Natural Resource Economics under the Rule of Hotelling1

Gérard Gaudet
Département de sciences économiques and CIREQ
Université de Montréal

June 2007

1 Presidential address delivered at the 41st annual meetings of the Canadian Economics Associa-
tion, Halifax, 2 June 2007. I would like to thank Didier Tatoutchoup for his assistance in collecting
the data and Isabelle Boudreau for bibliographic assistance. Very special thanks also to my friends
and long time collaborators Pierre Lasserre, Ngo Van Long, Michel Moreaux and Stephen Salant
for their comments and especially for the many enjoyable and profitable discussions about natural
resource economics we have had over the years.
1 Introduction

The year 2006 marked the 75th anniversary of the publication in the Journal of Political

Economy of Harold Hotelling’s “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources” (Hotelling 1931).

The word seminal takes all its sense when writing or speaking about this article. Rarely
has a single paper had as much influence on the development of a whole field of economic

research as this one has had on the economics of exhaustible resources.1 This anniversary
provides a good occasion to look back at how the famous Hotelling’s rule of natural resource
exploitation has evolved as a framework for understanding the functioning of natural resource

markets and to look forward at some unresolved issues, both theoretical and empirical, that

would help reconcile the theory and the facts about resource price behavior over time.

Hotelling’s motivation in writing that paper was twofold. He was reacting to the de-

mand for regulation of the exploitation of exhaustible natural resources by the Conservation

Movement, which had been particularly strong in the U.S. during the period 1890 to 1920.

But he also wanted to propose an economic theory of exhaustible resources to remedy the

inadequacy of what he called the “static-equilibrium type of economic theory” for analyz-

ing an inherently dynamic problem. His analytical approach to the problem of the efficient

use of exhaustible resources was similar to that which he had used in a wonderful paper

published in 1925, in the Journal of the American Statistical Association, titled “A General
Mathematical Theory of Depreciation” (Hotelling 1925). In that paper, he introduced the

definition of the depreciation of an asset as the decrease in the discounted value of its future
returns. Not only is the topic related to that of the depletion of a natural resource, but it
required the use of the calculus of variations, as did his economics of exhaustible resources.

Hotelling’s treatment of the economics of exhaustible resources did not get serious at-
tention before the 1970s. There are probably two explanations for this. The first is that
1
By exhaustible resources Hotelling means nonrenewable resources, as opposed to renewable resources.
The expression “exhaustible resource” is somewhat of a misnomer, since both type of resources are ex-
haustible. Hotelling recognizes that “a complete study of the subject would include semi-replaceable assets
such as forests and stocks of fish”[renewable resources], but chooses to limit himself to “absolutely irreplace-
able assets”[nonrenewable resources] (Hotelling 1931, p. 139–140).

1
economists, even academic economists, read the newspapers, and the newspapers’ attention

was directed to other more pressing issues in the middle of the Great Depression, as it was
during most of the war years that followed in the 1940s.2
The adequacy of natural resources for sustained economic growth became a concern after

World War II, particularly in the U.S. This concern gave birth to the President’s Materials
Policy Commission (Paley Commission), whose report was made public in 1952, and, as an
outgrowth, to Resources for the Future, the influential Washington think tank. Hotelling’s

contribution nonetheless went unnoticed throughout the 1950s. Resources for the Future
sponsored the publication in 1963 of Scarcity and Growth, by Harold Barnett and Chandler

Morse (Barnett and Morse 1963), which was the first systematic analysis of long run scarcity

measures of a number of natural resources. Barnett and Morse make just a passing reference

to Hotelling’s 1931 paper.3 So lack of public concern for the issues of natural resource use is

not sufficient to explain the lack of interest for Hotelling’s contribution before the 1970s.

The other reason why the paper did not get the early attention it deserved is that it was

a difficult paper, given the level of mathematical sophistication of the economic profession at

the time. In fact, according to Hotelling’s own later account, his paper was rejected by the

Economic Journal because its mathematics were too difficult (Arrow 1987, Darnell 1988).

Then came, in the 1970s, another period of intense public concern for natural resource

scarcity. This was triggered by Limits to Growth, the report for the Club of Rome published

in 1972 by Dennis Meadows and his co-authors (Meadows et al. 1972), predicting catastrophic
consequences for the early twenty-first century unless economic growth was seriously cut
back, and by the 1973 oil embargo and the ensuing energy crisis. This time academic

economists were ready to tackle the analytical framework put forth by Hotelling in 1931,
being equipped with the optimal control theory learned by working on optimal economic
2
The same volume of the Journal of Political Economy contained a paper titled “Some theoretical aspects
of stock market speculation” and another titled “Savings, investment, and the control of business cycles”
which were certainly more topical at the time.
3
They characterize Hotelling’s paper as “contribut[ing] usefully in a technical way [my emphasis] to the
question of whether, and why, the time distribution of resource use and investment under private enterprise
conditions may be socially erroneous.”(Barnett and Morse 1963, p. 46)

2
growth problems in the 1960s. William Nordhaus published in 1973 an important study

entitled The Allocation of Energy Resources which applies the Hotelling model to the problem
of how different energy sources should be used (Nordhaus 1973). He also published the next
year a critical analysis of Limits to growth in the American Economic Review (Nordhaus

1974). Robert Solow devoted his 1974 Ely Lecture to the American Economic Association
to the subject of natural resource economics (Solow 1974). The same year the Review of
Economic Studies published a Symposium devoted to the topic of exhaustible resources,

with contributions by Partha Dasgupta, Geoffrey Heal, Tjalling Koopmans, Joseph Stiglitz
and Robert Solow, among others. Natural resource economics began to acquire greater

prominence as a field of research. The now famous Hotelling’s rule was at the heart of it

and it still is.4

2 Hotelling’s rule

Like the stock of any physical capital, a stock of natural resource in situ is an asset to its

owner. In a market economy, the value of this asset, like for any other capital asset, will be

related to the rate of return it is expected to yield to its owners.

Typically, the rate of return on a physical asset can be decomposed into three components:

• A first component is attributable to the flow of product generated by the marginal unit
of the asset — its rate of marginal productivity or dividend rate.

• A second component is due to the fact that the asset’s physical characteristics may
change over time, a factor which may or may not depend on the use being made of it

or on the size of the stock being held.

• A third component is the rate at which the asset’s market value changes over time.

This may be negative, as long as it is offset by some other positive components of the
return.
4
That is not to say that there were no significant contributions to the natural resource literature before
the 1970s. To mention a few: Gray (1914), Scott (1955b), Gordon (1967), Herfindahl (1967) as concerns
nonrenewable resources; Gordon (1954), Scott (1955a) and Smith (1968) as concerns renewable resources.

3
In order for the asset markets to be in equilibrium, this rate of return must be equal to the

rate of return that can be expected by its owners if they were to sell the marginal unit and
invest the proceeds elsewhere. I will assume for now that the alternative is a “bond” which
yields an exogenously given riskless rate of return and will call it the “rate of interest”.

In the case of some physical asset such as buildings, machinery and equipment, the first
component usually refers to the marginal product derived from its use as an input in the
production process. The second component refers to the rate of physical depreciation of the

asset, which enters negatively in the rate of return. It may be due to wear and tear from the
use of the asset or simply to obsolescence, and is often treated as a constant in theoretical

work. The third component, refers to the capital gains that can be had by holding this asset.

Suppose now the asset in question is a nonrenewable resource, such as a mineral deposit

or a stock of oil in the ground. Such assets, being non reproducible, have the property that

the size of their existing stock cannot be increased over time. Furthermore, holding such an

asset in situ yields no dividend: as long as it is left in the ground, it is totally unproductive,

contrary to a machine or a piece of equipment, which are capable of generating a flow of

services. Hence the first component is identically zero. As for the second component, there

is usually no exact equivalent in the case of resource stocks, in the sense that physical

deterioration will not occur from simply holding the asset in the ground. There is a sense

however in which keeping the marginal unit of the asset stored in the ground rather than

extracting it prevents the average quality of the remaining stock from deteriorating. This
second component therefore enters positively in the rate of return, rather than negatively.
Let me also set this component to zero for now and come back to it later. This leaves the

rate of appreciation in value as the only source of return on the stock of natural resource.
The value of the marginal unit of resource held in the ground is what it can fetch on the
flow market, net of the cost of taking it out of the ground. If p(t) is the current flow price

which the resource can fetch on the market once extracted and c(t) is the marginal cost of

4
extracting it at date t, then its marginal value in the ground must be:

π(t) = p(t) − c(t),

which represents the asset price of the resource.

If the rate of interest is denoted r, then asset markets equilibrium requires:

π̇(t)
= r. (1)
π(t)

This is the famous Hotelling’s rule, derived as an equilibrium condition on the asset markets.
It states that the net price of the natural resource — its asset price — must grow at the rate

of interest.

If the marginal cost of extracting the resource is independent of the rate of extraction

and invariant over time, then this immediately yields a prediction as to the behavior of the

market price over time, namely:

 
ṗ(t) c
=r 1− . (2)
p(t) p(t)

If this were a correct representation of reality, we should observe the price of nonrenewable

resources continuously growing at a rate which tends to the rate of interest as the share of

cost in price gets smaller and smaller over time and that of the scarcity rent gets higher and

higher.

This is not what we have been observing over the last century and more. Using U.S.

price data for the period 1870-2004 for copper, lead, zinc, coal and petroleum, 1880-2004
for tin, 1900-2004 for aluminium and nickel and 1920-2004 for natural gas, I have plotted

in Figures 1 to 10 the rate of change of price of each of those seven nonrenewable minerals

and three nonrenewable fossil fuels. The first thing that we notice is the high volatility in
the rate of change of those prices. But more significantly for the purpose at hand is the fact

that this volatility appears centered at zero. In fact, in none of the ten cases is the mean

rate of change of price significantly different from zero.5 It is very hard to detect any trend
5
The p-values range from 0.82 to 0.98.

5
in the actual price levels of those resources and certainly not the kind of positive trend that

is suggested by the above statement of Hotelling’s rule.6

Is this sufficient to invalidate Hotelling’s rule? I believe not. When viewed as an asset
markets equilibrium condition, this observed discrepancy means that there must in reality

be more to the return on holding nonrenewable natural resource stocks than simply the rate
of price appreciation. Factors related to extraction costs, to durability of the resource, to
market structure and to uncertainty must also be taken into account in order to correctly

characterize the rate of return on resources. In what follows I will discuss in turn how each
of those factors could potentially help bridge the gap between the underlying theory and the

evidence.

3 Costs

The first factor that comes to mind which is likely to attenuate the growth in the flow price

of the resource is a decreasing cost of extraction, due to technological progress. Technological

change was an important factor in the finding of Barnett and Morse that, except possibly for

forestry, the average cost of extractive resources had been following a declining trend over

the period of close to one hundred years they were considering.

For the sake of the argument, write the unit cost of extraction as c(t) = ce−αt , to reflect

exogenous technological progress at the rate α in the extraction technology. Then Hotelling’s

rule yields the following prediction for the rate of change in the market price p(t):
 
ṗ(t) c(t) c(t)
=r 1− −α . (3)
p(t) p(t) p(t)

The rate of change of the market price is thus the weighted sum of the rate of interest and

the rate of decrease in cost due to technological change. If the share of marginal cost in price
6
The analysis by Berck and Roberts (1996) of the actual prices of nine nonrenewable natural resources
up to 1991 (the same resources as in Figures 1 to 10, plus iron and minus nickel and tin) using time-series
methods leads them to conclude that there is at best “a weak supposition that natural resource prices will
rise” (Berck and Roberts 1996, p. 65). A quick glance at the evolution of those prices between 1991 and
2005 leads one to conjecture that adding those fourteen years of observations would make the supposition
weaker still.

6
is sufficiently high, the effect of the rate of technological change on cost dominates. The

reverse is true if the share of marginal cost in price is sufficiently low. This is consistent with
a price path that would be at first decreasing and then increasing (Slade 1982). It cannot
however justify forever flat or decreasing price paths. In the long run, as the share of cost

in price becomes negligible, the effect of the rate of interest must come to dominate and
the rate of growth of price must eventually become positive and again approach the rate of
interest over time.

There is another reason besides technological progress for the cost of extraction to vary
over time. It can be interpreted as having to do with the second component of the rate

of return on physical assets, which I have so far neglected. As the resource stock gets

depleted, we can expect the marginal cost of extraction to increase, due to the fact that the

resource tends to be less easily accessible and of lesser grade. A marginal addition to current

resource extraction not only uses up the resource stocks, but it uses up the cheapest available

and hence increases all future cost. This Ricardian effect has been called a “degradation

cost” (Solow and Wan 1976) and can be assimilated to physical depreciation that can be

prevented by not depleting the asset. To capture it, write the marginal cost of extraction as

a decreasing function of the remaining stock, in addition to rate of technological progress:

c(t, X(t)) = e−αt f (X(t)), f 0 (X(t)) < 0.7 Hotelling’s rule must then be modified to reflect

this stock effect. It becomes:

π̇(t) e−αt f 0 (X(t))x(t)

− = r, (4)
π(t) π(t)

where x(t) represents the rate at which the stock X(t) is being depleted. Thus leaving the
marginal unit of resource in situ provides an additional return, in the form of a lower cost

of extraction in the future. Hotelling’s rule now dictates that the net equilibrium price grow
at a rate which is less than the rate of interest. But since this stock effect directly enters
the net price through its effect on cost, the expression for the rate of growth of the flow
7
For careful analyses of the effect on the predicted time path of the asset price (or scarcity rent) of other
more general hypotheses concerning the extraction cost function, see Farzin (1992, 1995) and more recently
Livernois and Martin (2001).

7
price remains unchanged, except for the fact that the level of marginal cost now depends on

the remaining stock. Flow price behavior remains qualitatively the same. The prediction is
still that the rate of growth of the market price is the weighted sum of the rate of interest
and the rate of decrease of extraction cost due to technological progress. Unless extraction

becomes unprofitable before the stocks are exhausted, we should still observe that price will
eventually be growing at a rate that approaches the rate of interest as the share of cost in
price becomes smaller and smaller.

As just sketched, the depletion effect could be interpreted as being due strictly to physical
reasons, as if lower-cost resources had to be exploited first in order to gain access to the

higher-cost ones. This is often the case in any one resource pool. But at an aggregate level

it is realistic to assume that many resource pools that differ in their cost of extraction are

available for exploitation at any one time. Then it is economic efficiency and not nature that

dictates that, of any two resource deposits, the low-cost one be depleted before moving on

to the next highest-cost one (Herfindahl 1967, Solow and Wan 1976).8 As long as the stocks

in both resource pools are positive, asset markets equilibrium requires that Hotelling’s rule

hold for each. Hence the asset price of each must be growing at the rate of interest but with

the asset price of the high-cost deposit lower than that of the low-cost deposit, since the

flow price they can get on the market is the same for both deposits (I am assuming identical

products). The owner of the high-cost deposit will find it unprofitable to extract and will

hold on to his asset as long as the low-cost deposit is not depleted. When the switch to the
higher cost deposit occurs, there will be a jump up in the cost of extraction. Hence the asset
price will have grown on average at less than the rate of interest in the long-run (Dasguspta

and Heal 1979, p. 172–175). But the flow price itself will be continuously growing.
8
The problem of the efficient order of use of many resource pools has been generalized to resource pools
that may exhibit nonconvex cost of extraction over some range (Weitzman 1976), to resource pools that are
differentiated by their set-up cost as well as their marginal cost (Hartwick, Kemp and Long 1986) and to a
general equilibrium context (Kemp and Long 1980, Amigues, Favard, Gaudet and Moreaux 1998). It has also
been generalized to resource pools that are differentiated by their geographical location with respect to many
spatially distributed markets (Gaudet, Moreaux and Salant 2001) and by characteristics which distinguish
them in their efficacy in many different end uses (Chakravorty and Krulce 1994, Chakravorty, Roumasset
and Tse 1997).

8
4 Durability

When we think of nonrenewable resources, we often think of fossil fuels, such as oil, natural

gas and coal. But an often neglected fact is that many nonrenewable resources — in par-
ticular metals — are durable goods. In fact of the ten nonrenewable resources whose price
trend we just examined, seven can be considered durable resources, in the sense that they

are not consumed in a single usage as are fossil fuels.

Unlike fossil fuels and other nondurable resources, durable resources are capable of yield-
ing a continuous flow of services once extracted. Thus the demand for those resources is

(at least partly) a stock demand. Once above ground, this stock of durable good becomes a

conventional physical asset and the asset markets equilibrium requires that its rate of return

be equal to the rate of interest. This rate of return will include a dividend component (the

flow of services it generates) and a physical depreciation component, in addition to a capital

gains component, which corresponds to the rate of appreciation of the market price of the

good. Hotelling’s rule must still hold for the asset held below ground, which means that this

market price net of the cost of extraction must also be growing at the rate of interest. But it

does not follow anymore from Hotelling’s rule that market price will necessarily be growing.

In fact we can easily imagine a scenario where price would be always falling, even though

the net price (the price of the asset in the ground) is always rising at the rate of inter-
est (Levhari and Pindyck 1981). For this, simply assume that demand is stationary and

that the resource is perfectly durable, so that there is no physical depreciation. Then the
long-run desired stock of the durable above ground is a constant. If marginal extraction cost
is an increasing function of the rate of extraction, then this desired stock will be approached

smoothly, at a decreasing rate. If the desired stock exceeds the available reserves, then the
resource is scarce and its net price must follow Hotelling’s rules. But since demand is a
decreasing function of the stock already in circulation, market price must be decreasing.

Of course in the real world demand is not stationary and the rate of physical depreciation
is not zero and it may itself depend on price (Henderson, Salant, Irons and Thomas 2007).

9
But even if we relax those assumptions, the price path can be expected to exhibit a decreasing

phase before starting to increase. The rate of decrease and the length of the decreasing
phase will depend on the rate of depreciation and the rate of growth of demand (Levhari
and Pindyck 1981). Clearly, durability can be an important factor in reconciling Hotelling’s

rule with the long-run price paths we observe.

5 Market structure

Another factor which can influence the rate of return on resource stocks is the presence of
imperfect competition.

If the resource stock is in the hands of a monopolist, the marginal value to the owner of

the stock of resource left in the ground will be equal to the marginal profit it can bring on

the flow market once extracted. To a monopolist, this is less than the net price. The asset

markets equilibrium condition will still require that the rate of return on the resource stock

be equal to the rate of interest. Only now the rate of appreciation of the in situ value is not

measured by the rate of change of the net price, but by the rate of change of the monopolist’s

marginal profit. If we neglect changes in the marginal cost over time, the prediction is then

that the rate of growth of price will be given by (Stiglitz 1976):

 
ṗ(t) c η̇(t)
=r 1− − , (5)
p(t) η(t)p(t) η(t)

where η(t) denotes the ratio of marginal revenue to price.

There are two effects from the introduction of a monopolist. The first comes from the
fact that even if the proportion of marginal revenue to price does not vary over time (η does
not change), price will be growing at a slower rate than in a competitive market simply

because marginal revenue is smaller than price and hence the weight given to the rate of
interest is smaller. Thus even if the elasticity of demand remains unchanged over time, as
would occur if demand were isoelastic and stationary, the price path will appear flatter than

in a perfectly competitive world unless the marginal cost of extraction is negligible. The
second effect comes from the fact that the gap between price and marginal revenue can be

10
expected to change over time. If this gap is decreasing over time (η is growing), this will tend

to further flatten the price path. The difference between price and marginal revenue being
inversely related to the elasticity of demand, this will happen if the elasticity of demand
is increasing over time. This is what is to be expected as substitutes for the resource are

discovered and is therefore not an unrealistic assumption.

The absolute level of the price path will depend on the stock of the resource that is
available for extraction. Since the flow market equilibrium requires that price be the same

under monopoly and perfect competition at the date of exhaustion of the resource stock,
this means that the monopoly price must initially be higher and eventually become lower

than the competitive price. This reasoning assumes that the available stock of resource is

the same under monopolistic and competitive industry structures.9 If costly efforts must be

expended to determine the initial resource stock, then the monopolist may possibly further

exert his monopoly power by choosing a lower initial stock than would price-takers (Gaudet

and Lasserre 1988). This however does not change the fact that monopoly power will tend

to flatten the price path.10

I have so far discussed imperfect competition assuming a pure monopolist. As Hotelling

himself remarked, a more realistic market structure for many nonrenewable resources is some

form of oligopolistic competition.11 The flattening effect on the price path just described

will of course still be felt, since it is due strictly to the presence of some market power. An

oligopolistic world is however much more complex than either perfect competition or pure
monopoly. It involves strategic interactions in an inherently dynamic context, since the re-
9
The fact that the monopolist’s price is flatter than the perfectly competitive price path means that the
monopolist will take a longer time than the competitive market to exhaust the same initial resource stock,
hence the saying that “the monopolist is the conservationist’s best friend”.
10
The well known special case of a stationary isoelastic demand, under which the monopolistic and com-
petitive price paths coincide (Stiglitz 1976), rests not only on an assumption of zero marginal cost, but also
on an assumption that the initial reserves are at the same exogenously given level in both situations (Gaudet
and Lasserre 1988).
11
Hotelling analyzes in some details the cases of perfect competition and monopoly. He provides no formal
analyses of oligopolistic market structures, other than a very sketchy discussion of duopoly. He does however
recognize that a market composed of “a few competing sellers” is “more closely related than either [monopoly
or perfect competition] to the real economic world” (Hotelling 1931, p. 171).

11
source stock evolves over time. The strategic considerations involved may themselves further

modify the way the rate of return on holding the stock of resource is to be characterized, as
we will see.
The pioneering works on oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable resources were motivated

by the post-1973 oil market and the presence of OPEC as a dominant player. Thus the first
approach to the problem (Salant 1976) treated the market as composed of a dominant cartel
and a competitive fringe and adopted the Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept, whereby each

player ignores the effects of his decisions on the strategies of his rivals. Under this approach,
in solving for an equilibrium it is assumed that the competitive fringe takes as given the

price path of the dominant player and chooses a production path, while the dominant firm

takes as given the production path of the competitive fringe and chooses a price path. This

type of market structure provided the framework for a number of subsequent analyses (for

instance Pindyck (1978), Salant (1982), Lewis and Schmalensee (1979) and Ulph and Folie

(1980).

A number of other studies have retained the cartel-versus-fringe assumption, but have

treated the cartel as a Stackelberg leader (Gilbert 1978, Newbery 1981, Ulph 1982, Groot,

Withagen and de Zeeuw 1992). Under this approach the cartel is aware of the effect of its

decisions on the decisions of the fringe and takes it into account. The fringe, as a follower,

chooses a production path in reaction to the output path of the cartel. The cartel, as the

leader, determines its own output path taking as given the fringe’s anticipated reaction.
Thus, unlike in a Nash-Cournot world, the cartel is in a position where it can manipulate
the fringe’s reaction.

Those models have provided extremely important insights into the functioning of imper-
fectly competitive markets under the dynamic conditions that follow from the non renewa-
bility of resource stock and they have been very useful tools of analysis. But they also raise

some questions as to the proper way to model nonrenewable resource markets. In particular,
one drawback from which they suffer is that the strategies are limited to being a function

12
only of time and the initial stocks of the resource — so-called open-loop strategies. This

implicitly assumes that the players can credibly commit at the outset to whole price or
output paths. In the absence of the capacity to credibly commit in this way, the equilibria
they generate are generally not robust to deviations of the vector of resource stocks from

its equilibrium level. To use the game theory jargon, the equilibria obtained are generally
not subgame perfect. In the case of the leader-follower approach, the derived equilibria may
not even be time-consistent, in the sense that the cartel may, in some cases, wish to deviate

from the initially chosen path at some future time if it is allowed to reconsider its plan
(Newbery 1981, Ulph 1982, Maskin and Newbery 1990, Karp and Newbery 1992, Karp and

Newbery 1993).12

An alternative is to assume that the strategies consist of decision rules that express a

producer’s rate of extraction as a function of the current stocks of the resource and possibly of

time — so-called Markovian strategies, or stationary Markovian strategies if independent of

time.13 The resulting equilibria are of the feedback (or closed-loop) type and will be Markov

perfect: they will constitute a Nash equilibrium not only for the resource stocks along the

solution path, but also for all out of equilibrium resource stocks. Solving for Markov perfect

Nash equilibria in this context raises very difficult theoretical and computational issues and

much remains to be done. Only very recently (Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw 2003) has a

solution to the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium been derived, for the case of linear demand

and constant marginal cost.

Another drawback of the dominant firm approach is that not all resource markets can be
characterized as composed of a dominant cartel and a fringe. In fact the market structure of

the oil industry is an exception rather than the rule in this respect.14 Although there have
12
An equilibrium may be time consistent but not subgame perfect: there may not be any incentives to
deviate from the initially announced plan if allowed to reconsider in the future, but still the decision may
not remain optimal if the vector of resource stocks deviates from its equilibrium value. Of course, if the
equilibrium is subgame perfect, then it is also time-consistent.
13
This type of strategy is called Markovian because it depends only on the current resource stocks and
not on the whole history of the stocks.
14
The diamond industry may be another such exception, the De Beers cartel having exercised strong
control over supply for many years. But the structure of that industry is also changing, since it appears

13
historically been numerous attempts to cartelize other natural resource industries, none have

been very successful at controlling the market (Eckbo 1976, Teece, Sunding and Mosakowski
1993, Suslow 2005, Benchekroun, Gaudet and Long 2006) and, when able to attain some
success in pushing up price, have been short-lived.15 Certainly, many resource markets can

best be viewed as composed of a small number of producers involved in simultaneous decision

making, with none of them exerting any dominance, as in the standard Cournot competition.
The properties of static Cournot equilibria are well known. Modeling the nonrenewable

extraction game as an open-loop dynamic game, can be viewed as a direct replication of the
Cournot framework in a dynamic setting (Lewis and Schmalensee 1980, Loury 1986, Polasky

1992). Indeed, in terms of information structure, open-loop dynamic games are formally

identical to static games, since in the open-loop game the player is allowed to condition his

decision only on the initial state and time. From a purely technical point of view, the only

difference lies in the fact that in a static game the decision space is the space of real numbers,

whereas in the open-loop dynamic game the decision space is the infinite-dimensional space

of functions (functions of time in this case).

The fact that in a dynamic context the state evolves over time as a function of the

actions taken opens the door to more intricate analysis. Some issues which appear trivial

in a truly static context become very relevant in a dynamic context, even if formulated as

open-loop. Imagine an industry in Cournot competition which is faced with a temporary

exogenous perturbation — for instance a tax which is imposed for a finite period of time
and then lifted. In a truly static world, once this tax is lifted, the production level can be
expected to revert to the previous static equilibrium level, since the state is unchanged by

the temporary effects of the tax on production. In a dynamic context however, such as a
natural resource industry, the temporary tax will leave the industry in a different state then
it would have been without the tax, since current production decisions have an effect on
that De Beers is having to loosen its grip over supply in the face of emerging competition and government
regulations (The Economist, 24 February 2007, p. 68).
15
Other than OPEC, the resource cartels studied by Pindyck (1977, 1978) (copper and bauxite) have since
completely ceased their activities.

14
the state, as measured by the resource stocks. If the producers are able to anticipate this

temporary perturbation and so are able to condition their open-loop paths on it, then we
can expect the open-loop equilibrium production path to be perturbed not only while the
tax is in effect, but also before the tax is applied and after it is lifted (Benchekroun and

Gaudet 2003).
This example highlights the most objectionable feature of modeling natural resource
oligopolistic markets as open-loop equilibria. In the open-loop approach to a nonrenewable

resource exploitation game, each producer is assumed to choose at the outset the whole time
path of extraction of its own resource stock, conditional only on its initial reserves and those

of its competitors. It is therefore assumed that the producers do not use information on

the evolution of the level of reserves which they observe after initially making their decision

on the production path. Thus if the above tax scheme was unanticipated at the time of

deciding on the production path, it is unlikely that the planned open-loop production would

still constitute a Nash-equilibrium once the reserves have adjusted to this exogenous shock.

Open-loop strategies are probably not a good description of how oligopolistic natural

resource producers make their decision. As in the sequential decision cartel-fringe model

just discussed, it seems more reasonable to assume that producers condition their production

decisions on the current state of reserves rather than simply on the initial reserves and time,

and thus use Markovian decision rules. This of course assumes that the producers observe

the evolution of reserves, which is a realistic assumption given that much information on
current stocks is readily available for most resources. We are then looking for a Markov
perfect oligopolistic equilibrium, with each producer choosing its decision rule as a function

of the state of reserves, taking as given its competitors’ decision rules.

The difficult problem of solving for Markov perfect equilibria in oligopolistic nonrenewable
resource industries remains open, to a large extent.16 Nevertheless, it is clear that if producers
16
Salo and Tahvonen (2001) have recently proposed a solution to a feedback equilibrium of this sort for
the case of a linear demand, under assumptions that unit cost is an affine function of remaining reserves
and that it is not profitable to physically exhaust the resource stocks. More explicitly, they solve in that
context for an equilibrium in linear strategies, in which each player’s production is positively related to his

15
condition their production decisions on the remaining reserves, then Hotelling’s rule needs

to be modified. Indeed, if a producer knows that his own resource holdings affect a rival’s
production decision and hence the rival’s reserves, which in turn enter into his own decision
rule, then there will be a strategic component to the return on holding reserves. This strategic

effect will depend, at any given time, on each producer’s remaining reserves and his rivals’
reserves (see Benchekroun and Gaudet (2003), for an example).
~
Let us write this strategic component s(X(t), ~
π(t)), where X(t) is the vector of stocks

remaining at time t. For the sake of the argument, ignore the stock effects on costs and
assume a symmetric equilibrium. We might then rewrite Hotelling’s rule as:

π̇(t) ~
+ s(X(t), π(t)) = r. (6)
π(t)

Unfortunately, so little is known about the properties of the decision rules in this type of

equilibrium that it is not possible to put a definite sign on this component of the rate of

return. It is therefore not possible to predict the effect it should have on the price path. It

certainly cannot be ruled out that it is a factor in explaining the flatness of the observed

price paths. But much theoretical work needs to be done before its empirical relevance can

be ascertained.

6 Uncertainty

I have so far assumed a world of perfect certainty in which wealth can be held either in

the form of known natural resource stocks or in the form of a bond, whose rate of return is
exogenously given. This obviously lacks realism if the objective is to explain long-run price
behavior. Resource stocks are not known with certainty and both extraction and exploration

activities provide information about the ultimate size of available stocks.

own stock and negatively related to the rivals’ stocks. They show that this feedback equilibrium can lead to
markedly different conclusions than the open-loop models of Lewis and Schmalensee (1980), Loury (1986)
and Polasky (1992), in particular as concerns the evolution of market shares and industry concentration over
time. This seems to be attributable in good part to the assumption that production will become unprofitable
before the resource stocks are exhausted. It is difficult to compare this feedback solution to the known open-
loop solutions, since it rests on two different working assumptions: with respect to the type of strategies
allowed and with respect to the depletion of the resource stocks.

16
 If as extraction proceeds one gains information about the true size of the reserves, then the

net price of the resource will reflect the informational value of extraction. As a consequence,
it will not be rising at the rate of interest (Kemp 1976, Loury 1978, Gilbert 1979, Kemp and
Long 2007). Extraction will proceed faster than otherwise and this will impact on price.

Exploration is also an obvious way of gaining information about the true level of reserves.
With uncertain stocks it becomes profitable to carry out exploration activities in order
to reduce this uncertainty. Any resulting revision of the estimated reserves will change

the basis for the calculation of the asset price (Deshmukh and Pliska 1980, Arrow and
Chang 1982, Lasserre 1984). If the estimated reserves are repeatedly revised upwards as a

result of the exploration activity, then the predicted rise at the rate of interest of the net

price of the resource will be offset by repeated downward adjustments in the net price that

serves as a basis for this rise. Hotelling’s rule applies between such revisions of reserves,

as usual. But if over a long period of time successful exploration activities dominate the

unsuccessful ones, then the asset price may appear to be growing on average at less than the

rate of interest. This will of course reflect itself in a similar way in the time path of the flow

price, whose long-run increase will appear dampened by the successive drops in the asset

price.

Insecure property rights have also at times constituted another source of uncertainty

which has had an impact on the patterns of extraction and of price. Faced with a threat of

expropriation, owners of resource stocks are likely to act as if their discount rate were higher
than in the absence of that threat (Long 1975). Leaving the resource in situ becomes a risky
investment, since the insecure owner has no guarantee that he will be able to fully reap the

fruit of his investment. As a consequence, he will tend to shift production from the future
towards the present.17 It has even been argued that the quadrupling of oil prices between
1973 and 1977 should be attributed not so much to the cartelization of the market, but to
17
The “overexploitation” that occurs in such a situation is much like the overexploitation that occurs when
a resource is exploited in a common property regime, as is the case, for instance, when many oil producers
pump from the same oil pool (See Libecap and Wiggins (1984), Libecap (1989) and Gaudet, Moreaux and
Salant (2002))

17
the resolution of the property rights issue, which definitely shifted from the companies to

the host countries by 1973 (Johany 1979, Mead 1979).18 According to this argument, as the
possibility of nationalization became more and more imminent, the oil companies that held
concessions in the Middle East reacted by raising their rate of discount. Once the property

rights were secured in their favor, leaving the oil in the ground became a more attractive
investment for some countries than it would have been for the companies facing the threat
of expropriation.

More generally, exploitation of the stocks of natural resources and the decisions to invest
in such stocks takes place in a risky environment. To illustrate the possible effect of this

on the long-run resource price path, consider a stylized economy in which there are two

goods and three assets. One of the goods is a nonrenewable resource, which serves as an

input into the production of the second good, a composite commodity which can be either

consumed or accumulated. The accumulated stock of the composite good can be held either

in the form of physical capital or in the form of a bond, which yields the exogenously given

risk free rate of return, as above. The physical capital can be either devoted to extracting

the natural resource or combined with the flow of extracted natural resource to produce the

composite good. Both the production process and the extraction process, and hence the cost

of producing the composite good and the cost of extracting the resource, are stochastic.19

Total wealth in this economy is now held in the form of two risky assets (the nonrenewable

resource and the physical capital) and one risk-free asset (the bond). In addition to choosing
a level of consumption, the representative risk-averse consumer decides on the allocation

of his portfolio among those three assets. Hotelling’s rule will now take the form of the

familiar intertemporal equilibrium asset-pricing rule of portfolio theory, adapted to take into
account that the holdings of the nonrenewable resource stock cannot be increased (Gaudet
18
See also on this Salant (1982), pages 9 and 14. A closely related type of uncertainty is where agents face
the threat of a price collapse due to massive sale of government held resource stocks (such as gold) at some
unknown time in the future (Salant and Henderson 1978).
19
To be more precise, we might assume, as in Gaudet and Khadr (1991), that each of the production
processes depends on a parameter that represents the state of productivity in the sector and that the change
in those productivity parameters follows an Itô process.

18
and Howitt 1989, Gaudet and Khadr 1991) and yield no dividend.

This means that the equilibrium expected rate of change of the in situ value of the
resource will generally differ from the rate of interest, so as to reflect the relative riskiness of
the natural resource as an asset. Suppose unfavorable productivity outcomes in the resource

extraction sector are associated with unfavorable productivity outcomes in the production
of the composite commodity and similarly for favorable outcomes. Then on average the
two outcomes tend to reinforce each other, thus increasing the uncertainty in the economy’s

future capacity to produce the composite good, as perceived from today’s standpoint. To
the risk-averse representative consumer, this is an undesirable feature of holding the resource

stock which must be compensated through a relatively higher rate of return.

On the other hand, suppose that unfavorable productivity changes in the resource sec-

tor are typically accompanied by favorable productivity changes in the production of the

composite commodity, and vice-versa. It is then expected that when the resource is least

easily accessible, it is also the most productive. The two outcomes therefore tend to offset

each other and thus to mitigate the uncertainty in the economy’s capability to produce the

composite commodity. The resource stock is then a relatively less risky asset and thus does

not need to exhibit a large expected appreciation in value relative to the rate of return on

the stock of physical capital.

For the purpose at hand, a convenient way of expressing the equilibrium asset pric-

ing condition for the resource is in its so-called consumption-beta form (Breeden 1979,
Ingersoll 1987). In this form, Hotelling’s rule modified to account for uncertain returns
becomes (Gaudet and Khadr 1991):

µπ − A(y)σπy = r (7)

where µπ is the expected rate of appreciation of the in situ price of the resource, y is
consumption, which can be interpreted in this representative consumer framework as per

capita consumption, A(y) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and σπy is the
instantaneous covariance between the rate of change of the in situ resource price and the

19
rate of change of consumption.

In a world with many risky assets, we can write this equilibrium condition in a different
form. If µM is the instantaneous rate of return on any portfolio that has a nonzero covariance
with changes in consumption, then we also have µM = r + A(y)σM y . Hence, by substitution

into (7), Hotelling’s rule can also be rewritten:

µπ − β[µM − r] = r, (8)

where β = σπy /σM y is the so-called consumption-beta.

It is now apparent from (7) that the expected rate of appreciation of the in situ price

will differ from the rate of interest by a risk premium that takes the sign of the covariance

between the rate of change in the in situ price and the rate of change of consumption. A

positive covariance means that the return on the resource stock would tend to accrue in

states of the world where marginal utility of consumption is low. This makes the resource

a relatively risky asset and calls for a positive risk premium. But this covariance may well

be negative, in which case holding the resource stock constitutes a form of insurance against

adverse changes in consumption. The risk premium associated with holding the resource

stock is then negative and the expected rate of increase in the in situ price will be less than

the rate of interest. In fact, if the risk premium is sufficiently negative, we may even expect

the in situ price to be decreasing.

This has immediate implications for the flow price of the resource, the expected rate of

increase of which is now given by:

   
c(t) c(t)
µp = µπ 1− + µc (9)
p(t) p(t)

where µp and µc denote respectively the expected rates of change of the flow price and the

expected rate of change of extraction cost. If the covariance between the rate of change in
the in situ price and the rate of change of consumption is sufficiently negative, both terms on

the right-hand side may be negative. Thus negative risk premia on the holding of resource

stocks can reconcile Hotelling’s rule with observed price paths that are relatively flat and

20
even decreasing. A direct test of this conjecture would require data on asset prices (π), as

opposed to flow prices (p). Unfortunately, only flow prices are observed.
The rare cases where tests of Hotelling’s rule have been carried out taking into account the
possibility of risk diversification (Young and Ryan 1996, Slade and Thille 1997, Roberts 2001,

Livernois, Thille and Zhang 2006) tend to support the view that this is an important element
in the determination of the return of natural resource stocks.20 Its role in explaining the
observed behavior of resource price paths certainly deserves serious empirical investigation.

7 Concluding remarks

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the foregoing discussion should not be viewed as

an exhaustive survey of the field of natural resource economics, nor of the relevance of

Hotelling’s rule.21 I chose to concentrate on those theoretical developments that seem more

likely to reconcile the asset pricing rule that is Hotelling’s rule with the observed behavior

of market prices over time. In doing so, I have ignored important issues and topics for

which Hotelling’s rule is of particular relevance. Let me just mention resources and growth,

sustainability, recycling, natural resources in national income accounting, natural resource

taxation, investment in extraction capacity and investment in backstop technologies. I have

also ignored the large literature on renewable resources, which, contrary to nonrenewable

resources, admit a steady state if managed in an appropriate manner. Like nonrenewable

resources, renewable resources are assets to their owners and are subject to the same asset
markets equilibrium conditions, with the important difference that stocks of renewable re-

sources, such as fisheries or forestries, yield a dividend in situ in the form of natural growth.

Some renewable resources are also more prone to problems raised by difficulties in applying
20
Livernois et al. (2006) is the only study that actually uses direct observations of the asset price. Their
data comes from the sales of logging rights for old-growth timber in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. This resource
can be considered nonrenewable, since the old-growth timber in that region is several hundred years old.
Young and Ryan (1996) use aggregate average cost for four Canadian mining industries, while Slade and
Thille (1997) use cost estimates for 14 Canadian mining firms. Roberts (2001) uses the flow price to represent
the asset price, which amounts to assuming that cost are either zero or a constant proportion of the flow
price, so that the rates of change of the two prices are the same.
21
For a more exhaustive survey of the literature on nonrenewable resources see (Krautkraemer 1998).

21
private property rights, which leads to free access or common property exploitation, another

issue which I have ignored in my discussion of Hotelling’s rule.

This last point raises the question of externalities associated with the exploitation and
use of natural resources. The global warming debate and the environmental concerns it raises

with respect to the use of energy resources is a perfect example of this. From a social point
of view, the net benefits will take into account the damage costs that result from the use
of those energy resources, in addition to the cost of extracting them. Hotelling’s rule then

comes through as a social optimality condition, in the form of an intertemporal arbitrage

rule with policy implications. It is conceivable that the resulting socially optimal price path

will be flatter than in the absence of the externality, or even decreasing, in order to push the

lasting damage cost towards the future.22 To the extent that such environmental policies

were to be implemented, one should observe the same flattening effects on the actual market

price paths.

The impact of environmental policies on market equilibrium resource price paths is ob-

viously an interesting direction for further research. So is the application of Hotelling’s rule

to the more general analysis of what some perceive as the “new scarcity”(Simpson, Toman

and Ayres 2005), namely the limited capacity of the environment as a waste sink.

22
For an interesting first effort at modeling this problem, see Bartelme, Lim and Yee (2007).

22
 Data sources

Copper, lead, and zinc: Manthy (1978) and U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity
Summaries

Tin: Potter and Christy (1962) and U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries
Aluminum, nickel and silver: U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries
Coal, natural gas: Manthy (1978) and U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual

Energy Review 2005 (2006)

Petroleum: Potter and Christy (1962) and U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual

Energy Review 2005 (2006)

23
References

Amigues, Jean-Pierre, Pascal Favard, Gérard Gaudet, and Michel Moreaux (1998) ‘On the

optimal order of natural resource use when the capacity of the inexhaustible substitute is
limited.’ Journal of Economic Theory 80(1), 153–170
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1987) ‘Harold Hotelling.’ In The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of

Economics, ed. John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, vol. 2 (London:
MacMillan Press) pp. 670–671
Arrow, Kenneth J., and Sheldon Chang (1982) ‘Optimal pricing, use, and exploration of

uncertain natural resource stocks.’ Journal of Environmental Economics and

Management 9, 1–10

Barnett, Harold J., and Chandler Morse (1963) Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of

Natural Resource Availability (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press for

Resources for the Future)

Bartelme, Dominick, Lili Lim, and Chia Chye Yee (2007) ‘Optimal extraction,

environmental damage and backstop research.’ Department of Economics, University of

Michigan (mimeo)

Benchekroun, Hassan, and Gérard Gaudet (2003) ‘On the profitability of production

perturbations in a dynamic natural resource oligopoly.’ Journal of Economic Dynamics

and Control 27, 1237–1252

Benchekroun, Hassan, Gérard Gaudet, and Ngo Van Long (2006) ‘Temporary natural
resource cartels.’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 663–674
Berck, Peter, and Michael Roberts (1996) ‘Natural resource prices: Will they ever turn

up?’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31, 65–78

Breeden, Douglas T. (1979) ‘An intertemporal asset pricing model with stochastic
consumption and investment opportunities.’ Journal of Financial Economics 7, 265–296

Chakravorty, Ujjayant, and Darrell L. Krulce (1994) ‘Heterogeneous demand and order of
resouce extraction.’ Econometrica 62(6), 1445–1452

24
Chakravorty, Ujjayant, J. A. Roumasset, and K.-P. Tse (1997) ‘Endogenous substitution

among energy resources and global warming.’ Journal of Political Economy

105, 1201–1234
Darnell, Adrian C. (1988) ‘Harold Hotelling 1895-1973.’ Statistical Science 3(1), 57–62

Dasguspta, Partha S., and Geoffrey M. Heal (1979) Economic Theory and Exhaustible
Resources (Welwyn, England: James Nisbet and Co. and Cambridge University Press)
Deshmukh, Sudhakar, and Stanley R. Pliska (1980) ‘Optimal consumption and exploration

of nonrenewable resources under uncertainty.’ Econometrica

Eckbo, P.I. (1976) The Future of World Oil (Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing

Company)

Farzin, Y.H. (1992) ‘The time path of scarcity rent in the theory of exhaustible resources.’

Economic Journal 102(413), 813–830

(1995) ‘Technological change and the dynamics of resource scarcity measures.’ Journal of

Environmental Economics and Management 29, 105–120

Gaudet, Gérard, and Ali M. Khadr (1991) ‘The evolution of natural resource prices under

stochastic investment opportunities: An intertemporal asset-pricing approach.’

International Economic Review 32, 441–455

Gaudet, Gérard, and Peter Howitt (1989) ‘A note on uncertainty and the Hotelling rule.’

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16, 80–86

Gaudet, Gérard, and Pierre Lasserre (1988) ‘On comparing monopoly and competition in
exhaustible resource exploitation.’ Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 15, 412–418

Gaudet, Gérard, Michel Moreaux, and Stephen W. Salant (2001) ‘Intertemporal depletion
of resource sites by spatially distributed users.’ American Economic Review
91(4), 1149–1159

(2002) ‘Private storage of common property.’ Journal of Environmental Eonomics and

Management 43, 280–302

25
Gilbert, Richard J. (1978) ‘Dominant firm pricing policy in a market for an exhaustible

resource.’ Bell Journal of Economics 9(2), 385–395

(1979) ‘Optimal depletion of an uncertain stock.’ Review of Economic Studies
46(1), 47–57

Gordon, H. Scott (1954) ‘The economic theory of a common-property resource: The

fishery.’ Journal of Political Economy 62(2), 116–124
Gordon, Richard L. (1967) ‘A reinterpretation of the pure theory of exhaustion.’ Journal of

Political Economy 75(3), 274–286

Gray, Lewis Cecil (1914) ‘Rent under the assumption of exhaustibility.’ Quarterly Journal

of Economics 28(3), 466–489

Groot, Fons, Cees Withagen, and Aart de Zeeuw (1992) ‘Note on the open-loop von

Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel versus fringe model.’ Economic Journal

102(415), 1478–1484

(2003) ‘Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model.’ Journal of Economic

Dynamics and Control 28, 287–306

Hartwick, John M., Murray C. Kemp, and Ngo Van Long (1986) ‘Set-up costs and theory

of exhaustible resources.’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

13, 212–224

Henderson, Dale W., Stephen W. Salant, John S. Irons, and Sebastian Thomas (2007) ‘The

benefits of expediting government gold sales.’ Review of Financial Economics

(forthcoming)
Herfindahl, Orris C. (1967) ‘Depletion and economic theory.’ In Extractive Resources and

Taxation, ed. Mason Gaffney (Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press) pp. 68–90
Hotelling, Harold (1925) ‘A general mathematical theory of depreciation.’ Journal of the
American Statistical Association 20(151), 340–353

(1931) ‘The economics of exhaustible resources.’ Journal of Political Economy

39(2), 137–175

26
Ingersoll, J.E. (1987) Theory of Financial Decision-Making (New York: Rowman and

Littlefield)
Johany, Ali D. (1979) ‘OPEC and the price of oil: Cartelization or alteration of property
rights.’ Journal of Energy and Development 5(1), 72–80

Karp, Larry, and David M. Newbery (1992) ‘Dynamically consistent oil import tariffs.’
Canadian Journal of Economics 25(1), 1–21
(1993) ‘Intertemporal consistency issues in depletable resources.’ In ‘Handbook of

Natural Resources and Energy Economics’ (Amsterdam: North-Holland) pp. 881–931

Kemp, Murray C. (1976) ‘How to eat a cake of unknown size.’ In ‘Three Topics in the

Theory of International Trade’ (Amsterdam: North-Holland) chapter 23, pp. 297–308

Kemp, Murray C., and Ngo Van Long (1980) ‘On two folk theorems concerning the

extraction of exhaustible resources.’ Econometrica 48(3), 663–674

(2007) ‘Extracting several resource deposits of unknown size: Optimal order.’ Working

Paper 2007s-10, CIRANO, Montreal

Krautkraemer, Jeffrey A. (1998) ‘Nonrenewable resource scarcity.’ Journal of Economic

Literature 36(4), 2065–2107

Lasserre, Pierre (1984) ‘Reserve and land prices with exploration under uncertainty.’

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 11, 191–201

Levhari, David, and Robert S. Pindyck (1981) ‘The pricing of durable exhaustible

resources.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 96(3), 365–377

Lewis, Tracy R., and Richard Schmalensee (1979) ‘Cartel and oligopoly pricing of
nonreplenishable natural resources.’ In Dynamic Optimizations and Applications to

Economics, ed. P.T. Liu (New York: Plenum Press)

(1980) ‘On oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable natural resources.’ Quarterly Journal
of Economics 95(3), 475–491

Libecap, Gary D. (1989) Contracting for Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press)

27
Libecap, Gary D., and Steven N. Wiggins (1984) ‘Contractual responses to the common

pool: Prorationing of crude oil production.’ American Economic Review 74(1), 87–98
Livernois, John, and Patrick Martin (2001) ‘Price, scarcity rent, and a modified r percent
rule for non-renewable resources.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 34(3), 827–845

Livernois, John, Henry Thille, and Xianqiang Zhang (2006) ‘A test of the Hotelling rule
using old-growh timber data.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 39(1), 163–186
Long, Ngo Van (1975) ‘Resource extraction under the uncertainty about possible

nationalization.’ Journal of Economic Theory 10, 42–53

Loury, Glenn C. (1978) ‘The optimal exploitation of an unknown reserve.’ The Review of

Economic Studies 45(3), 621–636

(1986) ‘A theory of ‘Oil’igopoly: Cournot equilibrium in exhaustible resource markets

with fixed supplies.’ International Economic Review 27(2), 285–301

Manthy, Robert S. (1978) Natural Resource Commodities: a Century of Statistics: Prices,

Output,Consumption, Foreign Trade, and Employment in the United States, 1870-1973

(Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future)

Maskin, Eric, and David Newbery (1990) ‘Disadvantageous oil tariffs and dynamic

consistancy.’ American Economic Review 80(1), 143–156

Mead, Walter J. (1979) ‘An economic analysis of crude oil : Price behavior in the 1970s.’
Journal of Energy and Development 4(2), 212–228

Meadows, Denis L. et al. (1972) The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s
Project on the Predicament of Mankind (New York: Universe Books)
Newbery, David M. G. (1981) ‘Oil prices, cartels, and the problem of dynamic

inconsistency.’ Economic Journal 91(363), 617–646

Nordhaus, William D. (1973) ‘The allocation of energy resources.’ Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 3, 529–570

(1974) ‘Resources as a constraint on growth.’ American Economic Review 64(2), 22–26

Pindyck, Robert S. (1977) ‘Cartel pricing and the structure of the world bauxite market.’

28
 Bell Journal of Economics 8(2), 343–360

(1978) ‘The optimal exploration and production of nonrenewable resources.’ Journal of

Political Economy 86(5), 841–861
Polasky, Stephen (1992) ‘Do oil producers act as ‘Oil’igopolists?’ Journal of Environmental

Economics and Management 23, 216–247

Potter, Neal, and Francis T. Christy Jr. (1962) Trends in Natural Resource Commodities:
Statistics of Prices, Output, Consumption, Foreign Trade, and Employment in the

United-States, 1870-1957 (Baltimore MD: John Hopkins Press for Resources for the
Future)

Roberts, Michael J. (2001) ‘Can portfolio theory explain flat and downward natural

resource price trends?’ Paper presented at the Second World Congress of Environmental

and Resource Economists, Montery, California, June 24-27, 2002

Salant, Stephen W. (1976) ‘Exhaustible resources and industrial structure: A

Nash-Cournot approach to the world oil market.’ Journal of Political Economy

84(5), 1079–1093
(1982) Imperfect Competition in the World Oil Market : A Computerized Nash-Cournot

Model (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books)

Salant, Stephen W., and Dale W. Henderson (1978) ‘Market anticipations of government

policies and the price of gold.’ Journal of Political Economy 86(4), 627–648

Salo, Seppo, and Olli Tahvonen (2001) ‘Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource
markets.’ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25, 671–702

Scott, Anthony (1955a) ‘The fishery: The objectives of sole ownership.’ Journal of Political

Economy 63(2), 116–124

(1955b) Natural Resources: the Economics of Conservation (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press)

Simpson, David R., Michael A. Toman, and Robert U. Ayres (2005) Scarcity and Growth

Revisited: Natural Resources and the Environment in the New Millennium (Washington,

29
 DC: Resources for the Future)

Slade, Margaret E. (1982) ‘Trends in natural-resource commodity prices: An analysis of

the time domain.’ Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 9, 122–137
Slade, Margaret E., and Henry Thille (1997) ‘Hotelling confronts CAPM: A test of the

theory of exhaustible resources.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 30(3), 685–708

Smith, Vernon L. (1968) ‘Economics of production from natural resources.’ American
Economic Review 58(3), 409–431

Solow, Robert M. (1974) ‘The economics of resources or the resources of economics.’

American Economic Review 64(2), 1–14

Solow, Robert M., and Frederic Y. Wan (1976) ‘Extraction costs in the theory of

exhaustible resources.’ Bell Journal of Economics 7(2), 359–370

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1976) ‘Monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources.’

American Economic Review 66(4), 655–661

Suslow, Valerie Y. (2005) ‘Cartel contract duration: Empirical evidence from inter-war

international cartels.’ Industrial and Corporate Change 14, 705–744

Teece, David, David Sunding, and Elaine Mosakowski (1993) ‘Natural resouce cartels.’ In

Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, vol. III, ed. A.V. Knesse and J.L.

Sweeney (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.) chapter 24

Ulph, A.M. (1982) ‘Modeling partially cartelized markets for exhaustible resources.’ In

Economic Theory of Natural Resources, ed. K. Neumann Eichhorn, W. and R.W.

Shephard (Würzburg-Wein: Physica-Verlag) pp. 269–291
Ulph, A.M., and G.M. Folie (1980) ‘Exhaustible resources and cartels: An intertemporal

Nash-Cournot model.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 13(4), 645–658

United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2006) ‘Annual energy review
2005 [online].’ Technical Report, United States Energy Information Administration

(EIA). Available: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf

Weitzman, Martin L. (1976) ‘The optimal development of resource pools.’ Journal of

30
 Economic Theory 12, 351–364

Young, Denise, and David L. Ryan (1996) ‘Empirical testing of a risk-adjusted Hotelling
model.’ Resource and Energy Economics 18, 265–289

31
 0,8

Copper
0,6

0,4
Rate of price change

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 1 : Rate of change of the U.S. price of copper, 1870-2004

0,8

Lead
0,6

0,4
Rate of price change

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 2: Rate of change of the US price of lead, 1870-2004

32
 4,0

Zinc
3,0

2,0
Rate of price change

1,0

0,0

-1,0

-2,0
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 3: Rate of change of the US price of zinc, 1870-2004

1,0

Aluminum
0,8

0,6
Rate of price change

0,4

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4

-0,6
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 4: Rate of change of the U.S. price of aluminium, 1900-2004

33
 1,0

Tin
0,8

0,6
Rate of price change

0,4

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4

-0,6
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 5: Rate of change of the U.S. price of tin, 1880-2004

2,0

Nickel

1,5
Rate of price change

1,0

0,5

0,0

-0,5
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 6: Rate of change of the U.S. price of nickel, 1900-2004

34
 1,0

Silver
0,8

0,6

0,4
Rate of price change

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4

-0,6

-0,8
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 7: Rate of change of the U.S. price of silver, 1900-2004

0,8

Natural Gas
0,6

0,4
Rate of price change

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 8 : Rate of change of the U.S. price of natural gas, 1920-2004

35
 0,8

Coal

0,6
Rate of price change

0,4

0,2

0,0

-0,2
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 9: Rate of change of the U.S. price of coal, 1870-2004

1,0

0,8
Petroleum

0,6
Rate of price change

0,4

0,2

0,0

-0,2

-0,4

-0,6
1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

FIGURE 10: Rate of change of the U.S. price of petroleum, 1870-2004

36