Nato
Nato
Nato
2018
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For almost 70 years, NATO has helped provide security and stability in an often
unsecure and unstable world. As we look to 2035 and beyond in the Strategic
Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report, we see more uncertainty and challenges
ahead. We should take an active role to shape the future, as it will be the legacy we
leave behind. Simply put, we must do what we can today to help the next generation
uphold and defend the core values that we hold dear as an Alliance. This is our
shared responsibility, and one we should not take lightly. We must not be afraid of
the future. We must embrace it.
NATO needs to continuously and simultaneously operate and adapt to remain fit-for
purpose, now and through the foreseeable future. To that end, the Framework for
Future Alliance Operations (FFAO) advises NATO Nations and Partner Nations on
both Warfighting and Warfare Development. This document helps to inform the
Alliance of opportunities to improve its defence and deterrence posture together with
its ability to project stability, ensuring it remains continuously proactive, ready, and
responsive. Perhaps most importantly, this document describes how NATO forces
can keep the edge and retain the ability to defeat our potential adversaries on the
battlefields of the future.
We would like to express our personal thanks to all those who provided their wise
counsel, including Member and Partner Nations, Alliance leadership, Commands,
Centres of Excellence, industry, academia, think tanks, and all others who supported
this effort. Thank you!
�P�"--ilz
Curtis M. Scaparrotti Denis Mercier
General, U.S. Army General, French Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 4
Introduction 6
Chapter 1 10
Chapter 2 19
Chapter 3 24
Way Ahead 40
Annexes
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Since its creation in 1949, NATO has provided security in the Euro-Atlantic
area and contributed toward the further development of international relations built
on trust. It has also worked to develop a common understanding of difficult global
security problems and promoted conditions of stability and well-being. Today, NATO
faces a wide-array of complex challenges from many directions. As NATO prepares
to meet the future head on, forces should continually seek opportunities to ensure
they remain proactive, ready, and responsive. This document provides best military
advice that identifies the required characteristics and abilities of forces that need to
be available to the Alliance to retain the military edge and prevail in future
operations, address challenges, and seize opportunities of the future.
2. Building on the foundation of FFAO 2015, this edition includes new discussion
on the nature of war and character of conflict, Instability Situations, legal and ethical
questions, and opportunities. The FFAO 2018 also includes an overarching Central
Idea, refined Strategic Military Perspectives, Enabling Elements, and refined Military
Implications. In addition, this document includes new emphasis on nuclear issues,
terrorism, human captial, mission command, cross-domain operations and effects,
full-spectrum cyberspace operations and space issues, and new disruptive
technologies including artificial intelligence as a game-changer.
3. Overall, the future security environment through 2035 and beyond will be
dynamic and ambiguous. Increasing complexity and uncertainty will present NATO
with a range of challenges. Taking into account the anticipated characteristics of
conflict in the future, a series of Instability INSTABILITY SITUATIONS*
Situations are defined that could result in an
WMD Proliferation/Threat/Use
Alliance decision to employ military forces.
Conventional War
These Instability Situations range from high-
end conflict to natural disaster and are used Threat Escalation
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INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
AIM
SCOPE
10. Using the SFA report as its foundation, the FFAO recommends abilities that
NATO forces should develop through 2035 and beyond. The Strategic Commands 3
completed the first edition of this document in 2015. The Military Committee (MC)
concluded that the FFAO can be used to inform the NATO Defence Planning
Process (NDPP) and expand it into the long-term. The MC also concluded that the
Strategic Commanders should develop the next iterations of the SFA and the FFAO
1
NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, (22 May 2017).
2
NATO, Strategic Concept 2010, as approved at the Lisbon Summit.
3
Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) are the two
Strategic Commands.
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in time to inform the subsequent cycles of the NDPP. The North Atlantic Council
noted these conclusions on 20 November 2015.4
4
MCM 0199-2015, Military Committee Advice on the Utilization of the Framework for Future Alliance
Operations (NU); PO(2015)0624 North Atlantic Council Notation (NU).
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12. The FFAO describes what NATO forces need in terms of future abilities. 5
Abilities are defined as critical attributes needed to achieve success in the execution
of a future military activity. Abilities describe what NATO should be able to
accomplish to cover the full range of the Alliance military missions and to guarantee
NATO military effectiveness and freedom of action. In this context, abilities are not
intended to restrain formal capability development processes. This document does
not prioritize the abilities NATO forces will need, as prioritization is part of a classified
process. Due to the nature of forecasting, it will be necessary to continually review,
revise and challenge the conclusions herein as events of the future unfold.
13. This document can be used to inform both NATO and its member Nations in:
14. This cycle of the LTMT programme is oriented on 2035. This date is outside of
the current procurement cycle, yet not so far in the future that conclusions become
implausible or unrealistic. This document is designed to complement, rather than
compete with, other products developed by NATO and countries.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
15. The team that helped develop this document assumed that NATO
foundational documents would remain unchanged, including the core tasks
described in the Strategic Concept. The team also assumed that the SFA, and other
references used in development of the FFAO, are valid indicators of the future.
METHOD
16. ACT developed this document in concert with Allied Command Operations
(ACO). The project used a qualitative, focus-group methodology that brought
together military and civilian subject matter experts through a series of workshops,
independent reviews, and experimentation (e.g., Urbanization, Protection of Civilians
experiments). From 2016 to 2018, the programme of work included four workshops:
5
See Annex F.
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17. The process began with the development of the Future Security Environment
and Instability Situations derived from the trends and defence and security
implications described in the SFA 2017 report.6 These Instability Situations provided
the basis for Strategic Military Perspectives, and Military Implications. None was
prioritized; prioritization is under the remit of the NDPP.
18. ACT circulated each chapter through representatives of all NATO Nations and
appropriate NATO bodies and included their input and recommendations.
Additionally, the document was reviewed through an independent concept test within
ACT. Finally, the document underwent a line-by-line review by the Strategic
Commands prior to final signature.
19. The FFAO 2015 was a first-of-its-kind document within the Alliance. In a short
period, it grew in importance and served to inform discussions concerning the future.
As such, in the revision of this document, the overall intent was to retain the best
parts of the previous version while applying lessons learned, clarifying key concepts,
filling known gaps, and covering new topics.7
6
See Annex A – Summary of SFA 2017 Report.
7
NATO-ACT, FFAO Lucerne Conference Report 2016.
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INTRODUCTION
23. The SFA describes the Future Security Environment as dynamic, ambiguous,
and uncertain. The world is transforming in multiple, yet connected, areas at an
exponential rate. The convergence of several political, social, technological,
economic, and environmental trends is redefining the global security context. Driven
mostly by rapid changes in technology, the world is more interconnected. As people
communicate more than ever before, the events and decisions in one region
influence the lives of others across the rest of the world. Ageing populations, with
their attendant health and pension costs, are gradually straining social welfare
systems. Military budgets may be stressed by mounting public debt in both
developed and developing economies. The global power shift continues toward
multi-polarity. While informational and economic globalization is intensifying,
disinformation, polarization, nationalist reactions and anti-globalization sentiments
are also growing. Additionally, the effects of climate change are more evident and
pervasive than ever before. As these developments increase uncertainty and
complexity, they present challenges to the capacity of individual states to manage a
mounting set of interconnected problems.9
FUTURE CHALLENGES
24. In the study of war and armed conflict, there are some factors that change
over time and others that remain the same. By its nature, war has always been a
contest of wills driven by fear, honour and interest.10 In the traditional definition of
war, three key factors interact: (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the
play of chance, fog, and friction; and (3) its use for political purposes.11 War also
occurs within a larger social, political and economic context based on the interplay
8
NATO-ACT, FFAO Bydgoszcz, Poland Conference Report 2017. Please note that the entirety of this
chapter was developed using the outcomes of this report unless specified otherwise with notation.
9
NATO-ACT, Strategic Foresight Analysis, 2017, See Annex A.
10
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.
11
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1984).
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and balance of the government, people and the military. This will likely remain valid
in the future, however, as evidenced by current threats involving non-state actors,
the character of armed conflict changes over time. Factors such as technological
advances, new concepts of operation (e.g., global strike, hybrid, and cyberspace
operations) and shifts in the geopolitical landscape will greatly influence the Future
Security Environment.12
25. Since its founding, NATO has seen many shifts in the character of armed
conflict. Although it is impossible to predict with absolute certainty what the future will
be like, analysis indicates that future armed conflict may be characterized by:
12
Colin Gray, “War – Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity”, Parameters. Implications. See
Annex D – Technology Implications.
13
As of 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, space is currently not a separate domain recognized,
however, NATO nations have different opinions on this and further discussion is appropriate as
changes unfold in the Future Security Environment.
14
Also known as “generational conflict”.
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Instability Situations
15
See Annex D – Summary of Urbanization Study; See OECD Definition of Global Commons.
16
This could occur in many areas including cyberspace, autonomous systems, robotics, hypersonic
weapons, digital data, artificial/sentient intelligence, communication, surveillance, and electronic
warfare; See Annex B – Technology Implications.
17
This could include hypersonic, electro-magnetic pulse, tailored biological weapons, nano-
technology, See Annex D – Technology Implications.
18
Instability is a state of likely change and not all instability will result in an Alliance decision to employ
military forces.
19
The weapons will like be targeted on areas of vital interest to NATO.
20
See Annex B – Technology Implications.
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21
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Irrelevance of Traditional Warfare?” War On the Rocks.
22
ICRC, Violence and the Use of Force.
23
See glossary.
24
NATO, AAP-6.
25
Melissa Clarke, “Globally, Terrorism is on the Rise; Institute for Economics and Peace.”
26 NATO, AAP-6
27 Global Terrorism Index 2015, November 2015
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28
See OECD Definition of Global Commons.
29
Lee Billings, “War in Space May Be Closer than Ever,” Scientific American.
30
Sarah Kuranda, “Experts: Recent Critical Infrastructure Attacks a Sign of Major Security Challenges
Coming in 2016.”
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27. Numerous novel legal and ethical questions should be discussed today so
that forces are prepared for future challenges.35 How does NATO apply the existing
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and other legal and ethical constraints given
advances in technology and the rapidly changing character of conflict across the
31
Stian Kjeksrud, Alexander Beadle, and Petter Lindqvist, Protecting Civilians from Violence. NATO
Policy for the Protection of Civilians.
32
Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Refugees and Migrants: Europe's Past History and Future Challenges.
33
Regina Parker, “Prevent Disease to Prevent War,” The Strategy Bridge.
34
Peter Baxter, “Catastrophes – Natural and Manmade Disasters,” Conflict and Catastrophe
Medicine.
35
St. Anne’s College, Human Enhancement and the Law Regulating for the Future, The Royal
Academy of Engineering, Autonomous Systems: Social, Legal and Ethical Issuessystems-report;
Phillip W. Gray, Weaponized Non-Combatants: A Moral Conundrum of Future Asymmetrical Warfare,;
ICRC, What limits does the law of war impose on cyberspace attacks?,
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potential Instability Situations, understanding that adversaries may not apply the
same rules?36 Some of the specific questions include the following:
36
LOAC includes principles of humanity, necessity, distinction, and proportionality.
37
See Annex B – Technology Implications.
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FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES
Technological Advances
28. Innovation is the adoption of new technologies and new ideas. Innovation and
technological changes will offer military advantages to allow NATO forces to
maintain the edge. If not capitalized on, NATO forces could lose this advantage to
adversaries in the future. Technological advances are likely to be greatest in five
broad areas, known as BRINE: (1) Biology, biotechnology and medicine; (2)
Robotics, artificial intelligence, new smart weapons and human enhancement; (3)
Information and communication technology, surveillance and cognitive science; (4)
Nanotechnology and advanced materials; and (5) Energy technology. However,
other advances, such as additive manufacturing (3D printing) and hypersonics, could
play a role as well. These developments will likely have an impact on organizational
structures, culture, and processes. For example, increased automation used properly
could result in fewer casualties, and additive manufacturing could increase
sustainability and reduce the logistics footprint.
Expanding Partnerships
30. Although states will continue to develop new technologies, in many areas the
greatest advances will likely come from commercial entities. The degree of civil-
military cooperation will vary between nations, but overall, relationships with
academia and industry become more critical to maintain the military advantage. This
includes sharing information and building trust with traditional and non-traditional
entities, such as non-defence industry.
38
NATO-ACT, Strategic Foresight Analysis 2015 Update Report; NATO-ACT, Strategic Foresight
Analysis 2013. NATO-ACT, Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017.
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Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), forces could increase their
situational awareness, promote regional security, deter conflict, and deescalate
conflict situations.
Addressing Instability
33. Because operations will more likely occur in densely populated areas and
against adversaries that hide within civilian populations, future forces may have more
interaction with people.39 Therefore, what they do or fail to do will have a greater
impact on human reactions. Properly cultivated and applied, a warfighting mind-set
balanced with a humanistic mind-set could improve how the forces act within the
civilian context. If they can influence population and the human aspects of conflict in
the right way, it will strengthen NATO legitimacy both domestically and abroad.40
SUMMARY
34. Overall, the Future Security Environment through 2035 and beyond will be
dynamic and ambiguous, as well as increasingly complex and uncertain. This future
will present NATO with a range of challenges and opportunities. Taking into account
the anticipated characteristics of conflict in the future, a series of Instability Situations
are described, each of which could result in an Alliance decision to employ forces.
These Instability Situations range from high-end conflict to natural disaster and are
used in the FFAO as lenses through which to analyse and assess what
characteristics (Chapter 2) and abilities (Chapter 3) are required in the future. In
addition, study of the Future Security Environment, especially in areas of artificial
intelligence, autonomy and human augmentation/enhancement, raises novel legal
and ethical questions that need consideration today so that forces can still apply the
law of armed conflict in new contexts. However, along with the challenges and
questions, there are also opportunities that NATO could seize in the future and it
should be prepared to do so.
39
See Annex C – Summary of Urbanization Study.
40
U.S. Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations, (April 10, 2017); NATO BI-SC
Directive, 040-001 Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command
Structure, 16 May 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
CENTRAL IDEA
36. As the Alliance continues to maintain its cohesion – its centre of gravity, 42
military forces must develop characteristics and abilities to execute the core tasks to
address Instability Situations in the security environment through 2035 and beyond.
To remain fit-for-purpose, the Strategic Commanders recommend that the central
idea that guides transformation is as follows:
To keep the military edge and prevail in future operations, NATO forces
must continually evolve, adapt, and innovate and be credible, networked,
aware, agile, and resilient.
37. If forces can keep the military edge, NATO will have the advantage over
potential adversaries. Keeping the edge means NATO has to be proactive and have
the best human capital, technology, education, and training. Prevailing in future
operations means that forces are able to accomplish their assigned missions and
affect the will of the adversary through a combination of interdomain effects. Through
critical thinking, continual evolution, adaptation and innovation, they will learn and
grow to conduct future operations more efficiently and effectively. To achieve the
central idea, forces will need to be credible, networked, aware, agile, and resilient.
41
NATO-ACT, FFAO Rome Conference Report 2017. Please note that the entirety of this chapter
was developed using the outcomes of this report unless specified otherwise with notation.
42
See Annex C – Cohesion Perspectives Project.
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Credible
38. NATO forces are credible when internal and external stakeholders recognize
leaders, units, and equipment as possessing the ability to effectively deter and
defend against threats from any direction. The credibility of NATO as an Alliance is
an essential component to prevent conflict and accomplish the mission. NATO
requires credibility at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) and across all of
the core tasks. How potential adversaries perceive political will, cohesion,
professionalism, capabilities, readiness, and lethality may determine their course of
action. Credibility changes over time and is influenced by many factors, including
force quantity, quality, integrity, how well they can achieve dominance/superiority
across the domains, and if they can achieve assigned objectives.
Networked
41. Networking is the interaction of the NATO Command Structure, NATO Force
Structure, and NATO Nations with each other, Partners Nations and external actors,
drawing on each other’s abilities. This is enabled by common principles and
standards that contribute to interoperability. NATO forces can network to gain
operational efficiencies, including improved operational tempo and command and
control. Networking helps NATO act in concert with a variety of state and non-state
actors to address future security threats holistically. Networking suggests
cooperative, persuasive, persistent and proactive engagement with organizations
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and actors, both inside and outside of the Alliance, enabling forces to anticipate
crises as well as leverage a wide-range of capabilities. NATO could collaborate with
non-defence industry, which could help NATO identify best practices, reduce risk,
and increase capacity.
Aware
44. In the future, data will increasingly become a strategic resource. Using
technology for the collection and processing/analysing of large quantities of
information, and the dissemination of the products in a comprehensible and easy to
use fashion, will be key to awareness. In addition, forces will have to focus on
producing all-source actionable intelligence by enhancing human intelligence
collection and human network analysis. Information fusion will be vital to allow
leaders to make timely and relevant decisions, exploit possibilities, and address
threats at an early stage. Understanding the environment and associated cultures
should enable forces to make better-informed decisions concerning military options.
Agile
45. Forces have agility if they can effectively respond to dynamic and complex
operational challenges as well as seize opportunities with appropriate and timely
actions. NATO may continue to fight highly adaptive adversaries, equipped with a
mix of low-tech and advanced technology, that use novel, and ever-changing
methods to achieve their aims. To respond appropriately, future forces may need to
be multi-purpose by design, capable of conducting many types of operations. They
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will need as few operational caveats as possible if they are to maximise utility and
agility.
47. Radical, ideologically motivated hostile actors (including terrorists) will employ
long-term, indirect approaches to affect NATO populations. Forces should seek to
disrupt this strategy by sharing real-time intelligence, denying access to WMD, and
supporting disruption of networks and safe havens. Therefore, NATO forces will
require great agility to support the fight against terrorism within Projecting Stability
efforts while continuing to fulfil the traditional deterrence and defence role.
Resilient
48. A resilient force has sufficient capability, capacity, and will to endure adversity
over time, retain the ability to respond, and to recover quickly from strategic shocks
or operational setbacks. Many future Instability Situations are global in scope and
may demand increased resilience from Alliance forces and the societies and
systems they defend. Resilience encompasses many factors including structures,
systems, and processes, as well as leadership, motivation, determination, and
training.
49. Resilience requires assured access to the global commons and control of
lines of communication. In all circumstances, forces must possess the ability to
sustain themselves. If necessary, they may be required to coordinate sustainment for
local populations. Here, pre-aligned coordination measures between civilian and
military authorities are needed. The Alliance may also need to provide decentralised
sustainment to all echelons of its dispersed military units by expanding support
networks, local contracting, on-site manufacturing, and host nation support. Forces
also need robust communications infrastructure to collect, process, and disseminate
information throughout a crisis despite potential interruptions.
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ENABLING ELEMENTS
50. In addition to the characteristics described above, future forces will need key
enabling elements to accomplish the core tasks and address instability in any
security environment. One such enabling element is strong and sustained public and
political support, which should manifest as forward-looking policies, legitimacy,
proper authorisations, robust legal frameworks, strong leadership, and timely
decision-making. Another element is national civil preparedness, which if improved,
will serve to make the Alliance even more resilient and increase the military potential
that a nation could apply elsewhere. Additionally, NATO forces require timely and
effective defence/security investments and Defence Planning aligned with the Level
of Ambition and leveraging new concepts and technology.43
SUMMARY
51. This chapter describes the Strategic Commanders’ best military advice to
guide transformation and allow forces to adress challenges and seize opportunities
of the future. It introduces the Central Idea: to keep the military edge and prevail in
future operations, NATO forces must continually evolve, adapt, and innovate and be
credible, networked, aware, agile, and resilient. These characteristics should guide
force development in the future. Finally, the chapter recognizes that there are
external enabling elements crucial to success in the future, but outside the direct
control of the military structure. NATO leaders will need to inform and advise key
stakeholders within Nations to ensure that necessary enabling elements are in place,
thereby setting the conditions for success in future operations.
43
See Annex B – Technology Implications.
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INTRODUCTION
53. Military Implications are best military advice intended to inform Alliance
transformation, including policy development, long-term requirements, and capability
development. Simply put, Military Implications are factors that planners need to take
into account during detailed long-term planning and decision-making. Although
strongly recommended, Military Implications are neither defined requirements, nor
are they expressed as required capabilities.
54. In some areas, abilities needed today will remain important to the future force
and will endure whilst evolving. Other abilities will come from the need to adapt to
threats and the changing character of armed conflict. Finally, some abilities will come
from innovative ideas or technology developments that are potential game-changers.
55. These Military Implications are written in a format aligned with the NATO
Capability Hierarchy to support defence planning.44 The NATO Capability Hierarchy
describes the Main Capability Areas of Prepare, Project, Engage, Protect, Sustain,
Inform and Consultation, Command and Control (C3). Analysis of the Instability
Situations indicates that these areas will endure and, therefore, this document
mirrors this approach with its description of Main Ability Areas. These areas provide
an interconnected network of abilities that allows forces to perform the core tasks
and address Instability Situations as needed (see figure 2).
44
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
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56. In general, NATO military operational activities fall into the Main Ability Areas
across a theoretical curve of military intervention (see figure 3).45 This diagram is
only representational and not all operations in the future will necessarily follow this
construct. Some Main Ability Areas endure throughout all stages where others occur
only in some stages based on the overall intent.
45
This is a conceptual description, some stages my overlap based on the operational contexts of the
future, some activities may occur cross-stages; NATO-ACT, FFAO Stavanger Conference Report
2017.
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57. The primary goal of prevention is to keep Instability Situations from arising
and prevent escalation by a combination of diplomatic, informational, military,
economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities. However, if an
Instability Situation does arise, forces need to be prepared, trained, and ready to
deal with a wide array of challenges and to protect themselves from hostile action. In
this stage, it is important to inform key stakeholders to improve awareness, increase
resilience, and establish and maintain robust command and control structures.
NATO should use consultation mechanisms to maximize trust and cohesion as part
of a comprehensive approach along with the other instruments of power.
58. In the intervention stage, forces must respond at the appropriate time to
achieve the political-military objectives and desired end-state. This means that they
must have the ability to project and engage across all domains, achieve mission
goals, as well as protect themselves and civilians. Forces must be able to sustain
operations over the long term. During this stage, it is important that strategic
communication precedes action and mission command is used to maximize initiative
within the commander’s intent. As the force achieves its military objectives, there is
an opportunity to begin to influence wider issues. The political-military actions that
NATO takes or fails to take during this window of opportunity may affect the security
situation for years to come. Military commanders must continue to provide advice
with the aim of receiving clear political guidance so that they can adapt to conditions
on the ground in an increasingly complex future.
59. During stabilization, military forces may gradually return to a prevention role
whilst the root causes of the instability are addressed socially and politically. They
must have the ability to engage across all domains, sustain themselves, support
select non-military efforts, and communicate with key stakeholders to improve
capability and capacity. Due to the character of conflict in the future, forces may find
themselves in this stage for a long period of time. As appropriate, the next stage is
transition which includes redeployment and transfer of authority to other appropriate
actors. Due to the complex and dynamic nature of the future, these stages may not
be sequential and lines between them may become blurred as operations unfold.
60. Throughout all stages, forces will need to maintain robust command and
control structures as well as protect themselves and the civilian population. Over
time, the focus returns to prevention and maintaining stability. It is important to note
that not all activities that NATO will undertake fall within an operational construct,
however clear guidance, detailed planning, and adequate assessments are still
needed to generate and employ capabilities.
FUTURE ABILITIES
Prepare
61. Preparation is the ability to establish and sustain sufficient and effective
presence at the right time, keeping sufficient flexibility to adapt to possible changes
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62. To prepare for future operations, forces will require proper education, realistic
training and exercises; and must train as they intend to fight. This includes
simulation, experimentation and testing of new systems, concepts and Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Preparation should range from training basic
military skills to large-scale, high-intensity combined/joint operations against a
conventional opponent capable of operating across the entire spectrum. 46 Within this
range fall mission-specific exercises and training needed to address various
Instability Situations and enable units to reach the desired readiness level. This
should include the ability to operate independently in degraded operating
environments. Forces could integrate emerging technologies into their training and
exercises with a mix of realistic live, virtual, and constructive simulations to improve
effects, whilst reducing cost and environmental impact. Finally, to retain the edge,
they will need the ability to integrate lessons learned and best practices into
preparation.
62. Forces should be able to make creative use of human capital. Because of
increased globalization, they should improve their ability to understand cultural
differences including language, religion, history, and habits. This may require the
ability to integrate additional assets (e.g., reservists) and to draw on national
expertise such as governance, healthcare, law enforcement, education, and other
specializations. 47 Due to changing demographics, recruitment efforts will face
increasing challenges, but automation and artificial intelligence may offer new
solutions. NATO forces will require the ability to monitor and exploit innovations in
human physical and mental enhancement. This also includes the ability to identify
human augmentation applications and risks, including overreliance on technology
and to explore impacts of human augmentation on the organization and individuals.48
46
In the future this might include hybrid, irregular warfare, cyber, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) in all
domains, nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical, dense urban areas, artificial intelligence, and
autonomous systems environment, and counter-lawfare (see glossary).
47
Includes support through reach-back.
48
See Annex B – Technology Implications.
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63. Forces will require the ability to develop leaders with greater (geo-) political,
cultural, technological, informational, and social awareness in order to better identify
and mitigate risk while capitalising on opportunities. Specifically, this will be
important in the areas of autonomy, robotics, artifical intelligence, advanced data
analytics, cyberspace, and space systems. Forces will also require the ability to
foster a culture of awareness to keep pace with and exploit technological advances.
Personnel will need to understand technology and how to integrate it into operations
through new concepts, doctrine, and legal frameworks.
64. Within the area of capability development falls military acquisitions and
procurement, which should be based on a shared understanding of future trends and
an assessment of the implications for millitary forces. NATO will require the ability to
coordinate closely with Member Nations to ensure assigned forces are properly
equipped, interoperable, and have the necessary capabilities to perform all required
tasks. The definition of requirements and development of agile acquistion processes
will be critical to capability development and maintaining the technological edge of
the Alliance.
65. Within this area also fall the development and inclusion of best practices or
innovative ideas into military activities. Forces will need the ability to process and
use huge amounts of data and improve a lessons learned network, connecting
tactical through strategic levels, to collect, proccess, and share TTPs and best
practices. In addition, they will need to maintain or improve interoperability by using
common standards and aligning concepts, doctrine, TTPs, and best practices. This
also should include the ability to conduct near real-time analysis of NATO operations
and lessons learned and the ability to conduct experiments that include new
challenges and opportunities (such as artificial intelligence, human augmentation,
autonomous systems, cyberspace, hybrid, and space warfare).
67. Forces must have the ability to operate and maintain installations and
facilities. Additionally, they must have the ability to provide strategic assessment,
49
This includes both governmental and non-governmental organizations.
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Project
68. Project is the ability to conduct strategic (re) deployment and Reception,
Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI) in support of Alliance operations
and missions. Project ensures the relevant units are in the right place at the right
time to accomplish political-military objectives.
69. In the future, forces will need to have the ability to assemble, prepare, move
to loading points, and embark at designated points. Even during Instability
Situations, NATO must be able to mobilise and mount joint forces globally. In the
future, NATO needs to maintain assured access to land, sea, air, and space
(including the ability to launch) as a pre-requisite to mounting. Additionally, activities
in the cyberspace domain and the information environment will set the conditions to
project forces.
70. NATO will need the ability to move troops or equipment over strategic
distances to a place or position at the right time to conduct operations.
Consequently, NATO joint forces must be able to deploy, sustain, and redeploy
where and when needed. Equally important will be the need to guarantee access to
sufficient strategic lift. Additionally, it will be necessary to rapidly deploy advanced
units and liaison capabilities in order to project timely physical presence and prepare
the ground for follow on operations. Finally, forces may need to leverage civilian
expertise, including critical enablers and civilian crisis response teams, to facilitate
and enhance NATO deployment/redeployment.
71. The Alliance will need to plan and provide RSOI-facilities (in concert with host
nations) to support the timely transition of deployment, including personnel,
equipment, and materials. Forces should also work with Member Nations, Partner
Nations, and non-NATO entities to provide robust and flexible reception and staging.
Engage
73. Engage can be described as performing the tasks that contribute directly to
the achievement of mission goals, including all abilities required to defeat
adversaries. Engage is important because it is the fundamental value-adding
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74. To accomplish the core tasks in the future, forces will need to be able to
manoeuvre jointly to gain advantage over an adversary, maintain access to the
global commons and conduct the full range of operations. This includes the ability to
counter and defeat a conventional adversary through large-scale and high-intensity
operations. Also, the ability to affect the adversary on day one and gain and maintain
superiority or dominance accross domains is critical. The overall aim is to create a
cross-domain effect on the adversary.
75. Forces must be mobile and able to operate across all domains and in many
different types of environments (e.g., arctic, virtual, space, littoral, megacities,
subterranean).50 In the same way, they should be able to conduct geographically
dispersed operations across large areas. This includes the ability to quickly employ
discreet units with small-footprints in uncertain or contested environments.
Furthermore, they will need to conduct operations with enhanced manoeuvrability
including all necessary enablers and supporting elements.
77. Forces must manage the efficient application of joint effects to deny, degrade,
or destroy adversary formations, facilities, and infrastructure throughout the
operational area, thus enabling decisive manoeuvre whilst avoiding collateral effects.
78. Joint Effects require the ability to maintain and use a broad range of
conventional capabilities while taking advantage of new technologies. This could be
realized by considering the holistic requirements of conducting Joint Targeting, which
includes trained and qualified personnel, robust intelligence, as well as interoperable
Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and targeting software within NATO
and the Nations. Forces must be adequately trained and qualified to perform the
entire targeting cycle process and have the supporting intelligence to perform target
system and target audience analysis. Investment in CIS that allows close
cooperation and information sharing will enhance NATO ability to conduct targeting.
An emphasis should be placed on using extremely precise, discriminatory systems to
50
See Annex C – Summary of Urbanization Study.
51
This could include partners in the future such as private companies.
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79. There are certain concerns for the future. Units will likely seek to create
effects in mega-cities or densely-populated areas which pose a challenge as
targeting must be performed with minimum possible collateral damage. They must
find the right balance between given tasks and rules of engagement to accurately
deliver effects at the proper time and place. Forces should have the ability to conduct
counter irregular and hybrid warfare campaigns, potentially over long-durations, in
forward deployed, austere environments.
81. Due to the increasing ability of hostile actors to influence populations, forces
need the ability to detect and characterize threats accurately, and counter with non-
lethal effects. They must better use all available channels to counter hostile actors
and coordinate timely joint effects through joint targeting. To this end, they will need
to integrate and synchronize information activities to create effects on perceptions,
and shape opinions and decision making. Additionally, they should work with other
actors to provide the military contribution towards a comprehensive approach,
promoting internationally-accepted norms (e.g., gender related, building integrity). 52
Some Instability Situations, including pandemic and mass migration, may require
forces to employ innovative methods in order to support wider international
objectives and priorities.
52
NATO/EAPC Policy for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and
Related Resolutions (PO(2014)0253) and the NATO/EAPC Action Plan for the Implementation of
UNSCR1325 and Related Resolutions (EAPC(C)D(2014)0019).
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Sustain
83. Overall, forces must have adequate military engineering support to enable
operations to gain and maintain freedom of movement and support force protection.
Military engineering must be able to work in a multi-disciplinary fashion to support
military and civil critical infrastructure (re-) construction operations such as
humanitarian relief and support to civil authorities. Additionally, in the future, forces
should have the ability to maintain extensive interoperability and integrate with
civilian contractors to complement organic military engineering capacity.
84. In the future, networked military forces should have the ability to operate with
small multi-capable units in a distributed or logistically autonomous manner. This
could be enabled by autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, artificial
intelligence, and other emerging technologies. This includes the ability to develop
and use more modular and flexible logistics structures with common stock systems
and procedures. Also, forces should have the ability to conduct operations from
forward areas with limited logistic support and reduced host-nation support.
Therefore, they should be able to use sea-based logistics during operations to
increase agility and resilience, and manage prioritization of logistic resources.
85. Forces should have the ability to identify and use a network of military and
non-military partners to help sustain multi-domain operations with scalable
maintenance. Within the framework of Building Integrity, the use local/regional
commercial vendors, third-party maintenance and automated health monitoring of
equipment in the future (e.g., digital twinning) is required. Here, protection of
sensitive data will become increasingly important. Three areas with game-changing
potential are the use of additive manufacturing, autonomous repair, and remote
expert support. Finally, forces should retain self-reliance on National support whilst
remaining agile enough to pool resources.
86. In the future, forces should minimize logistics footprints ensuring uninterrupted
logistic support, and where necessary, create backup sustainment systems. This
includes the ability to improve sustainment and logistics, leveraging technologies and
autonomous systems and, where necessary, balancing the length of logistics chains
against operational risk. It also includes the ability to establish, maintain, and use
dispersed logistics hubs and the ability to contract local sustainment or use host
nation support. Forces should make use of appropriate logistics techniques to
reduce, exploit, and convert waste to increase self-sustainment and reduce
environmental impact. To capitalise on some of the foreseen future opportunities,
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forces should have the ability to reduce unnecessary redundancy and streamline
sustainment by leveraging advanced technologies (e.g. advanced data
analytics/artificial intelligence/in-theatre manufacturing/3D printing, block chain
technology, digital twinning). This also includes the ability to leverage energy
efficiency technology.
87. In the future, dispersed operations will require assured access to ground, air,
and maritime transportation assets to support in-theatre sustainment and movement.
New technologies, such as driverless vechicles, autonomous delivery, better fuel
efficiency, and manned-unmanned teaming may change the way this is done. This
includes the ability for NATO to coordinate and manage movement and transport
with both military and civilian assets while mitigating risks to resilience.
88. In the future, forces will continue to require the ability to implement medical
standards/best practices, adopt new technologies, and explore innovative ideas
through training and preparation. They will require the ability to improve all aspects
of human resilience, including mental health and survivability, so that individuals are
able to retain flexibility and cope with the physical and cognitive stressors of the
Future Security Environment. In addition, they will require the ability to assist in
delivery of effective and efficient care in remote, austere, and degraded
environments by managing medical information and employing new technologies
(e.g., wearable sensors, personalised medicine, augmented cognition, smart textiles,
human-machine critical care teams, and automated surgery). Finally, to provide for
the timely evacuation and treatment of casualties and to minimise preventable
deaths, forces will require the ability to innovate medical systems (e.g., new
training/technology, telemedicine, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology/synthetic
biology).
89. Forces may be required to cooperate with other agencies when Instability
Situations have a health-related impact. This will require the ability for early detection
of infectious diseases via health surveillance systems, and the ability to share health
surveillance information with host nations, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations (medical intelligence). The need to assist local medical
healthcare systems, sustain force health protection, and operate in an area affected
by an epidemic or CBRN situation may become important. Finally, forces may need
the ability to take and provide rapid countermeasures (e.g., use of personal
protective equipment, decontamination, medication, vaccination, quarantine, and
water and food security and hygienic measures).
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Protect
91. To allow mission success, NATO must be able to protect its centre of gravity –
the cohesion of the Alliance – and retain the political will to operate. 53 Future
missions will continue to require close cooperation with partners and forces must be
able to protect and sustain the relationships with these partners. In addition, some
future Instability Situations may overwhelm local authorities and may exceed the
capacity of civilian response and thus threaten mission success. Forces should be
able to assist local authorities in protecting critical civilian infrastructure and key
services including governance, health, emergency, security/law enforcement,
finance, transportation, power, communications, utilities, and food production.
92. In the future, the global commons and Alliance lines of communication could
be increasingly contested by hostile actors and competitors. Therefore, the
proliferation of anti-access technology and the congestion of the global commons will
create significant challenges for Alliance power projection and sustainment. Forces
will need the ability to retain assured access to the global commons and continued
use of its lines of communication. They also need to create and protect a permissive
environment for operations despite anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) methods.
93. Force protection and base defence will continue to be vital to the success of
expeditionary operations. Due to an increasing terrorist threat, force protection may
also become more relevant at home. Consequently, forces will need the ability to
establish superior force protection measures, physical security, and access control to
minimise risk to own troops, military equipment and capabilities (including strategic
reserves). Forces must be able to avoid, minimise, and mitigate negative effects of
operations on civilians, and protect them from conflict-related violence.
94. For their projection, engagement, and sustainment, forces will need the ability
to protect critical military and civilian infrastructure, logistic facilities, vital networks,
natural resources and essential lines of communication. They should also be able to
assist local authorities and operate in a manner that seeks to preserve civilian
property that is culturally and historically important (e.g., national monuments and
icons).
53
See Annex C.
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95. In the information age, the availability of accurate and reliable information
from trusted sources is essential for both civilians and the military. As a
consequence, NATO will need the ability to validate its own information and to
protect it from manipulation. Also, forces will need the ability to protect the EM
environment to allow the guaranteed use of it and to detect, investigate, and defend
against all forms of EM attack. Similarly, they will need the ability to protect the
cyberspace environment and to detect, investigate, and defend against all forms of
cyberattack. This includes the protection of command and control systems and tools
used in the decision-making process. As the cyberspace domain continues to
evolve, NATO may be required to take a more active role (e.g., protection of critical
infrastructure and services, safeguarding data) to minimize impact on civilian
populations.
96. The usage and/or proliferation of WMD requires the ability to counter the
threat and protect the force. This includes the possible development of yet unknown
WME (e.g., electromagnetic pulse, nano, custom biological) which may become
available to hostile state and non-state actors. 54 Forces should develop new
countermeasures and training to counter new classes of WMD/E as technology
evolves. Forensic methods, technical exploitation, and other internationally
recognized attribution methods should be used to identify the threat and assist
political decision-making and inform appropriate responses. In particular, the ability
to address the re-emerging threat of nuclear weapons, offensive CBR programmes,
and hostile acts in cyberspace and space is of growing importance.
97. Forces must have the ability to protect themselves from extreme
environmental conditions, address health and safety issues, and minimise their
environmental impact.
98. The future will likely bring a wide range of new threats coming from emerging
technology or from new, creative, and innovative tactics, techniques, procedures,
capabilities, or doctrine. Without incurring the cost of research and development,
hostile actors can capitalise on technological advancements and translate them into
capabilities that threaten the Alliance. Examples of areas where technology could
revolutionise warfare are sub-surface and subterranean operations, swarm
techniques, space based weapons, directed energy, autonomous systems and
sensors, quantum computing, unmanned systems, electromagnetically launched
projectiles, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing/3D
printing, biotechnology and nanotechnology. Forces must be able to identify, monitor
and understand these new threats, and develop protective measures.
54 Including CBRN material and accidental release or deliberate misuse of toxic materials.
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100. Overall, future C3 requires the Alliance to possess resilient, adaptable and
interoperable C3 systems. Due to the complex and dynamic future battlefield,
commanders will increasingly need to exercise authority and give direction using a
mission-command philosophy to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's
intent. Forces will also need the ability to observe, orientate, decide, and act across
all domains to conduct fully integrated operations using a comprehensive approach
to achieve the desired effect.
101. In the future, forces will need the ability to integrate C3 in a rapid manner.
They will also need to leverage advanced data analytics to develop operational and
environmental situation awareness to assist leaders in their decision-making
processes. This also includes the ability to understand complex problems rapidly in
support of the planning process, course of action development, and risk assessment.
Furthermore, the development of attribution, joint targeting, and engagement lists
must occur at a pace that will allow commanders to quickly engage targets (e.g.,
time-sensitive targeting). This system must be robust, reliable, secure, and include
the following attributes real time battle assessment, automatic back up, stand-alone
capability, automatic reconstitution following degradation, mobility to allow the
commander to move on the battlefield, reach-back, and an ability to integrate with
55
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1984).
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partners and other key stakeholders. Here, the volume of data involved will likely
require the use of analysis tools that may include artificial intelligence.
102. This area includes the ability of C3 systems to support mission command
style decision-making and assist leaders in achieving clarity concerning complex
problems, including the use of automated analysis and artificial intelligence. These
tools should have an increased ability to synchronize the different stages of the
OODA loop quickly to improve responsiveness. To help political-military decision-
making, these tools also need to allow military forces to connect and interact with the
political level and allow for the delivery of best military advice quickly and concisely
through consultation. Hence, leaders at all levels need to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the operational environment (including culture, ethnicity, religion
and other considerations such as diplomatic, information, and economic issues).
These tools should include human-artificial intelligence teaming, war-gaming,
modelling, simulation, and behavioural studies, big-data analysis, amongst others.
103. Forces will need C3 systems to provide robust awareness and a 360-degree,
24-7 operational picture, across all domains. This may include interfacing with non-
military organizations such as local governments, non-governmental organizations,
and business enterprises. In the future, dominance in the EM spectrum and access
to robust and secure communications systems across all domains is required.
Additionally, forces need to possess sufficient bandwidth to allow for uninterrupted
information flow between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command.
This includes the ability to use civilian communications networks and systems. They
also need to be able to operate in communication degraded or denied environments
by adapting procedures. Because of the many advances expected in technology in
the period of 2035 and beyond, personnel will need the ability to understand,
acquire, and make use of the most advanced communications technology to
maintain a military advantage (e.g., blockchain) whilst maintaining interoperability. To
accomplish dispersed operations over long-distances, military forces will need
assured global communications to facilitate real-time reach-back and enable the
chain of command to execute C3.
Inform
104. Inform is establishing and maintaining the situational awareness and level of
knowledge required to allow commanders at all levels to make timely, informed, and
responsive decisions. Inform is important because it helps build a shared
understanding and it affects all other Military Implications. Informing includes the
ability to access, store, classify, disseminate, and filter information. Informing occurs
both in peace time and during conflict or crisis.
105. In order to enhance mission success, NATO will need to refine its collection
methods by leveraging technology and improving its ability to obtain timely
information via Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR). To
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107. In the future, NATO should invest in the ability to use automated processes to
collect data. It should also improve the ability to use cost effective technology
including autonomous and disposable assets, remote sensors, and intelligence
networks to enable early warning. These investments in collection systems would
enhance the ability to cultivate all possible sources of information, including human.
NATO should develop the ability to pull information from the Internet of Things to a
level not currently practiced. NATO may need to support and influence the
development of new agreements, legal frameworks, policies, and principles to adapt
to new technology.
108. Forces need to receive, convert, and fuse data and information from all
available sources into relevant and usable intelligence/knowledge, decision-support
and situational awareness products. They should increase the rate at which they
process information by using advanced technological methods, including artificial
intelligence, virtual reality, modelling, advanced data analytics, and simulation to
enhance the comprehensive preparation of the operational environment. The result
of processing should be to develop a common operational picture that spans from
strategic-level situational awareness down to tactical-level attribution and targeting.
Where applicable, forces could collaborate with partners to improve its data
processing capabilites.
109. Forces need the ability to distribute timely information and intelligence in an
appropriate and accessible form, across and between networks. They also need the
ability to convey information and intelligence that has been obtained from other
actors (e.g., law enforcement agencies) in a timely manner to those who need it.
56
See Annex B – Summary of Urbanization Study.
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Forces will need to better customize products as needed, including visualization for
individual users, including the use of new technologies (e.g., Internet of Things).
110. NATO should take a collaborative approach to intelligence sharing that may
include common databases, network knowledge, forensics and biometrics in order to
better detect threats. Building a repository of shareable information could assist
forces in their ability to exploit multi-intelligence sources (e.g., national, commercial,
private, and other origins) using advanced data analytics and artificial intelligence.
This will allow NATO indicators and warning systems to better identify the early
phases of a crisis, enable timely decision-making, and share intelligence across
domains at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Furthermore, this includes
the ability to leverage regional experts to support intelligence collection, liaison,
education, and training at all times, including via reach-back.
SUMMARY
111. Military Implications are best military advice intended to inform Alliance
Transformation, including the development of policies, long-term requirements, and
capabilities. Military Implications are not defined requirements, nor are they
expressed as required capabilities. The Alliance may take into account these long-
term abilities during defence planning. In the future, the main abilities NATO may
require fall into the areas of Prepare, Project, Engage, Sustain, C3, Protect, and
Inform.
112. The application of new technologies will drive most of the changes for NATO.
A mission-command approach and improved situational awareness could allow
NATO to outpace the decision cycle of any potential adversary. They must become
more precise, lethal, and able to work across domains, with an increased emphasis
on cyberspace and space in the future. Innovation is crucial to keeping the military
edge, therefore forces must adopt a mindset that enables growth and change. They
must put significant effort into the development of their human capital, especially
leader development. Overall, forces will need to develop a wide-range of abilities and
work in close cooperation with partners to address Instability Situations and be
sucessful in future operations.
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WAY AHEAD
113. This document is developed in concert with NATO Nations, NATO Partners,
Centres of Excellence, and other key stakeholders as of March 2018. The analysis
provided within can and will change as events unfold the future. As such, this
document provides a baseline for further discussion and debate, informs decision-
making, and helps set the conditions for success. Moving forward, the FFAO 2018
will be used to help inform the development of the MC input to the Political Guidance
2019 and all steps of the upcoming cycle of NDPP.
114. In order to maintain a robust community of interest, scan the horizon, and
adapt to unforseen changes, the LTMT programme will hold workshops and develop
future-oriented products in the upcoming years. This will culminate in the release of
future editions of the SFA in 2021 and FFAO in 2022.
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ANNEX A TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
2. Use of power politics. The importance of NATO has increased for collective a. Increased potential of confrontation and conflict.
defence of the Euro-Atlantic region as it is the main framework that maintains a b. Nationalism and divergent risk and threat perception.
robust and an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities. c. Requirement for a robust and credible defence and
deterrence
3. Non-state actor influence in domestic and international affairs. Non-state a. Growing complexity due to a wide variety of non-state
actors are expected to exert greater influence over national governments and actors.
international institutions and their role is likely to expand. b. Requirement for closer cooperation with non-state
actors.
c. Increased role of private actors for security.
d. Increasing concerns for the Protection of Civilians.
4. Challenges to governance. Emerging powers are increasingly challenging a. Duplication of existing global governance structures
POLITICAL
established global governance institutions and requesting greater roles. Existing b. Increased requirement for partnership and inclusive
governance structures, particularly in weak and failing states, are not sufficiently governance.
addressing the requirements of the broader population. c. Projecting stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.
5. Public discontent/disaffection and polarization. In western countries, risks a. Lack of trust in governments and institutions.
such as undermined legitimacy of the government mandate, political impasse and b. Increasing polarization in the West and developing
the difficulty of implementing reforms and social polarization are likely to be countries.
increased.
6. Asymmetric demographic change. The worldwide ageing populations will a. Ageing populations will strain resources.
cause major challenges for some economies and government budgets. Gender b. Youth bulges leading to instability and migration.
inequality will further destabilise demographic change. However, the population in c. Failed integration of migrants.
countries with a high fertility rate will remain relatively young, as seen in Africa,
thus creating a youth bulge and potential for migration.
7. Increasing urbanization. Urbanization is increasing at different rates globally, a. Increasing urbanization might lead to resource
with the highest growth rates in the least developed parts of the world thus competition.
creating the challenge of providing adequate basic services and a functioning b. Ownership and control of critical infrastructure could be
infrastructure to ensure a minimum quality of life for citizens. contested.
c. Governance challenged by uncontrolled urban growth.
d. Dependence of littoral urban areas on sea lines of
communication.
e. Increased urbanization may require NATO involvement
in urban areas.
8. Fractured and/or polarised societies. Polarization of societies has become a a. Polarization causes instability and civil war.
worldwide phenomenon; however, western developed nations are particularly b. Instability along the NATO border causing large-scale
HUMAN
vulnerable due to increased empowerment of individuals. Polarization can also migration to Europe.
exist between countries. c.
Fractures in society might undermine trust and
legitimacy.
9. Increasingly connected human networks. Human networks are expected to a. Increasingly decentralised and diverse human networks.
continue to be increasingly decentralised thereby allowing unforeseeable threats. b. An increasing need to understand human networks.
c. The need for influencing human networks with effective
and precise strategic communication is increasing.
A-1
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10. Rate of technology advance. The advances in technology and innovation a. Rapid development of technology challenges
accelerate as they are fuelled by continued exponential increases in supporting interoperability.
computing power and advances in augmented intelligence. b. Increasing legal and ethical concerns.
c. The rate of technical advancement challenges
acquisition and life-cycle management processes.
11. Access to Technology. The ability of individuals, non-state and state actors a. Access to technology enables disruptive behaviours.
to access technology has significantly increased. b. Uncontrolled access to technology challenges existing
frameworks.
12. Global network development. Global networks will increasingly enable a. The increasing number of sensors, access to data and
access to and provide information on commodities and capital assets. Global global networks generates operational vulnerabilities.
networks will increasingly be used for dissemination of post-truth information. b. Opportunities to exploit the sensors, data, and global
networks.
c. Adversaries will use global networks for dissemination of
false or misleading information.
TECHNOLOGY
13. Dominance of the commercial sector in technological development. The a. State approaches are not keeping up with the
advances in defence technology developments/sales and space commercial sector.
exploration/exploitation by commercial sectors have taken away the monopoly b. The Alliance will lose perishable skills that cannot be
that used to be held by governments. easily recovered.
14. Technological dependencies. Both society, and defence and security, have a. Reliance on certain technologies will create
increasingly depended on certain technologies which have become essential in vulnerabilities.
everyday lives. b. Necessity to protect critical civilian infrastructure.
c. Over expectations from technological solutions.
15. Globalization of financial resources. An increasingly interconnected a. Erosion of trust in increasingly fragile financial
global financial system makes it more vulnerable to attacks by both state institutions.
and non-state actors. b. Lack of visibility on transactions supporting criminal and
terrorist activities.
c. Growing interdependencies may reduce potential for
interstate conflict.
16. Geopolitical dimension of resources. Emerging technologies and the a. Natural resources will play an increasing role in power
exploration opportunities availed by climate change may allow the discovery of politics.
mineral and energy resources in previously inaccessible and possibly disputed b. Resource-driven crises remain a constant.
regions such as the High North. c. Climate change has the potential to disrupt traditional
ECONOMICS
20. Natural disasters. Natural disasters will have increasing impact, partly due a. measures.
Increased requirement for humanitarian support.
to overall increases in the severity and prevalence of severe weather events, but b. Unavailability of national military assets due to natural
also due to changes in the regions and times of the year where these events disaster.
may occur. c. Increased requirement to improve resilience.
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ANNEX B TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
TECHNOLOGY IMPLICATIONS
1. The acceleration of technological advances, commercialization and global
proliferation has increasingly challenged the technological advantage of the Alliance.
Discovering, developing and utilising advanced knowledge and cutting-edge science
and technology is fundamental to maintaining the technological edge that has
enabled the Alliance to succeed across the full spectrum of operations over the past
decades.
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g. Mixed Reality - Mixed Reality is the merging of real and virtual worlds
to produce new environments and visualizations where physical and digital
objects coexist and interact in real time. Applications include heads up or
head mounted displays for pilots and soldiers for real-time situational
awareness, digital cockpits/windows, realistic training environments or
providing hands-free job performance aids.
3. The above highlights the Technology Trends observed by the NATO STO. It
does not provide an exhaustive list of all emerging technologies but focusses on the
technologies, which fall under the purview of the NATO STO Panels and Group, and
those that are favourable to international collaborative research. Additional
technology trends that are highlighted in national defence technology trends
reporting but are not included in the list above include (Reference: Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Technology), Emerging
Science and Technology Trends: 2016-2045 A Synthesis of Leading Forecasts):
a. Energy - Over the next 30 years, the global demand for energy will
likely grow by 35%. The development of methods like fracking and directional
drilling has opened vast new reserves of oil and natural gas. At the same time,
renewable energy sources such as solar and wind are approaching cost-parity
with fossil fuels. In the past two decades, the cost of power produced by solar
cells has dropped from nearly $8 per watt of capacity to less than one-tenth of
that amount. Nuclear, while still the subject of intense public debate, is
continuing to grow, with new reactor designs promising greater safety and
less radioactive waste. While adoption of cleaner energy sources would help
combat global climate change, new frictions will emerge over access to rare
materials used in batteries, solar cells, and other linchpins of the energy
revolution. The fading of fossil fuels also carries significant risk of economic
and social destabilization presenting new security challenges.
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the number of megacities with 10 million inhabitants or more will grow, from
28 in 2016 to 41 by 2030. Mass migration to cities will put significant pressure
on urban transportation systems, food and water supplies, power and energy
infrastructure, sanitation, and public safety. Information and communications
(ICT) technology will support the growth of “smart cities” that use data and
automation to make urban centres more efficient and sustainable. Distributed
sensor systems will monitor water, power usage, and automatically balance
distribution via smart grids. Networked traffic systems and autonomous
transportation options will ease gridlock. Rooftop solar panels, micro-wind
turbines, thermal power, and other renewable energy sources will provide
clean, distributed power generation. At the same time, cities that cannot afford
to invest in these technologies (or that lack the political will to do so) could
turn into congested, dirty, and dangerous flashpoints for instability and
conflict.
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4. Full versions of the two source documents for this Annex are located at:
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ANNEX C TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
INTRODUCTION
1. The Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO) defines the abilities
required for NATO Forces to accomplish core tasks in the future. Fundamentally, the
Alliance should strive to maintain cohesion – its centre of gravity –to achieve the
desired political–military objectives. This project sought to identify factors that would
affect Alliance cohesion through 2035 and beyond.
2. The FFAO Cohesion Project targeted students and professionals as the next
generation of leaders from different backgrounds (e.g,. academia, military, industry)
to understand their perspectives on NATO Cohesion. The primary question that
guided this research was: Which factors are likely to affect NATO cohesion through
2035 and beyond?
3. The study followed a grounded theory methodology and employed both
quantitative and qualitative methods, triangulated with the scholarly literature on
Alliance cohesion theory. Between March and June 2017, the Cohesion Project
gathered data through a series of focus groups, an online survey, and a workshop
prepared in cooperation with the ACT-sponsored Innovation Hub. In total, almost one
hundred persons participated in either of ways from throughout NATO and Partner
Nations.
COHESION FACTORS
4. The findings of this study indicated that NATO cohesion relies on two pillars:
trust and reciprocity. This means the ability of NATO Nations to respond as a group
and to develop shared interests, values, and common standards and rules. Cohesion
is a manifestation of unity, when members stay together despite differences and look
beyond self-interests. The ultimate element of cohesion is the willingness to commit
and sacrifice for others; an expression of “something bigger than ourselves”.
5. As to the risks, the findings indicated that in terms of probability, NATO will
face a weakening of its core values, accompanied by internal threats to its cohesion.
The latter will also have the most severe impact on NATO cohesion. Technology and
organizational frictions also emerged as primary areas of concern. The findings
further indicated the ways in which five major factors could directly affect NATO
cohesion in the future:
a. External Risks. The lack of common existential threat to sovereignty
and diverging threat assessments is the major negative element associated
with the external threat theme. Although findings suggested the failure to
activate Article 5 in case of attack as a potential risk, non-Article 5 missions
could constitute a major test for NATO cohesion. However, many
opportunities to improve Alliance cohesion may emerge in the future. NATO
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ANNEX D TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
URBANIZATION STUDY
INTRODUCTION
1. The UN reports that urban areas world-wide will absorb 3 billion new people in
the next generation. 57 Many of these people will go into under-governed, under-
resourced and overstretched cities on coastlines. Studies based upon global
demographic trends suggest that an increasing percentage of armed conflicts are
likely to be fought in urban surroundings. The trends already exist and the
continuation of urbanization in the future will only exacerbate the likelihood of NATO
involvement in urban operations.
2. The future urban system will be characterized by a high degree of density and
complexity expressed through multi-dimensional subsystems. The physical
subsystem consists of the complex terrain of an urban settlement, along with the
natural environment within and surrounding it.
4. Governance in future urban areas is likely to have its own informal structures.
The information subsystem has seen the most significant change since the
beginning of the 21st century with the explosion of technology, especially
communication technology that increases connectivity within and between cities.
This enables rapid exchange of concepts, data, and technology-enabled techniques
among urban populations, including criminal and terrorist organizations.
57
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York – World Urbanization
Prospects dated 2014.
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FUTURE THREAT
5. Future threats will incorporate both state and non-state actors, including
politically and criminally motivated groups. While many of these threats already
exist, future technological developments and the characteristics of future cities will
further exacerbate them. Technological advances will enable a proliferation of
capabilities such as drones, 3D-manufactured weapons systems, sophisticated IED
s and indirect fire weapons. Adversaries can be expected to adopt swarming tactics
at the level of individual weapons (swarm weapons) and by applying combat groups
that aggregate and disaggregate as needed, massing and dispersing in response to
changes in the tactical environment.
6. The city itself, along with its infrastructure and systems, will become a target
of enemy action, requiring hardening and protection as well as a degree of specialist
knowledge to keep it running. Decoupling humans from weapon systems and
increasing electronic connectivity will enable adversaries to disrupt or control larger
urban areas with smaller forces.
EMERGING ASPECTS
7. In order to counter the future threat and operate within the future urban
environment NATO will need to develop key capabilities, described here within the
Joint Functions format of AJP-1:
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Persistent Deployable C3
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CONCLUSION
10. The future character of conflict in the future urban battlespace has been
described by the 5Cs: it will be more Congested, more Cluttered, more Contested,
more Connected, and more Constrained. As such, it is critical for NATO to think in
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this space, and remain adaptable and resilient enough to operate in the most
challenging physical and human environment.
11. Cities will quickly ‘swallow’ and disperse military troops. NATO is unlikely to
be able to build up overwhelming force in terms of mass to control these cities and is
more likely to require a footprint as small as possible inside the city. Urban
operations will require the conduct of concurrent multidimensional military tasks.
NATO will require an agile organization that is able to integrate into the urban
system, supported by an in-depth understanding of the entire urban environment.
12. NATO Conceptual Study on Urbanization, from which this Annex is drawn, is
available in full at: https://urb.transnet.act.nato.int
13. If you have questions or comments concerning this study please contact:
natocde@act.nato.int
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ANNEX E TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
d. Always drive the narrative, matching what we say with what we do.
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ANNEX F TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
Note: Where possible the FFAO development team applied existing definitions from
AAP-6 and recently approved NATO documents.
Adaptation – Learning and changing to keep pace with the challenges of the security
environment.59
58
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
59
MCM-0214-2015, Military Advice on NATO’s Future Strategy, Posture, and Adaptation, dated 10
December 2015.
60
Gartner – IT Glossary
61
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
62
Term modified from “operational agility” as described in FFAO 2015. Rationale for this change is
that NATO forces should be more than just operational agility, they should have agility at the tactical,
operational and strategic levels.
63
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Definition of Artificial Intelligence.”
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Basing – Providing appropriate basing and cantonments for NATO forces and
equipment.66
BRINE – (1) biology, biotechnology and medicine; (2) robotics, artificial intelligence,
and human augmentation; (3) Internet and Communication Technology (ICT) and
cognitive science; (4) nanotechnology and advanced materials; and (5) energy
technology.
64
Bi-SC TT with ACT in lead: Proposal for Further Enhancing JISR to Improve NATO’s Strategic
Anticipation (ACO 313261); Functional Assessment Of The NATO Command Structure (NCS), 2016.
65
Term modified from “strategic awareness” as described in FFAO 2015. Rationale for this change is
that while situational awareness is important, NATO military forces should also have tactical and
operational awareness as well. Definition derived from AAP-6.
66
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
67
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
68
NATO, AAP-6; NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8
December 2016.
69
NATO ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
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Character of Armed Conflict – A set of qualities that make an armed conflict different
from other instances of armed conflict.70
Collective Defence – Deterrence and defence against any threat of aggression, and
against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security
of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.73
Consult, Command, Control (C3) – The ability to exercise authority over and direct
full spectrum of assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the
mission.74
Communication and Information Systems (CIS) – The secure and effective transfer,
processing and storage of information in support to NATO missions. 75
Conventional War – Armed conflict between two or more states in open confrontation
where the forces on each side are well-defined, generally use conventional weapons
and fight using weapons that primarily target the opponent's military. 77
70
Colin Gray, “War – Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity,” Parameters.
71
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1.
72
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
73
NATO, Strategic Concept 2010.
74
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
75
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
76
Ibid.
77
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Irrelevance of Traditional Warfare?” War On the Rocks.
78
Ibid.
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Credibility – When internal and external stakeholders recognize leaders, forces, and
equipment as possessing the ability to effectively deter and defend against threats
from any direction. 80
Critical Infrastructure Attack – Hostile actors could attack physical and virtual
infrastructure nodes and installations in an attempt to disrupt vital societal functions
and global stability.81
Crisis Management – The coordinated actions taken to defuse crises prevent their
escalation into armed conflict and conation hostilities if they should result.82
Digital Twin – Increased computing power and connectivity are making it possible to
virtualise this task by creating and maintaining a digital representation, of any piece
of real equipment, and thus of any plant or engine.86
79
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
80
Credibility was added as a Strategic Military Perspective to address a gap concerning the overall,
feasibility that forces could accomplish their assigned missions. Credibility was identified as a key
aspect of deterrence at the 2017 FFAO Rome Conference.
81
Sarah Kuranda, “Experts: Recent Critical Infrastructure Attacks a Sign of Major Security Challenges
Coming in 2016,”CRN.
82
NATO, AAP-6.
83
Jason Healy, The Five Futures of Cyberspace Conflict.
84
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
85
Ibid.
86
Economist, The Digital Twin.
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Engage – Ability to perform the tasks which contribute directly to the achievement of
mission goals, including all abilities required to defeat adversaries.90
Force Escalation – When hostile actors use threats or the use of force increasingly
over time that destabilises the security environment that could lead to a strategic
miscalculation or increase the likelihood of a wider conflict.91
Force Preparation – Training, educating and exercising forces to prepare for the full
range of NATO missions and planning for foreseeable contingencies and
operations.92
Gender – Refers to the social attributes with being male and female learned through
socialisation and determines a person’s position and value in a given context. 94
Generation – Generating forces and capabilities with appropriate readiness for the
execution of Alliance missions. 95
87
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
88
NATO Strategic Communications “Commander’s Handbook,” 2014
89
Stian Kjeksrud, Alexander Beadle, and Petter Lindqvist, Protecting Civilians from Violence.
90
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
91
ICRC, Violence and the Use of Force.
92
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
93
FFAO 2015.
94
This means also the relationships between men, women, boys and girls, as well as the relations
between women and those between men. Notably, gender does not equate to an exclusive focus on
women” NATO BI-SC directive 040-001 “integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective into the
NATO command structure” 16 May 2017.
95
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
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Global Strike – A system that can deliver a precision-guided weapon anywhere in the
world.98
Hybrid War – Hostile state actors will using a combination of conventional and
unconventional means to avoid being held directly accountable for their actions while
retaining the option to employ conventional forces, if directly threatened. One of the
major characteristics of hybrid warfare is that it often aims to leverage all elements of
power while limiting the conflict below the threshold of conventional war thus
complicating the timely and effective use of rigid collective defence mechanisms.101
96
OECD Definition.
97
Gerald Stang, Global Commons: Between Cooperation and Competition.
98
John Prime, "Local Base Is First Choice For New Unit: Air Force Global Strike Command could
result in 1,000 or more personnel", The Times (Shreveport), 3 April 2009.
99
Technopedia. “Human Augmentation.”
100
Dictionary.com.
101
NATO, International Staff Memo, IMSM-0043-2016.
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facilities, command and control, and equipment that is necessary for the
sustainment, deployment and redeployment of NATO forces across the full spectrum
of NATO missions.102
Inform – The ability to establish and maintain the situational awareness and level of
knowledge required to allow commanders at all levels to make timely and informed
decisions.103
Innovation – Critical and creative thinking that converts new ideas into valued
outcomes.
Joint Fires – The coordinated and efficient application of both lethal and/or non-lethal
Joint firepower to deny, degrade and destroy adversary forces, facilities and
infrastructure throughout all dimensions of the operational area thus enabling
decisive manoeuvre whilst avoiding unwanted collateral effects.107
Main Capability Areas – Prepare, Project, Engage, Protect, Sustain, Inform and
Consult, Command and Control.110
102
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
103
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
104
Merriam-Webster, “Simple Definition of Instability.”
105
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
106
NATO, AAP-6.
107
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
108
Ibid.
109
Lawfare Blog.
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NATO Forces – Forces assigned to NATO by the Nations to achieve an agreed upon
mission. This includes the NATO Command Structure, NATO Force Structure, any
standing forces, and the pool of forces Nations could make available to the Alliance.
110
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
111
Ibid.
112
Strategy page.
113
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
114
Ibid.
115
AJP-1 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine.
116
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
117
Eirik B. Lundestad and Tor G. Jakobsen, “A Unipolar World: Systems and Wars in Three Different
Military Eras.”
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Partners – In the broadest definition, partners (lower case “p”) includes formal NATO
Partner Nations that are signatories to a political agreement and other entities (e.g.,
contact countries, host-nations, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental
organizations, industry, and academia). These relationships are contextual; see
specific agreements for further details.
118
Peter Baxter, “Catastrophes – Natural and Manmade Disasters,” Conflict and Catastrophe
Medicine.
119
Colin Gray, “War – Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity,” Parameters.
120
Definition develop at the spring 2017 FFAO Workshop in Rome. This definition was a replacement
for the “Security Networking” SMP discussed in the FFAO 2015.
121
National Intelligence Council, “Non-state Actors: Impact on International Relations and
Implications for the United States”, Aug 23, 2007, p. 2.
122
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
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Persistent – Daily, routine, even habitual use, that builds enduring relationships,
interoperability, efficiency and trust.
Prepare – Ability to establish, prepare and sustain sufficient and effective presence
at the right time, keeping sufficient flexibility to adapt to possible changes in the
strategic environment. These also include the abilities to contribute to NATO
deterrence.124
Processing – Receiving, converting and fusing data and information from all
available sources into relevant and usable intelligence/knowledge, decision-support
and situational awareness products by collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and
interpretation through fusion and collaboration.125
Projecting Stability – Proactive activities intended to influence and shape the security
environment beyond the limits of Alliance geographical boundaries thereby
increasing security and reducing threats.127
Protect – The ability to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel and
activities, whilst ensuring the Allies freedom of action and contributing to mission
success.128
Readiness - Having the right capabilities and forces that are trained, interoperable,
and deployable and maintained in the right operational structures and groupings and
at an appropriate notice to move.
123
Regina Parker, “Prevent Disease to Prevent War,” The Strategy Bridge.
124
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
125
NATO-ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
126
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
126 Draft MC 0655/1, Military Concept for Projecting Stability, 24 August 2017.
127
Delivery of Coherence on Projecting Stability – A Process for Military Analysis, IMS CS of 31 Mar
17
128
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
129
NATO ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
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Resilience – Having sufficient capability, capacity, and will to endure adversity over
time, retain the ability to respond, and to recover quickly from strategic shocks or
operational setbacks.130
Responsiveness - Having the right posture that includes having the right forces and
the right place at the right time to be able to respond in a timely, appropriate, and
credible manner.
Strategic Military Perspectives – Elements of best military advice that provide the
central idea and framework of characteristics necessary for NATO forces to execute
the three core tasks, address Instability Situations, and seize the opportunities in the
future.
130
SACT Food For Thought Paper on Resilience, 28 January 2016. This SMP was modified from the
term used in FFAO 2015 to add clarity and as the SMPs in general address characteristics that NATO
forces should share, the modified “shared” was deemed redundant.
131
NATO ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
132
Draft MC 0655/1, Military Concept for Projecting Stability, 24 August 2017
133
NATO, AAP-6.
134
Military Committee STRATCOM Policy 2017, as a SMP the term “strategic communications” was
removed as it was seen as less of a characteristic required by future forces and more of a critical
aspect of the central idea as described in Chapter 2.
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Supply of Material and Services – Supplying all material and items used for the
logistic support and services of military forces, which includes the determination of
stock levels, provisioning, distribution, replenishment and Real Life Support
Services. This includes a wide range of activities such as combat resupply of all
classes material, catering, lodging, map distribution, labour resources, postal and
courier services, canteen, laundry and bathing facilities, support to mortuary affairs
etc.135
Sustain – The ability to plan and execute the timely logistical support of forces.136
Irregular War – Hostile state and non-state actors conducting military activities
through or with underground, auxiliary or guerrilla forces to enable a resistance
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying
power.139
Warfare Development – Shaping forces to fight in the future. Specifically, the broad
set of activities across functions and tasks, which includes capability development,
defence planning, strategy and policy development advice, innovation, outreach,
concept development, experimentation, lessons learned, doctrine development,
education and individual training, strategic analysis, and wargaming (alternative
analysis) in these areas.
135
NATO ACT, NATO CAPABILITY HIERARCHY.
136
NATO Directive: NATO Capabilities Requirements Management, Version 0.1, 8 December 2016.
137
Melissa Clarke, “Globally, Terrorism is on the Rise,” ABC News.;NATO, AAP-6 Edition 2015, MC-
472/1 "Military Committee Concept on CT", endorsed by MC and approved by NAC, December
2015)., (November 2, 2016), Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015,
November 2015.; NATO, PO(2015)0045.
138
NATO, AAP-6.
139
Ibid.
140
UN, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Threats and Responses.”; NATO, AAP-6 Edition 2015.
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ANNEX G TO
FFAO
DATED MAR 18
LINKS OF INTEREST
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