ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION: QUR’ĀNIC EXEGESIS AND GENDER

Karen A. Bauer

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

Adviser: Michael Cook, Class of 1943 University Professor of Near Eastern Studies,
Princeton University

January, 2008
© Copyright by Karen Anne Bauer, 2007. All rights reserved.
 Abstract

The aim of my research is to understand how canon, tradition, societal norms, and
circumstance influence Qur’ānic interpretation. I do this by examining clerical exegeses
(tafsīr, pl. tafāsīr) of three key verses in the Qur’ān which describe the nature of women
and the relationship between the sexes. In my work, I question scholarly and popular
assumptions about how canon and other authoritative sources influence interpretation. It
is common to view the Qur’ān, earliest exegeses, and prophetic sayings (hadīths) as
having determined pre-modern interpretation. This view assumes that certain pre-modern
interpretations are inevitable, given the words of the Qur’ān, prophetic hadīths, and
words of the Companions of the Prophet. In this dissertation, I show how exegetes work
with the text of hadīths, but also pick and choose between hadīths and other authoritative
sources; commentaries are shaped by their own concerns, opinions, schools of law,
teachers, and by common understandings in their day. I argue that, while all of these
factors were important components of exegesis, the exegetes’ individual judgment and
the mores of their time carried a greater weight in determining exegesis than did the
elements commonly considered to be its sources.

Exegetes’ interpretations of women’s status and roles are the subject matter of the
dissertation: gender provides the lens through which I study the larger question of the
sources of exegesis and its development. For the devout, the interpretation of these
verses has a direct effect on daily life. Different understandings of how to behave
towards a recalcitrant wife, for instance, could have serious implications for the woman
in question. The venture of interpretation is an intellectual pursuit; yet exegetes seek to
influence practice: they prescribe behaviors regulating Muslims’ daily lives and
households, as well as explaining why such prescriptions make sense. Thus, although
exegetes rarely comment on actual practice, these exegeses help the present-day reader to
understand the mores of the scholars who produced them.

iii
 Acknowledgments
I owe a great debt to my advisor Michael Cook. It has been a true privilege to
have his comments, advice, and support through every aspect of the dissertation process.
His meticulousness and careful attention to every detail have been invaluable, and have
had an inestimable effect on my work.
I am grateful to Patricia Crone, M. Shahab Ahmed, and M. Qasim Zaman for
serving on my dissertation committee, for their feedback on my work, and for taking time
to speak with me about it. Patricia Crone’s insightful and thoughtful comments on the
various drafts of the dissertation have been particularly valuable and influential, as have
our discussions about this project and other matters. I wish to thank Hossein Modarressi
and Paul Heck for their classes and for speaking with me about this work, and Professor
Modarressi for his general exam.
I am fortunate indeed to have worked with so many wonderful professors.
My friends and colleagues, Ayesha Chaudhry, Philippa Townsend, Behnam
Sadeghi, and Kathi Ivanyi, who read parts (or, in Ayesha’s case, most) of this
dissertation, I thank both for their efforts and for their friendship. Behnam and Philippa
especially were there to talk about work, to give moral support, and more, from
beginning to end. It would have been so much more difficult without them.
I would also like to thank Walid Saleh and Suleiman Mourad, who provided me
with copies of pages from manuscripts of al-Wāhidī and al-Jishumī, respectively.
Furthermore, I am grateful to Walid Saleh, Jonathan AC Brown, Kecia Ali, and
Ayesha Chaudhry, who all generously shared with me unpublished and forthcoming work
of theirs, without which this dissertation would not have been complete.
I undertook research trips to Syria in 2004 and 2005. Although the work from
these trips will figure only in the final iteration of this project, and does not appear here,
the shaykhs and shaykhas I spoke to there helped me to a deeper understanding; indeed, a
fundamentally different understanding, of my project. I would especially like to thank
Mariam Roncero, Ali Keeler, and Huda al-Habash for giving so generously of their time
and energies.

iv
 This project could not have been completed without the financial support of
Princeton’s Near Eastern Studies Department and of the Princeton Institute for
International and Regional Studies (PIIRS), for which I am grateful.
Thanks to all of my friends, but especially to Charlotte Jackson, Beth Cohen, Jane
Murphy, Asad Ahmed, Stephennie Mulder, Samer Abboud, Asli Bali, Christopher
MacEvitt, and Lance Jenott, for being there in particular times of need.
And finally, my greatest debt is to my parents Bill and Jackie Bauer, and also to
my sister Sarah Bauer, and my husband Peter Keevash, for their seemingly endless well
of support and love.

v
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ III

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................... VI
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................1
SOURCES AND METHODS, 1: PRACTICAL MATTERS ......................................................................................7
SOURCES AND METHODS, 2: THE NATURE OF THE SOURCES AND THEORETICAL CONCERNS ......................10
A PRELIMINARY NOTE: KEY TERMS: BI’L-MA‘RŪF, FADL , ADAB, AND QAWWĀMŪN ......................................20
1: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NARRATIVES OF CREATION AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ACCOUNTS OF ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE EXEGESES OF Q4:1 ...............................................24
1.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................24
1.2 Q4:1, OTHER CREATION VERSES, AND POSSIBLE SOURCES OF THE RIB INTERPRETATION......................24
1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL NARRATIVES ON EVE’S CREATION ...............................................31
1.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF CREATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL NARRATIVES .....................44
1.5 THE OUTLIER: AL-B IQĀ‘Ī (D. 885/1480)...............................................................................................54
1.6 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................55
2. NEGOTIATING THE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES, 1: EXEGESES OF Q2:228 ......................58
2.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................58
2.2 THE EARLY TEXTS ...............................................................................................................................60
2.3 AL-TABARĪ AND HIS PEERS: RE-READING EARLIER TEXTS, AND REFINING THE DISCOURSE ..................64
2.4 THE USE OF HA DĪTHS IN EXEGESIS BETWEEN AL-TABARĪ AND AL-WĀHIDĪ ..........................................72
2.5 GRAMMAR AND COMMON SENSE IN EXEGESES BETWEEN AL-TABARĪ AND AL-WĀHIDĪ .......................82
2.6 AFTER AL-WĀHIDĪ: A DIVIDE BETWEEN CONVERSATIONAL AND FORMAL TAFSĪR ................................85
2.7 TAFSĪR AFTER IBN KATHĪR: NEWLY INCORPORATED HA DĪTHS ...........................................................102
2.8 CONCLUSION: EXEGETES’ METHODS OF EXPLAINING Q2:228 ............................................................105
3. NEGOTIATING THE AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES, 2: EXEGESES OF THE BEGINNING OF
Q4:34 ..........................................................................................................................................................107
3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................107
3.2 EARLY EXEGESES ..............................................................................................................................109
3.3 AL-TABARĪ AND HIS PEERS: VARIETY IN THE DISCOURSE ON GENDER ...............................................119
3.4 AFTER AL-TABARĪ: ANALYSIS OF OBJECTIVE TRUTHS AND THE PRACTICE OF EXEGESIS ....................123
3.5 AFTER AL-WĀHIDĪ: JUSTIFYING MEN’S POSITION; ENCOURAGING THEIR GOOD BEHAVIOR................132
3.6 NEW EXEGESES AFTER IBN KATHĪR ..................................................................................................143
3.7 CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATION AND DEBATE IN EXEGESES OF Q4:34....................................................150
4. DIFFICULT INTERPRETATIONS: EXEGESES OF THE SECOND HALF OF Q4:34 .............152
4.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................152
4.2 SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS FOR IF YOU FEAR NUSHŪZ, ADMONISH THEM…. BEAT THEM, AND
WHEN THEY OBEY YOU, DO NOT SEEK A WAY AGAINST THEM ..................................................................156
4.3 WA’HJURŪHUNNA FĪ AL-MADĀ JI‘ ........................................................................................................162
4.4 CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS IN INTERPRETING Q4:34, PART 2. ..............................................................180
5. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................182
APPENDIX A: SOURCES OF EXEGESIS USED IN THIS DISSERTATION .................................195
A 1. BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES .....................................................................................................195
A 2. TABLE OF AUTHORS, WORKS, AND WHICH VERSES THEY COMMENT ON. .........................................210
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................................................218
MODERN SECONDARY SOURCES: WORKS CITED .......................................................................................218
PRE-MODERN WORKS CITED AND SOURCES ANALYZED ...........................................................................220

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 Introduction

Qur’ānic exegesis is the attempt to understand and explain the meaning of the
Qur’ān. Comprehending the text of the holy book is central to the lives of pious
Muslims, and through their interpretations, exegetes attempt to clarify any obscurities, as
well as explaining how to live and behave in accordance with the Qur’ānic dictates. But
the text of the Qur’ān alone does not determine its interpretation. Pre-modern exegetes
were also informed by other authoritative sources, including the sayings of the Prophet
(hadīths), philology, scientific theories of their day, and previous interpretations. The
exegete is the mediator of these sources: he decides which of them make the most sense
in order to explain each verse, and often adds his own view. In turn, his views are
informed by numerous contexts, including personal and social milieu, geographical
location, teachers, and school of law and theology. And exegetes’ ideas of how the
Qur’ān should be interpreted develops from age to age and varies between individuals in
the same period, who dispute how the authoritative sources should be used, and even
what constitutes an authoritative source. The timeless messages of the Qur’ān are
balanced against these contexts: exegetes attempt to understand the eternal truths of the
text, but also to make that text comprehensible within their own particular time and place.
An exploration of the tension between the exegetes’ apparent desire to create
works which were at once timely and timeless, and of the conflicting methods of
accomplishing this goal, is at the heart of this dissertation. I show the ways in which
understandings of the true meaning of the Qur’ān varied and changed in the pre-modern
period within one particular genre of text, Qur’ānic exegesis. I also delve into the
question of why exegesis varied and changed, by examining the nature of the exegetes’
authoritative sources, and how these sources are cited. I argue that the two factors which
carried the greatest weight in determining interpretation are exegetes’ personal opinion
and the mores of their societies.
My method is to analyze the diachronic development of Sunnī and Imāmī Shī‘ī
interpretations of four Qur’ānic passages; these passages discuss women’s status and the
relationship between the sexes. Exegetes’ interpretations of women’s status and roles are
the subject matter of the dissertation: gender provides the lens through which I study the

1
larger question of exegetical sources and development. I thereby approach two major
issues: the mechanisms through which pre-modern interpretation took place, and the
ways in which the discourse on women’s status and roles changed through time, within
the genre of interpretation. This work attempts to contextualize the process of
interpretation, but also to contextualize discussions of gender as they occurred in a
specific group of texts.
Despite broad agreement on some essential points, the interpretations of these
verses present a striking range and variety through time. The nature of the variation
found in these exegeses means that they defy simple categorization of “dogmatic,” which
is the view of one prominent scholar.1 A more precise way of describing the exegeses of
these verses is that certain interpretations remain constant through time, while others vary
between times, places, and individual authors. This gives the impression of constancy
while incorporating change and variety.
Often, authors writing about the genre of Qur’ānic exegesis neglect to analyze
critically its development and sources. The result is that exegeses are mostly or entirely
decontextualized. One example is Brannon Wheeler’s Prophets in the Qur’ān: an
introduction to the Qur’ān and Muslim Exegesis.2 This anthology of exegeses and verses
is valuable because it provides, in English, a good idea of the themes that occur in the
Qur’ān and in Islamic exegesis, with regard to the particular subject of prophets.
However, in the body of the work, these interpretations are not presented in an order
which would enable the reader to put them into the context from which they emerged.3
The entire focus is on content rather than the development of narratives. Yet by
removing these narratives from their context, it is impossible to fully understand them, or
the debates which surrounded (and may have generated) them.
An equally serious problem is found in Wheeler’s brief introduction, which
oversimplifies the causal relationship between exegesis and its sources. He describes
how “Muslim interpretation relies first on the Prophet Muhammad himself for
1
Barbara Stowasser, in her Women in the Qur’ān, Tradition and Interpretation, New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994, pg. 7, for instance.
2
Wheeler, Prophets in the Qur’ān: an introduction to the Qur’ān and Muslim Exegesis, London:
Continuum, 2002.
3
They are not organized chronologically, and the interpretations attributed to early sources are cited by the
name of that source (Ibn ‘Abbās, for instance) rather than by the name of the author in whose work their
interpretation was found (for instance al-Tabarī).

2
understanding the context and meaning of the revelations [emphasis mine].”4 He goes on
to describe how the opinions of the Prophet are transmitted in hadīths through his
Companions and their Successors, which then form the basis for most interpretation.
In introductions such as Wheeler’s, it is commonplace to simply mention certain
origins of, or sources for, exegesis. These are usually described as the Qur’ān, hadīths,
and early interpretations (the “canon”). Although this is a seemingly straightforward
portrayal of the venture of exegesis, it is not entirely accurate. Saying that exegesis
“relies on” hadīths, for instance, presumes that the hadīths have a causal effect on
exegesis: that the corpus of hadīths is transmitted through generations of exegetes and is
the starting point for their understandings. However, a close look at interpretations
shows that determining exegetical origins is not so straightforward. In this dissertation, I
show how exegetes work with the text of hadīths, but also pick and choose between
hadīths and other authoritative sources; commentaries are shaped by their own concerns,
opinions, and by common understandings in their day. Sources such as hadīths do not
travel on a one-way road from the past to dead-end in the mind of any one exegete;
instead, the exegete is at the center of a roundabout of converging influences.
Other scholars have noted both the development in exegesis and how the opinions
and presuppositions of individual authors have an effect on their exegeses. One example
is Muhammad Husayn al-Tabātabā’ī. In his introduction to his own modern work of
exegesis, he describes how Qur’ānic interpretation developed along four parallel lines,
with the interpretations of four groups of interpreters: the traditionists, theologians,
philosophers, and sūfīs (mystics).5 His is a brief, but learned, analysis of these different
types of exegeses of the Qur’ān, and how each of the four groups sought to support their
own arguments in their works.6 Indeed, in certain contentious verses, these divisions are
readily apparent.
The passages under consideration in this dissertation, however, defy such
categorization. Because they have to do with the relationship between the sexes, many of
the disagreements between exegetes cannot be attributed, for instance, to their different

4
Wheeler, Prophets, p. 5.
5
Tabātabā’ī, al-Mīzān, tr. Sayyd Saeed Akhtar Rizvi, Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services,
1983 (first published in Arabic in 1973), p. 5.
6
Ibid., 5.

3
theological viewpoints or schools of law. Important differences do exist between schools
of law on questions of women’s status. But this dissertation shows that legal rulings are
not the only, or even the major, source of disagreement between exegetes when it comes
to these passages. The exegesis of these passages is thus an ideal locus for analyzing the
development of and sources for exegesis in general, as removed from the particular
constraints of legal school or philosophical viewpoint (which are nevertheless noted
when applicable).
The four Qur’ānic passages which occasion these interpretations consist of
portions of three verses. To show the relationship of early to later texts, each chapter is
organized as a diachronic analysis of new interpretations as they appear through time: the
earliest interpretations are given in full, and subsequent developments documented.
In addition to analyzing the content of interpretations of each of these verses, the
chapters of this dissertation each have a slightly different theoretical concern. The first
passage analyzed here, from Q4:1, reads: Fear your Lord, who created you from a single
soul, and from it created its mate. This passage describes the creation of humankind in
gender-neutral terms. But the “single soul” and “its mate” are universally understood to
refer to Adam and Eve. In the second chapter, I explore possible sources for this view,
how the exegetes’ narratives of creation developed through time, and how this verse was
used as a platform for philosophical and metaphorical interpretations. This chapter thus
presents an overview of some of the multiple layers of understanding possible in the
interpretation of one, seemingly straightforward, passage of the Qur’ān.
Passages from Q2:228 and Q4:34 refer to the place of each sex in different states
of marriage. Exegetes share a broad shared understanding of the relationship between
husbands and wives as one in which husbands have authority, but they differ about
specific details. The subject of Q2:228 is divorce; the passage analyzed here reads:
women have rights like their obligations in kindness, and men have a degree over them;
exegetes disagree about the nature of women’s rights over, and obligations to, their
husbands in marriage and divorce, and the nature of the “degree” that men have over
them. The subject of Q4:34 is the relationship between men and women; it is usually
understood to apply to the marital bond. It begins: Men are qawwāmūn (supporters of/in
authority over) women, with what God has given the one more than the other, and with

4
what they spend of their wealth. So the good women are obedient. Most exegetes
understand the term qawwāmūn to refer to both support and authority, and agree that “the
one more than the other” refers to men being given more than women. But they disagree
about what exactly (material or immaterial) men have been given that is “more than” that
given to women. The interpretations of Q2:228 and the first half of Q4:34 are similar
thematically, and these two chapters are closely related.
Chapter 3, which traces the interpretations of Q2:228, focuses on the methods
used by the exegetes to construct their exegeses. In it, I show how specific methods
emerged through time, and how the use of authoritative sources changed and developed.
Chapter 4, dealing with interpretations of the beginning of Q4:34, is a more in-
depth explanation of the exegetes’ negotiations between their own context and other
authoritative sources. In this chapter I also document some of the exegetes’
disagreements with one another.
The second half of Q4:34 has to do with the punishment of wives. It reads: And
those [women] from whom you fear nushūz, admonish them, avoid them in the beds, and
strike them; if they obey you do not seek a way against them. The term nushūz is usually
glossed as some form of disobedience. Unlike the beginning of Q4:34 and Q2:228, this
passage raises a problem for the exegetes, who debated the meaning of the second
punishment, and whether it allowed husbands to have sex with their wives or not. Thus,
the focus of my final chapter is on exegetes’ methods of reconciling their interpretations
with “problems” in the Qur’ānic text. A large part of this chapter is also devoted to an
analysis of how exegetes rejected an early interpretation, thereby placing limits on the
acceptable content of the genre; some attempted to establish one acceptable meaning for
the phrase.
For the devout, the interpretation of these verses has a direct effect on daily life.
Different understandings of how to behave towards a recalcitrant wife, for instance, could
have serious implications for the woman in question. The venture of interpretation is an
intellectual pursuit; yet exegetes seek to influence practice: they prescribe behaviors
regulating Muslims’ daily lives and households, as well as explaining why such
prescriptions make sense. Thus, although exegetes rarely comment on actual practice,

5
these exegeses help the present-day reader to understand the mores of the scholars who
produced them.
Because the mores of the exegetes contradict the mores of many current-day
readers, especially with regards to gender issues, some scholars have dismissed them as
misogynist.7 Indeed, it seems that the prevailing view of women in the pre-modern
period was that they were not as rational, strong, or capable as men; thus men need to
protect them. But the distinction between this view of women, and hatred of them, is an
important one. Many exegetes in this study, while avowing that women are not as
capable as men, also seek to protect women’s interests. I refer to this attitude as
patriarchal, rather than misogynist.
Most exegetes prove the truth of their interpretations by citing sources which they
considered to be objective and timeless. But from today’s perspective these rationales
can reveal both the time-bounded and subjective aspects of exegesis. For instance,
scientific arguments were used in some exegeses in order to prove that men’s nature is
hot and dry, whereas women’s is cold and moist. Because of their hot, dry nature, men
are stronger than women and thus able to take care of them as well as exercising authority
over them, whereas women’s cold moist nature leaves them weak, in need of care and a
source of authority. This argument rests on scientific claims which would have been seen
in their day as a model of timeless objectivity. However, to most readers today, this
argument would appear not only wrong, but also as exemplary of the time-bound nature
of exegesis. Scientific orthodoxy no longer holds that men’s nature is hot and dry,
whereas women’s is cold and moist, and from a modern perspective it seems that such
“knowledge” about men’s and women’s natures was fostered by preconceptions about
gender roles and the nature of the sexes.
While some of the rationales are time-bound, others are used in a subjective way.
The Qur’ān and sayings of the Prophet are unchanging; other timeless proofs include the
sayings of the Companions, Successors, and other early exegetes, which were valued
because of their proximity to the Prophet and to the scenes of revelation. Yet this study
shows that exegetes do not take adopt elements wholesale; they pick and choose from

7
For instance, Hadia Mubarak, “Breaking apart the interpretive monopoly: a re-examination of verse 4:34,”
Hawwa, 2, 3, p. 262.

6
these rationales, and often elaborate on early views. Thus, the inclusion of an exegete’s
own personal opinion about the verse is not his only method of controlling the outcome
of exegesis. By choosing which proofs to include, and providing their own glosses, these
exegetes were exercising their own judgment about the true meaning of earlier works.
Ultimately, I argue that, while all authoritative sources play into the process of
interpreting the Qur’ān, the factors of exegetes’ individual judgment and the concerns of
their own time carried a greater weight in determining exegesis than the elements
commonly considered to be the “sources” of exegesis, such as hadīths, early
interpretations, and the text of the Qur’ān itself. The subjective and time-bounded
elements in exegesis are precisely the factors which make it most relevant to the
exegetes’ own milieu, and thereby fulfill a central purpose of exegesis. Muhammad
Husayn Tabātabā’ī argues that the subjectivity of past exegetes necessitates a new
exegesis, which is what he undertakes.8 But his is not solely a modern attitude. In this
dissertation, I explore the delicate balance maintained by the exegetes between their
desire to preserve continuity with previous generations, and the necessity of making the
text relevant in their own time and place.

Sources and methods, 1: practical matters

In order to survey the interpretation of these verses in the pre-modern period, I
draw on 67 works by a total of 59 authors; in several cases, I have used more than one
work by an author. These works are mostly from the genre of exegesis of the Qur’ān -
tafsīr al-Qur’ān, referred to here as tafsīr.9 They range in time from the earliest
preserved exegeses to the early-modern period; this dissertation comprises the pre-
modern portion of a larger project which will include modern exegeses.10 Most of the
works I have chosen are those of major interpreters, although I also include a few minor
ones. Most of my sources are published, though I use manuscripts in three cases.11 To
my knowledge, none of the primary sources I use in this dissertation have been fully
translated; all translations here are my own unless otherwise noted.

8
Tabātabā’ī, Mizan, 9.
9
For comparison, I also use a few works which are not from the genre of tafsīr.
10
In the present project, the the final author’s death date is 1195/1791.
11
Al-Wāhidī’s Basīt and al-Jishumī’s tafsīr are only available as manuscripts; I also use manuscripts of al-
Baghawī’s tafsīr for the sake of comparison to the printed versions of the work.

7
 The authors hail from a wide geographical area: Islamic Spain to Central Asia.
They include adherents of the four Sunnī schools of law and Imāmī Shī‘īs; two authors
follow minor schools.12 Appendix A gives short biographies of the authors of each of the
works used, showing which verses they comment on, and lists full bibliographical details
of the works.13

Source problems
The number of works I analyze here gives some sense of the scope of pre-modern
exegesis, but, given the variety in these 67 works, it has become clear to me that they
cannot come close to measuring the full range of interpretations over the 1000-year
period which they span. This poses problems for the proper analysis of these sources.
For instance, when I say that a certain exegete “introduced” an interpretation, this is
always with the knowledge that an earlier exegete, not included in this study, might have
actually introduced it. I have focused my analysis on the way that exegesis changes
through time; my findings about changes in content and method are consistent between
all four of the passages that I have analyzed, and I believe that this dissertation is able to
give an overview of the development of interpretation through time. But I hope that
future scholars will be able to take the analysis of context in the pre-modern period much
further than I am able to here. An especially fruitful and important avenue of analysis
would be the effect of geography on interpretation. A geographical analysis is beyond
the scope of this project in its current form.14
The problems of using published sources have been discussed by other authors,
including Walid Saleh and Kecia Ali.15 Suffice it to say that these publications can be
unreliable: often, they are not critical editions based on many manuscripts and they

12
The Ibādī Hūd b. Muhakkam and al-Tabarī, who had his own school of law.
13
In the text of the dissertation, I use only abbreviated citations for the sources listed in the appendix.
Shortened citations: Author, shortened title of work, volume number, page number.
14
Although for my analysis of the modern period I have interviewed clerics in Syria and I hypothesize that
their particular milieu has an effect on their interpretations; I may undertake a limited geographical analysis
of the pre-modern period when converting this dissertation into a book.
15
See Ali, Money, Sex, and Power: the contractual nature of marriage in Islamic Jurisprudence of the
formative period, dissertation submitted to Duke University, 2002, 42; Saleh, The Formation of the
classical tafsīr tradition, Boston: Brill, 2004, introduction.

8
include typing errors. At worst, their editors have a bias and either exclude or include
elements which change the manuscript sources, but this seems rare.16
A different problem occurs with the very earliest sources: almost every early work
I draw on has been reconstructed in a later period. It is impossible to know if their
originals included interpretations which were not accepted by any later exegete, or if the
later exegetes from which these reconstructions were drawn changed the texts in any
way. Yet using these sources still gives some idea of their popularity through time. The
fact that they were cited by prominent exegetes at least shows that they were in
circulation at one point.

Method specific to this dissertation

To analyze these sources, I made charts for each verse - unfortunately too big to
be included here - listing the rationales given by the authors in the course of their
interpretations. I check every time a different exegete cites a particular rationale, such as
men’s superior rationality, and then determine its popularity by calculating how often it is
cited as a percentage of the number of authors who could have cited it (i.e., who died
after the time of the first appearance of the rationale in question). This method has one
significant problem: the rationales could have been introduced earlier by an exegete not
included in this study, and indeed exegetes often cite a now-lost work as their source.
But the method also has a major benefit: it conclusively shows that certain rationales
were in existence at certain points. Especially when these rationales were used by major
authors, whose texts would have been widespread, it shows that exegetes after that point
chose whether to include them or not. In the text of the dissertation I focus especially on
patterns of citation from the text of al-Tabarī, who is considered today to be a major pre-
modern source, and on the patterns of citing the earliest exegeses.
These charts enable me to analyze how popular the earliest exegeses actually were
in later texts, and how exegeses which developed in a later period were incorporated into
the corpus. I can show that some early exegeses were discarded, while others were
preserved and developed into a discourse which could not have been predicted by just

16
Although it did occur in the one manuscript that I checked against a published text: the modern published
edition of al-Baghawī’s text included a different version of a hadīth than that found in the manuscripts.

9
reading the earliest texts. This method also shows that that the earliest sources were not
the only sources of exegesis, and that exegetes in every age picked and chose which early
interpretations, and which of their own opinions, to include in their works.

Sources and Methods, 2: The nature of the sources and theoretical concerns
The aim of this section is to introduce the sources which I use in a more broad
sense, by asking what these sources comprise, how they are organized, whether they can
be considered a genre, and by identifying (in part) the aims of the authors. This latter
point leads to the question of the purpose and development of interpretation in general,
which I also address briefly here.

Framing the question of interpretive objectivity

Pre-modern intellectuals and modern scholars of Islam alike have framed the
issues surrounding interpretative objectivity in different ways. The most prominent
debate in the pre-modern period was whether the Qur’ān could only be explained by
reference to the views of the Prophet and his Companions (tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr), or
whether the exegetes’ reasoned judgments could also be used in interpretation (tafsīr bi’l-
ra’y). The terms describing these two methods of interpretation are literally
“interpretation according to what has been transmitted (ma’thūr)” and “interpretation
according to personal judgment (ra’y).” Some pre-modern scholars, such as Ibn
Taymīya, seem to treat these different ways of writing exegesis as distinct: strict
adherence to tradition and early authority, or whimsical personal interpretation.17 Yet
this is an oversimplification. Even scholars exercising ra’y were not using their own
judgment arbitrarily: rather, they sought to use reasoning to improve the objectivity of
their interpretations. Put simply, they were attempting to ascertain what God wanted
from them, not what they wanted for themselves. Furthermore, personal judgment is a
part of every exegesis at some level: scholars must at the very least decide what to

17
Ibn Taymīya actually discusses many different types of mistakes that an exegete can make, and which
will compromise the value of his exegesis. In section 4 of his Muqaddima fī usūl al-tafsīr, he mentions the
problem of using ra’y to interpret the Qur’ān. See Ibn Taymīya, Muqaddima fī usūl al-tafsīr, Kuwait: Dār
al-Qur’ān al-Karīm, 1971; one example is on p. 75. It is unclear to me when the expressions tafsīr bi’l-ra’y
and tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr first came to be used.

10
include and what to exclude from their work. In an important sense, then, the labels
ma’thūr and ra’y may not be accurate descriptions of different ways of writing tafsīr.18
One of the earliest Western scholars to tackle the question of exegetical
subjectivity was Ignaz Goldziher (d. 1921). In his book Schools of Koranic
Commentators, Goldziher outlines seven different ways of interpreting the Qur’ān. He
draws on a body of work that spans a wide range of Islamic intellectual pursuits,
including works of exegesis, law, and morals, among others; since exegesis is at the heart
of these many different types of work, Goldziher does not differentiate between genres.
One of the underlying arguments of his book is that, in each of the seven cases, specific
circumstances and ideologies, such as an exegete’s school of law or theology, determine
interpretation. Thus, whereas one school of thought would read their point of view into a
particular verse, another would see the opposite meaning: each school is able to read their
particular viewpoint into the same verse. These disagreements prove that, rather than
being an objective process which would reveal the same truth to each interpreter,
exegesis is highly flexible, dependent on the subjective view of the individual interpreter
as well as the exigencies of his particular situation.19
Goldziher’s essential point, that interpretation depends on context, is sound. But
his approach leaves certain questions unanswered. Do his observations about the
flexibility of exegesis mean that it can stretch to accommodate any viewpoint, as he
seems to suggest? And, although Goldziher himself did not differentiate between the
genre of exegesis and other genres of text, should today’s scholars do so? Indeed, is it
appropriate to call tafsīr of the Qur’ān a genre at all?
Scholars since Goldziher have dealt with these questions, particularly the latter
two, and here I will focus on three scholars who have discussed tafsīr as a genre,
describing tafsīr’s form and content (i.e., the shape it takes, what is included and what is

18
Andrew Rippin argues that: “The basic separation between tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr (or riwāya) and tafsīr bi’l-
ra’y (or dirāya)… reflects a tension which runs throughout the Muslim community and its intellectual
disciplines, that of the authority of the community (ma’thūr) versus that of the [individual] intellect
(ra’y)… This separation does not, however, provide a sufficient analytical tool by which one may
characterize the wide variety of books and approaches which are contained within the broadly-defined
genre of tafsīr, since it concentrates on a superficial understanding of the form of the works with little
attention to their underlying substance” (Andrew Rippin, “Tafsir” EI2, v. 10, 84).
19
Goldziher makes his argument clear from the very first paragraph of his book. See Goldziher, Schools of
Koranic Commentators, Edited and translated, Wolfgang H. Behn, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006.

11
not included) and its function, meaning how it functions hermeneutically, as a tool to
understand scripture.

Form and content

Norman Calder, Andrew Rippin, and Walid Saleh all agree that tafsīr is a genre
with a form which differentiates it from other types of work; since content effects form, I
also discuss content here. In his article “Tafsīr from Tabarī to Ibn Kathīr: Problems with
the description of a genre,” Norman Calder classifies tafsīr in the period under his
consideration as “a literary genre with definable formal characteristics.”20 He argues that,
at its most basic level, tafsīr consists of a significant portion of the Qur’ān, and
commentary on it.21 Works within this genre cite specific authorities, which, he says,
helps an exegete to define the tradition within which he works: citation of authorities
delimits the boundaries of his source pool. Calder’s argument is important for
understanding specific ways in which tafsīr differs from other genres. When the source
pool of named authorities differs between different types of work, their content can also
be expected to differ.
The cited authorities did not always have the same view of the meaning of a
verse, and preserving their views seemed to be more important than creating a single
canonical interpretation. The result, Calder claims, is “polyvalent” readings of the text of
the Qur’ān.22 On a practical level, this means that the reader of a work of tafsīr, who
might be expecting a definitive answer to the question of the author’s opinion of the
meaning of the verse, is often confronted with long lists of sometimes conflicting
interpretations. Often, no definitive answer as to the “true” meaning of the verse is given

20
Norman Calder, “Tafsīr from Tabarī to Ibn Kathīr: Problems in the description of a genre, illustrated with
reference to the story of Abraham,” in Hawting and Shareef, Approaches to the Qur’ān, New York:
Routledge, 1993, 101-138.
21
Ibid., 101.
22
Ibid., 103. Walid Saleh takes this argument a few steps further. He claims that “Quranic exegesis
became Sunni by becoming polyvalent. The Qur’ān spoke in many meanings, and they were all true,
unless there developed an ijmā‘ (a consensus) concerning a particular meaning. Since few interpretations
became subject of an ijmā‘ and hence no unanimous meanings were ever attached to them, each varied
interpretation was true on its own. A verse could have conflicting interpretations, each of which could be
adduced as part of the meaning of the word of God without disrupting the notion of the clarity of the
Qur’ān” (Saleh, Formation, 18). Saleh’s argument is weakened by the fact that he provides no evidence to
support the claim that polyvalence meant that all given meanings were true, and he does not explain how
Qur’ānic exegesis is really Sunnī, given that Imāmī tafsīr is also “polyvalent.”

12
at all. However, not all readings are always given equal weight. Sometimes authors
choose one reading to the exclusion of others, and sometimes they express preference for
one of the many readings that they provide in the text. In his terminology, “choice” hides
variety, and “preference” admits variety, but controls it.23
Saleh builds on this argument by describing how the totality of tradition was
available to every exegete writing a new work.24 Although assessing the scope of the
exegetes’ actual source pool would be a difficult task, it seems likely that most exegetes
had access to the major works of earlier authors. However, Saleh points out that the
question of how an exegete picks one interpretation, and not another, from the tradition
has remained largely unstudied.25
Andrew Rippin provides one answer as to how an exegete might choose which
interpretations to include in exegesis. Individual exegetes focus on different aspects of
interpretation, and exegesis is a process of reconciling the text with the context of
interpretation. In his words,
Different mufassirūn have different concerns and goals, and this is reflected in the
relative weight they put upon elements such as history, grammar, semantics, law,
theology, or folklore. All commentators are concerned with the process of
analyzing the text in light of the “external world”, however that be defined for the
individual author, with the aim of resolving any apparent conflict and making the
text “clear”.26

An individual author’s choice to focus on grammar, theology, or other elements affects a

work’s style and content. Both Saleh and Rippin provide important clues to understand
how and why early interpretations are preserved in later works: many earlier
interpretations remain in a source pool, from which individual exegetes may draw
according to whichever they deem to be authoritative.
Although both Saleh and Rippin refer to authors’ choices in citing precedent,
neither discuss the implications of the fact that, at times, early, supposedly reliable
exegeses are dropped from the tradition entirely or almost entirely, only resurfacing once

23
Calder, “Problems,” 104.
24
Walid Saleh, Formation, 14-15.
25
Saleh, Formation, 16.
26
Andrew Rippin, “Tafsīr,” EI2, v. 10, 84.

13
or twice through time.27 In other words, although most or all exegeses may be available
at any point, that does not mean that they are actually cited and that they remain within
the tradition. I document this phenomenon and connect it to the development of
interpretation. As interpretations become more complex, some early explanations are
dropped while others are expanded upon and given new glosses. It is important to note
that even in shorter works, which do not include multiple interpretations, the factor of
choice affected content: certain new elements appeared. The resulting blend of the old
with the new gives the appearance of continuity, when in fact the tradition is constantly
changing and developing.

Function and the question of genre

The foregoing discussion has not fully answered the question of whether Qur’ānic
exegesis should be considered as a genre in terms of function. This question is pertinent
since interpretation occurs in many different types of work; one might even say that
exegesis is central to much Islamic intellectual output. Furthermore, works within the
genre of tafsīr are informed by elements of different genres, such as law; although the
exegetes may not even mention legal rulings, they take knowledge of legal works for
granted, and sometimes rulings surface to clarify a point. Thus, I argue, the boundaries
of tafsīr are porous: they admit elements from other genres, just as other genres are
influenced by elements from tafsīr.
But ultimately the content of these genres differs in important ways, because the
function, and thus the content, of these works are different. On the most basic level, the
function of works of tafsīr is to explain the Qur’ān verse by verse, whereas the function
of works of law (fiqh) is to explain different legal interpretations.28 The difference in
function has practical consequences: the exegesis of these verses shows that, whereas

27
In fact, Saleh denies that this happens at all: “…the genealogical nature of this tradition meant that it was
impossible to oust any major component of the tradition once it had gained entry.” Saleh, Formation, 15.
28
Thus, the most obvious way in which tafsīr differs from other genres is that, however varied tafsīr may
be, not every interpretation enters into the genre of tafsīr; a study of works of exegesis alone will not give a
full picture of the range of thought on any particular issue.

14
works of law outline the limits of allowable behavior, works of tafsīr recommend
behaviors that do not exactly match the laws.29
One can see the different functions of these genres in the handling of the verses
analyzed in this dissertation. Exegetes describe the marital relationship, in which men
have much legal leeway, and they draw heavily on legal works; but often exegetical
recommendations moderate legal rulings. For instance, certain schools of law allow men
to beat their wives as long as they do not break open the skin on their heads, and these
rulings may be included in the exegesis of a verse. This means that any beating short of
that point cannot be punished by the law; only beatings in which the skin on the head is
broken are punishable. But the very same exegetes often recommend, in their
explanations of the same verse, that the beating be much less severe: with a tooth-stick,
for instance. This is not to say that law books never recommend behavior that falls short
of the legal limits – in fact some law books do recommend beating with only a tooth-stick
– but rather that as a general rule law books are meant to elucidate the law as such,
whereas the tafsīr of these verses has a different function: to advise on what was
preferable in daily life. The effect of this function on the content of the interpretations is
apparent throughout this dissertation. The exegeses of the passages studied here offer an
excellent opportunity for highlighting the grey area between legal rulings, which are
often quite lenient towards men, and exegetical recommendation, which sometimes
encourages men’s leniency towards their wives.
Focusing on the content of the exegeses, and comparing with a few non-tafsīr
works, allows me to make observations about the ways in which exegesis within the
genre of tafsīr differs from the exegesis in other genres. On the basis of these
observations, I argue that tafsīr is a genre with porous boundaries: it is distinct, but is
permeable and in fact is constantly permeated by elements from other genres.30

29
I will not deal with the actual uses of works of tafsīr here i.e., how the works of exegesis were used by
preachers or teachers. In any case this aspect of tafsīr has only been briefly noted by most authors. Calder
speaks of the practical implications of different styles of writing tafsīr, saying that shorter works, which
preserve a monovalent interpretation, were probably designed for educational curricula (Calder,
“Problems,” 104). Saleh builds on his point by dividing tafsīr into two types: madrase and encyclopedic.
Madrase tafsīr, he says, was for use in schools, and encyclopedic tafsīr operated under the principle of
consensus. Neither Saleh nor Calder, however, explain where longer, encyclopedic tafsīr would have been
used, if not in the schools.
30
However, because this study focuses on works of tafsīr, the question of how content differs between
genres cannot be fully answered here. In an excellent article, Jane Dammen McAuliffe discusses the genre

15
The effects of context
Above, I have examined the practical function of tafsīr: to explain the text of the
Qur’ān to the believers, verse by verse, citing the interpretations of previous authorities
and the opinions of the exegetes themselves. I have also explained that interpretations
and methods vary across time and between exegetes. I will now go on to explore the
evidence provided by these interpretations for how exegetes reconcile the text of the
Qur’ān, sunna of the Prophet, and early exegeses with their own historical, social,
political, and intellectual contexts.
In this dissertation, I proceed from an assumption of “good faith” in the exegetes
– in other words, I take it that they did not think of their own enterprise as a capricious
one and that, for them, the text of the Qur’ān matters as do the rationales that they cite,
such as hadīths. But at the same time, I have observed that interpretation is highly
flexible. Exegetes cite completely contradictory interpretations in their works, and, as
mentioned above, rationales are cited selectively, which may give the impression of
capriciousness. Taking into account the exegetes’ context helps to explain why they can,
in good conscience, “stretch” the text to accommodate so many meanings.
The work of Gadamer is useful for understanding the nature of interpretation. He
introduced the idea of the “fusion of horizons,” through which the interpreter seeks to
bring his own understanding closer to that of the original milieu of the text, while
concurrently the text is able to be understood from a point of view closer to the
interpreter’s. The horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter fuse.31 This
fusing of horizons can be seen in the exegetical texts which I have studied: the process of

boundaries of tafsīr and comes to the conclusion that the genre of exegesis does not include all arguments
about any given verse; in other words, there are genre boundaries. See Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “The
Genre Boundaries of Qur’ānic Commentary,” in With Reverence for the Word: medieval scriptural
exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, ed. McAuliffe et. al., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,
445-461. Ayesha Siddiqua Chaudhry, in her forthcoming dissertation from NYU, studies the Qur’ānic
command to “beat them” (i.e., the recalcitrant women) in premodern texts of several different genres. Her
conclusions will undoubtedly shed more light on the question of tafsīr as a genre.
31
He also describes how, as the interpreter’s horizon moves, so does the text: “A horizon is not a rigid
boundary but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further… For everything that is
given as existent is given in terms of a world and hence brings the world horizon with it” (Gadamer, Truth
and Method, second revised edition, trans. John Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, New York:
Continuum, 2004, p. 245).

16
Qur’ānic exegesis is the exegetes’ attempt to reconcile the words of the Qur’ān with what
they know to be true both in their own milieux and in the milieu of the Qur’ān.
It is important to delve briefly into the implications of the fusion of horizons, and
the elements of choice that exegetes exert over their source pool. The selective citing of
sources means that even when early interpretations are included in later works, their
presence is not inevitable, it is chosen. In other words, the corpus of early interpretations,
and the existence of hadīths pertinent to the topic of exegesis, did not determine the
content of exegeses. While exegetes of all ages sought to understand what the earlier
authorities had said about a particular verse, some of these explanations no longer
resonated in later ages. In practical terms, such selective citing can be seen to reflect the
milieux of the exegetes.
Although Qur’ānic exegesis is a conservative genre, meaning that great
importance was placed on continuity with previous authorities, sometimes earlier
interpretations are not satisfying to the exegetes, and they must add their own
interpretation or cite rationales which had not previously entered the genre. New
exegeses reflect the exegetes’ understanding of the text and previous interpretations
through the lens of their current milieux, their own opinions, and their development of
new interpretive methods as time passes. New interpretations often appear and then are
subject to later elaboration. Al-Tha‘labī (d. 427/1035), for instance, cites the
interpretation that men have superior religion (dīn) to women; even though this
interpretation may be a reference to a hadīth it is new to the genre. Later exegetes
elaborate on this theme, saying that men’s superiority includes going to the mosque,
attending Friday prayers, calling to prayer, staying in the mosque over night, and so forth.
Sometimes, “new” interpretations refer to established legal rulings, but appear for the
first time in exegesis with a particular interpreter. Al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923) says that
women have the right to sex in marriage, and subsequent exegetes cite him as the source
of this interpretation even though it is a legal ruling. And at other times, new
interpretations seem to stem solely from the exegete’s own opinion. Al-Tabarī says, for
instance, that mankind’s creation from Adam means that we should care for one another
as brothers, for in a sense we are all related.

17
 Despite what may seem to be a staggering number of new interpretations,
common contexts can lead to a shared understanding and to basic similiarities between
exegetes’ opinions. This is the case with their insistence on men’s authority and
women’s obedience – one point of real agreement between them. The exegetes evidently
do not envision a household which conforms to today’s notions of gender equality; across
different times and places, schools of law and theology, these verses can be comfortably
interpreted from within their patriarchal milieux. Thus, passages that may cause concern
for readers today, such as the phrase which says that men have “a degree over” women,
are not necessarily problematic in the broad sense for pre-modern exegetes. They share
an understanding of the many aspects of men’s superiority over women which might
constitute the “degree,” while nevertheless often disagreeing about the specifics of the
phrase’s interpretation.
But some verses were more difficult to interpret comfortably from within the
presuppositions of law and culture that the pre-modern exegetes brought with them to the
text. This is true of the phrase avoid them in the beds (wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘),
which describes one of the punishments for the recalcitrant wife. This phrase brought up
the question of whether avoidance allowed men to assert their basic right to sex within
marriage, or whether the term meant “avoidance” at all.32 In this case, the text of the
Qur’ān did not bind the exegetes so strictly that they could not fundamentally disagree
about what the punishment entailed.
This seems to indicate that the text of the Qur’ān will admit any interpretation.
But in practice the exegetes as a group reject interpretations which go beyond their
common ideas of the bounds of propriety, common sense, or proper grammatical usage.
Common sense and grammar, for instance, are the rationales used by exegetes to reject
al-Tabarī’s interpretation of avoid them in the beds (wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘), which
he says means to tie the recalcitrant women up in their houses with the hijār, the rope
used to tie camels.
This is the only case in this dissertation of the unanimous rejection of an
interpretation, but other cases exist. The exegetes unanimously reject Sufyān b.

32
Kecia Ali describes this right in chapter 2 of her dissertation Money, Sex, and Power. She says, for
instance, that “The wife has two interlinked duties [in marriage]: to allow her husband to derive (sexual)
enjoyment from her (al-istimtā‘a bihā) and to accept restrictions placed on her mobility (habs)” (169).

18
‘Uyayna’s interpretation that Q2:282, which speaks of women’s witnessing, does not say
if one of the women errs, the other can remind her, but rather says if one of the woman
errs, the other is made like a man. Maribel Fierro has documented the rise and fall of the
interpretation that there have been women prophets in Islam; rather than being a single
exegete’s opinion, this was a minority view amongst some scholars in Spain, which was
later rejected.33
Because notions of propriety and common sense are relative, the question remains
of whether interpretations which have once been rejected could be resuscitated and
treated as authoritative in later periods. In the final iteration of this project, I will explore
how some interpretations which were rejected by the majority of pre-modern scholars
have been judged, by some modern exegetes, to be sound.34

33
Fierro, “Women as Prophets in Islam,” in Writing the Feminine: Women in Arab Sources, ed. Deguilhem
and Marín, London: I. B. Taurus, 2002, p. 183-198.
34
An example of a “revival” of rejected pre-modern interpretations is the modern Syrian reformist cleric
Muhammad al-Habash’s resuscitation of the interpretation that there were women prophets in Islam.

19
A preliminary note: key terms: bi’l-ma‘rūf, fadl, adab, and qawwāmūn
Certain terms which recur in these texts are used in a variety of ways by the
exegetes and have subtle shades of meaning which are not easily conveyed in one-word
translations. I describe some of these terms here, focusing on the terms bi’l-ma‘rūf,
qawwāmūn, fadl (and its variations), and adab (and variations), with a few other terms
explained in less detail. While I draw on dictionaries to define these words, I do not seek
to provide comprehensive definitions, but to describe the connotations relevant to the
exegeses treated here.

Bi’l-Ma‘rūf
The expression bi’l-ma‘rūf appears in verse 2:228, Women have rights like their
obligations bi’l-ma‘rūf. Its literal meaning is “according to what is known” or
“according to custom.” However, neither of these translations brings out the real sense of
the phrase, which, according to Ibn Manzūr (d. 711/1312), author of the dictionary Lisān
al-‘Arab, is doing good deeds, obeying God and His law, and treating people well. Its
opposite is al-munkar - the reprehensible.35 He also speaks of the term as enjoying
friendly companionship with one’s wife, which is the sense in which it is often used by
the exegetes. I translate it as “in kindness.”

Qawwāmūn: supporters of, in authority over

Qawwāmūn can mean, broadly, those in support of or in authority over; when
used elsewhere in the Qur’ān, without the preposition (‘alā), it refers to support.36
Support, authority, or guardianship is qiwāma, from the same root. Exegetes usually
translate qawwāmūn to mean that men are financial supporters of women and that they
are in authority over them.
Women are never described, in these texts, as being qawwām over men, although
they are said to be upholders (qayyimāt) of their husband’s rights.

35
For much more on this, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic
Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
36
In Q4:135 and Q5:8.

20
 The term qā’im ‘alā can have several different interpretations; in the Lisān al-
‘Arab, Ibn Manzūr says that it means “one who maintains (thābit ‘alā) something and
cleaves to it (tamassuk bihi) is qā’im over it (qā’im ‘alayhi).”

Fadl and variations: surplus, superiority, generosity

The root f-d-l appears in Qur’ān 4:34, and words with this root are frequently used in
order to explain the attributes of the sexes in exegeses of all four verses studied here.

Fadl as surplus: Men are often described as having fadl over women in a number of ways
(for instance, in rationality, good judgment, strength, and so forth). Ibn Manzūr says that
fadl means a surplus, or having more of something.37 Its opposite is naqs, or
deficiency.38 Lane, in his Lexicon, quotes Ibn Manzūr’s definition exactly; he adds that
with the preposition ‘alā, the word fadl refers to having a surplus, or superiority, over
others. Ibn Manzūr’s definition reflects the exegetes’ most common usage of this term,
which is often used to describe men’s surplus over women in certain qualities, rights, or
abilities.
These qualities, rights, or abilities, when described as men’s fadl, are not implied
to be entirely absent in women; rather, men have more of these things. With a term like
rationality (‘aql), this is especially important to remember. ‘Aql is a quality which
distinguishes humans from animals; whereas women meet the basic standard of humans
(i.e., they do possess ‘aql), men’s ‘aql exceeds women’s; their surplus is opposed to
women’s naqs, or deficiency. When fadl is used in this sense in these sources, I usually
translate it as “surplus;” sometimes “superiority” gives a better sense of the meaning.

Faddala as distinguish/make superior: The second form of this root is what God does to
“some of them over others” in verse 4:34; Ibn Manzūr describes this as being the
equivalent of mayyaza, or to distinguish. Lane adds that to faddala ‘alā is to judge
someone to be more excellent than others, or to make them so (as in the Qur’ān). So
when God does this to “some over others”, it means that He has made some excel over

37
In its verbal form fadala, it is the equivalent of zāda, to become greater, or increase; the noun fadl is the
equivalent of ziyāda, a surplus.
38
Ibn Manzūr, Lisān al-‘Arab, 1998, v. 10, 280.

21
others, or has distinguished some of them over others, or made some of them superior to
others. With the preposition bi- it means to distinguish particularly by something. I
usually translate this term as “distinguish.” The verbal noun of faddala (tafdīl) is defined
by Ibn Manzūr as “an elevated degree of fadl”; I usually translate it as “superiority”; a
related term, fadīla, is an excellent quality, and can also mean “superiority.”

Fadl as magnanimity: A hadīth of the companion Ibn ‘Abbās (described fully below) has
him say that he does not like to take advantage of all of the rights that he has over his
wife, because God has granted him a degree over her; this is explained by the following
expression, in which fadl appears twice: “Men are asked to manage women with
magnanimity (fadl), so that they have one degree of superiority (fadl) over them (nudiba
al-rijāl ilā al-akhdh ‘alā al-nisā’ bi’l-fadl li-yakūn lahum ‘alayhinna fadl daraja.)”39 I
have translated akhdh ‘alā as “manage”: the words (literally “take hold of”) imply some
element of control at best, and imprisonment at worst; management seems an appropriate
rendering given the words of Ibn ‘Abbās’s hadīth. In this particular schema, men treat
women generously, forgiving them some of their duties, so that they have a degree of
superiority over women. I translate a separate, but related, expression (akhdh ‘alā
yadayhinna) as “restrain.”40

Adab and variations: discipline, manners, punishment

Several of the earliest exegetes, and many later ones, mention that men are in
charge of women’s adab; later exegetes often say that men are responsible for women’s
ta’dīb.
Adab is defined as “good discipline of the mind and manners,” meaning that
someone who is described as having adab is “well-disciplined, well-educated, well-bred,

39
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, v. 4, 536 (exegesis of 2:228).
40
Another expression used by the exegetes is akhdh ‘alā yadayhā: this (in masculine form) is described by
Ibn Manzūr as “preventing someone from doing something which he wishes to do, as if you grabbed
(amsakta) hold of his hand.” I translate this expression as “restraining them”. Incidentally, this exact
definition is also in Lane, who took it from the Lisān; this term is not in Kazimirsky. Akhdh ‘alā is not in
Lane or Ibn Manzūr. Kazimirsky describes it just as Ibn Manzūr has described akhdh ‘alā yad: “occuper,
intercepter quelque chose à quelqu’un; s’emparer du terrain, de la place/contre quelqu’un.” A few
exegetes, such as al-Wāhidī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, say al-akhdh fawq yadayhā, which seems to indicate
that the family’s income is in the man’s hands. The expression is not in the dictionaries.

22
or well-mannered, polite, instructed in polite accomplishments”41 or “elegance.”42 This is
generally one of the ways that men are considered superior to women. In this
dissertation, I usually translate adab as discipline, but the subtle sense of education and
manners should be kept in mind.
In its second verbal form with a direct object (addabahu) means to teach someone
the discipline of mind which constitutes adab. It therefore also means to discipline
someone, by making them disciplined and well-mannered and polite. This is what men
are instructed to do with women. Lane has a concise definition of the verbal noun,
ta’dīb:
He taught him well, or much, the discipline of the mind, and the acquisition of
good qualities and attributes of the mind or soul: and hence this latter also
signifies he disciplined him, chastised him, corrected him, or punished him, for
his evil conduct; because discipline, or chastisement, is a means of inviting a
person to what is properly termed al-adab.43

I usually translate the term as discipline or punish. Some later exegeses have men
responsible for tadbīr, which in pre-modern usage means to manage or order the affairs
of a province or household.44
Both of these terms are excellent illustrations of the way that men are perceived to
be superior to women. Men are in charge of women’s moral education, because men
have been endowed with more discernment than women have. For instance, tamyīz is a
quality often ascribed to men, and can be best defined as discernment. Several other
words are used to describe men’s qualities of discernment and good judgment, such as
hazm, ra’y, ‘aql, and so forth; these qualities put them in the position to be in charge of
women’s adab.

41
Lane, Lexicon, v. 1, 34.
42
Ibn Manzūr, Lisān (zarf).
43
Lane, “Adab,” Lexicon, v. 1, 34.
44
Lane, “Dabara,” Lexicon, v. 3, 844.

23
 1: The development of narratives of creation and philosophical accounts of its
implications in the exegeses of Q4:1

1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the interpretations of a portion of one of the Qur’ānic
verses which speaks of creation, Q4:1, which reads: Fear your Lord, who created you
from a single soul, and from it created its mate. The interpretations of Q4:1 follow two
major parallel tracks. The first is a set of continually developing historical narratives
describing how Eve was created and what else happened in the garden of Eden. These
narratives show how readings of a matter which the exegetes considered to be historical
fact were still subject to embellishment and elaboration through time. This is why I refer
to the interpretations about Eve’s creation as a continually developing set of historical
narratives. The second track followed by these exegeses is a set of narratives about the
underlying meaning of this verse. These show how philosophical elements entered into
exegesis, describe multiple layers of meaning in the Qur’ānic verse.
In addition to exploring the development of narratives about creation, this chapter
explores some possible sources for these narratives. Most of the interpretations of this
verse seem, on the face of it, to have little to do with the verse itself. The apparent
distance between the text and its interpretation opens the door to the exploration, in this
chapter, of the domain between exegetes’ literal and figurative readings of texts, and their
uses of sources outside of the realms of Qur’ān and hadīths.

1.2 Q4:1, other creation verses, and possible sources of the rib interpretation
In order to understand the background for the historical narratives about Eve’s
creation, it is necessary to know something about the other Qur’ānic creation verses,
hadīths, and other possible sources of interpretation on which the exegetes drew. In this
section, I describe some sources from which exegetes may have drawn knowledge about
the creation of mankind. However, none of the sources discussed here actually provides
a narrative matching all details of the exegetes’ interpretations. Therefore, this section
provides some background for understanding the exegetes’ interpretations, rather than
identifying direct sources or verbatim correlations.

24
 There is near consensus on most aspects of Q4:1. What debates exist have to do
with the substance out of which Eve was created. A few exegetes disagree about whether
Eve was created from Adam’s rib, or from the clay left over after his creation (an Imāmī
view), or if she was created like Adam. To fully understand why these questions, and not
others, are matters of debate it is important to understand the context of Q4:1 – in other
words, what the exegetes could take for granted as common knowledge.
I argue that, in light of other Qur’ānic verses, understanding the “single soul” to
refer to Adam and “its mate” to refer to his spouse is not implausible.45 Eve is never
mentioned by name in the Qur’ān, nor is the substance of her creation, which could
explain why the latter is a matter of debate. But there are links between verses which
mention creation, the single soul, and Adam.

The text of Q4:146

This portion of Q4:1 can be divided into three phrases. The first is the admonition
to the people (nās) to fear your Lord, which defines the addressees of the verse. The
second is who created you (pl.) from a single soul. Created you seems to be an allusion
to the creation of mankind; you is in the plural, and the verse addresses people - although
there was a dispute over whether the verse addresses all people or just the Meccans, the
majority view is that humankind is addressed.
The word which I have translated “soul” here is nafs, which has many meanings;
among them is self, or individual (as in English, when “soul” is used to mean person). In
this chapter, I will show that “soul” was understood by most, if not all, pre-modern
exegetes in this sense: to refer to a single person, rather than to refer to the ethereal spirit
which is the most common modern understanding of that term.

45
Thus I disagree with Amina Wadud Muhsin, who says that the Qur’ān “does not even refer to the origins
of the human race with Adam. It does not even state that Allah began the creation of humankind with the
nafs of Adam, the man” (Amina Wadud-Muhsin, Qur’ān and woman, Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Fajar Bakti,
1994, p. 20).
46
The full text of Q4:1 reads: “O People! Fear your Lord, who created you from a single soul, from it
created its mate, and from them spread forth many men and women. And be careful of your duty to God,
by whom you demand of one another (your rights), and (of) the wombs that bore you. For God ever
watches over you.”

25
 Not only did God create “you” from the single soul/person, from it He created its
mate. The word I have translated as “it” here is actually a pronoun. While I translate the
verse as “from it…,” an equally good translation is “…from him, He created his mate.”
Although this verse does not mention names or even a specific meaning for
creation, in the pre-modern exegeses which I have examined the single soul is universally
understood to be Adam and its/his mate is understood to be Eve. The elements brought
to bear in the interpretation of this verse are diverse, ranging from apparent adaptations of
the creation narrative from Jewish sources47 to esoteric debates about the nature of
existence.48 But reading this verse as a literal reference to Adam and his mate is not that
farfetched, given other verses of the Qur’ān.
There are two types of Qur’ānic reference to the creation of humans: one type
discusses the physical matter of creation, and the other discusses the creation of the
“soul” and its “mate,” as in Q4:1. An example of a verse which speaks of the physical
creation of man is found in sūra 32:
Allah created in six days, the heaven and the earth and all that is between them,
then he mounted the throne; you have not, besides him, a protecting friend or
mediator… He who made all things good which he created, and who began the
creation of man from clay. Then he made his seed from a drought of despised
fluid. Then he fashioned him and breathed into him of his spirit, and appointed
for you hearing and sight and hearts (Q32:5, 7-8).49

In this version of creation, the world and everything in it was created in six days; man
was created from clay, to which was added some fluid, and then he was shaped, and God
breathed into him his spirit. So the physical “stuff” of this creation is clay, a draught of
fluid, and the breath of God.
From the creation of man, described in the third person, the verse then shifts
perspective to address the reader directly. After breathing life into the man, God
appointed “for you” the faculties of hearing, sight, and understanding (heart). The
attributes of the first man become the attributes of humankind; rhetorically, “you (pl.)”
become the ones fashioned by God’s hand and granted these faculties.

47
Al-Tabarī cites Ibn ‘Abbās, who cites Jewish sources.
48
For instance, Abū Hayyān and Muhsin al-Fayd, described in the final section of this chapter.
49
Qur’ānic translations in this chapter are Pickthall’s; my own minor modifications are noted.

26
 Other verses speak of the physical “stuff” of man’s creation as consisting of clay,
water, dust, mud, a clot of blood, or God’s word.50 These verses of the creation of either
mankind or of a single man. None of these verses speak specifically of the substance
from which woman was created. On the other hand, there is a direct link between the
physical creation of man and Adam in two verses, which mention him by name. In
Q3:59, Adam is said to be created out of dust and when God says “be,” he is. Verse
17:59 describes Adam’s creation out of clay, and Iblīs refusing to bow down to him. In
both of these verses, Adam is created by God from substances of the earth, the same
substances which on numerous occasions are described as being the substances of the
first creation.

50
Qur’ānic accounts of the substance of creation include: Q3:47, “[Mary] said: My Lord! How can I have a
child when no mortal hath touched me? He said: So (it will be). Allah createth what He will. If He decreeth
a thing, He saith unto it only: Be! and it is.” Q3:59, “Lo! the likeness of Jesus with Allah is as the likeness
of Adam. He created him of dust, then He said unto him: Be! and he is.” Q15:26, “We created humans (al-
insān) from potter’s clay, of black mud altered.” Q15:28-9, “And (remember) when thy Lord said unto the
angels: Lo! I am creating a mortal out of potter's clay of black mud altered. So, when I have made him and
have breathed into him of My Spirit, do ye fall down, prostrating yourselves unto him.” Q15:33, “[Iblīs]
said: I am not one to prostrate myself unto a mortal whom Thou hast created out of potter's clay of black
mud altered!” Q17:61, “And when We said unto the angels: Fall down prostrate before Adam and they fell
prostrate all save Iblīs, he said: Shall I fall prostrate before that which Thou hast created of clay?” Q18:37,
“His comrade, when he (thus) spake with him, exclaimed: Disbelievest thou in Him Who created thee of
dust, then of a drop (of seed), and then fashioned thee a man?” Q19:67, “Doth not man remember that We
created him before, when he was naught?” Q22:5, “O mankind! if ye are in doubt concerning the
Resurrection, then lo! We have created you from dust, then from a drop of seed, then from a clot, then from
a little lump of flesh shapely and shapeless, that We may make (it) clear for you. And We cause what We
will to remain in the wombs for an appointed time, and afterward We bring you forth as infants, then (give
you growth) that ye attain your full strength.” Q23:12-14, “Verily We created man from a product of wet
earth; then placed him as a drop (of seed) in a safe lodging; then fashioned We the drop a clot, then
fashioned We the clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones with
flesh, and then produced it as another creation. So blessed be Allah, the Best of creators!” Q24:45, “Allah
hath created every animal of water. Of them is (a kind) that goeth upon its belly and (a kind) that goeth
upon two legs and (a kind) that goeth upon four. Allah createth what He will. Lo! Allah is Able to do all
things.” Q25:54, “And He it is Who hath created man from water, and hath appointed for him kindred by
blood and kindred by marriage; for thy Lord is ever Powerful.” Q30:20, “And of His signs is this: He
created you of dust, and behold you human beings, ranging widely!” Q35:11, “Allah created you from dust,
then from a little fluid, then He made you pairs (the male and female). No female beareth or bringeth forth
save with His knowledge. And no-one groweth old who groweth old, nor is aught lessened of his life, but it
is recorded in a Book, Lo! that is easy for Allah.” Q38:71-2, “When thy Lord said to the angels: Lo! I am
about to create a man out of the mire, and when I have fashioned him and breathed into him of my spirit,
then fall down before him prostrate,” Q40:67, “He it is Who created you from dust, then from a drop (of
seed) then from a clot, then bringeth you forth as a child, then (ordaineth) that ye attain full strength and
afterward that ye become old men - though some among you die before - and that ye reach an appointed
term, that haply ye may understand.” Q96:1-2, “Read: In the name of thy Lord Who createth, createth man
from a clot.”

27
 Adam also appears elsewhere in the Qur’ān – not in verses describing the creation
of man, but in verses describing other events.51 For example, it is Adam who names all
creatures, and Adam and his (unnamed) wife are the protagonists of the story of the
garden of Eden. At the conclusion to this story, human beings are admonished not to
disobey God in the manner of your two parents (abawaykum) – Adam and his spouse.
Humans are frequently referred to as the sons of Adam.52 Given this context, it is not
difficult to see why interpreters understood that Adam was both the first human and the
father of humankind.
Several verses also refer to the creation of, or humankind’s creation from, a
“single soul/individual.” Some of these verses, like Q4:1, also refer to the creation of that
soul’s “mate.”53 But beyond the general statement of its creation from the single soul,
none of these verses mention the exact nature, method, or substance of the mate’s
creation. It is not surprising, then, that some exegetes disagree about the stuff out of
which Adam’s mate was created. But what is somewhat surprising, solely given the
Qur’ānic context, is the absolute consensus amongst the exegetes that Adam’s spouse is
Eve, the almost complete agreement that Eve was created from Adam’s rib, and the broad
agreement that it was done while Adam was sleeping. Furthermore, creation stories

51
The verses which mention Adam by name include: Q2:31, 33, in which God teaches Adam the names of
things and has Adam tell the creatures their names, Q2:34, in which the creatures prostrate themselves to
Adam, Q2:35, in which Adam is commanded to dwell in the garden but not eat of the tree, Q2:37, in which
Adam learns from the lord, Q3:33, in which God chose Adam and Noah, Q3:59, in which God created
Adam from dust and said “be” and he was, Q5:27, which is the story of the two sons of Adam, Q7:11, in
which Iblīs refuses to bow down, Q7:19-27 which tells of the garden of Eden; Adam is mentioned by name
in Q7:19, Q17:61, in which Iblīs refuses to prostrate himself, Q18:50, in which Iblīs refuses to prostrate
himself, and is one of the Jinn, Q19:58, in which God bestows his grace on Adam, Q20:115, which
describes the covenant of Adam, Q20:116, in which Iblīs again refuses to prostrate himself before Adam,
Q20:117, in which Iblīs is named as the enemy of Adam and his wife, Q20:120, in which Satan whispers to
Adam about the tree, Q20:121, in which Adam and his wife eat of the tree and see that they are naked.
52
Humankind is referred to as the “sons of Adam” in the following verses: Q7:26, Q7:27, Q7:31, Q7:35,
Q7:172, Q17:70, Q36:60.
53
Verses besides Q4:1 which mention the creation of the “single soul” or “mates,” include Q7:189, “He
who created you from a single soul and made from it its mate in order to dwell together.” Q30:20-21, “Of
His signs is this: he created you of dust, and behold, you human beings, ranging widely! And among his
signs is this: He created mates from yourselves (min anfusikum) that ye might find rest in them, and He
ordained between you love and mercy.” Q6:98, “And [it is] He who produced you from a single soul.”
Q39:6, “He created you from a single soul, and then made its mate from it.” Q42:11, “He made mates for
you, from your souls.” It should be noted that in some of these cases the single soul and its mate seems to
be the intention, while in others the intention seems to be the creation of men and women as mates for each
other, or at least the creation of women as mates for men. Some verses speak of the creation of males and
females: Q49:13, “O people! We have created you male and female, and we have made you into tribes and
nations in order to know one another.” Q53:45, “He created the spouses, male and female.”

28
become well-developed through time. These factors indicate that the Qur’ān is not the
only source for the exegetes’ interpretations.

Other sources of creation narratives

I have not discovered any sources which account for all of the elements present in
most exegeses of Q4:1; in other words, I have not found any accounts which can be said
to be an immediate, or direct, source. However, a few works are clear sources for some
of the elements present in Muslim creation exegeses. A proper review of all possible
sources of these interpretations would be a research project unto itself. In this section I
briefly describe the Biblical creation account, some Jewish sources, and two hadīths.54
Many exegetes’ interpretations bear a resemblance to the second account of
human creation in the Bible, which speaks of the creation of woman from Adam’s rib
while he sleeps.55
God56 formed man57 from clods in the soil, and blew into his nostrils the breath of
life. Thus man became a living being…. Then God cast a deep sleep upon the
man and, when he was asleep, he took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh at
that spot. And God fashioned into a woman the rib that he had removed from the
man, and he brought her to the man. Said the man, This one at last is bone of my
bones and flesh of my flesh. She shall be called Woman, for she was taken from
Man. Thus it is that man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and
they become one flesh.58

Although many Islamic exegeses bear some resemblance to this Biblical passage, no
exegeses that I have studied replicate the Biblical version exactly. Several exegeses
mention elements such as Adam sleeping, Eve’s creation from a rib, the rib being
replaced by flesh, and that “woman” is called “woman” because she is taken from a man.
But none at all say that Adam said “this is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh,” and

54
In this dissertation, I have not reviewed Christian works, although of course they are another possible
source for Muslim interpretations.
55
The first Biblical account of creation bears no resemblance to anything I have seen in Muslim sources:
“Then God said, “I will make man in my image, after my likeness… and God created man in his image, in
the divine image created he him, Male and female created he them.” Gen. 1:26 – 27. (Anchor Bible,
Genesis, trans. E. A. Speiser, New York: Doubleday, 1964, p. 4.)
56
Each time God is mentioned in this translation he is called God Yahweh. I have eliminated the Yahweh
from my quotation.
57
Noted in the Anchor Genesis: “MT ’ādām.”
58
(Gen. 2: 7, 21-23.) Ibid., 14-15.

29
none say “thus it is that man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and they
become one flesh.”
Later Jewish and Christian interpretation of this biblical verse might have
influenced Muslim understanding. But in my brief search of Jewish sources I did not
detect interpretations similar to the major threads of Muslim interpretation. In fact,
contrary to the common Muslim understanding of Eve’s creation from a rib on Adam’s
left side, the Aramaic Targum of pseudo-Jonathan actually says that the rib is Adam’s
thirteenth rib on his right side.59 Other Jewish accounts offer diverse views, including
that the original creation was a being including both male and female sides, and that this
being was later separated into each sex.60 Such accounts do not exist in the Muslim
sources I have reviewed. In only one case did a Muslim source bear a striking
resemblance to one of the Jewish sources I read.61
Hadīths also seem to be a source for Muslim interpretations. However, the
interpretations go beyond the scope of hadīths, and so hadīths cannot be considered to be
the only source of interpretation. At least one hadīth on the authority of the Prophet says
that women were created from a “crooked rib.”62 It does not mention that the first
woman was created from a rib, nor does it say the names of any women who were created

59
“The Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam, and he slept. And he took one of his ribs – it was the
thirteenth rib of the right side – and he closed its place with flesh. And the lord God built the rib he had
taken from Adam into a woman and brought her to Adam. And Adam said, “This time, but never again,
will woman be created from man as this one had been created from me- bone of my bones and flesh of my
flesh. It is fitting to call this one woman, for she has been taken from man” Pseudo Jonathan, Targum
Pseudo-Jonathan, Genesis, Translated by Michael Maher, Collegeville, Minn: The Liturgical Press, 1992,
Series: the Aramaic Bible, The Targums, v. 1B, p. 24. The Palestinian Targum Neofiti in the same series
has no mention of which rib was taken.
60
This is the interpretation of Rabbi Samuel b. Nahman, in the Midrash Rabbah, Genesis, v. 1, Trans.
Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman, London: Soncinco Press, 1961, p. 54.
61
The interpretation of al-Kāshānī, pseudo Ibn ‘Arabī, detailed below. A full-scale comparison of sources
in all three religions could be its own study, and, in fact, there is an anthology of primary sources from all
three religions which I draw on in this chapter: Eve & Adam: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim readings on
Genesis and Gender, ed. Kristen E. Kvam, Linda S. Schearing, and Valerie H. Ziegler, Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1999. This work is valuable as an anthology of Jewish and Christian sources.
But incidentally the editors do little to provide a true comparison with Islam: approximately 40 pages of the
500-odd page work are devoted to Islamic scripture and writings. The pre-modern selections consist of
several of the Qur’ānic verses mentioning creation, part of al-Tabarī’s interpretation of two verses, a
selection from al-Kisā’ī and a selection from Ibn ‘Arabī; of the 300-page section in the book devoted to
pre-modern sources, only 20 pages are given to Arabic sources. Two modern Muslim sources are included.
The editors seem unaware of the lack of balance in their work, since they do not mention it anywhere.
62
This hadīth will be quoted in full below.

30
from ribs. But, given an understanding that the reference is to Eve, it could provides
good authority for Sunnī exegetes to say that Adam’s spouse was created from a rib.
On the other hand, a hadīth on the authority of Abū Ja‘far, considered by Imāmīs
to be an infallible Imām, says that Eve was created from the same clay as Adam, not from
his rib. These two hadīths, as I will describe below, directly contradict each other; this
contradiction poses a problem for Imāmīs wishing to know the exact stuff of Eve’s
creation. And, although the latter hadīth mentions Eve by name, neither of these hadīths
mentions other details often included in exegeses – for instance, that Adam was sleeping
when the rib was extracted. It seems that there must have been other sources, besides
Qur’ān, Biblical accounts and Jewish interpretation, and hadīth, from which these details
were drawn.

1.3 The development of historical narratives on Eve’s creation

Early exegeses
Five out of the six early sources which spoke of this verse say that Eve was
created from one of Adam’s ribs, and any debate over this matter that may have existed at
this time is not preserved in the sources I reviewed.
Mujāhid says that the rib was the qusayrā, a word which seems to have no clear
definition according to later exegetes, who say it was either the shortest rib or the bottom
rib.
Who created you from a single soul meaning Adam, and created from it its mate
he says, [God] created Eve from the qusayrā of Adam, while he was sleeping.
And he woke and said “athā,” which means “woman” in Aramaic.63

This tale of creation bears some resemblance to the Biblical version: according to
Mujāhid, God creates Eve from one of Adam’s ribs while Adam is sleeping. When he
awakens, he says “woman.” But this story also has some differences from the Biblical
account. The Bible never mentions which rib Eve was created from, and it never

63
Mujāhid, Tafsīr, v. 1, 143.

31
mentions the language in which Adam speaks; some Jewish commentators claim,
contrary to Mujāhid’s interpretation, that Adam spoke in Hebrew.64
Mujāhid explains that Adam’s word, “athā,” means “woman” in Aramaic
(nabatīya). However, Mujāhid’s Aramaic is not in a standard form, and it seems likely
that he is referring to a less common dialect.65 This interpretation is cited by Hūd b.
Muhakkam, al-Tabarī, Ibn Abī Hātim, and al-Suyūtī; all attribute it to Mujāhid, and none
seem to have noticed or corrected his mistake, even though al-Tabarī would have had
access to Aramaic speakers in Iraq. But the earliest exegete to cite Mujāhid, Sufyān al-
Thawrī, quotes him as saying only that Eve was created from one of Adam’s ribs; he does
not include Mujāhid’s account of Adam sleeping or waking and saying “woman.”66
Most other early accounts of creation are less detailed than Mujāhid’s. Al-
Dahhāk says that Eve was created from Adam’s “back rib, which is the lowest of his
ribs.”67 Muqātil says that Eve was made from the “self (nafs) of Adam, meaning from his
rib.”68 He also clarifies that Eve is named Hawwā’ in Arabic because she was created
from a living thing (hayy).69 And the grammarian al-Farrā’ explains the grammatical
reason for putting the word “single” in the feminine, which is that the word “soul” is

64
In the Midrash Rabbah: “She shall be called woman (ishah) because she was taken out of man (ish).
From this you learn that the Torah was given in the Holy Tongue. R. Phineahas and R. Helkiah in R.
Simon’s name said: Just as it was given in the Holy Tongue, so was the world created with the Holy
Tongue. Have you ever heard one say, gini, ginia, itha, ittha, antropoi, pntropia, gabra, gabretha? But ish
and ishah [are used]. Why? Because one form corresponds to the other” Midrash Rabbah, Genesis, v. 1,
Trans. Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman, London: Soncinco Press, 1961, p. 143. The editor’s note clarifies that these
interpretations mean Hebrew was the first language to be used; the other languages are Greek and Aramaic.
65
The written form of the Aramaic word for “woman” is antta (or, more properly, ’ntt’), but the “n” is not
pronounced. Because the n is assimilated, it makes the first t hard; pronounced, the second t is aspirated
(th). Therefore, the pronounced form is atthā. This is very close to what Mujāhid has – he is just missing
the first hard t. Many thanks to Jack Tannous for a clear explanation of the Aramaic. Also thanks to
Joseph Witztum for sending dictionary definitions, explaining that the Jewish Babylonian dialect would be
ittha (first t hard), and for recommending that I look at Rosenthal’s note his translation of Volume 1 of al-
Tabarī’s History: “The aspirated th indicated in the Tabarī text seems unlikely, as the Eastern Aramaic
pronunciation of the word for “woman” was ’attā (’ntt’). However, the local origin of the Arabic tradition
is, of course, uncertain. Modern Mandaic has eththā [which fits what Mujāhid has perfectly]. This and the
following two traditions are to be found in Tafsīr, IV, 150 (ad Qur. 4:1)” (The History of al-Tabarī -
Ta’rīkh al-rusūl wa’l-mulūk - v. 1, General introduction and from creation to flood. Translated and
annotated by Franz Rosenthal, Albany: SUNY press, 1989, p. 274 n. 671). Because there were so many
different dialects of Aramaic, it is most likely that he was referring a dialect form not preserved in the
dictionaries. Otherwise, it may be that he was using the spoken form but that the first hard t was lost in the
writing, or that the text is corrupt.
66
Sufyān, Tafsīr, v. 2, 43.
67
Al-Dahhāk, Tafsīr, v. 1, 271.
68
Muqātil, Tafsīr, v. 1, 355.
69
Ibid., v. 1, 355.

32
grammatically feminine; if “single” had been put in the masculine, he explains, it would
have been equally acceptable.70
Although five of the six early sources which comment on this verse share the
view that Q4:1 refers to the creation of Eve from one of Adam’s ribs, it is unclear to me
how this view was formulated or whether the preserved texts really represent consensus
on the issue, as they seem to. What is clear is that the view that Eve was created from
Adam’s rib was widespread in the early period – there is less early variation on the
meaning of this verse than on any of the other verses that I have studied in this
dissertation. This is not the whimsical opinion of one prominent exegete, which then
went on to be adopted by all.
If their provenance remains unknown, I can at least trace the subsequent citation
of these interpretations. 53 exegetes commented on this verse; of them, 52 gave the
interpretation that the “single soul” was Adam, and 48 said that his mate was Eve. The
abstentions should not be taken to indicate disagreement; the odd interpreter focused on
entirely different matters. No other interpretations were quite so popular, but other
prominent early interpretations included: God created Eve while Adam was sleeping
(mentioned by 14 interpreters), Eve was created from a rib, and she was created from a
left-hand rib.
Unpopular interpretations were that: Eve was created from a back rib, that she
was created from Adam’s self (nafs), that she was created from a lower rib, and that
Adam said “woman” in Aramaic after Eve’s creation.
The North African Ibādī Hūd b. Muhakkam has the most unusual and complete
interpretation of this verse.71 He begins by quoting Mujāhid, but instead of explaining
that the language being spoken is Aramaic and then leaving it at that – as Mujāhid does –
he proceeds to a discussion of the term in Syriac and Hebrew, unique in the sources I
reviewed.
From a single soul meaning Adam, and created from it its mate i.e., Eve, [who
was created] from one of the qusayrā ribs, from Adam’s left side, while he was
sleeping. Mujāhid says: [Adam] woke up and said, “Athā, athatī,” which means,

70
Al-Farrā’, Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān, v. 1, 252.
71
According to the editor of his work, al-Hajj al-Sharīfī, he was named for a Berber tribe, the Hawwāra
tribe, which lived in the mountainous region in what is current day Algeria. See the introduction to the
Tafsīr of Hūd b. al-Muhakkam, v.1, 6.

33
 “Woman, my wife.” Athā, which in Syriac is ishā, ishatī, means “woman, my
wife,” except that it is pronounced with the letter tā’ in Hebrew, and the letter
shīn in Syriac. Ithā means “come here! (ta‘ālī!)”72

Although Hūd’s ostensible source of interpretation was Mujāhid, this passage was almost
certainly taken from the tafsīr of Yahyā Ibn Sallām al-Basrī.73 Somewhere along the
chain of transmission between Yahyā ibn Sallām’s source and Hud, or in later
transmission, some errors were made. For instance, Hūd explains that the word is ishā,
ishatī in Syriac, a dialect of Aramaic. However, he is wrong. Ishshāh, ishtī is actually
Hebrew for “woman, my wife.” The terms that Hūd says are Hebrew are Syriac: Hūd has
transposed the Syriac and Hebrew terms. He includes a few other mistakes in his Syriac
which indicate that either he was not proficient in Syriac or Hebrew, or that later copyists
made some errors in this text. It also seems possible that Hūd or his source was working
from an oral transmission.74
Hūd b. Muhakkam’s linguistic discussion was not reproduced in any other texts I
reviewed. It may be that Hūd’s text did not go on to be widely cited because, as an Ibādī,
he would not have been an appealing source for interpreters from other schools. But the
lack of later citation of his work could also be because Hūd was from a fairly rural area in
North Africa, and was not a part of the same channels of transmission as the other
exegetes in this study. What is less immediately obvious is why Ibn Sallām’s text was
not more widely distributed.
Hūd goes on to quote two hadīths describing women’s origin from a crooked rib,
and the consequences of such origin. The first of these hadīths is not recorded in any
other works of exegesis; it was either rejected by later scholars, or unknown to them in
the first place.
Al-Hasan [al-Basrī] says that the Messenger of God says, “Woman was created
from a rib, and if you wish to straighten her you will break her, so her
72
Ibid., v. 1, 345.
73
The editor of Hūd’s tafsīr, al-Hajj b. Sa‘īd al-Sharīfī, remarks on the great similarities between this tafsīr
and that of Yahyā Ibn Sallām al-Basrī, who died in 199/815, nearly a century before Hūd. Sharīfī says that
in fact Hūd’s text could be called an abridgement of the earlier work (Al-Hajj b. Sa‘īd al-Sharīfī,
Introduction, Tafsīr Hūd b. Muhakkam, v. 1, 23-4). Ibn Sallām was born in Kūfa, lived in Basra, but then
went to Qayrawān (in current-day Tunisia), where he stayed for a time and students listened to his tafsīr.
After his stay in Qayrawān, Ibn Sallām went on Hajj and then went to Egypt, where he died (ibid., v. 1, 21-
22, n. 3).
74
Attā is “woman” in Syriac, but it is pronounced “atthā,” which is close to how Hūd has written the term,
though like Mujāhid he is missing the first hard t.

34
 crookedness lives with her.” And Abū Hurayra says that the Messenger of God
says, “Woman was created from a rib, you cannot straighten the innate disposition
of one of them, for [they] are like a rib and if you straighten [them] out, you break
[them] – so enjoy them as they are, crooked.75

These different versions of the “crooked rib” hadīth imply that Eve’s creation from a rib
had direct consequences for all women’s morals and dispositions. Men are naturally
“straight,” but the Prophet clarifies that women - who are naturally crooked - cannot be
“straightened out.” But it should be noted that exegetes who do not agree with the
interpretation of the creation from a rib do not have different attitudes towards women’s
morals or dispositions. While this hadīth may be an expression of the exegetes’ beliefs
about women’s morals and dispositions, it does not seem to be the cause of those beliefs.

Views of Eve’s creation from al-Tabarī (d. 311/923) to Abū ’l-Layth (d. 373/983)
Some of the accounts discussing creation cited here are more elaborate than those
in the early period, and show slightly different versions of Eve’s creation in the garden.
But some merely tell of the stuff of Eve’s creation, without delving into how exactly it
was done. Almost all exegetes in this period speak of Eve’s creation from a rib, although
the Imāmī al-‘Ayyāshī gives an alternate view of creation and the Sunnī Ibn Wahb does
not mention a rib.
Ibn Wahb says that Eve was inside of Adam, and that Eve was created from
Adam’s nafs (soul/self). The word nafs is the same word that is used in the verse itself; I
leave it un-translated below.
From a single nafs from Adam’s nafs, in which was Eve’s nafs. And created
from it from the nafs of Adam its mate Eve.76

This brief interpretation uses the words of the verse but adds that these words refer to
Adam and Eve. This interpretation is something like that of Muqātil, who said that Eve
was made from Adam’s nafs, but Muqātil clarifies that the “self” means that Eve was
created from Adam’s rib. Ibn Wahb, on the other hand, says that Eve’s nafs – her soul, or
self - was inside of Adam’s soul, or self, without ever actually defining the word nafs.
Therefore, it is difficult to say whether this interpretation is simply the majority view

75
Hūd b. Muhakkam, Tafsīr, v. 1, 345-6.
76
Ibn Wahb, al-Wādih, v. 1, 140.

35
(Eve was created from Adam’s rib, and therefore she was, in a sense, inside of him before
the creation) or if it marks a departure.
Al-Tabarī cites many hadīths on the authority of the Prophet’s Companions and
other early authorities. These mostly state that Eve was created from a rib; he quotes
Mujāhid and others to this effect. But two of the interpretations quoted by al-Tabarī were
not represented in the early exegeses that I cited above. The first is on the authority of al-
Suddī, and describes how Adam dwelt in the Garden alone before Eve was created:
Adam was living in the Garden, and he was walking around in it all alone,
without a companion (zawj) to live with him. So he slept deeply, and when he
woke there was a woman sitting by his head. God had created her from his rib.
Adam asked her, “What are you?” She said, “A woman.” He said, “Why were
you created?” She answered, “For you to dwell with me.”77

In this version, the stuff of Eve’s creation is not described in detail; but Eve is
created for Adam, so that he will not be lonely. Unlike in Mujāhid’s version (and the
verion in the Bible), where Adam names Eve, here Adam must ask Eve what she is and
why she has been created.
A much different scenario is painted by Ibn ‘Abbās, who cites the experts in the
Torah as saying that Adam exclaimed in recognition as soon as he woke from Eve’s
creation.
God cast a deep sleep upon Adam, according to what has reached us on the
authority of the People of the Book, from the experts in the Torah (lit: People of
the Torah) and other learned people, on the authority of ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās
and others. Then [after making Adam sleep] God took one of his ribs from the
left hand side and he healed where it had been. [All of this occurred] while Adam
was sleeping, and he did not wake up until God created his wife Eve from the rib,
and he made her into a woman, so that they could dwell together. Then the sleep
was lifted from him, and he awoke, and saw her by his side, and said – according
to what they claim, and God knows best if this is true – “My flesh! My blood!
My wife!” And he found rest with her (sakana ilayha).78

Although this account is ostensibly from the experts in the Torah, it nevertheless differs
in many ways from the Jewish accounts I have examined. In the Bible, the rib was not
specified, and instead of saying “my flesh! My blood! My wife!,” as al-Tabarī has him

77
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, v. 7, 515-16.
78
Ibid., v. 7, 516.

36
say, Adam says, “this is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.”79 On the other hand, in
the Bible Eve was created to be Adam’s helpmeet, and to provide companionship for
him, as in this account.
Al-Tabarī claims to draw on the teachings of the Jews “and other learned people,”
as transmitted to him through the sayings of the Prophet’s Companion Ibn ‘Abbās “and
others.” But despite the fact that Jewish exegesis was apparently considered an
appropriate source for Ibn ‘Abbās and thus for al-Tabarī, the latter does express some
doubt as to whether this story accurately represents the truth of what happened, by saying
“they claim” and “God knows best.”
Despite the fact that al-Tabarī cites more than one version of events, this portion
of the verse is not the cause of much serious disagreement: Eve was created from Adam’s
rib, though the exact circumstances are up for debate. But there is a vehement disavowal
of the rib interpretation in one hadīth cited by early Imāmī sources.
The first Imāmī interpretation of this verse, that of al-Qummī, says that Eve was
created from Adam’s lowest rib.80 This interpretation does not foreshadow the
controversy which will engulf Imāmī interpretations of this verse, over whether Eve was
created from Adam’s rib, or from the clay left over after his creation. This controversy is
caused by the fact that each position is held by an infallible Imām.
This controversy is first alluded to in al-‘Ayyāshī’s tafsīr. The hadīths cited by
al-‘Ayyāshī and other early Imāmīs do not represent developed narrative accounts of the
events in the garden. Instead, they focus on the stuff of Eve’s creation. Al-‘Ayyāshī
begins with several hadīths which say that Eve’s creation was from a rib, and even one
which defines the rib from which Eve was created, the qusayrā, as being the smallest
rib.81 These hadīths are on the authority of sources which were considered sound by
Imāmīs: two are on the authority of ‘Alī b. Abī Tālib (Amīr al-Mu’minīn). He then cites
a hadīth which explains the effect of this creation on women’s natures and interests,

79
Ramban focuses on the order of creation, and the fact that Adam had to realize that he needed a “help”
before Eve was created (Ramban, Commentary on the Torah, Genesis, Tr. Rabbi Dr. Charles B. Chavel,
NY: Shiloh Publishing House, 1971, 76-79).
80
“Who created you from a single soul meaning Adam, and from it created its mate meaning Eve, whom
God created from his [Adam’s] lowest rib” (al-Qummī, Tafsīr al-Qummī, 1, 130).
81
He cites two hadīths on the authority of ‘Alī: “Eve was created from the qusayrā of the side of Adam,
and the qusayrā is the smallest rib – and God put flesh in its place…. Eve was created from the side of
Adam while he was sleeping” (‘Ayyāshī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 361.)

37
which is said to be the words of Abū ‘Abd Allāh, in other words Ja‘far al-Sādiq,
considered by Imāmīs to be the sixth Imām.
Abū ‘Abd Allāh said, God Almighty created Adam from water and earth, so the
sons of Adam [men] are interested in water and earth, and God created Eve from
Adam, and so women are interested in men, and they should be kept inaccessible
indoors.82

This hadīth explains one of the implications of creation: Men have been created from the
earth, and therefore they are interested in matters of the earth. But because the first
woman was created from a man, women’s interests lie in men alone. They therefore
must be kept indoors where, presumably, their penchants will have no chance to be
exercised. A similar hadīth is also quoted in Sunnī sources, but using a different chain of
transmission.83
A final hadīth cited by ‘Ayyāshī on the subject of creation presents the alternate
Imāmī view: Eve was created from the clay left over after Adam’s creation. This hadīth
is also on the authority of an Imāmī Imam, Abū Ja‘far, or Muhammad al-Bāqir, the fifth
Imām.
On the authority of ‘Amr b. Miqdām, on the authority of his father, he said, I
asked Abū Ja‘far “From what thing did God create Eve?” He said, “What do they
say regarding this creation?” I said, “They say: ‘God created her from one of
Adam’s ribs.’” So he said, “They are wrong (kadhabū)! Was He incapable of
creating her from anything other than a rib?” I said, “I am your servant, O
descendant of the Messenger of God, from what thing was she created?” So he
said, “My father told me, on the authority of his fathers, that the Messenger of
God said, ‘God Blessed and Almighty took a handful of clay, and mixed it with
his right hand – and both of his hands are right – and created Adam from it. And
there was some leftover earth, and from that he created Eve.”84

Abū Ja‘far unambiguously states that the view that Eve was created from a rib is false. If
God was omnipotent, he says, then why would he have created Eve from a rib? It is
undeniably true that God could have created Eve from anything at all. But Abū Ja‘far

82
Ibid., v. 1, 361.
83
This hadīth, or a similar one, is cited by 8 sources after al-‘Ayyāshī: five of these are Imāmīs and cite al-
‘Ayyāshī. Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, Ibn Kathīr, and al-Suyūtī cite a very similar hadīth. Ibn Abī Hātim al-
Rāzī’s chain of transmission is: his father, Muqātil b. Muhammad, Wakī‘ Abū Hilāl, Qatāda, Ibn ‘Abbās.
His hadīth is the same, only it says that women’s desire (nahma) is for men and men’s desire is for the
earth. (Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, v. 3, 852.) Ibn Kathīr and al-Suyūtī both cite Ibn Abī Hātim; Ibn
Kathīr uses the same chain of transmission except he says Muhammad b. Muqātil rather than Muqātil b.
Muhammad.
84
‘Ayyāshī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 363.

38
does not explain why creation from Adam’s clay is any better than creation from Adam’s
rib, nor why, since God is omniscient, there should have been any clay left over at all.
‘Ayyāshī’s selection of hadīths shows that hadīths on the authority of the
infallible Imams support two irreconcilable views of creation: that Eve was created from
Adam’s rib, and that Eve was not created from the rib, but that she was created from the
same clay as Adam. Although different Imāmī factions may have taken different sides on
this issue from an early period, no Imāmī commentators that I studied express their own
opinion on the matter until Muhsin al-Fayd (d. 1091/1680), whose views I describe
below. Almost all Imāmī commentators, including Muhsin al-Fayd, include both views
of creation just as al-‘Ayyāshī does: that Eve was created from Adam’s rib, and that she
was created from the soil leftover after his creation.85
Imāmī sources in the period before al-Wāhidī give various narratives of creation,
their narratives seem fixed: they do not develop the same story beyond one original form.
The Sunnī Abū ’l-Layth al-Samarqandī, on the other hand, presents an account of Adam
and Eve in the garden which is better developed than that of al-Tabarī.
Who created you from a single soul meaning Adam and created from it its mate
meaning, He created Eve from Adam’s self (nafs), and that means that God
Almightly, when he created Adam and put him to live in the Garden, cast a deep
sleep upon him. While Adam was between sleeping and waking God created Eve
from one of his left ribs. When Adam awoke it was said to him, “Who is this, O
Adam?” He said, “A woman, because she was created from a man,” and then it
was said, “What is her name?” He said “Hawwā’ (Eve), because she was created
from something living (hayy).” It has been said that she is only called Hawwā’
because her lips were red (hawh); it is also said that her color verged on brown,
and so she was called Hawwā’ because of the word “ahwā” which is like His
Almighty words, [God brings forth the pastures] and then turns them to a russet
stubble (fa-ja‘alahu ghuthā’an ahwā) [Q87:5].86

Abū ’l-Layth’s narrative of the story of the Garden is better developed than al-Tabarī’s
version; although this interpretation also resembles that of Muqātil, who said that the nafs
meant the rib, this account includes far more detail than that of the early exegete. In this
version, God speaks to Adam, asking him to name Eve, just as he has named all of the
other living creatures.

85
Imāmī commentators who faithfully reproduce the hadīths present in al-‘Ayyāshī’s commentary include
al-Tūsī, al-Tabrisī, al-Shaybānī and al-Bahrānī.
86
Abū ’l-Layth al-Samarqandī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 328-9.

39
 Abū ’l-Layth cites two reasons, besides her being created from a living thing, why
Eve could have been named Hawwā’: her lips were red, and her coloring was brown.
Both explanations use the letters in the Arabic version of Eve’s name, Hawwā’. It seems,
however, that Abu ’l-Layth disagrees with both of these interpretations because they are
introduced by saying “it is said” and “some say.” This interpretation is not taken up by
any later exegetes.
These early interpretations have revealed how a historical narrative can become
better developed through time. From the earliest narrations, which were just bare-bones
descriptions of Eve’s creation from a rib while Adam slept, to Abū ’l-Layth’s
interpretation, which is a more full-fledged account of Adam’s exact state (between
sleeping and waking) during that creation, these stories are becoming more and more
elaborate. Proceding from a basis of good faith in the exegetes means that I deem it
unlikely that they were simply making up stories, whimsically deciding that certain
scenarios may have happened. But it is reasonable to propose that popular preaching was
affecting these narrations, or that exegetes living in outlying territories, such as Abū ’l-
Layth, who lived in Samarqand, had developed different narratives of history than those
working in more central lands.

Narratives of creation after al-Wāhidī

A few exegetes in the period after al-Wāhidī clearly differentiate between two
Sunnī views of Eve’s creation: that she was created from a rib, or that she was created
like Adam. In these exegeses, an alternate interpretation of the words of the verse is
pitted against the common understanding. In the verse, God created “you” from a single
soul, and “from it” created its mate. “From it” is commonly understood, as shown above,
to mean that Eve was created from Adam’s rib. But in these interpretations, “from it”
means “like it” or “of the same type.”
Sūrābādī is the earliest example of an exegete who distinguishes clearly between
these two views, and I describe his interpretation below. An interpreter who speaks more
succinctly is Ibn al-Jawzī, who names the source of this interpretation as Ibn Bahr Abū
Muslim al-Isbahānī.

40
 The single soul is Adam, and its mate is Eve. And from in His words created
from it refers to the division [of the single soul – in other words, Adam was
divided, resulting in Eve] according to the doctrine of the majority of exegetes.
Ibn Bahr says that from it means “from the same type (min jinsihā).”87

Ibn al-Jawzī clearly lays out the two doctrines of creation, the majority doctrine and the
minority one, which is that Eve was created of Adam’s type. Ibn al-Jawzī does not imply
that this alternative view of creation has any implications for women’s status vis-à-vis
men. Nor does he explain what exactly the doctrine means: does it mean that Eve was
created out of the same material as Adam, rather than out of his rib? Does it mean that
Eve was created to be similar to Adam? From this passage, it is unclear.
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s account may shed a bit more light on the view that Eve
was created from Adam’s type: he says that this means Eve was created from Adam’s
leftover clay, which is the view that so far has only been taken in Shī‘ī sources. Not only
does Fakhr al-Dīn cite this opinion, he seems to agree with it.
In this passage, Fakhr al-Dīn outlines each interpretation:
The meaning of the term mate is Eve, and concerning the creation of Eve from
Adam, there are two doctrines. The first, which is taken by the majority, is that
when God created Adam, he cast a deep sleep upon him, then he created Eve from
one of his left ribs. When he woke, he saw her, inclined towards her, and became
fond of her, because she was created from a part of him. The saying of the
Prophet supports this interpretation: “woman was created from a crooked rib, and
if you try to straighten her, you will break her, and if you leave her crooked, you
can enjoy her.”
The second doctrine is that preferred by Abū Muslim al-Isfahānī, that the
meaning of His words created from it its mate is from its type (min jinsihā),
which is like the verse God has made for you mates like yourselves (min
anfusikum) [Q16:72, 42:11] and as also in His words when he has sent forth
among them a messenger from among them (min anfusihim) [Q3:164] and His
words He sent a messenger from among yourselves (min anfusikum) [Q9:128].88

Fakhr al-Dīn’s account of the creation from a rib is different from that of previous Sunnī
exegetes - for instance, Adam’s feelings towards Eve are described. He goes on to
explain the pros and cons of each view, and seems to settle on the second:

87
Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, v. 2, 1.
88
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr, v. 9, 161.

41
 The judge [possibly al-Baqillānī89] says that the first doctrine is better, because it
corroborates His words created you from a single soul. For if Eve had been
created in the beginning, then humans would have been created from two souls,
not from a single soul. It is possible to answer him by saying that the word from
is used for the original creation (ibtidā’ al-ghāya).90 If the beginning of creation
consisted of Adam, then it is true that He created you from a single soul.
Moreover, if it is established (thābata) that God Almighty was capable of creating
Adam from earth, then He was also capable of creating Eve from earth; and if this
is so, what point would there be in creating her from one of Adam’s ribs?91

In this passage, Fakhr al-Dīn explains that God’s words regarding creation from a single
soul may mean that Eve was created from Adam’s rib. The refutation of this point, he
says, is that Adam was actually created first, as the original creation. Afterwards, Eve
was created from the same substance. So, in this sense, everything was created from the
single soul, which was Adam.
Although Fakhr al-Dīn’s account hints at a philosophical debate, it does not
represent a significant development in the story of creation. By far the best-developed
account of Eve’s creation, and the one which differs most from everything that came
before it, is presented by Muhsin al-Fayd, an Imāmī who died in 1091/1680. This
account seems to combine customary practice, Imāmī law, elements from the Qur’ān and
hadīths.
God, Blessed and Almighty, when He created Adam from clay, ordered the angels
[to prostrate themselves before him,] and they prostrated themselves before him.
Then God cast a deep sleep upon him, and created Eve for him, making her from
the hollow of his abdomen. That is so that women are subservient to men. Eve
began to move, and Adam paid attention to her, until she was called upon to go
away from him. When he looked at her, he beheld a fair creation, which
resembled him except in its being female. He spoke to her, and she spoke to him
in his language. He asked her, “Who are you?” And she said, “A creation which
God has made, as you can see.” Adam then said, “Oh Lord, who is this fair
creation who has kept me company, who I gaze upon?” God said, “O Adam, this
is my servant, Eve, would you like her to remain with you, being your companion,
and obeying your orders?” Adam responded, “Yes, my Lord, and because of this
I owe you thanks and praise.” God said to him, “Ask me for her hand in
marriage, for she is my servant, and she is suitable for you also as a mate for your
sexual desires,” and God bestowed upon him sexual desire. Before that, he had

89
My thanks to Patricia Crone for this suggestion. My thanks also to Tariq Jaffer for his suggestion that
the judge could be ‘Abd al-Jabbār or al-Baqillānī. This passage is cited verbatim by Abū Hayyān, see his
al-Bahr, v. 3, 163.
90
This term is unknown to me, although I have translated it as “original creation.”
91
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Al-Tafsīr, v. 9, 161.

42
 made him know everything [else]. Adam said, “O Lord, I ask you for her hand in
marriage, so what would you like for that [as a dower]?” God said, “I would like
you to teach her about my religion.” Adam said, “If you wish it, I owe you that,
O Lord.” God said, “I wish it, and I give her to you in marriage, and join you to
her.” Adam said to her, “Come to me.” Eve responded, “No, you must come to
me!” [So] God Almighty ordered Adam to go to her, and he did. If he had not
done that, then women would go out, and even ask for men’s hand in marriage by
themselves. This is the story of Eve, may God’s prayers be upon her. 92
As in other versions of the creation story, the method of Eve’s creation has implications
for the relations between the sexes and for women’s status. In this case, women are
naturally subservient to men because Eve was created from the hollow of Adam’s
abdomen. She was created for Adam, spoke his language, and was pleasing to his eye.
But after these details, the account veers in an unexpected direction: towards the
laws and customs governing an Islamic marriage – a practical aspect of the garden scene
which was not covered in other exegeses. God acts in the role of Eve’s marriage
guardian, telling Adam, who is quite at a loss on beholding Eve’s beauty, to ask for her
hand. God then acts as the intermediary between her and Adam during Adam’s proposal
of marriage. In return for bestowing Eve upon Adam, God requests that Adam teach her
about his religion. Thus Adam’s role as Eve’s teacher acts as his dower, given to God
rather than to Eve herself. This account seems to be influenced by both custom and law:
the marriage takes place with the consent of the guardian, with the “payment” of a dower,
consisting of Adam’s agreement to teach Eve, which, I will show, is a recognized duty of
husbands towards their wives.
Early on, Eve defies Adam. When he asks her to come to him, she refuses, and
God takes her side. This is why, Muhsin al-Fayd explains, men ask for women’s hand in
marriage, and women do not ask for men’s. Again, current practice and law seems to
play a part in the events of the Garden.
In each part of this story men’s superiority over women is asserted, but in the
telling of it, Eve comes across as wiser than Adam. After all, despite the fact that he is
supposed to teach her about God’s law, she is the one who understands it first, knowing
that Adam must come to her. Furthermore, she is not shy about defying Adam, despite
God’s assurances to him that she will obey. In her defiance she is correct, and God

92
Muhsin al-Fayd, Kitāb al-Sāfī, v. 2, 176-7.

43
agrees with her, not taking Adam’s side. Unlike the earliest versions of the story, Adam
does not name Eve, and he does not say “woman, my wife!” Instead, he must ask God
about her, and God informs him of Eve’s identity.
One is unsure of the source of Eve’s wisdom and Adam’s naïvete, especially since
these elements seem to be unique to this particular version of events and are not
reproduced in other exegeses. What is clearest about this account is its lack of reliance
on earlier accounts: the “sources” for exegesis have been left well behind.

1.4 The implications of creation: the development of philosophical narratives

The exegeses described so far in this chapter go beyond a literal reading of the
Qur’ānic text, even when a literal reading is understood to mean that the “soul” refers to
Adam and its “mate” to Eve. And, as it will become clear in this section emphasize that
their understanding of the Qur’ānic text is multi-layered and nuanced, referring to matters
such as the nature of existence while at the same time retaining the “literal” sense of the
text as referring to the creation of Adam and Eve.
In addition to highlighting exegetes’ flexible methods, these interpretations show
the porous boundaries of the genre. Exegesis, in the larger sense of the explanation of
Qur’ānic verses, is at the heart of debates in all arenas. As I described in the introduction,
works of tafsīr can be considered a genre because they draw on a common source pool,
and they have a structure which follows the Qur’ān verse-by-verse. But this genre is not
circumscribed by the elements that define it: “outside” elements (such as science) are
used by authors of tafsīr to explain the meanings of verses. Likewise, important debates
about the nature of existence do not take place exclusively within one genre of text. The
exegeses of this verse described in this section include certain elements of such cross-
genre philosophical, theological, and ideological debates.

The brotherhood of man

Al-Tabarī is the first exegete to comment at length on the broad implications of
creation. In fact, although the earliest interpretations focus on the substance that Eve was
created from, the main focus of al-Tabarī’s interpretation is his own view of the verse’s
import, which constitutes a departure from the early interpretations which he cites. He

44
asserts that creation from a “single soul” is proof of the brotherhood of man: since
humans were all created from a single father and mother, they should be kind to one
another. Thus, the first creation comes with lessons for all humankind to obey.
Then God described himself: He alone created all living creatures from one single
person. [In this verse] He informs His servants about the manner of their creation,
and that is from a single soul; he alerts them to the fact that they are all sons of
one man and one mother. Each [person] is part of every other (ba‘duhum min
ba‘d) so people’s rights over one another are like the rights of a brother over his
brother, because of their unity of lineage from one father and one mother. This
requires people to safeguard each other’s rights - because even those furthest
removed from one another are joined in lineage to the father who brings them
together - just as it is necessary for them to [safeguard the rights of] closer
relations, and have kind feelings for one another, to demand justice for each other
and not oppress each other. The strong should give freely of themselves to ensure
the rights of the weak [are protected].93

For al-Tabarī, this verse is an ethical statement about the nature of creation, and how
humans need to care for one another, the strong for the weak. It is God’s call for humans
not to oppress one another, since everyone is joined in lineage, and therefore all humans
are related.
Several other exegetes express similar opinions, or quote al-Tabarī.94 Other
exegetes tell how it is that one common source could produce such varied individuals.
After explaining that God could have made Eve out of the clay left over after Adam’s
creation, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī quotes Ibn ‘Abbās’s opinion: since Adam was created
from the surface of the earth (the adīm), with all of its good and bad components, his
offspring also have good and bad elements.
Ibn ‘Abbās says: “Adam is named Adam because God created him from the entire
surface of the earth (adīm al-ard kulluhā), its red and black, its good and bad. For
that reason, Adam’s sons were red and black, good and bad.95

Fakhr al-Dīn explains why it is that, if everyone is descended from one person, they look
and act differently from one another.96 The fact that he connects not only looks, but

93
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘ v. 7, 513-14.
94
For instance, al-Haddād says: “God has enjoined a duty upon us [humankind] by creating us from a
single person, because that increases the chance that mankind will feel kindly towards one another, and will
show mercy towards each other, because we all return to a common source” (al-Haddād, Tafsīr, v. 2, 200).
95
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, v. 9, 161.
96
Some Imāmīs have a much more detailed and intricate explanation for how procreation happened legally
between the sons and daughters of Adam and Eve. See for instance, Muhsin al-Fayd’s exegesis of 4:1.

45
temperament, with ancestry, shows that he assumes that lineage has a range of effects on
personality.
In these exegetes, mankind’s relationship to one another is emphasized. They
explain the practical implications of creation. Other exegetes speaking about the nature
of creation range from practical arguments to abstruse ones.

The nature of creation

This verse is used as an occasion to discuss the nature of creation in two exegeses.
In each of these, philosophical arguments about the nature of creation are combined with
a practical discussion of Eve’s creation. Thus, the verse is understood to refer to Eve, but
also to refer to larger truths.
Sūrābādī explains that there are three different doctrines concerning Eve’s
creation which solve the problem of how she and Adam could have lawful sexual
relations, since she was created from him and is thus, in a sense, his progeny. Sūrābādī’s
text is not intended to be an esoteric philosophical discussion, but rather a practical
answer to a practical question. His style is reminiscent of lessons in the mosque, in
which the audience can ask questions, and the teacher explains the correct doctrine.
God created you from one individual (tan), and that individual is Adam, from
whom God created all people…And created from it its mate and God created,
from that one individual, its spouse Eve. They say that Eve was created from
Adam outside of the Garden, and they say that she was created inside of the
Garden, and God knows best [which is true]. Question: if Eve was created from
Adam, then how could it be legal (halāl) [for] Adam to marry her? Answer:
Some interpreters say, and created from it its mate, means “for him,” and some
interpreters say and created from it its mate means “of its type” (min jinsihā)97
just as God says There hath come unto you a messenger, one of yourselves
(rasūlun min anfusikum) [Q9:128] i.e., someone like you. A group of interpreters
also say that Eve was created from Adam, but when she was created it was a new
creation, thus the rules governing it were new, so that the rulings governing it are
not the same as those governing progeny and close relations.98

Sūrābādī explains that three doctrines would make it legal for Eve to marry Adam: Eve
was created for Adam, not from him, Eve was created like Adam, not from him, or Eve

97
Although Sūrābādī’s interpretation is in Persian, he includes this phrase in Arabic, probably because he is
quoting from Arabic sources.
98
Sūrābādī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 380.

46
was made from Adam, but as a new creation, not as a part of Adam. He says that the
second doctrine, that Eve was like Adam (of his type), is supported by the Qur’ānic verse
which says that prophets have been chosen “from among you,” i.e., from among people
like yourselves.
Although Sūrābādī does not cite texts to back up the view that Eve is a new
creation, the later exegete Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī does. He argues for this view in his
response to the naturalists and the theologians. In this lengthy passage, the verse
becomes the occasion to expose a debate about the nature of creation, and to advance a
particular philosophical argument. Thus, the tone of this passage is entirely opposite to
the Sūrābādī text, which was informal and practical. Here, the esoteric aspects of this
verse begin to emerge:
Some naturalists (tabā’i‘īyūn) adduce this verse, advancing the argument that
created you from a single soul indicates that all people were created from a single
soul, and His words and created from it its mate indicate that its mate was created
from it [also]. Then He says, in describing Adam, He created him from earth
[Q3:59] which indicates that Adam was created from earth, and then with regard
to people, from it, we created you [20:55]. All of these verses are indications that
what comes into being only does so from some pre-existing matter, from which
[other] things are created, and that creating something from pure nothing, ex
nihilo, is impossible.
The theologians (mutakallimūn) respond by saying “creating something
from something else is rationally impossible, because this created thing, if it is the
very thing which existed before, would not be created at all, and if it has not been
created, it cannot have been created from another thing.” If we say that the
created thing is distinct from that which existed before it, then the created thing
and this new feature of it comes out of pure nothing. So it is established that the
creation of things out of other things is rationally impossible. As for the word
“from” in the verse, it is used for the original creation (ibtidā’ al-ghāya)99 in the
sense that the creation of these things originated with those things, not in the
sense of any need or requirement [for pre-existing material], just in the sense that
this is actually how it occurred.100

In the case of Fakhr al-Dīn’s exegesis, this verse has become a platform for an
ideological debate which does not have to do with Adam and Eve, but rather the nature of
creation. The naturalists hold that everything in the universe has always existed, and
therefore creation ex nihilo is impossible. The theologians, including Fakhr al-Dīn,

99
This expression, the same one used by Fakhr al-Dīn above, is unknown to me.
100
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, v. 9, 161-2.

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respond that the term “creation” means making something new. Thus, even when the
created thing has another thing as its origin, it is still a new thing, and is not pre-existing
matter.
Philosophical debates about creation entail exegesis of the Qur’ān; although this
debate about the nature of existence seems to have taken place mostly outside of the
genre of exegesis, it still has the text of the Qur’ān as its focal point. Other exegetes take
further steps beyond the text of the Qur’ān.

Going deeper into the text: multilayered understandings

A few exegetes describe the canonical texts as having multiple layers of meaning.
These interpretations are important because the deeper layers of meaning are often not
obvious. While some exegetes simply explain that there are deeper meanings in the text,
others actually express disdain for “surface” interpretations. These texts give some clues
as to the differences between individual exegetes’ ideas of proper readings of the text.
Abū Hayyān (d. 745/1353), says that Muhammad’s hadīth about Eve’s creation
can be understood literally and as an image for Eve’s unruliness. While the words of the
Qur’ān and Prophet are literally true, they also have wider implications.
The apparent meaning of the verse is that in the beginning Eve was created from
[Adam’s] self (nafsihi) and that he is the source from which she originated, and
from which she was created. Ibn ‘Abbās, Mujāhid, al-Suddī, and Qatāda all say
this. And they say that God created Adam all alone in the garden, and then he
went to sleep and God Almighty removed one of his qusayrā ribs on the left side–
it is also said from one of the ribs on his right side. Ibn ‘Atīya says: “this doctrine
is supported by the authenticated hadīth which says that woman was created from
the most crooked rib, and if you try to straighten her then you will break her –
breaking her means divorcing her.” It could be that this hadīth is an image101 for
women’s unsteady morals (idtirāb akhlāqihinna), and their essence, which does
not abide in one [steady] state (kawnihinna lā yathbut ‘alā hāla wāhida) i.e., their
unruliness (sa‘bāt al-mirās), which means that they are like a crooked rib…”102

Abū Hayyān goes on to explain the controversy over Eve’s creation, quoting Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī’s discussion exactly, but noting, contrary to Fakhr al-Dīn, that the “most

101
Yahtamil an yakūna dhālika ‘alā jihat al-tamthīl….
102
Abū Hayyān, al-Bahr al-Muhīt, v. 3, 163.

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obvious” interpretation is that of Eve’s creation from a rib.103 Thus, even though the
crooked rib hadīth may be understood to stand for women’s unsteadiness, it is still
literally true.
A near-contemporary of Abū Hayyān, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, who wrote a
tafsīr which was attributed to the mystic Ibn ‘Arabī, and who died in 730/1329,104 takes a
Sūfī view of creation based on Aristotelian divisions. He uses Q4:1 in order to explain
creation and the relationship of the universal rational soul to the bodily form. In this
interpretation, philosophical elements are bound to the Islamic narrative, so the verse has
several different levels of meaning.
Who created you from a single soul That is the universal rational intellect, which
is the heart of the world, and that is the true Adam and He made from it its mate
i.e., the animalistic soul, which originates from [the intellectual soul, Adam]. It is
said that she was created from his left rib, from the part which follows the world
of generation and corruption, which is weaker than the part that follows the truth
[God], and if it were not for her mate [the intellectual soul], then she [the
animalistic soul] would not have been sent down to the world.105

In this account, the Aristotelian divisions into the universal rational soul and the bodily
form are materialized, in the actual persons of Adam and Eve. Eve, he says, was created
from Adam’s left rib. The left is the side which follows the world of generation and
corruption, and is weaker than the part which follows the truth, which is God, or the right
side. He then explains that the intellectual soul came to the earth first, and was followed
by the animalistic soul. As in many exegeses, Adam is the cause of Eve’s existence. In
this case, that is also because the spiritual exists in time before the physical embodiment,
and there could be no physical world without the spiritual coming first.

‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī goes on to explain that Adam’s seduction was

accomplished through Eve. Most strikingly, Eve is responsible for Adam’s

103
“They say that from it refers not to the soul, but to the clay of Adam’s creation, from which Eve was
created. I.e., she was created from the same thing that Adam was created from. The most obvious doctrine
is that of Ibn ‘Abbās, and those who say that Eve was created while Adam was in the Garden” (Abū
Hayyān, al-Bahr al-Muhīt, v. 3, 163).
104
Different parts of his name are shared by three other exegetes in this study. But he is not ‘Abd al-
Razzāq, the early exegete, nor Muhsin al-Fayd, the Shī‘ī dealt with extensively below, nor the Mālikī Ibn
‘Arabī. I refer to him here by his full name.
105
Kāshānī, attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, v. 1, 247-8. Thanks to Caner Dagli, who helped me
to understand this passage.

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embodiment/downfall. This interpretation seems to contradict the Qur’ānic account of
the fall.

It is well known that Iblīs enticed [Eve] first, so as to attain the seduction of
Adam through her seduction, and there is no doubt that this attachment to the
body would not have come about except through her. And from them were spread
forth many men i.e., spiritual beings (ashāb qulūb), who tend toward their father,
and women beings of soul and nature (ashāb nufūs wa-tabā’i‘) who tend toward
their mother. 106
Above, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī said that the existence of the spiritual realm is a
prerequisite for anything to be physically. In this passage he explains that, although Eve
was made for him, still when he says that the “attachment to the body would not have
come about except through her,” it means that the physical Eve causes the embodiment
of the spiritual Adam by seducing him. This seduction was planned by Iblīs, who enticed
Eve first in order for her to seduce Adam and cause his downfall into the physical realm.
The incorporation of elements from the Biblical story of the creation and
mankind’s fall from grace emphasizes women’s baser natures and their destructive
effects on men; the implication in the final phrase, which speaks of men tending towards
the father and women tending towards the mother, shows that these expressions indicate
actual characteristics in men and women.
Although ‘Abd al-Razzāq mentions that Eve’s temptation of Adam is “well
known,” in asserting Eve’s sole responsibility for the fall he actually seems to contradict
the story of the garden as told in the Qur’ān, in which both Eve and Adam are enticed.107

106
Ibid., v. 1, 248.
107
The account of the enticement and fall from Eden in the Qur’ān reads: And [God said] (unto man): O
Adam! Dwell thou and thy wife in the Garden and eat from whence ye will, but come not nigh this tree lest
ye become wrong-doers. Then Satan whispered to them that he might manifest unto them that which was
hidden from them of their shame, and he said: Your Lord forbade you from this tree only lest ye should
become angels or become of the immortals. And he swore unto them (saying): Lo! I am a sincere adviser
unto you. Thus did he lead them on with guile. And when they tasted of the tree their shame was manifest
to them and they began to hide (by heaping) on themselves some of the leaves of the Garden. And their
Lord called them, (saying): Did I not forbid you from that tree and tell you: Lo! Satan is an open enemy to
you? They said: Our Lord! We have wronged ourselves. If thou forgive us not and have not mercy on us,
surely we are lost! He said: Go down (from hence), one of you a foe unto the other. There will be for you
on earth a habitation and provision for a while. He said: There shall ye live, and there shall ye die, and
thence shall ye be brought forth. O Children of Adam! We have revealed unto you raiment to conceal your
shame, and splendid vesture, but the raiment of restraint from evil, that is best. This is of the revelations of
Allah, that they may remember. O Children of Adam! Let not Satan seduce you as he caused your (first)
parents to go forth from the Garden and tore off from them their robe (of innocence) that he might manifest
their shame to them. Lo! he seeth you, he and his tribe, from whence ye see him not. Lo! We have made
the devils protecting friends for those who believe not (Q7:19-27).

50
In the Qur’ānic account of the fall from the Garden, the sin of eating the fruit is both
Adam’s and his wife’s, who are equally blamed for the sin when humans are admonished
not to behave as their “parents” did when disobeying God (Q7:27, see note 375). This is
thus a much different narrative than the Biblical or any number of para-Biblical accounts,
in which Satan seduces Eve to eat from the tree of knowledge, and she in turn encourages
Adam to do so. Although as I said in the beginning of this chapter I have not found
direct sources of influence on the exegtes, ‘Abd al-Razzāq apparently adheres to the
Biblical or to a para-Biblical version of these events, in which Eve seduces Adam into
sinning.108 Moreover, several elements in his exegesis relate to aspects of certain Jewish
interpretations.109 This seems to be an example of the way in which the interpretation of
a verse can go against the apparent meaning of the Qur’ān.
The final exegete I will examine in this section, and arguably the one who takes
the most liberties with his sources, is the Imāmī Muhammad b. Murtada Muhsin al-Fayd,
whose lengthy account of Eve’s creation was quoted above. The remainder of Muhsin al-
Fayd’s exegesis is worth examining in detail because he actively embraces a non-literal
reading of the Qur’ānic text. Each segment of this interpretation provides new insight
into the sources upon which he drew in constructing his work of exegesis. But in the
final analysis it becomes clear that no source is more powerful that his own opinion, with
which he frames and manipulates all evidence to suit his argument.
Muhsin al-Fayd begins with the series of hadīths which have been cited in each of
the other Imāmī exegeses before him; he is so thorough that he includes the opinion of al-
Qummī that Eve was created from a rib – an opinion that was not included by other
Imāmī authors. He then cites the hadīth in which the Imām Abū Ja‘far expresses outrage
at the idea that Eve was created from a rib; although he cuts this off in the middle to give

108
It would take more research to find some para-Biblical accounts and see how they relate to ‘Abd al-
Razzāq’s account, likewise to find out how unusual ‘Abd al-Razzāq’s interpretation is.
109
In the Midrash Rabbah, Adam was described as being created with both higher, angelic, and lower,
beast-like attributes (Midrash Rabbah, tr. Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman, v. 1, p. 61). Other Jewish exegetes
described Adam as being created of “upper and lower” elements; upper elements do not die, lower elements
do die. “R. Tifadi said in R. Aha’s name: The Holy One, blessed by He, said: ‘If I create him of the
celestial elements he will live [for ever] and not die, and if I create him of the terrestrial elements, he will
die and not live [in a future life]. Therefore I will create him of the upper and of the lower elements; if he
sins he will die, while if he does not sin, he will live” (ibid., v. 1, 62). In one answer to a question posed to
Rabbi Joshua, women were described as bringing death into the world: “Why do they [women] walk in
front of the corpse [at a funeral]? Because they brought death into the world, they therefore walk in front of
the corpse … [and later it is said that] she extinguished the soul of Adam” (Ibid, v. 1, 139).

51
the lengthy account of Eve’s creation cited above, he returns to this hadīth at a later point,
including Abū Ja‘far’s words that those who say that the creation was from a rib “are
wrong!”
Despite the level of detail in his account of Eve’s creation described above, he
himself seems not to completely agree with it. He goes on to explain his own view: Eve
was created from Adam’s rib. But, in an attempt to reconcile the contradictory views of
the Imāms, he says that the rib is actually the leftover clay of Adam’s creation.
The narration which says that Eve was created from Adam’s left rib is correct,
and its meaning is from the clay which was left over from his left rib, and because
of that men have one rib fewer than women do.110

He draws on current theories of anatomy to explain that men have one rib fewer than
women do. Although this may have represented the state of scientific knowledge in
Muhsin al-Fayd’s time, it is not true: both sexes have twelve pairs of ribs. This is an
example of how time-bound interpretations can shape the views of an exegete. Although
he thought he was drawing on a verifiable physical fact to support his argument, the
verifiable falsity of that “fact” actually undermines his point.
In addition to showing that he was no expert in physiology, this passage
illuminates the ways in which he re-read precedent in order to forge his own argument.
In plain terms, he disregards any interpretations which do not agree with his own in order
to make his point. Although he actually quotes an infallible Imām as saying that Eve was
not created from a rib, he says that she was created from a rib.
Muhsin al-Fayd goes on to explain, in much the same manner as ‘Abd al-Razzāq
al-Kāshānī did, that men have a natural propensity towards the spiritual world,
represented by the right side, and women incline towards the physical world, represented
by the left side. In this passage, certain physical facts actually stand for deeper esoteric
truths about the nature of men and women.
I say, what has been transmitted to us to the effect that Eve was created from one
of Adam’s left ribs is an indication that the bodily, animalistic tendencies are
stronger in women than in men, and the spiritual, angelic (malakīya) tendencies
are, the other way around. That is because “right” is among those terms which
alludes to the spiritual, heavenly world (‘ālam al-malakūt al-rūhānī), and the
“left” is among those terms which allude to the world of the physical realm (‘ālam

110
Muhsin al-Fayd, Kitāb al-Sāfī, 2, 178.

52
 al-mulk al-jismānī). The “clay” is the substance of the body, while the “right” is
the substance of the spirit, and there is no physical without spiritual (lā mulk illā
bi-malakūt). This is what is meant by the saying of the Imam, “both of His hands
are right.”111 The left hand rib missing (manqūs) from Adam alludes to some of
the desires which originate from the dominance of the bodily [realm] (ghalabat
al-jismīya) which is a characteristic of the created [physical] world (‘ālam al-
khalq). These desires are the “leftover clay” extracted from Adam’s interior
which then became the substance of Eve’s creation. The Imam draws attention, in
his hadīth, to the fact that the heavenly and commanding tendencies are stronger
in men than the tendencies towards the worldly (mulk) and the physical (khalq),
and the other way around in women.112

According to Muhsin al-Fayd, the difference in the natures of men and women all come
down to the fact that Eve was created from a left rib, removed from Adam. The right is
the side of the spiritual realm, so men, missing the left rib, are naturally more spiritual.
And the left is the side of the bodily physical realm, and so women, created with material
taken from Adam’s left rib, are naturally inclined towards the physical world.
This interpretation takes into account the rib mentioned in one hadīth, and it takes
into account the clay mentioned in another, but it does not take into account the fact that
the Imām Abū Ja‘far said that the interpretation of the rib was incorrect. In this
interpretation, Muhsin al-Fayd reconciles two positions which are actually irreconcilable.
He then claims to have secret knowledge because of his adherence to the words of the
Imāms.
Thus the outward appearance is a sign of the inner [truth] (al-zāhir ‘unwān al-
bātin),113 and this is the secret behind the omission in men’s bodies, in relation to
women’s. The secrets of God are only attained by the enlightened (asrār Allāh lā
yunāluhā illā ahl al-sirr). And disbelief in the words of the infallible [Imams] is
explained by the understanding of the Sunnīs (al-‘āmma), which is based on the
apparent meanings and not the origin of the hadīths.114

The story of creation thus becomes a vehicle for a polemical attack against the Sunnīs
who are not initiated into the true ways of the Imāms and thus the truth behind the stories
which they tell. In other words, instead of being a tale of creation, this passage is a point

111
Although Muhsin al-Fayd cites these words, he does not actually quote this part of the hadīth in his
exegesis.
112
Ibid., v. 2, 178.
113
This could mean one of two things (or it could mean both). The outward appearance of the missing rib
could be a sign of the intrinsic differences between men and women. Or the outward appearance of the text
of the Qur’ān (the zāhir) represents inward truths (bātin) only understood by Imāmīs.
114
Muhsin al-Fayd, Kitāb al-Sāfī, v. 2, 178.

53
of Sunnī-Imāmī divide, with Muhsin al-Fayd claiming superior understanding because of
adherence to the words of the infallible Imāms, and claiming to understand the truth of
the hadīths as those who just read the words of them cannot. He thereby justifies looking
beyond the literal sense of texts and delving into their inner significance. This method, in
his view, controverts the superficial understanding given by a solely literal reading of the
texts. The non-literal meaning, the hidden meaning, is revealed to only a few, the
enlightened (ahl al-sirr). This may justify his going against the literal sense of the words
of the Imām Abū Ja‘far.

1.5 The outlier: al-Biqā‘ī (d. 885/1480)

Al-Biqā‘ī’s interpretation does not properly belong to descriptions of the narrative
development of interpretation or of its intellectual development. In his interpretation, al-
Biqā‘ī stresses how the method of both Adam and Eve’s creation fits in with God’s
divine message about the different ways in which He has created humans. His mode of
exegesis is also unusual because, unlike any other exegete I have examined in this study,
he looks at the verse in the context of the surrounding verses, and looks at the sūra in the
context of the surrounding sūras.
Al-Biqā‘ī begins by explaining his theory of how this particular sūra fits into the
Qur’ān. In al-Biqā‘ī’s philosophy, the sūras and verses are all thematically connected.
He adopts a chronological organization of the verses to facilitate his analysis.
Created you from a single soul and that single soul is your [i.e., humankind’s]
father, Adam, peace be upon him… and God made the matter of piety [the subject
of this chapter opening] in view of two sūras; this one, which is the first half of
sūra 4, and al-Hajj, which is the second half of sūra 4…
The sūra of creation [this sūra] was put before the sūra about the afterlife [al-
Hajj] so that the verses of creation are caused to be near to the verses of the seen
[world].115

In these passages, al-Biqā‘ī explains that the order of the sūras is determined by their
content: this sūra 4 has as its main theme creation, and sūrat al-Hajj, which is, he says,
the second half of sūra 4, has as its main theme the afterlife.
But al-Biqā‘ī goes on to illuminate the more subtle reason behind the placement
of the verse regarding God’s creation of Adam, and his creation of Eve from Adam. He
115
Al-Biqā‘ī, Nazm al-Durar, v. 5, 173.

54
explains that the verses preceding these verses had as their subject Jesus’ creation, and
that this verse answers the critics who ask how Jesus could have been created from a
woman alone. Although God did not provide the answer to that question in the Jesus
verses, he does provide the answer here. This is an entirely different sort of thematic
connection than most of the connections with other verses which occur in exegesis –
rather than referring to Eve and Adam or to esoteric matters, al-Biqā‘ī refers to the
specific types of creation made by God.
More amazing than [the fact that the chapter on creation precedes the chapter on
the afterlife], and more subtle, is that the greater goal of the verses preceding this
one was the debate about the matter of Jesus, and whether the like of [his
creation] is like Adam’s [creation], peace be upon him. The truth of the matter
[about Jesus] is that he is a man, born from a woman alone, without the
intervention of any man. God gives in this verse… an answer to whoever says
“how is that so?” by describing the creation of that [single] soul…and created
from it its mate i.e, the like [of Jesus] is like Eve, in that she is a woman born of a
man, without the intervention of any woman. And therefore the like [of Jesus] is
like his father and mother, Adam and Eve together. Thus this [passage] is to
inform us about the creation of Adam, Eve, and Jesus, peace be upon them all…
[which shows that there are] four types of creation, and no more, and they are: a
person from neither a man nor a woman, a person from both a man and a woman,
a person from only a man, and a person from only a woman.”116

Al-Biqā‘ī explains that Jesus is similar to both Adam and Eve. Adam was created
without the intervention of any human beings, and Eve was created from a man, without
the intervention of a woman. Like her, Jesus was created from one person, but it was a
woman, without the intervention of a man. They illustrate the different types of creation:
the creation without the intervention of a man or woman (Adam), creation without the
intervention of a woman (Eve), creation without the intervention of a man (Jesus) and
creation from both man and women (everyone else). Al-Biqā‘ī’s interpretation shows
that this verse can be understood within the wider Qur’ānic context to refer to elements
well outside of its literal sense.

1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored parallel developments in the interpretation of the
text of Q4:1: the development of historical narratives and doctrines on Eve’s creation,

116
Ibid., 5, 173-4

55
and the development of intellectual narratives which have included philosophical debates
about the meaning of existence.
These interpretations show that the literal reading of the text is not always
considered to be the only valid reading by the exegetes, who often take a multi-layered
approach in which a number of parallel readings are true. In some, a phrase of the verse
becomes a synecdoche for all of mankind or the nature of creation. According to others,
the manner of Eve’s creation has grave implications for women’s status. This is
especially true of interpretations in which the Aristotelian divisions of the base,
animalistic, physical world is associated with Eve and thus with all women, and is in
direct contrast with the intellectual and spiritual world of Adam and thus of all men. In
interpretations such as these, the number of layers of meaning grows exponentially. The
single soul means Adam and its mate means Eve. Adam stands for the universal rational
intellect, and Eve stands for the baser animalistic physical world. Adam existed before
Eve because the spiritual exists before the physical; furthermore there can be no physical
without the spiritual. And, although Eve was created for Adam, she also caused his
downfall into the physical world, which must be somehow inevitable because otherwise
she would not have been created. But at the same time, Adam and Eve stand for all men
and women; men’s propensity is towards a higher, intellectual and spiritual existence,
while women’s is towards all baser concerns of the earth according to the animalistic
tendencies in their nature.
These interpretations give the sense of a cosmic drama being enacted on an
everyday level, in which men’s downfall is also their inevitable fate. Though by nature
they are spiritual, intellectual beings, they are nevertheless bound to this world quite
firmly by the person of the wife, who represents all of the entanglements of the physical
realm: it is in wives that men’s physical passions have an outlet, and it is to wives (and
children) that they must pay maintenance, which entails the burden of earning a living.
The development of multi-layered narratives show the ways in which exegesis
moved well beyond elements commonly considered to be the sources for, or origin of,
interpretations: the Qur’ān, hadīths, and the early interpretations. These interpretations
exemplify the ways in which the elements of personal opinion and common cultural

56
understanding play out in exegetical texts, while at the same time revealing only a part of
these wide-ranging debates which took place across different genres of text.
In the following chapter, I will focus on the development of exegetes’ strategies
of interpreting text through time, by examining the many ways that they interpreted verse
2:228.

57
 2. Negotiating the authoritative sources, 1: exegeses of Q2:228

2.1 Introduction
This chapter is a diachronic analysis of the content and method of interpretations
of Q2:228, which reads: Women have rights like their obligations in kindness and men
have a degree over them (Lahunna mithlu ’ lladhī ‘alayhinna bi’l-ma‘rūfi wa-lil-rijāl
‘alayhinna darajatun). I explore how the types of authoritative sources cited by the
exegetes changed over time, and how they were explained in ways that accommodated
the exegetes’ own circumstances.
This chapter also shows the diachronic development of the discourse on women in
the exegesis of Q2:228. It will be apparent that the tone of later exegeses tended to be
harsher than the tone of earlier exegeses. But this change in tone does not necessarily
mean that attitudes towards women were radically different in the later period; although
some attitudes might have changed through time, a more plausible explanation for these
developments as a whole is that the content of exegeses developed as a result of changes
in exegetes’ methods. As they decided to include more legal rulings, for instance, their
lists of men’s rights grew longer. And rationales changed through time too: some early
exegeses include oblique references to hadīths on the authority of the Prophet, but later
ones include the full text of those hadīths and others. This does not mean that earlier
exegetes did not believe men had the legal rights cited in later texts, or did not know the
hadīths cited as rationales. It is more likely that they did not see fit to include these
elements in their exegeses as later exegetes did. The aim in this chapter is to clarify such
developments in content and method through the exegeses of Q2:228.

The text of Q2:228 and major themes in its interpretation

The portion of Q2:228 studied here consists of two parts: the statement that
women have rights like their obligations “in kindness” (bi’l-ma‘rūf), and the statement

58
that men have a degree over them.117 This introduction is a brief overview of some of the
issues that arise in its interpretation through time.
Since the rest of the verse is about divorce, women have rights like their
obligations is usually taken to be a prescription for how to behave during a marriage or
divorce, rather than a general statement that women have rights. Thus, a better
translation from the point of view of the exegetes would be: “women have rights against
their husbands like those that their husbands have against them.”
The term “like” has been interpreted in two ways: that women’s and men’s duties
to one another are the same – women and men are each owed sex in marriage, for
instance - or that women have rights just as their husbands have rights. In the latter case,
the wives and husbands are not owed the same rights, but, for instance, husbands are
obligated to maintain their wives and wives are obligated to obey their husbands. The
latter understanding, “just as” is by far the more prevalent in the sources, although in this
dissertation I use the literal translation “like” for the sake of clarity.
The second part of the verse says that men have a degree over them; the exegetes
discuss the nature of this degree. In the early period, men’s “degree” is usually
understood to consist of the rights which men have more than women. Al-Tabarī sees the
degree as a prescription rather than a description: men must forgive women who do not
fulfill all of their rights so that men have a degree over them. In exegeses after al-Tabarī
affirmation of the degree is understood as a factual statement that men have more rights
than women and also as a description of men as inherently superior to women.
Descriptions of men’s inherent qualities are part of a trend in the 10th century towards
explaining why a given verse was revealed: understanding men’s innate qualities can
explain why they have been put in a position of power over women, or why they have
more rights than them.
In the period around al-Wāhidī (d. 468/1075) and beyond, exegetes focus their
interpretations on women’s household behavior and their status. As described in the
introduction, works of tafsīr often lay out a law governing behavior and then recommend

117
The full verse reads: Women who are divorced shall wait, keeping themselves apart, for three [monthly]
courses. And it is not lawful for them that they should conceal that which God has created in their wombs,
if they are believers in God and the last day. And their husbands would do better to take them back in that
case if they desire a reconciliation. Women have rights like their obligations in kindness, and men have a
degree over them. God is Mighty, Wise. Trans: Pickthall, with my amendments.

59
behavior which is more moderate than that allowed by the law. In one sense, then, the
tafsīr of these verses is like a manual of behavior. In the post-Wāhidī period,
recommendations about household behavior are taken a step further: al-Zamakhsharī, for
instance, discusses men’s and women’s household roles, saying that women are
responsible for cooking, cleaning and the like, whereas men are not. This is an important
indication of how customary practice can influence interpretation.

2.2 The early texts

Early interpretations are commonly viewed as the sources for later works.
However, as I have shown in Chapter 1, these early interpretations do not form the basis
for all later ones. In the case of Q2:228, some themes emerge in the early exegeses
which appear as prominent threads of interpretation in later periods. These include
wifely obedience, companionship between the spouses, men’s superior rights, and the
necessity of men maintaining women.118 But other interpretations of this time did not go
on to become popular: the assertion that women’s maintenance depends on their
obedience, and the assertion that men’s advantage consists of the rights that they give to
women. This is an example of exegetes’ picking and choosing from authoritative
sources.
Almost all of these interpretations are general prescriptions of behavior; the
exception is the necessity of men’s financial maintenance of women, which is a specific
duty. Al-Dahhāk’s (d. 105/723) exegesis is typical of the sorts of general inducements to
behave well that are included in these exegeses:
When women obey God and obey their husbands, then their husbands are
obligated to give them good companionship, refrain from harming them, and
maintain them with their [the husbands’] wealth (wa-yinfiq ‘alayha min
sa‘atihi).119

The term “like” is not interpreted to mean that men and women have the same rights and
duties.120 Men’s duties are to support women, be companions to them, and refrain from

118
Two early exegetes do not deal with this part of the verse but do say that women must disclose
pregnancy in the waiting period after a revocable divorce (‘idda), a reference to the earlier part of the verse.
119
Al-Dahhāk, Tafsīr, v. 1, 196.
120
Maintenance according to wealth is a reference to Qur’ān 65:7, let the man of means spend according to
his means (li-yunfiq dhū sa‘atin min sa‘atihi).

60
harming them. The gentle nature of these duties, the companionship and refraining from
harm, is an allusion to the words “bi’l-ma’rūf”, discussed above.
Women’s duty is obedience to their husbands and to God; the specific nature of
this obedience (i.e., what exactly it entails) is not mentioned. Obedience to God and
husbands is put on the same plane, and is deemed to be significant enough to justify the
fact that men have more duties than women do. Since women’s rights are predicated on
their obedience to God and to their husbands, if they do not obey, the implication is that
they may forfeit their rights to maintenance, companionship, and their husbands’
refraining from harming them.
What is the degree that men have over women? Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d.
150/767) notes that husbands are put at an advantage because of their role as providers
for their wives. Like al-Dahhāk’s interpretation, Muqātil’s is a general statement that
men have more rights than women; he does not mention what exactly these rights are.
Muqātil says, women have rights over their husbands like those that their
husbands have over them. And men have a degree over them [Muqātil] says,
husbands have superiority (fadīla) over wives in rights, and due to the rights the
[husbands] grant them (wa-bi-mā sāq ilayhā min al-haqq).121

According to Muqātil, men’s degree is dual: they have more rights than women, and they
have the power to grant women their rights; women do not have the power to grant men
rights. Other exegetes take similar interpretations of the “degree.” ‘Abd al-Razzāq (d.
211/826) says that men have a degree “of surplus (fadl) over women”; he leaves the
“surplus” undefined, but it could be that men have more rights than women.122 The Ibādī
Hūd b. Muhakkam echoes Muqātil by saying that men have superiority (fadīla) in rights
– he then quotes verse 4:34 in order to explain this advantage.123

The transmission of early exegesis

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the substance of most of these
interpretations is repeated through time, but two interpretations are not so popular. These

121
Muqātil, Tafsīr Muqātil, v. 1, 194.
122
‘Abd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr, v. 1, 347.
123
Hūd b. Muhakkam, Tafsīr, v. 1, 217.

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two interpretations are an example of how early interpretations are not always taken up
wholesale by later generations.
The most widely cited early explanation of this verse, in several different
wordings, was that there should be a friendly relationship between the spouses (husn al-
suhba, ‘ishra, husn mu‘āshara). Twenty-three later works, or 41% of the total studied
here,124 mentioned that there should be companionable spousal relations. Other
prominent themes to be carried into later generations are: men’s advantage in rights (in
34% of later exegeses), the quotation of verse 4:34 in order to explain this verse (in 23%
of later exegeses), and women’s obedience (in 20% of later exegeses). A correlate of the
latter explanation, which is that men’s degree consists of women’s obedience, was cited
in 18% of exegeses.
The discourse surrounding the necessity of men’s maintaining women was
developed through time. 18% of exegeses mentioned that men must provide women with
maintenance – a direct quotation of an early exegesis. But 38% explain that men’s
degree over women consists of their financial maintenance, which is a later addition to
the original interpretation. This latter explanation highlights the fact that men’s monetary
support is perceived to give them an advantage over women.
Although almost all later works cite some sort of early precedent, none of these
interpretations was cited by more than 50% of the total pool of works. This is an
example of how exegetes pick and choose between early interpretations.
Two early explanations receive barely any attention in later ages. Al-Dahhāk
predicates women’s maintenance on their obedience: most exegetes who quote al-Dahhāk
simply say that he enjoins women’s obedience to men, and men’s maintenance and good
treatment of women, without explicitly making women’s good treatment and
maintenance a condition of their obedience. Another lesser-cited interpretation is that of
Muqātil, who says that men have an advantage because they give women rights; only 4
exegeses in total - 7% of this sample - cite that interpretation of the verse, even though
many more cite men’s superiority (fadīla) and attribute it to Muqātil. Muqātil and al-
Dahhāk are well respected and widely quoted by later generations of exegetes - but
specific aspects of their interpretations are left out.

124
Commentary on this verse is in only 55 out of the total 67 works in this study.

62
 One explanation for this selective citation of early authorities could be that later
exegetes were using different versions of the early works than are available today; most
of these early works have been reconstructed. And in the few cases where the early work
is not reconstructed, the versions available today are probably not the same as the
manuscripts used by the pre-modern exegetes. But whether these interpretations were the
“authentic” or true words of the exegetes is not the question of this dissertation. Instead,
it is worth noting that these interpretations were in certain works. Even one verbatim
citation indicates that some later exegetes knew of these interpretations and chose
whether to incorporate them. This means that the citation of early sources was the choice
of the exegetes; not all early works needed to be incorporated into all later exegeses, and
when they were, verbatim quotation was not a top priority.

Differences between works of tafsīr and law

The fact that the companionship between husbands and wives forms a major and
ongoing theme in exegesis contrasts with legal sources from this period on the subject of
marriage. Kecia Ali characterizes the early legal texts on this subject as being
preoccupied with specific behaviors and duties such as wives’ duty to have sex with their
husbands whenever the husbands wish.125 Although the legal duty of women’s
obedience, at least in the realm of sex, is well-established, not all exegetes feel the need
to mention it when describing spousal relations in this verse. This does not necessarily
mean that the exegetical sources contradict the sources focused on law; exegetes know
the law, and these two types of source are usually complementary, rather than
contradictory.
These early works of exegesis do not reflect the whole range of exegeses of the
verse in this period. The writings of al-Shāfi‘ī, founder of the school of law named after
him, were incorporated into a book of Ahkām al-Qur’ān by al-Naysābūrī, who died in
458/1065.
God knows best [what the meaning of the verse is] i.e., women have rights and
obligations like those that their husbands give to them in kindness. [There should

125
See Kecia Ali, Money, Sex, and Power, Chapter 2, which “focuses on the wife’s right to maintenance
and the husband’s right to control her movements and derive sexual enjoyment from her in exchange” (Ali,
Money, Sex, and Power, 84).

63
 be] sexual intercourse (jimā‘) between the husband and wife. Each must desist
from dislike, and when one of them is owed a right, the other should not trouble
them about it, nor display dislike in rendering the service, nor delay in fulfilling
that right. For reluctance [to give] on the part of one who has enough is unjust.126

Despite al-Shāfi‘ī’s prominent position as a jurist, certain aspects of his exegeses of this
verse were not incorporated into later exegetical works - even those of Shāfi‘ī exegetes.
For instance, his assertion that whoever is fulfilling the other’s rights should not do so
reluctantly was not cited by even one exegete in this study.
Even when an interpretation directly related to legal rulings does enter into the
tafsīr of this verse, it is not always attributed to the jurists who wrote outside of the genre,
but rather to the exegete who wrote within it. For instance, other explanations given by
al-Shāfi‘ī were incorporated, but not attributed to him. He speaks of sexual intercourse as
an obligation of marriage, an interpretation adopted by several later exegetes. However,
they do not attribute this opinion to al-Shāfi‘ī, nor to any of the other jurists who have
written on this subject, but rather to the exegete al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923), whose
interpretation I describe below.

2.3 Al-Tabarī and his peers: re-reading earlier texts, and refining the discourse
In this section, I will analyze as one group the exegeses of Ibn Wahb al-Dinawārī
(d. ~300/912-13), the Imāmī al-Qummī (d. 307/919), al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923) and al-Tabarī
(d. 310/923), who had his own law school, the Jarīrī school. Taken together, they provide
a picture of the state of exegesis during al-Tabarī’s lifetime.
I showed in the previous section that the earliest interpretations of Q2:228 seem
mostly to consist of the exegetes’ own opinions. Al-Tabarī’s exegesis marks a change in
the method of writing tafsīr: he lists early opinions, then picks what he considers to be
the most likely among them and explains why; occasionally, none of the early opinions
are acceptable and he creates his own interpretation. The fact that he comments on early
opinions, rather than simply recording them, means that those interpretations have

126
Al-Shāfi‘ī, Ahkām, v. 1, 204.

64
become a part of the interpretable canon.127 In other words, just as the text of the Qur’ān
has always been subject to interpretation, so now are the opinions of the earliest exegetes.
His method of writing tafsīr includes the use of several different authoritative
sources; foremost among them are hadīths on the authority of the Prophet, early
interpretations, references to the law, and his own opinion. The other exegetes analyzed
here incorporate many of the same types of authoritative sources, but without the same
structure as al-Tabarī’s work.
In terms of content, these exegeses are more specific than the earliest ones were.
While the earliest texts that I examined tended to include generalized prescriptions for
men to be good to women, particular rights and duties begin to be emphasized in the texts
of al-Tabarī’s era. The increasing specificity of the interpretations of this verse at this
time is a sign of developments in the idea of what should be included in the written text.
Ibn Wahb gives several examples of men’s specific rights. His interpretation of
“like” is that men and women have the same right to respect, companionship, and
intimacy. Certain rights, therefore, are absolutely equal between the spouses. Yet for Ibn
Wahb men’s degree consists of several of their legal advantages: more inheritance than
women, if they are killed their blood wit is more than a woman’s, and men can testify in
cases where women cannot. In addition, he says that men have superior rationality (‘aql);
this is probably a reference to the Prophetic hadīth which states that women are deficient
in rationality and religion, which will be discussed more fully below. By mentioning
women’s deficient rationality, Ibn Wahb introduces men’s inherent qualities as an
element of their superiority over women. Early works did not explain why men have
been given the degree over women, so they had no occasion to mention men’s inherent
qualities; this is true too for al-Tabarī, al-Qummī, and al-Zajjāj. Ibn Wahb’s
interpretation, which does speak of men’s inherent rights and qualities, is an exception in
his own time, but it is a precursor of future trends.
Women have rights and respect by their husbands like that which they owe to their
husbands bi’l-ma‘rūf in terms of companionship, and intimacy; and men have a

127
That interpretable text is canonical is the view of Kermode as cited by Jonathan Brown, The
Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunnī Hadīth Collection,
Forthcoming Summer, 2007, with Brill publishers, p. 48. All page references refer to the unpublished
manuscript which Dr. Brown was kind enough to send to me; I include them here although they will not be
much good to future readers wishing to check them.

65
 degree over them superiority (fadīla) in rationality (al-‘aql), inheritance, blood
wit, and witnessing; and what they owe in terms of maintenance [of their wives]
and service (khidma) [to their wives].128

In terms of rationales, Ibn Wahb draws on earlier interpretations, he possibly alludes to a

hadīth on the authority of the Prophet, he references several rulings on women’s legal
status, and he gives his own opinion. None of these rationales is explained at length, but
it is clear that the breadth and scope of interpretation in this period is changing.
The Shī‘ī al-Qummī focuses his interpretation on the wider import of the whole
verse: he speaks of wives having a duty to report their pregnancy or lack thereof to their
husbands when their husbands have divorced them.129 This interpretation references both
Qur’ān and the legal rulings which surround the issue of women’s revocable divorce.
Like others of his era, al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923) mentions specific legal rights within
marriage: he says that sex is a component of the marital obligations in his Ma‘ānī al-
Qur’ān. Just like Ibn Wahb says that certain rights are the same between the spouses, al-
Zajjāj says that men’s and women’s right to sex is the same.
The meaning [of the verse] is that women achieve [sexual] pleasure (al-ladhdha)
from men, just as men achieve it; men have superiority (fadīla) because of their
financial maintenance and their guardianship (qiyāmuhu), through which they
correct them [their wives].130

There are three possibilities for what al-Zajjāj means in his interpretation that women
achieve pleasure from sex: that he is simply describing sex as enjoyable for both parties
(i.e., he takes the “like” to be a description of men’s and women’s equal pleasure), that he
is making a statement of his opinion on the law: the law says that women should achieve
pleasure from sex (i.e., the “like” is a legally binding prescription saying that men must
ensure that women achieve pleasure during sex), or that he is prescribing behavior that is

128
Ibn Wahb, Al-Wādih, v. 1, 75.
129
Al-Qummī says: “it is not permissible for a woman to hide her pregnancy, her menstruation, or her
becoming pure after menstruation. God has imposed upon women three states: purity, menstruation, and
pregnancy. Men have a degree over them. He [al-Qummī] says, men have more rights over women than
women do over men” (Al-Qummī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 74). The explanation of this interpretation is that when the
husband pronounces the words “I divorce you” once or twice, the wife is legally divorced and may remarry
after a waiting period (the ‘idda). However, the divorce is “revocable,” so if he wishes to take her back
during her waiting period, he may do so. If he pronounces the divorce a third time, it is irrevocable and he
may not take her back until she has been married to another person. But it should be noted that “revocable”
is not really an accurate term to describe the first and second divorces, since the effect of his saying “I
divorce you” is cumulative.
130
Al-Zajjāj, Ma‘ānī, v. 1, 301.

66
not legally binding (men should ensure that women achieve pleasure just as women
ensure that men do). Because he does not elaborate, it is difficult to tell whether his
statement is prescriptive or descriptive; given the majority legal views of women’s right
to sex within marriage, it is likely to be prescriptive.131
Al-Zajjāj also states that through guardianship, men correct women. This hints at
men’s guardianship being both monetary and moral, a theme which is elaborated on in
later exegeses.
As I have shown in the preceding paragraphs, the exegetes of al-Tabarī’s age cite
rationales from earlier exegeses, hadīths, the Qur’ān and this verse in particular, legal
works, and their own opinions; usually their works are a combination of these factors. At
the outset, al-Tabarī’s work seems almost solely to be framed by earlier exegeses. In
truth his exegesis is a complex interweaving of the types of authoritative sources
common in other exegeses of his age. Yet he does not mention the content of the
interpretations given by Ibn Wahb, al-Zajjāj, or al-Qummī: he leaves aside issues of
women’s rationality, men’s legal rights, and sexual intercourse which did not appear in
the earliest exegetical sources.
He frames his discussion of the beginning of the verse around the meaning of
“like,” citing two groups of exegetes: the first takes the view that “like” means “just as,”
whereas the second is that “like” means “the same as.” Authority for the first
interpretation comes from al-Dahhāk’s claims that women have the right to
companionship from their husbands, and they owe their husbands obedience.132 The
rights of the husband and wife are not the same, but they are each owed rights. This is
the general inducement towards kindness that appeared in early texts.
The other interpretation, that men’s and women’s rights in marriage are the same,
relies on a hadīth of Ibn ‘Abbās’s which says that both husbands and wives should take
care of their physical appearance. It has him saying, “I like to make myself beautiful for
my wife, just as I like it when she makes herself beautiful for me, because God said,

131
According to Kecia Ali’s research, women do not have the same right to sex within marriage that men
do. See her “Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence: the necessity for critical engagement with
marriage and divorce law” in Progressive Muslims on justice, gender and pluralism, ed. Omid Safi,
Oxford: Oneworld, 2003, 163-
132
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, v. 4, 531.

67
women’s rights are like their obligations.”133 Ibn ‘Abbās’s hadīth is referred to
henceforth as the “beautification hadīth”.134 Although this interpretation is on an early
authority, it did not appear in an earlier work of exegesis that I have seen. It refers to a
specific duty in marriage – the duty of beautification.
Al-Tabarī’s own opinion is that this part of the verse refers to women who have
been revocably divorced (divorced once or twice).135 He describes the recise behavior
which is both commendable and legal in such a situation: revocably divorced women’s
husbands should not take them back unless they truly wish for reconciliation, nor should
divorced women hide their pregnancy.136 “Like” means “just as”: women have specific
rights, and so do men.
Like al-Zajjāj, al-Tabarī is commenting on the behavior surrounding a legal
ruling. Although, as I explained above, al-Zajjāj’s statement is not entirely clear, it seems
to be a recommendation for behavior that is not guaranteed in the law, namely sexual
fulfillment for both parties to the marriage. Similarly, al-Tabarī is commenting on the
law (the husbands’ rights to “revoke” the divorce and take back their wives) and saying
that when men invoke this right, they should not do so in a capricious way. Rather than
providing numerous opinions on different legal rulings - the method in books of law - he
focuses on one issue and the behavior that will make this situation, which inherently
seems to put women at a disadvantage, more just and fair. He does not question the
notion of a revocable divorce and the man’s unilateral right to take his wife back, but
rather the manner in which this right is likely to be invoked.
Since he has explained how husbands should deal fairly with their divorced
wives, how does al-Tabarī deal with the “degree” that men have over women? In the
end, he takes a new approach, in which the degree is a prescription for good behavior on
the part of the husbands, rather than a description of husbands’ rights. In so doing, he
introduces an important dimension in the use of previous interpretations as rationales.

133
Ibid., v. 4, 531-2.
134
I usually use the term hadīth to refer to the sayings of the Prophet, but here I use it to refer to a saying of
Ibn ‘Abbās, a Companion.
135
Although I continue to use the term “revocable,” Kecia Ali points out that it is not truly a “revoked”
divorce, because the effect of the divorce counts towards the three-divorce limit before a permanent
divorce.
136
Ibid., v. 4, 532.

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Al-Tabarī’s work seems to be framed by earlier interpretations; but he uses his own views
to shape those interpretations and to give them new meanings.
Al-Tabarī lists five interpretations which have been handed down to him by
previous authorities. Although some exegetical disagreement is cited in early works, in
this case it is actually highlighted; according to the five interpretations, the degree is: the
surplus portion which God has given to men rather than women (al-fadl alladhī
faddalahum), such as inheritance and jihād;137 “men’s command and women’s
obedience” (al-imāra wa’l-tā‘a);138 “the dowry which men give to women” and that the
li‘ān procedure is different for men and women;139 the fact that men give women their
rights;140 and finally, that men have beards, while women do not.141 Some of them have
to do with God-given rights (jihād and inheritance, for instance),142 others with earthly
duties (obedience, dowry). Finally, one refers to a cosmetic difference between men and
women, the beard which men have and women do not. Because this latter is simply the
difference of facial hair, rather than God-given rights and duties, it could be seen to
minimalize the differences between the sexes’ rights and duties which are the focus of the
other interpretations. As I will describe below, at least one later author disdained this
notion.143
Almost all of the interpretations cited by al-Tabarī refer to specific differences
between men and women that were not mentioned in the early works that I have
described above. In other words, he cites early authorities as giving specific commands
for behavior within marriage, but the earlier texts that I have analyzed do not include such
specific commands. This could indicate that more of the oral exegesis is entering into the
text in al-Tabarī’s period.
He goes on to explain his own position, which shows development from earlier
exegeses in both content and form. Not only does he state the nature of men’s and
women’s duties, but he also elaborates upon an earlier interpretation, that of Ibn ‘Abbās.

137
Ibid., v. 4, 533.
138
Ibid., v. 4, 534.
139
Ibid., v. 4, 534. Li‘ān is a procedure for denying paternity.
140
Ibid., v. 4, 535.
141
Ibid., v. 4, 535.
142
I refer to the jihād as a right because it is something that women are not allowed to do, even if they wish
to; I include more discussion of this below. Therefore, it is not just a duty for men, it is their right. And
143
Ibn al-‘Arabī, whose views are described below.

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Ibn ‘Abbās’s statement is that men should forgive some of women’s duties. Al-Tabarī in
turn says that this means that men should manage women with generosity; the element of
management is absent from the Ibn ‘Abbās hadīth. For al-Tabarī, men control the marital
situation, which is why it is in their power to be magnanimous.
He further clarifies the meaning of the word “degree” as “rank and status (rutba
wa’l-manzila):” when men manage women magnanimously, they have a surplus, or
superiority (fadl) in ranking and status. Finally, he specifies that although the statement
“men have a degree over them” is overtly factual and descriptive, in reality it is
prescriptive: certain behavior (men managing women generously) is the substance of the
degree. While incorporating earlier exegeses, this marks a significant departure from
them:
The best interpretation, in my opinion, is that of Ibn ‘Abbās, which says that the
degree which God Almighty gives to men over women is that He put the husband
in a position to forgive his wife some of the duties enjoined upon her,
disregarding them, while concurrently fulfilling all of his obligations towards her.
And that is because God says and men have a degree over them following his
statement that women have rights like their obligations, whereby He informed us
that it is incumbent upon men not to harm women when they invoke their right of
return after a revocable divorce, nor [should they harm them when fulfilling] their
other rights. Likewise, it is women’s responsibility not to harm men by hiding
their pregnancy from them, or [in fulfilling] their other rights. Therefore, God
invites men (nadaba) to manage women magnanimously (al-akhdh ‘alayhinna
bi’l-fadl) if they fail to fulfill some of the obligations towards their husbands that
God enjoins upon them. And this is what Ibn ‘Abbās meant when he said “I don’t
like to take advantage of all of my rights over my wife, because God Almighty
says this in His words, and men have a degree over them. The meaning of degree
is a rank and status. [Although] this statement from God, exalted is He, is overtly
a factual statement, its meaning is that men are invited to manage women
magnanimously, so that they will have superior ranking to them.144

Making Ibn ‘Abbās’s view into interpretable text enables al-Tabarī to give it his own
meaning. The result is that the content of al-Tabarī’s interpretation is different from
others of his age and before, which have all taken the degree to be descriptive, rather than
a prescription of how men should act. Only al-Zajjāj’s interpretation has the possibility
of being prescriptive like al-Tabarī’s, and even then the prescription is with regards to the
first part of the verse (women have rights) rather than the second (the degree).

144
Ibid., v. 4, 535-6.

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Summary of the opinions of al-Tabarī and his peers
Subsequent citation of the exegeses of al-Tabarī’s generation falls into the same
pattern as the exegeses of the formative-period works: it is selective. This means that
some interpreations, new in al-Tabarī’s time, become incorporated. Which exegeses
became widespread does not have to do with who first cites them, but rather how well
they resonate with later generations of interpreters.145
Several of the interpretations of al-Tabarī and his peers go on to become
widespread in later exegeses. The two most popular exegeses, with 21 citations each (or
44% of the exegeses) define the degree as men’s inheritance and husbands’ maintenance
of their wives, as mentioned above. 36% of exegeses cited Ibn ‘Abbās’s beautification
hadīth (“I like to make myself beautifulfor my wife…”). Other popular explanations
were that the degree consists in jihād (36%), the dowry (38%), women’s obedience
(23%), men’s command (imāra) (19%), men’s rationality (19%), or each member of the
couple’s right to sex (19%). Explanations cited in 10-14% of exegeses, were that the
degree consists in men’s beards, status (manzila), the fact that they are able to witness in
more situations than women, or their greater part in blood money (if a man is killed).
The interpretation taken by al-Tabarī himself, that of Ibn ‘Abbās, who said that women
should be forgiven some of their duties, was cited in 6 subsequent exegeses (12 %); so
was a reference to the Prophet’s Farewell Pilgrimage oration which states that men
should “be God-fearing in your treatment of women.” However, in al-Tabarī’s time, it is
worth noting that the whole Pilgrimage oration is not quoted. Less cited is an explanation
which is not in the Farewell Pilgrimage Oration, stating that women should be God-
fearing in their treatment of men.
Some explanations from this period receive very few citations, or are not even
mentioned in later generations. Ibn Wahb’s statement that men owe women service is
only cited one other time in this study, and he was the only one to mention that women
have respect (hurma) by their husbands. Likewise, al-Zajjāj was the only exegete in this
study to say that men correct women through their guardianship, although as mentioned

145
The percentages here are the percent of exegetes after the early period who took this interpretation, not
the percent of exegetes in this sample in total.

71
above his opinion that both men and women have the right to sex was quoted by 19% of
subsequent sources; several of these mention al-Zajjāj as their source. Thus one part of
his interpretation is cited (the part which states that both members of the couple have a
right to sex) and the other part (which states that men correct women) is almost always
left out.
Goldziher characterizes al-Tabarī as the culmination of tradition, and the starting
point for all future exegesis.146 It is true that his exegesis changed the face of the genre,
and it is probable that many subsequent exegetes read al-Tabarī’s work. Yet patterns of
citation reveal that they do not always agree with him or even cite the early
interpretations which he cites. Only two other exegetes (4%) mention that women should
obey in those matters in which God has commanded obedience, a statement which would
seem to limit the extent of women’s obedience; likewise, only two other exegeses cite his
opinion that men’s degree is connected to behavior. His preference, that the verse is
really about divorce, and that divorced women’s husbands must only take their wives
back if they sincerely desire reconciliation, is only cited in three subsequent works.
Al-Tabarī’s own views seem to carry little weight. His belief that the “degree” is
prescriptive, rather than descriptive, goes un-remarked by the vast majority of subsequent
exegetes. Just as with all works throughout the history of exegesis, al-Tabarī is quoted
selectively; his selection of exegeses should not be seen as an ultimate determiner of the
shape of commentaries in subsequent generations. In fact, it seems from the study of
these verses that no one exegete or work of exegesis fulfilled that role.

2.4 The use of hadīths in exegesis between al-Tabarī and al-Wāhidī

Exegeses after al-Tabarī focus increasingly on why Q2:228 says what it does,
rather than just what the verse says and means. Detailed explanations emerge, which
means citation of complex rationales to explain the verse. These include longer hadīths
attributed to the Prophet and grammatical, physical, and natural explanations for men’s

146
Goldziher describes al-Tabarī’s exegesis thus: “On the one hand, the culmination of traditional exegesis,
and on the other hand, the starting-point and main reference work of exegetic literature. While
summarizing the former in a final manner, this work also carries the seed of an endeavour to go beyond a
merely enumerating exegesis” (Ignaz Goldziher, Schools of Koranic Commentators, 56).

72
and women’s place in marriage.147 As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,
such developments represent increasingly sophisticated methods in writing tafsīr, but the
result is significant development of its content.
In this section I will focus on the use of hadīths attributed to the Prophet. I show
that “authenticity” (discussed below) was not the only, or even the major, factor in hadīth
citation in most exegeses of Q2:228. Rather, I argue, content played a part in which
hadīths were cited by exegetes of all ages. It is important to understand exactly how the
authoritative source of the hadīth was selectively cited by the exegetes in order to
construct their interpretations. This strengthens the argument that, although hadīths may
have had an effect on exegetes’ views, nevertheless as a corpus they cannot be considered
to be the origin of exegesis. Rather, certain hadīths are selected which make sense to the
exegetes, given their own circumstances.
The question of authenticity is central to much discussion of hadīths. By
“authenticated” hadīths, I mean those hadīths that are found in the “Six Books” of hadīth
collections.148 The “Six Books” came, over time, to be considered the most reliable
hadīth collections. But the reality of which hadīths were “authentic” in the period under
consideration was not as cut and dried as it seems from today’s perspective. Jonathan
A.C. Brown writes that even al-Bukhārī’s and Muslim’s two collections did not become
canonical until the 11th century.149 And despite the “sahīh movement” (that is, the
movement towards authentification of hadīths and the compilation of books of
authenticated collections, such as those of al-Bukhārī and Muslim), “the personal
collection of hadīths expanded.”150 In other words, individual scholars kept accumulating
hadīths even after al-Bukhārī and Muslim’s were regarded as canonical collections.
Brown’s analysis is borne out by evidence in this and other chapters. Exegetes such as
al-Jassās and al-Tha‘labī seemed to feel little need to verify the authenticity of the hadīths

147
Although pre-modern scholars refer to all early authoritative statements as hadīths, I use this term only
to refer to the sayings of the Prophet (unless otherwise noted).
148
In order to determine which hadīths are in the “Six books,” I have used an online database,
www.almuhaddith.org. In the cases where I wish to undertake a detailed analysis of the text of the hadīths,
I have gone to the books themselves.
149
See Jonathan Brown, Canonization, especially Chapter 7. As he says, “By the end of the fifth/eleventh
century, the Sahīhayn had become synonymous with authenticity in Sunni discussions of the Prophet’s
legacy as well as an exemplum of excellence in hadīth scholarship” (Brown, Canonization, 320).
150
Ibid., 72.

73
they cite: it seems to be more important for them to include something that the Prophet
might have said than to be sure that he actually said it. As I will show in a later section,
certain later exegetes, such as al-Baghawī and Ibn Kathīr, used only hadīths from
canonical collections; but not every exegete followed their lead. As a general rule, later
exegetes who have been understood to write a tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr used authenticated
hadīths, whereas the authors of tafsīr bi’l-ra’y did not seem as concerned with using
solely authenticated hadīths.
The exegetes in this period who use the largest number of hadīths to explain verse
2:228 are al-Jassās (d. 370/981) and al-Tha‘labī (d. 427/1035). They cite a mix of
authenticated hadīths found in the six books and non-authenticated hadīths, although al-
Jassās’s hadīths are more often authentic than not. Often, one long hadīth will actually
be a mix of several shorter ones, and even when these hadīths are found in authenticated
collections the wording is often slightly different from the “authentic” version.151 These
factors indicate that within this genre, hadīth citation is not an exact science at this time:
getting the gist of the hadīth seems to be more important than quoting its exact wording.
To start with al-Jassās, in addition to the school-based focus, his work exhibits
methods different from earlier works of tafsīr.152 One is the great number of hadīths he
includes. He also pauses at appropriate moments to include chapters (bābs) on different
subjects, such as the “Chapter on the rights of the husband over the wife and the wife
over the husband,” which appears at his exegesis of Q2:228. The widespread use of
hadīths and the chapters entitled “bāb” on certain subjects are both methods adopted by
al-Tha‘labī, who died 54 years after al-Jassās and wrote a work of Tafsīr (not an Ahkām
al-Qur’ān as al-Jassās did). It is unclear whether al-Tha‘labī’s methods were influenced
by al-Jassās.

151
This makes identification somewhat difficult; in each case I searched the collections using a number of
different terms in the hadīth.
152
It is unusual for later exegetes to attribute opinions to al-Jassās (whereas, for instance, they do attribute
opinions to al-Zajjāj, al-Tabarī, and others), so it is possible that al-Jassās’s work was not a source for later
works of exegesis. If this is true, it could be because al-Jassās’s work, as an Ahkām al-Qur’ān, is on the
boundary between a law book and a book of tafsīr, and thus may not have been seen as a source for works
of tafsīr. It is organized like a typical exegesis, in “chained” (musalsal) style. However, ahkām al-Qur’ān
works are school-based accounts of the rulings associated with each verse in the Qur’ān: they are not meant
to portray the range of exegeses but rather to give the school’s opinion of the rulings associated with the
verses. Yet the ahkām al-Qur’ān works of the later authors Ibn al-‘Arabī and al-Qurtubī go on to be widely
cited, and later exegetes mention them by name.

74
 Though he is not often named as a source, his hadīths develop ideas about the
rights of wives and husbands in a manner well represented in later works. Some of these
hadīths assert men’s physical rights over their wives. For instance, he quotes a line from
the Prophet’s Farewell Pilgrimage Oration about striking women and says that this is one
of men’s rights over women.153 Further hadīths assert men’s right to keep women
indoors, and emphasize the link between women’s obedience to husbands and their
piousness:
A woman came to the Prophet and said, “O Messenger of God, what is the right
of a husband over his wife?” He responded that she should not give alms with
anything from his house without his permission, for if she did so, he would have
the reward and she would be punished. [Or] she said, “Oh Messenger of God,
what is the right of a husband over his wife?” and he responded, “She must not
leave the house except with his permission, nor should she fast even for one day
without his permission.”154

These hadīths (really two versions of the same hadīth) assert men’s physical domination
over women: they have rights over women’s bodies and behavior. Before al-Jassās, no
interpretations of this verse mention men’s right to keep women in their houses, nor their
right to prevent their wives from undertaking supererogatory religious performances.
Again, there is a sharp contrast between the exegetical and legal sources on the issue of
seclusion; although men’s right to seclude women had not yet appeared in exegeses of
these verses, according to Ali it is a legal doctrine from an early age, which would have
been taken for granted by most exegetes.155 A version of this hadīth is cited in the two
major hadīth collections of Muslim and Bukhārī, as well as several minor collections,
although it is only cited by two subsequent exegetes in this study. However, direct
citation of the hadīth may not have been necessary for its content to affect interpretation:
three additional exegetes state that a part of men’s degree is that wives are not allowed to
engage in supererogatory religious performances without their permission.
In the above hadīth, women’s obedience to their husbands is more meritorious
than supererogatory religious performance, and will result in their heavenly reward:

153
This will be discussed fully below; the line in question is, “if they do that [allow strangers into the
house] then hit them without inflicting serious harm,” (al-Jassās, Ahkām, v. 1, 443).
154
Al-Jassās, Ahkām, v. 1, 443.
155
Kecia Ali, Money, Sex, and Power, says that confinement (habs) is one of the husbands’ rights over
wives in marriage. See her Chapter 2, “Sex, Maintenance, and Recalcitrance,” 169-231.

75
obedience actually becomes a religious performance. Al-Jassās goes on to cite other
hadīths in which religious duty and wifely duty are linked. The following passage
consists of a number of short hadīths.
It has been narrated on the authority of the Prophet… “it is not allowed for one
human to prostrate himself before another, but if it were allowed, women would
have to prostrate themselves before their husbands…” The Messenger of God
said, “If a man calls his wife to his bed, and she refuses, and he remains angry at
her, then the angels will curse her until morning…”
A woman came to the Prophet, who asked her if she was married. She responded,
“Yes,” and he asked her, “how are you with him?”
She answered, “I will do anything for him, unless I am incapable of it.”
He said, “Be aware of how you stand with him, for he will be your heaven or your
hell.”156

In the first hadīth, a woman’s relationship to her husband is likened to a man’s

relationship to God; because of husbands’ God-like status vis-à-vis their wives, women
must obey their commands just as men obey God’s commands. In the second, women’s
refusal to come to bed results in their being cursed by angels: sexual availability is
directly linked to piety. A final hadīth says that a husband’s feelings about his wife will
affect her fate in the afterlife; in this case the woman’s actions are given less weight than
the man’s feelings. In an article on wifely obedience, Kecia Ali comments on the link
between a wife’s obedience to her husband and to God. Although obedience to God is
always put before obedience to husband, as she so eloquently puts it: “Only if what her
husband asks her is ma‘siya [sinful disobedience] may she refuse him. Otherwise, her
failure to obey itself becomes ma‘siya, sinful disobedience.”157
These hadīths all appear in Sahīh collections. Women prostrating themselves
before their husbands, which is the most popular hadīth in subsequent works of exegesis,
is in one major collection (Abū Dāwūd) and some minor collections; five subsequent
exegetes cite this hadīth. That hadīth had twice the number of citations as the cursing
angels hadīth, despite the fact that the latter is in both Muslim and al-Bukhārī (the
Sahīhayn), and some more minor collections. The husband being his wife’s heaven and

156
Al-Jassās, Ahkām, v. 1,445.
157
Ali, forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Women in Islamic Cultures, “Religious Practices: Obedience
and Disobedience in Islamic Discourses.” She goes on to say “While ma‘siya typically refers to sinful
disobedience to God, through an interpretive maneuver it is made to come full circle: God has ordained that
women must obey their husbands, and thus disobedience (nushūz) to one’s husband is sinful disobedience
(ma‘siya) to God.”

76
hell is in Mālik’s Muwatta’; it is not cited in the subsequent exegeses of this verse
covered in this study.
In the above hadīths, the tone towards women is threatening. In the generation
after al-Jassās, al-Tha‘labī (d. 427/1035) quotes several hadīths which, while affirming
the need for the wife’s obedience to her husband, nevertheless focus on her heavenly
rewards, rather than her punishment. One remarkable hadīth touches on a range of
subjects from the virgins of paradise to the wife’s opinion of her husband affecting his
heavenly reward. This hadīth is worth quoting in full.
Maymūna, the wife of the Prophet, said the Messenger of God said, “The best of
men in my community (umma) are those who are best to their wives, and the best
of women in my community are those who are best to their husbands. Every day
and night the reward of a patient and God-fearing woman is that of a thousand
martyrs killed in the path of God, and the superiority (fadl) of one of them over
the virgins of paradise (hūr al-‘ayn) is like my preference over any man among
you. The best women in my community are those who follow the path of their
husbands in everything that they wish except if they ask them to do something
that contradicts God’s laws; the best of men in my community are those who are
gentle towards their families with the gentleness of a mother to her son. Each day
and night, the reward of one hundred martyrs killed in the path of God will be
recorded for each patient and God-fearing man from among them.”158

In this portion of the hadīth, women and men are put on equal footing in one sense: the
best citizens of the Prophet’s community are women who are good to their husbands and
men who are good to their wives, and they each receive the same heavenly reward for
their virtuous behavior. Thus, whereas most exegetes mention jihād as one of the rights
that men have and women don’t (including it as a part of men’s degree over women), in
this hadīth, women and men who are good to each other are rewarded more than warriors
in the jihād. In this way, women are able to access the heavenly rewards reserved for
martyrs.
One aspect of men’s heavenly reward is that they are given virgins of paradise,
which is not among women’s rewards. However, in this hadīth women are assured that
they are preferred over those virgins in the same way that Muhammad is preferred over
normal men. Furthermore, even men’s goodness is measured by using women as an
example: the best of men has “the gentleness of a mother to her son.” This initial

158
Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 2, 172.

77
statement of women’s rights raises a question, which is addressed in the second half of
this lengthy hadīth. In this passage the gender hierarchy is clearly articulated.
‘Umar b. al-Khattāb said, “O Messenger of God, how will women’s reward be
that of one thousand martyrs and men’s reward be that of [only] one hundred
martyrs?”
The Prophet responded “Do you not know that [some] women will receive a
greater reward than men, and a better hereafter, and that God, Blessed and
Exalted, will raise a man up in paradise above his ranking (lit: degrees above his
degrees) because of his wife being pleased with him and because of her entreaties
on his behalf? Do you not know that the greatest punishment after that for
polytheism is for the woman who cheats on her husband? Are you not God-
fearing in your treatment of the weak? For God will ask you about these two: the
orphans and the women, and whoever is the best to them has thereby reached God
and pleased Him, and whoever is worst to them deserves God’s displeasure.
The rights of husbands over wives are like my rights over you [believers];
whoever causes me to lose my rights [through disobedience] has caused God to
lose his; and whoever has caused God to lose his rights has brought upon himself
the displeasure of God, and his end is Hell and his destiny is hopeless.”159

In the second half of the hadīth, the Prophet explains that good women may receive
greater rewards than men; in other words, rewards in the afterlife are not connected to
sex, but rather to an individual’s good deeds. Yet despite the fact that some women can
receive even greater rewards than men, men still provide the sole context for women’s
rewards; it is obedience to the husband, regardless of his piousness, that may place
women above men in heaven. Whereas women in the first half of the hadīth are
compared to the Prophet, in the second half, men are – their rights over their wives are as
great as the Prophet’s rights over his people. And whichever woman disobeys her
husband, “causing him to lose his rights,” has also disobeyed the Prophet and God. The
result of not fulfilling the husband’s rights is bad news for women: Hell and
hopelessness. Therefore, the hadīth, which started out by putting the “best men” and the
“best women” on almost equal footing ends up reinforcing the gender hierarchy. By
making obedience to men the sole path to women’s salvation, men stand between women
and any heavenly reward they might eventually receive.
A fragment of the beginning of this hadīth (“the best of men is the best to his
women,”) has a version in one major collection (al-Tirmidhī) as well as several minor
collections; the remainder of the hadīth, both first and second parts, is not in any hadīth
159
Ibid., v. 2, 172-3.

78
collection that I searched. The full version as quoted above is not cited by subsequent
exegetes, except Abū’l-Futūh Rāzī (d. 525/1131), an Imāmī whose exegesis of 2:228 is
an almost exact translation of al-Tha‘labī’s tafsīr of the same verse, including at least one
of the women’s jihād hadīths; quoting from the Abū’l-Futūh text here would simply be
redundant.160 The translation is so literal that at times it renders the Persian text
unidiomatic.161
Whereas in these sources obedience to husbands provides the sole context for
women’s rewards, men are eligible for other types of rewards, not just those associated
with being good to their families.162 For instance, at this time it was common in tafsīr to
include the jihād amongst a list of men’s other rights over women; this seems to be
widely viewed as one of the ways that men could achieve a reward inaccessible to
women, who do not have jihād.

Al-Tha‘labī cites this opinion, but then contradicts it by citing a hadīth which says
that women do have jihād: patience and obedience. By quoting the Prophet on the
subject of women’s jihād, al-Tha‘labī is introducing the greater authority of the Prophetic
saying in order to contradict the already well-established precedent of an early exegete.

And men have a degree over them of superiority (fadl).

Ibn ‘Abbās says, “with the dowry he spends on her, and his maintenance of her.”
And it is said, in rationality; it is also said, in inheritance, and “by the degree”.
And Qatāda says, “in jihād.”163
On the authority of Abū Ja‘far Muhammad b. ‘Alī, on the authority of Jābir b.
‘Abd Allāh, he said, “While we were with the Messenger and a group of his
Companions, a woman came so close that she nearly stood on his head, saying,
‘Peace be upon you, O Messenger of God. I am a delegate to you from the
women, and no woman heard of my coming to see you without being delighted by
it, O Messenger of God. Indeed, God is the Lord of men and the Lord of women,
and Adam is the father of men and the father of women, and Eve is the mother of

160
Walid Saleh has already noted that al-Tha‘labī’s tafsīr was used by Imāmī authors, and that this may be
one reason for Ibn Taymīya’s disapproval of him. Abū’l-Futūh does not copy al-Tha‘labī’s tafsīr of the
other verses in this study; his exegesis of these verses were simply translations of the Arabic text into
Persian, the language in which he wrote his tafsīr.
161
My thanks to Behnam Sadeki for confirming this impression.
162
This is partially due to the type of source that I am examining here – there are surely rewards for
praying, fasting, and so forth, but these rewards are not mentioned in the exegesis of the verses which have
to do with the relations between husbands and wives.
163
Although al-Tha‘labī quotes Qatāda as saying that the jihād is the provenance of men, other sources,
such as al-Māwardī and al-Tabarī, attribute this opinion to Mujāhid. Later, al-Tabrisī (d. 548/1153)
attributes the opinion to both Mujāhid and Qatāda.

79
 men and the mother of women. So why is it that when men go out (kharajū) in
the path of God and are killed, they will live with their Lord and be rewarded, and
when they go out, the matter is as I say, but we women are confined by them, and
we serve them (nakhdumuhum) – so do we receive any reward at all?’
The Prophet said, ‘Yes, greet the women and say to them that their obedience to
their husbands and recognition of their rights will [have a result] equal to the
husbands’ reward, although few of you do it.’164

There is a real sense of injustice in this woman’s question to the Prophet. She reminds
him first that men and women are spiritually equal: all sons and daughters of Adam and
Eve, all followers of the Prophet. So why is it, she asks, that men are rewarded for going
out of the house when women are ordered to stay indoors? The Prophet’s answer is that
women are promised a reward equal to that of their husbands for all of their hard work
within the house – which seems to be a nod to women’s spiritual equality with men. But
the hierarchy between the sexes is re-established as the Prophet reminds her that most
women are unlikely to achieve it.
In this and other women’s jihād hadīths quoted by al-Tha‘labī, men’s ability to be
rewarded for going out of the house is a source of some anxiety for women.165 They are,
nevertheless, able to go out themselves, to see the Prophet and to be among his male
companions.
This hadīth is not in any major works; it appears in the collection of al-Hāfiz al-
Haythamī. It does not reappear in exegetical works other than that of Abū’l-Futūh Rāzī.
Perhaps because these hadīths are not authenticated, they do not become incorporated
into subsequent works of exegesis nor do they have any effect on the content of
subsequent exegeses. Jihād remains firmly within the tradition as an aspect of men’s
degree over women: 36% of exegetes in total cited it, and 35% of the exegetes who came
after al-Tha‘labī: his citation of these hadīths seem to have had no impact whatsoever on
the trajectory of the citation of jihād as an aspect of men’s superiority over women.

164
Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 2, 173.
165
“It is established (thābit) on the authority of Anas that he said: “The women came to the Messenger of
God and they said, ‘Oh Messenger of God, men achieve superiority (al-fadl) by undertaking jihād in the
path of God, and we do not have anything equivalent to this work in the path of God.’ ….“It was asked, ‘is
jihād obligatory for women?’ And Muhammad said, ‘Yes. Their jihād is different, they strive within
themselves, and if they are patient then they are jihād fighters (mujāhidāt). If they are patient then they are
persevering (murābitāt), and they will have double the rewards,’” (Ibid., v. 2, 173). I could not find these
hadīths in any collection. Ibn Taymīya also quotes a women’s jihād hadīth: see the Conclusion.

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 Al-Tha‘labī was later accused of not including reliable hadīths in his work, and
indeed the subsequent popularity (or lack thereof) of al-Tha‘labī’s hadīths seems at first
to be based on how well authenticated his hadīths are, as in the case of the jihād hadīths
above. But a closer look reveals that the content of hadīths also plays into how much
they were cited after al-Tha‘labī’s time.166 The most popular hadīth cited by al-Tha‘labī
concerns the rights of women: women have rights to food, clothing, and not to be hit in
the face; rights which are specific and circumscribed. This hadīth is cited by seven
subsequent exegetes, and is present in Abū Dāwūd, which is one of the six major hadīth
collections. Another hadīth mentioned above, “the best of men is the best to his wives”,
which calls for generally good behavior towards women, has a version cited in al-
Tirmidhī (one of the Six Books) as well as in several minor hadīth collections.167 Yet
this hadīth has only two citations subsequent to al-Tha‘labī. Although both of these
hadīths were cited in one of the six books, only one of them went on to be well-cited
among exegetes.
Reliable attestation is thus not the sole criterion for a hadīth’s staying power in
this period. Al-Wāhidī, the student of al-Tha‘labī, did not quote the hadīths cited by his
teacher, but did quote a more elaborate version of one of the hadīths cited by al-Jassās.
Although al-Jassās’s version is well attested, appearing in the Sahīh of Muslim, the
version quoted by al-Wāhidī is only in minor collections.168
A woman from the tribe of Khath‘am came to the Prophet and said, “O
Messenger of God, I am a widow. Tell me: what are the rights of husbands over
their wives? If I am able to bear it, I will remarry; otherwise, I will remain as I
am.” He replied, “The right of husbands over wives is that if they ask to have sex
with their wives, even if the wives are on the back of a camel, they must not
refuse them access to themselves. Some of husbands’ other rights are that wives
must not undertake a voluntary fast except with their husbands’ permission; if

166
Ibn Taymīya says: “In tafsīr, there are many fabricated hadīths, for instance the hadīths narrated by al-
Tha‘labī, al-Wāhidī, and al-Zamakhsharī concerning the merits of the sūras of the Qur’ān, which appear in
each sūra. The scholars agree that these hadīths are fabricated. As a man, al-Tha‘labī was good, and
pious. But he was like someone who gathers firewood at night [i.e., indiscriminate]: he copied whatever he
found in books of tafsīr, whether authenticated, weak, or fabricated. Al-Wāhidī, his companion, was more
discerning than him in his use of the Arabic language, but his writings are [even] less safe, and he was
further from the example of the salaf. Al-Baghawī’s tafsīr is a summary of al-Tha‘labī’s, but he protected
his tafsīr from fabricated hadīths and innovative opinion,” (Ibn Taymīya, Al-Muqaddima, 19).
167
This hadīth is found in different variations in several collections, including the Musnad of Ahmad ibn
Hanbal, and the Sunnan of Tirmidhī.
168
Majma‘, by Hāfiz al-Haymanī; al-Hāfiz al-‘Irāqī Ahādīth al-ihyā’, and Suyūtī (who died long after al-
Wāhidī).

81
 they do, the reward will not go to them, but instead they will be punished for it. It
is among the husbands’ rights that wives not leave the house without their
permission, and if they do the angels of the sky, the angels of the earth, the angels
of mercy and the angels of vengeance will curse them.169

In this hadīth, sex is the primary purpose of marriage; a corollary of men’s rights over
their wives’ bodies is that the wives must not leave the house, lest their husbands want
them in their absence. Perhaps because it is not well attested, this hadīth was not
destined to become very popular in exegetical works.
Although citation in this period was not necessarily related to a hadīth’s
authenticity, nevertheless authenticity seems to play some part in whether a hadīth was
subsequently popular. The non-authentic hadīths from these exegeses were not often
cited in later works. But just because a hadīth appears in a work of exegesis and in one
of the six books, that does not guarantee it a place in the exegetical tradition. Among the
authenticated hadīths, two had great popularity, whereas one did not - the two which
were popular encouraged certain specific behaviors towards women and the one which
was not was an inducement towards general kindness.

2.5 Grammar and common sense in exegeses between al-Tabarī and al-Wāhidī
The use of the hadīth introduced several themes into exegesis. Grammatical
analysis of the words of the verse provides another set of themes, highlighting the
physical differences between men and women. A man’s beard is the only physical
rationale which early exegetes cite to explain this verse; in this period the discourse on
men’s physical superiority becomes much better developed.
After introducing the verse with a variety of widely-cited rationales, Shaykh al-
Tā’ifa Abū Ja‘far al-Tūsī (d. 460/1067) centers his argument on the root letters for the
word “man” (r-j-l), focusing on the linguistic connection between masculinity and certain
types of strength; thus the argument is both linguistic and related to physical
characteristics. The incorporation of grammar into exegesis is widely practiced at this
time, though this is the first instance that I encountered this particular explanation.
You may say man (rajul) is distinguished by masculinity (rujūla), i.e., strength
(quwwa), and [one says] that he is the more manly of the two (arjaluhumā), i.e.,

169
Al-Wāhidī, al-Wasīt, v. 1, 334-5.

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 the stronger or the two. A rajīl horse (faras rajīl) is [an expression which refers
to] strength in walking, and the leg (rijl) is characterized by its strength in
walking. [One says] a swarm of locusts (rijl min al-jarād) or a detached number,
which resembles a leg (rijl) because it is part of the whole. The pedestrian (rājil)
is the one who walks on his feet (rijlayhi). Extemporizing a speech (irtijāl al-
kalām) is called extemporizing (irtijāl) because it means gaining the upper hand
over those who cannot master their thoughts, nor their speech…170

This same account occurs, with slight variations and several omissions, in al-Basīt by al-
Wāhidī (d. 468/1075).
It is said that man (rajul) is distinguished by going on foot (al-rujla), i.e.,
strength, and [one says] “he is the more manly of the two men (arjal al-rajulayn)”
i.e., the stronger of the two. A rajīl horse (faras rajīl) is [an expression which
refers to] strength in walking, and the leg (rijl) is characterized by its strength in
walking. Extemporizing a speech (irtijāl al-kalām) means gaining the upper hand
by mastery of thought and speech…171

Given that al-Tūsī and al-Wāhidī lived at the same time, dying only eight years apart, it
seems likely that these two quotations have a common source in a lexicographical work;
less likely is the possibility that one of these authors copied from the other during his
lifetime.172 If one of them did copy from the other, it would have been al-Wāhidī, as his
passage is the less complete of the two.173
While al-Wāhidī and al-Tūsī use linguistic analysis to emphasize men’s strength,
the Sūfī al-Qushayrī does not use the backup of grammar when speaking of women’s
weakness. Instead, he seems to refer to legal maxims and to the widely-held opinions, or
common sense, of the time:
Since men have rights over their wives due to the fact that they maintain them,
wives have a right to servants if their circumstances permit it. And men have a

170
Al-Tūsī, al-Tibyān, v. 3, 354.
171
Al-Wāhidī, al-Basīt, MS Nurosmanye, fol. 236, p. 307.
172
Part of this passage is quoted by Ibn Manzūr: wa-hādhā arjal al-rajulayn ay ashadduhuma; whereas part
of this discussion is attributed to Ibn al-A‘rābī, the source of this part is unclear. Ibn Manzūr, “rā’-jīm-
lām,” Lisān al-‘Arab, v. 5, 155.
173
This sheds doubt on the view of Walid Saleh, “Al-Basīt represents the first attempt in tafsīr to get
beyond the crisis facing quranic exegesis by charting a more thorough philological reading of the text. This
is the first explicit refusal of the mainstream solution, the encyclopedic approach pioneered by al-Tabarī
and perfected and popularized by al-Tha‘labī” (“The last of the Nishapurī School of Tafsīr: al-Wāhidī (d.
468/1076) and his Significance in the History of Quranic Exegesis” forthcoming in the Journal of the
American Oriental Society).

83
 degree over them in superiority (fadīla); and women have a surplus of weakness
and human incapability (‘ajz basharīya).174

It is still somewhat rare to cite physical and mental explanations for this verse in this
period. Of the 16 exegetes analyzed here between al-Tabarī and al-Zamakhsharī, only
three cite rationality as a factor in men’s degree over women.

Summary: new exegeses after al-Tabarī

In this period, as in every period, early exegeses continue to be cited. New
exegeses after al-Tabarī include: that the degree is man’s right of divorce or his right of
return after divorce; that it is the man’s guardianship of the woman; and that men have
better judgment/opinions (ra’y) than women. Some new exegeses go on to become fairly
popular, particularly that the degree is men’s guardianship (qiyām) of women, which was
cited by 8 exegetes in this sample; an additional 13 exegetes cite Q4:34 (saying that men
are qawwāmūn over women), which was often used to explain men’s degree over women
and their guardianship of them.
The two major developments in this time were the increased use of hadīths
attributed to the Prophet and a number of physical and grammatical explanations of
men’s superiority. In hadīth citation, al-Jassās, al-Tha‘labī and al-Wāhidī all cited
reliable hadīths, which were attested in the Six Books, and unreliable hadīths, which
were only attested in more minor works or, at least in al-Tha‘labī’s case, were not
attested at all. Whereas their unauthenticated hadīths had a fairly short shelf-life, and
were not much cited over time, the authenticated hadīths were not so easily predictable:
some were nearly ignored in later ages, others were well cited. Content could be a factor
in whether a reliable hadīth enjoyed later popularity: the hadīth which promises reward to
men who are good to their wives is not widely cited in later sources; the popular hadīths
respectively list women’s limited rights (to be fed, clothed, and not hit in the face), and
emphasize their inferior status by saying that if any humans were ordered to prostrate
themselves before others, women would be ordered to prostrate themselves before their
husbands.

174
Al-Qushayrī, Latā’if al-‘Ishārāt, v. 1, 193. Although ‘ajz is a word in the masculine, basharīya is in the
feminine, which could indicate corruption in the text.

84
 Women’s innate physical inferiority was also cited in sources of this period. The
use of the nearly identical paragraph speaking of the root letters of the word “man”
highlights the similarity between works of different schools of law for this verse: al-Tūsī
is an Imāmī and al-Wāhidī is a Shāfi‘ī. In most cases in this period, the school of law of
a particular source is not at all discernible from his exegesis of this verse. All branches of
Sunnīs and Imāmīs have very similar views on the issue of men’s and women’s roles;
deviations, such as that of al-Tha‘labī, are not because of school (al-Tha‘labī was a
Shāfi‘ī like his student al-Wāhidī), but rather because of an exegete’s personal choice of
which materials to include in his exegesis.

2.6 After al-Wāhidī: a divide between conversational and formal tafsīr

Many developments take place in the content, style, and methods of exegeses of
this period. Stylistically, some exegeses maintain formality while others assume a
somewhat conversational tone. The first group begins to use only authenticated hadīths
from one of the six books; some of these exegeses, such as that of Ibn Kathīr, have been
called tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr by subsequent commentators. Those exegetes who take a more
conversational tone often modify the earliest exegeses by explaining them in previously
unheard-of ways. Many of these exegeses, such as that of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, have
been called tafsīr bi’l-ra’y.175
Content tends to focus increasingly on women’s behavior and status. In this
period, al-Zamakhsharī cites customary practice as an acceptable source for tafsīr. Seen
in light of the conversational tone of some tafsīr of this period, it seems to be that certain
exegetes felt the need to address the current concerns of an audience who might
potentially be instructed in these works or benefit from them.

Increasing focus on women’s behavior and status in the “conversational” tafsīr

The exegesis of Sūrābādī (d. 494/1101) shows developments both in content and
style. In terms of style, he writes in Persian, and frames his exegesis as a question-and-

175
Although the correlation between the use of authenticated hadīths and the label of ma’thūr is interesting
to note, accurately assessing the accuracy of the labels tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr or tafsīr bi’l-ra’y is not the
project of this dissertation; as I mentioned in the introduction, the labels do not actually mean that one type
of exegesis is only opinion and the other is only transmitted hadīths.

85
answer. Thus his exegesis seems to be more user-friendly to an audience of Persian
speakers, and it demonstrates the lack of formality which probably characterized
exegetical question and answer sessions between a learned ‘ālim and his audience.176 He
says that men’s “degree” is not that they have more rights than women, but that their
rights are different.
Question: Why did God first say that women have rights like those of men, and
then afterwards that men have a degree over them – isn’t the husband’s elevated
status a contradiction [of the first part of the verse]?
The answer is that men have a degree over them, but not in terms of [their having
more] rights [than women]: they say that this is superior rationality (‘aql), they
say that men have the duty to pay the dowry (haqq-i kāwīn), and they say that this
is the right of mastery, as in the verse “men are qawwamūn over women.”
[Emphasis mine].177

Sūrābādī claims that men and women have equal rights, but that they are of different
types. The “degree” refers to an inherent quality which distinguishes men from women
(rationality) and to the fact that men’s payment of the dowry, and their qiwāma, gives
them mastery over women. He goes on to explain what men’s and women’s rights are.
As for the rights of women over men, they have four: to companionship, to
maintenance, to be taught the good (ta‘līm-e khayr), and to be kept according to
custom or released in kindness. Men have five rights over women: to obedience,
self-control, modesty, [physical] pleasure, and honesty.”178

The emphasis on men educating women is typical of this period, and is an important
aspect of the patriarchal discourse: like a parent, husbands are responsible for their wives
both physically and spiritually. Men’s responsibility for educating women may be a
corollary of their right to keep women indoors, which is also emphasized in texts of this
period. Men are free to go out as they choose: thus, they are able to earn money and
become better educated than women. This is one symptom of the regulation of everyday
behavior, which is an ongoing theme in these texts. Sūrābādī seeks to regulate behavior
by emphasizing that women must exercise self-control and modesty. This is more precise
than earlier exegetes’ directions to women to obey their husbands.

176
The pilgrim Ibn Jubayr (d. 613/1217) describes such question-and-answer sessions in the mosque. See
Ibn Jubayr, The travels of Ibn Jubayr, trans. R. J. C. Broadhurst, London: J. Cape, 1952, p. 228.
177
Sūrābādī, Tafsīr Sūrābādī, v. 1, 195-6.
178
Ibid., v. 1, 195.

86
 Al-Zamakhsharī takes this discourse to a new level by actually recommending
different household chores for each spouse, which earlier exegeses never do. I argue that
exegesis develops according to current societal norms and mores; al-Zamakhsharī is a
good example of an exegete who directly states that social practice can affect
interpretation. He does so by interpreting the term bi’l-ma‘rūf differently from any other
exegete: he says it is a reference to people’s customs, not to kindness:
Their rights are like their obligations it is necessary that women have rights over
men, like men’s necessary rights over them. Bi’l-ma‘rūf in a way that does not
contradict the customs of the people (‘ādāt al-nās) nor the law (sharī‘a). Women
should not ask men to fulfill duties that are not men’s obligations towards them,
nor should men ask women to fulfill duties that are not women’s obligations; nor
should either of the spouses treat the other harshly.179

The important point here is that he acknowledges that the Qur’ān, sunna of the Prophet,
and previous exegeses are not the only determinants of interpretation. This opens the
door to the possibility of change and development in interpretation according to
circumstance. Al-Zamakhsharī goes on to explain the results of paying attention to
people’s customs: different household roles for men and women.
The parallelism [legislated in the verse with the words women’s rights are like
their duties] is in terms of duties in their proper essence, not in the type of deed.
So, if wives wash their husband’s clothes, or bake for them, it is not necessary for
husbands to do the same; it is acceptable for them to do things that men do.180

Even though the particular customs he cites may have been universal, al-Zamakhsharī
was a well-traveled scholar who would have known that by citing custom as a basis for
interpretation he was opening the door to circumstance affecting and changing
interpretation. And his assertions seem to meet with no opposition from later exegetes,
several of whom cite his opinion.

Changes in hadīth citation: towards standardization.

While some exegetes seemed to take pains to reach out to the current concerns of
the potential audience for their works, others moved away from this model, instead

179
Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, v. 1, 272.
180
Ibid., v. 1, 272. The final part of al-Zamakhsharī’s exegesis reads: “and men have a degree over them
more rights, and superiority (fadīla). It is said that women can achieve what men can achieve in terms of
[sexual] pleasure (ladhdha), though men have superiority over them because of their guardianship (qiyām)
of women, and their spending in their interests,” (Ibid., v. 1, 272).

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seeking to more rigorously cite only previous interpretations and authenticated hadīths. I
demonstrated above that exegetes such as al-Jassās, al-Tha‘labī, and al-Wāhidī did not
bother too much about the authenticity of the hadīths they included in their exegeses.
This was considered to be a serious fault by certain learned men in later ages, such as Ibn
Taymīya. Almost a century after al-Tha‘labī’s death, al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122) made it
his goal to fix al-Tha‘labī’s tafsīr.
Ibn Taymīya, an early critic of many exegetes and most tafsīr, is nevertheless a
fan of al-Baghawī, saying that “al-Baghawī’s tafsīr is a summary of al-Tha‘labī’s, but he
immunized his tafsīr against fabricated hadīths and innovative opinions.”181 A
significant difference between these texts, and, one may surmise, an important part of al-
Baghawī’s “cleanup operation,” is that he provides complete chains of transmission for
his hadīths, something which al-Tha‘labī omits to do.182 Although he omits hadīths
which were included in al-Tha‘labī’s work, he only rarely adds hadīths to replace
them.183 The result is a significant change in content: al-Baghawī discards all of the
women’s jihād hadīths that had been cited by al-Tha‘labī.

181
Ibn Taymīya, al-muqaddima, 19; cf. Saleh, Formation, 209 n. 17: “A preliminary study points to the
fact that al-Baghawī removed surplusive philological arguments, sūfī material, and non-linguistic poetic
material. He seems to have augmented the Prophetic traditions, though not consistently. He also removed
the political material and removed traditions that were considered of flagrantly weak isnāds.”
182
As a comparison, for verse 4:34 there are several minor differences between the tafsīr of al-Tha‘labī and
al-Baghawī: for instance, al-Tha‘labī discusses and al-Baghawī omits the rules for retaliation between
spouses. The other differences are: al-Tha‘labī includes “it is said” before mentioning that women are
deficient in religion, whereas al-Baghawī simply states that they are; al-Tha‘labī includes and al-Baghawī
omits a Qur’ānic verse stating that women should stay in their houses; as with 2:228, al-Baghawī includes a
Prophetic hadīth stating that if any humans should bow before others, it would be wives before their
husbands – as with 2:228, this hadīth is omitted by al-Tha‘labī (al-Baghawī, Ma‘ālim al-tanzīl, v. 2, 206-8;
al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 3, 302-3). A non-authenticated hadīth in al-Tha‘labī, and unsurprisingly not in al-
Baghawī, states that any woman without a husband is wretched (miskīna), even if she is wealthy (al-
Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 3, 302-3). The most surprising omission by al-Baghawī in his exegesis of 4:34 is
certainly that of the Qur’ānic verse which says that women should stay in their houses, for tafsīr al-Qur’ān
bi’l-Qur’ān is a universally accepted method.
183
When he does seem to add interpretations not present in al-Tha‘labī, we cannot be sure that it is really
his addition, and not just an occasion where he was using a different version of al-Tha‘labī’s tafsīr than that
represented in the printed version available today, which is, as Saleh points out, deeply flawed and
unreliable. The hadīths cited by al-Tha‘labī are briefly noted here, with the ones also cited by al-Baghawī
marked by an asterisk (*). Al-Tha‘labī cites two hadīths that speak of men’s and women’s rights: women’s
rights are that her husband not hit her face, that he not insult her, that he feed her and clothe her, and not
leave her;* women should be treated well for they are like slaves in men’s protection;* one hadīth stating
that the “best of men in my community are the ones who are the best to their women”*, and that women’s
reward for being “patient and God-fearing” is the same as the reward of “ a thousand martyrs”; that man
should obey God with regards to the weak, who are defined as women and orphans; and that women’s
obedience to her husband is her jihād (al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 2, 172-3; al-Baghawī, Ma‘ālim al-Tanzīl, v.
1, 268-9).

88
 Although he cites only authenticated hadīths, al-Baghawī’s selection of hadīths is
not a predictor for how popular the hadīth will be in subsequent works of exegesis. As
noted above, the hadīth which states that “the best of men in my community is the best to
his women” is present in one of the six books, and thus it is included in al-Baghawī’s
work. However, it is cited only once after that, by the Imāmī Abū’l-Futūh Rāzī.
Al-Baghawī’s citation of the Prophet’s Farewell Pilgrimage Oration provides the
clearest example of the way his methods differ from those of the exegetes who preceded
him. Muhammad’s speech was quoted in part by several previous exegetes in a non-
authenticated form, which was the norm in works of exegesis. Below I trace the changes
in the way that this important hadīth was cited in the exegeses used in this study.
Al-Jassās (d. 370/980) was the first in my sample to cite the Farewell Pilgrimage
Oration. He says:
The Messenger of God gave a speech on ‘Arafāt, in which he said, “Be God-
fearing in your treatment of women, for you have taken them as a trust from God,
and sex with them has been made legal by the word of God. Your rights over
them are that they do not allow anyone to enter the house (lit: tread on your
carpets) whom you disapprove of; if they do that, then you may hit them without
causing severe pain. Their rights over you are to food and clothing according to
custom (bi’l-ma‘rūf).184
Tha‘labī’s version reads:
The Messenger of God said, “treat women well, for they are captives in your
protection, who don’t own anything for themselves. You have only taken them in
trust from God, and intercourse with them has been made legal by the word of
God.185
Al-Baghawī’s version, which is the same at that in Muslim’s Sahīh, reads:186
“Be God-Fearing in your treatment of women! Verily you have taken them as a
trust from God, and intercourse with them has been made lawful unto you by
God’s word. Your rights over them are that they not allow anyone to enter the
house (lit: tread on your carpets) whom you disapprove of; if they do, then strike
them without inflicting harm. Their rights over you are that you clothe them
according to custom. I have left you with the Book of God; if you cleave to it you
will not thereafter err. You will be asked about me on the day or judgment: what

184
al-Jassās, Ahkām al-Qur’ān, v. 1, 443.
185
al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 2, 172.
186
The 1993 version, published in Saudi Arabia, has one difference from this version; the text above is in
accord with the manuscripts and the 1857 printed edition. In the 1993 version, the first sentence was
augmented in the following manner: “Fear God concerning women, for they are your captives (fa-
innahunna ‘awānin ‘indakum), and you have taken them as a trust from God” (al-Baghawī, Ma‘ālim al-
tanzīl, v. 1, 269). The italicized words are not in the Sahīh Muslim version.

89
 will you say?” The listeners said, “we will testify that you have conveyed [the
message], guided [us truly], and offered sincere counsel.” He said, with his index
finger raised toward the sky and pointing at the crowd: “God bear witness” three
times.187

Al-Baghawī’s choice to write a work which corrects an earlier, unreliable, tafsīr and
which includes the authenticated versions of hadīths represents an important
methodological development in the exegeses of this age.
A similar phenomenon seems to occur in the Imāmī exegesis of al-Tabrisī (d.
549/1153). Whereas the earlier Imāmī exegete al-Tūsī had not included any specifically
Imāmī material in his exegesis of Q2:228, al-Tabrisī includes a hadīth found in an Imāmī
book of hadīths, Ibn Bābawayh’s Man lā yahduruh al-faqīh.188
Although it could be that al-Tabrisī wishes to include a sectarian element in his
tafsīr, this is not an exact parallel to the Sunnī sahīh movement: at first glance al-
Tabrisī’s work is difficult to distinguish from those of Sunnī exegetes.189 For instance, he
discusses and explains Ibn ‘Abbās’s interpretation, and seems to be using al-Tabarī’s
tafsīr as a model.190 In fact, a direct comparison with the work of the Sunnī al-Baghawī

187
Princeton MS Garrett MS #209b.
188
Al-Tabrisī’s version is almost the same as that in the book he quotes, Man lā yahduruh al-faqīh by Ibn
Bābawayh al-Sadūq; the latter has one phrase not included in al-Tabrisī’s work, which is below in bold.
Al-Tabrisī says: “In the book man lā yahduruh al-faqīh it is narrated on the authority of al-Bāqir (peace be
upon him): a woman came to the Messenger of God, peace be upon him and his family, and she said, “O
Messenger of God, what is the right of a husband over his wife?” He said to her, “That she obey him, and
not disobey, that she not give alms from her house except with his permission, that she not undertake a
supererogatory fast except with his permission, that she allow him to have sex with her, even if she is on
the back of a camel, and that she not leave the house except with his permission, for if she leaves without
his permission then the angels of the sky, the angels of the earth, the angels of anger, and the angels of
mercy, will curse her until she returns to the house.”
She said, “O messenger of God, who has the greatest rights over a man?”
He said, “His parents.”
She said, “Oh Messenger of God, what person has the greatest right over a woman?”
He said, “her husband.”
And she said, “I don’t have any rights over him like those that he has over me?”
He said, “No, and for every hundred [of his rights] you don’t [even] have one.”
So she said, “By God, no man will ever hold my neck [I will never marry!]”
He said, “If I were to order anyone to bow before another, I would order woman to bow before her
husband” (al-Tabrisī, Majma‘ al-Bayān, v. 2, 134; al-Sadūq, Man lā yahduruh al-faqīh, Najaf: Dār al-
Kutub al-Islāmīya, 1378/1958, v. 3, 277).
189
It is only fair to repeat that these verses are not be the best ones by which to judge doctrinal differences
between the Sunnīs and the Imāmīs; rather, due their practical nature, they are useful for understanding
what these two seemingly disparate groups had in common.
190
“It is said that the meaning [of men have a degree over them] is in status (manzila), [men’s
responsibility to] manage women magnanimously (al-akhdh ‘alayhā bi’l-fadl), which is why Ibn ‘Abbās
says, “I don’t like to take advantage of all of my rights over [my wife] so that I am superior to her (Al-

90
reveals many similarities, despite the fact that al-Baghawī seems to be a partisan of the
sahīh movement, and thus his work is in some way quintessentially Sunnī.191 And many
of al-Tabrisī’s interpretations which did not appear in al-Baghawī’s work appeared in
other Sunnī works.192 The extent of overlap between al-Tabrisī’s work and that of Sunnī
authors, even the sahīh-hadīth-heavy work of al-Baghawī, shows that for the Imāmī al-
Tabrisī, just as for al-Tūsī, using the same rationales as Sunnī authors was not
problematic: although he included certain sectarian elements, he did not seek to purge his
tafsīr of elements which were contained in Sunnī works. Below I will make a more
thorough comparison of this Imāmī work with the works of later Imāmīs, which shows
that in a later period certain Imāmī scholars eliminated Sunnī elements from their
exegeses, or revived a tradition of Imāmī interpretation not seen elsewhere in this study,
by only quoting Imāmī sources.
Although the changes made by al-Baghawī and al-Tabrisī do not have precendent
in this body of sources, they might be expected. Such modifications represent an attempt
to clean up a genre which has never bothered too carefully about including the proper
versions of hadīths, never bothered to be absolutely sure that every interpretation has
reliable precedent, or that hadīths stick closely within school boundaries. Given the
“sahīh movement” documented by Jonathan A.C. Brown, i.e., the movement towards
using only authenticated hadīths, one might expect such housecleaning to occur in works
of tafsīr. But what is more difficult to understand is why it happened so late, long after

Tabrisī, Majmu‘, v. 2, 134). The subtle modification from al-Tabarī’s text is that al-Tabarī had not
mentioned men’s superiority, whereas al-Tabrisī does.
191
They are: the husband must provide the wife with maintenance and clothing; the husband’s right is that
nobody enter the house [lit.: tread on his carpet] whom he does not like; he must not the wife’s face, nor
insult her, and he must feed her when he eats and clothe her as he is clothed. In both texts, the degree is
variously defined: it could be in his spending; divorce; inheritance; jihād; and finally that men’s rights are
more than women’s rights. In addition, al-Tabrisī provides a shortened version of the Farewell Pilgrimage
Oration (al-Tabrisī, Majma‘ al-Bayān, v. 2, 133-4).
192
They are: that there should be companionable relations between the spouses; that they should not harm
one another; they have equality in shares (al-qism); the wife owes obedience; the degree is not taking
advantage of all of his rights (this is Ibn ‘Abbās’ interpretation, taken by al-Tabarī); and finally that wives
achieve pleasure just as husbands do, but his advantage is in spending (the interpretation of al-Zajjāj) (al-
Tabrisī, Majma‘ al-Bayān, v. 2, 133-4). However, one rationale cited by al-Tabrisī does not appear in
either Sunnī or Imāmī works: that women should not use tricks to spend their husbands’ wealth. The idea
of women’s trickery has not appeared in exegeses of these verses, but it is well known from the exegesis of
Q12:28, where ‘Azīz views Yūsuf’s shirt, torn from behind, and says to his wife, This is one of your guiles!
Indeed, your guile is great (qāla innahu min kaydikunna, inna kaydakunna ‘azīm). “Your” is in the
feminine plural and most exegetes followed the interpretation that the verse refers to all women.

91
the sahīh works became canonical. I am unable to provide any real answer for the
question of why these changes happened at this time. But one possible explanation for
this is the conservativism of the genre of tafsīr – such changes would have come slowly,
and were not accepted by all exegtes. That explanation would account for the fact that
these methods are not copied by every subsequent exegete: after al-Baghawī’s time,
several exegetes in this study still include inauthenticated hadīths in their works.

Subtle and unsubtle modifications of early exegeses: away from standardization

Although most exegetes simply repeat early exegeses verbatim and then elaborate
upon the meaning of the verse, some explain the earliest exegeses in novel ways. These
elaborations seem to show how the exegetes’ own opinions, or their societal mores, could
shape their understandings of, and explanations for, the earliest interpretations. These
works, therefore, return to the question of the use of sources, and how seemingly
immobile sources could be modified from age to age according to current understandings.
One example of an apparent modification of an early exegesis is found in Ibn
‘Atīya (d. 546/1151). It seems that Ibn ‘Atīya is using al-Tabarī’s text as a basis for his
own; although his work is shorter, everything in Ibn ‘Atīya’s commentary on this verse
seems to have its origin in al-Tabarī, so it is likely that he was working directly with the
al-Tabarī text.193 But Ibn ‘Atīya subtly changes al-Tabarī’s interpretation. According to
al-Tabarī, Ibn ‘Abbās said that men should forgive their wives when they fail to fulfill all
of their duties. Al-Tabarī interprets this statement to mean that men should manage
women with generosity. Ibn ‘Atīya defines that generosity as both financial and moral,
which Ibn ‘Abbās did not. He also explains why men have been given this responsibility:
men are better than women.
Ibn ‘Abbās says, “That degree is an indication, inducing men to behave well with
women and to be generous with them morally and financially.” I.e., the better one

193
For Q4:34, the texts differs in more significant ways, as I will discuss below. Ibn ‘Atīya includes the
following provisions in his exegesis of Q2:228: Women have rights like their obligations, meaning, he
says, that women’s marital rights consist of good marital community, and each of the spouses making
themselves handsome for the other. The degree could be: jihād; inheritance; obedience; dowry; the li‘ān
procedure; the inducement of man to a good marital community; his spending on her, and his guardianship
of her; matrimonial authority and divorce; and men’s ability to grow a beard (Ibn ‘Atīya, al-Muharrar, v. 1,
306).

92
 (al-afdal) must have self-control, which is the best, most distinguished
doctrine.194

Ibn Taymīya notices and disparagingly comments on Ibn ‘Atīya’s tendency to make
changes to al-Tabarī’s tafsīr, although this particular modification is in line with the
practice in Ibn ‘Atīya’s time - not yet standard in al-Tabarī’s time - of explaining why the
verse delegates authority to men.195
Ibn ‘Atīya and Ibn ‘Arabī both attack the interpretation which says that the beard
alone distinguishes men from women. This is a shift in discourse: the earliest exegeses
took note that men and women have different roles. After al-Tabarī, exegetes began to
explain why this is so, mentioning innate differences such as rationality. Now, the
interpretation which limits the differences to mere facial hair is actively denounced. In
the words of Ibn ‘Atīya:
Humayd said, “the degree is [men’s] beard,” and the judge Abū Muhammad [Ibn
‘Atīya] says, “Even if this [interpretation] is an authentic narration on [Humayd’s]
authority, it is weak, for it is not in conformity with the wording of the verse, nor
with its meaning. When you look attentively at the issues which have been
mentioned by the exegetes, then [you will find that] most of them say the degree
entails superiority.196

Ibn ‘Atīya seems to doubt that this hadīth could even be the authentic transmission of
Humayd’s words: Humayd was a Companion and a poet,197 his interpretation, that men’s
degree over women is the beard, first appeard in al-Tabarī’s tafsīr. But despite being a

194
Ibid., v. 1, 306.
195
Ibn Taymīya writes: “The commentaries of Ibn ‘Atīya and others like him are more faithful to the views
of the ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamā‘a, and freer from innovations than the commentary of al-Zamakhsharī. But
it would have been better, and more pleasing, if Ibn ‘Atīya had limited himself to quoting from the
comments of the salaf which have already been recorded in books of tafsīr. He quotes much from the tafsīr
of Muhammad Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, which is one of the most glorious and reliable commentaries, but then,
without a word of warning, he leaves off of what Ibn Jarīr [al-Tabarī] has transmitted from the salaf, and he
mentions what he calls the “sayings of the profound scholars.” By this, he means nothing but a group of
theologians who have developed their ideas in a way that mirrors the Mu‘tazilīs, though they are closer to
the sunna than the Mu‘tazilīs. It is necessary to recognize things for what they are, and to know that on the
whole this exegesis is biased towards a particular view (hādhā min jumlat al-tafsīr ‘alā al-madhhab). For
if we have one doctrine on a verse given by the companions, successors, and imams, and a group comes
along and explains it with another doctrine, because of some particular beliefs, which are not the beliefs of
the companions or the successors, then they are no different from Mu‘tazilīs and other innovators. In short,
whoever diverges from the beliefs of the companions or successors, and gives an explanation which
contradicts theirs, is wrong. Not just wrong, but an innovator, even if he is an interpreter of law (mujtahid),
whose mistakes will hopefully be forgiven” (Ibn Taymīya, al-Muqaddima, 23-4).
196
Ibn ‘Atīya, al-Muharrar, v. 1, 306.
197
J.W. Fück, “Humayd b. Thawr,” EI2, v. 3, 573.

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Companion, for Ibn ‘Atīya the majority opinion of the exegetes, and the dictates of
common sense, overrule his view.
In his Ahkām al-Qur’ān, the Mālikī Ibn al-‘Arabī goes so far as to rebuke those
scholars who might think that a man’s beard is the only thing which distinguishes him
from women.
It is said, the degree is inheritance, or jihād, or the beard. And it is best for a
servant of God to keep silent about things of which he is ignorant, especially
concerning the Book of Glorious God. For men’s degree over women is not
hidden to those who understand; even if it had only been that woman was created
from man, and that men are women’s origin.198

After stating that the beard is one possible interpretation, Ibn ‘Arabī says that those who
are “ignorant” should “keep silent,” because men’s degree over women is clear. The
implication is that the degree goes far beyond facial hair. Eve’s creation from Adam’s rib
can be generalized, according to Ibn al-‘Arabī, to mean that all women are inferior to all
men – man is the original creation, and woman was created from man, and for him. Most
changes in discourse are not as dramatic as this one, in which the words of a Companion,
once an acceptable part of the tradition, are dismissed as worthless.
As I have shown above, one way of changing the tone of earlier exegeses is to
give them a new gloss. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī takes this model to a new level: although
much of the material in his exegesis has appeared in earlier works, he sets up a new
framework for understanding this verse as a whole. In other words, he does not simply
list many, possibly conflicting interpretations, with little explanation, as do most
exegetes, nor does he re-gloss the interpretation of one single earlier exegesis. Instead,
he incorporates these interpretations into an argument.
Although all of the individual elements of this argument are familiar to anyone
who has read a few exegeses of this verse, this is the first time it has been articulated as a
unified whole: each member of the couple has a particular role to play, and neither of
their roles is complete without the other. Husbands guide their wives (like shepherds)
and, because of their makeup as rulers, they must uphold their wives’ best interests. The

198
Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ahkām, v. 1, 272.

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parallel with statecraft is explicit: the ruler must secure the best interests of the people he
rules.199
He makes his points in a disputational style, and his work is addressed directly to
the reader (or listener). Because he presents a cohesive argument without conflicting
evidence, his work resembles that of al-Jassās, the author of the Ahkām al-Qur’ān; but
this work is not like the ahkām al-Qur’ān genre because he does not focus on law. Fakhr
al-Dīn’s method and style are well-developed and, especially since the text is addressed
directly to the reader, one can imagine this work being read aloud at a mosque lesson.
Fakhr al-Dīn explains the degree that men have over women by outlining eight
specific ways in which men are superior to women.200 The eight points are a combination
of inherent qualities, such as rationality, with marital rights, such as the ability to take a
concubine, and rights which entail power over others, such as the imamate, judging, or
witnessing. The culmination of his argument is that, because men have been made
superior to women, and hadīths tell men that they must take care of them, men who harm
women are sinning.
Thus the superiority of men over women is established in these matters, and it is
clear that women are like helpless captives in men’s hands. This is why
[Muhammad] said, peace and blessings be upon him, “Treat women well, for they
are your captives” and in another narration, “Be God-fearing in your treatment of
two weak ones: orphans and women.” The degree that God has given men over
women in terms of ability is because men are recommended to fulfill more of
women’s rights [than women have to fulfill of men’s]. The mention of that

199
The complete passage reads: “Women have rights like their obligations know that since God Almighty
clarified that the intention of return after a revocable divorce is for the establishment of peace, not bringing
harm to wives, He [also] clarified that each of the spouses has a right against the other. Know that the
intention of marriage is not complete unless each one of the spouses fulfills their duty towards the other,
and that there are many rights in which both participate; we will indicate some of them. The first is that
husbands are like rulers and shepherds, and wives are like the ruled and the flock; so it is necessary for
husbands, because of their makeup as rulers and shepherds, to undertake to fulfill wives’ rights and their
best interests. [Likewise], it is necessary for wives, in exchange for that, to display obedience to husbands”
(Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, v. 6, 101).
200
“Know that the superiority (fadl) of men over women is a well-known matter, and its mention here
admits two interpretations: the first, that men are superior to women women in certain ways: first is
rationality (‘aql), second, blood money, third, inheritance, fourth suitability for the imamate, judgeship, and
witnessing, fifth, that they may marry or take a concubine while already married, and women may not
[marry again] when they are married [nor may they ever take a concubine]. The sixth is that the husband’s
share in inheritance from his wife is greater than the wife’s share is from her husband, seventh, husbands
are able to divorce their wives, and when they divorce them, they are capable of demanding that they return
whether the woman wishes to return or not. As for women, they cannot divorce their husbands nor are they
able to forbid their [divorced] husbands from demanding that they return. The eighth is that men’s share in
booty is greater than women’s share” (Ibid., v. 6, 101).

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 [degree] is like a threat to men when they set about to hurt and harm women,
because whomever God bestows more blessings upon, their sinfulness is more
detestable to God, and their liability for reprimand is greater.201

Fakhr al-Dīn’s discourse is much more sophisticated than that of others of his age. Ibn
‘Atīya, for instance, explains that men are better than women, but Fakhr al-Dīn explains
the consequence of this superiority. And whereas most exegetes say that men have more
rights, Fakhr al-Dīn connects men’s rights with an increased level of responsibility
towards women.
Other exegetes, such as al-Tha‘labī, cite hadīths without comment; the reader is
left to guess whether this particular citation has any special meaning.202 But in Fakhr al-
Dīn’s hadīth citation, content is central, and bolsters his argument. In fact, this is a clear
case in which content matters more than authenticity. The two hadīths which he cites fit
well within his discourse: he has explained the extent of men’s rights and how men have
rights that women do not, and then, because of men’s great power over women, he
cautions them to treat women well. These two hadīths are both in al-Tha‘labī’s exegesis.
The first, “treat women well, for they are your captives” is in the authenticated collection
of Ibn Mājah, but the second hadīth, encouraging good treatment of women and orphans,
is not in any hadīth collection that I searched (nor in al-Baghawī’s tafsīr). It seems that,
although al-Baghawī may have been a part of a movement towards using only
authenticated hadīths in tafsīr, not every exegete adhered to this philosophy.203 In Fakhr
al-Dīn’s case, the content of the hadīth is more important than its reliability.
As cohesive as Fakhr al-Dīn’s commentary is, it is a departure from the norm of
his period and, like that of al-Tabarī, does not seem to have much influence on the
opinions of commentators after him as far as these verses are concerned. Other exegetes
201
Ibid., v. 6, 101-2.
202
Al-Tha‘labī’s citation of hadīths which say that women have their own particular jihād (being patient
and obedient to their husbands) in his explanations of Q2:228 seem to indicate that he believes women have
a jihād, but in his exegesis of Q4:34, al-Tha‘labī cites jihād as one of the aspects of men’s superiority over
women, and he does not once mention that women might have their own jihād. Because he gives the
hadīth without comment, and later gives a conflicting interpretation, the reader is left to guess whether he
simply forgot to mention women’s jihād in 4:34 or if he does not think that women have their own jihād.
203
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the exegetes who begin to use authenticated hadīths
are generally considered to be authors of tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr, whereas the authors, like Fakhr al-Dīn, who do
not are generally considered to be adherents of tafsīr bi’l-ra’y. But, given the serious doubts cast on the
accuracy of these labels by other scholars (such as Saleh and Rippin) which I described in the introduction
to the dissertation, I think it unwise to make any assumptions about the “true” nature of Fakhr al-Dīn’s
work based on the fact that he uses opinion and inauthentic hadīths to explain this verse.

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do urge men to be kind to women, but are not as forceful in their warnings about the
consequences of bad behavior. This could be cited as an example of difference between
exegesis and legal manuals. Fakhr al-Dīn’s inducements to good behavior are not legally
binding: women usually cannot get a divorce merely on the grounds that their husbands
harm them.204 If Fakhr al-Dīn is to be believed, men’s rebuke will be in the afterlife.
Yet in at least one case, an author in the Ahkām al-Qur’ān genre sees a practical
worldly necessity in fulfilling women’s rights. The Mālikī al-Qurtubī focuses on Ibn
‘Abbās’s beautification hadīth. He describes, in great detail, the sorts of “beautification”
that men can undertake, and why it is important to do so.
Ibn ‘Abbās says, “I like to make myself beautiful for my wife.” Scholars say that
men’s beautification differs according to their state, and that they should make
themselves beautiful in accordance with their state. Those things that one does at
one time in life are not the same as at other times; so what is befitting to youth is
not befitting to older men. Have you not seen that when older and middle-aged
men trim their moustaches, it is beautiful and it suits them; whereas when youths
do the same it is ugly and detestable, because their beards haven’t come in fully
yet; when they clip their moustache as it first appears on their faces, it is ugly,
whereas if their beards had come in and then they trimmed their moustache, that
would suit them nicely. It is narrated on the authority of the Prophet, peace be
upon him, that he said, “My Lord has ordered me to preserve my beard and trim
my moustache” It is also this way in matters of clothing – and all of these matters
are for the purpose of [fulfilling women’s] rights. For when husbands are decent
and seemly, they will make their wives happy by beautifying themselves, which
will cause their wives to abstain from other men. Likewise, kohl [makeup for
eyes] suits some men and not others…. Then [after all of this] it is necessary for
husbands to take time when their wives need a man, in order to keep their wives
chaste and keep them from looking at anyone else. If men feel themselves
incapable of fulfilling their wives’ rights in the bed, they should take medicine to
increase their potency (yazīd fī bāhihi) and strengthen their desire in order to
satisfy their wives and cause them to be chaste (yu‘affuhā).”205

Al-Qurtubī focuses heavily on men’s behavior and dress; none of the other exegeses of
this verse speak of men’s dress, and nobody, including al-Qurtubī, mentions women’s
dress. He further breaks with the pattern seen in other musalsal works of his age by
focusing on men’s duty to women, especially in his emphasis on men’s satisfying women
sexually and keeping them happy, so that they remain with their husbands and do not go
204
Kecia Ali argues that according to the Shāfi‘ī and Hanafī schools, divorce on grounds of harm to the
woman is not granted, but that it can be granted in some cases according to the Mālikīs. See her Money,
Sex, and Power, chapter 3, 232-310.
205
Al-Qurtubī, Ahkām, v. 3, 124.

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to other men. The hadīth which he quotes, encouraging men to trim their moustaches and
leave their beards full, is not in any of the Six Books, nor in any other collections that I
searched.
Al-Qurtubī also speaks of men’s degree, quoting previous works such as Ibn al-
‘Arabī’s Ahkām al-Qur’ān. Both of these Mālikī authors emphasize women’s inferiority
due to Eve’s creation from Adam; but it seems that to al-Qurtubī, natural superiority is no
excuse for men’s neglecting their wives’ needs.

Debates about women’s spirituality and religious duties

Although exegetes’ belief in men’s superiority in terms of rights and rationality is
well established in earlier exegeses of other verses, when the Mālikī/Shāfi‘ī Abū Hayyān
(d. 745/1353) says that men’s degree over women is in religion/religiosity (diyāna) it is
new to the exegeses of this verse.206 He later says that this is the most obvious
interpretation, because women’s piety is linked to their obedience, and they are not very
obedient:
The most obvious interpretation is that the degree is what women want of piety,
honor, obedience, and respect concerning men’s rights…. And God clarified that
the parallelism [women’s rights are like their obligations] concerns what each one
[of the spouses] owes the other. Thus women must give their husbands more
rights and respect…207

Earlier exegetes said that men can fulfill a number of religious duties that women cannot,
such as acting as Imām; men have already been entrusted with taking care of women’s
morals, and now the step has been taken of saying that women lack religiosity.208
His belief that men have superior religiousity does not mean that he absolves
women from the duty of commanding right and forbidding wrong, which is a duty for all
believers. But the wife must ultimately submit to her husband’s command:
It is said that the meaning of the parallelism [of women’s rights and duties in
2:228] is that it is women’s right to living expenses and dowry (mahr) and a good
marital relationship, leaving behind hardship. Likewise it is women’s duty to
command right and forbid wrong, and on this basis there is a parallelism in duties

206
This concept is introduced earlier in the exegeses of Q4:34.
207
Abū Hayyān, al-Bahr, v. 2, 201.
208
Incidentally, Abū Hayyān does not seem too concerned with correct attribution of his interpretations: he
states that it was Mujāhid who said that men’s beards differentiated them from women, when it was
actually Humayd (Abū Hayyān, al-Bahr, v. 2, 201).

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 that the husband performs, and the necessity of the wife’s obedience to his
commanding right and forbidding wrong.209

The fact that women have to command right and forbid wrong means not only that they
have the ability to distinguish moral right from wrong, but also that they have some sort
of authority: the authority to tell others when they are doing wrong, and to promote the
doing of right. Abū Hayyān makes it clear that the wife must submit to her husband’s
commanding right and forbidding wrong. He does not explicitly state that the husband
must obey the wife’s command, although that is implied.
Other exegetes did not appear to believe that commanding right and forbidding
wrong was one of women’s duties, saying instead that this was one aspect of man’s
superiority over women.210 Michael Cook points out that it seems inconsistent to deny
women the right to command right and forbid wrong, since female believers are
commanded to do so in Qur’ān 9:71.211 But there were differences of opinion on the
question of commanding right and forbidding wrong in both exegetical and non-
exegetical works.212 For instance, only some of the intellectual heirs of al-Ghazzālī
followed his opinion, which is that women are obligated to perform the duty.213 Most
interestingly, Cook points out that while some writers use intrinsic differences to justify
women’s not having to perform this duty, others justify it on the basis of social
circumstance; still others regulate women’s performance of the deed, so that it remains
verbal, or within their hearts, or even within the family, thus respecting women’s
obligation to stay at home.214 This is one example of how adherence to certain customary
practices, such as women staying indoors, affects jurists’ and exegetes’ opinion of
whether they should perform religious duties such as commanding right and forbidding
wrong.

209
Abū Hayyān, al-Bahr, v. 2, 200.
210
Ibn al-‘Arabī says, for instance, “The guardianship of woman was made for men, because of his two
preferences over her - the first: completeness of intellect and judgment (tamyīz). The second: completeness
of religion and religious duties such as the jihād and the commanding of right and forbidding of wrong in
general (‘alā al-‘umūm), and also other things” (Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ahkām al-Qur’ān, v. 1, 416).
211
Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 18, n. 20; 483.
212
A discussion of women commanding right and forbidding wrong can be found in Cook, Commanding
Right, 482-486.
213
Ibid., 484.
214
Ibid., 483-485.

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 Ibn Kathīr writes that his method of interpreting the verse is to rely on the Qur’ān,
the traditions of the Prophet, and finally on the exegesis of the companions.215 He
composes his exegesis of this verse almost entirely of authenticated hadīths;216 Norman
Calder has noted his patent lack of regard for tradition, which Calder blames on Ibn
Taymīya.217 In the case of verse 2:228, Ibn Kathīr’s lack of regard for previous
interpretations shows: he takes an interpretation that has not appeared before in the
exegeses of this verse, which is to say that men are superior to women in this world and
the next. In other words, men’s spiritual superiority has the result of a better reward in
the afterlife.
God’s words, and men have a degree over them mean in superiority, creation
(khalq), morals (khulq), status, obeying the order, spending, upholding the good,
preference in this world and the next, as He has said, Men are qawwāmūn over
women…218

Ibn Taymīya’s emphasis on the necessity of sticking close to the interpretations of the
“pious predecessors” might create an expectation that authors who were influenced by
him, such as Ibn Kathīr, would go back to the earliest interpretations, hadīths, and
sayings of the Companions, and copy them verbatim. But, although Ibn Kathīr’s exegesis

215
McAuliffe, Qur’ānic Christians: an analysis of classical and modern exegesis, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991, 17.
216
“Their rights are like their duties according to custom i.e., women have rights over men like the rights
that men have over women, and each one of them should do their duty to the other. It was established in
the Sahīh of Muslim, on the authority of Jābir, that the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, said in his
farewell pilgrimage, “Be God-fearing in your treatment of women, for you have taken them as a trust from
God, and sex with them has become legal for you because of the word of God. Your rights over them are
that they not let anyone whom you dislike into your houses (lit: tread on your carpets); if they do that then
hit them non-violently. Their rights are their sustenance, and their clothing, according to custom.” In a
hadīth of Bahz b. Hakīm b. Mu‘āwiya b. Humayd al-Qushayrī, on the authority of his father, on the
authority of his grandfather, that he [the grandfather] said, “O, messenger of God, what is the right of one
of our wives?” and he replied, “that you feed them when you eat, and you clothe them as you yourselves
are clothed, and you do not hit their faces, nor insult them, nor leave the house when you leave them alone
in bed.” Wakī‘ said, on the authority of Bashīr b. Sulaymān, on the authority of ‘Ikrima, on the authority of
Ibn ‘Abbās, that he said, “I like to make myself beautiful for my wife, just as I like it when she makes
herself beautiful for me, because God said, [2:228].” Ibn Jarīr [al-Tabarī] and Ibn Abī Hātim [al-Rāzī]
narrated this” (Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, v. 2, 338-9).
217
Calder says: “Ibn Kathīr’s Tafsīr has many merits; but he has little respect for the intellectual tradition;
he barely recognizes its authority and is indifferent to the fact that the positions he takes up imply at least a
disrespect for his predecessors. He does not generally like polyvalent readings, but argues vehemently for
a single “correct” reading… It may be remarked that an overleaping of the intellectual tradition in favour of
a dimly defined salaf, a stringent reading of revealed texts, and a rigid dogmatic agenda is the major
intellectual gift to Islam of Ibn Taymīyya; not that he originated this kind of fundamentalism, but, putting
his considerable intellectual powers into the service of a naïve faith, he gave and still gives this kind of
view respectability” (Calder, “Problems,” 124-5).
218
Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, v. 2, 339.

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includes many authenticated hadīths, that does not stop him from including his own
interpretation based on his understanding of these texts.

Summary: Exegeses of Q2:228 between al-Wāhidī and Ibn Kathīr

The modifications in tafsīr works of this period shows that some exegetes sought
to incorporate only authenticated hadīths in their exegeses while others, in the style of
earlier exegeses, did not. It is tempting to say that those who included only authentic
hadīths did not include any personal interpretation, but Ibn Kathīr’s exegesis of this verse
is actually a re-analysis of the canonical sources. This is why he includes his own view
of what these sources say about women’s spiritual status - that men are preferred in the
nex world.
But, despite the fact that he sought to rely only on canonical sources and not on
other exegeses, Ibn Kathīr’s analysis of this verse could have been affected by other
interpretations of his time. Other exegetes of his period had begun to explain Q2:228 in
terms of women’s religious deficiencies. Given this context, Ibn Kathīr’s interpretation
seems like the radical fringe of an existing trend, rather than a radically new
interpretation.
Al-Zamakhsharī’s explanation, in which he claims that men and women have
different household roles than one another, is by far the most popular new explanation in
later ages: 6 (24%) of the 25 exegetes I studied who died after him cite this interpretation
(though few attribute it to al-Zamakhsharī). Fewer go on to cite the example he gives, of
women cooking and washing for their husbands.
Other new exegeses of this period were cited less frequently, and some not at all.
Some of the explanations which were cited by several exegetes in later ages were: that
man is woman’s origin (this is almost always attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī), that Ibn ‘Abbās
said the degree is an inducement to men’s behaving well towards women, because “the
better one must have self-control,” that neither men nor women should ask for what is not
due to them, that man is like the ruler and shepherd, whereas woman is like the ruled, or
the flock, that man is able to punish his wife, that the degree is men’s protection of
women. Exegetes also mention several rights that men have and women do not, such as
men’s suitability for the Imamate, judgeship, and ruling.

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 Although Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī calls for moderation and kindness in men’s
treatment of women, this does not become a popular explanation of the verse. The
interpretation of women’s place and status takes ever-stricter forms in most works of
exegesis.

2.7 Tafsīr after Ibn Kathīr: Newly incorporated hadīths

On the whole, exegetes of this period cite fewer new rationales for this verse than
exegetes of earlier periods did. Most of the changes of this period have to do with hadīth
citation; incorporating hadīths that have not been cited for this verse leads to changes in
the content of exegeses.
But not all exegetes used hadīths to forge new interpretations. Al-Biqā‘ī, quoting
an exegete called al-Hīrālī, said that men’s minds are calmer than women’s minds;
furthermore, men are more perfect in their religious observances. He also says that God
meant all men, for he did not say “husbands.”219 This latter point could be in response to
a debate, which is apparent in the exegeses of 4:34, about whether men have to do
anything in order to deserve their place.
The most prominent Sunnī exegete of this period is al-Suyūtī. His tafsīr consists
solely of Prophetic hadīths. He provides chains of transmission for all of these hadīths,
and most of them are in one of the Six books; likewise, most of them have been
referenced by other exegetes in their exegeses of this verse. However, a few hadīths, on
the subject of not hurrying women during intercourse, have not been cited by any
exegete; they appear in minor collections.
Ibn Qays narrated, on the authority of Qays b. Talq, on the authority of his father,
that the Messenger of God, s, said, “When you have intercourse with your wife,
do not hurry her, so that she may fulfill her needs, just as it is necessary for her to
fulfill your needs.” ‘Abd al-Razzāq and Abū Ya‘lā on the authority of Anas said,
the Messenger of God, s, said, “When one of you has intercourse with his wife, he
should give her her dowry, and if he climaxes before her (sabaqahā), do not hurry
her.” In the narration of ‘Abd al-Razzāq, “If he has fulfilled his need and she has
not fulfilled her need, then do not hurry her.” 220

219
Al-Biqā‘ī, Nazm al-Durar, v. 3, 301.
220
Al-Suyūtī, al-Durr, v. 1, 276.

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Keeping women sexually fulfilled is not an entirely new theme in the exegesis of Q2:228,
since al-Qurtubī says that men should fulfill women’s needs to “keep them chaste,” i.e.,
from fulfilling their needs with another man; but he does not cite the Prophet to justify his
opinion.221
Al-Suyūtī was said to have had an exceptional memory and to know 200,000
hadīths; his mission in his commentary, al-Durr al-Manthūr, was to use only hadīths on
the authority of the Prophet and the earliest Companions.222 Composing a work based
only on the Prophet’s hadīths and his Companions’ sayings is a true methodological
break from the preceding generations, and in prioritizing hadīths, he does not stick to
precedent within works of exegesis. Al-Suyūtī saw himself as a “renewer” of his own
age, and affirmed the need for reasoned interpretation (ijtihād) in different realms;223 his
vision of himself might account for his willingness to break with previous exegetical
methods and content.

Imāmī tafsīr of the 17th and 18th century

Certain Imāmī tafsīr of this period include Sunnī sources: Muhsin al-Fayd, who
died in 1091/1680, for instance. Above, I compared al-Tabrisī’s exegesis with exegeses
of Sunnīs, showing that, despite al-Tabrisī’s inclusion of an Imāmī hadīth, his exegesis
was still mostly indistinguishable from Sunnī ones. Muhsin al-Fayd, in turn, cites al-
Zamakhsharī. And in terms of content, his citation on the authority of the Imām Ja‘far al-
Sādiq resembles Ibn ‘Abbās’ interpretation:
Women have rights over men
like their obligations which they owe to men; their deservingness [of the

221
The necessity of fulfilling women’s sexual needs was emphasized as early as al-Ghazālī (d. 504/1111).
In the Ihyā, he writes: “Once the husband has attained his fulfillment, let him tarry until his wife also
attains hers. Her orgasm (inzāl) may be delayed, thus exciting her desire; to withdraw quickly is harmful to
the woman. Difference in the nature of [their] reaching a climax causes discord whenever the husband
ejaculates first. Congruence in attaining a climax is more gratifying to her because the man is not
preoccupied with his own pleasure, but rather with hers; for it is likely that the woman might be shy. It is
desireable that he should have intimate relations with her once every four nights; that is more just, for the
[maximum] number of wives is four which justifies this span. It is true that intimate relations should be
more or less frequent in accordance to her need to remain chaste, for to satisfy her is his duty” (Madelain
Farah, Marriage and Sexuality in Islam, a translation of al-Ghazālī’s book on the Etiquette of Marriage
from the Ihyā’, Salt Lake City: University of Utah press, 1984, p. 107; my thanks to Bella Tendler for
recommending this source).
222
E. Geoffroy, “al-Suyūtī,” EI2, v. 9, 915.
223
Ibid., 914, and D. B. MacDonald, “Idjtihād”, EI2, v. 3, 1027.

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 fulfillment of their rights] is not in the type [of deed; i.e., men and women do not
have to do the same things].
bi’l-ma‘rūf According to that which is not neglected in the law (shar‘), nor in the
customs of the people. So men are not obligated to fulfill rights that are not due
to women, nor are women obligated to fulfill rights that are not due to men.
And men have a degree over them Men have more rights, and [they have]
superiority due to their guardianship of women. In al-Faqīh, [Ja‘far] al-Sādiq was
asked about the rights of women over their husbands, and he said, “He must fill
her stomach, clothe her body, and if she is ignorant, forgive her.”224

This the first Imāmī source to cite al-Zamakhsharī’s interpretation in this study, although
it is likely that other Imāmīs, such as al-Tabrisī, used the Kashshāf. Muhsin al-Fayd also
cites the Imām Ja‘far al-Sādiq as saying that if the wife is ignorant, the husband should
forgive her. This interpretation seems to be related to that of Ibn ‘Abbās first cited by al-
Tabarī, but this is the first time that it has been cited with this wording and on the
authority of a Shī‘ī Imām.
A few years later, al-Bahrānī’s tafsīr uses only Imāmī sources: he quotes the full
hadīth which has already been cited by al-Tabrisī;225 and he notes al-Qummī’s exegesis:
In the tafsīr of ‘Alī b. Ibrāhīm [al-Qummī], he says, “The rights of men over
women are more than the rights of women over men.”226

This is the first time that another Imāmī has cited al-Qummī’s interpretation of this verse;
this may be an indication that Imāmīs are moving away from Sunnī precedent.227

224
Muhsin al-Fayd Al-Kashānī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 400.
225
Ibn Bābawayh [says] in al-Faqīh, on his chain of authority, on the authority of al-Hasan b. Mahbūb, on
the authority of Mālik b. ‘Atīya, on the authority of Muhammad b. Muslim, on the authority of Abū Ja‘far,
peace be upon him, that he said, “A woman came to the Messenger of God, s, and said, “O messenger of
God, what is the right of a husband over his wife?” He said to her, “She must obey him, and not disobey,
not give alms from his house except with his permission, nor undertake a supererogatory fast without his
permission, refuse herself to him, even if she is on the back of a camel; nor should she leave the house
except with his permission, and if she leaves without his permission, then the angels of the sky, angels of
the earth, angels of anger, and angels of mercy will curse her until she returns to her home.” She said, “O
Messenger of God, who has the greatest right over a man?” He said, “His parents.” She replied, “And who
has the greatest right over a woman?” He answered, “Her husband.” She asked, “I do not have rights over
him like those that he has over me?” And he replied, “No, and for every one hundred [rights] you do not
have one.” So she said, “By God [lit: who sent you with the truth as a Prophet], no man will ever hold my
neck! [I will never marry!]” (al-Bahrānī, Burhān, v. 1, 475).
226
Al-Bahrānī, Burhān, v. 1, 475.
227
Unfortunately I was unable to locate al-‘Ayyāshī’s commentary on this verse, if it exists, to make a
proper comparison between Imāmī sources.

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 On the whole, this period sees far fewer new interpretations than previous
periods; what new exegeses appear in al-Biqā‘ī’s exegesis seem designed to further
clarify the physical and mental differences between men and women.

2.8 Conclusion: exegetes’ methods of explaining Q2:228

The earliest exegeses of Q2:228 are not very detailed, and so this chapter has
explored how later exegetes interpret the silences in those texts. The most popular
overall interpretations of this verse, that the degree is inheritance or maintenance, were
not attested in the early sources that I have studied. Other popular ways of explaining the
verse included the idea that men are superior to women, that they owe women intimacy
and love, that the degree is men’s jihād, their payment of the dowry, or divorce, and
citation of the Ibn ‘Abbās beautification hadīth. Almost none of these interpretations
came from the earliest exegetes, who focus on the necessity of women’s obedience and
men’s maintenance of them.
In addition to hadīth citation, exegetes drew on science, grammar, custom, law,
and of course their own opinions in forming the interpretation of this verse.
Interpretations included many ways in which men are legally superior to women, but also
ways in which men are intrinsically superior, such as having more rationality than women
and better opinions than them. These opinions are usually presented in the form of lists
and are not backed up by citation. Given that the exegetes strove for objectivity in their
interpretations, it is reasonable to suppose that these interpretations represent what were
considered to be well-known facts about men’s and women’s natures in their day.
One way of including opinion and customary understanding in interpretation was
to rework early interpretations. One early interpretation of this verse was virtually
rewritten through time, while another was rejected outright. Al-Tabarī quotes Ibn ‘Abbās
as urging forgiveness of the wife with regard to some of her duties. He then interprets
this to mean that men must manage women generously. Several hundred years later Ibn
‘Atīya turns this statement into a value judgment as to the worth of women: men are
better than women, which is why they are in a position to forgive them. The content of
the early interpretation thus changes in fairly important ways over time. Al-Tabarī also
cites Humayd’s opinion that men’s “degree” can be reduced to a bit of facial hair: the

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beard. By the time of Ibn ‘Arabī, this interpretation is rejected, for by that point it is clear
that men are superior to women in numerous other ways.

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 3. Negotiating the authoritative sources, 2: exegeses of the beginning of Q4:34

3.1 Introduction
Verse 4:34 addresses practical aspects of the relationship of men and women, and
many exegeses of this verse seek to directly influence the household behaviors of the
believers. As I mentioned in the introduction, these interpretations are not sources for
social history, in that they usually do not comment on specific practices. But their
practical focus removes these interpretations from the rarefied realm of a purely
intellectual discourse. Determining the actual content of exegeses of this verse is in itself
a valuable exercise; many modern-day authors ascribe certain attitudes to the exegetes on
the basis of a few exegeses of Q4:34. The work in this chapter helps to contextualize and
explain these interpretations. In this chapter, I show that not all exegetes had the same
attitudes towards men’s and women’s status. Although broad outlines are shared,
important differences exist in the content of these works.
In Chapter 3, I focused on the exegetes’ methods, and the variation between them.
I showed how exegetes selectively use authoritative sources such as the hadīths, and I
argued that their choices reflect their own milieux. This chapter further develops the
discussion of exegetical methods. In examining the earliest exegeses, I focus on the use
of the asbāb al-nuzūl (the Occasions of Revelation, described fully below) to explain the
verse. For exegeses from the period after al-Tabarī, I focus on the exegetes’ complex
relationship to their authoritative sources, especially highlighting the negotiation between
exegesis and law. I show that the legal opinions of the exegetes’ schools do not always
emerge in their exegeses, even when those opinions are relevant to the discourse at hand.

The verse
Verse 4:34 is usually interpreted in several distinct, though interrelated, parts. In
this dissertation, I analyze the parts which are in bold (I have left two key, controversial,
terms untranslated):
Men are qawwāmūn over women, with what God has given the one more
than the other, and with what they spend of their wealth; so the good women
are obedient, guarding for the absent what God has guarded, and if you fear
nushūz, admonish them, and leave them in the beds, and strike them; and if

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 they obey you, do not seek a way against them; Surely, God is exalted, and
great.

In this chapter, I discuss the first part of the verse; the following chapter covers the
meaning of nushūz and its consequences. The beginning of this verse has a number of
words which could be translated in different ways, appearing in bold in the chart below.

Qawwāmūn With what Given … more than Some of them… others With what
(bi-mā) (faddala ‘alā) (ba‘duhum … ba‘d) (bi-mā)

Supporters of With what Given… more than Some of them… others With what
Or Or Or Or Or
In authority over/ Because of Made … superior to The one of them… the Because of
in charge of what other what

Therefore, although the above translation is accurate, the verse could also legitimately be
read to say: Men are in charge of women because God has made the one of them superior
to the other, and because they spend of their wealth.
When analyzing the commentaries on this verse, it is worth remembering that one
legitimate interpretation of the the verse itself is that men are superior to women. Thus,
although exegetes’ repeated assertions of men’s superiority are influenced by their own
cultural presuppositions about men’s and women’s abilities, nevertheless those cultural
presuppositions are supported by a certain grammatically correct reading of the verse.
The style of exegesis of this verse takes a course similar to that of exegeses of
Q2:228. Early exegeses are brief and fragmentary. Al-Tabarī’s exegesis is a summary
which offers his own additional commentary, and after al-Tabarī the emphasis is on
explaining why men have been put in the position that they have been. Other than the
discussion of specific words and content, the exegeses of these two verses have similar
themes. In other words, the discourse on why men have been made qawwāmūn over
women is similar to that about why men have a degree over them. However, a notable
difference is that developments towards increasing restrictions on women, and
explanations of women’s deficiencies, come earlier in the exegesis of Q4:34 than they did
in the exegesis of Q2:228. Thus, though similar developments occur, most of the themes

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which did not emerge until a late period in exegeses of Q2:228 are present earlier in
exegeses of Q4:34.

3.2 Early exegeses

Rather than attempting to define a common theme in the early interpretations of
this verse, this section focuses on the variety in discourses, while at the same time
identifying certain common elements.
In addition to the use of their own opinions to explain this verse, early exegetes
also quote jurists, other exegetes, and hadīths, especially the Occasion of Revelation
(sabab al-nuzūl, pl. asbāb al-nuzūl). The Occasions of Revelation are a genre of hadīth
explaining the circumstances under which particular Qur’ānic verses were revealed,
compiled in order to help exegetes and jurists understand the meaning of, and rulings
contained in, the verse.
The subject matter of the most widely cited sabab al-nuzūl for Q4:34 is hitting,
and thus in terms of content it seems to belong in Chapter 5, where I describe the
exegeses of the command, later in Q4:34, to “beat them.” However, I will discuss it here
because the sabab is key to understanding the early interpretations. In particular, the
dynamic it describes between the husband and wife sets up a relationship in which the
husband has power and authority, and the wife is not legally capable of defending herself
from him, even when it comes to questions of his physically harming her. Mujāhid b.
Jabr (d. 102/720) has a rather brief commentary focusing on this sabab:
A man slapped his wife, and she went to the Prophet, who said to her husband:
“She is owed retaliation (qisās).” Then the verse Men are qawwāmūn over
women was revealed to the Messenger of God, who recited it to them [the
husband and wife], saying “I wanted one thing, and God wanted another; what
God wants is better.”228

The retaliation which is ordered by the Prophet in this account is the legal response to a
wrongdoing, and it involves either a monetary reward in some cases, or punishment equal
to the offence in others. Thus, the Prophet sees the husband’s slapping his wife as a
wrongdoing with legal consequences. However, at the moment when he orders the legal
consequence of this offence, this verse is revealed. Muhammad’s inclination to punish

228
Mujāhid b. Jabr, Tafsīr Mujāhid, v. 1, 155.

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the husband is thus corrected by God’s apparent decision to allow men to slap their
wives.
The exegetes use this sabab in their interpretations from the very earliest period,
when no sabab, or any other type of hadīth, was adduced by early exegetes for the other
verses considered here. This is an example in which the early exegetes stick with a
straightforward, uncomplicated, reading of this portion of the verse; it seems that from
their point of view, this sabab epitomizes the husband and wife relationship. Because
this seems to be a case in which the exegesis from the age of the Prophet seems to
directly influence later interpretations, with no intermediary steps, it is an exception in
the interpretations of the verses studied here. Because other asbāb appear in later
exegeses of this verse, the dominance of this sabab can be reasonably ascribed to the fact
that the relationship that it describes is one which resonates with early exegetes’
understanding of women’s status within marriage. But it is possible that their
understandings were also influenced by the sabab itself.
Al-Dahhāk offers a more detailed explanation of this verse, in which he explains
that men are in charge of women’s piety and, should they fail to obey God’s commands,
of their earthly punishment. Men have this right because of their maintenance of women
and their efforts on women’s behalf. Thus, men’s role is as financial and moral
maintainers of women.
Men are in authority over women (qā’im ‘alayhā); they order them to obey God,
and if the women refuse, then they have the right to hit them without causing
severe pain (ghayr mubarrih). Men’s superiority (fadl) over women is due to
their maintenance and their efforts.229

Al-Dahhāk’s short interpretation, which appears at first to be solely opinion, is in fact

also informed by linguistic analysis of the Qur’ān and hadīth. In order to define
qawwāmūn, he uses a variant of the very same word: qā’im ‘alā, meaning, according to
the context here, that they have authority over them. The final part of the interpretation,
that men’s superiority (fadl) is due to their maintenance, relates directly to the words of
the verse; the reference to men’s efforts (presumably the efforts involved in maintaining
women) seems to be al-Dahhāk’s own addition.

229
Al-Dahhāk, Tafsīr, v. 1, 286.

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 His view of the scope of male authority is apparently derived from his own
opinion: men order women to obey God, and when the women refuse, then their
husbands may hit them. On the whole, exegetes agree that women can be beaten by their
husbands, though this is almost always qualified by the term ghayr mubarrih which I
translate as “without causing severe pain.”230 This measure of restraint relates back to a
hadīth, the Farewell Pilgrimage Oration. 231
A subtle aspect of al-Dahhāk’s interpretation is the implied limit on men’s
authority: he says that man orders his wife to obey God. This is not an unlimited
authority in which he orders her in every aspect of life, but rather are limited to those
matters which God has placed under his control. Her piety is his concern. Ibn Abī Talha
(d. 143/760), defines women’s duties more precisely:
Men are qawwāmūn over women, meaning commanders (umarā’): women must
obey men in matters in which God has ordered their obedience. And obedience is
that they must be good to their husband’s family, and preserve their husband’s
wealth. Men’s superiority (fadl) over women is due to their maintenance and
efforts.232

Women’s obedience is described as their good behavior towards their husband’s family
and their preserving his wealth; this is presumably in addition to other matters in which
God has commanded their obedience, such as making themselves available for sex.
Although men are in the position of commanding women, the command is not arbitrary,
nor is it unlimited.
‘Alī ibn Abī Talha’s interpretation is the first instance in this sample in which the
term qawwāmūn is defined by using a term not derived from the same root: he says that it
means that men are women’s commanders. The explicit connection to the political ruler
is developed in later exegeses; here, the term “commander” suffices to explain the point.
The rest of ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha’s interpretation, other than the reference to preserving the
husband’s wealth, which is from this verse, seems to be derived from his own opinion.

230
Ghayr mubarrih is often translated as “non-violent,” but hitting is intrinsically violent, despite the
qualifications of not breaking bones, or seriously wounding. Given this context, “without causing severe
pain” is a better translation. Kazimirsky says that mubarrih is: “very harsh, very painful, causing intense
pain (très sensible, très-pénible, qui cause une douleur violente).”
231
The hadīth reads: “Your rights over women are that they do not allow anyone in the house of whom you
disapprove, and if they do that, then beat them without causing severe pain (ghayr mubarrih)” (Muslim,
Sahīh Muslim, Cairo: Dār Ihyā’,1955, v. 2, 890; Kitāb al-Hajj, hadīth # 147).
232
‘Alī ibn Abī Talha, Sahīfa, v. 2, 146.

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 Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767) provides the most detailed explanation for the
verse of all of the early exegetes. He begins with a more complete version of the
occasion of revelation which was first cited by Mujāhid.
This verse was revealed concerning Sa‘d b. al-Rabī‘ b. ‘Amr who was one of the
Naqībs,233 and his wife, Habība bt. Zayd b. Abī Zuhayr. They were among the
Ansār of the Banū Hārith b. Khazraj. He slapped his wife, and she went to her
family. Her father went with her to the Prophet, s, and said, “I married my
daughter to him and gave her to his bed (ankahtuhu wa-afrashtuhu karīmatī),234
and he slapped her!”
The Prophet ordered retaliation, and she went to take retaliation from him, when
the Prophet said, “Come back! Gabriel has come to me and revealed this
verse!”235

This version of the hadīth differs in two major ways from the one cited by Mujāhid: the
first is that the main actor, now named as Habība bt. Zayd,236 does not go alone to the
Prophet; she goes first to her father, who is her intermediary with Muhammad. In other
words, whereas she was her own agent in the other version, in this case her father is her
first recourse, and he intercedes on her behalf. Her father’s position as guardian with
authority over her person is emphasized by his words, “I married my daughter to him.”237
Women’s agency is an important question in the early period. In several hadīths cited by
exegetes in this study, women are their own agents who go independently to the Prophet
and ask him questions; this has led some scholars to assert that women in that period had
considerably more freedom than those of later ages. This impression seems to be

233
This term referrs to the twelve representatives appointed by the Medinans who were negotiating with
Muhammad about the hijra from Mecca to Medina.
234
Zayd’s speech contains two words in the fourth form: ankaha and afrasha; both of these have two
objects. Afrashtuhu usually means “I made a bed for him.” I have not found any definitions of the word
which include a second object (in this case, karīmatī). Form 4 of the root n-k-h’” does take two objects,
and clearly means to marry someone to someone else. This seems to support the translation “I married him
to my daughter and gave her to his bed.” Hava has farasha (form one) with two objects to mean “to
facilitate an affair,” for someone, or to spread a carpet for someone, but this is not the correct form.
235
Muqātil, Tafsīr, 370. In her article “Disciplining Wives: A historical reading of Qur’ān 4:34” (Studia
Islamica, 2003), Manuela Marín does not identify Sa‘d b. Rabī‘ and Habība bt. Zayd as the main characters
of this story until the much later exegesis of al-Wāhidī; instead, she claims, the main actors are identified
differently in all early exegeses. There are lesser cited versions of this story which have different names,
but she is incorrect in implying that no early versions included Sa‘d and Habība. She also claims that the
Prophet’s saying “I wanted one thing and God wanted another” is only found in later exegeses, but this is
not so. Yet this article has many merits, some of which I describe briefly in Chapter 5.
236
As Marín notes, the names of the main characters in this hadīth sometimes differ, but its main
characteristics do not.
237
For a detailed analysis of early Islamic marriage laws and the issue of guardianship, see Kecia Ali’s
dissertation, Money, sex, and power.

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confirmed by the increasing restrictions on women’s behavior and mobility through time
in the exegetical sources.
The other major differences between this recension of the sabab al-nuzīl and the
one quoted by Mujāhid are the details indicating that wife beating was not a normal habit
amongst the early Muslims: both Habība and her father are outraged at her husband’s slap
(latam), so much so that they go to the Prophet to complain about the situation. Indeed,
Muhammad agrees with them and orders her to take vengeance on her husband.
However, in both versions of the hadīth God intervenes to correct Muhammad’s opinion.
Instead of finishing the sabab al-nuzūl, at this point Muqātil goes through the
verse that was revealed, pausing to explain:
Men are qawwāmūn over women. They say it means that men are in authority
over women (musallatūn). With what God has given some more than others that is
that men have more rights than their wives and with what they spend of their
wealth meaning, husbands have been given more because they pay wives the
dowry. So they are in authority over women’s discipline (al-adab) and
restraining them (al-akhdh ‘alā yadayhinna). There is no legal retaliation [when a
men beat their wives], other than when they kill or wound them. At that, the
Prophet said, “I wanted one thing, God wanted another, and what God wants is
better.”238

In this exegesis, men’s financial maintenance is directly linked to their control over
women’s behavior and bodies. Muqātil first uses the term “in authority over” to describe
men’s relationship to women. He clarifies that men have more rights than women, and
that this is because of the dowry. In turn, men have a measure of control over women’s
behavior/morality: “they pay wives the dowry, so they are in control of women’s
discipline.” Thus, it seems that God has given men more wealth so they will have the
ability to pay their wives’ dowries, which in turn enables them to discipline them, and
restrain them from going astray. How far can this discipline and control go? Muqātil
explains that there should be no legal retaliation – of the type sought by Habība and her
father - except in cases of wounding (jarh) or death (nafs). This is one of several legal
opinions about the limits beyond which men can be legally punished for beating their
wives.

238
Muqātil, Tafsīr, 370-1.

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 This opinion on the legal extent of hitting seems to contradict the hadīth above,
which says that beating should be without causing severe pain, and the Prophet’s clear
preference in the sabab al-nuzūl. Instances such as this highlight the fact that hadīths are
not the source of law; in fact they sometimes contradict the law.239
Although different exegetes quote different legal rulings on the extent beyond
which beating can be punished (such as “not wounding or killing” or “not breaking open
the skull”) almost all also say that men’s hitting of women should not cause serious pain.
Mubarrih, the term that I have translated as “causing severe pain,” is actually of unknown
meaning: all content ascribed to it seems to come from exegesis and hadīths.
What appears to be a contradiction between the doctrine that men should “not
wound or kill” and the more restrictive doctrine that all hitting should be “without
causing severe pain” is not. “Without causing severe pain,” and other limitations such as
“with a tooth-stick,” are not legal rulings – they are recommendations about how hard
hitting should be, taken from the hadīths of the Prophet. If men cause serious injury with
their hitting, or if they hit with a cane instead of with a tooth-stick, they are not liable for
legal punishment, but they have gone beyond the boundaries of what the exegetes think is
proper. Such recommendations are not absent from books of law, but the focus of law
books is different from that of exegetical works: law books give the rulings from each
legal school and often discuss which one is proper and why, whereas works of exegesis
explain the implications of the verse, sometimes including the legal ruling. The
boundaries between these two types of work are porous, as is demonstrated by the fact
that some jurists include recommendations like those often found in works of exegesis,
and exegetes often include the legal ruling associated with the verse in question.240
Muqātil’s interpretation offers the most expansive definition of men’s authority in
these early texts. Men can beat women as long as they do not wound or kill them, men
can restrain women, and they are in charge of women’s discipline and morals. He offers
none of the restraints which characterize other early exegeses, such as Alī ibn Abī

239
This is demonstrated by Sadeghi in his dissertation The Structure of Reasoning in Post-Formative
Jurisprudence.
240
They can also include a variety of conflicting legal rulings in one work. In verses such as the women’s
witnessing verse, Q2:282, which are taken to be the basis for the law. Because I only deal with exegesis in
this dissertation, I do not attempt to offer a full analysis of the ways in which the content of law books
differs from works of exegesis.

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Talha’s description of obedience as being good to the husband’s family. And, also unlike
other early commentators, Muqātil specifies that the “obedient women” spoken of in this
verse are obedient to God and to their husbands.
Then, God Almighty described women, saying so the good women in the religion
are obedient meaning obedient to God and to their husbands.241

As in exegeses of Q2:228, women’s obedience to their husbands is linked to their

obedience to God. Subsequent exegetes elaborate on men’s control and women’s
obedience. They also dwell on Muhammad’s mistaken idea about retaliation between the
sexes, and God’s correcting him.
Ibn Wahb al-Misrī (d. 240/854) tells a version of the occasion of revelation, but
says that God revealed two verses when Muhammad ordered the legal retaliation. The
first, Q20:114, says Be not in haste with the Qur’ān before its revelation to you is
completed, but say, “Oh my Lord! Advance me in knowledge!”; then Q4:34 is
revealed.242 The clear message is that Muhammad spoke from his own judgment on the
matter, before he truly understood God’s law, which he should have waited for; the
method of rebuke – and interpretation - is another Qur’ānic verse. ‘Abd al-Razzāq (d.
211/826) has no compunction about saying that the Prophet’s opinion – to limit men’s
behavior – was incorrect.243
Although Muqātil gives one legal opinion, that men are legally liable for killing
or wounding their wives, ‘Abd al-Razzāq gives another opinion of the law: men will only
be liable for legal retaliation if they kill their wives in the course of a beating, but not if
they beat them with any less severity.
A man struck (sakka) his wife and she went to the Prophet, who wished to put
limits on the man’s behavior, so God revealed men are qawwāmūn over women.
Ma‘mar said, “I heard al-Zuhrī saying, ‘Even when men wound their wives, or
break the skin on their heads (shajjahā), no legal retaliation will be ordered
against them unless they attack and kill them, in which case the husbands are
killed in [retaliation for] their wives.244

241
Muqātil, Tafsīr, 370-1.
242
Ibn Wahb al-Misrī, Tafsīr, 41.
243
It does not, therefore, seem that the doctrine of the infallibility of prophets (‘isma) was well established
at this time.
244
‘Abd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr, 452.

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Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742), the person quoted in this opinion, was a student of the
Companion Ibn Zubayr, who transmitted hadīths and was learned in law (fiqh).245 As a
Successor (person in the second generation after the Prophet), his opinion is reliable;
nevertheless, other jurists disagree with his extreme opinion that only killing the wife
results in legal retaliation.
Exegetes until this point have focused solely on the marital rights seen to be
enshrined by this verse. Hūd b. Muhakkam adds a non-marital legal advantage – men’s
witnessing. He also quotes a different hadīth to explain the verse. Thus, his sources:
Men are qawwāmūn over women, meaning in authority over women’s discipline,
and restraining them. With what God has given some of them more than others
He made two women witnesses equivalent to one male witness, and gave men
more in inheritance. And with what they spend of their wealth meaning the
dowry. It is mentioned that the Messenger of God said “A woman without a
husband is wretched (miskīna).” It was said to him: “Even if she is rich?” He
said, “Yes, even if she has money, Men are qawwāmūn over women.246

Hūd takes this verse to apply to all men and all women, not just husbands and wives. He
uses several sources for his interpretation. Men have been made superior to women,
according to Hūd, in terms of the rules on witnessing, in which two women equal one
man in some cases, and in others women are not allowed to witness at all. Men have
been given more inheritance than women. Both witnessing and inheritance are
mentioned in the Qur’ān and are legal precepts.
The next new element in Hūd’s tafsīr is the hadīth which states that even if a
woman is rich, she is wretched without a husband, because of men’s relationship to
women. The implication is that women are spiritually and morally impoverished without
men’s guidance.247 He goes on to explain the physical punishment that men can mete
out, and he defines good women:

245
M. Lecker, “Al-Zuhrī,” EI2, v. 11, 565. Less likely, he could be Hārūn b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 232/846), a
Mālikī scholar in Egypt.
246
Hūd b. Muhakkam, Tafsīr, 377.
247
This hadīth is not in one of the six books, but a similar hadīth which appears in two more minor
collections is, interestingly, absolutely gender neutral. “Wretched, wretched, wretched, is a man without a
wife, even if he has money. And wretched, wretched, wretched, is a woman without a husband, even if she
has money.” This hadīth is in al-Hāfiz al-Haythamī and in al-Muttqī al-Hindī.

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 Al-Hasan said, “[Women are not allowed to seek legal] retaliation in cases other
than those in which [their husbands] inflict deep, gaping wounds (al-
mawdiha).”248 Al-Hasan sees anything else as discipline (adab).249

Hūd cites the opinions of Hasan al-Basrī, a famous Successor of the Umayyad period
who lived in Basra.250 Al-Hasan says that as long as husbands do not cause serious
injury, hitting is simply adab - punishment, or teaching their wives a lesson. Thus far,
three different legal opinions have been quoted to describe how hard men can hit their
wives: they may not kill them, or they may not kill or wound them, or they may not cause
deep, gaping wounds. As described above, the differences between these legal rulings
result from jurists’ disagreements about the limits beyond which men should be punished.
Other early exegetes have defined the obedient women as being obedient to God,
or to God and their husbands. Hūd cites Hasan al-Basrī as saying that women’s
obedience is owed just to their husbands; but he also cites the counter-opinion, that they
must also be obedient to God.251 This interpretation highlights the importance that the
exegetes place on women’s obedience to their husbands.

Summary: early interpretations of the beginning of Q4:34

These interpretations show that early exegetes explain Q4:34 by drawing on
hadīths, although not always directly citing them, on well-known legal opinions, and on
other Qur’ānic verses. These sources for interpretation shape the exegetes’ opinions, but
they are also shaped by the exegetes’ opinions, in ways both obvious (such as the choice
of what to include in the work of tafsīr) and more subtle: al-Dahhāk and others use
variations on the words of the verse itself in order to explain its meaning.

248
Mawdiha: a gaping wound which allows, so to speak, to see to the bone (blessure béante et qui fait,
pour ainsi dire, voir jusqu’aux os) Kazimirsky, Dictionnaire Arabe-Français, Cairo: 1875, v. 4, 891.
249
Hūd b. Muhakkam, Tafsīr, 1, 377.
250
H. Ritter, “Hasan al-Basrī,” EI2, v. 3, 247. Ritter says, “His fame rests on the sincerity and uprightness
of his religious personality, which already made a deep impression on his contemporaries… and above all
on his famous sermons and pronouncements in which he not only warned his fellow citizens against
committing sins, but commanded them to conconsider and regulate their whole life [sic] sub specie
aeternitatis, as he did himself.”
251
He says: “The good women those who are good to their husbands are obedient i.e., obedient to their
husbands, according to al-Hasan. And according to others, obedient to God and their husbands” (Hūd b.
Muhakkam, Tafsīr, 1, 377).

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 Most of the earliest interpretations of this verse last through time. The sabab al-
nuzūl of Habība bt. Zayd is quoted in one form or another in 51% of the 61 texts I
analyzed for this verse.
Obedience is a common theme. The interpretation that good women are obedient
to their husbands is cited in 38% of texts, whereas good women being obedient to God is
cited in only 23%. This reflects what the exegetes see as the subject matter of the verse:
proper relations in the household. 18% of works simply say that the good women are
obedient, without specifying to whom the obedience is owed. Yet ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha’s
statements limiting women’s obedience (that the obedience consists of being nice to their
husbands’ families and that it consists of their preserving their husbands’ property) are
each repeated only four times, or in 6% of texts.
Men’s control and financial maintenance are factors in most exegeses. 30% of
exegetes say that men are in authority over women, using a variety of terms. Adab –
disciplining, or teaching women a lesson, is even more highly cited: 36% of exegetes say
that men are in command over women’s adab or ta’dīb. 33% say that man’s superiority
(fadl) comes from the dowry, and slightly fewer (30%) say that it is because of
maintenance. Slightly fewer (18%) say that men restrain women.
The rights which are mentioned by Hūd b. Muhakkam, that men have more
inheritance and that they have a better status as witnesses, are cited by 23% and 20% of
exegetes, respectively.
A few interpretations from this period, like that of ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha, are not
widely replicated in later texts. The hadīth “a woman is wretched without a husband” is
in only one text other than that of Hūd b. Muhakkam. The somewhat cruel-sounding
ruling of al-Zuhrī that there is no retaliation in a marriage, even if the husband breaks
open the skin on the wife’s head, is in only four texts in total (three after the earliest
period). The mention of the husband’s legal ability to inflict any damage other than deep,
gaping wounds only occurs once.
Though most subsequent exegetes say that women must obey their husbands, only
a few speak of limiting that obedience despite the fact that several early exegetes do.
Thus, as in the exegeses for Q2:228, certain early exegeses are left out of most later

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works, whereas others are retained; later exegetes pick and choose which interpretations
to include. The result is often a stricter interpretation.

3.3 Al-Tabarī and his peers: variety in the discourse on gender

As in the early exegeses, there is no common theme that defines the exegeses of
al-Tabarī and his peers. This section explores the variety of their discourse on questions
of gender. It is important to note that there was variety in the discourse of these exegetes,
all living and writing at roughly the same moment in time. The particular matter of
debate in this period seems to be whether men have unlimited authority over their wives.
Only one exegete that I have reviewed in this dissertation seems to maintain
absolute neutrality regarding women’s capabilities in a way that is pleasing to modern
feminist sensibilities. In his description of Q2:228, al-Qummī did not cite issues of
men’s authority or any innate differences between men and women. His exegesis of
Q4:34 is similarly neutral on these questions.
Men are qawwāmūn over women, with what God gave some of them more than
others, and with what they spend of their wealth meaning, God made it obligatory
for men to maintain women monetarily. Then He praised women, saying, so the
good women are obedient… meaning they guard themselves when their husbands
are absent. In the narration of Abū Jārūd, on the authority of Abū Ja‘far, obedient
means obedient.252

Al-Qummī’s interpretation is exceptional because he does not connect men’s financial

maintenance with their status, or position of authority over women. And in this portion
of the verse, he limits women’s duties to guarding themselves in their husband’s absence.
He clarifies in the last part of the verse that women owe men sex; still, he does not
mention authority or innate differences, and he does not even mention if “obedient”
means to the husband or to God.
On the other hand, Ibn Wahb, as in his interpretation of Q2:228, cites both innate
and legal differences between women and men to explain this verse. He preserves many
aspects of early interpretations, while adding a few new elements.
Men are in authority (musallatūn) over women’s discipline (adab). With what
God has given some of them more meaning men, in rationality (‘aql) and shares in
booty and inheritance than others meaning women. And with what they spend of

252
Al-Qummī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 137.

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 their wealth meaning that the dowry and maintenance is obligatory for men and
not women. So the good women Ibn Wahb says, the ones who are good to their
husbands are obedient to God concerning their husbands.253

Ibn Wahb says that men’s authority over women is due to their superior rationality, and
the fact that they have more money than women because they get more shares in booty
and inheritance. Both of the latter rationales are legal advantages that men have over
women. Men’s financial and rational advantages over women put them in a position to
maintain them financially and morally: financial maintenance and payment of the dowry
is legally required of men.
Ibn Wahb also says that good women are obedient to God concerning their
husbands – a slight shift from the earlier statements: in this case, the obedience to God is
specifically in the realm of wifely duties. It is unclear from this exegesis if there is a
limit to men’s authority.
Al-Zajjāj, on the other hand, specifies limits on men’s authority; he also cites
different types of differences between men and women in order to justify men’s place.
Men are caretakers of (qayyim ‘alā) women in those matters that are obligatory;
as for anything else, no (fa-ammā ghayr dhālika, fa-lā)… Exalted and Almighty
God gave men this responsibility because of their superiority in knowledge254 and
judgment (tamyīz); and because of men’s monetary maintenance of women [by
giving them] the dowry and nourishment. And He says the good women are
obedient i.e., caretakers (qayyimāt) of their husband’s rights.255

Al-Zajjāj’s explanation of why men have been given authority over women is threefold:
an innate characteristic (judgment), an acquired skill (knowledge), and legal
responsibility (the dowry and maintenance). It is particularly interesting that he cites an
acquired trait – knowledge – in order to explain men’s position. This could be an
indication that women in his society did not usually reach high levels of learning.
In his interpretation of Q2:228, al-Zajjāj says that men have a responsibility for
meeting women’s sexual needs, and that men correct women through their guardianship.
Since he links that verse with this one, it makes sense to read the interpretations together:
men’s ability to correct women is logical since, in addition to men’s monetary

253
Ibn Wahb, al-Wādīh, v. 1, 151.
254
I have translated the term ‘ilm here as knowledge, but it could be used here as a synonym for yaqīn, or
intuition (according to Lane).
255
Al-Zajjāj, Ma‘ānī, v. 2, 48.

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maintenance of women, God has given men superior judgment and they often are able to
acquire more knowledge.
He specifies that only certain matters are men’s responsibility. His interpretation,
which limits men’s role, could indicate a controversy within early works about the extent
of men’s control over women. Earlier works cover a range of opinions on this issue. ‘Alī
ibn Abī Talha’s specific description of women’s obedience seems to place limits on
men’s control, whereas ‘Abd al-Razzāq asserts that men’s control over women is
unlimited. Unfortunately, given al-Zajjāj’s brevity, it is impossible to know if his
statement “as for anything else, no” is an explicit rebuttal directed towards those exegetes
who grant men unlimited control over women.
Another way in which al-Zajjāj differs from earlier exegetes is that he draws a
linguistic comparison between the husband’s role as caretaker of the wife’s rights and the
wife’s role as caretaker of the husband’s rights, by using the same word
(qayyim/qayyimāt) to describe them. This shows that the word qayyim may be
interpreted in a gender-neutral way, as caretaker, or responsible – unlike qawwāmūn,
which seems, in these texts, to refer exclusively to men.
Al-Zajjāj’s approach also differs from those taken by his peers: al-Qummī does
not mention men’s authority or any innate characteristics, and Ibn Wahb does not clearly
delimit men’s role. Like al-Qummī, al-Tabarī does not include any mention of men’s
intrinsic qualities which might distinguish them from women.
Abū Ja‘far [al-Tabarī] says that by men are qawwāmūn over women, God means
that men are women’s guardians (ahl qiyām ‘alā) for they discipline them
(ta’dībihunna) and restrain them (al-akhdh ‘alā yadayhinna) in those matters that
God has made obligatory for the women and themselves (the men).256

In this section of the interpretation, al-Tabarī lays out the basic relationship between the
sexes: men are women’s guardians. They discipline and restrain women in certain
matters – presumably if the women are disobeying God’s laws and refusing to have sex
with their husbands. Al-Tabarī goes on to explain why men have been put in the position
to discipline and restrain women.
With what God has given some of them more than others meaning, God has made
men superior to women, in terms of payment of the dowry, spending on the wives

256
Al-Tabarī, Jāmi‘, v. 8, 290.

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 from the men’s property, and providing them with provisions. That is the
superiority (tafdīl) given by God Almighty to men over women, and because of it
men have been made qawwām over women, executors of command over them, in
that part of women’s affairs that God has granted to men.257

Rather than men being distinguished by more rationality than women, or better judgment,
al-Tabarī explains that God has put men in a superior position to women because they
pay the dowry, and maintain them both monetarily and in other provisions. These factors
are established in both Qur’ān and law. It is due to this maintenance of women that men
have control over them. In other words, al-Tabarī thinks of marriage as a contract in
which men’s part is to pay for women’s maintenance and upkeep, and their wives’ part is
to obey their husbands “in the matters in which God has commanded obedience,”
meaning that they must have sex with them when the husbands wish.258 Like most early
exegetes, al-Tabarī places limits on women’s obedience. He goes on to support his
position by quoting early authorities; this is clearly the source for the reconstruction of
‘Alī ibn Abī Talha’s interpretation, which also limits women’s obedience, as discussed
above.259 As I mentioned in the summary of the early exegetes, this interpretation, which
seems to limit the extent of women’s obedience, is not widely cited after the early period.

Summary of the subsequent popularity of the new interpretations of al-Tabarī’s period

Some of the rationales cited by al-Tabarī and his contemporaries became very
popular in later exegeses. In particular, men’s superior rationality, which in this sample
was first cited by Ibn Wahb, was cited by 30 later exegetes, or 58% of the sample. The
other rationale which has to do with men’s nature as men was also popular: 25% of
subsequent exegetes specify that “some over others” means men over women.
Certain explanations of this period have to do with men’s rights or acquired
excellencies. 17% of subsequent exegetes say that men have more education, or
knowledge (‘ilm, ta‘līm) than women; 10% said, in one form or another, that men are the

257
Ibid., v. 8, 290.
258
That this is the wife’s duty becomes clear in al-Tabarī’s exegesis of the second part of 4:34, described in
Chapter 4.
259
Al-Tabarī says, “And what we have said, so have the interpreters.... on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbās, His
words men are qawwāmūn over women means that men are commanders, and that it is women’s
responsibility to obey them in those matters that God has ordered them to. And this obedience is their
being good to their husbands’ families, and preserving their husbands’ wealth. Men are superior because of
their spending and their efforts” (al-Tabarī, Jāmi‘, v. 8, 290).

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“executors of command” over women – in other words, they are in charge of them. Only
two exegetes (including Ibn Wahb) cite booty as one of men’s rights; al-Zajjāj was the
only exegete to say that men have superior judgment (tamyīz). Although early exegetes
seem to place a limit on men’s authority over women, nobody other than al-Zajjāj bluntly
states that men are only responsible for those things that God has made obligatory, “and
other than that, no.”
Some explanations have to do with women’s role. Five exegetes (11%) say that
women uphold men’s rights (ahl qiyām) using the same language as is used for men; an
equal number describe the “good women” as those who uphold the religion, and say that
men’s fadl is in their spending to nourish, or sustain, women. 6% of exegetes say that
women should be obedient to God concerning their husbands. Only one exegete, al-
Qummī, described the words “the good women” as God’s praise of women.

3.4 After al-Tabarī: analysis of objective truths and the practice of exegesis
Exegetes’ efforts to interpret using objective evidence should not be dismissed as
meaningless: it is an important indication of how they thought about their own enterprise.
Bringing in scientific evidence, for instance, is the exegetes’ way of ensuring accuracy in
their interpretations. The fact that they sought to use such arguments shows that they
were aware that their personal opinions might affect their interpretations, and they sought
to protect against this eventuality. This section offers an analysis of the way that
exegetes negotiated with their sources of authority, their own personal opinions, and their
milieux. I show that the effect of milieu was important in determining interpretation. For
instance, I argue that the interpretation of women’s deficient rationality came from the
exegetes’ common understanding, rather than from a hadīth or the position of their
schools of law.
Hadīth citation is one clear way to differentiate between different ways of writing
exegesis. As I described in Chapter 3, in early exegeses the authenticity of hadīths did
not seem to matter, but in later exegesis, some exegetes chose authenticity over content,
while others chose content over authenticity. One example of an exegete who chose
content over authenticity was Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, the first exegete in this sample to
cite a hadīth which has the Prophet saying: “The best of women is one who makes you

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smile to look at, obeys when you order her, and in your absence preserves herself and
your wealth.”260 This hadīth lays out the expectations of good women: that they be
pretty, obedient, chaste, and prudent. Like many hadīths cited in exegeses of this period,
this one is only in minor collections and is not in one of the “six books.”
In the exegesis of Q2:228, hadīths which were not in one of the six books only
had a limited shelf life: they soon lost popularity. However, this particular hadīth
remains popular though time, long after the period of canonization has passed.261
Because this hadīth makes sense to the exegetes, they retain it in their works, and do not
seem to mind that it is not in one of the major canonical collections.
The interpretation that men have excess rationality has been described earlier in
this dissertation; here, I will examine it in terms of the possibility that this interpretation
emerges from the hadīth on the subject. In al-Jassās’s interpretation, he explains that
men’s superior rationality is a key reason why they have been put in charge of women:
because of their rationality they are responsible for women’s moral education and for
managing them.262 It makes sense that men’s surplus rationality would be cited in
interpretations, since it is affirmed in a hadīth: because the opposite of surplus is
deficiency (naqs), saying that men have surplus rationality is the same as saying that
women have deficient rationality, which is confirmed in a hadīth saying that women are
deficient in rationality and religion.263 Thus far, interpretation seems to be moving in an

260
Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, v. 3, 940.
261
The exegetes to cite this hadīth were: Ibn Abī Hātim (d. 327/938), al-Jassās (d. 370/981), al-Tha‘labī (d.
427/1035), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), al-Haddād (d. 800/1397), al-Suyūtī (d. 911/1505), Muhsin al-Fayd
(d. 1091/1680), al-Huwayzī (d. 1112/1700), al-Mashhadī (d. 1125/1713) and al-Qūnawī (d. 1195/1781).
262
Al-Jassās’s interpretation reads: “Men’s support (qiyām) of women concerns disciplining them (ta’dīb),
managing them (tadbīr) and protecting them, because God has made men superior to women in rationality
(‘aql) and judgment (ra’y), and because God has made it obligatory for men to spend on women. The verse
has several implications, one of them being men’s superiority over women in status. [Another is] that men
are the ones who undertake women’s management (tadbīrihā) and their discipline (ta’dībiha), which
indicates that it is their responsibility to keep women in the house, and keep them from going out; it is
women’s responsibility to obey men and to accept their authority in those matters that are not sinful
disobedience (ma‘siya). The verse also indicates that their maintenance is men’s responsibility, because of
God’s words and with what they spend of their money and in light of His words He shall bear the cost of
their food and clothing on equitable terms [Q2:233]” (al-Jassās, Ahkām, v. 2, 229).
263
The hadīth reads: “The Prophet of God, during the feast of ’Adhā or Fitr was going to pray, and he
passed by a group of women. He said, ‘Oh women, give alms, for I have seen that you are the majority of
the inhabitants of Hell.’ They said, ‘Why, oh Messenger of God?’ He replied, ‘You curse a lot, and you
are ungrateful to your husbands. I have not seen anyone more deficient in rationality (nāqisāt ‘aql) and
religion (dīn), who can go straight to the hearts of judicious men, than you.’ They said, ‘What is our
deficiency in religion and rationality, oh Messenger of God?’ He replied, ‘Isn’t the testimony of one

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entirely objective way: when the interpreters wish to explain a verse more thoroughly,
they should draw on the canon, meaning the hadīths, other Qur’ānic passages, and early
interpretations, in order to explain the verse.
But if the hadīth were simply the source of this interpretation, exegetes would cite
both rationality and religion as rationales for the verse, because women’s deficiencies in
both rationality and religion are described in the hadīth. And exegetes who cite
rationality do not usually cite the rationale of religion, which sheds doubt on the
hypothesis that the hadīth was the source of interpretation. Men’s surplus rationality
appears as a rationale in exegesis long before surplus religion is mentioned. Al-Jassās’s
interpretation, for instance, does not speak of men’s and women’s morality or religious
standing in those terms. Although he does mention that men are responsible for women’s
moral education, without his actually including the word dīn (religion) we cannot be sure
that this is a reference to the hadīth and does not merely reflect the dominant
understanding of the relations between the sexes in his time.
In the corpus that I have examined, the first mention of surplus rationality is that
of Ibn Wahb (d. 308/920) while the first mention of surplus religion is in the exegesis of
al-Tha‘labī (d. 427/1035). And, whereas 29 exegetes of the 61 analyzed for this verse
speak of men’s surplus rationality, only 7 speak of men’s surplus religion. Every single
exegete who cites the rationale of men’s surplus religion also cites the rationale of men’s
surplus rationality. But only around a quarter of the exegetes who cite men’s surplus
rationality also cite men’s surplus religion.
It seems likely that men’s surplus religion was, like men’s surplus rationality, a
matter taken for granted by the exegetes. This would be the reason why men have the
responsibility for women’s moral education and discipline ascribed to them in some of
these exegeses, including that of al-Jassās. It also seems that the idea of rationality could
have encompassed some moral sense, and thus that saying “rationality” implied, in some
way, a superior moral understanding.264 If the exegetes had been relying solely on the

woman worth that of half of a man?’ They said, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘That is the deficiency in your rationality
(‘aql). And isn’t it true that when one of you has her menses, she doesn’t pray, nor fast?’ The women
replied, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘This is the deficiency in your religion’ (Sahīh Bukhārī, Leipzig: Krehl, 1862, v. 1,
85). The hadīth is also quoted in a shorter form in the book of witnessing (ibid., v. 2, 152).
264
The definition of rationality (‘aql) is complicated, and this is not the place for a full discussion.
Therefore, I will give a very nice summary of the term offered by Lane: “The knowledge of the qualities of

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hadīth for their understanding, this dominant understanding of men’s superior moral
sense makes it seem even more likely that they would have cited both parts of it
(rationality and religion), instead of just the half which speaks of women’s deficient
rationality. But they did not.
Al-Jassās’s citation of men’s superior rationality (and thus women’s deficiency in
it) is all the more interesting because he is a Hanafī jurist, and the Hanafī school of law
allows women to act as judges in most circumstances. Judging is a position which
requires rational thought; it also entails authority over the persons being judged. Yet al-
Jassās still believes that women have less rationality than men. In fact, six of the eight
Hanafī exegetes in this study say that men have more rationality than women, despite the
school’s view that women have the ability to act as judges. In their milieu, it was taken
for granted that women have less rationality than men, and worse judgment; this did not
mean that they had no rationality, and apparently they still had enough to judge in most
circumstances. Unlike the Hanafīs, other schools cite women’s deficient rationalty as the
reason why they cannot act as judges. Men’s surplus rationality was taken to be an
objective truth, and objective truths were included in exegesis.
Another type of objective truth is seen in the exegesis of al-Tha‘labī, who
mentions “trade and spending” (tasarruf wa-tijārāt) as one of the areas in which men are
superior to women. Even though the law allows women to trade, and it is known that the
Prophet’s wife Khadīja worked in trade, al-Tha‘labī knows that men are better at it:
therefore, he includes it among their superiorities.265
Not only was exegesis bound up with current understandings of men’s and
women’s abilities, but it also seems to have changed along with changing norms.
Hadīths which were cited by the exegetes in this study indicate that women were allowed
to go out at the time of the Prophet. Yet both laws and interpretation in the post-

things, of their goodness and their badness, and their perfectness and their defectiveness, or the knowledge
of the better of two good things, and of the worse of two bad things, or of affairs absolutely, or a faculty
whereby is the discrimination between the bad and the good… The truth is, that it is a spiritual light (Q,
TA) shed into the heard and the brain (TA) whereby the soul acquires the instinctive and speculative kinds
of knowledge, and the commencement of its existence is on the occasion of the young’s becoming in the
foetal state [or rather of its quickening,] after which it continues to increase until it becomes complete on
the attainment of puberty, (Q, TA), or until the attainment of forty years (TA)” (Lane, Lexicon, v. 5, 2114 –
15).
265
Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 3, 302. Al-Tha‘labī will appear again below, in his proper chronological place.

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formative period focus on restricting women’s mobility.266 In exegesis, al-Jassās says
that as a result of men’s disciplining and management of women, they are entrusted with
keeping women in their houses; the later exegete al-Tha‘labī, and subsequent exegetes,
list mosque attendance for communal and Friday prayers as one aspect of men’s
superiority to women.267 In other words, whereas mosque attendance might once have
been normal, by the time of al-Tha‘labī, it is considered to be one of men’s privileges
over women. Such changes in interpretation may indicate how the rationales used by the
exegetes reflect changes in the mores of the societies in which they lived. On the other
hand, changes in interpretation also reflect increasing sophistication in the way exegesis
was written; therefore increased regulations on women’s behavior could, on the one hand,
be taken at face value, and on the other be seen to reflect the ever-more sophisticated
analyses of the exegetes.
Exegetes were also influenced by current scientific understandings. Like al-
Jassās, Abū’l-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 375/985) wishes to explain why men have been
put in charge of women. He mentions two theories, one of which is a scientific analysis.
It is said that men are superior in rationality (al-‘aql) and management (al-tadbīr),
and God put them in charge of women because they have superior rationality to
women. It is [also] said that men have strength in their selves and their natures
which women don’t have, because men’s natures are dominated by heat and
dryness, and in that there is strength and power, whereas women’s natures are
dominated by moisture and coldness, which means softness and weakness, and
that is why men have been given the right to be in charge of women.268

Abū’l-Layth seeks to explain the verse using means other than just the canon or his own
views: he cites a well-established scientific fact about the differences between men and
women. In Abū’l-Layth’s interpretation, bodily humors affect men’s and women’s
strength – since women are cold and weak, men are better suited to take care of them.
The notion that men are hot and dry and women cold and moist goes back to the ancient
Greeks at least, and this type of scientific explanation of the differences between men and
women would have been current for a millennium before Abū’l-Layth wrote of it in his
exegesis. Though today’s biologists have new theories about men’s and women’s

266
Sadeghi shows that post-formative Hanafī laws moved to restrict women’s mosque attendance (Sadeghi,
The structure of reasoning, 75, described in full throughout Chapter 4).
267
Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 3, 302. Al-Tha‘labī will appear again below, in his proper chronological place.
268
Abū’l-Layth al-Samarqandī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 151.

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natures, for Abū’l-Layth this explanation is a scientific, objective, truth.269 The fact that
exegetes refer to objective truths shows that they are trying to guard against letting their
own whims affect interpretation - rather than just venturing an opinion, exegetes such as
Abū’l-Layth and al-Jassās explain the verse by drawing on the facts of which everyone in
their world was aware.270 Those objective facts help to explain the verse just as much as
referencing elements of the canon such as Qur’ān and hadīth.
While the fact that exegetes draw on well-known evidence tells us that they
considered such evidence to be a legitimate basis for interpretation, the values of the
exegetes become apparent in the way that they used these facts in order to justify men’s
control of women as well as their role as women’s moral guides and teachers.

Exegetical debates: souls and bodies

Although women’s deficient rationality was taken to be an objective truth, and
was not a subject of debate in these sources, some matters are a source of debate between
the exegetes. Men’s surplus religion, which received fewer citations than men’s surplus
rationality, seems to have been one such matter.
Al-Tha‘labī is the exegete who first introduces men’s surplus religion to interpret
this verse. Several elements in his interpretation refer directly to men’s superior religious
practice, including the points that men have surplus strength to worship, are more upright,
are prophets, go to Friday and communal prayers, and have the privilege of waging jihād.
The latter element is particularly interesting. In his exegesis of 2:228, al-Tha‘labī cites
hadīths which have to do with women’s jihād and women’s spiritual reward being equal
to, or greater than, that of men. But in this exegesis he cites Qur’ānic passages which

269
How truth is established is another question, because considerations of truth are undoubtedly also
affected by values. However, this particular “truth” about men’s and women’s natures would have been
seen by Abū’l-Layth as an incontrovertible scientific fact, not a matter of question or debate; even more so
because it had been current for so long and across many different cultures. The patriarchal interpretations
made by the exegetes do reflect their own values, but they also reflect the reality of life in most times and
places. The size of men’s and women’s brains has been used by modern Muslim commentators to justify
men’s place, as have other neuroscientific arguments. Conversely, the fact that men and women score
similarly on IQ tests has been largely ignored by the modern Muslim exegetes whose work I have reviewed
for this project. There is therefore a good basis for arguing that modern interpretations which ignore the
latter scientific fact are indeed affected by the values of the exegetes.
270
Al-Jassās was one of the ashāb al-ra’y, the advocates of the use of personal opinion in the law. But the
ashāb al-ra’y did not advocate unfettered personal opinion or whim, and Schacht explains that “the
distinction bedween the ahl al-hadīth and ashāb al-ra’y is to a great extent artificial” (Joseph Schacht,
“Ashāb al-Ra’y,” EI2, v. 1, 692).

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state that men should go out on jihād, whereas women should stay at home. He thus
seems to contradict himself; this is one example of the difficulty of actually knowing a
certain exegete’s point of view. At times exegetes argue for a particular point, but they
often cite many contradictory rationales. Works like that of al-Tha‘labī illustrate the
range of interpretations which he considered acceptable, rather than necessarily
explaining his personal point of view:
Qawwāmūn means those who do their utmost (bālighūn) to educate women
(ta‘līmihunna) and to discipline them (ta’dībihunna) and to put their affairs in
order (islāh amrihinna). With what God has preferred some of them over others
It is said [that this phrase means that men have] surplus rationality, surplus
religion and uprightness (yaqīn). It is said that [men have surplus] strength of
worship; that they have [more rights than women in] witnessing, for God has said
if there are not two men, then a man and two women [Q2:282]. Al-Qurazī said
[that men are superior] in spending and business (al-tasarruf wa’l-tijārāt); it is
said [that men have] jihād [whereas women do not], for God has said [to men] go
forth [equipped] lightly or heavily, and fight jihād [Q9:41] whereas He said to
women stay in your houses [Q33:33]. Rabī‘ says that [men have more rights in]
the communal and Friday prayers.271

This exegesis shows that, at this point in time, religious elements had become an
acceptable part of the exegetes’ discourse on Q4:34. Although many subsequent

271
I refer to these interpretations as “new,” but in fact al-Tha‘labī names sources which are unavailable
today. As mentioned in the introduction, interpretations which are “new” in this corpus are not necessarily
new to the exegetes citing them. The remainder of al-Tha‘labī’s exegesis, which also introduces several
other points, reads: “Al-Hasan [al-Basrī] says, it is because of spending upon them, for God Almighty says
and with what they spend of their wealth. Some say that [men have more rights because] it is possible for
men to have four wives, but more than one husband is not legal for women. It is said [that the verse refers
to] divorce, which is men’s prerogative. It is also said that it is the bloodwit, prophethood and it is said in
the Caliphate and ruling. Ismā‘īl b. ‘Ayyāsh... said, “The Messenger of God said that women are wretched
if they are not married” (Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf, v. 3, 302-3). Incidentally, a passage in Jishumī’s Tahdhīb
reads very similiarly to this passage – while not all of the details are the same, the ways in which men are
superior are listed in the same order as in al-Tha‘labī’s work, and most notably the mention of spending and
trading (tasarruf, tijārāt), which is quite unusual, is repeated in al-Jishumī. Al-Jishumī’s work reads (in
part): “The meaning of men are qawwāmūn over women is that they are supporters of their women, in
discipline (ta’dīb) and management (tadbīr), because of their superiority in rationality (al-‘aql), and
judgment (al-ra’y)… some of them over others it is said, in rationality and judgment, religion and worship,
and witnessing. It is said [that they have superiority in] spending and trading (al-tasarruf wa’l-tijārāt) on
the authority of the Qādī [in al-Tha‘labī he is named as al-Qurazī, and al-Qādī could be a scribal error]. It
is said that [men have superiority in] jihād, communal prayer and Friday prayer, on the authority of al-
Rabī‘. It is said that [men’s superiority is] in [their] maintenance [of women], on the authority of al-Hasan.
It is said that [men’s superiority is] in inheritance, bloodwit, and it is said in prophethood, and the
Caliphate. And it is said that [men’s superiority is due to] their rights in divorce and return [after a
revocable divorce], and his duties in terms of the dowry and maintenance [of wives]” (Al-Jishumī,
Tahdhīb, MS Maktabat Āl al-Hāshimī). Al-Jishumī’s tafsīr was not taken entirely from al-Tha‘labī: the
beginning of his discussion of 2:228 can be found in al-Tūsī’s tafsīr.

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exegetes cite aspects of men’s religious superiority, nevertheless there seems to be some
disagreement about it. Al-Qushayrī (d. 464/1062) distinguishes between men’s intellects
and endeavors, which, he says, are a part of men’s superiority over women, and their
selves/souls and bodies, which are not.
Men are distinguished by their strength, so their burdens are greater [than
women’s], because one’s burdens depend on one’s strength. And this Qur’ānic
phrase refers to intellects and endeavors (al-qulūb wa’l-himam), not selves and
bodies (al-nufūs wa’l-juthath).272

Al-Qushayrī specifies that men have been given more responsibilities than women
because they are better able to bear them; their intellects and endeavors are greater than
women’s, but their selves, or souls, and bodies are not a part of this verse. The
implication is that women’s bodies and souls might equal men’s, or that the question of
souls and bodies does not enter into this verse.
Al-Wāhidī, however, lists men’s bodies as one of the ways in which God has
made men superior to women:
With what God made men superior to women in rationality, bodies (al-jism),
knowledge, determination (al-‘azm), jihād, witnessing, and inheritance.”273

In addition to these legal and intrinsic characteristics distinguishing men from women, al-
Wāhidī introduces two hadīths that were also cited to explain verse 2:228: that if any
humans were ordered to prostrate themselves before another, it would be women before
their husbands, and that the husband is the wife’s heaven or hell.
These exegeses indicate that there may have been some discussion or debate on
the matter of whether men really have spiritual and physical superiority over women. In
the conclusion, I will show that certain non-tafsīr sources present an argument in favor of
women’s spiritual equality which is not represented in these works of tafsīr.

Summary: subsequent popularity of post-Tabarī exegeses.274

Exegeses of this verse after al-Tabarī were varied, but the descriptions of the
differences between men and women fall into four main categories: rights, religion,

272
Al-Qushayrī, Latā’if, v. 2, 25.
273
Al-Wāhidī, al-Wasīt, v. 2, 45.
274
After al-Tabarī, I studied 47 works of exegesis for this verse, and the following percentages are from
those 47 works.

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physical/mental differences, and duties. Furthermore, several hadīths are cited to explain
this verse. The most popular new rationale from this period was that men fight jihād and
women don’t, which was cited in 29% of later works. Men’s other rights first cited in
this period were: men have the right to unilateral divorce (in 19% of post-Tabarī
exegeses); men are allowed to have four wives (12%); men are rulers/caliphs (10%); men
go out on military raids (8%); men’s bloodwit is more than women’s (6%) and men have
superior spending (tasarruf) (6%). Les cited explanations, with only one or two citations
were: trading (tijāra), the right to confine women, status (manzila), men’s ability to be
judges, and the li‘ān procedure favoring men.
The religious differences which appeared for the first time in this period were:
that men can be prophets (23%), that they attend communal and Friday prayers (23%),
that they are stronger in worshipping (8%), and simply that they have a religious
superiority (14%).
New mental and physical differences between the sexes which appeared at this
time were: men having better judgment (ra’y) or (hazm) (29%); men are stronger (19%),
and have more determination/a firm will (10%). In only one or two works, was it
mentioned that men’s bodies are better, that their intellects and efforts make them better,
that they are better able to bear things, or that they are dominated by heat and dryness (as
opposed to women’s moisture and coldness).
Men’s duties towards women often count as a part of their superiority. 14% of
post-Tabarī works mention that men are responsible for women (mubālighūn or a
variation); 10% mentioned that men must educate women (ta‘līm) or manage them
(tadbīr); slightly fewer said that it is men’s responsibility to protect or guard women, and
two works, or 4%, mentioned that men put women’s affairs in order.
Several hadīths were adduced to interpret this verse at this time, and of these the
most popular was one which states that the best of women is one who is good looking,
and obedient (21%). Half that number of exegeses cite the hadīth in which the Prophet
says that if any humans were to prostrate themselves before other humans, it would be
wives before husbands. Other hadīths were cited less frequently, by only one or two
exegetes.

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 Many of these rationales were cited at a later period in the exegeses of Q2:228. In
exegeses of Q4:34 the discourse about why men should be put in charge of women is
already quite well developed by the time of al-Wāhidī. This is especially noticeable since
in al-Tabarī’s age and before, explaining the “why” of a verse was quite rare; it was not
something done by al-Tabarī himself or exegetes previous to him, although al-Tabarī’s
contemporary Ibn Wahb cites men’s rationality as an aspect of their superiority over
women.

3.5 After al-Wāhidī: Justifying men’s position; encouraging their good behavior
In this period, the content of exegeses of Q4:34 changes in three ways: the
discourse is developed on men’s responsibility to teach women, and on their religious
superiority; at the same time, some exegetes say that men’s authority over women should
not be unlimited, and that they should behave properly in order to deserve such authority.
Finally, the Mālikī al-Qurtubī says that if men cease to maintain women (financially),
then they are no longer qawwāmūn over them: their wives can divorce them. The latter
reflects the Mālikī position in law, and thus it is one of the first times that there is a clear
differentiation between schools regarding a major tenet of Q4:34. Because of the
significance of this development, I divide this period into two sections: one to analyze
Mālikī positions on Q4:34, and the other to examine the views of the non-Mālikī
exegetes. Interestingly, earlier Mālikīs do not include this provision in their texts. Nor
do any Shāfi‘īs, although it is also the Shāfi‘ī view.
The interpretations of this period provide further examples of the ways in which
exegetes negotiated between their authoritative sources, their personal opinions, and the
opinions commonly held in their societies. In particular, I focus on the fact that the legal
tenets of the school did not always appear in works of exegesis, being rejected in favor of
more popular understandings.
Yet some elements of exegeses in this period were matters of debate. One of
these was whether the verse applied to all men and all women. A few exegetes’
interpretations allow for the fact that some men may not be suitable to hold a position of
authority over women. The method of accomplishing this interpretation is to question the
apparent meanings of words in the Qur’ān and hadīths.

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Mālikī explanations of qawwāmūn.
According to Mālikī law, men’s non-payment of maintenance results in the
women’s right to divorce. One Mālikī exegete in this period clarifies that if the man does
not pay maintenance, then he is no longer qawwām over his wife. Yet this does not mean
that Mālikīs have a significantly different description of men’s duties towards women, or
of the nature of men’s place as qawwāmūn. And it is interesting that in only one Mālikī
source is the legal ruling made explicit. Earlier Mālikīs simply do not mention it, and
could easily be mistaken for exegetes of other schools. For instance, the Mālikī Ibn al-
‘Arabī says that men must correct women even though he is a jurist writing a work of
Ahkām al-Qur’ān. Since the purpose of works of Ahkām al-Qur’ān is to explain the
rulings associated with the verses, it is all the more noticeable that he leaves out the
Mālikī ruling on support, instead focusing on husbands’ duties to teach their wives about
proper religion and to seclude them:
Men are entrusted with managing women (amīn ‘alayhā); they are responsible for
their affairs (yatawallā amrahā), and they correct women’s natural state, and this
is what Ibn ‘Abbās said. Women owe men obedience… It is the husband’s
responsibility to pay dowry and maintenance, to provide good company, to
seclude his wife and order her to obey God, and to transmit to her the Islamic
teachings regarding prayer and fasting which are duties for all Muslims. It is the
wife’s responsibility to preserve his wealth, be good to his family, obey his order
regarding seclusion and other matters, unless she has his permission [to go out],
and to accept his word regarding obedience [to God].275

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s method in explaining the verse is to quote previous authorities. He cites
‘Alī ibn Abī Talha without naming him, and he names Ibn ‘Abbās. However, the opinion
that he attributes to Ibn ‘Abbās is not one which appeared in early exegeses of this verse.
The true source of this interpretation (whether it was Ibn ‘Abbās’s, another exegete’s, or
simply Ibn al-‘Arabī’s alone) is unclear.
Ibn al-‘Arabī also gives legal rulings, such as the husband’s responsibility to pay
the dowry and maintenance, and to provide his wives with good company, and teach
them about the religion; he emphasizes that men should seclude women. Unlike most
exegetes, Ibn al-‘Arabī backs up his view by citing the hadīth which refers to women’s

275
Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ahkām, v. 1, 416.

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deficient rationality and religion; he makes this the organizing principle of the verse and
explains the verse’s rulings with the hadīth.276
In his description of how men are spiritually superior to women, Ibn al-‘Arabī
says that men have the right to command right and forbid wrong ‘alā al-‘umūm. This
phrase probably means that they have a public duty of commanding and forbidding.
Women may have such a duty within their own homes, but they are not responsible for
commanding right and forbidding wrong in the public space.
Like Ibn al-‘Arabī, the Mālikī Ibn ‘Atīya (d. 546/1151) does not mention the
Mālikī ruling on women’s right to get divorced in the event of lack of financial support.
Instead, he says that because marriage involves financial payment, it means that men
have a certain type of ownership of women.
Qawwām is of the emphatic form [of the word], and that means concern for
something, having exclusive control (istibdād bi’l-nazar) over it, and protecting it
diligently. The qiyām of men over women is of this type. Saying that the cause
of this is superiority and expenditure entails that men have a certain mastery and
ownership of them.277

Kecia Ali has an extensive discussion of marital laws in her dissertation, Money, Sex, and
Power, in which she points out that comparisons between marriage and slavery do not
mean that the jurists really thought of marriage and slavery as the same thing.278
However, she also points out that jurists saw the payment in marriage as entailing men’s
ownership of the right to sex with his wife.

276
He says: “God gave men the right of authority over women, because men are superior to women in two
ways: the first, perfection in intellect (kamāl al-‘aql) and discernment (tamyīz). The second, perfection in
religion (kamāl al-dīn), obedience concerning jihād, commanding the right and forbidding the wrong for
the general public (‘alā al-‘umūm), and other matters. And this is what the Prophet, s, said in the
authenticated hadīth: “I have not seen people more deficient in reason and religion, who can go straight to
the hearts of judicious men, than you.” The women then said, “What is the deficiency in our religion, oh
Messenger of God?” He said, “Doesn’t one of you spend the night without praying or fasting? That is the
deficiency in her religion. And the testimony of one of you is half of a man’s testimony, and that is her
deficiency in reason.” And God Almighty has legislated this deficiency by saying, if one of the two errs,
the other one will remind her [Qur’ān 2:282]” (Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ahkām, v. 1, 416).
277
Ibn ‘Atīya, al-Muharrar, 2, 47. Although his exegesis of 2:228 seems primarily derived from al-Tabarī,
in the exegeses of 4:34, it is less clear that Ibn ‘Atīya relies solely on the earlier text. His exegesis of 4:34
includes one interpretation that is not a part of the canon until the 6th/12th century: that men have a type of
ownership of women, who are their possessions; he also adds, unlike al-Tabarī, that women are deficient in
rationality.
278
Ali, Money, Sex, and Power, 422.

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 Like many interpretations, then, Ibn ‘Atīya’s does not focus on women’s rights,
but rather on men’s duties. Mālikī discussions such as his do not anticipate al-Qurtubī’s
statement that men’s failure to pay results in women’s ability to get a divorce. Al-
Qurtubī first explains the nature of men’s management of women, and gives a list of
reasons why they have been put in this position.279 Thus, from the beginning it is not
clear that his discussion will be any different from that of other Mālikīs. But after
thoroughly detailing the numerous reasons why men have been given such control over
women’s lives, he admits that if men do not uphold their financial end of the bargain,
women have the right to a divorce:
And with what they spend of their money when husbands are incapable of paying
maintenance then they are not qawwām over their wives, and since they are not
qawwām over them, then the wives have the right to annul the contract, due to the
cessation of the intention for which the marriage was legislated. In this is a clear
proof as to the annulment of the marriage in cases of nonpayment for maintenance
and clothing, which is the opinion of the schools of Mālik and Shāfi‘ī. Abū
Hanīfa says it is not annulled.280

According to al-Qurtubī, marriage is a legal contract which has a central point: the
maintenance of women, in exchange for their obedience. If the husband fails to pay, his
wife can divorce him. Although the Shāfi‘īs also agree with this rule, the Shāfi‘ī
exegetes studied here do not mention it. This could be a debate that only cropped up
occasionally in the exegetical canon, or it could be another instance of society’s norms
influencing interpretation.
Although dependent on payment, men’s qiwāma is justified by their inherent
qualities, both mental (rationality) and physical (men are hot and dry, while women are
cold and moist).281 The physical, intrinsic nature of their differences means that, while

279
He says: “[Qawwām] is that men are managers of women, they discipline them, and they keep them in
their homes, preventing them from going out (al-burūz). Women must obey in those matters that are not
sinful disobedience (ma‘siya). The explanation for this ruling is in men’s superiority, management,
rationality, strength, that they have been ordered to fight jihād, that they have been given inheritance, and
the [responsibility to] command right and forbid wrong. Some [exegetes] have the opinion that the
superiority is due to men’s beards, but this opinion is worthless (laysa bi-shay’)” (Al-Qurtubī, Jām‘ al-
Ahkām, v. 5, 169).
280
Ibid., v. 5, 169.
281
He says: “It has been said that men have superiority over women in rationality and education, and thus
the right of guardianship over women was given to men. It is said that men have bodily and natural
strength that women don’t have, because the nature of men is dominated by heat and dryness, and in that
there is strength and power, and the nature of women is dominated by moisture and coldness, and that
means gentleness and weakness, so men were given the right of guardianship over women by virtue of

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men’s violation of the marriage contract can result in divorce, it is only men who may be
qawwām over women: presumably, even exceptional women cannot reach the stature of
men.
One more exegete, the Mālikī/Shāfi‘ī Abū Hayyān, mentions that nonpayment can
result in divorce. He draws on the writings of al-Qurtubī and Ibn al-Jawzī, a Hanbalī. I
will quote Abū Hayyān’s interpretation at the end of the section in order to show the
cross-school influence on his work.

Limits on men’s authority

The idea that men’s behavior could affect their status as qawwāmūn over women
is represented in different ways by other exegetes. Several exegetes express concern that
men should act in a way that befits their position as commanders of and supporters of
women. Ibn al-Jawzī and Abū Hayyān even go so far as to say that men are only
qawwāmūn over women “when they are men.” This interpretation is particularly
interesting because it sets up “man” as a gender category involving certain specific
behaviors, rather than simply defining “men” according to the physical characteristics of
the sex.
Exegeses which say that men’s authority should be exercised in certain ways, or
that their authority is only merited by certain behaviors, are important because they argue
against the position that men have unlimited authority; this is one example of how pre-
modern exegesis on the subject of women cannot simply be dismissed as dogmatic or
misogynist. Although rare in the period between al-Tabarī and al-Wāhidī, such
limitations on men’s authority are not without justification in early sources: in the earliest
texts, women’s obedience was sometimes limited to “those matters in which God has
commanded obedience.”
Men’s responsibility to treat women well is always justified by these authors: it is
either a result of their power over women, or of their innate superiorities over women;
men’s religious superiority is especially emphasized in texts of this period. Therefore,
these authors’ concern for women’s welfare should not be seen as subverting the

those qualities, and by virtue of the words of God Most High, with what they spend of their money” (al-
Qurtubī, al-Jāmi‘, v. 5, 169).

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patriarchal household structure, but rather as supporting it and providing further
justification for it.
Al-Zamakhsharī likens the man’s position to that of the governor over the people,
and says that this governorship is merited by men’s superiority, not by their ability to
subjugate women.282 He then lists the ways in which men are superior:
Men are the commanders [of right] and forbidders [of wrong], just as a governor
guides the people... The “some” in some of them refers to all men and all women.
It means that men are only in control over women because God made some of
them superior, and those are men, to others, and they are women. This is proof
that governance is only merited by superiority (tafdīl), not by dominance, an
overbearing attitude, or subjugation. Concerning the superiority of men over
women, the exegetes mention rationality (‘aql), good judgment (hazm),
determination, strength, writing – for the majority of men – horsemanship,
archery, that men are prophets, learned (‘ulamā’), have the duties of the greater
and lesser imamate, jihād, call to prayer, the Friday sermon, seclusion in the
mosque (i‘tikāf), saying the prayers during the holidays (takbīrāt al-tashrīq),
according to Abū Hanīfa they witness in cases of injury or death (hudūd and
qisās), they have more shares in inheritance, bloodwit (himāla), pronouncement
of an oath 50 times which establishes guilt or innocence in cases of murder
(qasāma), authority in marriage, divorce, and taking back the wife after a
revocable divorce, a greater number of spouses, lineage passing through the male
line, and they have beards and turbans.283

The obvious aspect of this interpretation is its comparison of marriage to politics: every
state needs a leader to guide it correctly, as does every household. A more subtle aspect
is that al-Zamakhsharī mentions that “some of them” and “others” indicates that all men
are fit to exercise authority over women and all women should be subject to this
authority. Men’s superiority is not a question of “dominance and subjugation.” It is not
merited purely because men are apt to dominate and women to be dominated; if that were
the case, it could be that some strong women could dominate men. Rather, he explains,
men deserve to be put in charge of women because of the qualities that he lists, which
include personal attributes (rationality, judgment, strength, determination), skills (writing,
archery), and legal rights (witnessing, bloodwit, authority in marriage, divorce, the
privilege of waging the jihād, and so forth). This combination of qualities means that,
even if women can match men in certain ways, they will never achieve every aspect of

282
Al-Jishumī’s tafsīr, which was an earlier Mu‘tazilī tafsīr, does not have a similar discussion; I have
quoted his exegesis above, as it seems in part to be taken from that of al-Tha‘labī.
283
Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, v. 1, 505.

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men’s superiority over them, which is why, in his view, the verse refers to men
collectively being in authority over women collectively. The implication is that men
should not be overbearing, nor should they subjugate women, in their assertion of their
rights.
It is impossible to know, from the sources analyzed here, whether al-Zamakhsharī
was responding to a discourse that said that some women could equal men in certain
innate ways, such as rationality. Such a view only appears much later in the exegeses I
have examined.
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī explains that men and women are actually equal – in
monetary terms. He explicitly states that God has created a fair and equal financial
system for men and women; this was mentioned in the early exegesis of Muqātil b.
Sulaymān, but seems to have been left aside since that point.284 One sex, says Fakhr al-
Dīn, has not been made absolutely superior to the other in terms of the money disbursed
to each because inheritance is a provision for the maintenance of families. In order to
explain this, he cites a different Occasion of Revelation than the one involving Habība
and her husband’s slap.
Know that God Almighty said, do not covet that which God gave some of them
more than others. We have mentioned that the occasion of the revelation of this
verse is that women were talking about the superiority (tafdīl) given by God to
men over them in inheritance. Thus God mentioned in this verse that when He
gave men an advantage over women in inheritance, it is because men are
supporters (qawwāmūn) of women. God said that they share in [sexual]
enjoyment, each of the other, then He ordered that men pay the dowry to women,
and give them maintenance (nafaqa) so what was more for one of the two sides
[in inheritance] is comparable with more for the other [in payment of dowry and
maintenance]. He did not prefer anyone absolutely, and here He clarifies the
method of [household] organization.285

In the Occasion of Revelation cited by Fakhr al-Dīn, women asked the Prophet why men
had been given more inheritance than women, and this verse was revealed showing that
men’s greater inheritance is because of their financial support of women. Fakhr al-Dīn
thus explains the verse as a system of social organization, in which men get more in order
to be in a position to provide for women.

284
Muqātil says: “and with what they spend of their wealth} meaning, husbands have been given more
because they pay wives the dowry” (Muqātil, Tafsīr, 370-1).
285
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, v. 10, 87.

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 Although financial support explains men’s greater inheritance, men’s support
goes beyond the financial. Men are responsible for women: they do their utmost to
command good with regards to women, and one is called the qawwām of a woman when
he protects her.286
Fakhr al-Dīn does not define qawwāmūn as being commanders of women. But he
emphasizes two aspects of men’s responsibilities towards women: they must protect
them, and they must command them right and forbid them wrong. This exegesis
highlights the dual nature of men’s responsibilities: on the one hand, protecting, and on
the other, disciplining women. For Fakhr al-Dīn and most other exegetes, qawwām
involves both caretaking and control.
The fact that God has created equilibrium in men’s and women’s financial status
does not mean that men are not superior to women in other ways. He describes two ways
in which men have been made superior to women: in legal rulings and in actual
characteristics, which he describes as men’s knowledge and power.287 This explanation
is followed by the almost-verbatim quotation of the above-cited passage from al-
Zamakhsharī, explaining the ramifications of men’s superiority.288 Fakhr al-Dīn does not
just explain the various abilities of the sexes, but categorizes them, putting earlier
exegeses into a framework which explains how the disparate interpretations of the verse
fit together.
In each of the foregoing exegeses, the exegetes have mentioned certain ways in
which men and women’s positions are equalized. In some cases, men’s governance does
not justify their oppression of women; in other cases, men’s governance and power over

286
Ibid., v. 10, 88.
287
Know that men’s superiority over women has many aspects, some of which are actual characteristics
(sifāt haqīqīya), and some which are legal rulings (ahkām shar‘īya). As for the actual characteristics, know
that the advantage may be traced to two things, [namely] knowledge and strength; there is no doubt that the
minds of men and their knowledge is greater [than women’s], and there is no doubt that men are better able
to undertake physical labor [than women] (Ibid., v. 10, 88).
288
“And for these two reasons, men have an advantage over women in rationality (‘aql), prudence (hazm),
strength (quwwa), writing - in the majority of cases - horseback riding, shooting, in that men are prophets
and are learned (‘ulamā’), in that they have the greater and lesser imamate, jihād, calling to prayer,
delivering the Friday sermon, spending the night in the mosque, witnessing in cases of hudūd and qisās,
maintenance in marriages according to Shāfi‘ī, more of a share in inheritance and more men inherit than
women do, in the blood price in cases of murder and crimes, in shares, governance in marriage, divorce,
return, number of wives, and that lineage passes through the male line. All of these factors indicate men’s
advantage over women” (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr) v. 10, 88.

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women is the very reason that they must be kind to them. But in no case is men’s
ultimately superior position questioned.
Thus, when Ibn al-Jawzī states that not all men are qawwāmūn over all women,
this is significantly different from the other texts of his era. He introduces the idea that
men can only be qawwāmūn over women “when they are men,” which may be taken as
an indication that men must fulfill certain duties to qualify for their rights over women.
In other words, “men” is a term connoting specific behaviors and attributes, rather than
simply being a designation of sexual difference.
Qawwāmūn means that men are in control of disciplining women with regards to
[your] rights [over them]. Hishām b. Muhammad [al-Kalbī] narrated, on the
authority of his father, concerning His words men are qawwāmūn over women
that Muhammad [the father of Hishām] said, when they are men. And he recited:
Is every man that you consider [really] a man? And is everything that you light at
night [really] a fire?289

Ibn al-Jawzī’s interpretation is a clear rebuttal of the idea that all men are qawwāmūn
over all women that was put forth by al-Zamakhsharī. Thus, this represents a significant
point of debate amongst the exegetes. The justification for this opinion comes from
Muhammad b. al-Sā’id al-Kalbī (d. 146/763), author of a tafsīr which was said to be the
longest ever composed (in its time).290
The Mālikī Abū Hayyān (d. 745/1353) modifies Ibn al-Jawzī’s interpretation that
only some men are eligible as qawwāmūn by saying that the verse refers to this gender
over that gender in general, and that it doesn’t speak about specific cases.291 In other
words, some men might not be qawwāmūn over women.
It is said: the meaning of “men” here is someone who is discreet and trustworthy,
it is not only people with beards. Some people with beards have no good [in
them], nor harm, nor esteem; [they are of no consequence]. Thus it is said: a man
between masculinity and manhood (rujliya wa-rujūla). Because of that an
exegete [namely Ibn al-Jawzī] comes to the conclusion that in the words the
intention is elided: men are qawwāmūn over women when they are men. [And he
quotes the following verses:] Is every man you consider [really] a man? And is
everything you light at night [really] a fire?

289
Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād al-Masīr, v. 2, 74. “A-kulla imri’in tahsibīna ’mra’an wa-nāran tuwaqqiddu bi’l-laylī
nāran?” This bayt is in Sībawayh. My thanks to Joseph Witztum for his assistance with this verse.
290
He was said to be an Imāmī, but was such an authority that “even his detractors draw on him as a
source” (W. Atallah, “al-Kalbī,” EI2, v. 4, 495).
291
Abū Hayyān, al-Bahr, v. 3, 249.

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 The clearest interpretation is that this verse only deals with the question of
the whole sex; the question of individuals is not addressed. It as though it says,
this type is qawwām over that type… the meaning of the first “some” is men, and
the second is women, so the meaning is that men are qawwāmūn over women.292

Abū Hayyān describes what it is that makes up a man: “man” is a term that refers to
attitudes and behavior, such as discretion, trustworthiness, and esteem. He thereby
refutes Humayd’s notion that the beard is the distinguishing factor between men and
women. He specifically assesrts that, without masculine qualities, a “man” has no right
to be qawwām over women.293
These two exegetes, who define manliness as the true hallmark of a man, rather
than ascribing the differences to physical characteristics, go against the plain sense of
Q4:34, which makes no such qualifications. In order to clarify what God really meant by
theis phrase, they redefine its basic terminology. If one understands “men” not to refer to
physical sexual characteristics, but rather to a set of behaviors and attitudes, then men are
qawwāmūn over women. But people who look like men, without behaving in a manly
way, cannot really be called men, and therefore cannot be qawwāmūn. According to
these exegetes, it is inconceivable that God really meant that un-manly men could be in
authority over women. However, it should be noted that they do not question the basic
tenets of the text, which is that when men are manly, they are in authority over women.
The trends described in these exegeses are notably different from those in other
exegeses of this period, in which men’s responsibilities towards women are not
emphasized, but their religious superiority is. The new interpretations made by al-
Baydāwī (d. 685/1286) stress men’s ability to perform religious duties: he says that men
have “more strength [than women] for [religious] acts and pious deeds, which is why
they are endowed with prophecy, imamate, governorship, and performing religious
ceremonies.”294 Al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310) has an interpretation which is close to that of al-
Zamakhsharī, but with minor changes; he adds, for instance, that men have “perfection”

292
Ibid., v. 3, 248-9
293
The phrase he uses (namely, rujlīya wa-rujūla, between masculinity and manhood) is taken from the
grammatical synopsis of the root r-j-l which the lexicographer Ibn Manzūr cites as coming from the
grammarian Ibn al-A‘rābī. Other words from this same entry are found in al-Wāhidī’s and al-Tūsī’s
exegeses of Q2:228. See Ibn Manzūr, “r-j-l,” Lisān al-‘Arab, v. 5, 155.
294
Baydāwī, in the Hāshīyat al-Qūnawī, v. 7, 145

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in their praying and fasting.295 This refers to the fact that women cannot pray or fast
when they are menstruating.

Summary of new exegeses between al-Wāhidī and Ibn Kathīr

One of the most interesting developments of this period was the inclusion of
several caveats, or tempering explanations, of men’s rights over women. These included
the citation of the hadīth in which women ask about men’s preference in inheritance and
are reassured that men have to pay them maintenance, and a straightforward explanation
that men’s preferred status in inheritance is in exchange for maintenance of wives. Each
of these explanations were cited 4 times, or in 12.5% of post-Wāhidī exegeses. Other
explanations of this type were that men are not preferred over women absolutely, that
men’s preference is not merited by dominance and subjugation, and that the verse does
not refer to all people with the physical characteristics of men, but rather to those who
behave in a manly way. These interpretations represent an important trend, but it is a
trend absent from the majority of the new interpretations cited in this period.
Most of the new exegeses in this age focus heavily on men’s responsibilities and
the ways in which their religious obligations differ from women’s. Often the lines
between men’s duties and their religious obligations are blurred because men’s
responsibilities towards women have religious significance. The new exegesis from this
period which was most popular in later ages was that men command right and forbid
wrong with regards to women, as a governor guides the people; of the 32 exegetes in this
study who died after al-Wāhidī, 8 (25%) cite this rationale; an equal number cite men’s
right to assume the greater or lesser imamate. Slightly fewer (6, or 19%) cite men’s right
to call to prayer, and 5 (15%) cite men’s responsibility to teach women about religion.
Related exegeses, citing either men’s responsibility for women or their preference
religiously (or a combination of the two) were: men’s guardianship of women, upholding
women’s interests, men’s responsibility for women, their responsibility to protect
women, to command right and forbid wrong (to the general populace, rather than just
toward their wives), to keep women secluded indoors, and to provide them with good
company. Other new interpretations cited in this period which had to do with men’s

295
Al-Nasafī, Tafsīr, v. 1, 328.

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rights were: their right to call to prayer and to go to mosque, and their having the strength
to undertake pious deeds and ceremonies. Put together, religious themes and the theme
of men’s responsibility for women predominate in the new interpretations of this period.
There were other new elements introduced into exegeses at this time, including
certain of men’s rights: that lineage goes through the male line (5 citations, or 15% of
exegeses after al-Wāhidī), that men have the right to divorce, and that they have
possession of women.
Two new physical explanations were adduced: that men have beards and that they
are more elegant than women. Several exegetes listed acquired skills or attributes as
aspects of men’s superiority over women, including that men are learned (‘ulamā’), that
most men can write, that men can ride horses, practice archery, and wear turbans.
The texts of this period highlight the complicated relationship between custom,
exegesis, and law. Many of the elements listed as men’s rights or superiority are theirs
by custom: women are capable of riding horses and writing, for instance, but customarily
they apparently did not do so, or were not very skilled when they did, and thus these were
listed as part of men’s superiority over women. Women are legally allowed to engage in
trade, but this too is listed as one of men’s superiorities over women. Thus custom
affects interpretation. But interpretation also seeks to alter custom. The exegetes’ desire
to affect customary practice is apparent in their exhortations that men should treat women
well. By admonishing men of the necessity of treating women kindly, and taking care of
them, exegetes wish to have an effect on daily practice.

3.6 New Exegeses after Ibn Kathīr

The exegeses of this period are long and detailed, but they offer only a limited
number of new explanations for this verse. Developments in this period include the
citiaton of several hadīths which have not been previously cited, and that Imāmī sources
differentiate themselves from Sunnī sources. The most exciting development is that one
author of a marginal commentary says that some exceptional women are not deficient in
rationality.

New Hadīths in Sunnī commentaries

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 Al-Haddād (d. 800/1397) seeks to explain the Occasion of Revelation of 4:34.
The Occasion, described above, is that the husband of Habība bt. Zayd slaps her, and they
both go to the Prophet, who orders retaliation. Al-Haddād explains that at the time when
the verse was revealed, “retaliation occurred in those days in cases of slapping, breaking
open the skin of the head (shajja) and wounding.”296 This explains why the Prophet
would have ordered the retaliation in favor of Habība. Al-Haddād’s explanation can be
seen as an attempt to make the story intelligible to the audience of his own day.
The long series of hadīths cited by al-Suyūtī includes interpretations of the
earliest exegetes, hadīths which have been cited in other works, and hadīths which appear
only here. Though he includes three densely-packed pages of commentary, nowhere does
he cite the hadīth which states that women are deficient in rationality and religion. Two
of the hadīths which he cites praise women of good morals.
What is most beneficial for a man, other than his faith in God, is a devoted
woman with good morals, who bears many children. And what is worst for a
man, other than his disbelief in God, is a sharp-tongued woman with bad
morals….
A good woman with a good man is like a crown of gold on the head of a king, and
a bad woman with a good man is like a [heavy] burden borne by an old man…297

In both of these hadīths, good women are praised, but only insofar as they benefit their
husbands. Their independent merit is not considered.
A couple of exegetes in this time further qualify the exact way that men’s
intellects differ from women’s, but without the use of hadīths. Abū’l-Su‘ūd (d.
982/1574) describes men as having sounder judgment (razānat al-ra’y).298 Al-Nākūrī
(1004/1505) says that men’s understanding “is not diminished,” which is a direct
reference to women’s deficiency in rationality; again it is worth noting the choice of
language, which carefully mentions a diminishment in connection with women, rather
than stating that women lack rationality all together.
God has given some more than others because of their elevated status, perfection
in knowledge, aim (hads), accomplishment (darak) and because their
understanding is not diminished.299

296
Al-Haddād, Tafsīr, v. 2, 249
297
Al-Suyūtī, al-Durr, v. 2, 151
298
Abū’l-Su‘ūd, Tafsīr, v. 1, 692.
299
Al-Nākūrī, Sawāti’, v. 2, 29.

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 In the age in which all exegeses are becoming more complex, it is not surprising
that the exegetes become more precise in their descriptions of men’s intellectual
superiority.

Imāmī sources
The Imāmī works of al-Qummī and al-‘Ayyāshī cited only Imāmī sources, but
other Imāmī exegeses quoted both Sunnī and Imāmī sources, and were hardly discernable
as Imāmī. The interpretation of al-Tūsī, for instance, is in line with Sunnī exegeses of his
time and he quotes the same early authorities that are quoted by many Sunnīs.300 Al-
Tabrisī’s exegesis is similarly not distinguished from Sunnī exegeses of his period.
However, the Imāmī works from the eleventh/seventeenth century once again
tend to quote only from Imāmī sources. Al-Bahrānī (1107/1695), for instance, cites an
involved and detailed hadīth describing why men are superior to women, which is only
partially cited in other sources.301 In this version, a delegation of Jews is asking the
Prophet about the relationship of men to women.
A delegation of Jews came to the Messenger of God, and the most learned of
them asked about several issues; among which was this question: “What is the
superiority (fadl) of men over women?” The Prophet said, “like the superiority
(fadl) of the sky over the earth, and like the superiority of water over the earth; for
water brings life to the earth. If it had not been for men, God would not have
created women, and God Almighty says: Men are qawwāmūn over women, with
what God has preferred some of them over others, and with what they spend of
their wealth.
The Jew said, “In what way is that so?” The Prophet said, “Adam was created
from earth, and from the surplus earth (fadla) and the rest of it, Eve was created.
In the beginning, Adam obeyed the woman [lit: women]. So God Almighty
expelled him from Paradise, and He clarified the superiority of men over women
in this world. Haven’t you seen how women menstruate and are not able to
worship, due to uncleanliness? Men are not afflicted by anything like
menstruation.

300
Al-Tūsī’s interpretation reads: “Men are qawwāmūn over women in discipline (ta’dīb) and education
(tadbīr) because God gave men more than women in rationality (‘aql) and judgment (ra’y). Al-Zuhrī says
that there is no retaliation between a man and his wife, except in cases of death...” (al-Tūsī, al-Tibyān, v. 4,
449).
301
Muhsin al-Fayd’s version reads: “[The Prophet] was asked: “What is the superiority (fadl) of men over
women?” He said, “Like the superiority (fadl) of the water over the earth. Water brings life to the earth,
and men bring life to women. If it had not been for men, women would not have been created.” Then he
recited this verse, and then said, “Have you not seen that women menstruate and are not able to worship
because of being unclean, whereas nothing like menstruation afflicts men” (Muhsin al-Fayd, Kitāb al-Sāfī,
v. 2, 232-3).

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 The Jew said, “We declare that you speak the truth, O Muhammad.”302

The evidence presented in this hadīth is so compelling, it is enough to convince a group

of Jews that Muhammad is telling the truth. Without men, women would not have been
created: as water brings life to the earth, men bring life to women. Men are the first and
superior creation, always able to perform the worship of God which is the purpose of
their existence on earth. Women, who are afflicted by menstruation, are not always able
to worship God; instead, their existence revolves around men. In the exegetical sources,
there is a debate about the nature of creation which I described in Chapter 2; the notion
that Eve was created from the soil left over from Adam’s creation, rather than from
Adam’s rib, is mostly found in Imāmī sources.
According to this hadīth, God had to clarify the proper relations between the
sexes after Adam obeyed Eve by eating the apple in the garden. It was because a man
obeyed a woman that they were expelled from Paradise; this went against the natural
order and the result was disastrous for Adam and, through him, for all of humankind.
Through Q4:34, God ensured that women would always obey men. Interestingly,
however, men’s superiority is specific to this world; this implies equality in the Hereafter.
Men’s inheritance was explained as specifically compensating for their
maintenance of women in several Sunnī sources after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Al-Bahrānī
has an interpretation with the same substance, but different particulars, from an Imāmī
source.
Abū’l-Hasan al-Ridā wrote to [Muhammad b. Sufyān] in order to answer some
questions, and among them was the proof of why it is that men are given more in
inheritance. It is because when women marry, they take, and the man gives.
Therefore, men have been endowed with more. Another proof for giving men
twice what is given to women is that women are men’s dependents. When they
have needs, it is necessary for men to provide for them, and to maintain them, but
women do not have to provide for men, nor do women maintain men even when
they are in need. That is why God said: Men are qawwāmūn over women.303

Although the wording here differs from Sunnī interpretations, the substance of this
interpretation (that men have been given more money because of their support of women)
is exactly the same as in certain Sunnī sources, like that of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Here

302
Al-Bahrānī, al-Burhān, v. 2, 74.
303
Ibid., v. 2, 74.

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the explanation is equally reasonable. There are two proofs as to the fairness of the
distribution of wealth in inheritance: that at the time of marriage men give dowry, and
that women are men’s dependents, but men are never dependents of women, even when
they are in need and the women are rich.304 This Imāmī agrees with the Sunnī
interpretation, even while drawing on an Imāmī source for the proof.
But there are cases in which Sunnī sources are critiqued. Al-Qummī al-Mashhadī
(d. 1125/1713) directly confronts the Sunnī occasion of revelation, saying that the
Prophet could not possibly have disagreed with God’s law.
Al-Baydāwī says, “Habība bt. Zayd, a wife of one of the prominent Ansārīs,
rebelled (nashazat) against her husband, so he slapped her. Her father went with
her to the messenger of God, s, and complained, and so the Messenger said, “Take
your vengeance on him.” Then this verse was revealed, and he said “I wanted one
thing and God wanted another, and that which God wants is better.”
This indicates the falsehood of what was transmitted. It does not follow, from our
information, that the Prophet, s, would come to an opinion which had not been
revealed to him; but in this narration, he judges according to his opinion and then
the verse is revealed which is contrary to his opinion. This is the opposite of the
way things should be.305

Al-Mashhadī’s attack centers on the fact that the Prophet’s infallibility should have
prevented him from having an opinion contrary to God’s. The doctrine of infallibility is
not just an Imāmī doctrine, yet no Sunnīs in this study disavow this story.

Exceptional women
Some earlier exegetes mentioned that some men do not qualify as “men,” and said
that the verse legislates for one sex over another, but does not take individuals into
account. These exegeses hint that some exceptional women may equal men. But no
exegete in this study states this outright until the Hanafī al-Qūnawī (d. 1195/1791). In his
commentary on al-Baydāwī, he says that the verse legislates for men to be given
authority over women, but that some individual women may surpass some men. Al-
Baydāwī’s commentary is in bold, and al-Qūnawī’s commentary is in plain text.
Because of God’s making men superior to women. Concerning the partitive
“some of them”, it refers to the majority.

304
Though this interpretation reflects the law in the matter, it is debatable whether it was practiced.
305
Al-Mashhadī, Kanz, v. 2, 428.

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 Due to their perfection in intellect, good management, and greater strength
for pious deeds and religious ceremonies. The ruling here is with regards to the
sex [as a whole] and it is not inconsistent [with the ruling] that the makeup of
some individual women surpasses, in the matters mentioned, some individual
men.306

This is the first time in these texts that the notion of women’s absolute inferiority has
been directly countered. By saying that certain exceptional women may reach men’s
level in both rationality and religious deeds, al-Qūnawī directly challenges the universal
applicability of both parts of the “deficient in rationality and religion” hadīth.307 This
discourse might have developed from that of Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) and Abū Hayyān
(745/1353); if so since al-Qūnawī died in 1195/1791, it shows that, whereas the discourse
about men’s superiority was central to commentaries of this verse, the discourse about
exceptional women only crops up occasionally.
This text demonstrates how, in glossing an older commentary, the later
commentator can add his own opinions which may or may not reflect the original
author’s intent.308 From al-Baydāwī’s text, it is impossible to tell if he would have
agreed with al-Qūnawī’s gloss that some exceptional women could surpass some men.
And the following quotations show that at times al-Qūnawī agrees with al-Baydāwī, but
at other times he disagrees with him.
When al-Baydāwī lists prophethood as one of the ways in which men have been
preferred over women, al-Qūnawī agrees and defends this position, thereby discounting a
deviant Mālikī tenet that says that women have been prophets.
And because of that [perfection], men have been chosen for prophecy,
imamate, governorship, and religious ceremonies. There has never been a
female prophet. Verses with words like: We have inspired Moses’ mother
[Q28:7], refer to [Moses’ mother’s] inspiration (ilhām) [not to the type of
knowledge attained by prophets].309

306
Al-Qūnawī, Hāshīya, v. 7, 145.
307
Though it is not impossible that some authors may have said such things in other writings. Abū Hayyān
seems a likely candidate given the fact that he says that the verse is applicable to the sex as a whole, and
that there are some male exceptions, and also given his opinion that women have been prophets in Islam.
308
I checked in al-Baydāwī’s original text to be sure that there is nothing omitted in al-Qūnāwī’s version
which would anticipate al-Qūnāwī’s interpretation, but al-Baydāwī mentions nothing about exceptional
women. Al-Baydāwī, Anwār al-Tanzīl, Cairo: 1878, v. 1, 273.
309
Al-Qūnawī, Hāshīya, v. 7, 145.

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In the above passage, al-Qūnawī agrees with al-Baydāwī, but he adds to al-Baydāwī’s
text in order to make that text relevant to the debate about women prophets. Maribel
Fierro describes how the exegetes involved in this short-lived debate explained the
Qur’ānic terms surrounding the types of communication from God. For instance
“inspiration” (ilhām) describes the natural state imparted even to animals such as bees.310
According to those who argued that there were women prophets, such as Ibn Hazm, some
women, such as Mary, received a divine message telling them what would happen in the
future.311 Al-Qūnawī argues against this view by explaining that Moses’ mother was
simply inspired, not that she had received the same foreknowledge as prophets have; by
doing so, he agrees with al-Baydāwī’s position that only men have been prophets.
But al-Qūnawī disagrees with al-Baydāwī on the issue of women’s testimony.
This is an area where law is clearly affecting exegesis. Al-Baydāwī was a Shāfi‘ī, and
the Shāfi‘ī rules on testimony are very restrictive: women may not testify in most legal
matters. Al-Qūnawī, on the other hand, was a Hanafī, and this school allows women to
testify in all cases except those involving legal retaliation (qisās) and bodily punishment
(hudūd crimes). So, whereas al-Baydāwī says that men’s superiority consists of their
being able to testify in all legal matters, al-Qūnawī clarifies that women can testify
without men in certain cases.
[Men are superior because of] testifying in all legal matters, and the necessity
of jihād, the Friday prayer, and the like. I.e. [men may testify in] all legal
matters. As for women [they may testify] in certain legal matters either with or
without men.312

The legal cases in which women can testify without men are cases which involve matters
that only women see, such the birth of a live baby. Al-Qūnawī’s correction of al-
Baydāwī’s text shows how glossators may on occasion disagree with the works upon
which they comment.
Thus, although it is uncertain whether al-Qūnawī’s gloss staing that some
exceptional women may surpass some men represents a development of al-Baydāwī’s
view or a divergence from it, al-Qūnawī’s text represents an important new step in the

310
Maribel Fierro, “Women as prophets in Islam,” in Writing the Feminine: Women in Arab Sources, ed. R.
Deguilhem, GBR: I. B. Taurus, 2002, p. 185.
311
Ibid.
312
Al-Qūnawī, Hāshīya, v. 7, 145.

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exegeses of this verse. By saying that some women surpass some men in the matter of
rationality and religious observances, al-Qūnawī allows that there are and have been
exceptional women in history. Al-Qūnawī’s milieu may have affected his views: he was
from Constantinople and taught the Sultan there, and may have been in the company of
some very exceptional women in his dealings with the palace.313

3.7 Conclusion: Negotiation and debate in exegeses of Q4:34

Today, Q4:34 is one of the most controversial verses in the Qur’ān. Given its
apparent sanction of male authority over women and wife beating, it is difficult for many
modern Muslims to accept. While there was broad pre-modern agreement about the
verse’s intent, exegeses were also varied, with pockets of real disagreement about some
important aspects of the verse.
The elements most widely cited overall to explain this verse were the story
involving Habība bt. Zayd, and the view that men are more rational than women. These
elements explain the types of power that men have over their wives (the right to hit them)
and the reason why. Many more exegetes said that “good women” are obedient to their
husbands than said that they are obedient to God. Men’s payment of dowry and
maintenance were widely cited to explain men’s superiority over women. And many
exegetes explained men’s relationship to women by saying that they are in authority over
them, or that they are in authority over their discipline or morals. Slightly fewer exegetes
mentioned witnessing, jihād, and inheritance as aspects of men’s superiority over women.
The pockets of disagreement within this general narrative are sometimes obvious
and at other times subtle. When early exegetes, including al-Tabarī, say that women need
to obey men “in those matters in which God has commanded their obedience,” it seems
that they meant to limit men’s authority; some later exegetes exhort men to be kind to
women, and not to use their power over women to treat them cruelly. But others do not
give any indication that men’s power over women should be limited in any way. It is
unclear if these subtle discrepancies represent real disagreement, or if all exegetes
thought that men’s position of authority also entailed caretaking and kindness.

313
As a religious teacher, he may have taught women; but without finding out more about his wife, saying
so is speculation.

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 On the other hand, some disputes are more obvious. When al-Qūnawī says that
some women exceed some men in rationality and religious performance, it is unclear if
he is simply recording for the first time a widespread opinion, or if this is his view alone.
But it is clear that certain exegetes, such as al-Zamakhsharī, disagree: he says that all men
are superior to all women, because their superiority over them is comprised of many
combined elements, all of which cannot be attained by even the smartest, most pious, of
women.
One of the key developments in terms of both method and substance in the
interpretation of this verse is that certain exegetes question the plain sense of the Qur’ānic
phrase “men are qawwāmūn over women” and the hadīth about women’s rational and
religious deficiency. Exegetes question two points in the Qur’ānic phrase. The first is
whether “men” refers simply to the physical distinction between the sexes; two exegetes
say that it does not. Instead, they define “men” as people who have certain
characteristics. In the eyes of another scholar, a Mālikī, it is not “men” that is
questionable, but the nature of men’s qiwāma. He defines men’s payment of
maintenance as his qiwāma of women: if men do not pay, he says, they are no longer
qawwāmūn.
The later scholar al-Qūnawī does not question the provisions of the verse, but
rather one of its enduring rationales. By saying that some women can reach men’s level
of rationality and religious performance, he goes against the plain sense of the hadīth
stating that wome are religiously and rationally deficient.
These interpretations do not ultimately question well-behaved men’s rights over
women. But they do show that some exegetes openly questioned the plain sense of both
Qur’ānic verses and hadīths. These cases are exceptionally clear examples of the ways in
which all exegetes negotiate between their own understanding and the authoritative
sources which they aim to explain.

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 4. Difficult interpretations: exegeses of the second half of Q4:34

4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on two “worst case scenarios” for exegetes: when the words
of the Qur’ān do not seem to make sense, and when an important early authority takes an
interpretation that is outright wrong. As I describe below, both of these difficulties occur
to exegetes in the latter half of Q4:34. The result is an enlightening discussion,
undertaken in the exegeses themselves, about proper methods of interpretation, and what
it means to cross the limits of acceptable content.

The verse and Western scholarship

While the first half of Q4:34 broadly outlines the relationship between men and
women, the second half specifies punishments for a woman who commits nushūz, which
is variously defined: in exegeses of this verse it is usually understood to mean women’s
disobedience and refusal to have sex. This portion of the verse reads: and those women
from whom you fear nushūz, admonish them, avoid them in the beds, and beat them; and
when they obey, do not seek a way against them. Of the three measures defined as proper
punishment for the woman who has committed nushūz, the admonition is the least
controversial in the sources, the beating is somewhat controversial (with some
disagreement and variant opinions) and “avoid/ostracize them (wa’hjuruhunna)”
occasions the most disagreement. This is the phrase that poses a problem for the
exegetes, and it is in the interpretation of this phrase that one exegete’s view is deemed
unacceptable by all others. Yet, as I describe below, interpretations of this phrase have
not been the subject of much scholarly work in English.
Many scholars have written about specific elements of this verse and its
interpretation. The two aspects of the verse which generate the most scholarly literature
in English are nushūz, which is the cause of the punishment, and “beat them,” which is
the strictest consequence of nushūz.
Research on these terms is often informed by conceptions of women’s rights and
the proper relations between the sexes that are common today in many parts of the world,
but which differ greatly from those expressed in these pre-modern sources. Much recent

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scholarship in English questions whether “beating” is really the correct interpretation of
the term, what behavior occasions the punishment of wives, and how the patriarchal
assumptions of the exegetes affect their interpretations. Some of the literature which
seeks to answer these questions is motivated by a desire to absolve the Qur’ān of
pronouncements offensive to the author’s sensibilities.314 This approach often prioritizes
contemporary concerns over a historical reading, which would seek to understand the
concerns of pre-modern exegetes themselves.315
Two authors, Manuela Marín and Kecia Ali, stand out for their historical
approach, through which they nuance the view of pre-modern sources, both by
illuminating variation in the pre-modern discourse, and by attempting to ascertain
whether pre-modern exegetes and jurists had ethical concerns about those aspects of the
verse which are troublesome to many readers today. Manuela Marín’s goal is not to
summarize exegesis, but rather to contextualize the beating of wives. Thus she examines
historical accounts and accounts of violence against female Companions, and she
explores the Prophet’s attitude as expressed in hadīths. She argues convincingly that the
matter of wife beating was a contested issue in the Prophet’s time and after, and shows
that what was legally permissible (beating) was nevertheless frowned upon by jurists
such as al-Shāfi‘ī. She also discusses actual cases of divorce on grounds of maltreatment

314
The abstract of Hadia Mubarak’s article “Breaking apart the interpretive monolith” is one example of
such an approach. It reads: “As verse 4:34 is central to the Qur’ānic paradigm on gender relations, the
question of “wife-beating” has become a contentious issue in Islamic scholarly discourse. Does
“wadribuhunna”, a verb in the imperative form that is read to authorize the “beating”, “striking”, or
“scourging” of a wife, actually give husbands divine sanction to beat their wives? If so, upon what basis or
authority does one derive such a meaning? First, this paper examines the historical development of certain
misogynistic concepts that became embedded in Islamic academic discourse as a result of the classical
exegetes’ commentary on this verse, which were undoubtedly influenced by the patriarchal paradigm of the
medieval period from which they were produced. Second, this paper utilizes the classical exegetes’ own
purported methodology to reinvestigate the meanings of this verse in a way that can reconcile its practical
application with the Qur’ān’s egalitarian ideals and Islam’s conception of God’s absolute justice,”
(Mubarak, “Breaking apart the interpretive monopoly,” p. 262).
315
Ayesha S. Chaudhry has an insightful critical discussion of contemporary approaches to this verse in her
article, “The Problems of Conscience and Hermeneutics: Some Contemporary Muslim Approaches,”
forthcoming in the Journal of Comparative Islamic Studies. She divides contemporary Muslim approaches
to the “beating” into three groups: revisionist (the category which Hadia Mubarak falls into), traditionalist,
and reformist. Chaudhry points out that reformist scholars in particular recognize that the Qur’ānic text
itself might pose a “problem” for the contemporary reader, rather than, as in the case of the revisionists,
declaring that the Qur’ān could not possibly sanction beating.

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in al-Andalus. Marín notes that the exegetes’ personal choice of which traditions to
quote gives them leeway in their interpretations.316
In a forthcoming article, Kecia Ali discusses al-Shāfi‘ī’s use of the Prophet’s
opinions and behavior towards wife beating.317 She describes how the Qur’ān and the
Prophet’s own behavior seem to contradict one another, creating a legal problem:
Muhammad was reported to have struck one of his wives only once, and to have ordered
others not to “strike God’s female servants.” On another occasion, the Prophet says that
“the best of you will not strike,” which is the position taken by al-Shāfi‘ī: beating is
permissible, but it is not encouraged.318
Ali also analyzes other aspects of this verse. She discusses nushūz both in her
dissertation and in an article on the subject of obedience and disobedience. In the article,
she gives an excellent overview of the meaning of nushūz. She points out that, although
the Qur’ān itself does not define the term as wifely disobedience, it has been defined that
way by the exegetes and jurists through time.319 In her dissertation, Ali discusses the
legal consequences of a woman’s nushūz, and how a wife’s refusal to have sex can result
in the loss of her maintenance.320 Particularly relevant is her discussion of how the wife’s
maintenance is predicated on her willingness to have sex with her husband, both at the
commencement of the marriage and for its duration. Maintenance, she argues, is the
payment for husbands’ sexual enjoyment of wives and for the wives keeping themselves
available for sex.321

316
Manuela Marín, “Disciplining wives: a historical reading of Qur’ān 4:34,” Studia Islamica, 2003, 5-40.
317
Kecia Ali, “The best of you will not strike: al-Shāfi‘ī on Qur’ān, sunnah, and wife-beating,”
forthcoming in the Journal of Comparative Islamic Studies.
318
Kecia Ali, ibid.
319
Kecia Ali, “Religious Practices: Obedience and Disobedience in Islamic Discourses,” forthcoming in the
Encyclopedia of Women in Islamic Cultures. As she says, and I show below, jurists and exegetes usually,
though not universally, describe this disobedience as rebelliousness and refusal to have sex; the term
literally refers to a protrusion from the ground, or a raised-up hillock. When saying that the Qur’ān does
not define the term, she does not take into account the statement at the end of Q4:34, “when they obey you,
do not seek a way against them” which seems to indicate the fact that the punishment has been inflicted for
disobedience.
320
Kecia Ali, Money, Sex, and Power, 169-210.
321
As she says, “While the dower has often been understood as the compensation the wife receives in
exchange for her husband’s sexual access to her, I argue instead that [the] dower’s key function is to
legitimize intercourse between spouses by “making the [wife’s] vulva lawful” to the husband. It is
maintenance… which actually compensates the wife on an ongoing basis for the rights the husband
acquires through marriage. The wife has two interlinked duties: to allow her husband to derive (sexual)
enjoyment from her (al-istimtā‘a bihā) and to accept restrictions placed on her mobility (habs)” (Ibid.,
169).

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Difficult interpretations
One aspect of the verse that secondary sources have nearly ignored is the second
of the three punishments for the nāshiz women, which is for their husbands to ostracize or
avoid them in the beds (wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘), although this is in fact the part of
the verse which occasioned the most disagreement in the early exegetical sources.322
Even brief exegeses usually say something about this phrase, and the earliest
commentators came up with wildly divergent opinions on its meaning.
Why was this portion of the verse so disputed? Wa’hjurūhunna is in the
imperative mood, and it has several possible meanings, including to shun, avoid,
ostracize, or stop speaking to someone.323 Thus, men who fear nushūz should avoid the
women from whom they fear nushūz, i.e., recalcitrance. Wa’hjurūhunna is followed by
the preposition “in” and the noun madāji‘, which means beds, or sleeping places.
Therefore, the phrase wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘ seems to mean “avoid or ostracize the
recalcitrant women in the beds or sleeping places.” But most exegetes define nushūz as
the wife’s refusal to have sex, and this punishment seems to entail her successful
avoidance of it, which evidently does not make sense. It furthermore seems to require
that men punish their wives’ refusal by giving up their own right to sex, a right
guaranteed to them in the marital contract. In order to solve this problem, al-Tabarī puts
forth an interpretation of the verse which is unacceptable to later authors. Their rejection
of this towering authority affords the opportunity to study the limits of exegesis, and
thereby to better understand the exegetical process in the pre-modern period.
My study of 67 works324 adds to the aforementioned scholarly discussion about
the meaning of nushūz and “beat them,” and I discuss these parts of the verse briefly in
this chapter by summarizing early and later interpretations. But in light of the dearth of
secondary literature on wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘, this chapter is primarily focused on
that phrase and its interpretation.

322
Although a few authors, including Sa‘diyya Shaikh, focus on al-Tabarī’s interpretation of “leave them”;
I discuss her treatment of al-Tabarī below. Manuela Marín also speaks of al-Tabarī’s interpretation and Ibn
al-‘Arabī’s refutation of it.
323
Other meanings will be discussed below.
324
Works of exegesis and non-exegetical works from which I take exegesis.

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4.2 Summary of interpretations for if you fear nushūz, admonish them…. Beat
them, and when they obey you, do not seek a way against them

Fear
There are two main interpretations of if you fear nushūz: if you know of women’s
nushuz, which is cited by 17 exegetes (28%), or if you strongly suspect their nushūz,
which cited by 10 exegetes (16%). The latter is the argument of the grammarian al-
Farrā’, who centers his discussion of this part of the verse on the word “fear”, saying that
“fear” is a strong suspicion, rather than positively knowing of the nushūz.325 One exegete
also says that to fear is to fear, or be afraid of. One exegete specifies that the husbands
need proof of nushūz in their wives’ evil actions.326

Nushūz
Nushūz is a word which appears in the Qur’ān to describe the behavior of both
wives and husbands.327 The Qur’ānic verse regarding wives’ nushūz is directly addressed
to husbands (“if you fear nushūz”) whereas the verse regarding the husbands’ nushūz is
impersonal (“if a wife fears nushūz”). Likewise, the suggestions about dealing with
nushūz in the Qur’ān are different for husbands and wives: whereas husbands confronting
their wives’ nushūz are advised to implement the three-stage punishment described
above, the suggestion for wives dealing with husbands’ nushūz is that it is “best” to reach
an “amicable settlement.”
Just as the Qur’ān treats the husband’s and wife’s nushūz differently, so do most
exegetes. Although a few exegetes have a gender-neutral interpretation of the term,
women’s nushūz, as stated above, is generally understood to be their disobedience; 50%
of all exegetes cite disobedience as the meaning of the word. Seven exegetes (11%)
mention that the origin of the word nushūz is rising up, like a hillock from the earth.
Within the broad definition of “disobedience” and “rising up,” exegetes have several

325
Al-Farrā’, Ma‘ānī, 265.
326
Al-Sulamī, Ikhtisār al-Māwardī, v. 1, 321.
327
Q4:128 reads: If a wife fears nushūz or reluctance (i‘rād) from her husband, there is no blame for them
if they reach an amicable settlement, and such a settlement is best.

156
modifications. I will review these first, and then move on to definitions of nushūz which
are gender neutral or do not have to do with disobedience.
The variations on wifely disobedience are that wives: raise themselves up against
their husbands (21 exegetes, or 35%), takes their husbands’ rights lightly (3 exegetes, or
5%), rise up from bed, or disobey in bed (4 exegetes, or 6%), or do not go willingly to the
husband’s bed as they used to. One exegete says that nushūz entails women’s
stubbornness.328 Al-Wāhidī quotes several unusual interpretations of every part of this
verse; regarding nushūz, he says:
Nushūz is wives’ disobedience, according to the majority of the exegetes. ‘Atā
says that it is that wives do not put on perfume for their husbands, and prevent
them from having sex with them, and they stop doing the things which their
husbands used to find delightful. The root of nushūz is to be raised up [so it
entails a wife’s raising herself up] against the husband, by contradicting his
word…. 329

According to the sources cited by al-Wāhidī, nushūz has to do with wives not making
themselves ready for sex, by applying perfume and the like. In other words, wives are
not just obligated to perform the act, but also to display enthusiasm, and to be agreeable.
A few exegetes offer definitions of nushūz which do not directly refer to
disobedience. These include: that wives disturb their husbands, that the spouses dislike
each other, that there is enmity between them, or that it is wives’ asking for a divorce in
return for giving up their dowry (khul‘).330

Admonish them
The earliest interpretations of “admonish them” include the provisions that the
admonition should be verbal (13 exegetes, or 21%), and that the admonition is to remind

328
Nakūrī, Sawāti‘, v. 2, 29.
329
Al-Wāhidī, al-Basīt, MS Nurosmanye.
330
Ibn Abī Hātim, al-Tafsīr, v. 3, 942; al-‘Ayyāshī, al-Tafsīr, v. 1, 395. Al-‘Ayyāshī says: “Abū Ja‘far
says, ‘When a woman commits nushūz against her husband, then she asks for khul‘, and he should take
what he can from her, but when the man commits nushūz along with the woman’s nushūz, then this is
discord (shiqāq) [which necessitates the two arbiters as outlined in 4:35].” This is one of the few times that
the problems of the husband’s and wife’s nushūz are treated together.

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women of God (10 exegetes, or 16%) and of husbands’ rights, or the greatness of
husbands’ rights (4 exegetes, 6%).331
Several exegetes specify that admonishment should be the first step taken in the
case of the wife’s nushūz. Al-Qushayrī explains eloquently:
And those from whom you fear nushūz, admonish them, leave them in the beds,
and beat them I.e., increase the punishment gently, by degrees, and if the matter is
fixed after the admonishment, do not use the stick to hit. For the verse comprises
the rules of discipline to be observed in the exercise of fellowship [rather than the
treatment one would give to an enemy] (adab al-‘ishra).332

Al-Qushayrī specifies that the verse is intended to keep the couple together, not to drive
them away from one another – so husbands should not use violent measures if the matter
is fixed after verbal admonishment. Once again, the exegetical source prescribes
different limits than legal sources. Despite knowing that use of the stick (‘asā) to hit
wives is within husbands’ legal rights, al-Qushayrī does not promote such behavior –
rather, he says that it is best to discipline recalcitrant wives gently, by degrees.
Less cited interpretations of “admonish them” include telling wives to come back
333
to bed, admonishing them with knowledge,334 or with the Qur’ān,335 ordering them to
be pious,336 making them fear God337 and the punishment of their actions,338 and fear the
hitting that will result.339 Some exegetes thus seemed to view the admonishment as an
opportunity for the husbands to spare their wives from further punishment, which would
nevertheless be inflicted if the wives did not heed them.

Strike them
The sources allow for various levels of physical punishment, ranging from hitting
with a tooth-stick (an object about the size of a forefinger) to “not breaking bones.” All

331
This interpretation is taken by Alī ibn Abī Talha, al-Tabarī, Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, and Abū ’l-Layth al-
Samarqandī.
332
Al-Qushayrī, Tafsīr, v. 2, 25.
333
Al-Qummī, al-Tabarī, and Ibn Abī Hātim.
334
This interpretation is taken by Ibn Wahb.
335
Ibn Wahb, al-Tabarī, Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, and al-Wāhidī in al-Basīt and al-Wājīz.
336
Al-Sulamī, abridgment of al-Māwardī’s Tafsīr, which actually includes some elements not in al-
Māwardī’s tafsīr.
337
Al-Tūsī, al-Nahhās, al-Māwardī, Nukat (which naturally includes some elements not in al-Sulamī’s
abridgement).
338
Al-Nahhās, al-Māwardī, Nukat.
339
Al-Māwardī, Nukat and its abridgment, al-Sulamī, Tafsīr.

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sources which mention hitting (31 in all) also qualify it by saying “without causing severe
pain” (ghayr mubarrih). Nine of these (29%) cite the interpretation that husbands should
not break bones; 11, or 35%, say that the hitting should be without blemishing (ghayr
shā’in) and 2 say that it should not leave any mark (ghayr mu’aththir).340 Six (19%) cite
the interpretation that the beating should be with a tooth-stick (siwāk), and one says that
the beating should not seriously wound. Others say that it should not be too intense
(shadīd) or grueling. Two exegetes quote a hadīth which states that the Companion al-
Zubayr used to hit his wives with a stick.341
Most exegeses focus on the extent of the beating, but do not question the man’s
right to beat; for the majority, beating is simply a natural part of marital relations.
However, as mentioned above, several exegetes specify that the beating must be the third
and last measure in the series. And a few seem uncomfortable with the notion altogether.
Al-Wāhidī cites a hadīth which says:
The Messenger of God said, “Do not hit God’s female servants,” thereby
forbidding the hitting of women, until those women turned their backs on their
husbands, and the husbands complained to the Prophet, so the verse was revealed
regarding hitting them.342

This interpretation hints at yet another sabab al-nuzūl to the effect that the verse was
revealed when some husbands complained of not being able to discipline their unruly
wives. This hadīth exemplifies the attitude in many of these sources: beating is a
necessary measure to keep women in line, but it is not an agreeable duty. Three sources,
al-Tabarī, al-Jassās, and Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, say that if women obey their husbands,
then God has forbidden striking them.343 In other words, according to these exegetes,
hitting is actually not permissible when women do their duties. This is an occasion on
which the exegetes say that there are limits on men’s legal right to hit.
Other exegetes recommend not hitting, but they do not deny that men have the
right to do so; they base their opinions on those of prominent jurists. Fakhr al-Dīn al-

340
Al-Tabarī Jāmi‘ and al-Jassās, Ahkām.
341
Al-Tha‘labī, al-Kashf and al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf.
342
Al-Wāhidī, al-Basīt, MS Nurosmanye.
343
Al-Tabarī says, “It is not permitted to strike women until after admonishing them for their nushūz, nor is
admonition permitted to husbands unless [their wives are] disobedient. Then their husbands give them an
order, or an admonition, in kindness (bi’l-ma‘rūf) according to what God has ordered” (al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘,
v. 8, 312).

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Rāzī quotes al-Shāfi‘ī as saying that “hitting is permissible, but not doing it is better.”344
And Ibn al-Jawzī quotes Ahmad Ibn Hanbal as recommending that men delay hitting
until the other measures have been taken, though he admits that al-Shāfi‘ī allows the
hitting at the commencement of women’s nushūz. Other exegetes explain why the hitting
should occur: three exegetes specify that it is intended to dissuade women from their evil
actions.
Perhaps the most interesting case of imposing limits on men’s hitting has already
been discussed by Manuela Marín. She points out that al-Qurtubī makes a class
distinction in his recommendation to hit women who do not do the housework: lower
class women may need to be beaten, while upper class women may not.345 By citing
class differences, al-Qurtubī explicitly avows that circumstance can affect the
implementation of law: special circumstances produce special limits on men’s behavior.
Al-Haddād (d. 800/1397) seems concerned that husbands not go too far with any
of the measures specified in this verse. His interpretation reads much like an instruction
manual, describing to men exactly what they should say, how they should say it, and
why. If the situation gets to the point that hitting must occur, the blow should be “as a
man hits his son,” in other words, in order to discipline wives, not in order to seriously
injure them.
Because this interpretation seems to be motivated by such an earnest desire not to
harm the wife, and thus seems, in a sense, friendly towards women, it is a particularly
good example of how the boundaries of acceptable behavior and attitudes vary according
to time and place. In many parts of the world today, to hit a child or woman two or three
times with a sandal, as al-Haddād recommends, would be considered physical abuse, a
violation of their basic rights. For al-Haddād, hitting is acceptable if it does not seriously
harm the wives. But by the norms of many societies today, hitting itself is considered to
be seriously harmful. Although al-Haddād seeks to limit men’s behavior, he does not go
beyond the apparent norms of the society in which he lives.
The intention is that the admonition, the hujr, and the hitting specified in this
verse should be done in the order in which they are mentioned, because this falls

344
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr, v. 10, 90.
345
Qurtubī, Jāmi‘, v. 5, 174. Manuela Marín, “Disciplining wives: a historical reading of Qur’ān 4:34,”
Studia Islamica, 2003, 26.

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 under the rubric of commanding right and forbidding wrong, and if correction [of
the disobedience] is possible with the easiest and lightest [measure], there is no
need to go on to the heaviest. The first is that husbands say to their recalcitrant
wives, “Fear God and come back to bed!” If they obey, [that is acceptable], and if
not, the husbands insult them (sabbahā), for Ibn ‘Abbās says that the hujr is foul
language. It is said a man commits hujr when he speaks irrationally… Qatāda
and al-Hasan say that wa’hjurūhunna is from avoidance, and that is that husbands
should not come close to the bed, nor should they sleep with their wives, because
God Almighty has joined the word “avoid” with the words “in the beds.” When
the admonition does not have any effect on recalcitrant wives, then husbands
avoid them in bed, and if they love their husbands this will be unbearable for
them. But if they loathe them, their agreement to the separation will be proof of
nushūz on their part, at which point the husbands may hit them as long as they do
not inflict serious injury, nor blemish them, just as a man punishes his son. The
[extent of the beating] will be entrusted to the husbands’ reasoned opinion and
their independent judgment (ijtihād), according to what they see as being helpful.
Because of this, it is said that this blow is restricted by the condition of well-being
(muqayyad bi-shart al-salāma), and the best thing is to hit [recalcitrant wives]
with a sandal, and the blow should be twice or three times.346

Among the texts examined for this dissertation, this one is particularly limiting for men’s
behavior. But it is still a good example of the patriarchal power dynamic that informs the
understanding of marital relationships in most or all of these texts. Al-Haddād’s
comparison of the husband-wife relationship with that of a father and son is particularly
revealing. Fathers discipline their sons not because they wish to harm or injure them, and
not because of an arbitrary wish for power, but because they love them and think that
they will benefit from some discipline. Sons grow up, but apparently women never
outgrow the need for their husbands’ loving but stern authority. They are permanently in
a state of dependence and obedience.
I have described how several exegetes in this study express concern regarding
men’s beating their wives. They recommend that men do not beat too hard, say that it is
better not to beat, or that beating must only occur after exhausting other options.
Nevertheless men’s right to beat at all is not seriously questioned. The pre-modern
exegetes reviewed here do not break out of the straightforward reading of the verse in
order to take an interpretation which would exclude beating altogether, the way that some
modern exegetes do.

346
Al-Haddād, Tafsīr, v. 2, 250.

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When they obey you, do not seek a way against them
At least seven exegetes cited the interpretation that the husband should not seek
love from his wife, but only obedience. According to al-Tabarī, God has ordered wives
to obey, whether they want to or not. The act of their obedience, despite their own
wishes, is proof of their piety. If a wife does not love her husband, but she obeys him,
that is all that the husband is owed in terms of rights; he cannot ask for her love, because
nobody can control their feelings. As some exegetes put it, “Their hearts are not in their
hands.”
In this exegesis, al-Tabarī actually advises husbands what not to say to their
wives. They are not allowed to ask their wives to love them, or accuse their wives of not
loving them. And when their wives obey, they are not allowed to inflict any punishment
on them:
O men, when your wives, from whom you fear nushūz, obey your admonishment,
then do not tie them to the beds.347 When they do not obey you, then tie them to
the beds and beat them. If they resume obedience to you at that point, and return
to doing what they are obligated to do, then do not seek a path towards harming
them and being hateful to them. Nor should you seek a way to what is not lawful
to you in terms of their bodies and their property on any pretext, such as one of
you saying to his obedient wife, “You do not love me - you hate me!” and hitting
and harming her because of that. For God Almighty has said to men, when they
obey you, meaning [that they obey] even when they hate you. So [when they are
obedient despite their hatred of you] do not become angry with them, hitting them
and harming them, and do not oblige them to love you, for that is not in their
hands.348

Interpretations which speak of the necessity of obedience but not love are another
example of how these texts are informed by the law. It is clear from al-Tabarī’s
interpretation that men are likely to want their wives to love them; this exegesis bids
them to control this desire and to remember that in fact the contract of marriage legislates
for wifely obedience, but it says nothing about love.

4.3 Wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘

347
I will explain al-Tabarī’s interpretation of wa’hjurūhunna below.
348
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, v. 8, 316.

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 Above, I described the controversy over the phrase wa’hjurūhunna fī al-madāji‘.
To briefly recall the earlier discussion of the problem with this phrase, wa’hjurūhunna is
an imperative command which means to avoid or ostracise; it can also have a number of
other meanings, including to avoid speaking to someone. Fī in this context means “in,”
and madāji‘ means the beds or sleeping places. But, as al-Tabarī explains below,
avoiding women in the beds seems to be exactly what women who refuse to have sex
want, and furthermore it goes against men’s right to have sex which is guaranteed in the
marital contract. Thus, this portion of the verse poses a problem for the exegetes.
Because this phrase admits many different interpretations, I will leave it in the
Arabic for most of the discussion here. In the earliest period, most interpretations
revolved around whether, when enacting this punishment, husbands could have sex with
their wives or not. Al-Tabarī takes an extreme interpretation which is rejected by
subsequent exegetes. Their rejection of his view shows the limits of “proper” or
acceptable interpretation; the reasons given for this rejection reveal that later exegetes
thought al-Tabarī had gone beyond the boundaries of grammar and common sense.

Early exegeses of wa’hjurūhunna

Early exegetes have a variety of explanations for this phrase. Some take into
account the plain sense of its words, others do not, and still others modify the words.
Muqātil b. Sulaymān says that husbands should not go near their recalcitrant
wives for sex.349 His interpretation strays from the apparent meaning of “avoid them in
the beds” because the verse itself does not mention sex, and Muqātil does not mention
beds. This interpretation seems to be based on Muqātil’s opinion, and his response to the
current debate: whether “avoiding” included having sex with the recalcitrant wives or
not.
Some exegetes interpret the root letters for “avoid” (h-j-r) so that it does not mean
“avoid.” ‘Abd al-Razzāq, for instance, gives two different interpretations of this root,

349
“Those from whom you fear nushūz, meaning, you know of your wives’ disobedience … admonish them
by [mentioning] God, and if they do not accept wa’hjurūhunna. Muqātil says, don’t come close to them for
sex, and if they return to obeying their husbands with the admonition and leaving [don’t pursue the matter],
and if not, hit them without causing severe pain, meaning without blemishing them.349 And if they obey
you, then do not seek a way against them meaning proof. Muqātil says, do not trouble them for love, you
are not owed anything but obedience” (Muqātil, Tafsīr, v. 1, 371).

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neither of which means avoidance. The first is that the husband speaks roughly to his
wife, which is the opinon, he says, of Sufyān al-Thawrī:
Al-Thawrī… on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbās says, concerning His words
wa’hjurūhunna husbands should speak harshly to their wives (yahjuruha bi-
lisānihi), being verbally rough with them; but they should not stop having sex
with them (jimā‘ahā).350

In this interpretation, the husband insults his wife verbally, and does not “avoid” her at
all: he continues to have sex with her if he wishes. The method of interpretation here is
to change the form of the word. The verbal form hajara is changed to ahjara, rendering
it as “speak roughly/harshly,” rather than “avoid.”
‘Abd al-Razzāq then quotes al-Kalbī’s interpretation of wa’hjurūhunna in which
he disagrees with the interpretation of “speak roughly” and says that wa’hjurūhunna
means that the husband stays in bed and calls his wife to return to it.
Al-Kalbī says, the hajr in the beds does not mean to speak roughly to wives
(yaqūl la-hā hujran). It is ordering them to come back, and return to their
beds…351

This is the most arbitrary of all of the early exegeses, since it does not adequately explain
how a word with the apparent meaning of “avoid” or even “speak roughly” could mean
“order to return.” Rather than taking into account the words of the Qur’ān, it seems that
this interpretation takes into account only the exegete’s desired interpretation. In other
words, in this interpretation al-Kalbī says what he thinks the verse means, without
providing proof for it.
Hūd b. Muhakkam agrees with the interpretation “speak roughly to them;” his
commentary makes it clear that sex is at the heart of wives’ nushūz and their husbands’
response to their behavior.
The admonishing is only in the bed, the cursing (sabb) is only in the bed, and the
hitting is only in the bed. Husbands should not do this out of love, but only out of
[sexual] need.352

350
‘Abd al-Razzāq, Tafsīr, v. 1, 453.
351
Ibid., 1, 452.
352
Hūd b. Muhakkam, Tafsīr, 1, 378. The rest of his interpretation reads, “Those from whom you fear
nushūz, meaning, their disobedience; wives commit nushūz when they do not call [their husbands] to sleep
with them. Some of the exegetes say that husbands should begin with admonition, then if [the recalcitrant
wives] refuse [to have sex], speak harshly to them; then if they [still] refuse [to have sex], hit them without
causing severe pain, i.e., in a way that does not leave a blemish. Some exegetes say, the couple can then
take the case to the governor. Regarding His words when they obey you, then do not seek a way against

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Hūd clarifies that, since the entire matter of wifely nushūz is sexual, the husbands’
response should take place entirely in the bed. Outside of the bed, the admonishing,
speaking harshly, and hitting are not warranted: husbands cannot just hit their wives any
time, for anything. Furthermore, Hūd says, these measures are not meant as loving
gestures, but are a last recourse to be employed only out of a desperate need for sex.
In this case, the interpretive method for hujr is the same as above: linguistic, with
the term meaning “speak harshly to them” rather than “avoid them.” However, Hūd also
mentions al-Hasan’s interpretation, which is that wa’hjurūhunna means to stay away
from the wives.
Several of these early interpretations maintain the sense of avoiding the wife, or
ostracizing her, but others do not take into account this sense of the word, saying instead
that husbands should revile their wives, or even call them back to bed, rather than
avoiding them there. Although the early exegetes have radically different interpretations
of this phrase, at one point most of these exegeses are left behind and “avoid” becomes
the most common explanation for the verse.
The next chronological interpretation is that of al-Tabarī. Although he has the
most comprehensive discussion of this phrase of any exegete, he does not conclude that
the verse means to avoid the recalcitrant wives.

Crossing the limits of acceptable interpretation: al-Tabarī

Al-Tabarī’s approach shows that he is dissatisfied with the views of the earliest
exegetes. He seeks the meaning of the phrase in the usage of the Arabs, rather than the
views of previous exegetes, and thereby arrives at an entirely new reading. Yet his
interpretation, if not his approach, is rejected by subsequent generations of scholars. This
rejection shows that there are limits on interpretation, at least according to pre-modern
exegetes. A close analysis of his interpretation and the responses to it helps to illustrate
the nature of these limits, and how the response to deviance helped to define the “proper”
interpretation of the verse.

them, i.e., when wives allow their husbands to have sex with them, the husbands should not ask anything
more from them. Al-Hasan says, regarding His words wa’hjurūhunna, do not go near them. Al-Kalbī says,
regarding the words when they obey you, do not seek a way against them, i.e., do not oblige them to love
you” (Hūd b. Muhakkam, Tafsīr, 1, 378).

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 Al-Tabarī begins his discussion of wa’hjurūhunna by summarizing the views of
the early exegetes. He lists several schools of thought on what husbands should do to
punish recalcitrant wives, including the ones detailed above in the early exegeses,
namely: not have sex with them while lying with them, avoid speaking with them, but lie
with them and continue to have sex with them, avoid having sex with them, avoid talking
to them during their absence from the bed, leave them [alone] on the mattress until they
return to doing what their husbands like, and finally, speak harshly them while they stay
away from the bed. All of these interpretations are backed up by hadīths of Companions
and early interpreters; so far al-Tabarī’s method is exactly as it was for other verses.
However, he then launches into his own explanation, leaving behind the words of
the early exegetes. He says that the word hajara can only have one of three meanings in
Arab usage, by which he means Bedouin usage. By citing Bedouin usage, he seeks to
interpret the Qur’ān from a perspective which is closer to its original milieu, as opposed
to al-Tabarī’s own milieu of urban Baghdad. He therefore makes an important leap in the
methods used to interpret this verse: where the earliest exegetes engage in linguistic
analysis of the words of the Qur’ān, al-Tabarī attempts to put his linguistic analysis into
its historical context.
The first of the three meanings of this word in Arabic, he says, is that “a man
aviods speaking to another man, which means he repudiates and rejects him.”353 This is
the interpretation of “leaving off speaking” (hajr al-kalām) which was adopted by al-
Dahhāk, who also said that men should “lie with” their wives, changing the word for
“beds” to “lie with.” The second meaning is the “profusion of words through repetition,
in the manner of a scoffer.”354 The third possible meaning is one which had not been
suggested by any earlier exegete. It is “tying up a camel, i.e., its owner ties it up with the
hijār, which is a rope (habl) attached to its loins and ankles.”355 He then says that “one of
the views [on the meaning of the word] is incorrect, and a mistake” namely that hajara

353
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, 8, 306.
354
Ibid., 8, 306.
355
Ibid., 8, 307.

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means to speak roughly.356 It means that in the form ahjara, but not in the form hajara,
which is its form in the verse.357
Avoiding sex, al-Tabarī says, likewise does not make sense as an explanation,
because why would men avoid sex, when correcting their wives’ refusal to have sex is the
very purpose of the punishment? On similar grounds, he dismisses those who say that
“avoiding (hajara)” is “avoiding words,” or not speaking to recalcitrant wives: wives
who are recalcitrant surely would not want to speak to their husbands. In arguing against
these two interpretations, al-Tabarī takes an approach based on the definition of wives’
nushūz. Since wives’ nushūz is their refusal to be obedient and have sex with their
husbands, and keeping themselves from the marital bed, the punishment should not
consist of the very thing that the wives are being punished for.358
Al-Tabarī limits when these three measures should be applied. First, he says that
husbands are only allowed to undertake these measures when the wives refuse to have
sex. In his exegesis of the first part of Q4:34, al-Tabarī hinted that wives’ obedience is
not unlimited: it is in those matters which God requires; it is now clear that this is a
reference to sex. But when it comes to this duty, wives must be made to comply; when
words fail, they should be forced.
In order to force wives to comply, he takes the final interpretation, to tie them up
with the hijār, the rope used for tying up the camel. No recalcitrant woman would like
being tied up and forced to remain in her room or house, and furthermore, this solution
actively brings about the desired result of her compliance.
The likeliest interpretation concerning His words wa’hjurūhunna, and that which
comes closest to its intention is securing with the hijār, according to [the sources]
we have mentioned in which the Arabs say about the camel, when its owner
has tied it up as we have described, that it has been “ostracized”… When this [is
taken as] the meaning, then the interpretation of the verse is: those from whom
you fear nushūz, admonish them concerning their rising up against you. And if
they accede to the admonition, then you have no way against them. If they refuse
to repent of their disobedience, then imprison them,359 tying them to their beds,
meaning in their rooms, or houses, in which they sleep, and in which their
husbands lie with them. 360

356
Ibid., 8, 307.
357
Ibid., 8, 307.
358
Ibid., 8, 307-8.
359
Istawthaq min – according to Dozy, is imprison.
360
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, 8, 309-10.

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He supports his interpretation by citing four hadīths. The first two are on the authority of
the Prophet, and seem to make no sense with the translation of “avoid/ostracize” for
hajar; for “ostracize,” (in bold below) al-Tabarī would have substituted “tie them up:”
On the authority of Hakīm b. Mu‘āwiya, on the authority of his father, [who said
that] he came to the Prophet, s, and said, “What is one of our wives’ rights over
us?” The Prophet responded, “That he feeds her, clothes her, does not hit her face,
does not insult her, and does not ostracize her except in the house (lā tahjuru ilā
fī al-bayt)…Bahz b. Hakīm narrated, on the authority of his grandfather, that he
said to the Messenger of God, “O Messenger of God, what can we take from our
wives, and what do we give [to them]? He said, “[your wives are] your tilth, so
go to your tilth when you will [Q2:223], but do not hit their faces, nor insult them,
nor ostracize them except in the house. And feed them when you eat, clothe
them as you clothe yourself [and] in the same manner [as you clothe
yourselves].”361

In these two hadīths, the usual understanding of the word, avoid/ostracize, does not make
much sense, especially since in the hadīth, the place of the hajara is the house (bayt), not
the bed. These hadīths seem to support al-Tabarī’s view that the root h-j-r does not refer
to avoidance.
The next two hadīths are on the authority of the Prophet’s Companions. The
focus in these hadīths is on the manner of forcing compliance from recalcitrant wives,
when admonishing does not work. One of these mentions imprisonment, and one
advocates beating women into submission. These hadīths thus seem to support al-
Tabarī’s view that force is acceptable when dealing with non-compliant wives.
Something like what we [al-Tabarī] have said is the interpretation of a number of
the exegetes. … Al-Hasan said, “When women commit nushūz against their
husbands, the husbands verbally admonish them, and if they accept then [that is
fine], but if not, the husbands should beat them without causing severe pain and if
[at that] they return [to bed] then [that is fine]. If not, it is allowed for [the
husbands] to seize them and leave them alone (ya’khudh minhā wa-yukhallīhā)…
Ibn ‘Abbās said, concerning His words wa’hjurūhunna in the beds and hit them
“They do that to them, and hit them until they obey their husbands in bed. And
when they obey in bed, and have sex with their husbands, they do not have a way
against them.”362

361
Ibid., 8, 310-11.
362
Ibid., 8, 311. In the latter hadīth, yudāj‘ must mean to have sexual intercourse with, rather than lie with.

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Not only do these hadīths stress the fact that sex is the matter over which women must
obey, but one actually advocates seizing women.
It seems unlikely that al-Tabarī was advocating a figurative interpretation. When
summarizing his point, he seems to have actual ropes in mind:
Secure the [recalcitrant women] with shackles in the house (shaddūhunna
wathāqan fī manāzilihunna), and hit them, when they reject their duty to obey
God concerning your rights [to sex].363

While keeping women in their houses is quite a common theme in these exegeses,
physically tying them up, or forcibly restraining them, goes beyond other exegetes’
interpretations. It was deemed offensive by pre-modern exegetes, and equally or more so
by modern feminist commentators. I will explore the latter first, and then discuss the pre-
modern aftermath of al-Tabarī’s interpretation.

A modern feminist critique of al-Tabarī’s view

Modern feminists see interpretations such as al-Tabarī’s as emblematic of the
anti-woman attitude of pre-modern exegetes. Below, I discuss one feminist critique of al-
Tabarī, showing the merits of this approach and its shortcomings. Ultimately, I argue, it
is impossible to divorce pre-modern exegetical texts from their patriarchal context, which
results in interpretations that are unacceptable to modern feminists. But that does not
mean that they objectify women to the extent asserted by many feminist commentators,
including the one cited below. Dismissing these texts for adhering to the norms of their
own time ignores the discourse and disagreement among their authors, and discounts the
exegetes’ own methods of engaging with gender issues.
Sa‘diyya Shaikh, in her article on “exegetical violence,” cites al-Tabarī’s view as
“tying [the wife] up and forcing her to have sex.”364 She goes on to say:
Such an interpretation explicitly condones marital rape and epitomizes oppressive
and abusive gender relations. Male sexuality is depicted as unapologetically
omnipotent. There is no male accountability or recognition of the woman as
human. It is clear that such a framework which views women as utilitarian

363
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, 8, 313.
364
I have not located the source of her citation in al-Tabarī’s text itself, but this is the way that al-Māwardī
characterizes al-Tabarī’s interpretation.

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 ‘objects’ is inherently violent, and explicitly proposes extreme sexual violation
and dehumanization.365

Speaking from the perspective of a modern feminist, Shaikh is opposed to the substance
of the interpretation and to its framework. She is reacting to the patriarchal nature of the
pre-modern interpretations, which take certain norms for granted that are deeply
offensive to feminist sensibilities.
According to certain legal schools in the pre-modern period, for example, marital
rape does not exist as a concept: the contract of marriage gives husbands a right to have
sex with their wives, unless it will cause physical harm or they are in a state of ritual
impurity.366 The legal ruling on women’s wifely duty is reflected in sources which
describe their nushūz as their refusal to have sex with their husbands. A variety of
additional sources, such as Prophetic hadīths, are cited in order to let men and women
know that sex is within their husbands’ rights; wives’ refusal, or even going out of the
house (which would prevent their husbands from having access to them), will result in
their punishment in realms both sacred and profane. This is what Shaikh notes when she
says that such an interpretation is oppressive and abusive.
Yet it is incorrect to say that women in these sources are “utilitarian ‘objects’.”
Although they may legally be beaten and subdued, women in these sources are not
‘objects’ devoid of humanity. They have volition: their exercise of this volition,
recalcitrance, is at the center of these exegetical discussions. Despite the fact that the
marital contract, according to the exegetes, obligates women to obey their husbands and
to have sex with them whenever their husbands wish, the exegetes recognize the
possibility that wives may not do so, which would not be the case if women were
“utilitarian ‘objects’.” Some exegetes in fact take great care to specify exactly what to do
in the case of the wife’s recalcitrance. And, in the exegetical sources, interpretations
which explicitly condone having sex against the wife’s will are rare. Instead, the focus is

365
Sa‘diyya Shaikh, “Exegetical violence: nushūz in Qur’ānic gender ideology,” Journal for Islamic
Studies, Vol. 17, 1997, 65.
366
Kecia Ali speaks of husbands’ right to have sex with their wives against their will, especially according
to the Hanafī school (Ali, Money, Sex, and Power, 184-5). She clarifies, “Rape is treated in these [Hanafī]
texts as a form of ghasb or ightisāb – usurpation, a property crime that by definition cannot be committed
by the husband” (Ali, Money, Sex, and Power, 187).

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on making wives agree to sex. Although laws may allow forced sex, exegetes urge men
to take their wives’ wishes into account.
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that some exegetes seek to limit men’s arbitrary
use of their power over women. In certain cases, authors recommendations seek to curb
men’s behavior; they advise men to behave in a way which is more moderate than the
limits of the law require. The exegetes’ exhortations never transgress the boundaries of
their own patriarchal societies: they never seek to do away with beating, and they are
oppressive towards women. But within their own milieux, there was variety in the
discourse which Shaikh’s analysis does not admit.
By holding pre-modern scholars to a standard of gender norms in which beating is
not legitimate, many scholars miss the opportunity to understand how the exegetes
themselves viewed the issue of women’s rights. Dismissing their interpretations for
being patriarchal, which is to be expected given their milieu, obscures not only the
discourse of the exegetes, but also discounts their exegetical methods. Rather than
expecting these sources to conform to notions of women’s rights that are common today,
it is worth taking them on their own terms and trying to understand the variation in, and
limits of, their discourse and methods.
Al-Tabarī is an example of a scholar who uses methodological rigor to determine
the interpretation of the verse. He interprets the Qur’ān according to Arab usage, and
fuses his knowledge of the language with his understanding of the law to create an
interpretation which he finds acceptable linguistically and logically. Yet al-Tabarī’s
interpretation was not only dismissed by subsequent exegetes: it was actively denounced.

Al-Tabarī’s contemporaries and beyond: setting the boundary

Al-Tabarī’s contemporaries adopt varied interpretations of the verse; none of
them agree with or even cite al-Tabarī’s view.367 They reject not only his interpretation

367
The interpretations of al-Tabarī’s contemporaries are easily summed up: al-Qummī says that the
husbands should curse their wives, Ibn Wahb says that the husbands turn away from their wives, and al-
Zajjāj says that the verse has to do with avoidance: “Wa’hjurūhunna in the beds, i.e., while sleeping with
them, and during [any point of] nearness to them. If they love their husbands, this avoidance (hijrān) in the
beds will be unbearable for them, but if they are hateful, agreeing to it, it is proof of their nushūz” (al-
Zajjāj, Ma‘ānī, 2, 49). Al-Zajjāj specifies that the husbands should “avoid” their wives while sleeping with
them, and during any nearness between the two. This gives a palpable impression of the husband ignoring
his wife in their most intimate moments, which would indeed be unbearable for a woman who loves her

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but the versions of the interpretations of previous authorities found in his work. In this
section I will analyze both types of rejection. First, I show that al-Tabarī cited two early
authorities, and I argue that in his citation he slightly modified the words of their
exegeses. I argue that this modification can be proven by the fact that his distinctive
version of their words was almost never cited by subsequent authors, yet those authors
did cite other interpretations from the very same authorities. Not only did subsequent
exegetes reject al-Tabarī’s distinctive version of these early authorities’ words, but they
also rejected his own interpretation, that women should be tied to the beds. In explaining
their reasons for this rejection, exegetes state their reliance on elements such as ijtihād
(informed independent reasoning) and common sense as bases for interpretation.
The two early authorities whose work, I argue, al-Tabarī has slightly modified are
al-Dahhāk and ‘Alī b. Abī Talha. The modification is the transformation of the word
“beds” (madāji‘) into the verb “to lie with” (yudāj‘u). The latter term is used by exegetes
in two ways: it may mean lying with someone on one bed, or having sexual intercourse
with them.368 Al-Tabarī has al-Dahhāk saying:
[Husbands should] lie with [their wives] in one bed (yudāju‘hā), avoid speaking
with them (yahjuru al-kalām), and turn their backs to them.369

This interpretation makes it acceptable for men to continue lie with their wives on the
same bed, while not speaking to them and turning their backs on them. Recalcitrant
wives are punished, but husbands still have physical access to their wives as required in

husband. In this interpretation, it is clear that al-Zajjāj envisions the husband and wife lying in bed
together, but he does not reinterpret the word “beds” to mean “lie with.” The interpretations of Ibn Wahb,
al-Qummī, and al-Zajjāj are all in Ibn Abī Hātim’s exegesis, which also ignores al-Tabarī’s view and all
interpretations which change the word “bed” to “lie with.” The early view which specifies that husbands
should keep having sex with their wives is still preserved in at least one work near al-Tabarī’s time: al-
Nahhās, the grammarian, quotes Sufyān al-Thawrī as saying that “avoid them” means without avoiding
sex; this is what ‘Abd al-Razzāq cited Sufyān as saying. But whereas this interpretation appears to be
prominent in the earlier period, it is isolated among the eight I have studied between al-Tabarī and al-
Māwardī.
368
In Lane’s Lexicon or Ibn Manzūr’s Lisān al-‘Arab, yudāj‘u refers to lying with someone on the same
bed, or in the same inner garment; Ibn Manzūr gives the example of a man lying with his slave girl and
Lane gives the example of someone lying with his companion (male or female). Neither gives an example
of someone lying with his wife, or refers to the term directly as sexual intercourse. As I will show below,
in some exegeses this term does not mean intercourse, but in other cases it does.
369
Al-Dahhāk, Tafsīr, v. 1, 155-6.

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marriage. Al-Tabarī also cites ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha is cited as changing the word “beds”
into “lie with”; he specifies that lying with does not entail having sex.370
Changing the noun “beds” (madāji‘) into the verb “to lie with” (yudāj‘u) is not as
farfetched as it sounds in English – the root for “bed” and “lie with” are the same in
Arabic; in English it would be a transformation from “the place where one lies down”
into “lying with.” But it is still an interpretive leap: it is a change to the letters of the
word, making the noun into a verb. None of al-Tabarī’s contemporaries, and very few
later exegetes, cite this part of these early authorities’ interpretations. I believe that the
transformation of “bed” into “lie with” was one made by al-Tabarī, and was not intrinsic
to those authorities.
The first clue that this phrase may not be original to the exegeses of al-Dahhāk
and ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha lies in the fact that this unusual wording is shared between the two
works, and they are reconstructed directly from al-Tabarī’s work. The compilers of the
al-Dahhāk reconstruction, who cite al-Tabarī, have copied this wording verbatim from his
tafsīr.
The second clue lies in patterns of citation, for which I have followed only the
interpretation of al-Dahhāk. The view with which al-Tabarī credits al-Dahhāk actually
has three components: the first is changing the word “bed” to “lie with,” the second is
that the husband avoids speaking to the wife, and the third is that the husband turns his
back on the wife.371 As I will show, two of these components are recorded in later
sources as being the view of al-Dahhāk: that the husband does not speak to the wife and
that he turns his back on her. But the part of the interpretation which changes the word
“bed” to “lie with” only appears rarely. In the remainder of this section, I will trace
subsequent exegetes’ citations of al-Dahhāk’s exegesis as well as the rejection of al-
Tabarī’s own view.

370
“Those women who take their husbands’ rights lightly and don’t obey their commands commit nushūz,
and so God has decreed that the husbands should admonish them, reminding them of God, and of the
greatness of the husbands’ rights over them. If they accept, do not pursue the matter. If not, “leave them in
the beds,” and do not speak to them except to leave the marriage, which will be very hard on them. If they
return [to obedience], [the husbands should] not pursue the matter. If not, [they should] hit them without
causing severe pain, without breaking their bones, or seriously wounding them (lā yajarhu lahā jurhan)….
The leaving is that [the husbands] do not have sex with [their recalcitrant wives], [but they] lie with them in
one bed, and turn their backs (lā yujāmi‘uhā wa-yudāji‘uhā ‘alā firāshhiā, wa-yuwallīhā zahrahu)” (‘Alī
ibn Abī Talha, Tafsīr, 147).
371
Al-Tabarī, Jāmi‘, v. 8, 302.

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 Al-Māwardī is the first of al-Tabarī’s detractors in this sample of exegetes. He
succinctly summarizes the acceptable range of interpretations in his age, which include
different types of avoidance and also being verbally rough. For him, preserving the
opinions of early interpreters is more important than determining the correct
interpretation: he does not give an opinion about which one is correct. Thus it is
important to note that he cites al-Dahhāk differently than al-Tabarī does: he says that
husbands should not speak to their recalcitrant wives, and that they should turn their
backs on them, but he does not say that they should “lie with” them. He cites two parts
of the interpretation, but not the third:
There are five doctrines concerning avoid them in the beds. The first is that
husbands do not have sex with [their recalcitrant wives], which is the doctrine of
Ibn ‘Abbās and Sa‘īd b. Jubayr. The second is that husbands do not speak to
[their recalcitrant wives], and they turn their backs on them in bed, which is the
doctrine of al-Dahhāk and al-Suddī. The third is that husbands avoid the wife’s
mattress, and their beds, which is the doctrine of al-Dahhāk and al-Suddī.372 The
fourth is that husbands insult [their recalcitrant wives] in the bed, being rough
with them in speech, which is the doctrine of ‘Ikrima and al-Hasan. And the fifth
is that husbands tie up their recalcitrant wives with the hijār, which is a rope for
tying camels, in order to make them stay and have sex. This is the doctrine of Ibn
Jarīr al-Tabarī. [Ibn Jarīr supports his interpretation by] citing a narration of Ibn
al-Mubārak… But in this narration there is no proof of [al-Tabarī’s] interpretation
rather than another.373

The early views that al-Māwardī selectively cites need no backup: he does not seem to
require that hadīths support the interpretations which he deems acceptable. But when it
comes to dismissing al-Tabarī, it is done on the basis that his proof-text, one of the
hadīths he cites, does not prove his case.
The next of al-Tabarī’s detractors, al-Tūsī, outlines three interpretations of the
verse.374 He says that al-Dahhāk’s interpretation is to “avoid speaking,” to the wives. 375
He then cites Abū Ja‘far as saying that the interpretation is leaving the bed, clearly takes

372
There could be some error here, as the same two exegetes are credited with two different interpretations.
Thus, I do not take this second interpretation into account in my analysis.
373
Al-Māwardī, al-Nukat, v. 1, 483.
374
Although the earlier Imāmī al-Qummī cites “insult them” as the meaning of the phrase, this is not in al-
Tūsī’s interpretation.
375
He says: “Ibn ‘Abbās, al-Dahhāk, ‘Ikrima, and al-Suddī say that it is to leave off speaking. Sa‘īd b.
Jubayr says that it is leaving off sex, and Mujāhid, al-Sha‘bī and Ibrāhīm say that it is to leave the bed,
which is the doctrine of Abū Ja‘far [al-Baqir]. It is also said that the husbands turn their backs” (al-Tūsī,
al-Tibyān, v. 4, 451).

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precedence over the others. The final interpretation cited is that of al-Tabarī, but al-Tūsī
refutes this view on the grounds that it makes no sense:
One interpreter says that wa’hjurūhunna means securing them with a rope for
tying a camel (hijār), because of the saying “a man ostracizes (hajara) his camel”
when he ties it up with a hijār… This is a deviant interpretation, and it is doubly
so considering God’s words in the beds, because there are no ropes (ribāt) in
bed.376

Not only is al-Tabarī’s interpretation deviant because it does not follow precedent, but
also because it is impractical: there are no ropes in bed. This shows that interpretations
can be rejected on the basis of common sense and practicality, not just because of
improper source citation.
But like al-Māwardī, al-Tūsī does not explain why the other interpretations do
make sense: naming authorities for these interpretations is enough, even when these
authorities do not actually represent the full spectrum of early interpretation, and are cited
as having different opinions in earlier works.
Al-Wāhidī does not even mention al-Tabarī’s text. All of the interpretations he
cites involve avoidance; none refer to “speaking roughly,” “lying with,” or “tying up with
the hijār.” However, he does include one new element: that “avoiding” can mean not
paying maintenance.377 Like al-Tūsī, al-Wāhidī’s attributes the opinion to al-Dahhāk that
the avoidance is not speaking; he ignores the other two parts of al-Dahhāk’s
interpretation that were in al-Tabarī. The nearest that any of al-Wāhidī’s interpretations
comes to “lie with” is to say that, while on the same bed, there should be separation
between husbands and wives, which will be hard on any wives who love their husbands;
this was originally cited by al-Zajjāj. Separating from the wives on the beds is also the
interpretation of Sūrābādī.

376
Al-Tūsī, al-Tibyān , v. 4, 451.
377
Al-Wāhidī’s interpretation reads: “His words avoid them in the beds Abū Zayd says, the husbands avoid
them, so there is mutual estrangement. Ibn Muzaffar says avoidance (hujr) is from forsaking (hijrān), and
that is not paying maintenance. Ibn ‘Abbās, ‘Ikrima, al-Dahhāk, and al-Suddī say that the intention of
“leave them” here is leaving off words, or not speaking to the wives in bed; Ibn ‘Abbās says that the
leaving is not having sex (jāmi‘) with them, [the husbands] turning their backs on them on the mattress, and
not speaking to them. Al-Sha‘bī, Mujāhid and Ibrāhīm say that the intention is that the husbands leave the
bed, or that there is a separation between the husbands and wives on the bed. The latter is the choice of
Ishāq because he said concerning His words avoid them in the beds i.e., while sleeping with them and being
close to them, because if they love their husbands, the separation will be difficult for them, whereas if they
are hateful then they will agree to it, which will be a proof of their nushūz. Al-Wāhidī, al-Basīt, MS
Nurosmanye.

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 Al-Zamakhsharī explains the Qur’ānic term “beds,” which by his time may have
become antiquated. He says that it could have one of three meanings: either the place
under the blankets, meaning where one sleeps, or it could be an allusion to sex, or it could
refer to the houses in which they sleep. Al-Zamakhsharī’s interpretation, which is
distinctive because it mentions “blankets,” was quite popular after his time, and was
especially cited by Imāmī exegetes.
In the beds means in the sleeping places, i.e., do not have sex with recalcitrant
women under the blankets (taht al-luhuf). Or the term [beds] could be an allusion
to sex. It is said, “husbands turn their backs on their recalcitrant wives in bed.” It
is said, “in the beds is in their houses, in which they spend the night.”378

The latter part of this passage, where he says that the “beds” means the “houses,” is from
al-Tabarī. He goes on to describe the rest of al-Tabarī’s interpretation; although he
admits that al-Tabarī is a “weighty” scholar, he seems not to agree with his view.379
The most involved rebuttal of al-Tabarī comes from the Mālikī Ibn al-‘Arabī.
This author’s respect for al-Tabarī and his methods may explain his shock and dismay at
the substance of al-Tabarī’s interpretation. Of all of the exegetes reviewed here, only Ibn
‘Arabī feels the need to re-examine the verse seriously. He uses the very same method as
al-Tabarī, analysis of the usage of the Arabs, but arrives at a different result. His
interpretation is thus an important example of the flexibility inherent in methods which
seem to be entirely objective, such as grammar.
Before beginning his own analysis, Ibn al-‘Arabī describes al-Tabarī’s view and
why it is incorrect.380 Like al-Māwardī, Ibn al-‘Arabī attacks al-Tabarī’s use of a

378
Al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, v. 1, 506-7.
379
“It is said that the verse’s meaning is coerce them into having sex, and tie them up, from leaving the
camel when it is tied with the hijār. This is the explanation of one of the weighty scholars (al-thuqalā’)”
(Ibid., v. 1, 506-7).
380
Ibn al-‘Arabī begins his analysis by citing the four interpretations which appeared before al-Tabarī; he
does not include any interpretations attributed to al-Dahhāk or ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha, which indicates to me
that he is not using al-Tabarī’s work as a source for these interpretations: “There are four doctrines on
wa’hjurūhunna in the beds. The first is that the husbands turn their backs in bed, which is the doctrine of
Ibn ‘Abbās. The second is that the husbands do not speak to their recalcitrant wives, even while having
sexual intercourse with them, which is the doctrine of ‘Ikrima and Abū’l-Duhā. The third is that the
husbands do not have sex with their recalcitrant wives until they resume doing what their husbands wish,
and that is the doctrine of Ibrāhīm, al-Sha‘bī, Qatāda, and Hasan al-Basrī, which Ibn Wahb and Ibn al-
Qāsim narrated on the authority of Mālik and others. The fourth is that the husbands sleep with them and
have sex with them, but when they are speaking to them, they speak with insults and strictness, [especially]
when saying to her “come here!” which is the doctrine of Sufyān. Al-Tabarī said that all previous exegeses
contained contradictions, and he chose as its meaning that the women should be tied with the hijār, which

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particular hadīth. But rather than saying that the hadīth’s substance does not support al-
Tabarī’s interpretation (which was al-Māwardī’s view), Ibn ‘Arabī says that the hadīth is
not authentic. In this passage, he switches from addressing al-Tabarī personally, as one
might speak to a friend, to describing his mistakes in the third person, as if he is talking to
the reader of his text.
What a mistake, from someone who is so learned in the Qur’ān and the behavior
of the Prophet (sunna)! I am indeed amazed at you, [al-Tabarī], at what
boldnesses you have taken with the Qur’ān and sunna in this interpretation,
without even making explicit where it is taken from! For [this interpretation] was
taken from a deviant hadīth narrated on the authority of Ibn Wahb…. And it is
indeed strange that, with all of al-Tabarī’s deep studies into the science [of the
Qur’ān] and into the language of the Arabs, he has strayed so far from the true
interpretation! And how he deviates from the correct view! So it is absolutely
necessary, in this case, to deal with the matter by way of independent reasoning
(ijtihād), which leads straight to the truth. We [Ibn al-‘Arabī] have looked at the
possible meanings of the root h-j-r according to Arab usage, and we have found
seven of them.” 381

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s solution to his disappointment with al-Tabarī is to undertake ijtihād, or

independent reasoning, in order to arrive at the truth. The method he arrives at is an
exact parallel to al-Tabarī’s: he relies on Arab usage. But instead of the three meanings
that al-Tabarī said were the only ones found in Arabic, he finds seven: (1) the opposite of
coming together, (2) that which must not be said, (3) aversion to something, (4) the
utterings of a madman, (5) being at the midpoint of a river, (6) a good youth, and finally,
(7) the rope with which one ties the camel. Each of these meanings, he explains, really
“revolves around one single idea, and that is distance,”382 and he describes the ways in
which each of the definitions encompasses the idea of “distance.” Some of his
descriptions are plausible: the midpoint of a river is equidistant from its two banks.
However, some are not: a good youth, for instance, being far from defect.383 This
reasoning is vacuous because, after all, everything is far from something.

is a rope, in the houses, which [he claims] is what is meant by the word beds. He explains his view by
saying that the word “hajara” can only have three meanings, and it is not correct that it would be hajr
which is senseless chatter (hadhyān), for the woman would not be cured from that. Nor is it hujr, which is
obscene language, because God ordered it [and he would not order anyone to speak obscenely], and so [he
says] it must mean to tie them up with the hijār” (Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ahkām, v. 1, 417-18).
381
Ibid., v. 1, 418.
382
Ibid., v. 1, 419.
383
Ibid., v. 1, 419.

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 Using the idea of “distance,” which he believes to be the basic component of
these root letters, Ibn al-‘Arabī explains the meaning of the verse – to stay away from the
recalcitrant wife. He is quite clear that husbands should not have sex with their wives
without speaking to them, for “having sexual intercourse while not on speaking terms is a
ridiculous thing to do.”384 Thus, Ibn al-‘Arabī consciously rejects certain early exegeses.
I have documented such rejection elsewhere in this dissertation, and have argued that it
occurs, in some cases, because of the content of those early exegeses. But because in
those cases the authors simply omitted certain interpretations, it is always possible that
they thought of what was included as a summary, a synecdoche. In other words, such
“leaving out” may or may not be a conscious rejection on the basis of content. In this
case, Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that his rejection of an early exegesis is because of its content.
This means that he believes that his methods allow him to arrive at a better understanding
of the verse than earlier exegetes (in this case al-Suddī and al-Kalbī):
And since all of this is true, and the meanings all [go back to] the idea of distance,
the meaning of the verse is (therefore): “keep away from [the recalcitrant women]
in the beds.” And it doesn’t require all of this ado which everyone else has
mentioned. Since it mustn’t be as al-Suddī and al-Kalbī have mentioned, then
how could it be what al-Tabarī has chosen?385

After rejecting the interpretations of early authorities, he explains that the law is actually
a range, with a minimum and maximum extent. The minimum extent of the law is for
husbands to turn their backs on their recalcitrant wives in bed, and the maximum extent is
not to speak to, nor lie with, them. He says that the latter is the interpretation of Mālik.
Those who say “turn your backs on recalcitrant wives,” have made the bed into
the place386 of separation. They have taken the doctrine according to the clearest
of the clear meanings. It is [furthermore] the interpretation of Ibn ‘Abbās (habr
al-umma), which carries out the minimum extent of the law …
And whoever says to avoid speaking to [recalcitrant wives] carries out the
maximum extent of the law, and his doctrine is not to speak to [recalcitrant wives]
nor lie with them.”387

By making the law into a range of acceptable possibilities, Ibn al-‘Arabī actually tones
down the original sense of these texts, in which there was real disagreement. Instead of

384
Ibid., v. 1, 419.
385
Ibid., v. 1, 419.
386
Lit.: “into the adverbial noun denoting place.”
387
Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ahkām, v. 1, 419.

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acknowledging the disagreements between earlier exegetes, he rejects the unacceptable
interpretations and fuses the acceptable ones. This acceptable range is then put forth as
the actual, correct, interpretation of the verse.

After the establishment of a majority view: deviations

Although Ibn al-‘Arabī’s interpretation represents the majority view in his time
and after, it turns out that not every single exegete ignores the interpretations included in
al-Tabarī’s work. One of the only exegetes to cite al-Tabarī fully is the Mālikī Ibn
‘Atīya, from the very same school as Ibn al-‘Arabī. He includes al-Dahhāk’s
interpretation of “lie with” which was not cited by any interpreter in this study between
al-Tabarī and Ibn ‘Atīya. But rather than attributing this interpretation to al-Dahhāk, he
attributes it to Ibn ‘Abbās:
Ibn ‘Abbās said, [the husbands should] lie with [their recalcitrant wives] while
turning their backs on them, and not having sex with them. Mujāhid said, “Keep
away from their beds.” … Sa‘īd b. Jubayr says, “it means leaving off words, i.e.,
do not speak to them…” Ibn ‘Abbās also says “Revile them until they return to
bed.” This is not sound, because the word cannot be conjugated in that way… Al-
Tabarī says, “the meaning is tie them up with the hijār, as one ties a camel, and it
is a rope with which to secure the camel, which accords with beating them and the
like. Al-Tabarī reaches his goal while attacking the authority of the other
doctrines, though this interpretation gives room for pause (fī kalāmihi fī hādhā al-
mawdi‘ nazar).388

Despite Ibn ‘Atīya’s seeming loyalty to al-Tabarī’s text, he notes that al-Tabarī’s own
view gives room for pause, meaning that it is problematic.
A few other exegetes, namely Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Kathīr, quote the early views
presented in al-Tabarī, including al-Dahhāk’s view that men are to “lie with” their
recalcitrant wives. But they are in the minority. The majority of exegetes who do quote
al-Dahhāk do not have him changing the noun “beds” to the verb “lie with.” None go so
far as to actually agree with al-Tabarī’s view that the correct procedure is to tie women
up with ropes.

Summary of “leave them”

388
Ibn ‘Atīya, al-Muharrar, v. 2, 48.

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 The most popular interpretation of this part of the verse, with 22 citations (36%)
is that the husbands should turn their backs on their wives; 17 exegetes (28%) cite an
interpretation which says that the husbands should not have sex with their wives.
Interpretations which are related to these two, sometimes with only subtle differences or
additional provisions, were given by many exegetes. The numbers which follow are the
numbers of exegetes who took a particular interpretation.
The interpretations include that the husbands should not sleep with their wives,
should go to another bed, or not go near the bed (13), should not speak to their wives
while turning their backs on their wives (6), should sleep in the same bed, but not speak
to their wives (4), should not speak to their wives except to leave the marriage, which is
hard on the wives (2), should not speak to their wives as long as the wives stay away
from the bed (1), should call their wives to the bed (2), should speak with their wives, but
not have sex with them (2), should not speak with their wives, but should have sex with
them (1), should not stop having sex with their wives (2), should sleep in the same bed,
turning their backs to their wives, and without speaking to them, have sex with them
(1),389 should speak to their wives in a friendly way (3), should not have sex with their
wives on the mattress (2), or should not speak to their wives at all (3). Another
interpretation, which appears in the early exegeses cited above, is based on redefining the
root h-j-r, which can, with different voweling, mean to curse, or speak harshly to
someone (6).

4.4 Conclusion: problems in interpreting Q4:34, part 2.

The second part of Q4:34 presents two problems to the early exegetes: the need to
reconcile, on the one hand, the Prophet’s sunna (not beating his wives) with the Qur’ānic
command to beat; and on the other, men’s right to sex in marriage with the Qur’ānic
command to avoid recalcitrant wives in the beds. Since other authors have dealt with the
issue of beating, I focused the discussion in this chapter on the command to “avoid
them.”

389
Al-Tabarī, al-Jāmi‘, v. 8, 302, tradition # 9350. Al-Tabarī seems to mistrust this interpretation,
however, since he writes “it is this way in my book”, meaning (according to the editors’ note) that he has
left the interpretation as he found it in a book, but he fears corruption in the interpretation.

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 I have argued in this chapter that the views which al-Tabarī attributed to al-
Dahhāk and ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha were not actually their interpretations, but were al-
Tabarī’s own summary of the meaning of their views. This is based on the fact that the
same unusual word is used in both, and that this word is not attributed to them again until
much later exegeses which are clearly relying on al-Tabarī. I have shown elsewhere in
this dissertation that early exegetes did not always provide verbatim hadīths on the
authority of the Prophet; here, a similar attitude is taken to the statements of early
exegetes. The changes which I believe al-Tabarī made to these interpretations seem to be
for the sake of clarifying these early views, rather than deliberately changing their
meaning; this indicates that for al-Tabarī verbatim citation may not have been as
important as getting across the content of early exegetes’ views.
But these interpretations are rejected, as is that of al-Tabarī himself. For the most
part, exegetes after al-Tabarī do not explain why the views that they include are better
than the ones he included: they do not delve into their own logic of interpretation. Ibn al-
‘Arabī is the exception in that he explains the reasoning through which he arrives at his
view; this explanation is supposed to prove that his interpretation is the true one.
The quest to meld earlier interpretations, minimizing difference, and establishing
a “correct” reading of the verse, has not been a prominent part of the discourse in the
other passages described in this dissertation. But that could be because the interpretation
of those passages already had broad agreement from the exegetes. It was the
interpretation of the problematic phrase that occasioned the quest for a single, proper
view.
The exegetes may seem to be rigidly stuck to previous interpretations because
there are not many “new” views on this phrase. However, a close reading shows how
exegetes actually re-create previous interpretations in order to suit present circumstances.
Ibn ‘Arabī explains that two, different, early views are actually two points on the
spectrum of acceptable interpretations: men can lie with their wives and turn their backs,
or they can refuse to speak to or lie with their wives. By incorporating these two
disparate interpretations into the spectrum of the “acceptable,” Ibn al-‘Arabī is not simply
regurgitating received wisdom, but is re-interpreting and re-inventing that received
wisdom to fit with his view of the proper interpretation of the verse.

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 5. Conclusion
The patriarchal lens through which the exegetes understood these verses has been
apparent throughout this dissertation: almost every interpretation is colored by the
exegetes’ assumptions about men’s and women’s natural roles and capabilities. In
reading exegeses which clash with modern sensibilities, it is tempting to hold exegetes to
modern standards, according to which gender equality could be reasonably expected.
However, I argue that it is inappropriate to expect pre-modern exegetes to conform to
modern notions of gender equality; it is similarly inappropriate to take their works out of
context to ascribe to them such attitudes as feminism or misogyny, or to argue that a
minority view in the pre-modern period indicates that modern conceptions of women’s
rights have pre-modern precedent. Al-Tabarī is a good example of the ways in which
some pre-modern authors have been appropriated for a modern discourse, because
modern scholars have radically different views of his gender ideology: he has been
labeled both misogynist and feminist, and his views have been used to indicate both the
“woman friendliness” of the pre-modern sources and its opposite.
Hadia Mubarak claims that al-Tabarī has a misogynist interpretation of this verse.
Her argument rests primarily on al-Tabarī’s statement that when Q4:34 says some of them
over others (ba‘duhum ‘alā ba‘d) it means “men over women.” She claims that by
putting the gendered terms “men” and “women” into the gender-neutral phrase “some
over others,” al-Tabarī obscures the true egalitarian meaning of the verse and
“completely dismiss[es] all grammatical considerations.”390 In her view, he thereby
enshrines a misogynist interpretation which shapes all subsequent understandings of the
verse.391 Her argument has several flaws, but certain aspects of al-Tabarī’s interpretation
do seem to support the view that it is misogynist.392

390
Hadia Mubarak, “Breaking apart the interpretive monopoly,” 269.
391
Ibid., 269.
392
Mubarak’s argument rests on five points: (1) the verse has an egalitarian meaning, (2) al-Tabarī was the
first to say that “some over others” means “men over women,” (3) this interpretation leaves aside all
grammatical considerations, (4) it goes on to affect all future understandings of the verse, (5) and it is
misogynist. The true meaning of the verse (point 1) is not my concern, but the other elements of her
argument do not hold up to close inspection. As is apparent from the review of earlier interpretations, al-
Tabarī was not the first to advance the interpretation of “men over women” (point 2). In fact, nearly all
other exegetes reviewed in his period and before, except al-Qummī, specify that the verse refers to men
having been given more than women or having been made superior to them. This is not always a value
judgment: sometimes men have been given more wealth or rights than women, and the exegetes usually do

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 Like earlier exegetes, al-Tabarī describes men as women’s “commanders,” and he
says that “some over others” means “men over women.” This is combined with
statements that men have been made superior to women by virtue of their spending. In
his unusual interpretation of the second half of Q4:34, he speaks of men tying disobedient
women up in their houses, using the rope that is used for tying camels. When explaining
both Q2:228 and Q4:34, he repeatedly shows that men have more rights than women:
their right to tie women up like camels is a striking example of this disparity and of the
power relationship between men and women. Hadia Mubarak, and other modern feminist
authors, take these elements to mean that al-Tabarī has a misogynist outlook.
On the other hand, some modern scholars have used al-Tabarī’s unusual opinion
that women can be judges to indicate that pre-modern sources actually conformed to
modern notions of women’s rights; this evidence is used to fortify discussions of
women’s rights in Islam today. For example, in a recent opinion piece in al-Ahram
Weekly, former deputy president of al-Azhar Mahmoud Ashour uses al-Tabarī’s opinion
to argue that “from the bulk of scholarly consensus, one has to draw the conclusion that
women are entitled to serve as judges.”393
Many aspects of al-Tabarī’s interpretations support the view that he had a
particularly friendly stance towards women’s rights. In his interpretation of Q4:34, he
does not use terms which would imply a difference in intellect: in the fourteen opinions
he cites after his own for this verse, he does not include any describing men as having
superior intellect (‘aql) or judgment (ra’y).394 Going beyond the exegesis of this verse, it
is well known that al-Tabarī has the unusual opinion that women can be judges in all

not explain why. Thus, there was good precedent for al-Tabarī’s interpretation. Al-Tabarī does not leave
aside all grammatical considerations (point 3). The verse itself specifies “men” as being qawwāmūn over
“women,” it goes on to the ungendered “some over others,” and then says “with what they spend of their
wealth.” This latter part is translated by Mubarak herself as a reference to men. So “some over others” is
sandwiched between two references to men; interpreting it as a reference to men is not ungrammatical. I
have repeatedly demonstrated that al-Tabarī did not have the power to shape all subsequent interpretation
(point 4). In the exegeses of the verses studied here, al-Tabarī’s personal opinions are usually left out of
later works. And it is not only his own opinions which are marginalized: even his quotations of early
authorities are cited selectively. If his view of “men over women” had gone against the dominant
understanding of the verse, it would have been discarded in subsequent generations; since it made sense to
the exegetes of later ages, it was preserved. I deal with the question of the misogyny of his text (point 5) in
the following few pages.
393
Mahmoud Ashour, “Can women be judges?” Soapbox section of al-Ahram Weekly, 8-14 March, 2007,
issue # 835. Available online at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/835/op8.htm
394
Although neither did other exegetes of his period, other than Ibn Wahb.

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cases, including the most severe – those involving hudūd and qisās; these are excluded by
the Hanafī school (the only major school to allow women to be judges at all). He thinks
women are capable of judging on the basis that they can be muftiyas, meaning that they
can give valid opinions on questions of law. This is an area in which all law schools
recognize that women are equal with men: all hold that women can be muftiyas. But
most schools do not make an analogy with being a muftī in order to say that women can
judge: they say that because women do not witness in all cases, they cannot judge. Al-
Tabarī breaks with the norms of his time by affirming the analogy between the rules for
muftīs and the rules for judges: his approach guarantees women equality in judging.395
The question of authority is at the heart of the issue of women as judges, and al-
Tabarī’s view of women’s ability to wield authority differs from that of other jurists.396
Many jurists in his time connect women’s lack of authority over men in the private
sphere with a lack of authority in the public sphere: since women do not have authority at
home, they also cannot have public authority and be judges or witness in most cases
involving men. Al-Tabarī’s view that women can be judges means that he grants women
authority over men in the public sphere. This opinion was unusual precisely because
many jurists did not believe women should have any authority over men either in the
public or the private spheres. This may be why Michael Cook argues that, when reading
through the lens of the culture in which al-Tabarī lived, one may recognize in him a
“medieval Muslim feminist.”397
But al-Tabarī’s view of women judging does not change his view of men’s right
to authority in the private sphere of the home, and it is not an instance of the pre-modern
sources’ adherence to modern norms. He does not actually uphold equal rights for men
and women in all spheres, which is the doctrine of feminism. And just as his doctrine
that women can judge is not a sign of feminism, his belief that men have control in the
home is not a symptom of misogyny.

395
Most jurists give as rationales for women’s inability to judge the fact that women cannot witness and are
deficient in rationality, and therefore should not be put in a position of authority over men.
396
In this brief discussion, I am leaving aside the fact that most law is determined by inertia, in other words
reliance on the opinions of the earliest jurists, and am simply focusing on how jurists rationalize their
choice of not allowing women to judge.
397
Michael Cook, The Koran: A very short introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 104.

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 The problem with using terms such as “feminist” or “misogynist” to describe pre-
modern persons and doctrines is that these terms are modern, and they indicate a
pervasive gender ideology. According to these terms, a feminist has a doctrine of
upholding women’s rights in all spheres, and a misogynist is against women’s rights or
has a particular antipathy towards them. When al-Tabarī is described using these terms,
his various opinions are taken to indicate a gender ideology which should affect all of his
opinions. Thus, a statement of “men over women” in its specific context is taken to
indicate his feelings that “women” as a category are inferior to “men.” His opinion on
women judging is likewise taken to be a sign of his upholding women’s rights in all
spheres.
Not only are al-Tabarī’s opinions on one matter or another understood to refer to
his attitude as a whole, but sometimes his views (or the views of other scholars) are
brought forth as evidence of all pre-modern scholars’ attitudes. This is the case when al-
Tabarī’s unusual opinion of women’s right to judge is taken to indicate the “woman-
friendliness” of the pre-modern period (as when Mahmoud Ashour asserts that his view
somehow represents “scholarly consensus” on the matter of women judging). Yet it is
equally the case when certain aspects of the exegetes’ interpretations are held to be
symptomatic of their unmitigated misogyny. Such blanket attitudes towards the pre-
modern discourse ignores the variety of pre-modern scholars’ approaches to verses that
have to do with women. Yet the differences between the exegeses examined here show
that, despite agreement on aspects of these verses, there was no one correct, “orthodox,”
reading of them.
Citing Ibn Taymīya, the scholar Mahmoud Ayoub has stated that the Companions
and Successors “did not sharply disagree in their interpretations of the Qur’ān.”398 But
this is not true. Even in the earliest period, scholars had fundamental disagreements
about problematic aspects of verses, such as whether to avoid them in the beds means to
avoid sex with the recalcitrant wife, to have sex with her, or to speak rudely to her.
The variations documented here between early and later interpretations show that
the earliest interpretations did not determine the later ones. In every age, exegetes pick
and choose which interpretations to include in their own works, and they do not include

398
Mahmoud Ayoub, The Qur’ān and its interpreters, Albany: SUNY press, 1984, v. 1, 31.

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every early exegesis. Some early exegeses virtually disappear through time, and are not
reproduced in later periods.
Furthermore, the early exegeses which were repeated in later works were
elaborated upon in ways impossible to predict from the text of those early exegeses;
certain types of discourse developed which were not present in the earliest texts. For
instance, early exegeses focus on the meaning of the term qawwāmūn, and men’s and
women’s specific duties. After the early period, exegetes expand the discourse to include
descriptions of men’s and women’s innate qualities, which, they say, explains why men
and women should assume their particular roles. Other types of discourse are hinted at in
early texts, but are developed almost beyond recognition in later works. This type of
discourse includes the nature of the “degree” that men have over women, and the
development of the historical narrative regarding Eve’s creation.
In this study, I have assessed some of the many influences on the writing of tafsīr.
It is important to note that, although many of the exegetes reviewed in this study
influenced the genre in important ways, no one exegete had an ultimate influence on the
genre, and no one work included every interpretation available in its time. Thus, despite
the fact that some scholars believe that al-Tabarī “presents the entire tradition of tafsīr
critically and with admirable skill and fidelity,”399 this study has revealed that al-Tabarī
did not present the entire tradition in his own time, and furthermore that he may have
changed aspects of the early exegeses which he incorporated into his work. And
although al-Tabarī had a major influence on the genre, some of his citations of early
views are rarely cited by later exegetes, as when he has ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha saying that
women’s obedience consists of their being good to their husbands’ families, or when he
gives interpretations of Q4:34 saying that husbands should “lie with” their wives in the
beds. The fact al-Tabarī was so influential means that later exegetes were consciously
picking and choosing from his interpretations and those of other influential exegetes.
The element of conscious choice in exegesis helps to explain why the opinions of
certain late exegetes, such as al-Zamakhsharī, could become more widely cited than the
opinions of early influential scholars, such as ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha. But answering the
question of why certain interpretations were popular, while others were discarded, is

399
Mahmoud Ayoub, The Qur’ān and its interpreters, v. 1, 3.

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more complicated than simply documenting those changes. Studying the sources of
exegesis can help to answer the question of why exegesis changes, and how exegetes
ultimately choose one interpretation over another.
I have shown how exegetes draw on wide-ranging and disparate elements in their
works, including the text of the Qur’ān, hadīths, grammatical analysis, law, previous
interpretations, common cultural understandings, societal mores, historical narrative,
current scientific understandings, and their own opinions. Using such elements for the
continual production of new interpretations throughout the ages is one indication that
exegetes thought of their own venture as time-bound, and that they “felt the need to make
the Qur’ān relevant to every time and situation.”400
Yet some scholars claim that, despite the exegetes’ quest for immediate
relevancy, the venture of exegesis ultimately rested on the behavior of the Prophet and on
early exegeses. 401 In this view, in addition to the Qur’ān itself, hadīths on the authority
of the Prophet and his Companions and Successors were the real basis of interpretation
with exegetes adding their own explanations to these sources in order to make them
relevant in different times and places. Indeed, it is undeniable that the exegetes
considered these elements to be at the heart of their venture. However, I have shown that
the authoritative sources such as hadīths cannot be considered to be the basis of
interpretation: they were always cited in a subjective way, not in the objective way that
would put them at the foundation of the enterprise. Rather, I have argued, context is key
in determining interpretation.
In the Introduction, I mentioned some of the contexts that inform the exetetes,
including geographical location, teachers, school of law and theology, and personal and
social mores. Although all of these elements, as well as the canonical texts of the Qur’ān
and hadīths, play an important part in the exegetical process, I argue that exegetes’ own
opinions and their common cultural understandings are particularly important as
determinants of interpretation. In the following few pages, I will give a few examples of
the ways in which the twin lenses of personal opinion and common cultural

400
Ayoub, The Qur’ān and its interpreters, v. 1, 24.
401
While Mahmoud Ayoub admits that this search for relevancy was at the heart of the venture of tafsīr, he
concurrently claims that scholars “have always insisted that tafsīr must ultimately rest on the sunnah of the
Prophet and the views of his Companions and their Successors” (ibid., v. 1, 24).

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understandings had the power to shape exegesis despite considerations of other contexts
and authoritative sources. I begin with personal opinion.
As I described in the introduction, the exegetes’ opinions should not be
understood as their own whimsical ideas, but rather as their reasoned attempts to
synthesize all elements available to them to correctly interpret the Qur’ān. Nevertheless,
personal opinion can grant an exegete great leeway in interpretation. One instance of this
can be seen in exegeses regarding men’s spiritual superiority over women.
Many exegetes in this study state that men have a spiritual “edge” over women in
some way, whether this is because of more “religiosity,” better morals, or simply a
superiority in “religion” (dīn). One who makes the strongest statements of men’s
religious superiority is Ibn Kathīr, who goes so far as to say that men have “superiority in
this world and the next.”402 This goes beyond most exegetes’ statements, because
exegetes do not usually mention women’s heavenly reward; the implication of at least
one Qur’ānic verse is that good women are able to achieve the same reward as men.403
However, Ibn Kathīr seems to think that men’s superiority extends right into the next life.
This doctrine not only breaks with most exegetical texts on the matter, but also is
in direct contradiction to the opinions of his teachers, Ibn Taymīya and Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawzīya, who both state that good women can achieve the same status as men in the next
world. Ibn Taymīya quotes a version of a women’s jihād hadīth, and then explains it by
saying that God will be generous with women who are good to their husbands.
On the Prophet’s authority, some women said to him, “Men fight jihād, give alms,
and work, and we don’t do any of that,” so [the Prophet] said, “those of you who
are best to their husbands will equal that.” I.e., women’s good relationship with
their husbands is their duty and it pleases God, who will be generous with them,
even though their work is different from that of men. And God knows best.404

Ibn Taymīya emphasizes that women’s work is different from men’s, but that if women
do their duties well, they will receive God’s reward. His student, and another one of Ibn
Kathīr’s teachers, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya, repeatedly states that men and women are
402
Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, v. 2, 339.
403
Qur’ān 33:35 states: For Muslim men and women, for believing men and women, for devout men and
women, for true men and women, for men and women who are patient and constant, for men and women
who humble themselves, for men and women who give in charity, for men and women who fast, for men and
women who guard their chastity, and for men and women who engage much in Allah's praise, for them has
Allah prepared forgiveness and great reward.
404
Ibn Taymīya, Fatāwā al-nisā’, 213.

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equal spiritually, although unequal mentally. He even has an entire chapter devoted to
the differences between men and women in which he explains that women’s nature,
rather than their deficiencies, lead to their having different religious obligations.
As for ‘Umar’s words, “God has made men and women equal in their physical
acts of worship, and in the punishment of capital crimes, and He has made women
worth half of men in [terms of the amount of] blood money paid after murder,
[and also in matters of] witnessing, inheritance, and the freeing of slaves,” this too
is from the completeness of God’s law, and His wisdom and mercy; for the
correctness of physical acts of worship, and the consequences of these are equal
for both men and women. One sex’s need for these things is the same as the other
sex’s need for them; there is no difference between them. True, He has made a
division in some matters, such as the Friday prayers and group prayers: the
necessity of these two acts of worship is men’s alone, for women are not the sorts
of people who go out, mixing with men. Likewise, [there is a] difference between
[men and women] in performing the jihād, which is not necessary for women.
But they are equal in their performance of the hajj, and in certain types of good
deeds, such as giving alms (zakāt), praying and ablutions.405

In this passage, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya says that women are not the type of people who
“go out, mixing with men.” This explains why they do not have to do certain duties, such
as Friday prayers, group prayers, and jihād. These matters, Ibn al-Qayyim explains, are
dictated by circumstance, not because of men’s innate spiritual superiority.406
Thus, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya’s opinion is in direct opposition to the opinion of
those exegetes who list Friday prayers, group prayers, and jihād as aspects of men’s
superiority over women. And both Ibn Taymīya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya differ
radically from the views expressed by Ibn Kathīr, who says that men are better than
women full stop.407 The fact that both Ibn Taymīya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya were Ibn

405
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya, I‘lām al-muwaqqi‘īn, v. 2, 168.
406
He does, however, feel that men are innately superior in terms of their mental abilities. He says, “As for
witnessing, woman is only worth half of a man in it, due to the ruling which God has indicated in His book
and that is that women are weak in rationality (al-‘aql) and have little exactitude when they remember the
testimony. God has made men superior to women in mind (al-‘uqūl), understanding (al-fahm),
memorization, and discernment, and woman cannot reach the level of man in those things. God does not
completely forbid women’s testimony, because this would mean the loss of many of her rights, and it
would be an obstruction to her. Thus the best thing is to join women’s minds together when they testify
about their viewpoint, so that one of them may remind the other if she forgets, which is why the testimony
of the two women equals that of one man” (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya, I‘lām al-muwaqqi‘īn, 2, 168).
407
For instance, in his exegesis of 4:34: “And with what they spend on them i.e., the dowries and
maintenance, duties which God has enjoined upon men in the Qur’ān and prophetic practice (sunna). For
men are intrinsically superior (fī nafsihi) to women, and men are superior to women and confer benefit on
them (lahu al-fadl ‘alayha wa’l-ifdāl), so he is suited to being responsible for her, as God said, Men have a
degree over them” (Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, v. 4, 21).

189
Kathīr’s teachers seems to have little influence on his opinion. When it came time to
write his work of tafsīr, his own personal view prevails.
This case in particular highlights the restrictions of the genre of tafsīr: certain
views, such as women’s spiritual inequality, appear in works of tafsīr; others, such as that
of women’s spiritual equality, are nearly ignored. Since women’s spiritual status was a
matter of debate among the ‘ulamā’, it is striking that Ibn Taymīya’s viewpoint is almost
unrepresented in exegetical literature. And Ibn Kathīr feels no obligation to represent the
views of his own teachers in his work of exegesis. If one were to read only Ibn Kathīr’s
view, it might give the incorrect impression that women’s spiritual inequality was the
consensus at the time, or that his teachers and peers shared his opinion. Instead, it is
possible that a minority of the ‘ulamā’ actually held this view. Although works of tafsīr
illustrate the mores of some individuals, they should not be understood as a mirror for all
viewpoints.
In issues such as the choice of what precedent to include and what not to include,
and certain matters of personal conviction, an exegete’s opinion will override other
considerations. In other cases, customary understandings and customary practices are the
strongest considerations.
One realm in which customary practice can be shown to override other
interpretive considerations is that of the household roles, such as cooking and cleaning. I
have already shown that some exegetes recommend behavior that is not a part of the law.
But in the case of cooking and cleaning, some exegetes actually recommend behaviors
that go against their law school’s ruling on the obligatoriness of household service. In the
following pages, I will explain the different schools’ doctrines on cooking and cleaning,
again drawing on a text of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya’s. I then show how some exegetes
went against their law schools’ view in recommending that women perform household
tasks.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya has an unequivocal view that women should do
housework. He explains that under no circumstances should men do “women’s work”

190
such as cooking and cleaning; in his view, men’s doing such work would abrogate their
authority over women.408
As for creating ease and relaxation for women, and their husbands’ serving them
by sweeping, grinding, kneading, washing, making the beds, and undertaking the
service of the house; it is reprehensible (min al-munkar). God Most High says,
women’s rights are equal to their duties in kindness and He says, Men are
qawwāmūn over women. So if women don’t serve their husbands but rather their
husbands are their servants, then wives would be in charge of husbands (al-
qawwāma ‘alayhi). [Emphasis mine.] 409
Ibn al-Qayyim has a strong opinion that women’s performance of household duties is a
part of men’s authority over them: for men to undertake such work would make wives
qawwāmāt over their husbands. However, he explains that not all schools of law hold
this view. He is a Hanbalī, which is a school that obligates women to do housework.
According to him, the Mālikīs, Shāfi‘īs, Hanafīs, and Zāhirīs do not consider housework
obligatory for women.
A group of jurists forbids making wives’ service to their husbands in anything an
obligation, and among those who hold to this opinion are Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, Abū
Hanīfa, and the Zāhirīs. They say that because the contract of marriage only
stipulates for enjoyment, not servitude, and [because it stipulates] spending freely
for [the wives’] benefit, the hādīths mentioned above only indicate that voluntary
[service] is moral and noble, but not that it is a necessity.410
Ibn al-Qayyim explains that some schools do not obligate women to do housework;
rather, they hold the view that the only legal purpose of marriage is enjoyment and

408
Although Ibn al-Qayym does not mention this view, some early exegetes argue that husbands are
obligated to provide service to their wives, though from these sources it is unclear whether this means
hiring servants to work in the house, or simply that husbands are obliged “serve” their wives, i.e., provide
them with the necessities of life. For example, Ibn Wahb (d. 240/854) listed service as one of man’s duties
to his wife: “and men have a degree over them in rationality (‘aql), inheritance, blood money, witnessing,
and with what men owe in terms of the maintenance and service (khidma)” (Ibn Wahb al-Dīnawarī, al-
Wādih 1, 75). Two centuries later, al-Qushayrī (d. 464/1072) made a slightly clearer statement of women’s
rights: “Women’s rights are equal to their obligations, in kindness meaning, that since he has a right over
her due to his maintenance of her, she has the right to service when their state permits it” (Al-Qushayrī,
Latā’if al-Isharāt, 1,193). However, al-Qushayrī’s phrase is somewhat ambiguous since the tafsīr was
written in rhyming prose for easy memorization: in kāna lahu ‘alayhā haqq mā anfaqa min al-māl, fa-lahā
haqq al-khidma li-mā salaf min al-hāl. Formative and early classical period exegetes in this sample did not
mention women’s obligation to serve in their husbands’ houses, although this should not be taken to mean
that some did not believe they should: the Hanbalī school considers their service a legal duty. For the
formative-period jurists’ views against women performing housework, see Kecia Ali, “Progressive
Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence,” 170.
409
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya, Tafsīr, v. 2, 211.
410
Ibid., v. 2, 211. The tafsīr is a modern compilation from many of Ibn al-Qayyim’s works.

191
pleasure. Ibn al-Qayyim does not neglect the spouses’ right to sex in marriage.411 Yet he
feels that marriage is about much more than sex; namely, wives must undertake the
household duties to provide a sense of ease and relaxation for their husbands, who work
to provide maintenance for their wives. But, he says, other schools, such as the Mālikīs,
Hanafīs, Shāfi‘īs, and Zāhirīs, see the contract of marriage as a contract for sexual
enjoyment, which at the same time obligates husbands to pay for their wives’
maintenance. These schools say that women’s service is noble, by which he means that
they recommend that women perform service, but they do not obligate them to do so.
Women’s only legal obligation, according to these schools, is to provide sex for their
husbands. In other words, according to him all jurists say that women should serve in the
house; the question is whether such service is their legal obligation, or whether it is
voluntary.412
However, none of the exegetes in this sample mention a legal debate on this issue.
No matter what their school of law, the exegetes who mention housework do so only to
say that wives, not husbands, are responsible for it. As I described in Chaper 3, the
Hanafī al-Zamakhsharī uses the opportunity presented by Q2:228 to clarify that the sexes
have different household roles. He says that when women cook and clean for their
husbands, the husbands are not obligated to do the same. Although al-Zamakhsharī does
not say that women’s cooking and cleaning is obligatory, this is a typical exegetical
recommendation of proper behavior. He clarifies that neither sex should be obligated to
do what is not among their proper duties, and that their duties should follow the law
(sharī‘a) as well as the “the customs of the people” (‘ādāt al-nās).413
But in making these recommendations for behavior, al-Zamakhsharī apparently
goes against the ruling of his school of law on the matter, which says that women should
not be obligated to perform housework. Although some Hanafīs may hold that
housework is a commendable duty, none of the exegetes who speak of women’s duty to
perform housework ever mention the legal ruling that they are not obligated to do it. Al-
411
For instance, see his exegesis of Q2:228 in the modern compilation Tafsīr, v. 1, 392.
412
On the other hand, Kecia Ali describes the early Mālikī, Hanafī, and Shāfi‘ī view on women’s
housework thus: “Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i jurists emphatically denied any wifely duty to perform
housework… she need not even cook for herself, let alone her husband” Ali, “Progressive Muslims and
Islamic Jurisprudence,” 170. The issue of women performing the housework could be one in which the law
changed over time.
413
Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf, v. 1, 272.

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Zamakhsharī admits that he chooses customary practice in making this recommendation -
and he is not the only exegete to do so.414
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for instance, says that the intention of marriage is love,
understanding, sex, and having children; yet he also emphasizes that it is women’s duty
to serve in their husbands’ houses, especially in light of their husbands’ heavy
responsibilities. He adheres to the Shāfi‘ī school of law, which is one of the schools do
not obligate women to serve.
The second possible interpretation [of the degree that men have over women] is
[that] the desire for the benefits and pleasure [of marriage] is shared by both
[husbands and wives], because the intention of marriage is ease (al-sakan),
companionship, love (mawadda),415 the intermeshing of lineage, increasing
helpers and loved ones, and attaining pleasure (al-ladhdha). Both men and
women share in these aspects of marriage; it is indeed possible to say that women
get more out of it, and moreover that husbands alone [are responsible for] various
kinds of rights of their wives: the dowry, maintenance, defending their wives,
providing for their requirements, and keeping them from harm. So women’s
providing service to their husbands is more certainly obligatory in consideration
of their extra duties towards their wives.416 This is why God said: Men are
qawwāmūn over women… and the Prophet said “if I had ordered anyone to
prostrate themselves before anyone other than God, I would have ordered women
to prostrate themselves before their husbands.”417

Fakhr al-Dīn states clearly that because women get more out of marriage, meaning that
all of their financial needs, clothing, and food must be paid for by their husbands, they
should serve in the household. The fact that husbands work so hard for their wives, a
sociological argument, justifies women’s duty to do the housework. There is a reason,
here, for women’s duty; it is that men take a lot of trouble over them, and therefore they
should have to do something in return.

414
Other exegetes who quote al-Zamakhsharī (without always mentioning him by name) are: al-Baydāwī
(Shāfi‘ī, d. 685/1286), al-Nasafī (Hanafī, d. 710/1310), Abū Hayyān (Mālikī/Shāfi‘ī, d. 745/1353), al-
Biqā‘ī, Muhsin al-Fayd (Imāmī) and al-Qūnawī (Hanafī). Baydāwī’s interpretation was very brief. He
said: “women have rights over men like men’s rights over women, in terms of necessary duties and claims,
but not in terms of type [of deed] (jins)” (al-Baydāwī, Hāshīyat Qūnawī, v. 1, 251). Al-Nasafī quotes al-
Zamakhsharī exactly. See al-Nasafī, Tafsīr, 1, 180. Abū Hayyān explains that the law pays attention to
customs, and does not obligate either spouse to do anything that is not in their right, but does not explain
further. (al-Bahr al-muhīt, v. 2, 200).
415
The terms sakan and mawadda relate directly to Sura 30:21, in which the Qur’ān says: “And one of His
signs is that He created mates for you from yourselves that you may find rest in them (li-taskunu ilayhā),
and He put love (mawadda) and mercy between you”
416
Fa-kāna qiyām al-mar’a bi-khidmati al-rajul ākad wujūban ri‘āyatan li-hādhihi al-huqūq al-zā’ida.
417
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr, v. 6, 102.

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 But he goes further than simply explaining women’s duty: he says that housework
is obligatory, a legal term indicating the necessary performance of an act. Although al-
Zamakhsharī may have been making a recommendation, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī considers
women’s housework to be a legal duty. In this case, the mores of the society in which
these exegetes live have taken precedence over other authoritative sources, such as the
opinion of their school of law.
I have shown repeatedly throughout this dissertation how exegetes aim to be
objective in their interpretations of these Qur’ānic verses, drawing on disparate elements
in order to ensure the accuracy of their interpretations. Pre-modern scientific theories,
societal mores, and customs are all objective truths in their particular context. But these
are truths which can change. With the evolution of methods, scientists have developed
more sophisticated theories about the differences, and similarities, between the sexes, and
the origins of humankind. Even when applying seemingly unchanging frameworks, like
grammatical interpretations, exegetes seem often to be influenced by their ideas about the
innate differences between the sexes and the true meaning of a verse. And even in the
pre-modern period, societal mores and customs differed according to specific
circumstances.
These factors are too strong to ensure that Qur’ānic exegesis is a truly objective
process, uncovering timeless truths; instead, they reveal its ultimately subjective and
time-bounded nature. But perhaps this, too, was tacitly acknowledged by some exegetes
as an inherent part of their venture. By consciously rejecting early views, exegetes such
as Ibn al-‘Arabī give precedence to their own personal understanding as well as the mores
of their times. And by stating that customs play a part in their recommendations,
exegetes such as al-Zamakhsharī implicitly acknowledge that different times, and
different customs, will bring about different recommendations for the behaviors of the
sexes.

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 Appendix A: Sources of exegesis used in this dissertation

A 1. Brief Biographical sketches

Mujāhid b. Jabr Abū’l-Hajjāj al-Makhzūmī, (d. 102/720) was a Successor from Mecca
who later went to Iraq. He was well known as a Qur’ān reader and a source of tafsīr, and
was said to have read the Qur’ān with Ibn ‘Abbās three times, each time getting Ibn
‘Abbas’s exegesis. He was said to have met the angels Hārūt and Mārūt at Babel. “He is
associated with a rationalist approach to Qur’ān interpretation, and with ra’y in fiqh.”418
He is known primarily from al-Tabarī, who quotes him often, but there is a MS of his
exegesis in Cairo, published and edited by al-Sūrtī, which contains material not in al-
Tabarī. As Rippin says, “The text [of the Cairo manuscript] may well represent one of
the interpretive strands connected to the name Mujāhid, but it has been shown by Staut
and Leemhuis to have been neither a source for, nor an extract from, al-Tabarī.”419
Although that seems to indicate some problem, either with al-Tabarī or more likely with
the manuscript, nevertheless this publication is used in this dissertation.

Al-Dahhāk b. Muzāhim Abū Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Hilālī420 (d. 105/723) was from Balkh;
he spent time in Samarqand and Nīshāpūr.421 The work used here is from an incomplete
manuscript, which the authors identify as the rest of the Ibn Wahb tafsīr; the editors have
filled in the numerous gaps in the text using al-Tabarī’s tafsīr.

‘Alī ibn Abī Talha Abū’l-Hasan b. Mukhāriq (d. 143/760) was born in the Arabian
Peninsula, and served as a judge there for a part of his life, then he went to Hims. Several
biographers (al-Mizzī, al-Dhahabī, and Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalānī) say that he died in 143 in
Hims.422 The tafsīr used in this dissertation consists of the narrations of Ibn ‘Abbās on
the authority of ‘Alī ibn Abī Talha, reconstructed from later works, including that of al-
Tabarī.

418
Andrew Rippin, “Mudjāhid b. Djabr al-Makkī” in the EI2, v. 7, 293.
419
Ibid., 293.
420
Also called Abū Muhammad al-Khurāsānī. Tafsīr al-Dahhāk, 43.
421
Al-Mizzī, quoted in the Tafsīr al-Dahhāk, 47.
422
Rāshid ‘Abd al-Mun‘im al-Rajjāl, in the introduction to Alī ibn Abū Talha’s tafsīr, 15-16.

195
Muqātil b. Sulaymān Abū’l-Hasan b. Bashīr al-Azdī al-Khurāsānī al-Balkhī (d.
150/767) was born in Balkh and lived in Marw, Baghdad, and Basra. Muqātil died in
Basra and “is also said to have taught in Mecca, Damascus and Beirut.”423 His is the first
major Qur’ān commentary to have survived to today: furthermore, it is likely to be an
early manuscript. Thus it is of great value, although Muqātil did not enjoy a good
reputation as a traditionist or exegete, and his work was not used by al-Tabarī.424
Plessner emphasizes that his commentary focuses on narrative elements rather than issues
of text or grammar, and remarks: “It is likely that it presents versions of the stories told
by the early kussās.”425

Sufyān al-Thawrī Abū ‘Abd Allāh Sufyān b. Sa‘īd b. Masrūq al-Kūfī (d. 161/777) was
born in 97/716 in Kūfa. He was a prominent legal scholar of the Kūfan school, who
seems to have had an active life. He was hostile to the Abbasids, at one point rejecting
the post of judge in Kūfa and fleeing to San‘ā’, Yemen, where he studied hadīth with,
among others, ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-San‘ānī (also a source for this dissertation). He
apparently left Yemen for pilgrimage and for visits to Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon, and,
repeatedly escaping from the attempts at his arrest by the caliph al-Mansūr, ended up in
Basra, where he died just before a planned reconciliation with the next caliph, al-Mahdī.
His Qur’ān commentary is fragmentary.426

Ibn Wahb al-Misrī Abū Muhammad ‘Abd Allāh b. Wahb b. Muslim al-Misrī (d.
197/813) was a Mālikī traditionist who was born in Cairo in 125/743, and studied in
Medina with the Imam of Medina. He died in Cairo.427 The work I use in my
dissertation is from an incomplete manuscript, which the authors identified as Ibn
Wahb’s tafsīr; they have filled in the numerous gaps in the text using al-Tabarī’s tafsīr.

423
M. Plessner [A. Rippin], “Mukātil b. Sulaymān”, EI2, v. 7, 508.
424
Ibid., v. 7, 508.
425
Ibid., v. 7, 508.
426
This paragraph is a précis of Raddatz, “Sufyān al-Thawrī,” EI2, v. 9, 770-71. The EI2 entry on Sufyān
is extensive.
427
J. David-Weill, “Ibn Wahb,” EI2, v. 3, 963.

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Al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820) the ancestor of the Shāfi‘ī school of law. The work of Ahkām al-
Qur’ān attributed to him is the compilation of Ahmad b. al-Husayn b. ‘Alī b. ‘Abd Allāh
al-Nīshāpūrī, d. 458/1349. I use this work in order to compare the influence of al-
Shāfi‘ī’s exegesis of one verse with that of other exegetes.

Al-Farrā’428 Abū Zakarīyā’ Yahyā b. Ziyād al-Farrā’ (d. 207/822) was a grammarian
from Kūfa; the book used in this study is a “meanings of the Qur’ān” work, which tend to
be primarily linguistic expositions. Blanchère notes that “like his contemporaries, al-
Farrā’ seems in fact to have made wide use of direct inquiry among Bedouin
informants.”429 His travels included Baghdad, and he had definite Mu‘tazilī leanings.430

‘Abd al-Razzāq b. Hammām b. Nāfi‘ al-San‘ānī (d. 211/827) was a Yemeni of Persian
origin. He went to Syria and studied with al-Awzā‘ī and Mālik b. Anas, and, despite his
“ambivalent” reputation as a traditionist, and alleged Imāmī partisanship, he taught
eminent scholars such as Ahmad b. Hanbal.431 His tafsīr is largely that of his teacher,
Ma‘mar. His work is a good source for older materials.432

Hūd b. Muhakkam al-Hawwārī (d. end of 3rd/9th cy.) was an Ibādī Khārijī, though this is
not very apparent in his tafsīr. His nisba comes from the Hawwāra Berber tribe which
inhabited the area near today’s Algerian-Tunisian border. He was a judge who lived in
Qayrawan. His is one of the oldest complete tafsīrs to remain from this region. In it, he
relied heavily on the tafsīr of Ibn Sallām al-Basrī (d. 815), to such an extent that the
editor of this work, al-Hājj b. Sa‘īd al-Sharīfī, would actually call it an abridgement of
Ibn Sallām al-Basrī’s work.433 Al-Hājj al-Sharīfī has a wonderful description of how he
discovered the similarity between the works, and a full description of Ibn Sallām’s
work.434 The similarity between these works means that the Ibādī content of Hūd’s work

428
This laqab apparently refers not to him as a furrier, but rather to “one who skins, i.e., scrutinizes
language.” R. Blachère, “Al-Farrā’”, EI2, v. 2, 806-808.
429
Ibid., 807.
430
Idem; for a much more complete biography see his entry in the EI2.
431
H. Motzki, “al-San‘ānī”, EI2, v. 9, 7.
432
Ibid., v, 9, 7.
433
Al-Hajj b. Sa‘īd al-Sharīfī, Introduction, Tafsīr Hūd b. Muhakkam, p. 23 – 4.
434
Ibid., 26-7.

197
is limited. Al-Sharīfī says that Ibn Sallām’s tafsīr is only mentioned once by al-Tabarī,
therefore it probably had a bigger influence over exegeses in North Africa and Andalusia
than those further East.435 The most important sources for Ibn Sallām are Ibn ‘Abbās,
Tafsīr Ibn ‘Umar, Tafsīr Ibn Mas‘ūd, Tafsīr ‘Alī Ibn Abī Tālib. As for the successors,
according to al-Sharīfī, he relies only on tafsīr al-Hasan al-Basrī and tafsīr Mujāhid.436

Al-Qummī Abū’l-Hasan ‘Alī b. Ibrāhīm b. Hāshim (d. 307/919)437 was an Imāmī,

presumably from Qum. He was a famous exegete who taught Kulaynī among others.438

Ibn Wahb al-Dīnawārī Abū Muhammad ‘Abd Allāh b. Mubārak al-Dīnawarī

(~300/912-13), author of al-Wādih fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān, is a bit difficult to pin down. It
would seem from some biographical dictionaries that there are two Abū Muhammad
‘Abd Allāh Ibn Wahb al-Dīnawarī’s, both authors of a book by that title; one of them is
ibn Muhammad and the other is ibn Mubārak. Fortunately Harald Motzki has recently
published an article demystifying these two ‘Abd Allāhs.439 ‘Abd Allāh b. Muhammad,
contrary to the assertion of Rippin, did not write a book called al-Wādih, he says: it was
‘Abd Allāh b. Mubārak all along.440 Motzki affirms Rippin’s assertion that al-Wādih is
not an exact recension of al-Kalbī’s tafsīr, and says that “the author used al-Kalbī’s
exegesis, but did not confine himself to it.”441 He provides evidence showing that the
author’s death date is around 300/912-13. The question of exactly when Ibn Wahb wrote
his exegesis is particularly important for the subject matter of this dissertation because,
on the question of women, this work seems to break from others written in its time: he

435
Ibid., 28.
436
Ibid., 29.
437
Kahhāla puts his death date at 329/941, but I believe this is a mistake as all other sources list his death
date as 307/919.
438
Kahhāla, Mu‘jam al-Mu’allifīn, v. 7, 9. He is in Majma‘ al-Rijāl of al-Quhpā’ī, but this entry only lists
his books, not where he lived; a‘lām al-shī‘a by al-Tihrānī has a long entry on his teachers and students but
does not include information about where he lived and traveled.
439
Harald Motzki, “Dating the so-called Tafsīr ibn ‘Abbās: some additional remarks,” Jerusalem Studies in
Arabic and Islam, 30 (2006), 147-163.
440
‘Abd Allāh b. Muhammad has an entry in al-Dhahabī’s Siyar A‘lām al-Nubalā’ as a hadīth transmitter,
but he is not mentioned there as an author of any books. ‘Abd Allāh b. Muhammad is not in the Tabaqāt
al-Mufassirīn of Dāwūdī or Suyūtī, nor is he mentioned by Ibn Khallikān, Mizzī, or in ‘Iyād’s Madārik; he
has a short entry in Ziriklī which mentions him as a mufassir, but says he is better known as a hadīth
transmitter.
441
Motzki, “Dating,” 154.

198
says that women are deficient in rationality, whereas the other authors included in this
study who lived in his time and earlier do not mention anything about women’s minds.

Al-Zajjāj Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. al-Sarī b. Sahl442 (d. 311/923) was a grammarian who
was born and died in Baghdad.443 In his youth he was a glass grinder. ‘Abd al-Jalīl
‘Abduh, in the introduction to this work, claims that al-Zajjāj was a Hanbalī until, on his
deathbed, he said “they forced me to follow Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.”444 However, I have not
found confirmation of this story from the biographical dictionaries,445 including an entry
of several pages from al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī’s Tarīkh Baghdād, and he is not in Ibn Abī
Ya‘lā’s Tabaqāt al-Fuqahā’ al-Hanābila. I am not sure where ‘Abd al-Jalīl ‘Abduh got
this information.

Al-Tabarī Abū Ja‘far Muhammad Ibn Jarīr b. Yazīd (d. 310/923) had his own school of
law (the Jarīrī school). Al-Tabarī is a scholar of great renown, wrote a universal history
and was the first person to compile early opinions into one Qur’ān commentary. He was
born in Āmul in Tabaristān (in 224-5/839) and died in Baghdad. He left home at age 12
in order to study, and went for four or five years to Rayy; he also studied in Wāsit, Basra
and Kūfa, and lived in Iraq for at least eight years before leaving for Syria, Palestine and
Egypt; he is said to have studied particularly in Beirut and Hims. For the last 50 years of
his life he stayed in Baghdad in order to write.446 His commentary was apparently ready
for dissemination in around 290/903.447 After Muqātil’s tafsīr, this is the next major
work to have survived, according to Bosworth. Other Qur’ānic commentaries antedating
al-Tabarī’s including several mentioned here, such as those of Mujāhid b. Jabr and ‘Abd
al-Razzāq al-San‘ānī (d. 211/27), “survived only fragmentarily in late, possibly
reconstituted manuscripts.”448 Although, as I show in this dissertation, not all subsequent

442
Ibn Khalikān says he is Ibrāhim b. Muhammad b. al-Sarī.
443
Al-Ziriklī, al-A‘lām, (no location): Matba‘at Kūsatātsūmās, 1954-59, v. 1, 33.
444
‘Abd al-Jalīl ‘Abduh, “Introduction”, Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān (al-Zajjāj), page ‘ayn.
445
I have checked: Ziriklī, Kahhāla, Ibn Khallikān, al-Dhahabī’s Siyar a‘lām al-nubalā’, Tarīkh Baghdād
by al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, and Ibn Abī Ya‘lā.
446
C. E. Bosworth, “Al-Tabarī”, EI2, v. 10, 15. For more biographical information, Bosworth’s entry on
al-Tabarī in the EI2 is justifiably long and is much more detailed than I can summarize here.
447
Ibid., 14.
448
Ibid., 15.

199
authors include al-Tabarī’s interpretations, his influence on the development of the genre
of tafsīr is incalculable.

Al-‘Ayyāshī Abū’l-Nasr Muhammad b. Mas‘ūd b. Muhammad b. ‘Ayyāsh al-Sulamī al-

Samarqandī (d. ~320/~932) was an Imāmī from Samarqand. He converted from
Sunnism, and although he was accused of narrating on the authority of weak sources, he
is nevertheless an important source for later Imāmīs.449

Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Rāzī (d. 327/938)
was a Shāfi‘ī from Rayy.450 He traveled to Mecca, the coastal cities of Syria and Egypt,
and Isfahān.451

Al-Nahhās Abū Ja‘far Ahmad b. Muhammad, al-Misrī al-Nahwī (d. 338/949) was a
philologian, who wrote a work of Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān. He traveled to Baghdad and studied
Sībawayh’s grammar with al-Zajjāj (see above).452 He died most unfortunately. While
he sat reciting poetry at the Nilometer in Cairo, a passer by thought that he was saying a
charm to prevent the Nile from flooding and kicked him into the river, after which he was
never heard from again.453

Al-Jassās Abū Bakr Ahmad b. ‘Alī al-Rāzī (d. 370/981) was a Hanafī jurist who studied
law in Baghdād and Nīshāpūr, finally becoming the head of the Hanafīs in Baghdad.454
He was famously a representative of the ashāb al-ra’y, or those advocating the use of
personal opinion in law.455 He died in Nīshāpūr. The work used in this study is an
Ahkām al-Qur’ān, or work of the rulings associated with the Qur’ānic verses.

449
Bernard Lewis, “al-‘Ayyāshī”, EI2, v. 1, 794-5.
450
Asad Muhammad Tayyib, introduction to Ibn Abī Hātim’s Tafsīr, p. 9.
451
Ibid., p. 8.
452
Al-Safadī, quoted in the introduction to al-Nahhās’s Ma‘ānī, 3.
453
Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-A‘yān, ed. Ihsān ‘Abbās, Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1968, v. 1, 100.
454
O. Spies, “al-Djassās”, EI2, v. 2, 486.
455
Ibid.

200
Abū ’l-Layth al-Samarqandī Nasr b. Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Ibrāhīm (d. 373-93/983-
1003) known as Imām al-Hudā, was a Hanafī jurist from Samarqand, in Khurāsān.456

Al-Sulamī Imām Abū ‘Abd al-Rahmān Muhammad b. al-Husayn b. Mūsā al-Azdī al-
Naysābūrī (d. 412/1021) was a Sūfī and a Shāfi‘ī born in Nīshāpūr in 325/937. He
traveled in Khurāsān, Iraq, and the Hijāz, spending time in Marw and Baghdad. In
addition to his Qur’ān commentary, he wrote hagiographies of Sūfīs.457

Al-Tha‘labī Abū Ishāq Ahmad (d. 427/1035) was a Shāfi‘ī from Nīshāpūr. He was a
preacher, a man of literature, and a hadīth transmitter, as well as an exegete.458

Al-Hīrī al-Naysābūrī Abū al-Rahmān Ismā‘īl b. Ahmad al-Darīr (d. 430/1038) was a
Shāfi‘ī from Hīra in Nīshāpūr. He visited Baghdad on his way to Mecca, and there al-
Khatīb al-Baghdādī described him as carrying his books with him on the Hajj. The heavy
burden on his camel included the Sahīh of al-Bukhārī.459

Al-Māwardī Abū’l-Hasan ‘Alī b. Muhammad b. Habīb al-Māwardī al-Basrī (d.

450/1058) was a Shāfi‘ī who was born in Basra and died in Baghdad. He was appointed
as a judge and served near Nīshāpūr before returning to serve in Baghdad, where he was
named honorifically “supreme judge” (aqdā al-qudāt).460 However, some accused him of
having Mu‘tazilite views.461

Al-Tūsī Shaykh al-Tā’ifa Abū Ja‘far Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. ‘Alī (d. 459 or 460/1066-
67) was an Imāmī born in Tūs, Khurāsān (in 385/995). He left Tūs in 408/1017 to go to
Baghdad, where he studied under “leading Imāmī masters.”462 The Buwayhids who had
been ruling Baghdad at that time were very sympathetic to Imāmīs. But when they were

456
Schacht, in his article on Abū’l-Layth in EI2, does not mention where he is from; in the introduction to
Abū’l-Layth’s Tafsīr, the editors say he is indeed from Samarqand.
457
G. Bowering, “al-Sulamī”, EI2, v. 9, 812.
458
Walid Saleh has an extensive biography of al-Tha‘labī (Saleh, Formation, 25-52).
459
Fatīma Yūsuf al-Khaymī, in the introduction to al-Hīrī’s Wujūh, 15.
460
C. E. Brocklemann, “al-Māwardī”, EI2, v. 6, 869.
461
Ibid., v. 6, 869.
462
Mohammad ‘Alī Amir-Moezzi, “al-Tūsī”, EI2, v. 10, 745-6.

201
ousted by the Saljuks, the anti-Imāmīs (led by the Hanbalīs), sacked al-Tusī’s
neighborhood, and burned down his home and library. He took refuge in Najaf, where he
stayed until he died.463

Al-Qushayrī Abū’l-Qāsim ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin (d. 464/1072) was a Sūfī mystic, a
Shāfi‘ī, and an Ash‘arī. He was born in Ustuwā and went to Nīshāpūr as a young man,
where he met the Sūfī mystic Abū ‘Alī al-Daqqāq, studied with him, became so close to
him that he married his daughter, and succeeded him on his death.464 He was involved in
struggles between the Hanafīs and the Shāfi‘īs/Ash‘arīs, and “issued a manifesto
defending the orthodoxy of Abū’l-Hasan al-Ash‘arī” which was signed by the most
important Shāfi‘īs in the city.465 In 448/1056 he went to Baghdad, and from there to Tūs,
before returning finally to Nīshāpūr, where he died. His tafsīr has a mystical focus, but
this is not really apparent in the verses under consideration in this dissertation.

Al-Wāhidī Abū’l-Hasan ‘Alī b. Ahmad al-Naysābūrī (d. 468/1075) was a Shāfi‘ī from
Nīshāpūr. He was a student of al-Tha‘labī (above), and was unusual because he wrote
three separate Qur’ān commentaries: al-Wajīz (“the Summary”), al-Wasīt (“the
Intermediary”), and al-Basīt (“the spread out”), plus a work of Asbāb al-Nuzūl (the
occasions of revelation); I look at all four works here. Saleh says that “each of these
Qur’ān commentaries is an independent composition governed by different hermeneutical
rules and assumptions.”466 Al-Basīt centers on philology and has a “consistently Ash‘arī
reading,” al-Wasīt is non-philological and incorporates the material that “did not make it
into al-Basīt,” and al-Wajīz is, according to Saleh, “the first short commentary on the
whole of the Qur’ān in the medieval period that was explicitly written in response to
popular demand for a handy work.”467

463
Ibid., 745.
464
H. Halm, “Al-Kushayrī”, EI2, 5, 526-7.
465
Ibid., 526.
466
Walid Saleh, “The Last of the Nishapuri school of Tafsīr: al-Wāhidī and his significance in the history
of Qur’ānic Exegesis” forthcoming in JAOS.
467
Ibid.

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Al-Hākim al-Jishumī Sa‘d al-Muhsin b. Muhammad b. Karāma al-Bayhaqī (d.
494/1101), Mu‘tazilī, Zaydī, from Jishum, near Bayhaq. He studied in Bayhaq, and
studied and taught in Nīshāpūr, and then returned to Jishum in order to teach in the
mosque there. He was assassinated in Mecca. For most of his life he was a Hanafī and
Mu‘tazilī, and then it seems that late in life he became a fervent Zaydī. His commentary
is said to have had more Mu‘tazilī content than that of al-Zamakhsharī.468

Sūrābādī Abū Bakr ‘Atīq Naysābūrī (d. 494/1101), was from Nīshāpūr. His tafsīr is
important because it is one of the first to be written completely in Persian.

Al-Baghawī Abū Muhammad al-Husayn b. Mas‘ūd b. Muhammad al-Farrā’ (d. 516/

1122) was a Shāfi‘ī traditionist and Qur’ān commentator from a village near Harāt; he
died in Marw. He is most famous for a book of traditions in which they are organized
according to their reliability.469 This focus on reliable traditions is apparent in his Qur’ān
commentary, which is a modification of al-Tha‘labī’s al-Kashf.

Al-Maybudī Rashīd al-Dīn Abū ’l-Fadl Ahmad b. Muhammad, author of the Kashf al-
Asrār, a commentary in Persian, which was begun in 520/1126.

Al-Zamakhsharī Jār Allāh Mahmūd b. ‘Umar (d. 538/1143) was a Hanafī in fiqh but is
most famous for being a philologist. He was born in Khwārazm and died in Jurjān. He
visited and studied in Baghdad; he also lived for a time in Mecca, whence his laqab Jār
Allāh (God’s neighbor).470 His commentary, al-Kashshāf, became one of the most
widely copied commentaries of all time. Lane describes his commentary as being more
traditional than Mu‘tazilī; but his study is hampered by the fact that he did not consult
other Mu‘tazilī sources.471

468
W. Madelung, “al-Hākim al-Djushamī,” EI2 Suppl., p. 343. This article lists his death date as 484/1101;
however, 1101 Julian is 494 Hijri, so the 8 is most probably a misprint.
469
J. Robson, “al-Baghawī”, EI2, 1, 893.
470
For a full biography, see Andrew Lane, A Traditional Mu‘tazilite Qur’ān Commentary, Boston: Brill,
2006, 9-29.
471
I have a review of Lane forthcoming in JAOS in which I discuss the verses in which al-Zamakhsharī’s
commentary has Mu‘tazilī content.

203
Ibn al-‘Arabī Abū Bakr Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allāh (d. 543/1148) was a Mālikī
traditionist from Seville. He traveled with his father to the East, and spent time studying
in Damascus and Baghdad. He acted for a while as a Qādī in Seville; “when the
Muwahhids entered Seville he and others were taken to Marrākush where he was
imprisoned for about a year.”472 He died on his way from Marrākush to Fez. The work
used here is a book of Ahkām al-Qur’ān (a juridical work).

Ibn ‘Atīya ‘Abd al-Haqq b. Ghālib al-Andalūsī (d. 546/1151) was a Mālikī, from
Andalusia.

Al-Tabrisī Abū ‘Alī al-Fadl b. al-Hasan (d. 548/1153) was an Imāmī jurist and exegete
who grew up in Khurāsān; he “broadly followed the Mu‘tazilī doctrines adopted by his
Imāmī predecessors.”473 In the last part of his life, he moved to Sabzawār, where he died;
his corpse was carried to Mashhad where he was buried.474 He was a student of Abd al-
Jabbār b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Muqri’ al-Rāzī, who was a student of al-Tūsī, and of Abū ‘Alī al-
Hasan b. Muhammad, who was al-Tūsī’s son. Some of his teachers, including the
exegete Kirmānī, were Sunnīs.475 His work, Majma‘ al-Bayān, was completed in 1140 or
1142, and later became one of the most important Imāmī commentaries. Kohlberg says
that Tabrisī “acknowledges his debt to al-Tūsī’s Kitāb al-Tibyān, but criticizes al-Tūsī for
including unreliable material…” Al-Tabrisī’s commentary includes both Sunnī and
Imāmī material, in addition to his own views.476

Abū’l-Futūh Rāzī Husayn b. ‘Alī b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Khuzā‘ī al-Nīshāpūrī (d.

525/1131) was an Imāmī from Nīsāpūr whose tomb may be in Rayy. His is another early
Persian tafsīr. Shustarī (d. 1019/1610) says that some of the poetry used in al-
Zamakhsharī’s Kashshāf were also used in Abū’l-Futūh’s tafsīr; the two authors were
contemporaries.477

472
J. Robson, “Ibn al-‘Arabī,” EI2, v. 3, 707.
473
E. Kohlberg, “al-Tabrisī”, EI2, v. 10, 40.
474
Muhammad Muhammad al-Madanī, introduction to Tabrisī’s Majma‘ al-Bayān, 9-10.
475
Kohlberg, “al-Tabrisī,” EI2, v. 10, 40.
476
Ibid., v. 10, 40.
477
Jane McAuliffe, Qur’ānic Christians: an analysis of classical and modern exegesis, 56.

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Ibn al-Jawzī Abū’l-Faraj Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. ‘Alī b. Muhammad al-Jawzī
al-Qurashī al-Baghdādī (d. 597/1200) was a famous Hanbalī from Baghdad. He was a
jurist, traditionist, and preacher. He was very close to the Caliph al-Mustadī’; Ibn al-
Jawzī was at one point directing five madrasas. He encouraged the public denunciation
of Imāmīs.478 His passionate feelings on the subject led to his disgrace under the Caliph
al-Nāsir who promoted Imāmīs.479

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhammad b. ‘Umar b. al-Husayn (d. 606/1209)
was a Shāfi‘ī and Ash‘arī from Rayy, who wrote a widely read work of tafsīr. He went
from Rayy to Khwārazm, “where he was engaged in relentless controversies with the
Mu‘tazilīs who forced him to leave the country.”480 After moving around quite a lot, and
even visiting India, he settled in Herat. He was a celebrated teacher and preacher. He
also clashed with the Karrāmīya, who had an anthropomorphist interpretation of the
Qur’ān. He was well versed in philosophy and his work was said to have influenced Ibn
Taymīya.481 His commentary is described by Anawati as “at the same time philosophical
and bi’l-ra’y”; issues are discussed in the form of question and answer.482

Shaybānī, Muhammad b. al-Hasan was an Imāmī who lived in the 7th/13th century. The
printed work is from a manuscript which does not mention the name of the author, but he
is mentioned in a contemporary work as being the author of a book of this title. Shaybānī
was also a jurist (but should not be confused with the famous early Hanafī Shaybānī!)483

Al-Kāshānī ‘Abd al-Razzāq, attributed to the mystic Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī
(638/1240), was a Sūfī from Tlemcen. Although he only comments on one of the verses I
cover, his exegesis of it differs substantially from any other in this study.

478
H. Laoust, “Ibn al-Djawzī”, EI2, 3, 751.
479
Ibid., 751-2.
480
G. C. Anawati, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī”, EI2, 2, 751.
481
According to Laoust, who is quoted by Anawati, ibid., 752. The work by Laoust is “Essai sur les
doctrines sociales et politiques de Takī al-Dīn Ahmad b. Taymīya”, Cairo, 1939.
482
Ibid., 754.
483
Husayn Dargāhī, in the introduction to al-Shaybānī’s Nahj al-Bayān ‘an Kashf Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān, p.
hā’.

205
Al-Sulamī ‘Izz al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Salām al-Dimashqī al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 660/1262) was a Shāfi‘ī
jurist and an Ash‘arī theologian born in Damascus who spent the last 20 years of his life
in Cairo, where he died. He took an interest in Sūfism and considered discourse on
Sūfism to be a “laudable innovation.”484 He was apparently the first to teach Qur’ānic
commentary in Egypt at the Sālihīya, according to al-Suyūtī.485

Al-Qurtubī Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abī Bakr al-Ansārī (d. 671/1273)
was from Cordoba, and died in Munya in upper Egypt.486 He was a Mālikī.487

Al-Baydāwī Nasr al-Dīn ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar b. Muhammad al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1310)488
was a Shāfi‘ī from Shīrāz, where he became the chief justice. His Qur’ān commentary is
a reworking of al-Zamakhsharī’s Kashshāf, from which he has usually omitted Mu‘tazilī
interpretations unless he refutes them; however, according to J. Robson, “on occasion he
has retained them, perhaps without fully realizing their significance.”489 His tafsīr has
been very popular through the ages.

Al-Nasafī Imām ‘Abd Allāh b. Ahmad (d. 710/1310) was a Hanafī from Isbahān, where
he died in 710/1310.

Ibn Taymīya Taqī al-Dīn Ahmad (d. 728/1327) was a famous Hanbalī theologian and
jurist from Damascus. He was the teacher of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya and Ibn Kathīr. He
did not write a work of tafsīr, but he did write al-Muqaddima fī ‘Usūl al-Tafsīr, which is
a work on the proper way to write tafsīr. In this work, he rails against the use of reasoned
opinion (ra’y) and affirms the need to rely only on tradition. In this dissertation, I cite the
Muqaddima as well as a few elements from other works.

484
E. Chaumont, “Al-Sulamī,” EI2, 9, 812.
485
Ibid., 813.
486
Zirikli, “al-Qurtubī,” v. 6, 217.
487
Kahhāla, “Muhammad al-Qurtubī,” v. 8, 239.
488
It is unclear exactly when al-Baydāwī died, but van Ess argues that it should be around 710/1310 CE.
489
J. Robson, “al-Baydāwī,” EI2, v. 1, 1129.

206
Abū Hayyān al-Andalūsī Athīr al-Dīn Muhammad b. Yūsuf al-Gharnātī (d. 745/1344)
was a Mālikī/Shāfi‘ī philologist who began life in Granada and ended it in Cairo. He
traveled for 10 years throughout the Arab world and finally settled in Cairo to teach
Qur’ānic sciences at the Ibn Tulūn mosque.490

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya Abū ‘Abd Allāh Shams al-Dīn Muhammad b. Abī Bakr al-Zur‘ī
al-Dimashqī (d. 751/1350) was a Hanbalī from Damascus who was a student of Ibn
Taymīya. He clashed with the chief Shāfi‘ī judge, al-Subkī, on certain issues of
divorce.491 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya did not write a work of tafsīr, but his comments on
Qur’ānic verses have been collected.

Ibn Kathīr ‘Imād al-Dīn Abū’l-Fidā’ Ismā‘īl al-Dimashqī (d. 773/1371) was a Shāfi‘ī
from Damascus. He was a student of both Ibn Taymīya and of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya,
and he was the son-in-law of one of the most famous traditionists of Damascus, Jamāl al-
Dīn al-Mizzī. In addition to his work of tafsīr, he wrote a famous history. H. Laoust
characterizes his tafsīr as “essentially a philological work, [which] is very elementary in
its style and foreshadows, in its style, that which al-Suyūtī wrote later.”492

Al-Haddād Fakhr al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. ‘Alī al-Yamanī al-Zabīdī (d. 800/1397) was a
Hanafī from Zabīd in Yemen.

Al-Tha‘ālibī Shaykh al-Sayyidī ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Muhammad b. Makhlūf (d. 873-

5/1468-70) was a Mālikī from North Africa. He was born in Algiers, studied in Cairo,
and made the pilgrimage before settling in Tunis, where he died.493

Ibn Tamjīd Mustafā b. Ibrāhīm al-Rūmī (d. 880/1475) was a Hanafī exegete. He taught
the Ottoman Sultan Mehemed Fātih who died in 886/1481. His commentary on al-

490
S. Glazer, “Abū Hayyān”, EI2, v. 1, 126.
491
H. Laoust, “Ibn Kayyim al-Djawziyya,” EI2, v. 3, 821-22.
492
H. Laoust, “Ibn Kathīr”, EI2, v. 3, 818.
493
(No author given), “al-Tha‘ālibī”, EI2, v. 10, 425.

207
Baydāwī, which is preserved in the margins of the much later exegete al-Qūnawī’s
commentary on al-Baydāwī, is his only book.494

Al-Biqā‘ī Abū’l-Hasan Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. ‘Umar b. Hasan al-Biqā‘ī (885/1480)

was a Shāfi‘ī historian and litterateur, from the Biqā‘ in modern-day Lebanon. He lived
in Damascus and traveled to Jerusalem and Cairo, and died in Damascus.495

Al-Suyūtī Abū’l-Fadl Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Abī Bakr (d. 910/1505) was an
Egyptian Shāfi‘ī. His father was a Shāfi‘ī judge but he died while al-Suyūtī was still
quite young. He studied hadīth under the tutelage of both men and women; he later
dictated hadīths at the Ibn Tulūn mosque in Cairo. He had many adversaries in Cairo,
who seem to have been spurred on by his legendary (though perhaps justified) arrogance.
He considered himself to be the “renewer” of his age. He was anti-Mamluk and pro-
Abbasid. He was a Shādhilī Sūfī.496 He wrote on many diverse subjects, including tafsīr,
and he not only wrote his own work but finished the work of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Mahallī (d.
864/1459) after the latter’s death; because of their shared titles, this work is called the
Tafsīr Jalālayn. His own tafsīr uses only hadīths.

Abū’l-Su‘ūd b. Muhammad b. Muhyī al-Dīn al-‘Imādī (d. 982/1574) was a Hanafī who
was appointed Judge in Brūsa and then in Istanbul. Sultan Sulaymān made him Shaykh
al-Islām in 952/1545, a post which he kept until his death. According to Schacht, Abū’l-
Su‘ūd’s commentary is drawn mostly from those of al-Baydāwī and al-Zamakhsharī.497

Al-Nākūrī Abū’l-Fayd al-Faydī (d. 1004/1595) was an Imāmī who lived in India. He
was a poet, a man of letters, an historian, an exegete, and a governmental minister.498 He
and his brother went through very hard times in their youth, due to being Imāmī, though

494
‘Abd Allāh Mahmūd Muhammad ‘Umar, introduction to Hāshiyat al-Qūnawī, v. 1, 7.
495
Ziriklī, “al-Biqā‘ī,” al-A‘lām, v. 1, 50.
496
E. Geoffroy, “al-Suyūtī,” EI2, v. 9, 13-16.
497
J. Schacht, “Abū’l-Su‘ūd,” EI2, v. 1, 152.
498
Sayyid Murtadā-Ayatollah Zādeh Shīrāzī, in the introduction to Sawāti‘ al-Ilhām, v. 1, 114.

208
he later got a job in the palace, where he taught the Amir. He traveled with the emperor
Akbar to Kashmir. Political life seemed to suit him.499

Muhsin al-Fayd Muhammad b. Murtadā (1091/1680) was an Imāmī who was born in
Qum and began his studies there, before going to Kāshān, and making a trip to Shīrāz,
where he studied with Sayyid Mājid b. ‘Alī al-Bahrānī. He returned to Kāshān, where he
became a marja‘. He was a judge, exegete, theologian, and hadīth transmitter.500 He
wrote three commentaries on the Qur’ān and a commentary on the Imāmī hadīth
collection Nahj al-Balāgha.

Al-Bahrānī Hāshim b. Sulaymān b. Ismā‘īl al-Husaynī al-Bahrānī al-Katahānī (d.

1107/1695) was an Imāmī born in Katakān, a village in Bahrain. He traveled to Najaf,
where he studied, and then went to Iran where he visited Mashhad and studied under
‘Abd al-‘Azīm al-Astarābādī. He was well regarded in his own city, had a hand in its
administration, and served as a judge. He died in the village of Na‘īm in Bahrain, and he
was buried in Tūblī, another village in Bahrain.501

Al-Mashhadī Mīrzā Muhammad al-Mashhadī b. Muhammad Ridā b. Ismā‘īl b. Jamāl al-

Dīn al-Qummī (d. ~1107/1695) was an Imāmī from Mashhad. Although he was a well-
respected traditionist and exegete, not much is known about him.

Al-Huwayzī ‘Abd ‘Alī b. Jum‘a (d. 1112/1700) was an Imāmī from Shīrāz. He was a
jurist, scholar, and hadīth transmitter. He is highly praised by his contemporary al-Āmilī,
who says:
He has a book called Nūr al-Thaqalayn, which contains the very best, and in it are
transmitted hadīths of the Prophet and the Imāms concerning the tafsīr of the
verses, taken from the best books – and nothing is taken from other sources. I
have seen the copy written in his hand, and I have copied from it.502

499
Ibid., 1, 114-117.
500
Muhammad Mahdī al-Faqīhī, introduction to al-Asfā fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān, 9.
501
Muhammad Mahdī al-Asafī, introduction to al-Burhān by al-Bahrānī, v. 1, 45-54.
502
Al-Hurr al-‘Āmilī, Amal al-Āmil, v. 2, 154.

209
Al-Qūnawī ‘Isām al-Dīn Ismā‘īl b. Muhammad al-Hanafī (d. 1195/1781) was a Hanafī
who was born in Qūnya (Konya). He studied in Aleppo, and then taught in madrasas in
Constantinople, where he was the best teacher. News of him reached the Sultan Abū
Ta’yīd, who gave him a position as head teacher at the Dār al-Sa‘āda, and took lessons
with him there. He was a prolific scholar and author.503

A 2. Table of Authors, works, and which verses they comment on.

DD – death date
Note: Not all of the authors wrote works of tafsīr. Some works are included for purposes of comparison.
Sometimes publication information, editors’ names etc., cannot be found.

Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Mujāhid b. Jabr al-Makkī 102 720 Tafsīr Mujāhid x x

ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Tāhir b. Muhammad

al-Sūrtī
Beirut: al-Manshūrāt al-‘Ilmīya, 197?
Al-Dahhāk b. Muzāhim 105 723 Tafsīr al-Dahhāk# x x x

Compiled & edited by Muhammad Shukrī

Ahmad al-Zāwiyatī
Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 1999.
Alī ibn Abī Talha 143 760 Sahīfat ‘Alī b. Abī Talha ‘an Ibn ‘Abbās fī x
tafsīr al-Qur’ān#

Compiled and Edited by Rāshid ‘Abd al-

Mun‘im al-Rajjāl
Cairo: Maktabat al-Sunna, 1991.
Muqātil b. Sulaymān 150 767 Tafsīr Muqātil b. Sulaymān x x x

Ed. ‘Abd Allāh Mahmūd Shihāta

Cairo: al-Hayi’a al-Misrīya al-‘Āmma lil-
Kutub, 1979.
Sufyān al-Thawrī 161 778 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-karīm# x

Compiled and edited by Imtiyāz ‘Alī ‘Arshī

Rampur: Raza Library, 1965.
‘Abd Allah Ibn Wahb al-Misrī 197 812 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān li-‘Abd Allāh b. Wahb b. x
Muslim Abī Muhammad al-Misrī (125-197),
bi-riwāyat Sahnūn b. Sa‘īd (160-240).

Ed. Miklos Muranyi

Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 2003.

503
‘Abd Allāh Mahmūd Muhammad ‘Umar, introduction to Hāshiyat al-Qūnawī, v. 1, 6.

210
Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Al-Shāfi‘ī 204 819 Ahkām al-Qur’ān ## x x

Compiled by al-Naysabūrī, d. 458/1349.

Ed. Muhammad Zāhid al-Hasan al-Kawtharī
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1975.
Al-Farrā’ 207 822 Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān x x

Ed. Ahmad Yusūf Najātī, Muhammad ‘Alī al-

Najjār
Cairo: al-Hayi’a al-Misrīya al-‘Āmma lil-
Kutub, 1980. 3 volumes.
‘Abd al-Razzāq al-San‘ānī 211 826 Tafsīr ‘Abd al-Razzāq x x

Ed. Mahmūd Muhammad ‘Abduh

Beirut:Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1999. 3 vols.
Hūd b. Muhakkam al-Hawwārī 3rd 9th Tafsīr kitāb Allāh al-‘azīz x x x
cy. cy.
Ed. Al-Hājj b. Sa‘īd al-Sharīfī
Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990.
Al-Qummī, ‘Alī b. Ibrāhīm 307 919 Tafsīr al-Qummī x x x

Ed. al-Sayyid al-Tayyib al-Musawī al-Jazā’irī

Najaf: Matba‘at al-Najaf, 1386 (1966/7)
Ibn Wahb al-Dīnawarī 308 920 Tafsīr ibn Wahb al-musammā al-wādih fī x x x
tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Karīm

ed. Ahmad Farīd

Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2003. 2 vols.
Al-Zajjāj, Abū Ishaq Ibrāhīm 311 923 Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān wa-i‘rābuh x x x
b. Al-Sarī
Ed. ‘Abd al-Jalīl ‘Abduh Shalabī
Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Maktaba al-‘Asrīya,
1973. 2 vols.
Al-Tabarī, Abū Ja‘far 311 923 Jāmi‘ al-bayān ‘an ta’wīl āy al-Qur’ān x x x
Muhammad b. Jarīr
Eds. Mahmūd Muhammad Shākir & Ahmad
Muhammad Shākir
Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif bi-Misr, 1950-60
Al-‘Ayyāshī, Abū’l-Nadr ~320 932 Al-Tafsīr x x
Muhammad b. Mas‘ūd
Ed. Department of Islamic Studies, Mu’assasat
al-Ba‘tha, Qum
Qum: Mu’assasat al-Ba‘tha, 2000. v. 1-3.
Ibn Abī Hātim al-Rāzī, ‘Abd 327 938 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘azīm x x x
al-Rahmān b. Muhammad b.
Idrīs Ed. As‘ad Muhammad al-Tayyib
Mecca: Maktabat Nizār Mustafā al-Bāz, 1999.

211
Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

al-Nahhās al-Nahwī 338 949 Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān al-karīm x x x

Ed. Muhammad ‘Alī al-Sābūnī

Mecca: Jāmi‘at Umm al-Qurā, 1988.
al-Jassās, Ahmad b. ‘Alī 370 981 Ahkām al-Qur’ān x x

Ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān Muhammad

Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Bahīya, 1928 (1347)
Al-Samarqandī, Abū’l-Layth 375 985 Tafsīr al-Samarqandī al-musammā bahr al- x x x
‘ulūm

Eds. ‘Alī Muhammad Ma‘awwad, ‘Ādil

Ahmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd, Zakarīyā ‘Abd al-
Majīd al-Nūtī
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1993.
al-Sulamī, Abū ‘Abd al- 412 1021 Haqā’iq al-tafsīr: tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘azīz x x
Rahmān
Ed. Sa‘īd ‘Imrān
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2001.
al-Tha‘labī, Abū Ishāq Ahmad 427 1035 Al-Kashf wa’l-bayān x x x

Ed. Abū Muhammad b. ‘Āshār, Nazīr al-Sā‘idī

Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 2002.
al-Hīrī al-Nīsābūrī, ‘Abd al- 430 1038 Wujūh al-Qur’ān al-karīm x x
Rahmān Ismā‘īl b. Ahmad
Ed. Fātima Yusūf al-Khiyamī
Damascus: Dār al-Saqqā, 1996
al-Māwardī 450 1058 Al-Nukat wa’l-‘uyūn x x x

Ed. Sayyid b. ‘Abd al-Maqsūr b. ‘Abd al-

Rahīm
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1992.
Al-Tūsī, Shaykh al-Tā’ifa 460 1067 Al-Mabsūt fī al-fiqh al-‘ilmīya x x x

Ed. Muhammad al-Bāqir al-Bahbūdī

[Tehran]: Al-Maktaba al-Murtadawīya li-Ihyā’
al-Āthār al-Ja‘farīya, [1967].
Al-Qushayrī, Abū’l-Qāsim 464 1072 Latā’if al-ishārāt, tafsīr sūfī lil-Qur’ān al- x x x
‘Abd al-Karīm karīm

Ed. Ibrāhīm Basyūnī

Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-‘Arabī lil-Tibā‘a wa’l-
Nashr, [1968]
Al-Wāhidī, Abū’l-Hasan ‘Alī 468 1075 Al-Wajīz fī tafsīr al-kitāb al-‘azīz x x x
b. Ahmad
Ed. Safwān ‘Adnān Dāwūdī
Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1995.

212
 Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Al-Wāhidī 468 1075 Al-Wasīt fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-majīd x x x

Ed. ‘Ādil Ahmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd et. al., with

an introduction by ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Farmādī
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1994.
Al-Wāhidī 468 1075 Al-Basīt x x x

Manuscript Nurosmaniye 236.

Al-Wāhidī 468 1075 Asbāb al-Nuzūl x

Beirut: ‘Ālam al-kutub, 19[70?]

Al-Hākim al-Jishumī 494 1101 Tahdhīb

Manuscript, Maktabat Muhammad Qāsim al- x x

Hāshimī Private Library, Rahbān, Sa‘da

Manuscript, Leiden, Or. 2583 x

Sūrābādī 494 1101 Tafsīr Sūrābādī: Tafsīr al-Tafāsīr x x x

Ed. Sa‘īdī Sīrjānī

Tehran: Farhang-i Nashr-i Naw, 2002
Al-Baghawī 516 1122 Tafsīr al-Baghawī: Ma‘ālim al-Tanzīl x x x

Ed. Muhammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Nimr

Riyadh: Dār Tayba, 1993.504
*
Bombay: Matba‘at al-Sālihī, 1857
*
Princeton University MS Yahuda 127,
1155/1742.
*
Princeton University MS Garett 209b,
731/1131.
Maybudī, Rashīd al-Dīn Abū 520 1126 Kanz al-Anwār fī Kashf al-Asrār x x x
505
al-Fadl
Ed. Muhammad Kāzim Busayrī
Qum: Daftar-i Nashr-i al-Hādī, 2001.
Abū’l-Futūh Rāzī, Husayn b. 525 1131 Rawd al-janān wa-rawh al-jinān fī tafsīr al- x
‘Alī b. Muhammad Qur’ān

Ed. Muhammad Ja‘far Yāhaqqī, Muhammad

Mahdī Nāsih
Mashhad: Bunyād-i Pizūhishhā-yi Islāmī,
1950.

504
All citations refer to the 1993 edition unless otherwise noted.
505
Date of book, not of Maybudī’s death.

213
Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Al-Zamakhsharī, Jār Allāh 538 1143 Al-Kashshāf x x x

Mahmūd b. ‘Umar
Ed. Ahmad b. al-Munīr al-Iskandarī
Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, [1965].
Ibn al-‘Arabī, Abū Bakr 543 1148 Ahkām al-Qur’ān x x
Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allāh
Ed. ‘Alī Muhammad al-Bajāwī
[Cairo]: ‘Īsā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1967, v. 1.
Ibn ‘Atīya al-Andalusī 546 1151 Al-Muharrar al-wajīz x x x

Ed. ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Abd al-Shāfī Muhammad

Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1993-1995.
Al-Tabrisī, Abū’l-Fadl b. al- 548 1153 Majma‘ al-bayān li-‘ulūm al-Qur’ān x x x
Hasan
Ed. Muhammad Wā‘izzāda al-Khurāsānī
Tehran: Mu’assasat al-Hudā, 1997
Al-Tabrisī 548 1153 Jawāmi‘ al-Jāmi‘ x x x

Qum: Mu’assasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1998.

Ibn al-Jawzī, Jamāl al-Dīn al- 597 1200 Zād al-masīr fī ‘ilm al-tafsīr x x x
Qurashī al-Baghdādī
Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1964.
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī 606 1209 Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr x x x
Muhammad b. ‘Umar
Ed. ‘Abd al-Rahman Muhammad
Cairo: Matba‘at al-Bahīya, 1938.
Shaybānī, Muhammad b. al- 7th 13th Nahj al-bayān ‘an kashf ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān x x x
Hasan al-Shaybānī cy. cy.
ed. Husayn Dargāhī. Qum: Nashr al-Hādī,
1998.
Kashānī, ‘Abd al-Razzāq, 638 1240 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-Karīm lil-Shaykh al-Akbar x
attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī. …Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī

Beirut: Dār al-Yaqza al-‘Arabīya, 1968.

Al-Sulamī, ‘Izz al-Dīn ‘Abd 660 1261 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān… ikhtisār al-nukat lil- x x x
al-‘Salām Māwardī
(Abridgement of al-Māwardī’s tafsīr)

Ed. ‘Abd Allāh b. Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abd Allāh al-

Wuhaybī
Beirut: Dār Ibn Hazm, 1996.

214
 Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Al-Qurtubī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh 671 1273 Al-Jāmi‘ li-Ahkām al-Qur’ān x x x

Muhammad b. Ahmad
Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-‘Arabī, 1967.

Al-Baydāwī, Nāsir al-Dīn 710 1310 Hāshiyat al-Qūnawī ‘alā tafsīr al-Imām al- x x x
‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Umar Baydāwī506

Ed. ‘Abd Allāh Mahmūd Muhammad ‘Umar

Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2001
*
Anwār al-Tanzīl wa-Asrār al-Ta’wīl
No pub. data, 1911.
Al-Nasafī, ‘Abd Allāh b. 710 1310 Tafsīr al-Nasafī x x x
Ahmad
Ed. Marwān Muhammad Al-Sha‘‘ār
Beirut: Dār al-Nafā’is, 1996.
Ibn Taymīya 728 1327 Majmū‘ al-Fatāwā x x

Ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Muhammad al-‘Āsimī

al-Hanbalī
Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1997.
Ibn Taymīya 728 1327 Fatāwā al-Nisā’## x

Ed. Sa‘d Yusūf Abū ‘Azīz

Cairo: Dār al-Fajr lil-Turāth, 1999.
Ibn Taymīya 728 1327 Al-Tafsīr al-kabīr## x

Ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Umayra

Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1988.
Abū Hayyān al-Andalusī 745 1344 Al-Bahr al-muhīt x x x

Eds. ‘Ādil Ahmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd et. al.

Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1993.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya 751 1350 Al-Daw’ al-munīr ‘alā al-tafsīr## x x

Ed. & compiled by ‘Alī b. Hamad b.

Muhammad al-Sālihī
Riyadh: Mu’assasat al-Nūr/Maktabat Dār al-
Salām, 1999.
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya 751 1350 I‘lām al-muwaqqi‘īn

Cairo: Maktabat Kullīyāt al-Azharīya, 1968.

506
Al-Baydāwī’s tafsīr is included in full in this work of commentary.

215
Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Ibn Kathīr, ‘Imād al-Dīn 773 1371 Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘azīm x x x

Abū’l-Fidā’
Ed. Mustafā al-Sayyid Muhammad et. al.
Cairo: Mu’assasat Qurtuba, 2000.
Al-Haddād, Fakhr al-Dīn 800 1397 Tafsīr al-Haddād miss x x
ing?
Ed. Muhammad Ibrāhīm Yahyā
Beirut: Dār al-Madār al-Islāmī, 2001.
Al-Tha‘ālibī, ‘Abd al-Rahmān 873/ 1468/ Jawāhir al-hisān fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān x x x
5 70
Ed. ‘Ammār al-Tālibī
[Algiers]: Al-Mu’assasa al-Watanīya lil-Kitāb,
[1985].
Ibn Tamjīd, Mustafā Ibn 880 1475 His tafsīr is included in the Hāshiyat al- x x x
Ibrāhīm Qūnawī - publication information as above.
Al-Biqā‘ī, Burhān al-Dīn 885 1480 Nazm al-durar fī tanāsub al-āyāt wa’l-suwar x x x

Ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Mu‘īd Khān

Hyderabad: Matba‘at Majlis Dā’irat al-Ma‘ārif
al-‘Uthmānīya, 1969.
Al-Suyūtī, Jalāl al-Dīn 911 1505 Al-Durr al-manthūr fī tafsīr bi’l-ma’thūr x x x

Tehran: Al-Maktaba al-Islāmīya, 1957.

Jalālayn 864 1459 Tafsīr al-Jalālayn x x x
(Jalāl al-Dīn al-Mahallī, Jalāl & &
al-Dīn al-Suyūtī) 911 1505 Ed. ‘Abd Allāh Rabī‘ Mahmūd
* Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn, 2000.
Al-Mahallī:
‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Kamāl Abī
Bakr b. Muhammad b. Sābiq
al-Dīn
Abū al-Su’ūd b. Muhammad 982 1574 Tafsīr Abī al-Su‘ūd aw irshād al-‘aql al-salīm x x x
al-‘Imādī al-Hanafī ilā mazāyā al-kitāb al-karīm

Ed. ‘Abd al-Qādir Ahmad ‘Atā

Riyadh: Maktabat Riyād al-Hadīth, 1971.
Al-Nākūrī, Abū’l-Fayd al- 1004 1595 Sawāti‘ al-ilhām fī tafsīr kalām al-malik al- x x x
Nākūrī ‘allām

Ed. Murtadā al-Shīrāzī

[Iran]: M. Shīrāzī, 1996.
Muhsin al-Fayd al-Kāshī 1091 1680 Kitāb al-sāfī fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān x x x
Muhammad b. Murtadā
Ed. Muhsin al-Husaynī al-Amīnī
Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmīya, 1998.

216
Name DD DD Book 2: 4: 4:
AH CE # = reconstructed from later sources of tafsīr. 228 34 1
## = constructed from the author’s other writings

Al-Bahrānī, Hāshim al- 1107 1695 Al-Burhān fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān x x x

Husaynī
Qum: Mu’assasat al-Ba‘tha, 1994/5.
Al-Huwayzī, ‘Abd ‘Alī b. 1112 1700 Tafsīr nūr al-thaqalayn x x x
Jum‘a al-‘Urūsī
Ed. Hāshim al-Rasūlī al-Mahallātī
Qum: Matba‘at al-‘Ilmīya, 1980.
Al-Mashhadī, Mīrzā 1125 1713 Kanz al-daqā’iq x x x
Muhammad b. Ismā‘īl
Ed. Mujtabā al-‘Irāqī
Qum: Mujtabā al-‘Irāqī, 1988/9.
Al-Qūnawī, ‘Isām al-Dīn 1195 1781 Hāshiyat al-Qūnawī x x x
Ismā‘īl b. Muhammad
Publication information as above.

217
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Partial list of works in which there was no commentary on these verses

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Al-Tustarī, Sahl b. ‘Abdullah, Tafsīr al-Tustarī, ed. Muhammad Bāsil ‘Uyūn al-Sūd,
Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2002.

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