229 -0.267 Age -0.295 -0.711 -0.370 -0.147 -0.553
(0.03)* (0.64) (0.01)* (0.08) (0.20) (0.02)* (0.34) (0.13) (0.18) (0.01)*
Notes:
1. Column (1) report OLS estimates; (2) report IV estimates using characteristics of the 3. * denote significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.
nearest school as instruments for the characteristics of the school actually attended by the 4. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, missing values and a constant,
student (including distance and performance on the NEAT of the nearest school); (3) – and are estimated on propensity score samples (see text for discussion of how each
(5) report quantile regression estimates at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile, respectively, sample was generated).
using propensity score matched sample. 5. Base category: Female, in grades 1-3 or not enrolled.
2. Standard errors for cols (3)-(5) were estimated via bootstrap and p-values are reported in
parentheses above.
C. Using ALL NOT-NEAR as treatment (LEVELS MODEL)
ENGLISH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) MATH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.04)* (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.05)* (0.01)* (0.08)
mother’s educ in yrs 0.182 0.516 0.121 0.109 0.321 mother’s educ in yrs 0.069 0.458 0.021 0.052 0.146
(0.00)** (0.07) (0.35) (0.17) (0.01)* (0.19) (0.18) (0.84) (0.56) (0.19)
aspiration index 1.191 1.140 1.039 1.338 1.125 aspiration index 0.890 0.966 -0.041 0.983 1.801
(0.00)** (0.04)* (0.06) (0.00)** (0.13) (0.02)* (0.11) (0.95) (0.02)* (0.00)**
log(per HH member 0.396 1.160 0.243 0.348 0.768 log(per HH member 0.169 0.802 -0.061 0.164 0.225
expenditure) (0.00)** (0.20) (0.36) (0.10) (0.00)** expenditure) (0.29) (0.48) (0.78) (0.42) (0.39)
private -0.547 -31.207 -4.068 -0.188 -1.281 private -2.566 -35.034 -2.041 -3.239 0.701
(0.57) (0.23) (0.09) (0.88) (0.53) (0.02)* (0.29) (0.15) (0.02)* (0.66)
indicator if school -0.514 0.356 0.363 -0.745 -1.596 indicator if school -1.925 -9.174 -0.438 -2.106 -3.282
streaming (0.35) (0.97) (0.66) (0.24) (0.04)* streaming (0.02)* (0.43) (0.54) (0.00)** (0.00)**
(0.10) (0.66) (0.13) (0.05) (0.24) (0.00)** (0.51) (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.02)*
Experience 0.583 1.075 0.299 0.649 0.740 Experience 0.587 1.544 0.462 0.530 0.592
(0.00)** (0.46) (0.22) (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.40) (0.09) (0.00)** (0.03)*
Experience2 -0.009 -0.014 4.0e-04 -0.010 -0.015 Experience2 -0.013 -0.014 -0.005 -0.016 -0.016
(0.09) (0.69) (0.94) (0.05)* (0.04)* (0.02)* (0.73) (0.47) (0.00)** (0.02)*
Age -0.412 -0.644 -0.427 -0.403 -0.409 Age -0.304 -0.938 -0.458 -0.223 -0.105
(0.00)** (0.39) (0.02)* (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.02)* (0.39) (0.00)** (0.04)* (0.53)
Notes:
nearest school as instruments for the characteristics of the school actually attended by the 4. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, missing values
student (including distance and performance on the NEAT of the nearest school); (3) – and a constant, and are estimated on propensity score samples (see text for discussion of
(5) report quantile regression estimates at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile, respectively, how each sample was generated).
parentheses above.
D. Using ALL NOT-NEAR as treatment (GAIN MODEL)
ENGLISH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) MATH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0.09) (0.69) (0.16) (0.16) (0.72) (0.27) (0.62) (0.54) (0.49) (0.48)
mother’s educ in yrs -0.025 -0.122 -0.166 0.097 0.055 mother’s educ in yrs -0.024 0.050 -0.128 -0.012 -0.025
(0.68) (0.71) (0.12) (0.24) (0.72) (0.70) (0.90) (0.33) (0.91) (0.89)
aspiration index 0.592 0.601 0.249 0.505 0.840 aspiration index 0.707 0.584 0.316 0.652 2.065
(0.06) (0.19) (0.65) (0.16) (0.32) (0.05) (0.23) (0.61) (0.08) (0.01)*
log(per HH member -0.046 -0.415 -0.170 0.020 0.401 log(per HH member -0.318 -0.297 -0.538 -0.577 -0.025
expenditure) (0.76) (0.67) (0.59) (0.91) (0.22) expenditure) (0.06) (0.79) (0.04)* (0.00)** (0.96)
private -2.845 6.286 -4.444 -3.634 -1.702 private -4.388 -9.814 -2.599 -3.443 -6.325
(0.00)** (0.81) (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.50) (0.00)** (0.75) (0.27) (0.01)** (0.01)**
indicator if school -0.216 -5.549 1.459 -0.317 -2.301 indicator if school -1.450 -7.417 -1.222 -1.400 -2.961
streaming (0.64) (0.45) (0.03)* (0.63) (0.04)* streaming (0.04)* (0.37) (0.21) (0.03)* (0.02)*
(0.03)* (0.70) (0.90) (0.01)** (0.09) (0.00)** (0.29) (0.28) (0.01)** (0.01)**
Experience 0.286 1.217 -0.199 0.404 1.377 Experience 0.361 1.100 0.438 0.323 0.545
(0.09) (0.32) (0.37) (0.03)* (0.00)** (0.09) (0.38) (0.28) (0.08) (0.13)
Experience2 -0.003 -0.027 0.016 -0.008 -0.036 Experience2 -0.006 -0.011 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003
(0.50) (0.35) (0.03)* (0.11) (0.00)** (0.28) (0.69) (0.83) (0.16) (0.80)
Age -0.253 -0.321 -0.362 -0.195 -0.311 Age -0.295 -0.711 -0.393 -0.201 -0.495
(0.03)* (0.64) (0.03)* (0.15) (0.14) (0.02)* (0.34) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04)*
Notes:
nearest school as instruments for the characteristics of the school actually attended by the 4. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, missing values
student (including distance and performance on the NEAT of the nearest school); (3) – and a constant, and are estimated on propensity score samples (see text for discussion of
(5) report quantile regression estimates at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile, respectively, how each sample was generated).
parentheses above.
FIGURE 1. Diagram illustrating the identification strategy:
Suppose child A and child B are observably similar. We then use the outcome of child A to represent the
outcome of child B had child B not chosen the “treatment”: to “move” by attending a school outside one’s
barangay, to attend a school that is not the nearest (“not-near”), and to “transfer” schools between periods.
A. Movers
At time t,
A B
Brgy Lahug Brgy Tisa
B. Not-near
At time t, school J
A
B school K
C. Transfers
Between t-1 and t,
A B
school J school K
D. Transfers*Movers
Between t-1 and t,
J
K
A B
Brgy Lahug Brgy Tisa
40
FIGURE 2. HISTOGRAMS OF PROPENSITY SCORES (Propensity Score Samples. See text for discussion.)
Panel 2A. Selection: MOVERS

(Enrolled Sample) (Enrolled in Primary)
mover==0 mover==1 mover==0 mover==1
1000. 00
1000. 00
500.00 500.00
Frequency
Frequency
0.00 0.00
0.02 0.22 0.41 0.61 0.80 1.00 0.02 0.22 0.41 0.61 0.80 1.00 0.02 0.21 0.41 0.61 0.80 1.00 0.02 0.21 0.41 0.61 0.80 1.00
Pr(mover) Pr(mover)
Histograms by mover Histograms by mover
Panel 2B. Selection: NOT ATTENDING NEAREST

(Enrolled Sample) (Enrolled in Primary)
notnear==0 notnear==1 notnear==0 notnear==1
1500. 00 1500. 00
1000. 00 1000. 00
500.00 500.00
Frequency
Frequency
0.00 0.00
0.08 0.26 0.45 0.63 0.82 1.00 0.08 0.26 0.45 0.63 0.82 1.00 0.04 0.23 0.43 0.62 0.81 1.00 0.04 0.23 0.43 0.62 0.81 1.00
Pr(notnear) Pr(notnear)
Histograms by notnear Histograms by notnear
Panel 2C. Selection: TRANSFERRED SCHOOLS
(Enrolled Sample) (Enrolled in HS)
transf2==0 transf2==1 transf2==0 transf2==1
2000. 00 15.00
1500. 00
10.00
1000. 00
5.00
500.00
Frequency
Frequency
0.00 0.00
0.01 0.20 0.39 0.58 0.77 0.95 0.01 0.20 0.39 0.58 0.77 0.95 0.04 0.20 0.37 0.54 0.71 0.88 0.04 0.20 0.37 0.54 0.71 0.88
Pr(transf2) Pr(transf2)
Histograms by =1 if transfer in last 2 years Histograms by =1 if transfer in last 2 years
Panel 2D. Selection: TRANSFERRED TO SCHOOL OUTSIDE BRGY RESIDED

(Enrolled Sample) (Enrolled in HS)
tranmov==0 tranmov==1 tranmov==0 tranmov==1
2000. 00 15.00
1500. 00
10.00
1000. 00
5.00
500.00
Frequency
Frequency
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.19 0.39 0.58 0.77 0.96 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.58 0.77 0.96 0.04 0.21 0.39 0.57 0.74 0.92 0.04 0.21 0.39 0.57 0.74 0.92
Pr(tranmov) Pr(tranmov)
Histograms by tranmov Histograms by tranmov
42
APPENDIX 1
Sample attrition and selection
Live Births in 33 Sample Barangays of Metro Cebu 3,289

Of which: Twin Births 27 (0.8 percent)
Refusals 97 (2.9 percent)
Missed by Survey (discovered later) 58 (1.8 percent)
Birth Interview Too Late 22 (0.7 percent)
Live Births in Metro Cebu with Birth Interview 3,085

Of which: Migrated Out of Metro Cebu by Age 2 318 (10.3 percent)
Child Died by Age 2 156 (5.1 percent)
Refusal (at later date) 50 (1.6 percent)
Still in Sample When Child is 8 Years Old 2,231

Of which: Migrated Out/Could Not Find 29 31 (1.4 percent)
Child Died 8 (0.4 percent)
30
Of which: Never Enrolled in School 9 (0.4 percent)
Not Tested (e.g. refusal) 13 (0.6 percent)
Had Younger Sibling of School Age 1,261 (57.5 percent)

Of which: Not Tested 31 (1.4 percent)
Had Younger Sibling of School Age 1,155 (51.8 percent)
TOTAL OBSERVATIONS (INDEX AND SIBLING CHILDREN) WITH TEST SCORES

3,326
Of which: Missing School Information 905 (27.21 percent)

Missing Teacher Information 913 (27.45 percent)
29
31 children lost between 1991/92 and 1994/95 surveys is a net figure. 77 children interviewed in 1991-
92 could not be located in 1994-95, but 46 children in the 1983-86 sample who were not found in
1991-92 were found in 1994-95.
30
A new sample of about 500 women were added to the original sample in the 1994/95 survey.
APPENDIX 2. GAIN vs. LEVELS Model
This section shows that the levels estimator linearly controlling for a lagged dependent
variable and the difference estimator may provide estimates that bracket the causal effect of
interest. Guryan (1999) and Imbens, Liebman, and Eissa (1997) make similar points. As
discussed in the text, the following LEVELS estimator, δL, in
Υt = βΥt –1 + ΧδL + u
where Υt are test scores and Χ include individual, household, and school characteristics, is
equivalent to the GAIN estimator, δG, in:
Υt - Υt –1 = ΧδG + v
with the restriction that β = 1. (Note: We’ve suspended the time(t) and individual(i) subscript to
simplify notation, i.e., X=Xit, u=uit, etc.) Hence if in the limit β = 1, then
p lim δ$ G = p lim δ$ L = δ + Qxx cov( X , u )

−1
where δ are our parameters of interest and Qxx is a positive definite matrix equal to the plim of
(X’X/n). If selection on school choice is “positive”, such that parents choose high inputs (Χ↑) for
high ability or highly motivated children (u↑ or v↑), the estimators are then upward-biased. That
is, plim δG–hat = plim δL–hat ≥ δ. Conversely, if selection on school choice is “negative”, such
that parents choose high inputs (Χ↑) for children with less ability or less motivation (u↓), then
plim δG–hat = plim δL–hat ≤ δ.
Let us then consider the case when β ≠ 1. The levels estimator is given by:
~ ~ ~
δ$ L = ( X ' X )−1 X '(Yt )
~
where X are the residuals from a regression of X on Yt −1. Then,
~
p lim δ$ = Q ~~ cov( X , Y )
−1
L XX t
−1 ~ ~ $ δ + u)
~~ cov( X , βYt −1 + Xδ + X
= QXX
−1
= δ + QXX
~~ cov( X − γYt −1 , βYt −1 + u )
~
where X$ are the predicted values from a regression of X on Yt −1 , which are orthogonal to X ,
~ ~
cov( X , Yt −1 ) X' X Y 'Y
γ = ~~ = p lim(
, QXX ), and QYt −1Yt −1 = p lim( t −1 t −1 ).
QYt −1Yt −1 n n
Expanding and rearranging,
p lim δ$ = δ + Q ~~ cov( u, X ) − [Q ~~ Q
−1
L XX XX Yt −1Yt −1 ]−1 cov( X , Yt −1 )cov( u, Yt −1 )
−1
= δ + QXX −1
~~ cov( u, X )[1 − {cov( u, X )QY Y } cov( X , Yt −1 )cov( u, Yt −1 )]
t −1 t −1
44
If we are willing to make the assumption that cov(u, Υt –1) = 0, that is zero serial correlation, then
it is easy to see that δL is upward-biased when selection is positive and downward-biased when
selection is negative. It is, however, difficult to justify this assumption as the test scores are only
two years apart. Suppose then that we assume the structure of the serial correlation is such that
cov(u, Υt –1) < 0, e.g. children who scored low in 1994 exert more effort to do well in 1996. Then
if selection on school choice is “positive”, such that parents choose high inputs (Χ↑) for high
ability or highly motivated children (u↑,Υt –1↑), the levels estimator is upward-biased. That is,
plim δL–hat ≥ δ. Conversely, if selection on school choice is “negative”, such that parents choose
high inputs (Χ↑) for children with less ability or less motivation (u↓,Υt –1↓), then plim δL–hat ≤ δ.
If the serial correlation goes in the other direction, we would still have the same result as long as
the term {cov(Χ,Υt –1) cov(u,Υt –1)}/{cov(Χ,u)QΥt –1,Υt –1} is between 0 and 1.
1
On the other hand, the gain estimator is given by:
δ$ G = ( X ' X )−1 X '(Yt − Yt −1 )

p lim δ$ G = Q XX cov( Xδ + v t − v t −1 , X )
−1
−1
= δ + Q XX cov( v t − v t −1 , X )
= δ − Q XX −1 cov( v t −1 , X )
Hence, δG is upward-biased when selection on lagged outcomes is negative and upward-biased
when selection on lagged outcomes is positive.
Therefore, when selection is positive,
δG ≤ δ ≤ δL
and when selection is negative,
δG ≥ δ ≥ δL
1
Cov(vit , Xit) = 0 since one can think of the error term vit as vit = vi + vit where vi is an individual-specific
time-invariant component which gets differenced out under the gain model. Hence any current
unobservable component (vit) will not have been observed by parents to use as information in making
schooling and academic input decisions (Xit) at the beginning of the period. On the other hand,
parents may use information revealed from their children’s performance in the last period which is
unobservable to the econometrician (vit) to update their decisions.
45
APPENDIX 3. QUANTILE REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR MATCHING GROUPS
A. MOVERS
LEVELS GAIN
ENGLISH MATH ENGLISH MATH
SAMPLE ALL PRIMARY ALL PRIMARY ALL PRIMARY ALL PRIMARY
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
q10
father's educ 0.313 (0.128) 0.189 (0.14) 0.230 (0.12) 0.155 (0.14) 0.190 (0.126) 0.205 (0.19) 0.092 (0.12) -0.002 (0.17)
mother's educ 0.081 (0.136) 0.056 (0.15) 0.027 (0.09) -0.133 (0.12) -0.215 (0.114) -0.480 (0.14) -0.076 (0.12) -0.162 (0.23)
aspiration 0.695 (0.646) 2.000 (0.69) -0.354 (0.49) 0.429 (0.61) -0.123 (0.566) 0.444 (0.7) 0.360 (0.53) 0.912 (0.78)
ln(PCE) 0.248 (0.229) 0.081 (0.36) -0.032 (0.2) -0.010 (0.26) -0.274 (0.239) -0.101 (0.32) -0.594 (0.27) -0.674 (0.36)
private -3.798 (2.463) -4.674 (3.42) -1.747 (1.44) -0.355 (2.07) -4.848 (1.832) -7.476 (5.41) -2.907 (2.04) -2.338 (2.75)
streaming -0.036 (0.743) 0.094 (0.93) -0.158 (0.75) 0.445 (0.92) 1.515 (0.751) 1.451 (1.12) -0.774 (0.95) 0.251 (1.31)
student/teacher -0.067 (0.05) 2.E-05 (0.04) -0.031 (0.02) -0.035 (0.01) -0.001 (0.022) -0.005 (0.04) -0.050 (0.04) -0.067 (0.04)
teacher exper 0.197 (0.3) 0.337 (0.29) 0.253 (0.24) 0.671 (0.32) -0.263 (0.234) -0.283 (0.36) 0.323 (0.33) 0.394 (0.51)
experience sqd 0.001 (0.007) -0.001 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.010 (0.01) 0.018 (0.008) 0.015 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01)
avg teacher age -0.327 (0.2) -0.404 (0.18) -0.389 (0.15) -0.489 (0.17) -0.388 (0.176) -0.288 (0.19) -0.370 (0.24) -0.368 (0.27)
q50
father's educ 0.200 (0.083) 0.200 (0.1) 0.172 (0.06) 0.175 (0.08) 0.086 (0.081) -0.005 (0.09) 0.034 (0.08) 0.042 (0.1)
mother's educ 0.147 (0.07) 0.085 (0.1) 0.041 (0.07) 0.083 (0.11) 0.060 (0.082) 0.014 (0.1) -0.032 (0.08) -0.002 (0.11)
aspiration 1.153 (0.369) 1.189 (0.44) 1.003 (0.41) 1.140 (0.4) 0.449 (0.383) 0.462 (0.41) 0.694 (0.31) 0.696 (0.51)
ln(PCE) 0.301 (0.192) 0.608 (0.23) 0.212 (0.21) 0.175 (0.24) 0.040 (0.195) 0.585 (0.23) -0.410 (0.16) -0.439 (0.23)
private -1.143 (1.338) 1.448 (1.67) -3.619 (1.36) -3.394 (1.76) -4.519 (1.339) -2.291 (2.02) -3.917 (1.43) -0.803 (2.25)
streaming -0.687 (0.541) -0.243 (0.66) -2.064 (0.54) -1.825 (0.73) -0.263 (0.637) -0.052 (0.72) -1.399 (0.6) -1.343 (0.75)
student/teacher -0.036 (0.022) -0.038 (0.02) -0.069 (0.02) -0.066 (0.03) -0.048 (0.028) -0.038 (0.03) -0.034 (0.02) -0.038 (0.02)
teacher exper 0.538 (0.168) 0.738 (0.23) 0.466 (0.17) 0.531 (0.22) 0.342 (0.182) 0.319 (0.25) 0.265 (0.23) 0.488 (0.26)
experience sqd -0.007 (0.005) -0.015 (0.01) -0.014 (0.01) -0.018 (0.01) -0.006 (0.005) -0.008 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.013 (0.01)
avg teacher age -0.422 (0.104) -0.396 (0.14) -0.218 (0.11) -0.163 (0.13) -0.229 (0.138) -0.131 (0.15) -0.147 (0.12) -0.180 (0.14)
q90
father's educ 0.399 (0.118) 0.534 (0.13) 0.275 (0.11) 0.144 (0.12) 0.163 (0.114) 0.118 (0.16) 0.169 (0.14) 0.030 (0.15)
mother's educ 0.251 (0.114) 0.330 (0.16) 0.089 (0.1) 0.288 (0.16) 0.070 (0.134) 0.219 (0.18) 0.005 (0.18) 0.158 (0.17)
aspiration 1.289 (0.603) 0.994 (0.87) 1.328 (0.63) 1.416 (0.77) 0.906 (0.8) 1.087 (0.72) 2.228 (0.68) 1.955 (0.8)
ln(PCE) 0.816 (0.251) 0.644 (0.34) 0.286 (0.23) 0.262 (0.3) 0.176 (0.371) 0.384 (0.46) 0.023 (0.46) -0.086 (0.45)
private 0.169 (2.17) 2.871 (4.01) 0.311 (1.85) -3.025 (2.18) -0.384 (2.816) -2.204 (3.53) -7.977 (2.67) -7.360 (3.04)
streaming -1.186 (0.818) -0.772 (0.93) -3.038 (0.93) -2.516 (1.) -1.656 (1.277) -1.443 (1.27) -3.393 (1.28) -3.500 (1.26)
student/teacher -0.022 (0.019) -0.016 (0.02) -0.043 (0.02) -0.030 (0.03) -0.028 (0.023) -0.022 (0.02) -0.048 (0.02) -0.043 (0.02)
teacher exper 0.788 (0.246) 0.948 (0.32) 0.501 (0.31) 0.360 (0.36) 1.142 (0.356) 0.972 (0.44) 0.271 (0.33) 0.558 (0.45)
experience sqd -0.018 (0.007) -0.024 (0.01) -0.019 (0.01) -0.019 (0.01) -0.029 (0.009) -0.029 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) -0.011 (0.01)
avg teacher age -0.327 (0.156) -0.294 (0.18) 0.003 (0.24) 0.071 (0.25) -0.267 (0.205) -0.216 (0.22) -0.553 (0.24) -0.429 (0.3)
N 3232 2052 3232 2052 3232 2052 3232 2052

.10 Pseudo R2 0.322 0.246 0.358 0.288 0.112 0.121 0.126 0.121
.50 Pseudo R2 0.432 0.382 0.434 0.391 0.054 0.062 0.052 0.071
.90 Pseudo R2 0.426 0.412 0.363 0.371 0.058 0.063 0.072 0.104
Notes:
1. Bootstrap standard errors are reported in parentheses.
2. All regressions include controls for gender, grade, age, past achievement, missing values and a constant, and are estimated on
propensity score samples (see text for discussion of how each sample was generated).
46
B. NOT-NEAR
LEVELS GAIN
SAMPLE ALL PRIMARY ALL PRIMARY ALL PRIMARY ALL PRIMARY
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
q10
father's educ 0.273 (0.102) 0.132 (0.119) 0.229 (0.104) 0.158 (0.131) 0.176 (0.121) 0.204 (0.149) 0.070 (0.108) -1.E-04 (0.146)
mother's educ 0.121 (0.108) 0.135 (0.138) 0.021 (0.101) -0.121 (0.094) -0.166 (0.123) -0.389 (0.126) -0.128 (0.121) -0.324 (0.173)
aspiration 1.039 (0.531) 1.295 (0.655) -0.041 (0.597) 0.725 (0.536) 0.249 (0.59) 0.461 (0.639) 0.316 (0.585) 0.745 (0.669)
ln(PCE) 0.243 (0.21) -0.031 (0.289) -0.061 (0.26) 0.032 (0.276) -0.170 (0.279) -0.428 (0.29) -0.538 (0.283) -0.716 (0.395)
private -4.068 (2.315) -2.381 (3.066) -2.041 (1.459) -0.243 (2.185) -4.444 (1.859) -4.918 (3.977) -2.599 (2.337) 0.858 (2.831)
streaming 0.363 (0.768) 0.310 (0.841) -0.438 (0.792) -0.729 (0.743) 1.459 (0.73) 1.202 (0.826) -1.222 (0.925) -1.469 (0.972)
student/teacher -0.075 (0.051) 4.E-04 (0.053) -0.036 (0.013) -0.039 (0.012) -0.004 (0.031) -0.004 (0.035) -0.045 (0.038) -0.053 (0.044)
teacher exper 0.299 (0.247) 0.371 (0.286) 0.462 (0.273) 0.823 (0.322) -0.199 (0.266) -0.008 (0.291) 0.438 (0.375) 0.633 (0.361)
experience sqd 4.E-04 (0.006) 0.002 (0.008) -0.005 (0.007) -0.015 (0.009) 0.016 (0.006) 0.015 (0.009) -0.003 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01)
avg teacher age -0.427 (0.199) -0.468 (0.148) -0.458 (0.146) -0.464 (0.139) -0.362 (0.176) -0.502 (0.196) -0.393 (0.227) -0.349 (0.26)
q50
father's educ 0.195 (0.069) 0.080 (0.094) 0.173 (0.072) 0.193 (0.074) 0.115 (0.077) 0.013 (0.104) 0.058 (0.068) 0.086 (0.087)
mother's educ 0.109 (0.077) 0.142 (0.089) 0.052 (0.081) 0.008 (0.106) 0.097 (0.083) 0.082 (0.115) -0.012 (0.083) -0.009 (0.097)
aspiration 1.338 (0.369) 1.134 (0.37) 0.983 (0.374) 1.100 (0.425) 0.505 (0.406) 0.562 (0.422) 0.652 (0.354) 0.545 (0.458)
ln(PCE) 0.348 (0.192) 0.542 (0.236) 0.164 (0.208) 0.150 (0.253) 0.020 (0.207) 0.263 (0.216) -0.577 (0.16) -0.538 (0.232)
private -0.188 (1.146) 1.750 (1.608) -3.239 (1.403) -2.507 (1.821) -3.634 (1.232) -1.575 (1.819) -3.443 (1.459) -1.098 (1.632)
streaming -0.745 (0.566) -1.015 (0.503) -2.106 (0.588) -1.989 (0.642) -0.317 (0.65) -0.223 (0.642) -1.400 (0.603) -1.295 (0.69)
student/teacher -0.040 (0.018) -0.035 (0.021) -0.067 (0.02) -0.068 (0.02) -0.056 (0.025) -0.051 (0.027) -0.044 (0.017) -0.044 (0.016)
teacher exper 0.649 (0.184) 0.767 (0.185) 0.530 (0.193) 0.543 (0.198) 0.404 (0.21) 0.467 (0.246) 0.323 (0.211) 0.373 (0.212)
experience sqd -0.010 (0.004) -0.012 (0.005) -0.016 (0.006) -0.015 (0.006) -0.008 (0.005) -0.009 (0.007) -0.007 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006)
avg teacher age -0.403 (0.12) -0.421 (0.111) -0.223 (0.121) -0.247 (0.122) -0.195 (0.13) -0.200 (0.117) -0.201 (0.12) -0.157 (0.12)
q90
father's educ 0.390 (0.123) 0.351 (0.141) 0.210 (0.136) 0.116 (0.149) 0.055 (0.132) -0.037 (0.154) 0.123 (0.152) 0.145 (0.144)
mother's educ 0.321 (0.126) 0.270 (0.144) 0.146 (0.107) 0.186 (0.121) 0.055 (0.155) 0.208 (0.205) -0.025 (0.161) 0.031 (0.167)
aspiration 1.125 (0.639) 1.210 (0.692) 1.801 (0.64) 1.714 (0.685) 0.840 (0.815) 1.349 (0.746) 2.065 (0.897) 2.377 (0.714)
ln(PCE) 0.768 (0.277) 0.856 (0.272) 0.225 (0.245) 0.318 (0.322) 0.401 (0.387) 0.201 (0.475) -0.025 (0.457) -0.086 (0.468)
private -1.281 (2.363) -0.887 (3.859) 0.701 (1.571) -2.610 (1.971) -1.702 (2.607) -0.573 (3.318) -6.325 (2.258) -7.464 (2.373)
streaming -1.596 (0.927) -2.136 (1.008) -3.282 (0.847) -3.165 (1.042) -2.301 (1.131) -0.947 (1.429) -2.961 (1.357) -2.577 (1.204)
student/teacher -0.024 (0.02) -0.027 (0.018) -0.059 (0.025) -0.047 (0.023) -0.033 (0.018) -0.021 (0.022) -0.051 (0.021) -0.046 (0.018)
teacher exper 0.740 (0.265) 0.924 (0.228) 0.592 (0.298) 0.522 (0.306) 1.377 (0.316) 1.057 (0.351) 0.545 (0.332) 0.038 (0.373)
experience sqd -0.015 (0.007) -0.021 (0.007) -0.016 (0.007) -0.014 (0.007) -0.036 (0.008) -0.025 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 0.013 (0.011)
avg teacher age -0.409 (0.143) -0.341 (0.152) -0.105 (0.206) -0.109 (0.218) -0.311 (0.198) -0.319 (0.211) -0.495 (0.266) -0.564 (0.275)
N 3167 2385 3167 2385 3167 2385 3167 2385

.10 Pseudo R2 0.318 0.235 0.356 0.279 0.110 0.117 0.120 0.126
.50 Pseudo R2 0.431 0.379 0.434 0.379 0.053 0.064 0.050 0.066
.90 Pseudo R2 0.425 0.406 0.364 0.362 0.059 0.062 0.072 0.083
Notes:
C. TRANSFERS
(HIGH SCHOOL PROPENSITY SAMPLE ONLY)
LEVELS GAIN
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
q10
father's educ 0.371 (0.625) 0.250 (0.632) 0.351 (0.721) 0.520 (0.655)
mother's educ -1.056 (0.712) 0.468 (0.653) -1.377 (0.574) -0.250 (0.718)
aspiration -1.312 (4.928) 0.151 (4.963) 0.064 (4.854) -1.994 (4.487)
ln(PCE) 1.921 (1.776) 1.029 (1.85) 2.177 (1.71) 0.855 (1.355)
private 9.737 (12.319) -1.108 (15.251) 13.857 (15.73) -11.864 (15.44)
streaming -0.864 (6.288) 1.976 (6.553) -5.372 (6.5) -2.390 (6.446)
student/teacher 0.378 (0.286) 0.298 (0.293) -0.082 (0.327) 0.165 (0.306)
teacher exper -3.117 (2.399) -1.294 (2.382) -1.582 (3.021) 1.235 (3.011)
experience sqd 0.082 (0.081) -0.029 (0.087) 0.013 (0.092) -0.083 (0.097)
avg teacher age 1.041 (1.572) 1.274 (1.634) 1.738 (1.897) 0.628 (2.1)
q50
father's educ 0.539 (0.525) 0.781 (0.604) 0.612 (0.529) 0.266 (0.812)
mother's educ -0.522 (0.803) 0.309 (0.711) -2.115 (0.636) -0.117 (0.877)
aspiration -0.574 (5.049) -4.180 (5.322) -2.281 (5.079) -0.316 (6.119)
ln(PCE) 2.586 (2.166) 1.260 (1.744) 4.890 (2.897) -0.190 (2.368)
private 19.928 (11.201) 0.673 (11.982) 11.424 (17.39) -3.752 (14.022)
streaming -1.273 (8.602) -4.318 (6.094) 5.285 (8.201) -3.292 (8.149)
student/teacher -0.020 (0.353) -0.091 (0.308) 0.077 (0.349) -0.010 (0.392)
teacher exper -2.143 (2.108) -1.590 (2.288) -2.628 (2.687) -1.063 (3.04)
experience sqd 0.093 (0.07) 0.029 (0.082) 0.092 (0.087) 0.073 (0.084)
avg teacher age 0.411 (1.371) 0.559 (1.46) 0.603 (1.689) -0.872 (2.253)
q90
father's educ 0.098 (0.696) 2.395 (0.777) 0.931 (0.897) 0.556 (1.188)
mother's educ 0.375 (0.738) -1.051 (0.814) -1.716 (1.024) 1.030 (1.143)
aspiration 3.269 (5.027) -2.987 (6.565) -8.608 (7.648) 11.627 (10.16)
ln(PCE) 1.999 (2.008) 1.385 (2.449) 3.404 (3.871) -4.201 (3.473)
private 10.427 (12.028) -3.295 (14.762) 13.680 (43.624) -6.389 (20.456)
streaming 3.044 (7.731) 2.861 (7.21) 10.906 (19.487) -12.507 (7.93)
student/teacher 0.017 (0.402) -0.241 (0.451) 1.269 (0.964) -0.876 (0.566)
teacher exper 0.398 (2.556) 0.433 (2.826) 0.864 (8.332) 3.183 (4.59)
experience sqd 0.020 (0.071) -0.008 (0.084) -0.002 (0.208) -0.042 (0.123)
avg teacher age -0.596 (1.852) -0.347 (2.25) -0.344 (4.504) -1.990 (2.863)
N 75 75 75 75
.10 Pseudo R2 0.679 0.659 0.260 0.173
.50 Pseudo R2 0.594 0.557 0.169 0.152
.90 Pseudo R2 0.609 0.522 0.303 0.347
Notes:
D. TRANSFER*MOVER
(HIGH SCHOOL PROPENSITY SAMPLE ONLY)
LEVELS GAIN
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
q10
father's educ 0.747 (0.527) 0.807 (0.637) 1.117 (0.643) 0.369 (0.743)
mother's educ -1.598 (0.608) -0.694 (0.798) -1.691 (0.484) -0.060 (0.669)
aspiration 2.389 (4.845) 0.868 (4.799) -1.242 (4.133) -2.905 (6.411)
ln(PCE) 0.265 (1.549) 1.726 (1.564) 1.342 (1.586) 1.011 (1.809)
private 21.765 (17.203) 7.613 (26.685) 15.546 (18.939) -20.925 (30.186)
streaming -0.209 (6.999) 10.068 (8.327) 6.029 (7.196) -5.467 (8.471)
student/teacher 0.021 (0.309) 0.543 (0.423) 0.100 (0.407) 0.054 (0.38)
teacher exper 4.168 (2.67) -0.542 (3.077) 4.246 (3.321) 0.623 (3.762)
experience sqd -0.029 (0.106) 0.003 (0.121) 0.021 (0.111) -0.120 (0.14)
avg teacher age -1.978 (1.521) 0.187 (1.741) -3.150 (2.118) 1.645 (2.182)
q50
father's educ 0.753 (0.679) 1.042 (0.561) 1.028 (0.52) 0.358 (0.706)
mother's educ -0.444 (0.569) 0.407 (0.519) -1.641 (0.598) -0.415 (0.873)
aspiration 2.068 (3.83) -6.391 (6.478) -3.898 (4.332) 0.368 (7.653)
ln(PCE) 1.526 (1.847) -1.040 (1.554) -0.216 (1.837) -0.235 (2.884)
private 27.635 (12.209) 7.983 (19.614) 49.939 (17.95) 3.141 (25.452)
streaming -1.272 (6.172) 5.181 (7.442) -3.067 (6.091) -0.378 (14.017)
student/teacher 0.032 (0.219) 0.211 (0.343) 0.278 (0.312) 0.415 (0.487)
teacher exper -0.422 (1.87) 1.023 (2.501) -1.518 (2.442) 1.116 (4.31)
experience sqd 0.045 (0.058) -0.051 (0.088) 0.190 (0.084) 0.053 (0.125)
avg teacher age 0.174 (1.413) 0.321 (1.736) -0.823 (1.931) -1.876 (2.563)
q90
father's educ 1.534 (0.61) 1.193 (0.897) 1.037 (0.762) -0.632 (1.217)
mother's educ -0.143 (0.565) -0.802 (0.831) -0.841 (0.848) -0.371 (1.156)
aspiration -4.770 (3.416) 4.346 (8.475) -5.244 (5.407) 16.564 (8.605)
ln(PCE) 0.478 (1.719) -1.575 (2.808) 2.093 (2.855) -2.646 (3.099)
private 24.742 (9.423) 21.287 (21.201) 25.158 (15.262) 16.476 (23.244)
streaming 6.167 (5.648) 3.579 (8.614) 10.318 (9.537) -5.573 (12.375)
student/teacher 0.276 (0.243) 0.199 (0.421) 0.738 (0.403) 0.422 (0.61)
teacher exper -0.270 (2.276) 3.349 (3.639) -0.823 (3.203) 6.240 (4.476)
experience sqd 0.071 (0.065) 0.006 (0.124) 0.106 (0.084) -0.011 (0.126)
avg teacher age -0.703 (1.657) -1.964 (2.055) -0.503 (2.752) -3.958 (2.96)
N 75 75 75 75
.10 Pseudo R2 0.672 0.661 0.318 0.179
.50 Pseudo R2 0.644 0.602 0.280 0.155
.90 Pseudo R2 0.662 0.529 0.475 0.504
Notes:

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The Effects of Family Background and School Quality

on Low and High Achievers:

September 30, 2003

Keywords: education, school quality

III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK: The Education Production Function

Movers, transfers, and stayers

Two-Stage Least Squares

A. Results using movers to control for selection.

B. Results using not-near to control for selection

ALL Index Children Younger Siblings

Number of Children 3326 1647 539 128 492 384 126 10

Type of Household Structure in 1994

Mother's educational attainment

1996 English score 1996-94 English score

School Attended Characteristics

Teacher Characteristics (School Avg)

1996 Math score 1996-94 Math score

Student Characteristics in 1996

Teacher Characteristics (School Avg)

SAMPLE TREATED CONTROL

Note: Means estimated over enrolled sample. Standard errors in parentheses.

non-transfer*mover transfer*mover non-transfer*mover transfer*mover

A. Using ALL MOVERS as treatment (LEVELS MODEL)

Brgy Lahug Brgy Tisa

Between t-1 and t,

Between t-1 and t,

Brgy Lahug Brgy Tisa

Panel 2A. Selection: MOVERS

Panel 2B. Selection: NOT ATTENDING NEAREST

Panel 2D. Selection: TRANSFERRED TO SCHOOL OUTSIDE BRGY RESIDED

Sample attrition and selection

Live Births in 33 Sample Barangays of Metro Cebu 3,289

Live Births in Metro Cebu with Birth Interview 3,085

Still in Sample When Child is 8 Years Old 2,231

Still in Sample When Child is 13 Years Old 2,229

TOTAL OBSERVATIONS (INDEX AND SIBLING CHILDREN) WITH TEST SCORES

Of which: Missing School Information 905 (27.21 percent)

p lim δ$ G = p lim δ$ L = δ + Qxx cov( X , u )

δ$ G = ( X ' X )−1 X '(Yt − Yt −1 )

N 3232 2052 3232 2052 3232 2052 3232 2052

N 3167 2385 3167 2385 3167 2385 3167 2385

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non-transfermover transfermover non-transfermover transfermover