Case Digest by Adonis PDF

Alliance for Alternative Action
THE ADONIS CASES 2011

propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISSUES:
PHILIPPINES (1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?

(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a constitutional convention?
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES HELD:

SECTION 27, ARTICLE 18, 1987 CONSTITUTION YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power
DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA to amend or revise the Constitution, is different from the law-making power
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987) of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: propose amendments.
FACTS: Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative
M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as
S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to
Rizal. make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
"by authority of the Minister of Local Government." authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution
antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, — they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Constitution itself .
Municipality. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their
Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority to replace them and to authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do
designate their successors. not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same
Provisional Constitution, which provided: at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws,
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such eminently political character of treaty-making power.
appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
IMBONG VS. COMELEC
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners
35 SCRA 28 (1970)
was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25,
1987. FACTS:
HELD: Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year interested in running as candidates in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
deadline under the Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed to filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the
have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as
reading: candidates.
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No.2 which called for the Constitutional Convention to propose
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and
legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating
shall supersede all previous Constitutions.”
entirely the provisions of said resolution.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional Constitution must be passed Resolution No. 4 amending the Resolution No. 2 by providing that
deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section 2, “xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates,
Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention
respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated February 8, 1987 by shall be embodied in an implementing legislation xxx”
the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
effect. implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The
ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132 to
canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the mathematical confirmation of
implement the resolution passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of
the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which Assembly?
was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when HELD:
they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite. YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a
Constitutional Convention is vested by the Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power to
enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
exclusively pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising its
SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION
comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly) may
GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the
(GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967)
Constitutional Conventions, such as the number, qualification, and
compensation of its member.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the
FACTS:
constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 are as follows:
The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first,
1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly
proposing amendments to the Constitution so as to increase the
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second,
the purpose by ¾ votes of each house in joint session
calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
assembled but voting separately.
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
2. Such grant includes all other powers essential
representative district, to be elected in the general elections. And the third,
to the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary
proposing that the same Constitution be amended so as to authorize
implication.
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become
3. Implementing details are within the authority of
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress the Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in
passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, became Republic the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which
Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary
in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from
people, at the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality
of the said law contending that the Congress cannot simultaneously
San Beda College of Law 1

Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
a Constituent Assembly has omitted. (GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971)
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the delegates
ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 15, 1973 CONSTITUTION to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions
OCCENA VS. COMELEC and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981 Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of
article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the voting age
FERNANDO, C.J.: to 18. Said resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial
FACTS: amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire
proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits Constitution.
of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as The main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No.
successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved
to revise and not to amend. by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they are in
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both contravention to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said
members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 provision, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12, ISSUE:
1981. Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention constitutional?
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is already in effect. HELD:
Whether or not the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
propose amendments. Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Whether or not the three resolutions are valid. Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well
as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith are null
HELD: and void.
1.Yes. it is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of The Court is of the opinion that in providing for the
the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the
declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1,
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the
and effect." ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,
is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together
instability was removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the
coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is
there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are
Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To
least ten cases may be cited. be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the
2. Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether
indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of
explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in
the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order
Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that of proposing enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed
amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and
to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of which presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is improper
of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article submission.
on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon
the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. 73 SCRA 333 (1976)
FACTS:
3. Yes.The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum
amendments or revision is of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“Barangay”) to resolve,
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an powers.
entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by
system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the declaring the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting
people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be and canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum-
no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring
present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no therein that the question of the continuance of martial law will be
argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the submitted for referendum at the same time as the submission of his
'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether (President) proposed amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite
the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed on October 16, 1976.
would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary
sovereign people." Injunction, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. said Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the

constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution, hence, all elective officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis. Section 4 of Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?”
Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting that the The COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition
power to propose amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for
transition period is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
under sec.16, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and
A similar action was instituted by petitioners Gonzales and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as intervenors-
Salapantan arguing that: oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
1. Even granting him legislative powers under the martial law, ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by the COMELEC.
the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents
propose amendments to the Constitution, COMELEC and Delfin’s Petition to directly propose amendments to the
2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the
of 1935 and 1973, 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments:
3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a 1. The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity, the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
4. To lift martial law, the President need not consult the people Congress. No such law has been passed.
via referendum, and 2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the
5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would amount to an Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides
amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage for the effectivity of the law after the publication in print media
to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above. indicating that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
The Solicitor General, in his comment for respondent amendments because the latter takes effect only upon ratification
COMELEC, maintains that: and not after publication.
1. Petitioners have no standing to sue 3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16,
2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial 1991 to govern the “conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
cognizance of the court initiative and referendum on national and local laws”, is ultra vires
3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent insofar as initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
President has the authority to exercise constituent power concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to
ISSUES: pass the implementing law.
Do the petitioners have the standing to sue? 4. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term
Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial? limits constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of
2. Does the President possess the power to propose the people’s initiative.
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency
proposal, in the absence of an interim National Assembly? or office of the government has realigned funds for the purpose.
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed TheSupremeCourtgaveduecoursetothispetitionand
amendments within the time frame allowed therefore a sufficient granted the Motions for Intervention filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK,
and proper submission? MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.
HELD: ISSUES:
1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the 1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined upon the theory that self-executing provision?
the expenditure of public funds by the State for the purpose of 2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of implementation of the said constitutional provision?
such funds. 3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
2. It is a judicial question. 4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national
3. YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the and local officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an
legislative functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why amendment to the Constitution?
he cannot validly discharge the function of that assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, HELD:
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not to say NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses
that the President has converted his office into a constituent congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. congressional action. While the Constitution has recognized or granted
Rather, with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the that right, the people cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever
Presidency and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute reason, does not provide for its implementation.
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for 1. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply
and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the with the power and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory
Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the Constitution. Although said
Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without Act intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to
constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover that system and
actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would accordingly provide for a local initiative required for proposing
leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the Constitutional changes.
powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent 2. NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
are mere agents of the people. Constitution is void, as expressed
4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to in the Latin maxim “Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In every
the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the
that “it shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of delegation itself is valid.
such amendment or revision.” The period from September 21 to 3. The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not
October 16, or a period of three weeks is not too short for free academic, as the proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The national officials is an amendment to the Constitution and not a
issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the people revision. Thus, the petition was granted, and the COMELEC is
have been living with permanently enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition for
5. them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficiently law
The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of
martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for the system.
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC FACTS:
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997 On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with
FACTS: other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
“Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
by People’s amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
2300. The proposed amendments consist of the submission of this The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
proposition to the people—“Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum

(12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by These three specific amendments are not stated or even
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
of the 6.3 million individuals. amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
Unicameral- Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first
submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification. shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended signed the petition.
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed
Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. CAMPOS RUEDA
Constitution through a people's initiative. (G.R. No. L-13250, Oct. 29, 1971)
HELD: FACTS:
NO. The court declared that Lambino Group's initiative is This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda,
void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the administrator of the estate of the deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of
must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the
petition." sum P161,874.95 as deficiency state and inheritance taxes, including
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira
be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among
These essential elements are present only if the full text of others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." Then came this
the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of for estate and inheritance taxes which tax liabilities were paid by
the proposed amendments. petitioner.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed . . .
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the where intangible personal properties with were claimed as exempted from
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued
every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes. In a letter dated
full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed National Internal Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the
amendments before signing. payment OF deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties . . . . In a letter
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day,
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties. However, respondent
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that denied this request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 . . . and received by
the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the
they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that demanded the payment of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories." including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from
the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity ISSUE:
and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties Is Tangier a foreign country?
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably HELD:
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against Yes. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified
their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a
gather the signatures. politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The through a government functioning under a regime of law. 9 It is thus a
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed obedience its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic
amendments. organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who to promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein
signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is to view it in the light
changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
of the proposed changes, among which are: occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of
1. The term limits on members of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
the legislature will be lifted and thus members maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it
of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely; then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming
within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver
2. The interim Parliament can similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain
continue to function indefinitely until its within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
members, who are almost all the present international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied, international
members of Congress, decide to call for new law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of Hyde did opine.
the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of their Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international
own term of office; personality petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears
3.Within45days fromthe repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958
ratification of the proposed changes, the in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, it was specifically held by us:
interim Parliament shall convene to propose "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to
section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court,
further amendments or revisions to the
that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled to exemption from the
Constitution.

inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the PVTA VS.CIR
Philippines." There can be no doubt that California as a state in the [GRN L-32052 JULY 25, 1975]
American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international
personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the FACTS:
meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Private respondents filed with the CIR a petition, alleging
their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
BACANI V. NACOCO Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to
[GRN L-9657 NOVEMBER 29, 1956] them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration denied the allegations. The then Presiding Judge
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court sustained the claims of private
FACTS: respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date
The plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case pay the same, minus what it had already paid. Petitioner claims that the
No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR as it is exercising
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of C.A.
defendant, requested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of 444, invoking the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and
the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs Cooperative Financing Administration decision, and the distinction
complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth
transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation.
for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the
amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for ISSUE: Whether or not the traditional classification of function of
said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. government as ministrant and constituent applicable in the case at bar.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor
General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of HELD:
the amounts paid. The respondents argue that National Coconut No. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the
Corporation may be considered as included in the term "Government of needs of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice.
the Republic of the Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption of the Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
legal fees provided for in Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court. exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people - these latter
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a part of the Government of the functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of
Philippines by virtue of its performance of government functions. the government."
Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: "The growing
HELD: complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
No, NACOCO does not acquire that status for the simple classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
reason that it does not come under the classification of municipal or public obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
corporation. To resolve the issue in this case requires a little digression on initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally,
the nature and functions of our government as instituted in our and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public
Constitution. To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,' continue to
defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
authority of prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted
when referring to the national government, has reference to what our as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the concerning the promotion of social justice."
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National
functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks
constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance
bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are with the laissez faire principle.
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and
are merely optional. the Resolution of respondent Court, denying a motion for reconsideration
To this latter class belongs the organization of those are hereby affirmed.
corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain
aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut
Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD
organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation (G.R. NO. L-9959, DECEMBER 13, 1916)
under the Corporation Law.
But while NACOCO was organized for the ministrant function TRENT, J.:
of promoting the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate FACTS:
power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury
to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the
and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines" used in board was appointed to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that and allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution.
government. entity through which the functions of the government are By order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was
arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be published in the Official Gazette of Manila. These were later distributed up
provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we to the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of $365,403.85.
call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de
are given a corporate personality. separate and distinct from the Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order, directed its treasurer to turn
government and 'which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their over to the former the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of
powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law $20,000 each and were received on the following dates: February 15,
and of their corporate charters. March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the
As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made, the
public corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, Philippine Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover,
46 Phil., 586- 597). "By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of
Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest. After due trial,
as respects the transactions of the corporation. Unlike the Government, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and
the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is subject to made the following contentions:
taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or that the $80,000, given to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros,
instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. were so given as a donation, and that said donation had
Springer, 50 Phil., 288.) been cleared;
that the Government of the Philippine Islands has not subrogated
the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an
important sum of money abovementioned;
that the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

the cestuis que trustent, thus, the plaintiff is not the proper
party to bring the action;
that the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH 75
Government against the defendant appellant. PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945
ISSUES: FERIA, J:
Whether or not the $80,000 received by Monte de Piedad was in form of FACTS:
donation. Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the
Whether or not the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return respondent judge be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case no.
the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was 3012 which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
wiped out on the change of sovereignty. Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the
Whether or not the Government is a proper party to the case under the islands.
doctrine of parens patriae. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and
Whether or not the Philippine Government is bound by the statute of continue the proceedings on the following grounds: (1) the proclamation
limitations. issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur had the effect of
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
HELD: courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and
1.No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte de Piedad, after setting the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;(2) the lower
forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial
absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence
$100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there be of enabling law granting such authority; (3) the government established in
transferred to it the sum of $80,000. The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de facto
the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of government.
Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the
$80,000 be given to it as a donation. ISSUES:
The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the 1. Whether the government established during the Japanese
Governor- General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the occupation was a de facto government.
Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." 2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as existing in the Philippines under the Phil. Executive Commission
March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
without interest." Thus, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not Philippines by the US and Filipino forces.
as a donation. 3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur
declaring “all laws, regulations and processes of any other
2.No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in conflict with the political government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth are
character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated al judgments and
the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.
which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and 4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which were the same
are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present courts existing prior to and continue during the Japanese military
Government. occupation of the Philippines may continue those proceedings in
From the nature and class of the subject matter, it is clear said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
that it falls within the latter class. They are laws which are not political in liberated by the US and Filipino forces and the Commonwealth of
any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the the Philippines were reestablished.
right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities
and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident HELD:
institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable 1. YES. The government established under the names of
institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines
investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of during the Japanese occupation was a civil government and a de facto
the Insular Treasurer. government of the second kind: that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
3.Yes.The ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the enemy in the course of war. The distinguishing characteristics of this
action rests on the fact that the money, being given to a charity became a kind of de facto government are; (1) that its existence is maintained by
public property, only applicable to the specific purposes to which it was active military power within the territories, and against the rightful
intended to be devoted. It is but within those limits consecrated to the authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it
public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens
happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. To deny the who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do
Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
public policy. warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Sohier vs. Mass.
General Hospital, ruled that: “insane persons and person not known, or
not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often in 2. YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that
the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and
sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this valid, and, by virtue of the well known principle of postliminy in
beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the change of international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required
3. NO. The phrase “processes of any other government” is
for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to
exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.” Chancelor
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional processes of the
Kent says: In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established
parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, consideration the fact that, according to the well-known principles of
where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.) international law, all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not
of a political complexion, of the de facto government during the
4.No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is Japanese occupation were good and valid before and remained so
stated as follows: after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have
limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or been, the intention of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in using the phrase
government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the “processes of any government” to refer to judicial processes, in
mischief to be remedied are of such a nature that the state must violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable
necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental
in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his processes other than judicial processes, or court proceedings, for
private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the according to a well-known statutory construction, statute ought never
latter is only a nominal party. to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere construction remains.
nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is 4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of the local civil and
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a
judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the
military occupation takes place, in practice, the invader does not
United States.
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is
affirmed.
6
San Beda College of Law
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the
country to which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the ISSUES:
proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the 1. Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission and the citizens were suspended during the Japanese occupation.
so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason the same 2. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for the crime of
courts, which become reestablished and conceived of as having been treason by giving aid and support to the enemy during the
in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Japanese occupation.
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the
proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of HELD:
enacting laws conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings.
1. NO. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
CONCEPT OF THE STATE enemy’s occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
PEOPLE V. GOZO sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier and if its
53 SCRA 476, OCTOBER 26, 1973 is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested
in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the
FERNANDO, J: titular government must be distinguished from the exercise of the
FACTS: rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olangapo City. She existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out
demolished the house and built another one in its place without securing a of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the
building permit from the City Mayor of Olangapo City. The City Court of so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the
Olangapo found her guilty of violating a municipal ordinance that requires exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
permit from the municipal mayor for construction of building as well as any government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
modification, repairs or demolition thereof. temporarily to the occupant; x x x and that as a corollary of the
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Gozo put in issue the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
validity of such ordinance by invoking due process. She likewise during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to
questioned the applicability of the ordinance to her in view of the location their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
of her dwelling within the naval base leased to the American Armed there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
Forces; she contended that the municipal government cannot exercise
therein administrative jurisdiction. 2. YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable
ISSUES: to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
1. Whether municipal ordinance is valid? government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were
2. Whether the municipal corporation retains its administrative still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy’s
occupation.
jurisdiction over the area where Gozo’s house was located? Just as a citizen or subject of a government or
HELD: sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant of a
1. YES, the municipal ordinance is valid. The authority to territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate or sovereign if he adheres to the
require building permits is predicated upon the general welfare clause. enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort.
Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of
public health, public morals, public safety, and the well being and good
order of the community. CONCEPT OF THE STATE
2. YES, the municipal corporation retains its administrative

RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF 75
PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 1946
jurisdiction over the said area. By the agreement, the Philippine TUASON, J:
Government merely consents that the United States exercise FACTS:
jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given purely as a matter During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner, Ramon
of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government has not Ruffy, a Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, retreated in
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy. He organized and led
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area. The said Bolo
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Area was a contingent of the 6 th Military District, which has been
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of recognized and placed under the operational control of the US Army in the
such offenses. The Philippine jurisdiction retains not only jurisdictional South Pacific.
rights not granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of command
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. in the Bolo Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting as Commanding Officer
Moreover, the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, is for the Bolo Area was relieved of his position. Later on or on October 19,
the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity 1944, Lieut. Col Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. It was this
of legal self- determination and self-restriction. x x x A state is not murder which gave rise to petitioner’s trial.
precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of The trial court convicted petitioner and he now filed this
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by instant petition with the contention that he was not subject to military law
no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien at the time the offense for which he had been placed on trial was
character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject committed. Petitioners contended that by the enemy occupation of the
to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be dimished, but it does not Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed and governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of
forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. they are not War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation.
and cannot be foreign territory. He also assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War which provides
that “any person subject to military law who commits murder in the time of
war should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may
CONCEPT OF THE STATE direct.” Petitioner argued that the said law was in violation of Article VII,
LAUREL V. MISA section 2 of the Constitution since 93d of Article of War fails to allow a
77 PHIL 856, JANUARY 30, 1947 review by the Supreme Court of judgments of courts martial imposing
death or life imprisonment.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS: ISSUES:
Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio Laurel, herein petitioner, a 1. Whether petitioner was subject to military law at the time the
Filipino citizen, was arrested by the US Army and was interned, under a alleged offense was committed.
commitment order “for his active collaboration with the Japanese during 2. Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.
the Japanese occupation”. He was charged with treason as defined and
penalized by Art. 114 of the Penal Code. But in September 1945, he was HELD:
turned over to the Commonwealth government and since then he has 1. YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the time the
been under the custody of the Director of Prisons.
Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus mainly alleged offense was committed. The rule that laws of political nature or
asserting that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not
thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of bind the enemies in arms.
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the
Republic. officers and men of the Philippine army did not cease to be fully in the

service, though, in a measure, only in measure, they were not subject The most significant recommendation of the Commission
to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter was for the deceased and other victims of Mendiola incident to be
case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as compensated by the government.
prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of breach of the Due to the recommendation, petitioners filed a formal letter
discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty x x x; but for an act of demand for compensation from the government to which the latter did
unbecoming of a gentleman or an act which constitutes an offense of not take heed. The group then instituted an action for damages against the
the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be Republic of the Philippines together with military officers and personnel
legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial. involved in Mendiola incident.
Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of appointments as Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as
officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6 th against the Republic of the Philippines on the basis that there was no
Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army
waver by the state. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
amenable to the Articles of War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and
the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of a ISSUE:
duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order waived its immunity
Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the Articles of War which
provides for persons subject to military law. from suit?
2. YES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does HELD:

NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission does
not violate Article VII, section 2 of the Constitution which provides that not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the state. In
“the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of action on the event that
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed any party decides to litigate his or her claim. The commission is merely a
is death or life imprisonment”. Court Martial are agencies of executive preliminary venue.
character, and one of the authorities “for ordering of courts martial has Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President
been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President Aquino may have said or done, the same are not tantamount to the state
as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation”. Unlike courts of having waived its immunity from suit.
law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in
x x x court martial are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive this case, as when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative
power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in official action on the part of the state nor the affirmative discharge of any
Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and obligation which belongs to the state in its political capacity, even though
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his the officers or agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only
authorized military representatives. by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE 94 PHIL 504 (1954)
IMMUNITY FACTS:
Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action against defendant
Isaias Fernando, Director of Bureau of Public Works for unlawfully taking
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY possession of portions of her three parcels of land and causing the
SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II construction of irrigation canal without obtaining right of way and without
162 SCRA 88 (1988) her consent or knowledge.
The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff Festejo. On appeal,
FACTS: defendant Fernando invoked his being a public officer of the government
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers of the Philippines and thus, enjoys immunity from suit and should be
(deceased) were both employed as game room attendants in the special absolved from liability for damages.
services department of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA). They were
ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from suit?
advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-
time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion
HELD:
and to institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer recommended
NO. Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is
the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
back wages. personally liable and may be sued as any other citizen and held
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Commanding answerable for whatever injury.
Officer of Subic Naval Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director
of NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation and asked for its
rejection.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Moreau, even before the start of the grievance hearings,
U.S.A VS. GUINTO
sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the
(G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)
private respondent’s status and requested concurrence therewith.
Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the
CRUZ, J.
letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule
FACTS:
and had caused them mental anguish, and prejudgment of the grievance
In the first case, the private respondents are suing several
proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. They
officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with
make it clear that petitioners were being sued in their personal capacity. A
the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the
base.
petitioner and was denied. In the second case, private respondents filed a complaint for
ISSUE: Were the petitioners performing their official duties when they did damages against private petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S.
Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.
the acts for which they are being sued for damages?
In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as
HELD: a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy-bust
YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the operation conducted by the individual petitioners, officers of the U.S. Air
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators.
discharge of their official duties. Sanders as director of the special He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners
services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.
personnel including the private respondents and had a hand in their In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was filed by the
private respondents against the private petitioners, for injuries allegedly
employment, work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related
sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.
matters. The act of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by him
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them
as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval
and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their
Personnel in matters involving the special department of NAVSTA.
bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY These cases have been consolidated because they all
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was
220 SCRA 124 (1993) not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
FACTS: It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12 rallyists
died in their quest for “genuine agrarian reform”, President Aquino issued ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not applicable
Administrative Order No.11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola thereby making the State liable
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation for the
HELD:
disorders, death and casualties that took place.

8
NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable.
It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an implied consent
of the evidence, which have been carefully examined. by the State to be sued because it was intended to professionalize the
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being industry and to standardized the salaries of the security guards. It is
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule merely incidental to the purpose of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate
is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and the organization and operation of private security agencies.
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not The State is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the sued when it enters into a contract. However, it does not apply where
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish the contact relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
them - between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. (G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of TRENT, J.
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. FACTS:
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to owned by the Philippine General Hospital. A driver employed by the
be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this No. 2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was then
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the responsibility for the
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. collision solely on the ambulance driver and determined the amount of
There is no question that the United States of America, like damages to be awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from the
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity, as in the rendering the amount against the government.
cases at bar. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. A State may ISSUE: Whether or not defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be its immunity from suit as well as conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters enacted Act No. 2457
into business contracts.
The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil HELD:
Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its
The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff,
officers are designated "special agents," the United States government or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any
should be liable for their torts. cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject
and liability and a misconception that the two terms are synonymous. to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for
applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special
suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. special official. The special agent acts in representation of the state and
When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility
suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his
allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
even if he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise
its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical
The complaints against the petitioners in the court below office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
were aptly dismissed. by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.

SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE, INC. VS CA SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
(G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992) AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
(G.R. NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972)
FACTS:
A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act on the MAKALINTAL, J.
request by petitioner seeking to set aside the findings of PADPAO FACTS:
expelling it from PADPAO and considering its application for renewal of its Amigable is the registered owner of a lot covered by a
license even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO. A Motion Transfer Certificate of Title, where no annotation in favor of the
to Dismiss was filed invoking that it is a suit against the State which had government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of
not given its consent. the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango
ISSUES: and Gorordo Avenues.
Whether or not the action taken by the petitioners is a suit against It appears that said avenues already existed since 1921. In
the State. 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
Whether of not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are liable in their requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated
private capacities. by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as an disallowed it. Amigable then filed in the court a quo a complaint against
implied consent of the State to be sued the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
HELD: possession of the land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA being She also sought the payment of compensatory damages for the illegal
instrumentalities of the State exercising the governmental function of occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective the suit. The Government had not given its consent to be sued.
watchmen or security guard agencies. Even if its action prospers, the
payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government
did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for the purpose. under the facts of the case
No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called HELD:
to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official YES. Where the government takes away property from a
duties, without malice, gross negligence or bad faith, no recovery may private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
be held against them in their private capacities. expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the
9
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985, which dismissed the
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with then Court of First
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the Land
such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177
defined in the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac,
regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question
unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952,
what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is not too followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola
much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco
which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took
a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein
could still be appropriately invoked. and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by
the Director of Lands on October 24,1954.
On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
204 SCRA 212 (1991) Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its
FACTS: successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco and Dominador Santiago, et al. property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom.
Private respondents jointly moved “to strike out some Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the
portions of the complaint and for bill of particulars of other portions”, which property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of
motion was opposed by the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest
45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations. be declared legally valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to
Private respondents then presented a “Motion to leave to file cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court”.
The Sandiganbayan denied private respondents’ motions. ISSUE:
Private respondents filed an Answer to with Compulsory Whether or not the State can be sued for recovery and
Counterclaim. In response, the PCGG presented a “Reply to Counterclaim possession of a parcel of land
with Motion to Dismiss compulsory counterclaim.” HELD:
Private respondents filed a pleading denominated A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not
“Interrogatories to Plaintiff”, and “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as permitted, except upon a showing that the State hasconsented to be sued,
well as a motion for production and inspection of documents. either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of
respectively. sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed instrictissimi
The PCGG moved for reconsideration, arguing that the juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act.
documents are privileged in character since they are intended to be used The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
against the PCGG and/or its Commission in violation of Sec.4 of EO No. 1, authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the
V12: legislative body. Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed out by the Solicitor
a) No civil action shall lie General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the
against the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a
Commission or any "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the
member thereof for duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo
anything done or Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was
omitted in the authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly
discharge of the task made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave
contemplated by this doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria"
Order. relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said
b) No member or staff by document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only
the Commission shall 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano
be required to testify or comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares.
produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative
or administrative
proceedings THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
concerning matter UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ
within its official 136 SCRA 487 (1985)
cognizance.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions. The first, FACTS:
denying reconsideration of the Resolution allowing production of the Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its
documents, and the second, reiterating, by implication the permission to wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded
serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff. to the invitation and submitted bids. Said company was requested by
telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit? company, and from which it complied.
Later, the United States, through its agents, informed said
HELD: company that it was not qualified to receive an award at the project for the
NO. The state is of course immune from suit in the sense poorly completed projects it awarded to third parties. The company sued
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic petitioner for specific performance and if no longer possible, for damages.
that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds It also asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The from entering into contracts with others.
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while The United States entered a special appearance for the
assuming of an act for the State. The suggestion that the State makes no purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
implied waiver of immunity by filing a suit except when in doing so it acts matter of the complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject
in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non- governmental capacity, matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
is unacceptable. It attempts a distinction without support in principle or defendants as agents of the defendant United States of America, a foreign
precedent. On the contrary, “the consent of the State to be sued may be sovereign which has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit for
given expressly or impliedly.” Express consent may be manifested either the cause of action asserted in the complaint.
through a general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the US filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The trial
State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract. court denied the motion and issued a writ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO FELICIANO ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued?
AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. 70853; MARCH 12, 1987 HELD:
No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State
FACTS: from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or

waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of On the other hand, this Court has considered the following
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis:
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA
result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA
States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
[1984].) governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and
Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts
individual and can be thus deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they
sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign may be.
functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state
which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be
undisputed a function of the government of the highest order, they are not the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a
shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession
of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired, As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been
vacated. "There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only
THE HOLY SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO JR when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no
238 SCRA 524 (1994) such waiver may be implied."
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands
FACTS: in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction
Lot 5-A is registered under the name of the petitioner The can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has
Holy See. This lot is contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D registered in the name denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5- A were made
of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). These three lots were sold for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission
through an agent Msgr. Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon Licup. Licup or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to
assigned his rights to private respondent Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI). dispute said claim.
Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute Under Art.31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of eviction and Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil
clearing the land. SSEI insists that petitioner should clear the property of and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
the squatters. Petitioner refused and proposed that either SSEI undertake relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
the eviction or that the earnest money be returned. Msgr. Cirilos returned receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for
the P100,000.00 earnest money, and the property was sold to Tropicana the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic
Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). envoy with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards
SSEI filed suit for annulment of sale, specific performance the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
and damages against Msgr. Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana. Moreover the Department of the Foreign Affairs has formally
The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of intervened and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. It was denied on the duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines
ground that petitioner “shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the and as such is exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights,
business contract” in question. privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this court.
A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this The determination of the executive arm of the government
special civil action for certiorari. that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts. Where
ISSUE: Did the Holy See properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non- the plea of immunity is reacquired and affirmed by the executive branch, it
suability? is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s foreign
HELD: relations.
YES. In the case at bar, lot 5-A was acquired as a donation
from the archdiocese of Manila for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nuniciature in the Philippines. The subsequent disposal was made THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
because the squatters living thereon made it impossible for petitioner to REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
use it for the purpose of the donation. Petitioner did not sell lot 5-A for 54 SCRA 84 (1973)
profit or gain.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, FACTS:
each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a Republic of the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation. After the decision
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with became final and executory, respondent judge issued an order directing
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to the sheriff to execute the said decision, and the corresponding alias writ of
private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 execution was thus issued.
SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several
Law 194 [1984]). banks especially the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine
the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has Veterans Bank received such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller,
created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public funds for the
which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and civilian personnel.
a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings,
or an act jure imperii. challenges the validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of decision final and executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of
sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with execution directed against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with
respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized ISSUE:
business activities and international trading. May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against
This Court has considered the following transactions by a public funds?
foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a
foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers HELD:
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by
the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of private parties, there is corollary that public funds cannot be the object of
America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been
employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). previously granted and the state’s liability has been adjudged.

Thus in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment would lie. The
Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Supreme Court, in a case brought by the same petitioner precisely
Teehankee. The universal rule that where the state gives its consent to be invoking such doctrine, left no doubt that the funds of a public corporation
sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment.
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the It is well settled that when the government enters into
stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends when the commercial business, its abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
judgment is rendered, since the government funds and properties may not treated like any other corporation. (Manila Hotel Employees Association
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such vs. Manila Hotel Company)
judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific object is
appropriated by law.

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC 110 SCRA 460 (1981)
227 SCRA 693 (1993)
FACTS:
FACTS: During the height of the infamous typhoon Kading, the NPC,
The DAR and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or
for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental caused to be opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat
entity. Several guards of the agency assigned to the petitioner’s premises Dam. The many unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood filed with the
filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13 th month respondent court eleven complaints for damages against the NPC and
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and Benjamin Chavez. NPC filed separate answers to each of the eleven
overtime pay as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration, complaints and invoked in each answer a special and affirmative defense
against the petitioner and the agency. The Executive Labor arbiter that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely
rendered a decision finding the petitioner and the agency jointly and governmental function. Hence, it cannot be sued without the express
severally liable for the payment of the money claims. The decision became consent of the State. The respondent court dismissed the case on the
final and executory. The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of execution grounds that said defendant performs a purely governmental function in
which resulted in the property of the petitioner being levied. The petitioner the operation of the Angat Dam and cannot therefore be sued for damages
asserts the rule of non-suability of the State. in the instant cases in connection therewith.
ISSUE: ISSUE: Was the NPC performing a governmental function with respect to
Can the Department of Agriculture be sued under the contract entered the management and operation of the Angat Dam?
with the agency?
HELD:
HELD: YES. However, it is not necessary to determine whether
YES. The basic postulate under Art. X section 3 of the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management
Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent” is not and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government
absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed itself
circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned
conveys “that the State may not be sued without its consent.” Its import and controlled corporation, it has personality of its own, distinct and
then is that the State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be separate from that of the government. Moreover, the charter provision that
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through the NPC can sue and be sued in any court is without qualification on the
a general law waiving the immunity of the State from suit which is found in cause of action as the one instituted by the petitioners.
Act 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as basis of civil action between THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
private parties.” Implied consent on the other hand, is conceded when the BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES
State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to counterclaim or ASSOCIATION
when it enters into a contract. 1 SCRA 340 (1961)
In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested FACTS:
itself of its sovereign immunity. The rule relied upon by the NLRC is not, Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case
however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, and
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability. Distinction must still Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that Salvador and Ledesma
be made between one which was executed in the exercise of its sovereign have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the instant coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the
case, the petitioner has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned self-organization, and by discriminating in regard to hiring and tenure of
contract, not that it could have in fact performed any act proprietary in their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their union
character, but be that as it may, the claims of private respondents arising activities. Answering the complaint, Salvador and Ledesma denied the
from the contract for security services clearly constitute money claims for charges, and contended that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
which Act 3083 gives the consent of the state to be sued. personality to sue and be sued.
However, when the State gives its consent to be sued, it
does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestricted execution against ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued?
it. When the State waives immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the
other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has any liability. HELD:
NO. As a government office, without any juridical capacity, it
cannot be sued.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality of the
PNB VS. PABALAN government; it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
83 SCRA 595 (1978) Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing needs of the government. It is
primarily a service bureau. It is obviously not engaged in business or
FACTS: occupation for pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its
A judgment was rendered against Philippine Virginia appropriations are provided for in the budget. It is not subject to the
Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.
execution followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing
respondent PVTA which were deposited with the Philippine National Bank would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the government
(PNB). PNB objected on the constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of itself. The government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
a state. It alleged that such funds are public in character. its objection.
ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct?

HELD: MOBIL PHILS. EXPLORATION, INC. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE
NO. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution, SERVICE
what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law 18 SCRA 1120 (1966)
has been set forth in express terms: “The State may not be sued without
its consent.” If the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or FACTS:
offices in the government, then, certainly such a provision would lie a bar Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad
consigned to Mobil Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later delivered to
12
the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for
Philippines Exploration Inc. the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La Union and
filed suit in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. The
of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered cases plus other complaint against the driver and the owner of the passenger jeep was
damages. dismissed.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new
the ground that not being a person under the law, defendants cannot be trial. However, respondent judge issued another order denying the motion
sued. for reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of time. Hence,
After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed this petition.
the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor
the Bureau of Customs is suable. ISSUE: Whether the municipality is liable for the tort committed by its
employee?
ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be
sued? HELD:
NO. The test of liability of the municipality depends on
HELD: whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing
NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery governmental or proprietary functions. It has already been remarked that
of the national government in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
to express legislative mandate and a necessary incident of its prime competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not
governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
contrary. functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
from that of the government. Its primary function is governmental, that of sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant
assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or
other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To this that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this,
function, arrastre is a necessary incident. Although said arrastre function is the claimants cannot recover.
deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the primary and In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the municipality insists that he was on his way to Naguilan River to get a load
same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For of sand and gravel for the repair of the San Fernando municipal street.
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the
end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end. dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
After careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence,
we arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS COURT OF APPEALS discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger,
167 SCRA 28 (1988) tragic and deplorable though, it may be imposed on the municipality no
duty to pay the monetary compensation.
FACTS:
Ernest Simke went to Manila International Airport to meet his
future son-in-law. While walking towards the viewing deck or the terrace to THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
get a better view of the incoming passengers, he slipped over an elevation MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN VS. FERNANDEZ
about four inches high, and he fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. 130 SCRA 56 (1984)
He filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with FACTS:

the CFI of Rizal against the Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of Bulacan rendered
entity empowered to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain, and judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to respondents
develop the MIA. Judgment was rendered in his favor, and on appeal to Imperio, et al. When the judgment became final, respondent judge issued
the Court of Appeals, judgment was affirmed. a writ of execution to satisfy the same. Petitioner municipality filed a
motion to quash the writ on the ground that the municipality’s property or
funds are public exempt from execution. The motion was denied. The
ISSUE: Whether the CAA, being an agency of the government, can be respondent judge issued another order requiring both the municipal and
made a party defendant? provincial treasurer to comply with the money judgment. When the
treasurers failed to do so, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest
HELD: and that they will be released upon compliance, hence the present
YES. Not all government entities whether corporate or not petition.
are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character
of the objects for which the entity was organized. The CAA is not immune ISSUE: Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of the
from suit it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It is Provincial and Municipal Treasurers of Bulacan and San Miguel,
engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative respectively are public funds which are exempt from execution?
of the state, may more than the construction of public roads, be
undertaken by private concerns. The CAA was created not to maintain a HELD:
necessity of the government, but to run what is essentially a business YES. Municipal funds in possession of municipal and
even if the revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of provincial treasurers are public funds exempt from execution. The reason
travel and the convenience of the traveling public. for those was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois
‘that are held in trust for the people intended and used for the accomplices
of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created and that to
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. JUDGE FIRME impede, even defeat and in some instance destroy said purpose.” Thus it
195 SCRA 692 (1991) is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel as well as those in the possession of
FACTS: the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan are also public funds and as such they
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, is a are exempt from execution.
municipality corporation. Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded Besides PD 447, known as the Decree on Local Fiscal
in his official capacity as the presiding judge, while private respondents Administration, provides in section 3 (a) that “no money shall be paid out
are heirs of the deceased Laureano Banina, Sr. of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a specific statutory authority.” Otherwise stated, there must be a
passenger jeep, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck of the corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union which was driven by Alfredo the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid
Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeep including Banina, out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan
Sr. died. has passed any ordinance to this effect.
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages
against the owner and driver of the passenger jeep. However, the
aforesaid defendant filed a third party complaint against the petitioner and THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
the driver of the dump truck of the petitioner. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Thereafter, the private respondents amended the complaint 190 SCRA 206 (1990)
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were FACTS:
impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner
raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance
of the state, prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building System and Reality Corp., and
owner and driver of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the Arceli P. Jo involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at
collision. San Antonio Village, Makati.

An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to the Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may
petitioner’s complaint was a certification that a bank account had been be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.
opened with the PNB. After the decision has become final and executory,
a writ of execution was issued and a notice of garnishment was served HELD:
upon the manager of PNB where the petitioner had bank accounts. Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means
However, the sheriff was informed that a hold code was placed on the of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant
account of the petitioner. in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or
The petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB cocked garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution for to do so would result in government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of
the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
under the law. whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may
In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB, one appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a
exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property with the state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment
outstanding balance of P99, 743. 94. The other account was for the is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
obligations and other purposes of the municipal government with a ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
balance of P170,098,421.72. judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the
state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
ISSUE: Whether the bank account of a municipality may be levied on judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature
execution to satisfy a money judgment against it absent showing that the will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the
municipal council has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-
funds an amount corresponding to the balance due to the RTC decision? defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally
HELD: enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan
YES. Since the first PNB account was specifically opened for already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992,
expropriation proceedings it has initiated over the subject property, there is allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus
no objection to the garnishment or levy under execution of funds therein interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment
amounting to P4,965,506.40, the funds garnished in excess of of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government. Other statutory obligations are exempted from execution
without the proper appropriation required under the law. ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL
The funds deposited in the 2nd PNB account are public funds
of the municipal government. The rule is well-settled that public funds are PRINCIPLES AND STATE
not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided by the
statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or POLICIES
personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold
on execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN
governmental activities and functions of the municipality are exempt from (39 PHIL 778)
execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar.
This is not to say that private respondents are left with no FACTS:
legal recourse. When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, for
reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the best of all reasons, to exterminate vise, ordered the segregated district
the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the the City of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their houses
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. The court will not in the district by the police. At about midnight of October 25, the police,
condone petitioner’s blatant refusal to settle its obligation arising from an acting pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police and Justo
expropriation proceeding it has in fact initiated. Within the context of the Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
state’s inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers “Corregidor” and
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the “Negros”. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its Mindanao. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
taking. The state’s power of eminent domain should be exercised within Davao during the night of October 25, 1918.
the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that
valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid is fixed, ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of the City of Manila is
and the municipal has had more than reasonable time to pay full constitutional.
compensation.
HELD:
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE The Supreme Court condemned the mayor’s act.
G.R. NO. 107271; SEPTEMBER 10, 2003 Respondent’s intention to suppress the social evil was commutable. But
his methods were unlawfull.
FACTS: Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippines in
In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the conformity with an act of Congress. The Governor- General can order the
position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. One can
Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the
abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Police of that City to
reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their force citizens of the Philippine Islands, and these women despite their
back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the being in a sense, lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guarantees as
P75,083.37 as partial payment of her backwages. The others were paid other citizens.
in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries Law defines power. The law is the only supreme power in
(supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to
back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which gives itself and
auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.
The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the The fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of
validity of the sale of motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the
sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of
5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the
plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to commonwealth may be “government of laws and not of men”.
release the check but the City Treasurer can’t do so because the Mayor
refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the
Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of
Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to KURODA VS. JALANDONI
PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for 83 PHIL. 171
any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the
city. FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese
ISSUE: Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944,

who is now charged before a Military Commission with having unlawfully belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state
control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant who committed crimes against our people.
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the
laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish
the illegality of EO No. 68, which established a National War Crimes ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Offices and provides that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried AGUSTIN VS. EDU
by military commission; and to permanently prohibit respondents from 88 SCRA 195
proceeding with the case of petitioner.
Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it FACTS:
violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local A presidential letter of instruction (LOI) prescribing the use of
laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor triangular reflectorized early warning devices to prevent vehicular
an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering accidents was assailed for the lack of a legislative enactment that would
Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of `crimes' not based on authorize the issuance of said LOI. The petition quoted two whereas
law, national and international. Hence, petitioner argues — "That in view of clauses of the assailed LOI: [Whereas], the hazards posed by such
the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies
unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner." and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the
said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for
laid down on The Hague and Geneva Conventions notwithstanding that it the installation of road safety signs and devices.
is not a signatory thereto and whether it can create a Military Commission
to try violations of the Hague Convention? ISSUE: Whether or not a legislative enactment is necessary in order to
authorize the issuance of said LOI based on the 1968 Vienna Convention
HELD: on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.).
Yes. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office
and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war HELD:
criminals, was issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th day Not anymore. The petition must be dismissed for lack of merit. It cannot be
of July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. disputed that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, * * *." The
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to
law of the nation." which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands
in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of of international morality.
the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention
and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, 101 PHIL. 1155
in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization,
are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and FACTS:
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated several treaties which
of international law which are part of our Constitution. under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of
international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith.
The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President
of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is
by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs. Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
1 when we said accepted principles of international law.
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation HELD:
of armed hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given
disposed of as in time of war. `An important incident to a conduct of war is by the Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the
the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the
defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those medium of a treaty or a contract.
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual
violated the law of war.' (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of
language of a writer, a military commission `has jurisdiction so long as a the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
technical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armistice, personality and insures its security and future.
or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of peace, and Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the
may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.' (Cowls, Trial of War Criminals disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)" national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control;
Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and state, through which and by which it protects its own personality and
punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
Executive Order No. 68. protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is
to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the
law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the
the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected;
the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
the recognition of rules and principles of international law as subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or treaty or any other conventional agreement.
shall be a signatory.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly GONZALES VS. HECHANOVA
committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, 9 SCRA 230
and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with
Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the FACTS:

Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation HELD:
of tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Petitioner No. It is clear, under Article 1 of the Treaty, that the privileges
Gonzales - a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn provided therein are made expressly subject to the laws and, regulations
Planters Association filed this petition, averring that, in making or of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9,
respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone
jurisdiction", because RA No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first
RA No. 2207 - explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by successfully pass the required bar examinations.
"the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government Moreover, the Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
agency.” desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain
Respondent contended among others that the Government desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a
of the Philippines has already entered into two contracts for the purchase Filipino Citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines.
of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
agreements under international law; that such agreements became Philippines.
binding and effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic
thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to
on the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law
should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
each other, the conflict must be resolved - under the American Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of
jurisprudence - in favor of the one which is latest in point of time. the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents, in attempting to import foreign such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines .
rice, are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD: ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Yes. The respondents acted without jurisdiction or in excess PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA
of jurisdiction. It is respondents contend that the Government of the 66 PHIL 13, 1938
Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of
rice, one with the Republic of Viet Nam, and another with the Government FACTS:
of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with
under international law; that such agreements became binding and and convicted of refusal to register for military training as required by the
effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; above-mentioned statute. On appeal, Zosa argued that he was fatherless
that in case of conflict between Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the and had a mother and eight brothers to support, while Lagman alleged
one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter that he had a father to support, had no military leanings, and did not wish
should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with to kill or be killed; and both claimed that the statute was unconstitutional.
each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American
jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that ISSUE: Whether or not the the National Defense Law is valid, under which
petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to the accused were sentenced.
foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot
interfere; and that the aforementioned contracts have already been HELD:
consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed their conviction, holding
price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in that the law in question was based on the afore-cited constitutional
favor of the sellers of said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense. principle.
The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional
parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty
executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the The right of the Government to require compulsory military
American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal
without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement 64 PHIL 201
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a
between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
but, also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory International Eucharistic Congress.
may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies
signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third
regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the Church. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent
system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the
constitutional set up and that of the United States. postage for printing
ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?

IN RE: GARCIA HELD:
2 SCRA 984, 1961 In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of
Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act.
FACTS: No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature.
Under the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
Professions between the Philippines and Spain, nationals of each of the What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
two countries who have obtained the required degrees can practice their when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
professions within the territory of the other. Efren Garcia, a Filipino, the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
finished law in the University of Madrid, Spain and was allowed to practice Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does
the law profession therein. He invokes the treaty in order for him to be not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
allowed to practice in the Philippines without taking the bar examinations. property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by
ISSUE: the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Whether or not the Treaty can modify regulations governing admission to Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
Philippine Bar. particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not

issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the
of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn
the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940,
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the
and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
their owners but of the riding public as well.
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations
of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
There is no violation of the principle of separation of church National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
and state. The issuance and sale of the stamps in question maybe said to state.
be separably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim and ISSUE: Whether the rules & regulations promulgated pursuant to the
purpose of the government (to promote tourism).
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 considered as constitutional?
HELD: Yes. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
TARUC VS. DE LA CRUZ
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
G.R. NO. 144801; MARCH 10, 2005
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of
CORONA, J.:
the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
FACTS:
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Due to petitioners’ adamant drive to the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
create dissension within the diocese by celebrating their own open mass welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
without participation from the parish priest, Bishop de la Cruz declared business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
Church. The good Bishop did so as a last resort, as he first pleaded to the health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218).
petitioners’ to cease from riling up the community against the diocese. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall
Cruz before the Regional Trial Court. They contended that their expulsion into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
process of law. the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The
ISSUE:
moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so
Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case
much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the
involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty
institution?
HELD: is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The Court rules that they do not have such jurisdiction. The Petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.
their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of
“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
possession of church property.” economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil rights in the the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
present case. interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES populi est suprema lex.
ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS
78 SCRA 194, 1977
70 Phil. 726, 1940
FACTS:
FACTS:
Respondent Gonzales is a share tenant of Angeles et al., on
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
land devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. The landowners sold the
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
property to petitioners Almeda without notifying respondent in writing of
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
the sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds. Respondent
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from
thus sued for redemption before the CAR.
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30
Petitioners counter that long before the execution of the
p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending
deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7
the sale of the land to respondent but the latter said that he had no money;
a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of
that respondent, instead, went personally to the house of petitioners and
the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public
land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that respondent is a mere dummy
Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
of someone deeply interested in buying the land; that respondent made to
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the time he filed the
548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of
complaint for redemption.
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules
The Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first respondent to redeem the land for P24,000.00, the said amount to be

deposited by him with the Clerk of Court within 15 days from receipt of the evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of
decision. compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or disability
On appeal, the CA affirmed the assailed decision. Their arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim.
review. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award,
merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this
ISSUE: Is there a tenant's right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands? Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. What was said in
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is not
amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private
HELD: respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate
Yes. Among those exempted from the automatic conversion accorded the Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme
to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land of social justice and protection to labor." No other judicial attitude may be
Reform Code in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which
Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states: " Agricultural share antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and
tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby declared protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on
contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted to resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in
agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. . . . Provided, frustrating such a national policy." To be more specific, the principle of
That in order not to jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between a
to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
separate proclamation by the President upon recommendation of the resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand
department head that adequate provisions, such as the organization of from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is
cooperatives marketing agreement, or similar other workable not equality but protection.”
arrangements, have been made to insure efficient management on all
matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the processing
phases of such crops . . ."
Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by marketing ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
allotments. In other words, this section recognizes share tenancy in sugar SALONGA VS. FARRALES
lands until after a special proclamation is made, which proclamation shall 105 SCRA 359, 1981
have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants FACTS:
in the lands affected will become agricultural lessees at the beginning of Defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of
the agricultural year next succeeding the year in which the proclamation is residential land. Even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales of the
made. But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the law land aforesaid, plaintiff Salonga was already in possession as lessee of
denying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption some 156 square meters thereof, on which she had erected a house,
under the Code. paying rentals thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant
The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it Farrales.
does not exclude the other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-payment of rentals
of pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are against plaintiff. Judgment was later rendered in favor of defendant
exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and Farrales and ordering the therein defendants, including plaintiff herein and
tenancy system prevailing, implying that in other matters the right of pre- her husband, to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in
emption and redemption which does not refer to the consideration of the arrears.
tenancy the provisions of the Code apply. Thus, Section 35 states: Evidence showed that plaintiff offered to purchase from said
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of defendant the land in dispute, but, defendant, despite the fact that said
fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable persistently
cacao, coffee, durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the refused such offer, and instead, insisted to execute the judgment rendered
approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy system in the ejectment case.
prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant Farrales
Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended." praying the latter be ordered to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, question.
property ownership is impressed with social function. Property use
must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. ISSUE: Is the plaintiff entitled for specific performance?
The State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private HELD:
property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." No. If plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid
One governmental policy of recent date projects the emancipation of persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious that no meeting of the
tenants from the bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the minds took place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale,
ownership of the land they till. This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of was ever perfected between them.
October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers "of private agricultural Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of
lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease- perfection, and there is here no perfected contract at all, it goes without
tenancy, whether classified as landed estates or not" shall be deemed saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce against defendant
"owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not Farrales, and the fact that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of
irrigated and there (3) hectares if irrigated." the land to other lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein, does not
change the situation because, as to said other lessees, a perfected
contract existed which is not the case with plaintiff.
It must be remembered that social justice cannot be
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under our
ONDOY VS. IGNACIO Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice
97 SCRA 611, 1980 consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from
a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently,
FACTS: the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and
Petitioner Estrella Ondoy filed a claim for compensation for contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Court to grant.
the death of her son, Jose Ondoy, who drowned while in the employ of
respondent Virgilio Ignacio. Respondent moved to dismiss on the ground
of lack of employer-employee relationship. However, during the hearing of ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the case, respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO
and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased, a fisherman, was in that G.R. No. L-47841, October 7, 2008
ship, undeniably a member of the working force, but after being invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. FACTS:
The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security
respondent employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.
Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. and Temporary Restraining Order to stop herein petitioners and/or their
That the deceased died in line of Duty." The hearing officer or referee officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
dismissed the claim for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was duly basic rights and enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein
filed, but the then Secretary of Labor, denied such motion for petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them
reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence this petition for review. of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for compensation was validly dismissed. While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein
HELD: petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing
There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that Petition as Amparo Petition.
the deceased was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August
with the shipping enterprise of private respondent. Even without such 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a person “emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his
decision in favor of herein respondents. Hence, this appeal. life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right
This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective not only by a deprivation of life but also of
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.”
After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in
the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy permutations of the exercise of this right.
Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU). First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In its “whereas”
The abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates
sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men aspiration of the common people.” emphasis supplied) Some scholars
based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle, but
auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la essentially an individual international human right.[124] It is the “right to
Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.”
Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the
abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126]
Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and emphasis supplied)
George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the
the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was for the right to security of person, viz:
the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of
the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as
abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the are established by law. emphasis supplied)
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided
version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
he perfunctorily investigate. wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
Gen. Palparan’s participation in the abduction was also action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless
established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners’ captivity at to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to
them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the
Gen. Palparan’s direct and personal role in the abduction might not have “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the
been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his earlier part of the provision.
command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
process of law and without probable cause. psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be
of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in
of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute
they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
they assert that they are not “free in every sense of the word” as degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
their “movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against
have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held person.
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
threaten respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security.” integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim
Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
violation of their right to security of person. human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of
Elaborating on the “right to security, in general,” respondents the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
point out that this right is “often associated with liberty;” it is also seen as psychological invasion, viz:
an “expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel
and unusual punishment.” Conceding that there is no right to security (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means
expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under
their rights “to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
detention and solitary detention places fall under the general coverage of solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo.” They submit that
the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate
person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity -
which enunciates that, “The State values the dignity of every human nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” “freedom from threat” as afore-discussed.
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action
consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of
right to security. persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of
enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
ISSUE: Whether the Petition for issuance of Writ Amparo should be should all the more be protected from these degradations.
granted?
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right
HELD: Yes. While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights
guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the
all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: “The life to which each physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived provides, viz: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ...” (emphases supplied)
life and property… pervades the whole history of man. It touches every Article 3, on the other hand, provides that “(n)o one shall be subjected to
aspect of man’s existence.” In a broad sense, the right to security of torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Although

the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right
baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
viz: obligations.
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic
authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
circumstances in question. 82 SCRA 191, 1978
xxx xxx xxx
FACTS:
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr. filed an application for the
the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the preliminary examination
into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied) which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless
formality as respondent Municipal Judge failed to meet the strict standard
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable
has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of cause. He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that
women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz: tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail
imposed was clearly excessive. It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the
…gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general It was later ascertained that the petitioner is a seventeen
international law or under specific human rights conventions is year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the child and Youth
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Welfare Code.
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights
and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s application for release should be
granted.
Third , the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s
rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is HELD:
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Yes. As a minor, he could be provisionally released on
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as recognizance in the discretion of a court. This Court should, whenever
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code,
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate.
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being."
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under
threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
justice. 224 SCRA 792, 1993
FACTS:
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES The petitioner, all minors and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
MEYER VS. NEBRASKA all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the
262 US 390 [1922] full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical rainforests, duly joined and represented by their
FACTS: parents instituted a complained as a taxpayers’ class suit and prayed for
Robert Meyer, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, the rendering of judgment ordering defendant Factoran, then Secretary of
was tried and convicted in the district of Hamilton, Nebraska under an the DENR, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
information which charged him for unlawfully teaching reading German behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
language to Raymond Partpar, a ten year old child who had not to cease and desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
successfully reached the eight grade. The information was based upon approving new timber license agreements.
“An Act Relating to the Teaching of Foreign Language in the State of The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
Nebraska,” which prohibited any subject in any language other than two grounds: 1) lack of cause of action against him and 2) the issue raised
English to any person who has not successfully passed the eight grade. was a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the
ISSUE: May the State prohibit the teaching of foreign language to children aforementioned grounds. Thus, the petitioners filed a special civil action
who has not reach a certain grade level? for certiorari seeking to rescind and set aside.
HELD: ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have a cause of action to
It was held that it is incompetent for the government to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippine rainforests
prohibit the teaching of the German language to students between certain and have the defendant stop form receiving, processing and approving
age levels since there is nothing inherently harmful in the language that timber license agreements.
will impair the upbringing of the child; and in fact such a subject could
improve his academic background. HELD:
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action. The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history,
PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
262 US 390 the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
FACTS: accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.This right unites with the
The State of Oregon passed a law requiring right to health which is provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2.
parents/guardians of children ages 8-16 to send their child to public While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
school. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
schools by children 8-16 who have not completed their 8th grade. the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
Society of Sisters operates a private school. It owns valuable civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
building, especially constructed and equipped for the school purposes. different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
The law has already caused the withdrawal from its school of children, preservation and self-perpetuation -- aptly and fittingly stressed by the
who would other wise continue attending the same school. Society then petitioners -- the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
filed a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the law contending that the same governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
unconstitutional. need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
ISSUE: May the State require children to attend only public schools before
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
they reach a certain age? framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
HELD:
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which the
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
government under the Constitution reposes excludes any general power
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
of the State to standardize its children by enforcing them to accept for the present generation, but also for those to come -- generations
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of

which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
sustaining life. were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
conservation of the country's forests. ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
the objectives which serve as the bases for policy formulation and have exercise of police power. . . ."
defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary government
agency for the proper use and development of the countries natural The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of
resources. The right of the petitioners and all they represent to a balanced protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to the statement on
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect and ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
advance the said right. or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a "The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
cause of action. balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature."
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the

correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to
LLDA VS. CA health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."
231 SCRA 292, 1994 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
FACTS: Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes right. 29
Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the
petitioner, seeking to stop the operation of the open garbage dumpsite in The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA,
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the
on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter
content of the surrounding area. The LLDA conducted an on-site and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by
investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate that seeps from the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as
said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government necessary.
of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
Environment and Natural Resources, and clearance from LLDA as provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal
required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or
Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927 continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with
dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the
Camarin dumpsite. However, the City Government of Caloocan filed with Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector,
the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant
order with prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction. LLDA then filed a to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders
motion of Dismiss on the ground that their order was merely subject to issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed,
review of the CA and not the RTC. resulting in the thwarting of its laudable objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are
ISSUE: beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper
Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease courts.
and desist order
HELD: GARCIA VS. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
Yes. The LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is 191 SCRA 288, 1990
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of FACTS:
promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of
Laguna Lake including Caloocan City with due regard and adequate Investments (BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to
quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under RA 4850 it naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
authorizes LLDA to “make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution.” Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease domain located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the
and desist order" were not expressly conferred by law, there is Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management, and
jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an corporation, located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily naphtha.
implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified
is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and conditions for registration of
"toothless" paper agency. the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte February 24, 1988 by BOI.
cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by
laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, BOI, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the
declared: entire proceeds of liquidation investments in currency originally made and
at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3)
"Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the House
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials
and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until in the petrochemical plant.
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade

Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also
of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification of its project tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like
by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason Antaeus, need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation,
and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance
depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation. in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is
more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President battlecry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed
Aquino expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
in a conference with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National
Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of
social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the transfer of the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution
project to Batangas, BPC filed its request for approval of the amendments. affirmed this goal, adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the
Its application is as follows: "(1) increasing the investment amount from acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property
US$220 million to US$320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.' Significantly, there
of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian
changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to soil."
Batangas. BOI states that it has taken a public position preferring Bataan
over Batangas as the site of the petrochemical complex, as this would The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these
provide a better distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area. In sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
advocating the choice of Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere
complex, the BOI, however, made it clear in its view that the BOI or the provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
government for that matter could only recommend as to where the project following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
should be located. The BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the program.
final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis
provide the funding or risk capital for the project. The cases involved have been consolidated because they concern
common legal questions, including serious challenges to the
ISSUE: constitutionality of RA 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the Board of Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and other supplementary to RA 6657 such
Investments for yielding to the wishes of the investor, the national interest as PD 27 (providing for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
notwithstanding? distribution among tenant- farmers and to specify maximum land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27) Pres. Proc. 131
HELD: (instituting CARP) and EO 229 (providing the mechanics of
YES. under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of implementation of CARP) RA 6657 is the most recent legislation, signed
the State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments into law by Pres. Aquino on June 10, 1988.
within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities." The development of a self-reliant and independent national ISSUE: WON RA 6657, PD 57, Proc. 31 & Eos 228 & 229 considered as
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, valid and constitutional?
Article II of the Constitution.
HELD:
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It YES. The assailed laws are considered as a valid exercise of both police
should not be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making power and of eminent domain. The extent that it sets retention limits is an
venture, or even an assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, exercise of police power. It must be noted that like taxation, the power of
where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The eminent domain could be used as an implement of police power of the
petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. state. The expressed objective of the law was the promotion of the welfare
of the farners, which came clearly under the police power of the state. To
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given achieve this purpose, the law provided for the expropriation of agricultural
unprecedented favors, but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it lands (subject to minimum retention limits for the landowner) to be
surrenders even the power to make a company abide by its initial distributed among the peasantry. As the ponencia observed:
choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous
machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the
interests of the Filipino people. question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
way it deems best for the national interest.` physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
the owner in favor of the farmer- beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
part said he would not mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions
not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands
BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage. under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property
and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343, 1989 The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever
found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum
FACTS: retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of
challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its
to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes
resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and
increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today,
as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today.
sustaining soil, and crushed him to death. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution
itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died. prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be Congressman Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on
tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation Muslim Affairs of the House of Representative invited the petitioner in his
under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos capacity as speaker of the Assembly to participate in consultation and
will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially dialogue regarding the charting of the autonomous government of Muslim
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Mindanao to be held in Manila.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. Petitioner sent a telegram through the Secretary of the
Assembly to all the members thereof informing that “there will be no
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this session this November” in view of the invitation of Cong. Matalam.
difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session and declared
the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the seat of the Speaker vacant. This was reiterated in another session on
the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just November 5 of same year.
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less Respondents allege that because the Sangguniang
conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in
were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no their affairs, much less strike down their acts.
illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may ISSUE:
therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other
payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of governments of Region IX and XII?
value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar
scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in HELD:
force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they Yes, it may assume jurisdiction. In resolving this case the SC
presumably agreed in principle. made a differentiation between decentralization of administration and
decentralization of power.
In relation thereto, the just compensation to be made by the Government There is Decentralization of administration when the
in the form of financial instruments and not money is justified by the central government delegates administrative powers to political
revolutionary character of of the scheme and the need to allow the subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
government time to raise the funds needed. process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
BASCO VS. PAGCOR and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government
197 SCRA 52, 1991 of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over
FACTS: them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to
Petitioners seek to annul the Philippine Amusement and law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter - PD 1869, because it is allegedly their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
contrary to morals, public policy and order. Petitioners also claim that said hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
PD has a "gambling objective" and that Section 13 par 2 of the same PD governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
which exempts PAGCOR from paying any tax, any kind of term income or autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
otherwise as well as fees, charges as levies of whatever nature whether future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
national or local is violative of the principles of local autonomy for it is a An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees. autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never
meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
ISSUE: Whether or not the local autonomy clause is violated by PD 1869 central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "the President shall have the
HELD: power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In
The petitioner’s contentions are without merit for the the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
following reasons: made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation hits no
inherent right to impose taxes ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
2. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress" which has the power to "create and
abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative FACTS:
powers". Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of
Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power. Candidacy for President. Respondent Commission on Elections
3. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
long been revoked. Only the National Government has the power to Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The
issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they
consequence of the issuance of "licensesor permits" is no longer believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
vested in the City of Manila. On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of
4. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s
controlled corporation with an original charter. Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants
for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of
5. The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC
always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who
by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative'' law, its "exemption could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to
governments sovereign within the slate or an - imperiurn in imperio. reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his
right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose
170 SCRA 786, 1989 their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
FACTS: possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the
Petitioner is the elected speaker of the Batangas, pampook president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brefity). Respondents are members of numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
said Assembly. capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise
attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by
San Beda College of Law the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and
reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates
since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and his program of
23
government. respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
ISSUE: Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees had
Whether the constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
opportunities for public office” creates a constitutional right to run for or civil service examinations for sanitarians.
hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency?
ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be allowed such right
HELD:
NO.Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional HELD:
provision ensuring “equal access to opportunities for public office” is the The constitutional right to information on matters of public
claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, concern is recognized in the Bill of Rights. These constitutional
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and
law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self- For every right of the people recognized as
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
legislative or executive action.[3] The disregard of the provision does not individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be
give rise to any cause of action before the courts. constitutional. Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the
determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and
of the present Section 26, Article II had read, “The State shall broaden liberty, the ultimate illusion.
opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties.” In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both
Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the
forth an amendment that changed the word “broaden” to the phrase duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
“ensure equal access,” and the substitution of the word “office” to documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
“service.” He explained his proposal in this wise: as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the
I changed the word “ broaden” to “ENSURE New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this
EQUAL ACCESS TO” because what is important would time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article II,
be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it Section 28 thereof, to wit:
would necessarily mean that the government would be
mandated to create as many offices as are possible to Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
accommodate as many people as are also possible. implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
public service. So, in order that we should not mandate
the State to make the government the number one In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by
employer and to limit offices only to what may be what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials
necessary and expedient yet offering equal concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a
opportunities to access to it, I change the word public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
“broaden.” [7] mphasis supplied) applicability. We granted Mandamus in said case, and in the process, We
found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to
enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people . . . That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
as possible into public office. The approval of the “Davide be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
amendment” indicates the design of the framers to cast the reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden. discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39)
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to
be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs.
that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Ozaeta, supra:
[8] Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and
“public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty
inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which
the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v.
the provisions[9] of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates” Ozaeta, supra at 388).
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated December 10, 2002
outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that
give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without of, or access to, information of public concern . This is not to lose
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido
candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the
exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy
records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION . . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that
150 SCRA 530, 1987 damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other
FACTS: employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
concern is invoked in this special civil action for Mandamus instituted by 387).
petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,
in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was been registered in violation of the Constitution.
filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow
examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles
to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him declares as a State policy that:
upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access
to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec: 1] it is the
which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that
damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). constitutional guarantee.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
of Mandamus in a proper case. government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, from the Civil Service Commission.
the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus in this case is, whether and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
constitutional guarantee. the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of Mandamus, therefore lies.
access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v.
Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the
same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE
[1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in 170 SCRA 256, 1989
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by
giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to respondent Belmonte,
But the constitutional guarantee to information on General Manager of GSIS, requesting the latter to furnish him the list of
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before
official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may First Lady Imelda Marcos.
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as The Deputy General counsel of the GSIS wrote back the
those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the petitioner turning down his request on the ground that there exists a
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed confidential relationship between the GSIS and all those who borrow from
by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or it, which confidence it is the GSIS is duty bound to preserve.
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or the acts sought by petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right to
public concern. information
This question is first addressed to the government agency HELD:

having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, Yes. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of
this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be
access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the provided by law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, government and its employees and administration of various insurance
or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the public character. It is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against maximizing the benefits to insured government employees.
release . . ." To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought
and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant" dichotomy
In determining whether or not a particular information is of characterizing government function has long been repudiated. That the
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. " Public GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would
concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may of the right to information.
want to know , either 1because these directly affect their lives, or Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the
2
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents,
importance, as it relates to or affects the public. and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
The public concern invoked in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, was It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of

the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading
since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when
function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime
policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the
applicable only to "official" transactions. negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
First of all, the "constituent ----ministrant" dichotomy The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks
characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or suspended all its military actions.
running some business, discharges the same function of service to the Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya
people. from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001
simply agreed “that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their
Moreover, the intent of the members of the next meeting.”
Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to
manifest from the records of the proceedings a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
and considering further that government-owned and controlled May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002
are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad’s position as chief peace
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
transparency in government dealings. In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA -AD in its
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious “consensus”
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be ever embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as
inspect the records may be insured respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the
However, although citizens are afforded the right to Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon,
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[and Vice-Governor
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
public concern. to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
AQUINO-SARMIENTO VS. MORATO and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
203 SCRA 515, 1991 petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial
petition was followed by several other petitions by other parties. The Court
FACTS: ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
Petitioner, a member of respondent MTRCB, wrote its
records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's ISSUE:
records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
accordingly. Petitioner's request was denied by respondent Morato on the Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the
nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private HELD:
and personal. YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Petitioner counters that the records she wishes to examine shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents have no government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the
ISSUE: Was the respondents’ denial of petitioner’s request proper? statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
eventually accorded constitutional status.
HELD: The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled
violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to
May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a
members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) political significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
existence is public in character; it is an office created to serve public democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
interest. it being the case, respondents can Jay no valid claim to privacy. nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision- making if they
The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed
and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.
the discharge of public duties. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since,
if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.”
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation, so that they
FACTS: may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed

public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
the people. Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of
police power.
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been
That the subject of the information sought in the present defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not
concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real owe its origin to the Charter. It is a fundamental attribute of government
estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. It
adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However, police
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS power is not without its own limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery or unreasonably.
of the Marcoses’ alleged ill -gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of
party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public under the Constitution.
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity The concept of police power is well -established in this
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1)
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but
character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right to has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the comprehensive embrace.
consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is "Its scope, ever- expanding to meet the exigencies of the
not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
defects. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain
reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from "The police power of the State . . . is a power coextensive
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the 'law of overwhelming
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its and welfare of society."
transactions involving public interest.” It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
Intended as a “splendid symmetry” to the right to information under According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in
the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
II of the Constitution. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
even if nobody demands. individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the
with the people’s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the greater number.
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
public officials at all times accountable to the people. may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose. advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear
misuse of the power.
DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes.
“Equality before the law" admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and
STATE (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. It is the avowed
objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.
Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not
POLICE POWER mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. The Labor
Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
DRILON
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988, SARMIENTO, J. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL. 1155
Facts:
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to
Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners
the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of from engaging from retail trade in our country.
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated several treaties which
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted principle of
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith.
measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and ISSUE: Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is
females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police accepted principles of international law.
power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, PASEI, HELD:
challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given
DOLE on the following grounds: 1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to by the Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in
female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. The
respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986, YAP, J.
the medium of a treaty or a contract.
The law in question was enacted to remedy a real actual Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance the Bouncing Check Law punishes a person "who makes or draws and
and control of the retail business and free the citizens and country issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
future. credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that it offends the
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt and it
business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; contravenes the equal protection clause.
that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
state, through which and by which it protects its own personality and Issue: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal power.
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of occupation Held: Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police
regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already imprisonment for debt. It may be constitutionally impermissible for
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law
prerogative of the legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it
law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected; punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty of its police power. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. Wherefore, the
treaty or any other conventional agreement. decision rendered by the respondent judge is hereby set aside.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one- third of
the entire money supply of the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion,
WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA, G.R. No. consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two-thirds consists of
L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, J.B L., J. currency in circulation. These demand deposits in the banks constitute the
funds against which, among others, commercial papers like checks, are
Facts: Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the respondent alleging that such drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the
is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking
sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public system. Flooding the system with worthless checks is like pouring garbage
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
case directly to the Supreme Court. the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under the CA No. 567 is a valid not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
exercise of police power. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
Held: Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose , to provide means channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of
power. The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting against imprisonment for debt.
the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State is affected
to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power of the
sovereign.The decision appealed from is affirmed. DECS v San Diego
180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
et. al Facts: The petitioner disqualified the private respondent who had actually
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM taken and failed four times the National Medical Admission Test from
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, CRUZ, J. taking it again under its regulation. But the private respondent contends
that he is still entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth examination based
Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail the on constitutional grounds: right to academic freedom and quality
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. education, due process and equal protection. He filed a petition for
Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for public mandamus. The respondent judge declared the said rule invalid and
use without just compensation. The respondent invokes the police power granted the petition.
of the State.
Issue: Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid exercise of police
Issue: Whether or not the taking of property under the said laws is a valid power.
exercise of police power or of the power of eminent domain.
Held: Yes. The police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the
Held: It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain. The cases present public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Thus, the subject of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. While
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere constitutional right to be a doctor. The private respondent has failed the
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that he must yield to the
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court upheld
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer- the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
of the power of eminent domain. Wherefore, the Court holds the competence and preparation for a medical education. The decision of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. respondent judge is reversed.
Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all expropriated properties shall be
transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their
respective owners. Ynot v IAC
148 SCRA 659, Cruz, J.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Facts: President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending E.O. 626, which
et.al prohibits the transport of carabaos or carabeefs from one province to

another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of
these animals. The petitioner had transported six carabaos from Masbate
to Iloilo where they were confiscated for violation of the said order. He
sued for recovery and challenges the constitutionality of the said order.
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. He appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which upheld the lower City of Manila v Chinese Community
court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. 40 Phil 349, Johnson, J.
Issue: Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A is a valid exercise of Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be expropriated for the
police power. purpose of constructing a public improvement into an extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the plaintiff to exercise in fee
Held: No. We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial simple of certain parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand,
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, contends that the expropriation was not necessary as a public
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty improvement and that the plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said
in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes. The lower
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than court declared that there was no necessity for the said expropriation.
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them Hence, this appeal.
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented Issue: Whether or not the Courts can inquire into the necessity of
by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of expropriation of delegate, such as the City of Manila?
the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their Held: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the must exist conferring the power upon it.
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed of eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the general
was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
to the government. conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court . The executive order defined inquire into.
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed When the courts come to determine the question, they must
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions
In the instant case, the challenged measure is an invalid imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. The authority of
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, the city of Manila to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not
worse, is unduly oppressive. Moreover, there was no such pressure of denied as provided in its Charter. However, if the court, upon trial, finds
time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails,
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
destruction. Thus, the Court cannot say with equal certainty that it accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show
complies with the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. The conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there exists a
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose necessity for expropriation. The decision of the lower court is affirmed.
sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. Executive
Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.
Republic v PLDT
City Gov’t of Quezon City v Ericta 26 SCRA 620, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
122 SCRA 759, Gutierrez, Jr., J
Facts: The petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity
Facts: Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition seeking to annul exercising governmental powers through its branches and
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of paupers, on the ground that it While the respondent, Philippine Long Distance Telephone has the power
is contrary to the Constitution. The petitioner contends that the said order to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the
was a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of
respondent court declared the said order null and void. Hence, this instant messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the
petition. telephone systems of other countries. Sometime in 1933, the defendant
and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid telephone messages, could automatically be transferred to the lines of
exercise of police power. PLDT; and vice-versa. The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
Held: No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT
Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, to enable government offices to call private parties. The respondent
trades, and occupation as may be established or practice in the City.' said that the bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private
(Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537). The ordinance in question not Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities. The
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park petitioner prayed commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with it,
cemetery. As defined, police power is 'the power of promoting the through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and system. The lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the
property'. In the instant case, Section 9 of Ordinance No . 6118, PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties
Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an were not in agreement. Both parties appealed.
outright confiscation . It deprives a person of his private property without
due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no Issue: Whether or not the Bureau of Telecommunications has the right to
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial the PLDT.
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The Held: Yes. It is true that parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area where no agreement was made between them. Freedom to stipulate such
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private violence, intimidation or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
cemeteries. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked
welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract
any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. with it, the Republic, in the exercise of the sovereign of eminent
The petition for review is hereby dismissed domain, may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject
to the payment of just compensation. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a
that condemnation would be for public use. moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596);
"lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or
recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963
People v. Fajardo edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy
GR 12172, Aug. 29 1958 of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating among one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under
others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the
plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a
the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land
with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook
plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the
that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public time the property was first occupied by the AFP . It is claimed that
plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the “INTENTION” of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently,
the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded as may be inferred from the construction of permanent
with the construction of the building without a permit, because they improvements. But this "INTENTION" cannot prevail over the clear
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased the language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract,
property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the
and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud the question
being not what the intention wag, but what is expressed in the
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. language used. Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property,
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s property was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the
without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the
is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at
comfort and happiness of residents. the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected into a jet air base?" It might really have been the intention of the Republic
on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere
under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view notice much less an implied notice of such intention on the part of the
of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally commenced in court.
achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard . Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present
in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as
lessee.
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
GR No. 20620, Aug.15, 1974 Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present
vda. de Castellvi from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease , on because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the
succeeding year). The Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
refused. The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
termination of the contract because it would difficult for the army to vacate property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property
the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and
worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained
the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject the Philippine Air as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the
Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return
against the respondents over the 3 parcels of land. In its complaint, the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because
above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed
Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare.The court monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent
authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon domain on June 26, 1959.
deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961,
the trial court, rendered its decision in the ejectment case, finding that the It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of
unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We
Republic to pay interests. find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
"taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that
Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent,
1959. or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the
owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use,
Held: The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
be deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. property in 1947.
In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the
subject of "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract
domain) as follows: between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the
"Taking”under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the
entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is
under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or merged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so much so that
otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way the fair market value has been agreed upon, not as of the time of
as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". 15 We cannot accept the
enjoyment thereof." Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to
a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the
present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain. instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Article
1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule
present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic
Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi. would enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or
why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under

the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim
time the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.
Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of
lease in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. Issue: Can the appellant sue the government?
To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby
in order to secure a low price for a land which the government intends to Ruling: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government
expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed
the owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
expropriate the same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she
the "taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy the question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the property ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
fact that the value of the property, for many good reasons, had in the because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only
meantime increased during the period of the lease. This would be relief available isfor the government to make due compensation
sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the
effect of depriving the owner of the property of its true and fair market due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually value thereof at the time of the taking.
instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the "right and privilege" As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled
to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it
occupied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In
What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of
was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
same condition as at the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the (NOTE: The owner does not need to file the usual claim for
lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor recovery of just compensation with the Commission on Audit if the
what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was government takes over his property and devotes it to public use without
at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the benefit of expropriation. He may immediatetly file a complaint with the
the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the proper court for payment of his property as the arbitrary action of the
time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not refer to government shall be deemed a waiver of its immunity from suit.) Cruz, pg.
the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost of 74)
restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
lessee took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the GR No. 119694, May 22, 1995
purchase price, for purchase was never intended by the parties to the
lease contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that "However Facts:
general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent
upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code). Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of news
(A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” paper and magazine publishers.
of property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No.
enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private property must 2772, providing for a Comelec Space, which is a free print space of not
be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general
should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth , the property circulation in every province or city.
must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injuriously affected. Fifth , the utilization of the property for public use the issuance of a Temporary restraining order, PPI asks us to declare
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that
beneficial enjoyment of the property. it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to for public use without just compensation.
have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of print media to donate
Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the “Comelec Space”?
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation
by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) Held: NO. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space"
that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the purposes. The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. appraised under the public of expropriation of private personal property for
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private
compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the property for public use need to be examined here: one is the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been
Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the
“taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the power of imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative
just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.) enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be
shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use it, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just
Amigable v. Cuenca compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
GR No. 26400, August 15, 1974 paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by respondent Commission. There is nothing at all to prevent
Facts: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
Amigable's counsel wrote to the President of the Philippines, requesting constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind
payment of theportion of her lot which had been appropriated by the of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec
government. The claim was indorsed tothe Auditor General, who purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in thecourt a eminent domain.
quo a complaint, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that
Cuenca(Commissioner of Public Highways) for the recovery of ownership Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to
and possession of her lot. "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the
On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually
that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the to require prolonged consideration on their part . Firstly, there was no
recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show
government cannot be sued without its consent, that it had neither original that the police power - essentially a power of legislation - has been
nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff's claim for constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly,
compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate

exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to (NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo.
show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful On the opinion of Secretary of Justice, he said that the place must be
taking under the police power. subjected to the power of eminent domain since places invested with
unusual historical interest is a public use which such power may be
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy authorized. Thus, Republic, through the office of Solicitor General
instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national instituted a complaint for expropriation and filed an urgent motion for the
emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and issuance for an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
without regard the the individual business condition of particular property. The trial court issued an order authorizing Republic to take over
newspapers or magazines located in different parts of the country, to take the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for dismiss the complaint since such expropriation would constituted an
the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 application of funds directly or indirectly for the use, benefit, or support of
of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated Iglesia ni Cristo, which is contrary to the provision of Section 29 (2) Article
response to such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 does not VI of the 1987 Constitution.
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Issue: Whether or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent Domain is
extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-
Sumulong v. Guerrero meter parcel of land as declared by the NHI as a national landmark?
GR 48685, Sept 30,1987
Held: Yes.According to Justice Black, term “public use” means one
Facts: On December 5,1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a which confers benefit or advantage to the public and it is not
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately 25 confined to actual use by public. It may also be said to mean public
hectares, (in Antipolo Rizal) including the lots of Lorenzo Sumulong and usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general
Emilia Vidanes- Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 benefit.
square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by
valued by the NHA at P1.00 per square meter adopting the market value the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees public need or a public exigency. 16 Black summarizes the
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the and statutory basis for taking property by eminent
Philippine National Bank, representing the “total market value” of the domain. For condemnation purposes, "public
subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1224 which use" is one which confers same benefit or
defines “the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized advantage to the public; it is not confined to
housing upon payment of just compensation.” On 17 January 1978, Judge actual use by public. It is measured in terms of
Buenaventura Guerrero issued the order issuing a writ of possession in right of public to use proposed facilities for which
favor of NHA. Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing filed a motion for condemnation is sought and, as long as public
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the has right of use, whether exercised by one or
possession of their property without due process of law. This was, many members of public, a "public advantage" or
however, denied. They filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a
Court. public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont.
457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Issue: Whether the taking of private property for “socialized housing,”
which would benefit a few and not all citizens, constitutes taking for “public Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the
use.” exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain,
means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from
Held: Yes. The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to particular individuals. But each and every member of society need not be
certain limitations imposed by the constitution (1973), i.e. that private equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it;
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” (Art. if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.
IV, sec. 9); and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or
protection of the laws” (Art. IV, sec. 1). advantage, or what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the
The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and
coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or not for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and
indirect public benefit or advantage. Specifically, urban renewal or inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken defies absolute
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances
a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of
but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an
Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and increase in population and new modes of communication and
ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. 17
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional
does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by
all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has the public" has long been discarded.
to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
at once. “Socialized housing” falls within the confines of “public use”. time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
Individual differences are never taken into account. the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through
"cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. public use.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason
valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a
protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local pedantically" so as to enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the
assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself,
less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept
occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
do so. Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest
that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to
be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This
G.R. No. 106440 , 29 January 1996 attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of,
Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land which was later declared as not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
national landmark due to being ascertained by National Historic Institute power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to

recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the The Supreme Court ruled that there was no compliance with
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding the first requisite since the mayor sought to exercise the power of eminent
and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. domain pursuant to a resolution only. Ordinance is not synonymous to
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived resolution. An ordinance is a law, possesses a general or permanent
by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well character, and makes third reading for its enactment necessary. On the
be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely other hand, a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would of a lawmaking body on a specific matter, temporary in nature and its
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not enactment required only the decision of majority of all the Sanggunian
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. members
EPZA vs. Dulay

G.R. No. L-59609, 29 April 1987
Facts: A certain parcel of land was reserved by the President of the POWER OF TAXATION
Philippines for petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for the
establishment of an export processing zone. However, not all of the Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications G.R.
reserved area was public land. The petitioner made an offer to purchase No. L10405, 29 December 1960
the lands registered in the name of the private respondent, but, the parties
failed to have an agreement on the sale of the property. Thus, the Facts:
petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of possession against private respondent on the Court of First On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as
Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge favored the petition and issued a Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief,
writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take into possession the with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act
said property. Having determined the just compensation as only the issue Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
to be resolved, the respondent judge issued an order regarding the contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the
appointment of certain persons as commissioners who are tasked to construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of Pasig
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be feeder road terminals, that, at the time of the passage and approval of
expropriated. Consequently, commissioners were appointed and, said Act, the said feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned
afterwards, recommended in their report that the amount of P15.00 per subdivision roads within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal"
square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between the
properties. Subsequently, petitioners objected to the said order on the latter and EDSA, which projected feeder roads "do not connect any
grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Section 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that
the Rules of court on the ascertainment of just compensation through the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which
commissioners. said feeder roads were to be construed) were private properties of
respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval
of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May,
Issue: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of
Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the
the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was
concerned. accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of
them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was,
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote
the court’s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic
Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void, since constitutes an Act. No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. The determination of construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal
"just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the
executive department or the legislature may make the initial District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads
Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without in question were private property at the time of the passage and
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00
that its own determination shag prevail over the court's findings. Much less therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension
can the courts be and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and,
therefore, void ab initio "; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was
made by Congress because its members were made to believe that
Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation G.R.
the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not
No. 127820, 20 July 1998 private streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the
Facts: A complaint for expropriation was filed by the Municipality of aforementioned appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on
Parañaque against V.M. Realty Corporation involving two parcels of land December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the
located at Parañaque, Metro Manila. The complaint was in pursuant to Philippines, an alleged deed of donation of the four (4) parcels of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993. The complaint land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the
was for the purpose of alleviateing the living conditions of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then
housing project. Previously, an offer for the sale of the property was made Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said
by the petitioner, however, the latter did not accept. The Regional Trial donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such, said
Court of Makati issued order authorizing the petitioner to take possession donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting
of the subject property upon deposit to the Clerk of Court of an amount members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value base on its current tax interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is
declaration. However, upon the private respondent’s motion to dismiss, the unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
trial court nullified its previous order and dismissed the case. Thus, construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. But the appellate court funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision. aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta,
Issue: Whether the contested item of Republic Act No. 920

Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the power of eminent domain is
unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal?
valid.
Held: No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were
Held:The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became Republic
can exercise the power of eminent domain: (1) An ordinance is Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the
enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
private property.( 2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the purpose, and hence, was null and void.
landless.( 3) There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval
laws.( 4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in
not accepted. question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a
judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the
unconstitutionality of said appropriation. political subdivisions thereof.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested

only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance
of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act GR L-19201, 16 June 1965
constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined
at the request of a taxpayer. Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00
Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since the legislature is without in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros
power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose and Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction of
the project feeder roads are at the time private properties. The right of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total samount was actually
the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the
and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for donor’s gift tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the Commissioner of
public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one Internal Revenue issued as assessment for donee’s gift tax against the
purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest
purpose. of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960, and the compromise
for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of Manila motion for reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal
G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954 Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November
1960. After hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Facts: An ordinance was approved by the Municipal Board of the City of Internal Revenue except the imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr.
Manila which imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more Issue: Whether a donee’s gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic
than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of Church.
the court. The ordinance was in pursuance to paragraph (1) Section 18 of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila which empowers the Municipal Held: Yes. The phrase “exempt from taxation,” as employed in the
Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
referred to the plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation tax, now being from taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or convents,
required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance. The appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
plaintiffs paid the said tax under protest. The lower court declared the exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
validity of the law authorizing the enactment of the ordinance, but payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
declared the latter illegal and void since its penalty provided for the non- property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A donee’s
payment of tax was not legally authorized. gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was not on the property
Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class themeselves. It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon
legislation, are unjust and oppressive, and authorize what amounts to the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
double taxation? receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property
used for religious purposes does not constitute an impairment of the
Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we find that the lower court Constitution.
was in error in saying that the imposition of the penalty provided for in the
ordinance was without the authority of law. The last paragraph (kk) of the
very section that authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance (section Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
18 of the Manila Charter) in express terms also empowers the Municipal GR L-39086, 15 June 1988
Board "to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not
exceed to(sic) two hundred pesos fine or six months" imprisonment, or Facts: Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational corporation and
both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, the institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948. On 6
pronouncement below that the ordinance in question is illegal and void July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and
because it imposes a penalty not authorized by law is clearly without Armin Cariaga, respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure upon the
basis. petitioner for the college lot and building (OCT Q -83) for the satisfaction of
said taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the petitioner a Notice of
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of Sale on 8 July 1972, the sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno
plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they respectively Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of
belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal P 6,000 on public auction involving the sale of the college lot and building.
occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in its discretion, The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 July 1972 in the court a
discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes quo to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure” and the “Notice of
and leave the others untaxed. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non- payment of
3393-3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has authorized the real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April 1973,
City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the
other chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. We do not think it is trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the
for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by
be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and
imposed by the National Government. That matter is peculiarly rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment,
within the domain of the political departments and the courts would and thus the property is not being used “exclusively” for educational
do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant
Government and with a population and volume of trade many times petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before
that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so
that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a Issue: Whether the College is exempt from taxes.
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.
Held: Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes,”
Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because they reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to
say that it creates discrimination within a class in that while professionals facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
with offices in Manila have to pay the tax, outsiders who have no offices in accomplishment of the main purposes. While the second floor’s use, as
the city but practice their profession therein are not subject to the tax. residence of the director, is incidental to education; the lease of the first
Plaintiffs make a distinction that is not found in the ordinance. The floor cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered incidental to the
ordinance imposes the tax upon every person "exercising" or "pursuing" — purposes of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of
in the City of Manila naturally — any one of the occupations named, but the property for purposes mentioned in the Constititution.
does not say that such person must have his office in Manila. What
constitutes exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of Adonis Notes: The SC stated that if only the judge had read the 1973
judicial determination. The argument against double taxation may not be Constitution, he should have known the difference between the 1935 and
invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed the 1973 Constitution and he could not have summarily dismissed the
by the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely case. There is a substantial distinction between the 1935 and the 1973
recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution the requirement for exemption for
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the real property taxes is “exclusively” , while the 1973 Constitution requires

“actually, directly & exclusively”. The SC remanded to the Court of Origin SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
for further hearing. (excerpts from Sababan Notes) property without due process of law, nor any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual
liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but
ART. III – BILL OF RIGHTS are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
c. The, equal protection clause. —

SEC.1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
Ichong vs. Hernandez limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
GR L-7995; 31 May 1957 is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. Petitioner enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
property without due process of law. In answer, the respondents contend making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the who do not.
State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival. d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation
Issue: Whether or not the enactment of R.A No. 1180 is constitutional. enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for
Held: Yes. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for is applied.
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
petition is denied. THE BALANCING IS THE ESSENCE or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The
constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
without due process of law ; In answer, the Solicitor-General and the reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is reasonable basis for said distinction.
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival;
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
a. The police power. — Now, in this matter of EQUITABLE BALANCING , what is the proper
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power
attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by
and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of
to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public
considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts, although
police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless
the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative
and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent
of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate
application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
the issue accordingly resolved.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has —
become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and
from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility,
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self- prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in
demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its
become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. citizens.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so The Due Process of Law Limitation.
we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by
which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the legislature decisive. —
police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States
equal protection clause. that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been
b. Limitations on police power. — held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
following provisions of our Constitution: have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to
be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and Ynot vs IAC
in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is GR No. 74457, 20 March 1987
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and
by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were
authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting
by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of
to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, Executive Order No. 626- A. The government argued that Executive Order No.
and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements 626- A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that
of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to were still fit for farm work or breeding.
that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs.
New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.) Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due
Process.
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy
under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into Held: Yes. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
effect. Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note guaranteed by due process.
that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or a
the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only
economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an
of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but
our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the
security, will be at the mercy of other people. pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of insolence of power.
the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this
bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing
are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
endanger our national security it respects existing gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this
rights. country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently
survival. declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State,
is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described
almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as
"the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the
GR 98050, 17 March 1994 rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process
Facts: The PhilPhos Movement for Progress (PMPI), a labor organization clause into a worn and empty catchword.
composed of supervisory employees of the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation, filed a certification election on July 7, 1989 with the This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for,
Department of Labor and Employment. The move was not contested by to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. (1)The
the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation management and in fact conclusive presumption , for example, bars the admission of contrary
was supported by a position paper submitted to the Mediator-Arbiter on evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
August 11, 1989. The management hailed the creation of a supervisor’s there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
union provided that they meet all the necessary legal requirements. ultimately presumed therefrom. (2) There are instances when the need for
On October 13, 1989 the Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order for the expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
holding of the elections excluding the technical, professional and summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose,
confidential employees. Then on November15, 1989 respondent PMPI which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
prayed for the inclusion of technical, professional and confidential the safety and lives of the people. (3) Pornographic materials,
employees. On December 14, 1989 both parties submitted their position contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may
papers on the said subject matter. Mr. Milado, allowing the membership of be summarily destroyed. (4) The passport of a person sought for a
other employees as stated, granted the petition of PMPI. Petitioner then criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to
moved to have the technical, professional and confidential employees the country he has fled. (5) Filthy restaurants may be summarily
removed from the membership of the PMPI on April 16, 1990 to the padlocked in the interet of the public health and bawdy houses to protect
Secretary of Labor and Employment and a decision was made on August the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be
7, 1990 dismissing the appeal and the subsequent motion for omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
reconsideration. Then on July 8, 1991 the Court issued a temporary property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
restraining order against the holding of the certification election scheduled welfare from a clear and present danger.
on July 12, 1991 pending judicial review.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed
Issue: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied due process when a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
respondent Mediator-Arbiter granted the amended petition of respondent which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new opportunity to be heard. when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at
Held: No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the fair play.
action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In
Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the
confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
appeal to the Secretary of Labor

Alonte v. Savellano Issue: Was petitioner deprived of PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?
GR 131652, March 9, 1998
Held: Yes. The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
Facts: On December 5, 1996, an information for rape was filed against amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the
petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan Laguna and Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn rendered a Decision in the case a quo on the basis of two (2) affidavits
Punongbayan. (Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither marked nor offered
On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her into evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an
counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court petitioners right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
Administrator a petition for a change of venue and to have the case The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or rendered a Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on
on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by
counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a
On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano on behalf of dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result in conviction
petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up
the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant’s affidavit of with the same result).
desistance. Jurisprudence acknowledges that DUE PROCESS IN
On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed his comment on the CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, in particular, require (a) that the court or
motion to dismiss. Guiab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the
direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
for the denial of the motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion to rendered only upon lawful hearing.
change venue. The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat
On September 17, 1997, the case was assigned by raffle to strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after
Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did
Jr.,presiding. proceed on the merits but that-
On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Atty. “The two (2) accused did not present any
Balbin, submitted to the Manila court, a compliance where she reiterated countervailing evidence during the trial. They
her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance. did not take the witness stand to refute or deny
However, in an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge under oath the truth of the contents of the
Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest private complainant's aforementioned affidavit
of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in
independent of, this Courts separate determination as the trier of facts, of Court, but, instead, thru their respective
the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in lawyers, they rested and submitted the case
the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State for decision merely on the basis of the private
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered them, was sufficient enough for their purposes.
himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation They left everything to the so-called
(NBI), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of 'desistance' of the private complainant.”
P150,000.00.
According to petitioners, however, there was no such
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both
trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the
pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that they were
waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding to determine
the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed
both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4
by Punongbayan.
According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to
While Judge Savellano has claims that petitioners-accused
present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and
validity of the affidavit of desistance were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, their respective counsel of choice; that none of their counsel interposed an
the prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after
followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the
validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the rape and
she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was
against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the action. missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to
Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and may be
the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no waived.”
pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance. requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder
signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
daughters decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the
was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course
of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private
purpose;18 (2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
further evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act
She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the
Concepcion. order of trial. 20 There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
submitted for decision." court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
to Bail." During the pendency thereof, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila, This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings.
Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December
1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion
denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid
Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend
the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild Aniag vs. Commission on Elections
hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other GR 104961, 7 October 1994
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have
been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections
decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused
issued Resolution 2323 (”Gun Ban”), promulgating rules and regulations
Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty
on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons,
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of

security agencies or police organizations, and organization or no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. Pursuant to the superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged-
“Gun Ban,” Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without
Representatives, wrote Congressman Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular
Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the 2 aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding
firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Aniag rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose
from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. The as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to
policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates
as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges
firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-
of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. Thereafter, the faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature
police referred Arellano’s case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
inquest. The referral did not include Aniag as among those charged with petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would
an election offense. The City Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on the adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
circumstances mentioned in Arellano’s sworn explanation. Aniag explained considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to
that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not
with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress. The even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued
Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution recommending that the the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
case against Arellano be dismissed and that the “unofficial” charge against At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made
Aniag be also dismissed. Nevertheless, the COMELEC directing the filing by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to
of information against Aniag and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), its “QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.” It, however, insists that notice and
of BP 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
Sec. 32 of RA 7166 the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate
is bereft of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against The NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
Held: Yes. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution power. The NTC order violates procedural due process because it
T he facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the was issued motu proprio, without notice to PHILCOMSAT and
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for “initial evaluation,” which is a unilateral evaluation, but had
such offense. The non -disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
is violative of due process which requires that the procedure reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service
established by law should be obeyed. could have been shown and demonstrated to NTC. Reduction of
The COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the chance rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an
to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial
regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT
petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
incident . This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its questioned
essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. Due determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing
process guarantees the observance of both substantive and order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
requirement of reasonableness.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due process.
Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed
that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized 69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940
during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against
the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor
set aside. Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this
Philippine Communication Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the
GR 84818, Dec 18, 1989 Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine Communications employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted “a franchise to NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the
places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications.” Since
1968, It has been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Issue: Whether or not the motion for new trial should be granted.
Communications, and other telecommunication companies. It was exempt
from the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications Commission Held: Yes. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
(NTC). However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196, it was placed given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive involved.
order, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of It must be noted that the CIR is a special court. It is more an
public convenience.. On 9 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the nation. CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
same facilities, to continue providing the international satellite and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
communications services, and to charge the current rates applied for in technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem
authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the facilities, just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free
provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can
applied for. The NTC extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT assailed investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
said order. rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
Issue: Whether the NTC is required to provide notice and hearing to (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's
PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate pending cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
final determination of PHILCOMSAT’s application. (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
Held: YES. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz (4) The evidence must be substantial;
no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
San Beda College of Law the parties affected;
38
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
render its decision in such manner that the parties to the involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING conducted to
for the decision rendered. investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the
March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation
as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
CAPULONG previous ruling in Alcuaz .
222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993 Respondent students' contention that the investigating
committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after
died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10,
at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent
a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Investigating People vs. Vera
Committee found a prima facie case against respondent students for GR 45685, Nov. 16, 1937
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the Facts: The instant petition stems from the application for bail filed by Co
formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the Unjieng. He claims that he is innocent of the crime charged against him,
charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent that he has no existing criminal record and that he would observe proper
students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation conduct in the future if his application for bail is granted. The application
in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the was referred to the Insular Probation Office, but was consequently denied.
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the The denial was premised on the ground that Act No. 4221 provides
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. probation only to those provinces with available funds for the salary of
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently Thus, petitioner now comes before the Court assailing the constitutionality
enrolled. This was granted. A day after the expiration of the temporary
of the Act for being violative of the equal protection clause.
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate
the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection
This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that
guarantee?
the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and Held: Yes. The probation act is in violation of the said constitutional
reinstatement of the students was ordered. guarantee. It constitutes as a class legislation which discriminates against
persons of the same class and favor others. Person’s with similar
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. circumstances may be afforded with the privilege of probation merely due
to the discretion of the provincial officers. Hence, the Court ruled that the
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural said order is not constitutional.
due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required In the case at bar, the resultant inequality may be said to
respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their perhaps this is necessarily the result in every case. In the instant case,
counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In
elements of notice and hearing. such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former
The Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner within the purview of the law would be able to enjoy the benefits of
university herein, thus: probation in one province while another person similarly situated in
another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious
(1) the students must be informed in WRITING of the nature discrimination. While inequality may result in the application of the law and
and cause of any accusation against them; in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in al
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against cases the necessary result. Whatever may be the case, it is clear that
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: Section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them and inequality are permitted or allowed.
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Act. 4221 permits of
behalf; and the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating We see no difference “BETWEEN A LAW WHICH DENIES EQUAL
committee or official designated by the school authorities to PROTECTION” and a “LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL”. A
hear and decide the case. law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrmmination, it is within the
were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner constitutional prohibition.
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within
twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the records show Ichong vs. Hernandez
that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their GR 7995, May 31, 1957
counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in the
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others Facts: -supra-
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to
February 18, 1991 to file their statements. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause?
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
Held: None. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law
School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
respondent students. grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall
Respondent students may not use the argument that since within such class and those who do not.
they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in
now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? character the second part which requires the payment of P50. 00 as
As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no
the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted “CLEARED” for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty excessive BUT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO CONSIDER VALID
and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN SITUATION AMONG INDIVIDUAL
living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino ALIENS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO PAY IT . Although the equal
customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it
and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and
go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of
experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or
that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
seem. or a highly paid executive.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has
He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates
interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard,
indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
retail distribution to his hands. grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities allow or prevent an activity per se lawful .
and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization
the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere Board, where a law granted a government agency power to determine the
guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the
actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a
national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.
trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso that the authority
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon
violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other. discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
distinction. — power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade The ordinance in question violates the due process of
by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some
may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we (Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will
Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
all persons of one class are treated alike , and as it cannot be said that Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
established by the Constitution. shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is
given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.)
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions
and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the Dumlao vs. Comelec
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a GR 52245, Jan. 22, 1980
wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Facts: The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the
(Adonis Notes: Under the abovementioned case, the case was decided constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
under the 1935 Constitution wherein PARITY RIGHTS were granted to and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
U.S. Citizens.) Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho "Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In addition to violation of
GR 29646, Nov. 10,1978 section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
Facts: City ordinance No 6537, prohibits aliens from being employed or declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
engaged or participate in any position or association or business enumerated in section 1 hereof.
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila is being Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official
questioned by the private respondent for allegedly in violation of the equal (1)who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
protection guarantee. The trial court ruled in favor of the nullity of the which he is entitled under the law and (2)who shall have
ordinance. On appeal, petitioner argues that the ordinance cannot be been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
invalidated on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation, office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified
because it apples to pure tax or revenues measures and said ordinance is to run for the same elective local office from which he has
not such but is an exercise of the police power of the state. retired."
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinance is unconstitutional? Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed
insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
Held: The ordinance is unconstitutional. The contention that it was not based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
purely a tax or revenue measure because its principle purpose was for
regulation has no merit. It is obvious that THE ORDINANCE WAS Issue: Whether or not said provision violates the equal protection
PURPOSELY FOR THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE OF guarantee?
A REGULATION. Further, the assailed ordinance violates the equal
protection clause. To require a person to get a work permit before he Held: No. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is
can be employed from the Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several
will is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions
engage in a means of livelihood . Aliens once admitted cannot be based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the
deprived of life without due process of law. COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax purposeful discrimination.
or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the
has no merit . While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational

classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is
age, have been validly classified differently from younger germane to the purpose behind the measure . Unquestionably, it is the
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily for Filipino female overseas workers." 17 This Court has no quarrel that in
retirable. the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of
age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or
might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994, KAPUNAN, J.:
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the
other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials. Facts: Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in the killing of Benjamin
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for informations for murder and attempted murder were filed, the trial court
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975. In response, petitioner filed a motion to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the
official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to 90 days.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office , there is reason to R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was,
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new likewise, denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift
government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is petitioner's preventive suspension. Petitioner posits that as a member of
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and the Philippine National Police, he is covered by the Civil Service Law,
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the
change of mind, he would like to assume again . It is for the very maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection, neither does it permit such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 protection of laws.
Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause
does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a Issue: Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That days is a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws?
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
those belonging to the same. The purpose of the law is to allow the Held No . He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over
emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the
"even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately
theoretical inconsistencies. suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the
succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and
(NOTE: The questioned law is germane to the purposes for which it was shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
enacted) accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that
if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive
suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. vs. Drillon
GR 81958, June 30, 1988 We disagree.
Facts: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, inc. (PASEI), is a First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear,
domestic corporation engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the
workers, male and female for overseas employment. PASEI seeks to suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave
challenge the constitutionality of the Department Order No. 1 series of offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until
1998 of the Department of Labor. Said order prohibited and suspended the the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
overseas deployment of Filipina Domestic and household workers. Their termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
main contention is that the order is invalid for the DOLE erroneously providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from
exercised police power, which is an adjunct on the powers of congress, arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
and not executive in character. Moreover, it alleged that there was a independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension.
violation of the equal protection clause for it only sought to suspend the The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
deployment of Filipina workers, thus there was discrimination. finished.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the equal protection clause? Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment,
should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly no.
Held: No. The Court is satisfied that the classification madeN - the While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be
preference for female workers - rests on substantial distinctions. terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be
a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the
maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his
Government's efforts. liberty by habeas corpus.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In
the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which
are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to
a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill- all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the
treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are
arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with R.A. 6975.
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the
as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the
inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
41
PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the
suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall *Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
continue until the case is terminated. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the
present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These
cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
of R.A. 3019 reads as follows: Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the
meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section
concerned becomes all the more clear. 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start
preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office
which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated. upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another
The reason why members of the PNP are treated position without forfeiting his seat.
differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and
badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative campaign. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the
discussions. participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a political campaigns is unmistakable.
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact officers and employees is presently reflected and implemented by a
that the accused is in uniform and armed. number of statutes. (e.g. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55,
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or Chapter 8 – both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
privilege. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the 1987). Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election
equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely Code) further makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances partisan political activities an election offense. The intent of both
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If political activities is too plain to be mistaken.
the classification is based on real and substantial differences ; is
germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical
may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
guarantee. elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that “[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
Quinto vs. COMELEC corporations with original charters.” This is because elected public
G.R. No. 189698, February, 22. 2010 officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan
Puno. CJ: political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a
Note: The SC reversed its December 1, 2009 decision via the MRs of political office, elective positions included.
COMELEC and movant-intervenors
*Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section
FACTS: In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 – the Guidelines on the Clause
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official
Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-
2010 National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provides resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal
that “Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be protection clause of the Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his Secretary, et al.
certificate of candidacy (automatic resignation) however it exempts those
elected officials saying that “Any person holding an elective office or The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge
position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of against Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.” provisions “apply equally” to both elected and appointive officials. We held,
Sec.13(par. 3) of Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 9369 provides: “x x x any however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office x x x.” between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that
Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, reads: “x x x Any Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the
person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his Constitution, failed muster.
certificate of candidacy.”
Petitioners were appointive officers of the government who were planning In said case, the Court ruled that:
to run in the 2010 elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on the “Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
protection clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in their mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
favor. This prompted the COMELEC to file a motion for reconsideration term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
and the movant-intervenors with their own motion for reconsideration-in- On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
intervention. their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
ISSUES: 1) Whether the assailed decision is contrary to the constitutional entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
proscription against the participation of public appointive officials and appointing authority.
members of the military in partisan political activity.
2) Whether the assailed provisions do not violate the equal Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
protection clause when they accord differential treatment to elective and that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
appointive officials. Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
3) Whether the assailed provisions do not suffer from the Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
infirmity of overbreadth. civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote.
HELD: YES to all. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part
The Court now rules that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of in political and electoral activities.
the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Biraogo et al. v. The Philippine Truth Commission
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two GR No. 192935; December 7, 2010
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their J. Mendoza
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within FACTS:
the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M.
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.” G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does
clause. It held that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state not concern a demand by a citizen for information under the freedom of
as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses information guarantee of the Constitution. Rather it concerns the power of
in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an
therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency of
against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public the Government.
services; (iii) if the employees’ expression interferes with the maintenance
of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is Facts: Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the Economic
not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), while Perez is Chief of the
or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces
statutory restrictions. Therefore, insofar as government employees are tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation
concerned, the correct standard of review is an INTEREST-BALANCING of an anonymous letter, written by an employee of the EIIB and a
APPROACH, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit concerned citizen, alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question. positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. There were unfilled
positions because one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed,
and allegedly, these 190 personnel continued to receive their salaries as
“ghost agents.”
*Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section Petitioner Almonte denied the allegations and asked that the
66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth complaint be dismissed and the case considered closed. Similarly
petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied savings had been
First, according to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law realized from the implementation of of E.O. No. 127 (dismissal of 190
are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants personnel.)
holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being T he Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño
held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the
influence that may be attendant thereto. Such a myopic view obviously grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners Almonte and
fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the
bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to
“powerful political machine” that has amassed “the scattered Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
powers of government workers” so as to give itself and its vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988."
incumbent workers an “unbreakable grasp on the reins of power.”
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the
Second, the assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of subpoena duces tecum. Respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to
law are overly broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed
all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena
of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce
character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level. The Court ruled evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was
that: A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the
and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB,
candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents
political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents,
Local Elections. Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10)
restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued days from receipt hereof."
specifically for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for reconsideration, stating that, the
Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and subject to such
character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section 4(a) of RA limitations as may be provided by law" and that the complaint in this case
8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for is unsigned and unverified, thus the case is not an appropriate one.
partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and Local According to them, those complainants who wrote the letter should be
Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against identified and should sign the complaint. Otherwise, their right under the
Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable . Similarly, a considered review of equal protection clause of the Constitution will be violated. The motion for
Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in reconsideration, having been denied, hence, this petition.
conjunction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these
provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for Issue: WoN petitoner’s right to equal protection of the laws has been
nonpartisan public offices. The only elections which are relevant to violated.
the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since
these are the only elections in this country which involve Held: NO. The Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on
nonpartisan public offices. In this regard, it is well to note that from any complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or
as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, omissions. (Art. XI, § 12): The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
Congress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
governed by SPECIAL RULES, including a separate rule on deemed or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
resignations which is found in Section 39 of the Omnibus Election subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
Code. owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides in § 26(2): The Office
only where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever
speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint
(due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the
the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons
conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first
invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the
statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two
cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall
statute. dismiss the case.
Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan the Court held that
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and charges made in a
incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the
actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was
having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible really not necessary. Rather than referring to the form of complaints,
inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, § 12 means any
case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to such limitations as

may be provided by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by within the city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the
Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the Issue: Whether or not the ordinance violates the equal protection clause.
public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the
proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is
thereby made between the demands of national security and the Held: Yes. The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any
requirement of accountability enshrined in the Constitution. person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The equal protection
What has been said above disposes of petitioners' clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not
contention that the anonymous letter-complaint against them is nothing bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the general classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
investigation in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the purpose which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the
of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A
resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and increased ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring. produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and Company, Inc., was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
In the first place, there can be no objection to this because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar
procedure because it is provided in the Constitution Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
itself.
In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the
filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the
framers of the Constitution took into account the well- ART.2 SEARCHES & SEIZURES
known reticence of the people which keep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings.
PEOPLE vs. MARTI
Thirdly, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from G.R. No. 81561, January 18,1991
the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are FACTS: Andre Marti went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
public officials who, through official pressure and Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations them 4 gift- wrapped packages. The packages were not inspected by Anita
held against them. On the other hand complainants are Reyes, the proprietress, as Marti refused, who assured her that the
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
afford to hire lawyers friend in Zurich. However, before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau
. of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and
The Ombudsman is designated by the Constitution husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened
"protectors of the people" and as such they are required by it "to act the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar
promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials or order emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused. He squeezed one of the
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
corporation." Even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
presumptively privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. Above all, there must be Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory
a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered. The Court thus examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. It
dismissed the petition, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with by the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI.
all the safeguards outlined in this decision. ` Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for violation of R.A.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). Appellant contends that the evidence subject
of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy of
(NOTE: Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the communication and therefore argues that the same should be held
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified inadmissible in evidence.
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed ,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman ISSUE: Whether or not an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation . In the first place, of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the state?
there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting RULING: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. This
the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, whether
people which keep them from complaining against official citizen or alien, from interference by government.The contraband in
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the the case at bar came into possession of the government without the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are searches and seizures.
public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government
complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
afford to hire lawyers. ) only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made at
the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private establishment
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., vs. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
G.R. No. L-23794, February 17, 1968, BENGZON, J.P., J.: the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be invoked for only the act of private
Facts: In1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
4 imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries." ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the CFI with G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City
of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government (respondent
that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the prosecutors), several judges (respondent judges) issued a total of 42
equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from search warrants against petitioners & or the corporations of which they
being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the persons named
Administrative Code.The respondent asserted that the tax ordinance was and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or

residences, and to seize several personal properties as the "subject of Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion
the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal
offense" as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
(TCC), NIRC and the RPC." blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
void, said petitioners Stonehill, et.al. filed w/ the SC this original action for exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured
the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
Issues: execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
1. Whether the right against unlafwful search and seizures may be without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as
invoked by artificial beings? may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given
2. Whether or not the search warrants in question were validly up this approach and eventually adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE,
issued?
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
3. Whether or not the articles seized by virtue of the warrants are
admissible in evidence? constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
Held: "As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
1. YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to the guarantee evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is
although they may be required to open their books of accounts for that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
examination by the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER. constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
2. YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Art. III, that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
Section 2 of the Constitution: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth wrong, will that wrong be repressed".
therein; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
seized. case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search
Noneoftheserequirementshasbeencompliedwith. of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural of June 29, 1962 are null and void.
and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Soliven vs. Makasiar
Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had been alleged in said GR No. 82585, November 14, 1988
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the Facts: Petitioner Luis Beltran contends, among others, that his
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable constitutional rights were violated when respondent judge issued a
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that warrant of arrest against him without personally examining the
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal Petitioner contends that the Constitution now requires the judge to
laws. personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our The basis for his contention was the fact that the word “personally” was
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy added after the word “determined”, and the phrase “other responsible
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice officers as may be authorized by law” was omitted.
or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw Issue: Is the petitioner’s contention correct?
the so -called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in Held: No. The pertinent Constitutional provision is highlighted herein
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by below:
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit secure in their persons, houses, papers and
to amendSection3 of Rule122ofthe former Rulesof Court 14 by effects against unreasonable searches and
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a seizures of whatever nature and for any
search warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for upon probable cause to be determined
more than one specific offense." personally by the judge after examination
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the under oath or affirmation of the complainant
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the and the witnesses he may produce, and
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to particularly describing the place to be
wit: searched and the persons or things to be
"Books of accounts, financial records, seized.
vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, The addition of the word "personally" after the word
typewriters, and other documents and/or "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
papers showing all business transactions Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
including disbursement receipts, balance authorized by law", has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
sheets and related profit and loss Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the
statements." complainant and his witnesses determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
records pertaining to ALL business transactions of petitioners herein, personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, THE JUDGE IS
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly NOT REQUIRED TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to AND HIS WITNESSES.
be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
General search warrants are outlawed because they submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
of peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of probable cause.
Rights-- THAT THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges
DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation
elimination of general warrants. of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
3. NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and Silva vs. Honorable Presiding Judge of RTC of Negros Oriental
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. GR No. 81756, October 21, 1991

45
Facts: On June 12, 1986, Villamor, Jr., chief of the PC Narcom issuing a warrant of arrest . The trial court ruled in favour of Chan but
Detachment in Dumaguete City, Province of Negros Oriental, filed an dismissed the petition with respect to Fu Yan Fun. Both petitioners and
Application for Search Warrant with the RTC against petitioners Silva. respondent appealed.
Respondent Judge, on the same day issued Search Warrant No. 1, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 37 (a) of the
directing the police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the Immigration Act of 1940, which states that, “The following aliens shall be
residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of RA 6425 otherwise known as arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or any
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. During the search conducted by the police other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
officers, they also seized money belonging to petitioner Antonieta Silva warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the
amounting to P1,231.40. Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground deportation as
Thereafter, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the charged against the alien xxx.” Petitioners contend that the above
said amount on the ground that the search warrant only authorized the provision trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Art. III, Sec. 1 (3).
police officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue
that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrants of arrest.
warrant in violation of Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ right to personal liberty and security of unconstitutional.
homes against unreasonable searches and seizures as contemplated in
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution was violated. Held: No. The Court held that, Sec. 1 (3), Art. III does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
Held: Yes. The abovementioned section and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an
the Rules of Court provide that the judge must, before issuing a search order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power AS A STEP
warrant, determine, whether there is probable cause by examining PRELIMINARY OR INCIDENTAL TO PROSECUTION OR
the complainant and witness through searching questions and PROCEEDINGS FOR A GIVEN OFFENSE OR ADMINISTRATIVE
answers.The Court held that the judge failed to comply with the legal ACTION, not as A MEASURE INDISPENSABLE TO CARRY OUT A
requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witness in the VALID DECISION BY A COMPETENT OFFICIAL, such as legal order
form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
existence of probable causes as provided in the said statutory provision. pursuance of a valid legislation.
The depositions of the witnesses did not only contain It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to
leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it
propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the
merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of
that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is
provided. so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their
“The 'probable cause' required to justify the issuance of a findings of fact, after A fair though summary hearing, are made
search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce conclusive.
a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.Of the 8 The determination of the propriety of deportation is not
questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a
are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may
description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply
the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not
examination conducted WAS GENERAL IN NATURE AND MERELY want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of congress is
REPETITIOUS of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and
cause upon which a warrant may issue." independent.
Likewise, this Court previously declared that search warrants In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth
issued are invalid if it is due to the failure of the judge to examine the in Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid requiring that
witness in the form of searching questions and answers. Pertinent portion the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not
of the decision reads: extend to deportation proceedings.
"Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio The view, we, here express funds support in the discussions
Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. RESPONDENT JUDGE during the constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as
DID NOT EXAMINE HIM 'IN THE FORM OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty,
AND ANSWERS'. ON THE CONTRARY, THE QUESTIONS ASKED other than by order of a competent court.
WERE LEADING AS THEY CALLED FOR A SIMPLE 'YES' OR 'NO' Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of
ANSWER. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, 'the questions propounded by sovereignty. Such power is planted on the "accepted maxim of
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to sovereignty, and essential to self -preservation, to forbid the entrance of
the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of foreigners within its dominions." So it is, that this Court once aptly
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact that where aliens
for issuance of a valid search warrant." are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must visitors who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted
strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that them are subject to deportation by the Commissioner of Immigration, for
he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally having violated the limitation or condition under which they were admitted
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37(a), subsection (7) C.A. 613,
questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement as amended).
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As "the capricious disregard by And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the
the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was challenged as
search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion". unconstitutional because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused 1, paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution", this Court declared —
their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is "This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is subject to certain
one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by
money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the him, among them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may
search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has
of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such
an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to
proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal prepare the ground for his deportation under section 37 (a) of
likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such
Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money. power nugatory to the detriment of the State."
It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the
Immigration Act of 1940 is not constitutionally proscribed.
Morano vs. Vivo
GR no. L-22196, June 30, 1967 Harvey vs. Santiago
GR No. 82544, June 28, 1988
Facts: On November 23, 1961, Petititoner Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese
citizen, arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin, Sameul Malaps, Facts: Petitioners were among the twenty-two suspected pedophiles who
together with her minor son, with her first marriage, Fu Yan Fun. They were apprehended after a three-month surveillance by the Commission on
were permitted in the Philippines under a temporary visitor’s visa for 2 Immigration and Deportation (CID) in Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were
months after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.00. She married Morano, apprehended by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Santiago.
a Filipino citizen. The Commissioner of Immigration asked them to leave Petitioner contends the validity of their detention in CID Detention Center,
the country due to the expiration of the extensions they applied for. assailing, inter alia, that respondent violated Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Instead of leaving, they petitioned the CFI of Manila for Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since CID
mandamus to compel the Commissioner to cancel petitioners’ Alien agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizures
Certificate of Registration; prohibition to stop the Commissioner from as required by the said provision.

Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-
Issues: 22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific constraints in both
1. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest? the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially identical,
contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation
proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An
2. Assuming arguendo that the arrest was not
order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is
valid, is there a valid basis for the confinement of herein petitioner?
preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in
3. Is the Constitutional prohibition against
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
warrantless arrest & searches applicable herein?
"It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not
constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a
punishment, it being merely the return to his country of an alien who
Held: has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside
1. YES. There can be no question that the right against unreasonable within our borders. The deportation proceedings are administrative
searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly
Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings . It is essential,
of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient
constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied
that it must be based upon probable cause. Probable cause has been upon. It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a investigators. However, all the strict rules of evidence governing
cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof”. judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an fundamental and essential, like the right of cross-examination.
arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a
private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an
offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113,
Section 5). Alvarez vs. CFI
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on G.R. No. 45358, January 29, 1937
probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3)
months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the Facts: On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo
articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner
Criminal Procedure). kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a
2. YES. Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was money-lender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In
not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated
charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements
1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information
Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being received by him from a reliable person . Upon the affidavit in question
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of
persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the
purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned
L-39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "Where a person's and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance
detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night
for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles:
L-49014, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fundamental rule that a internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two
writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four check
become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs,
(Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]). forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of
their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book
respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked, Under belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other
those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe papers, many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory
that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psycho- notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the
sexual perversion involving children" ( Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and seizure of
Sexualis, p. 555; "Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children
said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his
are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's Third New International
protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even
Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p.
the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought
10]. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior
immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner,
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent
well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution). Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit
At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent
released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court.
attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued
(Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house
and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting
Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence situated
in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date,
3. NO. The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized,
are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question
1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section be returned to him.
37(a) provides in part:
Issue: Is the warrant of arrest herein illegally issued?
(a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Held: YES. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution,
Immigration and Deportation or any other
relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the people to be
officer designated by him for the purpose
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
and deported upon the warrant of the
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
Commissioner of Immigration and
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
Deportation after a determination by the
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
Board of Commissioners of the existence
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
of the ground for deportation as charged
persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58
against the alien;
provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
summary and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
the very purpose of deportation proceedings would be defeated. seized." It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not

only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized,
broadest sense, an “OATH” includes any form of attestation by their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an could issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit
outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the no other more adequate and detailed description could have been
given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
warrant, of the existence of probable cause . The true test of
description of the contents thereof. The description so made
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that PERJURY could be
of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his
III of the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the articles were seized in order that the Anti -Usury Board might
constitutional guaranties afford full protection. The term "unreasonable provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or
search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-Usury
Orders, No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable Law. (fishing expedition) At the hearing of the incidents of the case
meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All raised before the court, it clearly appeared that the books and documents
illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful ones are had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an
reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as
or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was against the person in whose possession they were found, is
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
procured equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited compulsion of an accused to testify against himself. Therefore, it
authorities, it appears that THE AFFIDAVIT , which served as the appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation of the Anti- Usury Law,
therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and which it is attempted to institute against him, we hold that the search
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.
are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the
NOTE: In sum, the ruling may be summarized as follows:
petitioner was subjected.
Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No.
search warrant be declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not
58, relative to search and seizure, should be given a liberal
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In
other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
witnesses to be presented necessarily by him. Section 1, paragraph 3, of
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form
Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon
and fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the ownership,
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they
Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice should be strictly construed;
must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is
reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit
the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
of the petitioner who had NO personal knowledge of the facts
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge
necessary to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor
of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal
take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor
proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for
General Orders, No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take
violation of the Anti- Usury Law;
the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in 4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it
requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the
the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if
possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may
the search and seizure be made at night;
dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was 5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of
insufficient because HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS WAS NOT witnesses to corroborate the applicant or complainant in cases
PERSONAL but merely HEARSAY, it is the duty of the judge to where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance
of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists ;
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be
probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but where, by
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be
warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the rather general, it is not required that a technical description be
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;
The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration
(Adonis Notes: The conjunctive word “AND” in Art. 3, sec.3 is not to be
of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact
meant as BOTH Complainant & Witness should each produce affidavits.
that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No.
58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively The Judge may require the affidavit solely of the complainant if it is itself
asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the place sufficient to establish probable cause. – Alvarez vs. CFI)
ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and
Soriano Mata vs. Judge Josephine Bayona
the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the
GR 50720, March 26, 1984, De Castro J.
contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be
made at night.
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano
contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and section 97 of illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned.”
shall serve as the basis for determining whether probable cause exists
and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under
of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, oath and must be in writing.
and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona replied, “it is with the
court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached
them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994, MELO, J.
invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The motion was denied by the Judge, stating that the court has Facts: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros, RTC Judge Arturo
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. de Guia issued in the morning of September 4, 1991 a search warrant
Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the paraphernalias" in the premises of appellant's house. However, the search
search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal warrant was not implemented immediately due to the lack of police
case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when personnel to form the raiding team. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of
these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata came to the that day, a raiding team was finally organized. In the final briefing of the
Supreme Court and prayed that the search warrant be declared invalid for raiding team at the police station, it was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando
its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Luna will buy shabu from appellant and after his return from appellant's
Rules of Court house, the raiding team will implement the search warrant. A marked
money consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ 329406 was given
by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was valid. PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to appellant's house to implement
the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del Rosario and
appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and
Held: NO. We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for PO3 Francisco found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil,
being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used ammunitions in a cup and
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but three wallets, one containing the marked money. SPO1 Novero found
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and a burner.
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under Normando del Rosario was charged with Illegal Possession
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". of Firearm and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs.
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the Issues:
judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or 1. Whether or not the implementation of the search warrant was
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to lawful and that the object seized may be used to prove Del
any affidavits presented to him. Rosario’s guilt?
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are 2. Whether the ammunition was validly seized as an incident to a
thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in lawful arrest?
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record . Such written deposition is necessary in
Held:
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
1. No. According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-
or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
bust operation, accused-appellant handed over to Veneracion Luna, the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites appellant a marked 100 bill and then returned to the police station and
of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, informed the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from
rendering the search warrant invalid. accused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house
The judge's insistence that she examined the of accused-appellant to implement the search warrant. The version of the
complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner's claim prosecution is highly incredible. The record is devoid of any reason why
that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers the police officers did not make any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at
connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after the time he allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was
he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not accompanied by another police officer. That was the opportune moment to
attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back arrest accused-appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution upon
of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he this Court is contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of
filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for
articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment
the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the
not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his every reason why such a police operation is called a "BUY-BUST"
xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys” dangerous drugs from
does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt the pusher and "bust" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands
becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission, while over the drug to the police officer.
insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in
take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would a small canister was actually seized or confiscated at the residence of
be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", such that, accused-appellant. in consequence, the manner the police officers
according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular.
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else. Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure found him lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in
the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in the living room while they searched the other parts of the house. Although
writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called
statutory prohibition heretofore quoted. in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellant's
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to residence (pp. 22-23, tsn, December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the
stop the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and even policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu.
the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of
action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized
"masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu. Sale
deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room. is totally different from possession.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is Moreover, the search warrant implemented by the raiding
sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement party authorized only the search and seizure shabu and paraphernalia
verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the for the use thereof and no other. “ the described quantity of
meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon paraphernalia". A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to
in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating
other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and to a crime. The Constitution itself and the Rules of Court, specifically
usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the
propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for
must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned,
long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.
commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized
by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to 2. NO. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the
be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, Del Rosario's arrest was
investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized,
the same is not admissible in evidence.
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of
their duties.
Umil v. Ramos
GR 81567, 9 June 1990 (It was held that when a police officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the distrurbances created thereby, and
Facts: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
(RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the warrant. The offense is deemed committed in the presence or within the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at view of the officer.)
the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA
of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992, Regalado, J.:
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined Facts: CIC Taduran together with S/Sgt. Molinawe and other officers
thereat, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman received from a confidential informer that there was an ongoing illegal
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Sgt. Molinawe gave the
at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.Consequently, Dural was money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for
referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. After agreeing on the
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted and later on Don
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a plastic" which was later
“Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter,
A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court said purchase of marijuana. Subsequently, Major Zeidem ordered a team
issued the writ of habeas corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed. Umil and to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the
Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where same date, appellant, Lonceras and Segovia was arrested. The
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they
them, and they were accordingly released. apprehended the three accused.
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a
for the crime of rebellion. plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized
by any search warrant. The RTC found Rodrigueza guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drug Act.
Held: Yes. Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a Issue: Whether or not the evidence confiscated during the raid conducted
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza is admissible in evidence.
justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to Held: NO. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the
act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of
a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and
the offense is bailable. The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation . It is
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus of duty by an agent of the law.
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be
of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued
by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this
Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and
People v. Sucro seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, (1) when the owner of
GR 93239, 18 March 1991 the premises waives his right against such incursion; (2) when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) when it is made on vessels
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to and aircraft for violation of customs laws; (4) when it is made on
monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s house. immigration laws; (5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain
Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. view; or (6) in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises
These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a
was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the
area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not
Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the
Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence,
saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the violated. The NARCOM agents could NOT have justified their act by
chapel. invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already
corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 been put under surveillance for quite some time . Had it been their
teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily
from Macabante. could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant is lawful. (In the case at bar, the police officer, acting as poseur-buyer
in a “buy-bust operation”, inst5ead of arresting the suspect and taking him
Held: Yes. Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest into custody after the sale, returned to police headquarters and filed his
is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal report. It was only in the evening of the same day that the police officer,
Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched without a warrant, arrested the suspect at the latter’s house where dried
for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of marijuana leaves were found and confiscated. It was held that the arrest
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. and the seizure were unlawful.)
Castiller. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from
the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals
insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance . However, warantless G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992, FELICIANO, J.:
search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed.
Facts: On July 2, 1991, petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way
The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the
accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Eldon Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked

over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an
left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
down petitioner's car plate number. Verification at the LTO showed that the Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained
car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.The security guard of the bake under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
shop positively identified Go as the same person who had shot Maguan. constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
The police launched a manhunt for petitioner. On July 8, 1991, seizures has not been violated.
Petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. That be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of
same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been
Prosecutor filed an information for murder before the RTC. Counsel for upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless "Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the
arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had effect that he had been stopped and searched
been conducted before the information was filed. without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating
Issue: W/N a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan the details of the incidents which amount to a
Police in respect of petitioner Go. violation of his right against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
Held: NO. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure determine whether there was a violation of
provides that “a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
arrest a person”: seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
arrested has committed, is actually committing, forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
or is attempting to commit an offense; determined by any fixed formula but is to be
(b) When an offense has in fact just been resolved according to the facts of each case.
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
has committed it; and the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
(c) xxx the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not
In this case, there was no lawful warrantless arrest of constitute unreasonable search.
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. Petitioner's
"arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither considered as a security measure to enable the
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints
of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan . destabilize the government in the interest of public
The information upon which the police acted had been derived from security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting. That notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
ROMEO POSADAS vs. CA lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, GANCAYCO, J. of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions - which all
Facts: On October 16, 1986, Patrolman Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Davao least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a of the state to protect its existence and promote
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were public welfare and an individual's right against a
within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner warrantless search which is however reasonably
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They conducted, the former should prevail.
approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is
by the two notwithstanding his resistance.They then checked the "buri" susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson manner that all governmental power is susceptible of
revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
(tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
and asked him to show the necessary license or authority to possess conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and community."
ammunitions in the RTC wherein after a plea of not guilty.Petitioner was
found guilty of the offense charged. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military
or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
Issue: W/N the warrantless search on the person of petitioner is valid. question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike
in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
Held: Yes. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected of the police officers to inspect the same.
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
However, there are many instances where a warrant and possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile
foremost of which is the "STOP AND SEARCH" (a.k. a. STOP & FRISK and much too late.
without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints. As
between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or In People vs. CFI of Rizal, this Court held as follows:
police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is
no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that ". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause . The mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question,
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of

probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured." Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the we can agree with the prosecution.
Solicitor General:
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore
and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the
case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or
walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they apparently while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men indicated that they
were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the
approached the men and asked them for their names, they mumbled a time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking
reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting
frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been
other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure Mengote in their presence.
was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was
a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a situation, on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and offense had been committed and that the accused- appellant had
allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly
determine his identity or maintain the status quo while obtaining more have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding
information. . . . his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote had been
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason
violated." to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after
PEOPLE vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not skulking
G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992, CRUZ, J. in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of
Facts: On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District (WPD) received a the noonday sun.
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-
looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was
dispatched to the place. Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
narrated that they saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified been shown what their suspicion was all about . In fact, the policemen
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The because of the telephone call from the informer that there were
suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to
accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard.(COMPARE THIS WITH PP
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified vs. POSADAS). The caller did not explain why he thought the men
as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants looked
pocket. The weapons were taken from them. suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
An information was filed against the accused-appellant
before the RTC for illegal possession of firearms. The Court convicted It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
Mengote for violation of PD 1866 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua . It arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even
is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer-
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant therefor could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion
having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal
malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of
Issue: W/N Mengote can be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. security.
Held: NO. There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, the Court sustained the
illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his
That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v.
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he surreptitiously examined the
bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground
applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows: The case before us is different because there was nothing to
support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
person may without a warrant, arrest a person: imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed,
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is or was at least being attempted in their presence.
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin , where the Court held that
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has the warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less
committed it; and innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that

Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the In a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST, as
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed. the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search.
committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or
or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was
only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it. may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto
Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an
of Danganan's house. overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
At the time of the arrest in question, the accused- committed.
appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in
abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being one incidental to a lawful arrest.
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope
presence. There was nothing to support the arresting officers' of a "STOP-AND-FRISK" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
abdomen. Par. (b) is no less applicable because has not been shown We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
had yet to be committed. and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
SAMMY MALACAT vs. CA conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997, DAVIDE, JR., J. an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . .
Facts: In response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo
Yu, a member of the WPD, along with 3 other policemen were on foot Other notable points of Terry are that while probable
patrol along Quezon Blvd, Quiapo when they chanced upon 2 groups of cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
Muslim-looking men posted at opposite sides of Quezon Blvd. The men holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and his frisk." A “genuine reason” must exist, in light of the police officer's
companions observed the groups for about 30 mins. The members fled experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
when they approached one of the groups. However, Yu caught up with the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
petitioner. Upon searching the latter, he found a fragmentation grenade and-frisk" serves a TWO -FOLD INTEREST: (1) the general interest of
tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." One of Yu’s companions effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber pistol was recovered. that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
Sammy Malacat was charged with violation of Sec.3 of PD appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
1866 for illegal possession of hand grenade. possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of petitioner is valid. officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
Held: No. Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a used against the police officer.
grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will be
discussed below. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures invalid:
is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a
seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days
to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
peace officer or a private person may, without a petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary
warrant, arrest a person: to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before
being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest expressly declares otherwise,
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or companions were "immediately collared."
is attempting to commit an offense;
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could
(b) When an offense has in fact just been have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes
committed, and he has personal knowledge of were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already
committed it; and 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were
merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
(c) When the person to be arrested is a trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
prisoner who has escaped . . .
Q And what were they doing?
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section A They were merely standing.
5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Q You are sure of that?
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited A Yes, sir.
to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." create any commotion.
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless ANone, sir.
search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the
accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant A None, sir.
requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe
concepts of a "STOP-AND-FRISK" and of a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to
LAWFUL ARREST. These two types of warrantless searches differ in Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
and in their allowable scope. between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was

indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as FACTS: Accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged for violation
noted by the trial court: of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused Mikael
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
were not yet aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. December 1988 as a tourist. On May 11, 1989, the accused went to
They did not see any bulging object in his person. Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. An order to establish a checkpoint in the
said area was because it was reported that in that same morning a
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the During the inspection, suspecting the bulge on accused's
Constitution. waist, CIC Galutan required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag with
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
PEOPLE vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain
G.R.No. 74869, July 6, 1988, CRUZ, J. hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Before the accused alighted from the
bus, he stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Facts: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them.
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo A teddy bear was found in each bagand when the officers opened the
City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, teddy bears it also contained hashish.
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him
to their headquarters for investigation. ISSUE: Whether the search made by the NARCOM officer was illegal
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later having no search warrant issued.
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act HELD: No. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
was filed against him. secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a
received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and under the following circumstances stated in Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the rules
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer on criminal procedure.
had pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. In his defense, Aminnudin accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
bag was confiscated without a search warrant. foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not
Issues: armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
1. W/N the arrest was legal? personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of
2. W/N the seized effects may be used as evidence as the search the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
was allegedly an incident to a lawful arrest? believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
Held: circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
1. No. There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
probable cause. The accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even suspiciously and attempted to flee.
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. It was held that has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic
for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant and attempted to flee.
can be secured. Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM
that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
The present case presented no such urgency. From the prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to drugs in his possession.
arrest and search Aminnudin. His name was known. The vehicle was Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a When NARCOM received the information, a few hours
warrant. Yet they did nothing to comply Moreover, the accused- before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling
appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police
so. authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of what are informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out
popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It
was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was held that when faced with on-the spot information, the police officers
was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a BULGE
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused
the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only
carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly became suspect and so managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent
arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to his identification papers when required to do so?
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. (1) The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
2. NO. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there possession, plus (2) the suspicious failure of the accused to produce
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
inadmissible. cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM
officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
198 SCRA 401, G.R. No. 91107, 19 Jun 1991
54
one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of
to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the
(2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago filed charges
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law against the Chief of Police and the Customs Commissioner.
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
ISSUE: Where petitioners allowed to search and seize the questioned
Espano vs. CA artices even without a warrant?
G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998
HELD: Yes. The policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs
Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the
and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and
identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases . But in
went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge
was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, or justice of the peace . . ." It is our considered view, therefore, that
petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
July 29, 1991. exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in laws.
convicting him on the basis of the following: (a) the pieces of evidence
seized were inadmissible; (b) In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized
ISSUE: W/N the marijuana confiscated from the house in addition to the the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended
marijuana confiscated while Espano waa frisked may be used as petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not
evidence? even allege that there was a search. All that they complained of was, "That
while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any
HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police,
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which where they were detained."
provides:
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of freedom from
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
seized." because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the
as proof of the commission of an offense . It may extend beyond the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the
under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of circumstances under which it is made must be looked to.
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan
and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. "The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production and taken
As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, animal-
trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare.
initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they
unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
warrant. Such search cannot fall under "SEARCH MADE INCIDENTAL silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world
TO A LAWFUL ARREST," the same being limited to body search and before their advent. The question of their police control and
to that point within reach or control of the person arrested , or that reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious
which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called
escaping . In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house "bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which is itself is no small matter.
when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a
of his house was within his reach or control. vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their
active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the which the law especially guards from search and seizure without
DOCTRINE OF SEARCH MADE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST. process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized
The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and
were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a
beyond the reach and control of petitioner. condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our
criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile
upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
Papa vs. Mago unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial
G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made."
FACTS: Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by
on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the
effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws,
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila, We have thus
two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case.
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate
No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the People vs. Musa
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993

FACTS: In the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and
test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the
selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled
agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
informer, to the house of Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer and money or property found upon his person which was used in the
had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper- furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of
wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus cause." Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-
Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money
be marijuana. found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy- without arrest and search warrants.
bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for
which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the
buy- bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then
Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic
a receipt. The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up bag hanging in a corner.
security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's
raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful
two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong. "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at evidence.
strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt.
Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from The "PLAIN VIEW" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The
gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, "PLAIN VIEW" DOCTRINE is usually applied where a police officer is
Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Furthermore, the
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of
marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right the doctrine:
hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped
towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house. "What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which
four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -
The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits the
the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
P20. 00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At something incriminating at last emerges."
Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in
wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa.
"plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
The appellant assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
bag containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it
appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged must be “IMMEDIATELY APPARENT” to the police that the items that
signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked subject to seizure.
money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he
gave the marked money to his wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in
Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to
"cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen." find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the
They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their
they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The
questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
admissible in evidence. police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent
kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM
agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
ISSUE: May all the evidence herein confiscated be exluded under the intention of fishing for more evidence.
exclusionary rule?
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
HELD: NO. Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask
every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by providing the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v.
in Article III, Section 2, the following:
California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain
view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. observer.
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search

and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain
Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, the Court stated that "[t]he most important view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

56
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in RAMIREZ vs. CA
any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by FACTS:
virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D.
wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEMBER 29, 1989 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
Command (NCRDC) was activated to maintain peace and order, the costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. (Conversation attached
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed below)
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other
the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had than a participant to the communication.
gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected Private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. with SC, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
CA promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure without in the present court's order is null and void. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
case is illegal. which CA denied. Hence, this petition.
HELD: No. Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being ISSUE:
harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act
grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine parties to the conversation.
checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners'
right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. The constitutional HELD:
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would
from a consideration of the circumstances involved. be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine being authorized by all the parties to any private
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which or cable, or by using any other device or
are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the record such communication or spoken word by
facts of each case. using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a any private communication to secretly record such communication
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded party other than or different from those involved in the private
as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation
and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in under this provision of R.A. 4200.
such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions ---- which all sum up moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in
to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the persons.
former should prevail. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is together with the deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
an orderly society and a peaceful community. alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
SEC. 3 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
AND CORRESPONDENCE Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word COMMUNICATE comes from the latin

word communicare , meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting nilapastangan mo ako.
signification, , as in a CONVERSATION , or signifies the "process by CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.
a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)". Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non- Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or (G.R. No. 107838, February 20, 1996)
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private Mendoza, J.,
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" FACTS : Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below: forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
fear from their conversations being overheard. But Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
this statement ignores the usual nature of seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their against her husband. Dr. Martin, hence brought an action for the recovery
lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations of the documents and papers and for damages against Cecilia. The trial
are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, court rendered its judgment declaring Dr. Martin as the capital/exclusive
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti- owner of the said properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
social desires of views not intended to be taken the trial court.
seriously. The right to the privacy of communication
, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers seized by Cecilia are
our Constitution must have recognized the nature of admissible in evidence against Dr. Martin.
conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings HELD: NO. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
and of his intellect. They must have known that part of evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
in the unaudited, and free exchange of applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
communication between individuals — free from her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, following the principle that in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized her.
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
CONVERSATION: the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am. Defendant subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo. communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) of fidelity that each owes to the other.
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, FELIPE NAVARRO vs COURT OF APPEALS
kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999,MENDOZA, J.
ang babalik sa 'yo, nag- aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo,
kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa Facts:
akin makakahingi. Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike Lingan, who were
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up reporters of the radio station together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
to 10:00 p.m. Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a
hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act.
paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and
kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita). took a picture. This called the attention of Dante Liquin, the floor manager,
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko. who together with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko. demanded to know why he took a picture which resulted to a heated
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on argument. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun,
your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. They went to the police
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa. station to report the matter. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon. motorcycle who were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa. corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, cursed him. Petitioner Navarro
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako. then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana — Jalbuena. At this point, Lingan intervened. The two then had a heated
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. exchange. As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him
Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako. with the handle of his pistol. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako. face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung forehead which floored him. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was
paano ka puma- rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko. deceased. This was submitted as evidence.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon. Issue:
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union. Whether or not the tape is admissible as evidence in view of RA 4200
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka which prohibit wire tapping?
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa
akin, dahil tapos ka na. Held: No, it may not. Sec. 1 of RA 4200 provides that “ It shall also be
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob. unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts

penalized in the next preceding sentence to knowingly possess any tape TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION. When the access
record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies code of the control programs of the particular computer system is
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make
after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the stored within the system.
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That It is plain and the SC held that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper
shall not be covered by this prohibition safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
of PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS . Since the exchange between track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
persons such are claimed to belong. consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
OPLE v. TORRES encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998; Puno, J. prevent.
FACTS: The SC rejected the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual
Petitioner Blas Ople prays that the SC invalidate Administrative Order No. has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. THE
System" on two important constitutional grounds: one, it is a usurpation of REASONABLENESS OF A PERSON'S EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on DEPENDS ON A TWO-PART TEST: (1) whether by his conduct, the
our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether
this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The
factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of
the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
ISSUE: diminish this expectation. The use of biometrics and computer technology
Whether AO 308 violates the constitutionally mandated right to privacy in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation
of privacy.
HELD. Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the Next, the Solicitor General urges the SC to validate A.O. No. 308's
subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an abridgment of the right of privacy by using THE RATIONAL
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to RELATIONSHIP TEST. He stressed that the purposes of A.O . No. 308
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." are: (1) to streamline and speed up the implementation of basic
government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of
services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He
The SC prescinds from the premise that the right to
concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. The SC was not
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the SC upheld the
justified by some COMPELLING STATE INTEREST and that it is
constitutionality of R. A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
NARROWLY DRAWN.
a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a
public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities,
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the
his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the individual's
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public
security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. The
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A.
debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019
issuance of A.O. No. 308. BUT WHAT IS NOT ARGUABLE IS THE itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were
BROADNESS, THE VAGUENESS, THE OVERBREADTH OF A.O. NO. prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid
308 WHICH IF IMPLEMENTED WILL PUT OUR PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a
PRIVACY IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is
not narrowly drawn. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to
should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for the Constitutions.
identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
"generation of population data for development planning." This is an
government which by issuing A.O . No. 308 pressures the people to
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on
the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308
record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive
can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
information for a purpose other than the identification of the
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
individual through his PRN.
Thus, the petition was GRANTED.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308
cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN every time he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. SECTION 4
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded
— whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency.
The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments,
income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN,
the better the chance of building a huge formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered THE UNITED STATES vs FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL.
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918.
this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
our authorities to resist. It does not provide who shall control and Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
the integrity of the information. THERE ARE ALSO NO CONTROLS asking for his removal.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of
first instance for the 7th Judicial District requesting investigation, proper "The DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS rests upon
action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration
charges. The judge of first instance, having established guilt, of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances
recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.'"
from his position as justice of the peace and it is ordered that the
proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Privilege is classified as either ABSOLUTE or QUALIFIED. With the first,
Secretary.Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words
judge of first instance granted the motion, documents were introduced suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.
asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
that charges were made for personal reasons. He was then acquitted.
Thereafter, in 1916, a criminal action for libel against the defendants who "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
earlier initiated the petition for the judge’s removal was instituted. The CFI the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
of Pampanga found the defendants guilty. has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained incriminatory matter which
Issue: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of a libel of Roman without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable."
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of
Pampanga. A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
Held: No.The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer
guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief
McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instruction to the in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle
Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the
rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-
of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The DUTY under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the
for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A
unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
American people demanded before giving their approval to the person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
Constitution. functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case
out of the privilege.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare
verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable jurisprudence of In the usual case MALICE can be presumed from defamatory words.
great English and American Constitutional cases. And what are these PRIVILEGE destroys that PRESUMPTION. The onus of proving malice
principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included are the then lies on the plaintiff.
following:
The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable
full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the cause will amount to proof of malice.
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the
less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good . basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition,
Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be
construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of
agencies of Government - PUBLIC OPINION should be the constant this case with these principles.
source of liberty and democracy.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled . Attempted suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as
contrary, it is a DUTY which every one owes to society or to the State to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for
the duty of all know of any official dereliction on the part of a them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens - to secure the
to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish removal from office of a person thought to be venal - were justifiable.
them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens
the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which
their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were
but only in a despotism." sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince
him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
The RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION is the necessary petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were
right of free speech. ASSEMBLY means a right on the part of citizens submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Executive Secretary.
PETITION means that any person or group of persons can apply, The present facts are further essentially different from those
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the established in other cases in which private individuals have been
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood,
and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the calumny, against the man and not the officer , have been the causes
charges made. of the verdict of guilty.
(1)Public policy, (2)the welfare of society, and (3)the orderly administration We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest
adoption of the DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE.

endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them
for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted. Ayer Production PTY Ltd. vs. Capulong
GR 82380, April, 29, 1988, FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
People vs. Alarcon The petitioner informed private respondent Juan Ponce
GR 46551, Dec. 12, 1939 Enrile about the projected motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out
FACTS: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first below: The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series about People
Instance of Pampanga in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Power—a unique event in modern history that-made possible the Peaceful
Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al., convicting the accused therein — revolution in the Philippines in 1986. Faced with the task of dramatizing
except one — of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory these remarkable events, screenwriter David Williamson and history Prof
letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the Al McCoy have chosen a "docu- drama" style and created [four] fictitious
President of the Philippines. characters to trace the revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the
A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the country.
Federico Mañgahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of Private respondent Enrile replied that "he would not and will
general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. The name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
objectionable portion, written in Spanish, is inserted in the following television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
petition of the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, filed with the Court of First exploitation". Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
Instance of that province on September 29, 1937. On the same date, the respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script. On 23 February
lower court ordered the respondent to appear and show cause. The 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary
respondent appeared and filed an answer, alleging that the publication of Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of
the letter in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom Makati seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie "The Four
of the press. Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production of the
mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection,
ISSUE: constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Whether the publication of the letter in question is within the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to freedom of expression
purview of constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, hence the outweigh private respondent Enrile’s right to privacy?
accused cannot be held guilty in contempt of court?
HELD: YES. The freedom of speech includes the freedom to film and
HELD: produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
1. YES. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are theaters or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age,
well defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or medium of expression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily information, education and entertainment. Motion pictures are important
punish able by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of
ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues
impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits
before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. is considerable. Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public
What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line between what involves
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained,
pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression."This freedom is
decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned
believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the
complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The freedom of speech and of expression.
fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the The counter- balancing claim of private respondent is to a
accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the right of privacy. The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the
important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or right of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into
modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
could not have been influenced by the questioned publication. person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
If it be contended, however, that the publication of the from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic
questioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where the character. Succinctly put, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY cannot be
appeal in the criminal case was then pending, as was the theory of the invoked resist publication and dissemination of MATTERS OF
provincial fiscal below which was accepted by the lower court, we take PUBLIC INTEREST. The interest sought to be protected by the right
the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming our of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the
integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, on which private respondent
its own . The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and relies heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a
this last court be comes thereby charged with the authority to deal with claim to freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a suit
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal. for enforcement of a licensing agreement between a motion picture
The Solicitor-General, in his brief, suggests that "even if producer as licensee and the widow and family of the late Moises Padilla
there had been nothing more pending before the trial court, this still had as licensors. This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a
jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the reason that the motion picture portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate
publication scandalized the court. The rule suggested, which has its origin of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros
at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and Occidental during the November 1951 elections and for whose murder,
in the United States, "the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and
effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our his men were tried and convicted. In affirming the judgment of the lower
constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press." Other court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had
considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As produced the motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the
stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper stipulated royalties, the Court, through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera,
publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the said:
courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute "Neither do we agree with petitioner's
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the submission that the Licensing Agreement is
rule is otherwise after the case is ended. In at least two instances, this null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal
Court has exercised the power to punish for contempt "on the cause or consideration, while it is true that
preservative and on the vindicative principle, on the corrective and petitioner had purchased the rights to the book
not on the retaliatory idea of punishment". Contempt of court is in entitled 'The Moises Padilla Story,' that did not
the nature of a criminal offense, and in considering the probable effects dispense with the need for prior consent and
of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable authority from the deceased heirs to portray
inference consistent with the theory of defendant's innocence will be publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in
indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the that of his mother and the members of his
guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],
administration of justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he 147 NY 434, 42 NE, 31 LRA 286. 49 Am St
must be acquitted. Rep 671), 'a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to
protect his memory, but the privilege exists for

the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings was as yet uncompleted and hence NOT exhibited to any audience.
and to prevent a violation of their own rights in Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what
the character and memory of the deceased.' the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, NO "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" of any violation of any
Petitioner's averment that private respondent right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
did not have any property right over the life of
Moises Padilla since the latter was a public 2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-
figure, is neither well taken. Being a public bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos
figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which led up to that
in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and
invade a person's privacy to disseminate public concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The
information does not extend to a fictional or subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this
novelized representation of a person, no matter country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the
how public a figure he or she may be (Garner public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and
v. Triangle Publications, DCNY, 97 F. Supp., expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject
564, 549 [1951]). In the case at bar, while it is matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and CERTAINLY
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner NOT TO THE PRIVATE LIFE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT PONCE
admits that he included a little romance in the ENRILE. Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of
film because without it, it would be a drab story Moises Padilla necessarily including at least his immediate family,
of torture and brutality." what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalized,
of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it
deal with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan
expression and to privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change
in the name of freedom of speech and expression, a right to produce of government in February 1986.
a motion picture biography at least partly "fictionalized" of Moises
Padilla without the consent of and without paying pre-agreed 3. The extent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan
royalties to the widow and family of Padilla. In rejecting the Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of
licensee's claim, the Court said: "The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be LIMITED IN
CHARACTER. The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioner's synopsis of the proposed film, may be generally described as such
contention that the Licensing Agreement intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful
infringes on the constitutional right of freedom historical account. Private respondent does not claim that
of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any
and as a newspaperman, he had the right to part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of
express his thoughts in film on the public life of his family.
Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The right
of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the 'hierarchy of civil 4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
liberties' public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private
respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a
The prevailing doctrine is that the CLEAR AND "public figure:"
PRESENT DANGER RULE is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible "A PUBLIC FIGURE has been defined as a person who, by his
limitation on freedom of speech and of the accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
press, which includes such vehicles of the profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in
mass media as radio, television and the his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
movies, is the 'BALANCING-OF -INTERESTS personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included
TEST'. The principle 'requires a court to take in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation
conscious and detailed consideration of the by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional
interplay of interests observable in a given baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however,
situation or type of situation' broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and
explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy,
In the case at bar, the interests observable are and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It
the right to privacy asserted by respondent and includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
the right of freedom of expression invoked by attention is focused upon him as a person.
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
particular circumstances presented and their right of privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less
considering the obligations assumed in the indiscrimately, in the decisions" that they had sought publicity and
Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, consented to it, and so could not complain when they received it; that their
the validity of such agreement will have to be personalities and their affairs had already become public, and could no
upheld particularly because the limits of longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press had a
freedom of expression are reached when privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who
expression touches upon matters of essentially have become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of
private concern. these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability
when they were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within
Whether the "BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST" or the "CLEAR AND the scope of the public interest they had aroused.
PRESENT DANGER TEST" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions,
the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public
production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public
Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of and other agencies of information to tell it. 'NEWS' includes all
privacy." events and items of information which are out of the ordinary
humdrum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the which arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its
instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in
respondent Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by making its own definition of news, as a glance at any morning newspaper
petitioners. The respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and other crimes, arrests and
and producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is important to note police raides, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, a death from
that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon the the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to a
movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film biography of twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been
Moises Padilla. Because of the preferred character of the constitutional murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many other similar matters of
rights of freedom of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal.
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint upon the exercise of such
freedoms. The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not, of course, Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia,
mean that no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of
claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent the change of government in February 1986. Because his
Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of
Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played
the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of
(20) days later; for the projected motion picture privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily NARROWER than that of
an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the
62
seclusion of simple private citizenship . He continues to be a "public Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended
figure." After a successful political campaign during which his party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It
participation in the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to
referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public came not from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself when
place, the Senate of the Philippines. he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor.
Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of
right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the identifiability alone the case falls.
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or We now proceed to resolve the other issues and pass upon the pertinent
reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private findings of the courts a quo on wether the disputed articles constitute
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must, further, be no privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability.
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent
and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every
facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. defamatory imputation is presumed to be
Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
essentially private concern ." To the extent that "The Four Day and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private except in the following cases:
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA 1) A private communication made by any
Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be person to another in the performance of any
regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be legal, moral or social duty; and,
carried out even without a license from private respondent.
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals which are not of confidential nature, or of any
GR 126466, Jan. 14, 1999, BELLOSILLO, J. statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by
FACTS: Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the public officers in the exercise of their functions.
incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc.,
owner of The Philippine Star. Between May and July 1989 a series of
articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION may be either absolutely privileged
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities or qualifiedly privileged . ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED
of an "organizer of a conference " without naming or identifying private COMMUNICATIONS are those which are not actionable even if the
respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI,
mentioned. Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from
National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED
obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal Associates. In turn, COMMUNICATIONS containing defamatory imputations are not
petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private actionable unless found to have been made without good intention
respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications"
claim that he was using his column for character assassination. 7 and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private
respondent filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within
Soliven, among others. the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as
correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private
ISSUE: Whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
communications as to exempt the author from liability. remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
HELD: YES. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since FAIR
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST are likewise
It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis
the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. Art.
publication. III, Sec. 4, provides: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people to
Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
bar. grievances. In the case of U.S vs. Bustos, this Court ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This
respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the
of the Jaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue of legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing
The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private libels.
respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed
by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an of the press . To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to
"organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing
June 1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the
National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal organizers freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos:
are not specified" . Neither did the disclose the identity of the conference
organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where 'Public policy, the welfare of society, and the
private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive orderly administration of government have
Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. The printout demanded protection of public opinion. The
and tentative program of the conference were devoid of any indication of inevitable and incontestable result has been the
Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an article entitled development and adoption of the doctrine of
"Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's privilege.'
name, while the tentative program only denominated private respondent
as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer.
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule
No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of
several organizers and that he was only a part of the organization , public opinion.
thus -
To reiterate, FAIR COMMENTARIES ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he INTEREST are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
the subject articles. His letter to the editor published in the 4 June 1989 false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
issue of The Philippine Star even showed private respondent Wenceslao's judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
uncertainty - nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
PUBLIC PERSON IN HIS PUBLIC CAPACITY, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public

official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is health, or any other legitimate public interest.
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the facts. 2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of
public interest. In his testimony, private respondent spelled out the Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free
objectives of the conference thus - speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and
x x x x The principal conference objective is to explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that
come up with a draft of an Omnibus Bill that will the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in
embody a long term land transportation policy for a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
presentation to Congress in its next regular become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to
session in July. Since last January, the National be sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the
Conference on Land Transportation (NCLT), the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in
conference secretariat, has been enlisting a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right
support from all sectors to ensure the success of likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give
the project.25 [TSN, 29 July 1991, p. 15.] vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For
if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to
Private respondent likewise testified that the FNCLT was raising funds non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole
through solicitation from the public - reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to
be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be
members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true
to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is
imbued with PUBLIC INTEREST. An organization such as the FNCLT guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder
aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country and in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of
seeking to source its funds for the project from the public at large cannot dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of
but invite close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As
legitimacy of the purpose of the activity and of the qualifications and pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise,
integrity of the personalities behind it. United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling
is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers."
It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked,
REYES vs.BAGATSING riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
GR 65366, Nov. 9, 1983, Fernando, J. avoided. To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by
FACTS: intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-
Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful 3. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear
march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as
starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is
Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage,
public property, a short program would be held. of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and
The filing of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was due use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. It discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of
reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views
strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was made to absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations where good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
a large number of people is expected to attend." denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a denial of freedom of expression v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that
arising from the denial of the permit? plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus
nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff- municipality.
HELD: Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use,"
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the
grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous 4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the
proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should
substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for categorically declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that
be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, section 2, providing
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom that `no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the
that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, selectmen of the town or from licensing committee,' was construed by the
Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing
consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid.
free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned
the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme
not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of Court, held that `a statute requiring persons using the public streets
the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the
grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity

to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free
discretion to issue or refuse license, . . .'" Nor should the point made by speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored.
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without Pita vs. Court of Appeals
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted GR 80806, Oct. 5, 1989
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements
civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the of the Special Anti- Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western
good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
desired to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M.
circumstances would be entitled to protection." Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several
officers and members of various student organizations. Among the
5. There is a novel aspect to this case. If the rally were confined to Luneta, publications seized, and later burned, was “Pinoy Playboy” magazines
no question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march would published and co-edited by Leo Pita. On 7 December 1983, Pita filed a
end at another park. As previously mentioned though, there would case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two injunction seeking to enjoin and or restrain Bagatsing, Cabrera and their
gates of the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would agents from confiscating his magazines or from otherwise preventing the
be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic
adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
Relations and binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of its speech and of the press.
Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as
intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the a result of an anti-smut campaign.
mission or impairment of its dignity." The Constitution "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, " To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the Held: NO. We cannot quarrel with the basic postulate suggested by
generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the appellant that seizure of allegedly obscene publications or materials
law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present deserves close scrutiny because of the constitutional guarantee
danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of protecting the right to express oneself in print (Sec. 9, Art. IV), and
the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable
justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point searches and seizure (Sec. 3, Art. IV). It must be equally conceded,
would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on however, that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature
staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred that is offensive to public morals, Also well settled is the rule that the
(500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for other right against unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes certain
purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seizure, or
its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or
view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech movable structure
and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that
question still confronts this Court. The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being
asked to pronounce what "OBSCENE" means or what makes for an
By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an obscene or pornographic literature. Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the
assembly should inform the licensing authority of (1)the date, (2)the Court laid down THE TEST, in determining the existence of obscenity,
PUBLIC PLACE where and (3)the time when it will take place. If it as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene,
were a PRIVATE PLACE, only the consent of the owner or the one is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to article charged as being obscene may fall." "ANOTHER TEST," so
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and
permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an common sense of men as an indecency." Kottinger hastened to say,
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or indecent must
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached . If depend upon the circumstances of the case," and that ultimately, the
he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of
a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. the community reached by it."
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, About three decades later, this Court promulgated People v. Go Pin, 10 a
they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech prosecution under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. Go Pin was also
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are even hazier:
highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, - even more so than on the other . . . We agree with counsel for appellant in part. If such
departments - rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits
respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no
felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of offense committed. However, the pictures here in question
judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic
precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to the extent that there may be qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that
inconsistencies between this resolution and that of Navarro v. the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain
Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made clear in the and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the
original resolution of October 25, 1983. exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not
be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures
9. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or exactly artists and persons interested in art and who
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and
mission or chancery; and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of
finds support in the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for
on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the love for excitement, including the youth who because of their
distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield
500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied, themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he pictures.
did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be
challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional
application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine
peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no lines have neither been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to
proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in question were used not
issue was obviated. Should it come, then the qualification and exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," the
observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.

It was People v. Padan y Alova, 13 however, that introduced to Philippine
jurisprudence the "redeeming" element that should accompany the work, "To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
to save it from a valid prosecution. We quote: sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test."
. . . We have had occasion to consider offenses like the As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a
exhibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude, political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be
which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a
to morals. In those cases, one might yet claim that danger, a danger that must not only be (1) clear but also, (2) present,
there was involved the element of art; that to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government
connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts
might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present
nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for,
nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But an DUE PROCESS.
actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts
of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of
offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it does, all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
influence specially on the youth of the land. . . . search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
In a much later decision, Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, the Court, following The Court of Appeals has no "quarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not
trends in the United States, adopted the test: "Whether to the average without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from
person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals." 36 Neither do
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Kalaw- we. But it brings us back to square one: were the "literature" so
Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the confiscated "pornographic"? That "we have laws punishing the author,
sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "DOMINANT publisher and sellers of obscence publications (Sec. 1, Art. 201, Revised
THEME" of the work rather than isolated passages , which were Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 960 and P.D. No. 969)," is also fine,
central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that but the question, again, is: Has the petitioner been found guilty under the
"contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what statute?
is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the
determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due
enforcers. process.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes

"obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to
recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparently, the Hence, we make this resume.
courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of
free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of 1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant
opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;
what is acceptable to society. And "[t]here is little likelihood," says Tribe,
"that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so 2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought
until the Court recognizes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless, to be seized are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of
although it is subject ---- as in all speech ---- to regulation in the interests an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
of [society as a whole] ---- but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how
human sexuality should be regarded and portrayed." 3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
"obscene:" the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in and on His Honor's sound discretion. (a matter of judicial
the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut ---- determination)
provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply
because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual 4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue
tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step the search warrant prayed for;
with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears,
say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present 5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of
generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the the Revised Penal Code;
thirties yet their works are considered important literature today. 29
Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but 6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may
now adorns the world's most prestigious museums. assess whether or not the properties seized are indeed "obscene"
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or
matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power
and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than under the Civil Code or the Revised Penal code.
resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is NOTE: In other words, the determination of what is “obscene” is a judicial
not, and has not been, an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a function.
settled matter. We share Tribe's disappointment over the discouraging
trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well as his pessimism on SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. V. COMELEC
whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight. G.R. No.147571; May 5, 2001
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic Facts: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
than rushing to a "perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair
possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with Election Act). Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election
the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local
petition. levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the
However, this much we have to say. other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to
the last day of the elections on May 14,2001. Petitioners claimed that
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of said provision, which prohibited the publication of surveys affecting
free expression, although not its protection. In free expression national candidates fifteen days before an election, and surveys
cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of affecting local candidates seven days before an election. Respondent
the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
State interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral
Bagatsing, "the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
danger that would justify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
authorit[ies]." Issue: Whether or not §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or press.
conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present
danger." "It is essential for the validity of . . . previous restraint or Held: YES. The Supreme Court in its majority opinion concluded that the
censorship that the . . . authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal disputed provision constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the
of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require." freedom of speech, expression and the press.

The O’Brian Test
To be sure, §5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression,
and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in
affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days United States v. O'Brien: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently
immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
local election. Because of the preferred status of the constitutional [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if
rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, “any system expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . “. The Government than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint.’There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
validity that inheres in every legislation. content-neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the
review of such laws." It is noteworthy that the O'Brien test has been applied
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, by this Court in at least two cases. Under this test, even if a law furthers
which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the
presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like §5.4. For as we have suppression of free expression. " Moreover, even if the purpose is
pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 is limited to nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression
ensuring “equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply” as is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in
well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such question.
media facilities for “public information campaigns and forums
among candidates.” This Court stated: Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as
applied to §5.4. To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution According to the Court, Section 5.4 was invalid because of three reasons:
may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises (1) it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it
in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory was a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of though such suppression was only for a limited period, and (3) the
securing equal opportunity among candidates for political governmental interest sought to be promoted could be achieved by
office, although such supervision or regulation may result means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. The
in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free petition for prohibition was granted.
press.
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion of the O’Brien test because the
MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test of causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental
clear and present danger for determining the validity of §5.4. Indeed, as interest makes such interest “not unrelated to the suppression of
has been pointed out in Osmeña v. COMELEC, this test was originally free expression.” By prohibiting the publication of election survey
formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech results because of the possibility that such publication might
cases. Hence, while it may be useful for determining the validity of laws undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a
dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not be whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such a test is concerning the same subject matter by NEWSPAPER COLUMNISTS,
concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as RADIO AND TV COMMENTATORS, ARMCHAIR THEORISTS, AND
basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of §5.4 and similar OTHER OPINION MAKERS. In effect, §5.4 shows a BIAS for a
regulations. particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring PERSONAL
OPINION to STATISTICAL RESULTS. The constitutional guarantee of
Instead, MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of freedom of expression means that “the government has no power to
balancing by “weighing and balancing the circumstances to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
determine whether public interest [in free, orderly, honest, peaceful its content.”[11] The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the
and credible elections] is served by the regulation of the free expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in
enjoyment of the rights”. After canvassing the reasons for the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,[12] thus:
prohibition, i.e., to prevent last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of
bandwagon effect to favor candidates, misinformation, the “junking” of There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
weak and “losing” candidates by their parties, and the form of election prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
cheating called “dagdag-bawas” and invoking the State’s power to Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
supervise media of information during the election period (pages 11-16), the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words ¾ those which by their
the dissenting opinion simply concludes: very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
Viewed in the light of the legitimate and significant objectives of Section and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
5.4, it may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech and may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
of the press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. Indeed, it is a mere order and morality.
restriction, not an absolute prohibition, on the publication of election
surveys. It is limited in duration; it applies only during the period when the Nor is there justification for the prior restraint which §5.4 lays on protected
voters are presumably contemplating whom they should elect and when speech. In Near v. Minnesota,[13] it was held:
they are most susceptible to such unwarranted persuasion. These surveys
may be published thereafter. (Pages 17-18) [The] protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. . . . No
The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these one would question but that a government might prevent actual
considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of
Instead, reliance is placed on Art. IX-C, §4. As already stated, the transports or the number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the
purpose of Art. IX-C, §4 is to “ensure equal opportunity, time, and primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates publications. The security of the community life may be protected against
therefor for public information campaigns and forums among incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly
candidates.” Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is government . . . .
noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006, §14 has lifted the ban and now allows
candidates to advertise their candidacies in print and broadcast media. Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition
Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of survey results would imposed by §5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a
sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a
ground that the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the electoral process. absolute, and substantial . It constitutes a total suppression of a
category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period
In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7)
This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the days immediately before a local election.
challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression,
and the press with little protection. For anyone who can bring a This sufficiently distinguishes §5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, §11(b), which this
plausible justification forward can easily show a rational connection Court found to be valid in National Press Club v. COMELEC and
between the statute and a legitimate governmental purpose. In contrast, Osmeña v. COMELEC] For the ban imposed by R.A. No. 6646, §11(b)
the balancing of interest undertaken by then Justice Castro in Gonzales v. is not only authorized by a specific constitutional provision, but it
COMELEC,[7] from which the dissent in this case takes its cue, was a also provided an alternative so that, as this Court pointed out in
strong one resulting in his conclusion that §50-B of R.A. No. 4880, which Osmeña, there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media
limited the period of election campaign and partisan political activity, was advertisements by the COMELEC space and COMELEC hour.
an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is
unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction

of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet ISSUE: Was the Mayor’s refusal to grant the permit to peaceably
criterion of the O’Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not assemble violative of the Constitution?
greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As
already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on HELD: YES. The rights of freedom of speech and to peacefully
voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, “junking” of weak or “losing” assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called “dagdag- fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
bawas.” Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they guaranteed by the Constitution. The exercise of those rights is not
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of absolute; it may be regulated so that it shall injure the equal
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by enjoyment of others having equal rights, or the rights of the
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such rights
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. is the "police power"--- the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987,[17] the COMELEC is given health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
the power: welfare of the people--- exercised by the legislative branch by the
enactment of laws regulating those rights, and it may be delegated to
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing
and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false their legislative bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact
election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. ordinances for the purpose.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained SEC. 1119 is susceptible to two constructions:
in §5.4. Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus
survey results calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their (1) That the Mayor has unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to
own surveys conducted. No right of reply can be invoked by others. No grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly ;
principle of equality is involved. It is a free market to which each candidate -or-
brings his ideas. As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon (2) That the applicant has the right to a permit, which shall be
effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with this natural- granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable
enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
the “winners.” Some are susceptible to the herd mentality. Can these be used for the purpose, to secure convenient use of the streets and
legitimately prohibited by suppressing the publication of survey results public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing
which are a form of expression? It has been held that “[mere] legislative to minimize the risk of disorder.
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient The Court adopted the second construction; the ordinance only
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the confers upon the Mayor the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
maintenance of democratic institutions.” determine or specify the streets or public places where the meeting
may be held. It does not confer upon him unfettered discretion to
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, refuse to grant the license. A statute requiring persons using the
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty public streets to procure a special license therefor from the local
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, "any system of prior restraints of expression authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional assembly, WHERE THE LICENSING AUTHORITIES ARE STRICTLY
validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for LIMITED, in the issuance of licenses, to consider the time, place, and
the enforcement of such restraint.'" There is thus a reversal of the normal manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the
presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation. public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide
Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX -C, §4 of the Constitution, proper policing. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to authorizing the
which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of holding of meetings.
communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like
§5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media The Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of
political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. streets, parks, and the other public places. "REGULATE" includes
IX-C, §4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the the power to control, govern, and restrain, but not suppress or
right to reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for prohibit. The legislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact
the use of such media facilities for "public information campaigns and ordinances regulating reasonably the exercise of the fundamental
forums among candidates." personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public places
cannot be delegated to the Mayor by conferring upon him
NOTE: The power to regulate, does not include the power to prohibit. unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and
control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or
partiality and oppression prevented.
ASSEMBLY & PETITION “An ordinance in that case subjects to the unrestrained will of a
single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or control
G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948,Feria, J. his action. His action or non- action may proceed from enmity or
prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other
FACTS: Primicias, via petition for mandamus, sought to compel Fugoso to improper influences and motives easy of concealment.”
issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda to
An ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power is
petition the government for redress of grievances. void. In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable
to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, the legislative body of the manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
City. It has been granted the following legislative powers, to wit: "(p) to attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any
provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a
and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues ... legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not
parks, cemeteries and other public places." Thus, the Municipal Board discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and
enacted sections 844 and 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, which arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
prohibit, as an offense against public peace, and penalize as a
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in
manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief that the
a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." SEC. 1119 states that the law interferes."
streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use "Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be
of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the
oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so
same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by
framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion”
ordinance or regulation… Provided that the holding of any parade or
procession in any street or public places shall only be done if a Mayor’s “Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion
permit is secured… of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation.” (The Court cited
The Mayor’s reason for refusing the permit was his reasonable ground to
a U.S. case)
believe, based on previous utterances and the fact that passions on the
The power of municipalities to regulate the use of public streets is
part of the losing groups remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
conceded . The privilege of a citizen to use the streets may be
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute. The authority of a
in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. However,
convenience of the people in the use of public highways is
petitioner’s request was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting."
consistent with civil liberties, a means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend. Where a restriction of the

use of highways is designed to promote the public convenience in the
interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some 1. Whether or not the decision of responded violates the
civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. As constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly and
regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a free speech?
traditional exercise of control by local government, the question is whether 2. Whether or not the suspension meted out by the school
that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right authorities are not violative of due process?
of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and
the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to Held:
public places.
1. NO. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the
The Court, citing a U.S. case, held: “A municipal ordinance requiring invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it
the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
streets, highways, public parks, or public buildings of the city and disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression,
authorizing the director of public safety, for the purpose of which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any
preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which "is
to issue a permit (and not merely to regulate) when after not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing . . . of a
investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
application, he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is right to prevent." In the above case, a permit was sought to hold a
not a valid exercise of the police power. peaceful march and rally from the Luneta public park to the gates of the
United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an open space
Streets and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of of public property, a short program would be held, Necessarily then, the
the public and have been used for purposes of assembly, question of the use of a public park and of the streets leading to the
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public United States Embassy was before this Court. We held that streets
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has been a part and parks have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The public and have been used for purposes of assembly to
privilege of a citizen to use the streets and parks for communication communicate thoughts between citizens and to discuss public
of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; issues.
it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in The situation here is different. The assembly was to be held
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in NOT in a public place but in private premises , property of respondent
consonance with peace and good order; BUT IT MUST NOT, IN THE University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of the summary this
GUISE OF REGULATION, BE ABRIDGED OR DENIED. relevant excerpt: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
If the Ordinance “does not make comfort or convenience in the use where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
of streets or parks the standard of official action,” instead, it enables only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
a single official to refuse a permit on his MERE OPINION that such possession is required." Petitioners did seek such consent. It was
refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage, IT granted. According to the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a
IS VOID. It can be an instrument of arbitrary suppression of free permit granted to them by the school administration, the Supreme Student
expression of views on national affairs. Council where your petitioners are among the officers, held a General
Assembly at the VMAS basketball court of the respondent University."
Moreover, the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws There was an express admission in the Comment of private respondent
cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or University as to a permit having been granted for petitioners to hold a
authority, except police regulation which are conferred upon the student assembly. The specific question to be resolved then is
legislative body of a municipal corporation. The police power to regulate whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
the use of streets and other public places has been conferred by the and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to
Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City. The Legislature has not peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
conferred upon the Mayor the same power.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech.
Besides, a grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a They were entitled to do so. They enjoy the said right like the rest of the
permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their
parades, or meetings, would be null and void. Under our democratic thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
system of government, no such unlimited power may be validly granted to case. They do not, shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of
emergency. educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
"FEAR OF SERIOUS INJURY cannot alone justify suppression of free safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the formulation in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to which the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities.
speech is practiced; that the danger apprehended is imminent and Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the
the evil to be prevented is a serious one.” Imminent danger can justify students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
prohibition ONLY IF the evil apprehended is relatively serious. That attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is process. A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or
serious injury to the state. on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he
does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
MALABANAN v. RAMENTO requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school'
G.R. No. L-62270; May 21, 1984, Fernando, J. and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it
Facts: Petitioners were students of Gregorio Araneta University, granted stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts
by the school authorities to hold a meeting, however they must comply classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
with some terms and conditions. Instead of following the terms and of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
conditions, the students continued their march to the Life Science building, guarantee of freedom of speech."
outside the area stated in the permit. Classes were disturbed due to the
noise. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by
their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the the student leaders. If in the course of such demonstration, with an
University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely
as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
employee, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types.
noise created. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through a They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the
CFI of Rizal and before the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the
Respondent, Ramento, as director of the National Capital Region, found exuberance of youth. They may give the speakers the benefit of their
petitioners guilty of the charge of holding an illegal assembly which was applause, but with the activity taking place in the school premises
characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
for one academic year. disciplinary action for conduct, which "materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
Issues:

One last matter. The objection was raised that petitioners failed to there was no actual disruption of classes. Petitioners therefore ask for
exhaust administrative remedies, That is true, but hardly decisive. exoneration or, in the alternative, award of back wages for the period of
Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case, three (3) years when they were not allowed to work while awaiting
especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively resolution of their appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the period of
called for, and time being of the essence, this Court has invariably six (6) months' suspension eventually meted them.
viewed the issue as ripe for adjudication. What cannot be too
sufficiently stressed is that the constitutional rights to peaceable assembly ISSUES:
and free speech are invoked by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and 1. WON the public school teachers were involved in a “strike”?
very likely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and 2. WON the teachers should be penalized for participating in
assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great the strike?
importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public. 3. WON penalizing the teachers for participation in the strike
That they have a right to do as citizens entitled to all the protection amounts to a denial of their right to peaceably assemble?
in the Bill of Rights.
HELD:
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case
of Reyes v. Bagatsing, for this Court to lay down the principles for the 1. YES. The persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass
guidance of school authorities and students alike. The rights to actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of
peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be grievances. The mass actions staged by Metro Manila public school
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless teachers amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence
evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or out for essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure the
utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they
in school premises, permit must be sought from its school were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request teaching hours.
arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic 2. YES. The teachers were penalized not because they exercised their
personnel. right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such
right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences
thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced
2. YES. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. It does not responsible.
follow however, that the petitioners can be totally absolved for the Although petitioners contend that classes were not
events that transpired. Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified, appointed by Secretary Cariño, that the prompt remedial action taken
in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the by Secretary Cariño might have partially deflected the adverse
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it was continued longer effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability
than the period allowed. According to the decision of Ramento, the of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the
concerted activity went on until 5:30pm. Private respondent could thus, very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary.
take disciplinary action. On those facts, however, an admonition, even a “This Court denies the claim that the teachers were thereby denied
censure certainly not a suspension could be the appropriate penalty. their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
While the discretion of both respondent University and responded redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be
Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable
calls for a much lesser penalty. If the consent of proportionally limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare.” The public school
between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not teachers in these mass actions did not exercise their constitutional
followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts
to a due process question. To avoid this constitutional objection, it is prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass
the holding of this court that a one-week suspension would be protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
punishment enough. refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had
the teachers availed of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or
holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or
DELA CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS even the Supreme Court - could have held them liable for their
G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, Bellosillo, J. participation in the mass actions.
FACTS:
The respective school principals submitted reports to the 3. NO. In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, it was held that for
Secretary of DECS regarding the participation of public school teachers the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
(petitioners) in an illegal strike and their defiance to the return-to-work redress of grievances to be upheld, like any other liberty, it must be
order issued by the DECS Secretary. The Sec. of DECS on his own filed exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public
an administrative complaint against the petitioners for the said acts which welfare. The public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions
were considered as a violation of the Civil Service Decree of the did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the
Philippines. For failure to submit their answers the Sec. of DECS issued contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
an order of dismissal against the teachers which was implemented service by staging the mass protests on regular school days,
immediately. Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they
(MSPB) and then to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC found had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time
petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service" — recess, after classes, weekends or holidays — to dramatize their
for having participated in the mass actions and imposed upon them the grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the
reduced penalty of six (6) months' suspension. However, in view of the bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even the
length of time that petitioners had been out of the service by reason of the Supreme Court — could have held them liable for their participation
immediate implementation of the dismissal orders of Secretary Cariño, the in the mass actions.
CSC likewise ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the service
without back wages. Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decision.
They initially filed petitions for certiorari with the SC which were all referred The argument that the rights of free expression and
to the CA. The CA ruled that the questioned resolutions of the Civil Service assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred
Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best position in the hierarchy of civil liberties is not applicable to defend the
interest of the service were based on reasonable and justifiable grounds; validity of the 1990 mass actions because there is a higher consideration
that petitioners' perceived grievances were no excuse for them not to involved here which is the education of the youth.
conduct classes and defy the return-to-work order issued by their
superiors; that the immediate execution of the dismissal orders of
Secretary Cariño was sanctioned under law. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION v.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals grievously PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO. INC.
erred in affirming the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of conduct G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973, Makasiar, J.
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only "offense" was
to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the Facts: Sometime in 1969, petitioner decided to stage a mass
government for redress of their grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that demonstration in Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the
the mass actions of September/October 1990 were not "strikes" as Pasig Police. Respondent Company, however requested petitioner that

the first-shift workers should not participate in the strike for it will unduly So it has been stressed that the (1)“FREEDOMS OF SPEECH” and
prejudice the normal operation of the company. Despite the warning, all (2)“OF THE PRESS” as well as (3)“OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND
the workers including those who were in first-shift still participated in the OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES” are absolute when
rally. Prior to that, respondent company informed that workers who belong directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
in the first-shift, who were without previous leave of absence approved by right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed,"
the company, who shall participate in the rally shall be dismissed for it is a even relying on the balancing-of-interests test.
clear violation of the existing CBA and is tantamount to an illegal strike. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass
Respondent company then filed a charge against petitioners and later demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their
dismissed some of its employees. "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work,"
herein petitioners are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated
Issues: Whether or not the constitutional freedoms of speech and the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
expression of the petitioner were violated by the respondent company in Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles
preventing some of its employees to participate in the rally and later governing a democratic society, such a conclusion cannot be sustained.
dismissed some of them. The demonstration held by petitioners was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, NOT against their employer, herein private
Held: No. There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an
which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar. exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They
article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person. of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, local police officers. It was to the interest of herein private
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
patience with general principles.” efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the
Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its
by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free laborers vis-a- vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on employees to further indignities.
the outcome of no elections." Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of
the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as
behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
the authority it was entitled to exercise. local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right the weapons afforded them by the Constitution he untrammelled
to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we absence of its employees, is a plea for the preservation merely of
cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell
want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its
Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality
all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are abused, harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the
protected. peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions As heretofore stated, THE PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM
on erring public officers and employees. OF EXPRESSION, OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF PETITION FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES over PROPERTY RIGHTS has been
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon at
of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely personality, the all- consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
regulation only "with narrow specificity." officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
political, economic or otherwise.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of employees, according to the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the effect imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to observe regular working
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and hours." The strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not such stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a mass
permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of these freedoms over demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a
property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or virtual tyranny over the mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on
object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory such a slender ground.
nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if
evil which the State has the right to prevent. it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. The respondent Court
of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is not rooted

in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they right to petition for redress.
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to
the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of
of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the
Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it
position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day;
Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of
their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages
lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only
rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts one day.
in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for
dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not IV
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional. Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
III employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to that "the State shall afford protection to labor . . ." Respondent Court of Industrial
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
"to engage in concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights employees of their right to self -organization for the purpose of collective
guaranteed in Section Three." bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being."
It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement
the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as
aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was ordained and directed by the Constitution.
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in
such a common action to better shield themselves against such alleged
police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional
workers for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal
potent means of inhibiting speech." conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank president with immorality, confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
nepotism, favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense
of bank employees. We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the
supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years.
Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to
their interests. accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which
the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned police. Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the
order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public
"any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations,
operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere
workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a
leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is
report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing
threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient
demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
local police, were more important to them because they had the courage inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the
to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of period for appeal . The battle then would be reduced to a race for
their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
which to pay for competent legal services. Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is
a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear
VI. and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a
public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion,"
and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance"
motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because
to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord strict scrutiny test.
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only Respondent’s argue:
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that
the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and 1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The presented evidence that they had been “injured, arrested or
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the detained because of the CPR,” and that “those arrested
aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.]
should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as 880 and other offenses.”
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to 2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners
cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner
the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-
employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is
was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, cannot be equally well served by a means that is less
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880
leaves open alternative channels for communication of the
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme information.
Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public
motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, assembly’s time, place and manner of conduct. It entails
1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and
the Court of Industrial are concerned. serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce
and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes
the denial of a permit on the basis of a rally’s program
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses content or the statements of the speakers therein, except
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; under the constitutional precept of the “clear and present
so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is danger test.” The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v. Comelec.
even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the
constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis 4. Adiong v. Comelec held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding
public assemblies and the law passes the test for such
determination of the dispute can be made. It is thus seen that a procedural regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial
rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional governmental interest to support them.
right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial 5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[9] held that a
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional local chief executive has the authority to exercise police
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair power to meet “the demands of the common good in terms
labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said of traffic decongestion and public convenience.”
charge. Furthermore, the discretion given to the mayor is narrowly
circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e),
13 and 15 of the law.
Bayan vs. Ermita 6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent.
“Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Azcuna, J. create a clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health”
Facts: Petitioners allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the and “imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil” both
express the meaning of the “clear and present danger test.”
Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were 7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means
violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was allowed by existing laws and ordinances to protect public
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to
No. 880. Malacanang also issued a policy denominated as “Calibrated call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and
Pre-emptive Response” (CPR) on all rallies. Said “CPR Policy” provides, dynamic enforcement of existing laws, regulations and
among others: ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not
replace the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.
The rule of calibrated preemptive
response is now in force, in lieu of maximum Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his
tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be dismissed on the
while those with ill intent are herding a witting ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a
or unwitting mass of people and inciting them permit independently of B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were
into actions that are inimical to public order, under the “clear and present danger” rule as there was a clamor to
and the peace of mind of the national stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other
community. people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,[11] Primicias v. Fugoso,[12]
Unlawful mass actions will be and Jacinto v. CA,[13] have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring
a permit; that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for
dispersed. The majority of law-abiding
the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based
citizens have the right to be protected by a
regulation because it covers all rallies.
vigilant and proactive government.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the
We appeal to the detractors of the
submission of all the Comments, the Court set the cases for oral
government to engage in lawful and peaceful
arguments on April 4, 2006,[14] stating the principal issues, as follows:
conduct befitting of a democratic society.
They assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 as well as the policy of

“Calibrated Preemptive Response" or CPR and seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR
policy recently announced.

Issues: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160: people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a
(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations? settled principle growing out of the nature of well-
(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness? ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
(c) Do they constitute prior restraint? is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall
(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors? not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
Declaration of Human Rights? community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the
Preemptive Response (CPR): power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness? general welfare of the people. This sovereign police
(b) Is it void for lack of publication? power is exercised by the government through its
(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
October 4, 5 and 6, 2005? those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative
Held: bodies called municipal and city councils enact ordinances
for purpose.
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as
citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition,
as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B .P. No. 880 1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the
which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: “No law shall be
assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action grievances.” Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty
as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
permit. censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings
I. B.P. 880 IS unless there be a “clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the
CONSTITUTIONAL State] has a right to prevent.” Freedom of assembly connotes the right
of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied,
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA, the Court, as occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican
early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado, already upheld the institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the
right to assembly and petition, as follows: opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence
There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a
assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole
and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to
pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character
rights. As early as the onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
to acknowledge:
“It is rather to be expected that more or less 2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt
to protest against grievances whether real or from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: “It must never be forgotten,
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason
the greater, the grievance and the more intense the by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of
disciplinary control of the leaders over their communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as
permitted to seize upon every instance of such an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.” What was
crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether
a seditious and tumultuous rising against the verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be
authorities, then the right to assemble and to remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing
petition for redress of grievances would expose all parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the
those who took part therein to the severest and prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It
to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in
guilty individuals should be sought out and the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter.
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-
be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
and seditious conduct and between an essentially advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.” under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court likewise sustained the primacy violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As
of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise,
convenience in the use of streets and parks. United States v. Apurado: “It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers.”
It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous xxx
conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give
free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to 8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold
make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
scheme of values. public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a
private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage its grant but at another public place . It is an indispensable condition
of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: “Whenever the title of streets and to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets the proper judicial authority . Free speech and peaceable assembly,
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments
consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for
respondents, be abridged or denied.” The above excerpt was quoted with and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes “as the sovereign prerogative
categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the of judgment.” Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the
commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as
of plaintiff- municipality. Reference was made to such plaza “being a they do precedence and primacy. x x x.
promenade for public use,” which certainly is not the only purpose that it
could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in
should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from Reyes.
a public park that is the Luneta.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to
the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas
Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is NOT AN
the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of ABSOLUTE BAN OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES BUT A RESTRICTION
Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in THAT SIMPLY REGULATES THE TIME, PLACE AND MANNER OF THE
Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: “Our conclusion finds ASSEMBLIES. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,[20]
support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New where the Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies
chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any
ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from it refers to all kinds of public assemblies[22] that would use public places.
licensing committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because
Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,”
Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly content
Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‘a based, since they can refer to any subject. The words “petitioning the
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or government for redress of grievances” come from the wording of the
procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is
is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the content of the expressions in the rally.
state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade Furthermore, THE PERMIT can only be denied on the ground of
or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. “Nor should the exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal
point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
be ignored: “Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the and Political Rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The Article 20
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the
safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of association.
the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately
depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most xxx
familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a
restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to Article 29
promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be
disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in 1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
other circumstances would be entitled to protection.” the free and full development of his personality is possible.
xxx 2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: “The question, if the respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; welfare in a democratic society.
not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution 3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be
protects.” There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful Nations.
character. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of Article 19.
what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. interference.
The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking
for the American Supreme Court, is not to be “abridged on the plea that it 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
may be exercised in some other place.” expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of

frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
II. THE CPR IS NULL &
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this VOID
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are necessary: The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the
Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
(b) For the protection of national security or of public respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Solicitor General, thus:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, THE LAW IS VERY CLEAR and is At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum
nowhere vague in its provisions. “Public” does not have to be tolerance mandated by B. P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if
defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster’s Dictionary it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
defines it, thus: means something else. Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x tolerance, which specifically means the following:
x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common
interests or characteristics x x x. Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law xxx

refers to “rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.” So it does not (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the
cover any and all kinds of gatherings. highest degree of restraint that the military, police and
other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to
avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress xxx
has the right to prevent.
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not
not relevant to the regulation. interfere with the holding of a public assembly.
However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a enforcement contingent under the command of a
precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test responsible police officer may be detailed and
stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to “imminent and grave danger of a stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters
substantive evil” in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace
not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the and order at all times.
same power independently under Republic Act No. 7160[24] is thus not
necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall
parties in their arguments. be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when
their assistance is requested by the leaders or
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that
an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no their responsibility to provide proper protection to
prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any those exercising their right peaceably to assemble
time: and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards
this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and following guidelines:
municipality in the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of this Act (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent
establish or designate at least one suitable who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete
“freedom park” or mall in their respective uniform with their nameplates and units to which they
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal
shall be centrally located within the parts of their uniform and must observe the policy of
poblacion where demonstrations and “maximum tolerance” as herein defined;
meetings may be held at any time without
the need of any prior permit. (b) The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may
In the cities and municipalities of be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash
Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high
shall establish the freedom parks within the shoes with shin guards;
period of six months from the effectivity this
Act. (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or
any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless
This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision. the public assembly is attended by actual violence or
The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of
knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park – Fuente property.
Osmeña.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. –
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
course, he added. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the
police may disperse such public assembly as follows:
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880’s mandate that
every city and municipality set aside a freedom park within six (a) At the first sign of impending violence, the
months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been taken for call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly
granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
revolution of 1986.
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks
Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential or other harmful objects from the participants are
part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s exercise of their thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at
right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to any property causing damage to such property, the
rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance
public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For
without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be (c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as
to deny the right. “Advance notices” should, however, be given to stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop
the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
proceedings. contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly, and after allowing

a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse; Batas Pambansa Blg. 880
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right
participant shall also be made during the public Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And] For
assembly unless he violates during the assembly a Other Purposes
law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act.
Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
Section 1. Title . – This Act shall be known as “The Public
(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of Assembly Act of 1985.”
the peace during the public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed. Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
xxx redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and
stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life,
– When the public assembly is held without a permit liberty and equal protection of the law.
where a permit is required, the said public assembly
may be peacefully dispersed. Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall (a) “Public assembly” means any rally, demonstration, march,
constitute violations of the Act: parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action
held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or
(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or expressing an opinion to the general public on any particular issue;
otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
assembly; economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of
grievances.
(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a
member of any law enforcement agency or any The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public
person to disperse the public assembly; meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed
by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully
one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of observed.
the public assembly or on the occasion thereof:
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing
xxx and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees
resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa
law enforcement unit; Bilang 227.
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing (b) “Public place” shall include any highway, boulevard,
the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza
vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems. square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people
are allowed access.
Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by
petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and (c) “Maximum tolerance” means the highest degree of
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities
one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the
necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists same.
who can show the police “an application” duly filed on a given date
can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their (d) “Modification of a permit” shall include the change of the
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or
being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in similar changes.
which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the
procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law. Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- A
written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
In sum, this Court reiterates ITS BASIC POLICY OF UPHOLDING THE organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY FREEDOM permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made
OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY. In several policy in (1) a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or (2) in
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that one entitled to its legal possession is required, or (3) in the campus
“in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily of a government- owned and operated educational institution which
against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election
that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy campaign period as provided for by law are NOT covered by this Act.
presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to
heightened scrutiny.” Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for a
permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
SUMMARY:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the
1. For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive

names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to
response policy has no place in our legal firmament and be used for the intended activity; and the probable number of
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds persons participating, the transport and the public address systems
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by to be used.
some police agents to justify abuses.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and
2. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned

responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.
as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict (c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled
being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit public assembly.
of rallyists, not the government.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly
3. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor
“permits” is valid because it is subject to the shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous
constitutionally-sound “clear and present danger” place in the city or municipal building.
standard.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall
his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and observe the following guidelines:
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, (a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal
public morals or public health. with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must observe the
the application within two (2) working days from the date the policy of “maximum tolerance” as herein defined;
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed
granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his (b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not
behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot
shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle
mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed. high shoes with shin guards;
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and (c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or
who must be heard on the matter. deliberate destruction of property.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public
on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours. assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the assembly as follows:
application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. (a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any
Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the possible disturbance;
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other
(48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or at
appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such
modifying if in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall
immediately executory. audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the
public assembly will be dispersed;
(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be
decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed (c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer
disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank. of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to
the participants of the public assembly, and after allowing a
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to
Supreme Court. forthwith disperse;
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals (d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also
are hereby allowed. be made during the public assembly unless he violates during the
assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such
Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. – Should the proposed public arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any amended;
public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public (e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to peace during the public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction
so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the
flow of commerce and trade. public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is required,
the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. – It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations of
take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended the Act:
public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance with
the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the (a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act
following: by any leader or organizer without having first secured that written
permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under use of such permit for such purposes in any place other than those
the permit; set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to otherwise peaceful assembly;
prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of
the public assembly; (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a
permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and other official acting in his behalf;
law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held
peacefully; (c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or
acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not any official acting in his behalf;
go beyond the time stated in the permit; and
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;
any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other
persons not participating in the public assembly. (e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any
law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law assembly;
enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law (f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one
(100) meters away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly
and order at all times. or on the occasion thereof:
Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative 1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as
for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that
their responsibility to provide proper protection to those exercising 2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is

3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
thoroughfares; develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit; under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
sound systems. elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
Sec. 14. Penalties. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any of exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding section (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1,
shall be punished as follows: subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c],
Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher,
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the
of one month and one day to six months; armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec.
13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec.
subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad.
and one day to six years; Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral
imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866; certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall Code).
be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to
shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish or the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or mall in their Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does
respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the
meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by
permit. the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
period of six months from the effectivity this Act. were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts
Sec. 16. Constitutionality.—Should any provision of this Act of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that
be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international
Sec. 17. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, letters of importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is
instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed,
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
amended, or modified accordingly. contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Sec. 18. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
approval. Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
Approved, October 22, 1985. question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are
of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its
Gregorio Aglipay vs. Juan Ruiz activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937, Laurel, J. character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
Facts: -supra- frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the freedom of religion?
Held: No. The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the Andres Garces, et. al, vs. Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo, et.
principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of al. G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981,Aquino, J.
adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, FACTS: The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City issued four (4)
has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San
occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.
the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and One of the resolutions further provided that the barangay council, in
aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas
church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the
was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor
Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the as chairman of the next feast day.
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the
of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino People. It is occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered
almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso,
freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked
in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind Veloso to file against Father Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a
themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of charge for grave oral defamation. Father Osmea retaliated by filing
religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. administrative complaints against Veloso on the grounds of immorality,
It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance
Constitution is RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, not mere RELIGIOUS of the law. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the
TOLERATION. Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the
request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, however, as a constitutional ignored" the council's resolutions, the council enacted another resolution,
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a Osmea for the recovery of the image. On June 14, 1976, the barangay
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to council passed another resolution, appointing Veloso as its
his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the representative in the replevin case.
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their against Father Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea

turned over the image to the council. ln his answer to the complaint for license. Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer
replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions library demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay the sum of P5, 891.45 which it
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member paid under protest. A suit was brought by plaintiff against defendant.
of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and
Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members Issue: WON the imposition of the fees constitute an impairment of the
(excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at free-exercise of religion of the petitioner as imposed on its sale and
Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions. The lower distribution of bibles.
court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the resolutions.
Held: YES. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
ISSUE: Whether the resolutions contravene Section 5 of Article III of the enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the
Constitution. right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right
can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on
HELD: NO. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently,
the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the
mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As
noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious
affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian
of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring
the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement
would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily
be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in
connection with prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in
their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored
the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes
swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could
see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta. The
Court finds that the momentous issues of separation of church and
state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any
sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or
indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues. This
case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image . lt would
never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful
and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions
to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question
belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs
to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image,
has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it
chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the
Catholic church that action would not violate the Constitution
because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private
property. The council has the right to take measures to recover
possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property. In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was
involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos
for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs.
Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department
Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps
to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church. The purpose of
the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The
design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing
about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended. The
instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49
Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La
Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of
raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the
Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held
accountable for the funds which it held as trustee.
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the
annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment
dismissing their amended petition is affirmed.
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957, Felix, J. The fees under Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied
to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
Facts: Plaintiff -appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non- profit, religious, enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. There is a difference when
Philippines. In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has the tax is imposed upon the income or property of the religious
been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except organization and one imposed against the acts of disseminating religious
during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and information. To tax the latter is impair the free exercise and enjoyment of
translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was religious beliefs regardless of the amount of such fees.
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945,
without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal As to Ordinance No. 3000 requiring the obtention of a mayor’s permit
San Beda College of Law before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or
80
occupations enumerated therein, we do not find that it imposes any where it INC again won but was directed to refrain from attacking other
charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, religions. The Court of Appeals reversed the same.
nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Ordinance No. 3000
cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Issue:
Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, 1. Whether the MTRCB has jurisdiction to review petitioner's TV program
is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo?
powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved 2. Whether the action of respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV
herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121 should be sustained?
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as
well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Held:
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, 1. YES. The right to religious profession and worship has a TWO-
trade or occupation of the plaintiff. FOLD ASPECT, viz., (1) freedom to believe and (2) freedom to act on
one's beliefs. The “first is absolute” as long as the belief is confined
"In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance within the realm of thought. The “second is subject to regulation”
requiring that a license be obtained before a person could canvass or where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or merchandise cannot welfare.
be made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious
from door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to 'purchase' program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public
certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom
Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of the books was twenty-five cents each, of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
the 'price' of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in making and ears of children. The Court reiterates the rule that the exercise of
the solicitations there was a request for additional 'contribution' of twenty- religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
five cents each for the books and five cents each for the pamphlets. about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which
Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated in the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
case interested persons were without funds. overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind
that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than a religious adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern
venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and
occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court continued: bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this
'We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free stultifying strife considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism
from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean vs. American with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have
Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which
here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our
one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird
employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the
on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of
tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space
the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not
of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the 2. NO. First, The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the petitioners TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will show that the
close all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed
would thus be denied the needy. . . . by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they
were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section
suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom
But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax - a flat of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of
Rights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of Second, even a sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal
these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship that, the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the
which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee religious program of petitioner, is not among the grounds to justify an
imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television program.
activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the
and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against
guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.'
Third, in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible
upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty
owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
Alabama (326 U.S. 501) or by the United States itself as held in the case carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on
expressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and freedom of expression on the ground that there is aclear and present
religion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional right of danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent."
property owners. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that ". . . it
is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent animmediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA extent necessary to avoid the danger."
G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, Puno, J. Lastly, the records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings
Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground
that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law." EBRALINAG et. al. vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
In its first course of action against respondent Board, INC SCHOOLS OF CEBU
appealed to the Office of the President where it was favored and then G.R No. 95770, March 1, 1993
again, before the Quezon City RTC alleging that the respondent Board
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring FACTS:
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them,

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute country, . . . — assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable
required by Republic Act No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, L. ed. 1042, 1046.)
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe
that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as
bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
5:21". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the
They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect
against official control SC holds that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of
constitutionality of the above provision of the new Administrative Code of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs
1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1265 and the may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the
implementing orders of the DECS. flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our
ISSUE: country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious
Whether or not the expulsion of students by reason of not persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed
upholding the flag salute law is unconstitutional? before every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through
that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting
HELD: the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was
YES. The 30-year old decision of SC in Gerona upholding the flag salute proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our
law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and
lightly to be trifled with. sovereignty of our nation.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling
had received legislative cachet by its in corporation in the Administrative Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our
Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to re- Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their
examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate
flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being and cherish the Philippine flag.
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which Estrada vs. Escritur
guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006
religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution;
Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 (NOTE: Strict neutral benevolence vis-à-vis Strict Separation/ Strict
Constitution). Neutrality)
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is
entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among FACTS:
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator In a sworn-letter complaint dated July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro
(Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Estrada requested Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531). 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, for an investigation of
The right to religious profession and worship has a respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with
TWO-FOLD ASPECT, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on a man not her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her
welfare act.[2] Consequently, respondent was charged with committing
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but
to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have
not justified. a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
The SC is not persuaded that by exempting the Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent
Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national asserted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of
shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation Pledging Faithfulness.”
"untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the
flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the
(Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not marital relations . The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and where divorce is allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the
learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but Jehovah’s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are
also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities’ approval of
virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples
national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation.
curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared respective spouses’ commission of adultery are investigated before the
in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations were
the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovah’s
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where the declarations
dully constituted authorities. were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943): Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an ceases, and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s case,
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . although she was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to
When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those marry on her part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus,
we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not their declarations remained valid. In sum, therefore, insofar as the
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in
touch the heart of the existing order. good standing in the congregation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative case herein should be dismissed? To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with
the very idea of a free exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific
HELD: applications they may have intended, clearly envisioned religion as
YES. In our decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long and arduous something special; they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing
scrutiny into the origins and development of the religion clauses in the the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science.
United States (U.S.) and the Philippines, we held that in resolving claims The strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction . Thus it is
involving religious freedom (1) BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OR not surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected strict neutrality,
ACCOMMODATION, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, permitting and sometimes mandating religious classifications.
intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our
Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent’s “plea of exemption Thus, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form
based on the Free Exercise Clause” (from the law with which she is of strict separation or strict neutrality, is that while the Jeffersonian
administratively charged), it is the COMPELLING STATE INTEREST wall of separation “captures the spirit of the American ideal of
TEST, the strictest test, which must be applied . church -state separation,” in real life, church and state are not and
cannot be totally separate. This is all the more true in contemporary
In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of religion shows the times when both the government and religion are growing and
movement of establishment of religion as an engine to promote state expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the
interests, to the principle of non-establishment to allow the free exercise of intersection of government and religion at many points.
religion.
(1) Religion Clauses in the U.S. Context

SECOND STANDARD: Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
U.S. history has produced TWO identifiably different, even opposing,
strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses. The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a
different view of the “wall of separation,” associated with Williams, founder
1. First is THE STANDARD OF SEPARATION, which may take of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant
the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer version to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the
of strict neutrality or separation , or what Mr. Justice Carpio church from the state
refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality .
Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former , Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important
both are anchored on the Jeffersonian premise that a “wall role in the public life of the United States as shown by many
of separation” must exist between the state and the Church traditional government practices which, to strict neutrality, pose
to protect the state from the church . Both protect the principle Establishment Clause questions. Among these are the inscription of “In
of church-state separation with a rigid reading of the principle. God We Trust” on American currency; the recognition of America as “one
nation under God” in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag; the
2. On the other hand, the second standard, the Supreme Court’s time-honored practice of opening oral argument with the
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY OR ACCOMMODATION, is invocation “God save the United States and this Honorable Court”; and
buttressed by the view that the wall of separation is meant to the practice of Congress and every state legislature of paying a chaplain,
protect the church from the state. usually of a particular Protestant denomination, to lead representatives in
prayer. These practices clearly show the preference for one theological
viewpoint— the existence of and potential for intervention by a god —
FIRST STANDARD: Strict Separation and Strict Neutrality/Separation over the contrary theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and
government agencies also cooperate in the building of low-cost housing
The STRICT SEPARATIONIST believes that the Establishment Clause and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug
was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state’s addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two. dimension.
According to this Jeffersonian view, an “absolute barrier” to formal
interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected. Religious Examples of accommodations in American jurisprudence also
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the abound, including, but not limited to the U.S. Court declaring the
state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate following acts as constitutional: a state hiring a Presbyterian
burdens the programs placed on believers. Only the complete minister to lead the legislature in daily prayers, or requiring
separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of employers to pay workers compensation when the resulting
religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, inconsistency between work and Sabbath leads to discharge; for
thus a strict “wall of separation” is necessary. government to give money to religiously-affiliated organizations to
teach adolescents about proper sexual behavior; or to provide
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deeply embedded in religious school pupils with books; or bus rides to religious schools;
American history and contemporary practice that enormous amounts of or with cash to pay for state-mandated standardized tests.
aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from government in return for
huge amounts of mostly indirect aid from religion. For example, less than
twenty-four hours after Congress adopted the First Amendment’s (1) Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause
prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion, Congress
decided to express its thanks to God Almighty for the many blessings As with the other rights under the Constitution, the rights embodied in the
enjoyed by the nation with a resolution in favor of a presidential Religion clauses are invoked in relation to governmental action, almost
proclamation declaring a national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer. Thus, invariably in the form of legislative acts.
strict separationists are caught in an awkward position of claiming a
constitutional principle that has never existed and is never likely to. Generally speaking, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits
religion will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because it
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the STRICT violates the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause or
NEUTRALITY OR SEPARATIONIST VIEW, (or, the governmental both. This is true whether one subscribes to the separationist
neutrality theory ) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education, where the approach or the benevolent neutrality or accommodationist
Court declared that Jefferson’s “wall of separation” encapsulated the approach.
meaning of the First Amendment. However, unlike the strict
separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the “wall of But the more difficult religion cases involve legislative acts which have a
separation” does not require the state to be their adversary.” Rather, secular purpose and general applicability, but may incidentally or
the state must be NEUTRAL in its relations with groups of religious inadvertently aid or burden religious exercise. Though the government
believers and non-believers. “State power is no more to be used so as action is not religiously motivated, these laws have a “burdensome effect”
to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” The strict neutrality on religious exercise.
approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that
religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
government action. It does not permit, much less require, allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
accommodation of secular programs to religious belief. hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if As Justice Brennan explained, the “government [may] take religion
applied in interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de into account…to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
facto voiding of religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
School District v. Schempp] strict neutrality could lead to “a brooding state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, exercise may flourish.” In the ideal world, the legislature would
hostility to the religious” which is prohibited by the recognize the religions and their practices and would consider them,
Constitution.Professor Laurence Tribe commented in his authoritative when practical, in enacting laws of general application. But when
treatise, viz:

the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and (2) the state has failed to demonstrate a particularly important or
burdened may turn to the courts for protection. compelling governmental goal in preventing an exemption; and
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a (3) that the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an means.
exemption from its application or its “burdensome effect,” whether
by the legislature or the courts. Most of the free exercise claims brought In these cases, the Court finds that the injury to
to the U.S. Court are for exemption, not invalidation of the facially neutral religious conscience is so great and the advancement of public
law that has a “burdensome” effect. purposes is incomparable that only indifference or hostility could
explain a refusal to make exemptions. Thus, if the state’s objective
(2) FREE EXERCISE Jurisprudence: Sherbert, Yoder and Smith could be served as well or almost as well by granting an exemption to
those whose religious beliefs are burdened by the regulation, the Court
The pinnacle of free exercise protection and the theory of must grant the exemption. The Yoder case is an example where the
accommodation in the U.S. blossomed in the case of Sherbert v. Verner, Court held that the state must accommodate the religious beliefs of
which ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or punishes the Amish who objected to enrolling their children in high school as
religious belief or conduct must be subjected to strict scrutiny under required by law. The Sherbert case is another example where the Court
the Free Exercise Clause. According to Sherbert, when a law of held that the state unemployment compensation plan must accommodate
general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the religious convictions of Sherbert.
the state interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and
compelling as to override the free exercise claim. Otherwise, the B. PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION, the Court finds that the State may,
Court itself will carve out the exemption. but is not required to, accommodate religious interests. The U.S.
Walz case illustrates this situation where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the constitutionality of tax exemption given by New York to church
the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of properties, but did not rule that the state was required to provide tax
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some exemptions. The Court declared that “(t)he limits of permissible state
“compelling state interest” intervenes. accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.” Other examples
Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when government are Zorach v. Clauson, allowing released time in public schools and Marsh
action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief v. Chambers, allowing payment of legislative chaplains from public funds.
or practice, the state must justify the burden by demonstrating that Parenthetically, the Court in Smith has ruled that this is the only
the law embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive accommodation allowed by the Religion Clauses.
alternative exists, and that a religious exemption would impair the
state’s ability to effectuate its compelling interest. As in other C. PROHIBITED ACCOMMODATION. as when the Court finds no
instances of state action affecting fundamental rights, negative impacts on basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it determines that the
those rights demand the highest level of judicial scrutiny. After Sherbert, legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment or the
this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted in court-mandated religious free exercise clause, it results to a In this case, the Court finds that
exemptions from facially-neutral laws of general application whenever establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
unjustified burdens were found. interests. To say that there are valid exemptions buttressed by the Free
Exercise Clause does not mean that all claims for free exercise
Then, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,[61] the U.S. Court exemptions are valid. An example where accommodation was
again ruled that religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding prohibited is McCollum v. Board of Education, where the Court ruled
that the law of general application had a criminal penalty. Using against optional religious instruction in the public school premises.
heightened scrutiny, the Court overturned the conviction of Amish
parents for violating Wisconsin compulsory school -attendance Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results, the
laws. The Court, in effect, granted exemption from a neutral, criminal question now remains as to how the Court should determine which action
statute that punished religiously motivated conduct. to take. In this regard, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test
which is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-accommodation
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following doctrines: (a) approach.
free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or
compelling interest test if government substantially burdened the Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First
exercise of religion; (b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest Amendment is that freedom to carry out one’s duties to a Supreme
test governed cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of Being is an inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of
religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where legislature. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not
the burden was indirect, i. e., the exercise of religion resulted in the merely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. With religion looked
forfeiture of a government benefit; and (c) the Court could carve out upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
application, whether general or criminal.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main components. First, action was 3. Religion Clauses in the Philippine Context: Constitution, Jurisprudence
protected—conduct beyond speech, press, or worship was included in the and Practice
shelter of freedom of religion. Neither Sherbert’s refusal to work on the
Sabbath nor the Amish parents’ refusal to let their children attend ninth a. US Constitution and jurisprudence vis-à-vis Philippine Constitution
and tenth grades can be classified as conduct protected by the other
clauses of the First Amendment. Second, indirect impositions on religious By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that of
conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six weeks of unemployment the Philippines, it is immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude
insurance benefits to Adel Sherbert, as well as direct restraints, such as that we have adopted—lock, stock and barrel—the religion clauses as
the criminal prohibition at issue in Yoder, were prohibited. Third, as the embodied in the First Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Court’s
language in the two cases indicate, the protection granted was interpretation of the same. Unlike in the U.S. where legislative exemptions
extensive. Only extremely strong governmental interests justified of religion had to be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constituting
impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language of the permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for religion are
test of the Free Exercise Clause suggests. mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions. Thus, our 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain provisions on tax exemption of
church property,[123] salary of religious officers in government institutions,
[124] and optional religious instruction.[125] Our own preamble also
invokes the aid of a divine being.[126] These constitutional provisions are
wholly ours and have no counterpart in the U.S. Constitution or its
(3) ACCOMMODATION under the Religion Clauses amendments. They all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in
adopting these constitutions, manifested their adherence to the benevolent
A free exercise claim could result to THREE KINDS OF neutrality approach that requires accommodations in interpreting the
ACCOMMODATION: (a) those which are found to be constitutionally religion clauses.
compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause; (b) those
which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required by the Free The argument of Mr. Justice Carpio that the August 4, 2003 ponencia was
Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the Establishment erroneous insofar as it asserted that the 1935 Constitution incorporates
Clause; and (c) those which the religion clauses prohibit. the Walz ruling as this case was decided subsequent to the 1935
Constitution is a misreading of the ponencia. What the ponencia pointed
A. MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION results when the Court finds that out was that even as early as 1935, or more than three decades before
accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause, i.e, when the the U.S. Court could validate the exemption in Walz as a form or
Court itself carves out an exemption. This accommodation occurs when permissible accommodation, we have already incorporated the same in
all three conditions of the compelling interest test are met: our Constitution, as a mandatory accommodation.
(1) a statute or government action has burdened claimant’s free exercise There is no ambiguity with regard to the Philippine Constitution’s departure
of religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief; from the U.S. Constitution, insofar as religious accommodations are
concerned. It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-

accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent Court should take off in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal
and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution.[128] As stated in towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religious liberty
our Decision, dated August 4, 2003: “not only for a minority, however small- not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us” to the greatest extent possible
The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows within flexible constitutional limits.
that these clauses were largely adopted from the First Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution xxxx Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on II. THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS
the religious clauses also continued to borrow authorities from U.S.
jurisprudence without articulating the stark distinction between the two We now resume from where we ended in our August 4, 2003 Decision. As
streams of U.S. jurisprudence [i.e., separation and benevolent neutrality]. mentioned, what remained to be resolved, upon which remand was
One might simply conclude that the Philippine Constitutions and necessary, pertained to the final task of subjecting this case to the careful
jurisprudence also inherited the disarray of U.S. religion clause application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., determining
jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams; thus, when a religion whether respondent is entitled to exemption, an issue which is essentially
clause case comes before the Court, a separationist approach or a factual or evidentiary in nature.
benevolent neutrality approach might be adopted and each will have U.S.
authorities to support it. Or, one might conclude that as the history of the There has never been any question that the state has an interest in
First Amendment as narrated by the Court in Everson supports the protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the
separationist approach, Philippine jurisprudence should also follow this sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which
approach in light of the Philippine religion clauses’ history. As a result, in a respondent’s relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I,
case where the party claims religious liberty in the face of a general law Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code, Articles 334
that inadvertently burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the provisions on marriage
insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that the wall of separation and family in the Civil Code and Family Code, all clearly demonstrate the
would not be breached if the Court grants him an exemption. These State’s need to protect these secular interests.
conclusions, however, are not and were never warranted by the 1987,
1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other provisions on religion in Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically
all three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in constitutional construction that articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is
the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently conflicting a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy
provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will give of rights — “the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,” in the
to all of them full force and effect. From this construction, it will be words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the
ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds
neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in
Philippine constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is the specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
goal of construing the constitution exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpio’s total adherence to the U.S. religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free
Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses to effectively deny Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
accommodations on the sole basis that the law in question is neutral and
of general application. For even if it were true that “an unbroken line of Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institutions
U.S. Supreme Court decisions” has never held that “an individual’s of marriage and the family,” or even “in the sound administration of
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise justice” that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,” our own State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the
Constitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words,
exempt religion. Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect, exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent
interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This,
permissive accommodations. the Solicitor General failed to do.
To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, the Court granted To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest
to plaintiff exemption from a law of general application based on the Free test, the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be
Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was required by an ordinance to sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be
secure a mayor’s permit and a municipal license as ordinarily required of merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that
those engaged in the business of general merchandise under the city’s unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill
ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to “religious censorship any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
and restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
people of the Philippines.” Although the Court categorically held that the against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to
questioned ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not prosecute respondent nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said “merchandise” for amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
profit, it also ruled that applying the ordinance to plaintiff and requiring it to Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in
secure a license and pay a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny
of religious profession and worship and its right of dissemination of the exemption would effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two
religious beliefs “as the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife
power to control or suppress its enjoyment.” The decision states in part, [approximately twenty-five years]” and have the effect of defeating the very
viz: substance of marriage and the family.
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of The Solicitor General also argued against respondent’s religious freedom
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to on the basis of morality, i.e., that “the conjugal arrangement of respondent
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can and her live-in partner should not be condoned because adulterous
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the relationships are constantly frowned upon by society”; and “that State laws
grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive on marriage, which are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the
evil which the State has the right to prevent. religious beliefs and practices of any church, religious sect or
denomination on marriage. Verily, religious beliefs and practices should
At this point, we must emphasize that the adoption of not be permitted to override laws relating to public policy such as those of
the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach does not mean marriage.”
that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise
claim comes before it. This is an erroneous reading of the framework The above arguments are mere reiterations of the arguments raised by
which the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio seems to entertain. Although Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago in her dissenting opinion to our Decision
benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the Court ought to view dated August 4, 2003, which she offers again in toto. These arguments
religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be have already been addressed in our decision dated August 4, 2003.[154]
afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test In said Decision, we noted that Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago’s dissenting
—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden opinion dwelt more on the standards of morality, without categorically
religious exercise. holding that religious freedom is not in issue.] We, therefore, went into a
discussion on morality, in order to show that:
xxx While the Court cannot adopt a doctrinal formulation that can eliminate
the difficult questions of judgment in determining the degree of burden on (a) The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in
religious practice or importance of the state interest or the sufficiency of our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
the means adopted by the state to pursue its interest, the Court can set a establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. Thus, when the
doctrine on the ideal towards which religious clause jurisprudence should law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the
be directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public morals” in the
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in the New Civil Code,[159] or “moral
because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly, character” in the Constitution,[160] the distinction between public and
because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other,
show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the should be kept in mind;

possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although
(b) Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, the morality contemplated by laws is secular (secular
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality morality), benevolent neutrality could allow for
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state accommodation of morality based n religion (religious
interests; secularity), provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
(c) The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority.
· The COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST involves a
three-step process. The Court explained this process in
detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in
(d) Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious each step, viz:
morality, the more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under
this public and secular morality fall under the phrase “disgraceful and
immoral conduct” for which a government employee may be held 1. “Has the statute or government action created
administratively liable.Only one conduct is in question before this Court, a burden on the free exercise of religion?” The
i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a government employee whose partner is courts often look into the sincerity of the
religious belief, but without inquiring into the
legally married to another which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider truth of the belief. The FREE EXERCISE
both immoral and illegal. CLAUSE prohibits inquiring about its truth.
While there is no dispute that under settled jurisprudence,
respondent’s conduct constitutes “disgraceful and immoral 2. The Court then asks: “Is there a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify the
conduct,” the case at bar involves the defense of religious freedom, infringement of religious liberty?” In this step,
therefore none of the cases cited by Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago THEGOVERNMENTHASTOESTABLISH
apply. There is no jurisprudence in Philippine jurisdiction holding THATITSPURPOSESARELEGITIMATE
that the defense of religious freedom of a member of the Jehovah’s FORTHESTATEANDTHATTHEYARE
Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not COMPELLING.
prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law.
We cannot summarily conclude therefore that her conduct is
likewise so “odious” and “barbaric” as to be immoral and
3. The Court asks: “Has the state in achieving its
legitimate purposes used the least instrusive
punishable by law. means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more thanh necessary to achieve
the legitimate goal of the state?” The analysis
In this case, the government’s conduct may appear innocent and requires the state to show that the means in
nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In which it is achieveing its legitimate state
the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed objective is the LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS,
i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
to protect the minority from the majority, the question of which legitimate state end that imposes as little as
perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the possible on religious liberties.
text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of the
clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive equality—a
reading of the religion clauses which leaves both politically dominant and MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
the politically weak religious groups equal in their inability to use the GR NO. 88211, September. 15, 1989
government (law) to assist their own religion or burden others—makes
the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exile. Pres. Corazon
democracy (the majority or a coalition of minorities). C. Aquino was declared President of the Phils under a revolutionary
government. However, the ratification of the 1987 Constitution further
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to THE strengthened the legitimacy of Mrs Aquino’s authority. The country was far
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY APPROACH that gives room for from being stabilized, though, as continued threats from various sectors
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free ranging from the rebels to the followers of the Marcoses and even those
Exercise Clause.Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held that were initiators of the people power revolution. Mr. Marcos has
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was “illegal per se signified, in his deathbed, to return to the Phils. But Mrs Aquino
because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the firmly on the decision to bar the his and his family’s return.
Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
does not offend compelling state interests. following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the or property without due process of law, nor shall any
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end xxx xxx xxx
that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again, the
Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test. Other Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
than the two documents offered as cited above which established the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
sincerity of respondent’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
was an internal arrangement within respondent’s congregation, no iota of Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
evidence was offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble the interest of national security, public safety, or public
attempt to procure any such evidence to show that the means the state health, as may be provided by law.
adopted in pursuing this compelling interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view
be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms -
including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
to an authority higher than the state, and so THE STATE INTEREST
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will Issue:
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. 1. Whether or not the right of the Marcoses of the liberty of
IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING THAT SUCH STATE INTEREST abode and the right to travel are violated?
EXISTS, MAN MUST BE ALLOWED TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE 2. Whether the President has the power to bar the petitioners
INFINITE. from returning home?
Held:
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITUR SUMMARY: 1. NO. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not
the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
· Benevolent Neutrality recognizes that the government
must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same 86
time, strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail with FGU Instance Corporation
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent as surety.
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to
the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders hearing, both trial judges denied the same.
of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the "right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country. " [Art. 13(2).] ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of liberty of abode is herein
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of violated?
movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right
to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which HELD: NO. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to
rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence
security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and of the nature and function of a bail bond.
freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter The object of a bail bond is to relieve the accused of
his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the
right to return to one's country in the same context as those power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the
court and do what the law may require of him."
The right to return to one's country is not among the The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights , which treats only available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well- operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The result of the
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court,
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
deprived" thereof. would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
2. YES. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of "The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in
anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been
nation demand. It is a (1) power borne by the President's duty to regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment . The
preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a (2) sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the
power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
faithfully executed . state."
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country,
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the in the first place, if it were otherwise.
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her
only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Faced travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the
with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and General in his comment:
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from Country' will show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's
being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common attend to some business transactions and search for
good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers business opportunities. From the tenor and import of
delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto.
people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.] Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute
necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears
no indication that the alleged business transactions could not
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is
G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986, FERNAN, J.: there any hint that petitioner's absence from the United
States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing
stockholders of Trans- Insular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would
Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Following the "run" on stock cause him irreparable damage or prejudice.
brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or
and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities shown that his surety has agreed to it. He merely alleges that his
and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc and for Trans-Insular Management, The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the
Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc. was granted and a assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
management committee was organized and appointed. government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
Pending disposition of SEC Case, the SEC requested the Commissioner against him.
of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to
this effect was issued by the Commissioner. When a Torrens title The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an
submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to absolute right. Petitioner’s contention that having been admitted to
be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the
petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding liberty, could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal. In all travel, is untenable.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all
absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases
pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to
except upon lawful order of the court, or when carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
necessary in the interest of national security, public Section 6, Rules of Court).
safety or public health."
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon
constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times
constitutional provision. whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or
G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was
but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Revised Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional
liberty. More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court
cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused
without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
arraignment and scheduled hearings. territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party
Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information "the accused their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course
has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone
abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court". Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Petitioner's Certiorari Petition
before the Court of Appeals was likewise denied.
SEC. 7 – RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Petitioner takes the posture, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes
the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits
prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION
only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public 150 SCRA 530, 1987
health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
FACTS: -SUPRA-
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were
treated under one provision. Article III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads: ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi should be allowed such right
"The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the HELD:
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired." The constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern is recognized in the Bill of Rights. These constitutional
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which
liberty of travel, thus: the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon
except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
the interest of national security, public safety, or public Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
health" (Article IV, Section 5). conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
sentences and treats them differently, to wit: For every right of the people recognized as
fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided constitutional. Without a government's acceptance of the limitations
by law." imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and
impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public liberty, the ultimate illusion.
safety, or public health." In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both
the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful
duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
national security, public safety or public health" as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may
HELD: YES. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this
even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article II,
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to Section 28 thereof, to wit:
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973
public interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987,
p. 263). In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by
what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction
concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a
to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general
when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
applicability. We granted Mandamus in said case, and in the process, We
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:
party
. . . That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the But the constitutional guarantee to information on
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to
publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39) official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the
in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed
Ozaeta, supra: by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is,
is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the public concern.
motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which This question is first addressed to the government agency
the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed,
scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the
thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v. burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern,
Ozaeta, supra at 388). or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from
the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against
of, or access to, information of public concern . This is not to lose release . . ." To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts,
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido
case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the In determining whether or not a particular information is of
manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. " Public
records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to: Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know , either 1because these directly affect their lives, or
2
. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383,
387). The public concern invoked in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, was
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra,
in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the
criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have
No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was been registered in violation of the Constitution.
filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow
examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles
to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him declares as a State policy that:
upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions
statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access
to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in Public office being a public trust, [Const., Art. XI, Sec: 1] it is the
which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that
damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). constitutional guarantee.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that
part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
of Mandamus in a proper case. government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, from the Civil Service Commission.
the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are
unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus in this case is, whether and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
constitutional guarantee. the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of Mandamus, therefore lies.
access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v.
Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the
same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE
the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 170 SCRA 256, 1989
[1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974] by FACTS:
giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. -SUPRA-

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
the acts sought by petitioner to be done, in pursuance of their right to discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.
information The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks
being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
HELD: same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption
Yes. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be suspended all its military actions.
provided by law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya
government and its employees and administration of various insurance from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
public character. It is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security
that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard
maximizing the benefits to insured government employees. to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001
The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the simply agreed “that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought next meeting.”
clearly a matter of public interest and concern. A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on
Furthermore, the "constituent-ministrant" dichotomy August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
characterizing government function has long been repudiated. That the Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to
GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
of the right to information. Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002
covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away
concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only. chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad’s position as chief peace
negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in
corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA -AD in its
the people's right of access to official records. It is further contended that final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious “consensus”
function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional ever embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed
policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
applicable only to "official" transactions. 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as
respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the
First of all, the "constituent ----ministrant" dichotomy Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon,
characterizing government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[and Vice-Governor
Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices [G.R. Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right
running some business, discharges the same function of service to the to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
people. respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information. petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial
petition was followed by several other petitions by other parties. The Court
Moreover, the intent of the members of the ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them ISSUE:
within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters
manifest from the records of the proceedings of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under
and considering further that government-owned and controlled Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions
are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions HELD: YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public
entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
transparency in government dealings. be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents law.
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the
that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be eventually accorded constitutional status.
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
inspect the records may be insured recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
However, although citizens are afforded the right to In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of political significance. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
public concern. recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nation’s problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision- making if they
are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times.
As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since,
if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.”
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation, so that they
FACTS: may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when the people.
President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

among others: (d)an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress,
That the subject of the information sought in the present (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of
fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public Justice to respondent Director.
concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real
estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for ISSUE: Was there undue delegation with respect to the restriction
adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service imposed on the accessibility of the Manual of Execution?
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery HELD: YES. A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is
of the Marcoses’ alleged ill -gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to
party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of
the correctional system." Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation
contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial with the Department of Health.
character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right to
information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a consummated contract is suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something
not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which
the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and provides:
if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its
defects. "SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the
procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the
dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others,
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the the sequence of events before and after execution;
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a limited to authorized prison personnel."
retreat by the State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.” Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the
Intended as a “splendid symmetry” to the right to information under implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has
the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
II of the Constitution. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by
above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. Being a
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
even if nobody demands. the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, invalid.
with the people’s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even
public officials at all times accountable to the people. with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose. the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern
"which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998 provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of

FACTS: public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for research data used as a basis for policy development, shall
the said crime. be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law."
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual
issues, and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of
No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the same
for the crime of rape. way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied petitioner's Motion for aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the
reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is
not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution Chavez vs. PCGG
of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL FACTS:
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC people's constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
ACT NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Does this right include access to the terms of government
Justice promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the
No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6] and directed the Director of the Bureau government, through the Presidential Commission on Good
of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction alleged ill-gotten wealth? More specifically, are the "General
and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated December 28,
Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and
execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its binding?
implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void for being,

The Case
These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking Limitations to the Right:
(1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from (1) National Security Matters
privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any greement with the At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that
heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; matters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
and privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information,
(2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given
agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or "scrupulous protection."
relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
Marcos heirs." conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to
reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.
The Facts
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former (2) Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside
cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or
systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in related laws) as well as banking transactions ( pursuant to the Secrecy of
a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news Bank Deposits Act 28) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.
items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the (3) Criminal Matters
reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the criminals, which courts may nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously
the national interest, 4 demands that respondents make public any and all jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged covert criminal activities.
billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest,"
since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be (4) Other Confidential Information
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the The Ethical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and employees
people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being from using or divulging "confidential or classified information officially
contrived and effected by the government. known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise public." Other acknowledged limitations to information access include
agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations
PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he of the Supreme Court.
has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become Scope: Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public
effective and binding. Interest
ISSUE: In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information
Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public sought must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be
the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses? limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends
only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
HELD: "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As to the
meanings of the terms "PUBLIC INTEREST" and "PUBLIC CONCERN,"
First Substantive Issue: the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, elucidated:
Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not
In determining whether or not a particular information is of
In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
to a compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill- "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions of the exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
Constitution: subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
government research data used as basis for policy the public.
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the
"legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy are eligibles." So was the need to give the general public adequate
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct
interest. of citizens, as held in Tañada. Likewise did the "public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions borrowers (members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)" qualify
refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being the information sought in Valmonte as matters of public interest and
considered. As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, the Court also held that official
PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, acts of public officers done in pursuit if their official functions are
because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official
the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein. acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of
Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that access to public records.
they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise
with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets. Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are
mandated to "provide information on their policies and procedures
The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of
provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. information, public consultations and hearings whenever
appropriate . . .," except when "otherwise provided by law or when
There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within required by the public interest." In particular, the law mandates free
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance
be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized reports of offices and agencies of government and government-
restrictions: owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets,
liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and
(1) national security matters and intelligence information employees.
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions
(3) criminal matters, and In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
(4) other confidential information. connection with their official functions must be accessible to the
public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental

affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs other classified information.
of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently
performing their functions as public servants. Undeniably, the
essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but thoughts
and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a Section 8 – Right to Form Association
better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able
to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a SSS Employees Association vs. Court of Appeals
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by GR 85279, July 28,1989
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-
informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes FACTS: A complaint for damages was filed by the SSS against the officers
desired by the people. and members of the SSS Employees Association alleging that on June 9,
1987, said officers and members staged an illegal strike and barricaded
the entrances to the SSS building. Said action prevented non-striking
The Nature of the Marcoses' Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth
employees from reporting for work and clients from transacting with the
SSS. Said strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor Management
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2)
Council that ordered the strikers to return to work. Strikers refused
days after the Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was
consequently incurring damages for the SSS.
primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government
resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate ISSUE: Whether or not SSS employees have the right to strike.
family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad.
HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
and entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by law, peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from
with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all
additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten impression, for in the Sub -Article on the Civil Service Commission,
wealth. it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority Government, including government-owned or controlled
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
imbued with public interest. We may also add that "ILL -GOTTEN IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also
WEALTH," by its very nature, assumes a public character . Based on
provides that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in
the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art.
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close
III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution
associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of
recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or
strike.
relationships, "resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing
grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the
expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
right to strike.
economic recovery.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether
provision that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to
petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-
President of the Commission, explained:
Access to Information on Negotiating Terms
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long.
When we proposed this amendment providing for self-
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to
organization of government employees, it does not mean
information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the that because they have the right to organize, they also
final agreement? This same clarification was sought and clearly have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only
addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the
deliberations, which we quote hereunder: right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights,
there is a provision that the right to form associations or
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should
societies whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be
be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or
abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is to prohibit the
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to
strikes coming from employees exercising government
the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the
functions, that could be done because the moment that is
contract itself?
prohibited, then the union which will go on strike will be an
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is
illegal union. And that provision is carried in Republic Act 875.
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr.
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
Presiding Officer.
they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
Vice-President is unfounded. It does not mean that because
“leading” to the consummation of the transaction?
we approve this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the
That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is
national interest. now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice
because we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We
Considering the intent of the Constitution, we believe that it is
know that this problem exists; that the moment we allow
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information
on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or repeat, the right to form an organization DOES NOT
communications during the stage when common assertions are still CARRY with it the right to strike. [Record of the
in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
of information in general, as discussed earlier — such as on matters

93
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the Company a CBA
the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, containing a closed shop provision which states that Membership in the
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original employees workers covered by this Agreement.
charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of RA 875, the employer was not
the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. organization is the representative of the employees." When RA 3350 was
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. enacted, it introduced an amendment: ... "but such agreement shall not
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This members in any such labor organization".
being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. As a member of a sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, appellee resigned from the Union. Thereafter, the
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms Union asked the Company to separate Appellee from service in view of
and conditions of employment in the Government, including any the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. Appellee filed
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by an action for injunction.
LAW" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended
and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as amended). Since the ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional since it infringes on the right to
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, form lawful associations?
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their HELD: No. RA 3350 does not infringe right to association. Both the
employers. Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is
The principle behind labor unionism in PRIVATE INDUSTRY is that the "right" to form or join associations. a right comprehends at least
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. two broad notions, namely: first , liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is,
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he
through the process of collective bargaining . should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he
himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join;
In GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, however, it is the legislature and, and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the
this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that BY REASON OF THE choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same
NATURE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYER and THE PECULIAR breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations.
CHARACTER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE, it must necessarily regard The right to refrain from joining labor orgs recognized by of
the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying the Industrial Peace Act is limited. The legal protection granted to such
to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a
that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. By virtue, of a
the interest of all people in the public service , and that accordingly, closed shop agreement, before RA 3350, if any person, regardless of
such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining
they employ. union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union
is curtailed and withdrawn. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to shop arrangement, RA 3350 introduced an exception : "but such
organize of government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. It merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the
Thus: closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said
may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of
employees' organizations and appropriate government any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
authorities. refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear,
The same executive order has also provided for the general therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It
sector, to wit: does not prohibit the members of said RELIGIOUS SECTS from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
government employees. In case any dispute remains fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them
existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer from joining ; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council them to join. RA 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
for appropriate action. provision on freedom of association.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or

associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the In re: IBP membership dues delinquency of Atty Marcial
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of Edillion A.C 1928, August 3 1978
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be FACTS: The IBP unanimously adopted a resolution commending to the
any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public SC to remove Marcial Edillion, a duly licensed practising lawyer, from the
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action . But roll of attorneys because of his stubborn refusal to pay his membership
employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and dues despite due notice. Edillon refused to pay believing it to be an
other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, invasion of his constitutional rights as he was being compelled to be a
to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. member of the IBP and to pay its dues was a precondition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Is compelling a lawyer to be a member of the IBP violating one’s

constitutional freedom to associate?
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union HELD: No. The SC maintains that the IBP does not make a lawyer a
GR 25246, Sept. 12,1974 member of any group of which he is not already a member of. By
virtue of his passing the Bar exams, Edillon automatically becomes
FACTS: Appellee Benjamin Victoriano is a member of "Iglesia ni Cristo", an IBP member.
an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc, and a member of the

The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the the relief. Thus, the Court declared that the continued operation and
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to enforcement of Republic Act 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
associate. oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and the same
should be declared null and void and without effect. This also holds true as
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which regards Executive Orders 25 and 32, considering that said Orders contain
he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the
passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. This pronouncement
provide an official national organization for the well-defined but is most especially needed in view of the revival clause embodied in said
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or
member. invalid.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual Co. GR 24670, Dec. 14, 1979
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may FACTS: Plaintiff Ortigas was engaged in the business of developing and
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be selling residential lots in Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong. It sold
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program to vendees Padilla and Angeles two lots (Lots 5 and 6) in installments
— the lawyers. under separate agreements of sale. The vendees transferred their rights to
Chavez. Upon completion of payment, plaintiff executed the deeds of sale
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer which contained a restriction, inter alia, that the lots shall be used by the
to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as buyer exclusively for residential purposes. The restriction was annotated in
an exercise of the police power of the state the titles of Chavez. Defendant Feati bought from her the lots and the
building restrictions were also annotated in its titles. Feati maintains that
The Court further maintains that said IBP fees is a regulatory measure the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Blvd. to Pasig River,
intended to raise funds for carrying out its objectives and purposes of the where the lots were located, has been declared a commercial and
integration. The Court carries the constitutional power and duty to industrial zone per Resolution 27 of the Municipal Council of
promulgate rules that concern admissions and practice of law, including Mandaluyong. So, it started constructing a bank on the lots. Plaintiff
the integration of the Philippine Bar. demanded that Feati stop its construction. The latter refused, arguing that
the building was in accordance with the zoning regulations and it had
obtained building and planning permits.
Section 10 – Non-Impairment Clause Plaintiff sought the help of the court to command Feati to comply with the
restrictions annotated in its title. The trial court held that the restrictions
were subordinate to the Resolution, which was a valid exercise of
Rutter vs. Esteban
police power. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council as
G.R. No. L- 3708 May 18, 1953
having rendered ineffective the restrictions. But plaintiff, in a motion for
reconsideration which was subsequently denied, argued that said Council
FACTS: On 20 August 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J. Esteban
had no power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by Feati.
two (2) parcels of land situated in the City of Manila. To secure the
payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same parcels ISSUE: Whether the Municipal Resolution, declaring the lots as part of the
of land was constituted in favor of Rutter. The deed of sale having been commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, superseded the
registered, a new title was issued in favor of Placido J. Esteban with the restrictions imposed by Ortigas, which was a contractual undertaking
mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban failed to pay the
between the parties to the sale
two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued
thereon, and so on 2 August 1949, Rutter instituted an action in the Court HELD: YES! The Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council
of First Instance (CFI) Manila to recover the balance due, the interest due to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
thereon, and the attorney’s fees stipulated in the contract. The complaint municipality. Granting that the Resolution is not an ordinance, it is a
also contains a prayer for the sale of the properties mortgaged in regulatory measure. The general welfare clause is liberally interpreted in
accordance with law. Esteban admitted averments of the complaint but set case of doubt to give more power to local governments in promoting its
up defense on the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342 (approved 26 economic conditions, the social welfare and material progress of the
July 1948), allowing a war sufferer eight (8) years from the settlement of people in the community. The exceptions are “existing vested rights”
his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission. After a motion for arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on
summary judgment has been presented by Esteban, and the requisite one hand and a 3rd party on the other, in which case, the original
evidence submitted covering the relevant facts, the court rendered terms and provisions of the contract should govern. While non-
judgment dismissing the complaint holding that the obligation which Rutter impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
seeks to enforce is not yet demandable under the moratorium law. Rutter absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the police power. The exercise of this power may be judicially inquired
constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion was denied. Rutter into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
appealed. unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or violation
of applicable constitutional guarantees.
ISSUE: Whether Republic Act 342 is unconstitutional for being violative of
The Resolution was passed in the exercise of police
the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
contracts? and general welfare of the people in the locality. The lots in question
not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes
HELD: YES. Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of
have flourished about the place. EDSA was a main traffic artery. The
monetary obligations are not of recent enactment. Moratorium laws have
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the
been adopted “during times of financial distress, especially when incident
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. The right to
to, or caused by, a war.” The Moratorium Law is a valid exercise by the
exercise the police power is a continuing one and a business lawful today
State of its police power, being an emergency measure. Although
may in the future, because of changed situation/ growth of population,
conceding that the obligations of the contract were impaired, the
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to
impairment was within the police power of the State as that power
yield to the public good.
was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which
The State, to promote the general welfare, may interfere
the legislature had found to exist.
with personal liberty, property, business and occupations. The
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a Resolution was reasonable, a legitimate response to a felt public need, not
moratorium statute lies in the determination of THE PERIOD OF whimsical or oppressive. The non-impairment of contracts clause will
SUSPENSION OF THE REMEDY. It is required that such suspension not bar a police power legislation, which is not likely to succumb to
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the the challenge that because of it, contractual rights are rendered
constitution. nugatory.
Herein, obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result Existing laws are read into contracts agreed upon by the
of the issuance of Executive Orders 25 and 32 and at present their parties to fix obligations between them. The reservation of essential
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act 342
attributes of sovereign power is also read intro contracts as a postulate of
and would continue to be unenforceable during the 8-year period granted
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves,
impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by
which in plain language means that the creditors would have to
virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government,
observe a vigil of at least 12 years before they could effect a
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
of society. The law forms part of, and is read into every contract unless
seems to be unreasonable, if not oppressive.
clearly excluded therefrom in those cases allowed.
While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should
be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who

Equity will not enforce a restriction upon the use of property P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of
by injunction where the property has so changed in character and the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the
environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for use should the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms,
restriction be enforced. Since it is now unprofitable and a health-and- diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition
comfort hazard to use lots 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, Feati
should be permitted, on the strength of the Resolution, to use the same for
commercial purposes. There is no proviso in the Resolution expressly
declaring that the ordinance was not intended to interfere with the
agreement between the parties. Thus, even if the restrictions where
assumed by Feati, the contractual undertaking cannot be enforced
as against the police power legislation.
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA vs. HON. ALFREDO CRUZ
G.R. No. L-56291. June 27, 1988,PADILLA, J
LOZANO vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, YAP, J Facts: On July 19, 1979, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant
of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought
Facts: -supra- to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then
detained therein together with several others.The following day, July
Issue: Whether or not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract? 20,1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
Held: No. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of companion." After the identification, the other detainees were brought back
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to down in front of her.
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, On July 23, 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the
under pain of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting petitioner.
them is circulation . Because of its deleterious effects on the public On August 22, 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not held. On April 2, 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. then rested its case.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally On July 14, 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,
protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts . Contracts manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer
which contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind to Evidence. On August 13, 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated
that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the
commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to
become a convenient substitute for money; it form part of the due process.
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory
power of the state. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of petitioner’s constitutional
right to counsel?
Ruling: No. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an

RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO G.R. investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
No. L-56450. July 25, 1983, GUTIERREZ, JR., J elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated
must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person
foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
his favor. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed between Randolph The Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be
Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person
Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that,
P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon. while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up
sheriff of Iloilo served personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings on was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
the private respondents. A day before the scheduled public auction, the entitled, at such stage, to counsel. When the process had not yet shifted
private respondents filed a civil action for specific performance, damages, from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does
and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the petitioners with the not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his
respondent court. The action, sought to declare the extrajudicial lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-
foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was,
null and void. The trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial sheriff therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale. accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated
petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between
Before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of the State and him had not begun.
Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu
Thereof," to which the petitioners interposed an Opposition. The
respondent court granted the respondents' motion.
People vs. Macam
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may order the cancellation of a 238 SCRA 306,Quiason, J.
mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the
payment of a promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a FACTS: The accused –appellant was charged with the crime of robbery
surety bond approved by the same court to secure the payment of the with homicide. Accused and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the
promissory note? security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Quezon City.
They were also forced to admit certain things, after which, he together with
Held: No. The questioned court orders violate the non-impairment of all the accused were in handcuffs bore contusions caused by blows
contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the indicted on their faces during custodial investigation. Thereafter, they was
mortgage with a surely bond to secure the payment of the P40.000.00 brought to hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for
note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage identification.
contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the
respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel has been violated during
efficiency and dispensed with a primary condition. custodial investigation.
A mortgage is but an accessory contract. The consideration of the
mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract without RULING: Yes. It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical
which it cannot exist as an independent contract. The mortgage lien stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement
in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the
substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-
from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings. After the start of the
be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused made
mortgage contract. in a police line-up is inadmissible.
Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non -impairment of
contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of
the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the

perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule,
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the
person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not
only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled;
he must also explain their effects in practical terms. The right of a person
under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of
this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person
has been "informed" of his rights.
Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged
waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the
case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by
the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven
(7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.
People vs. Judge Ayson

175 SCRA 216, Narvasa, J.
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippines Airlines
assigned at its Baguio station. It was alleged that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of a plane tickets, The PAL notified him of an
investigation to be conducted. The investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL’s code of conduct. A letter was sent by Ramos PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENNY DY
stating his willingness to settle the amount. Two months after a crime of G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Estafa was charged against Ramos. Evidence was presented by the
prosecution containing Ramos’ admission and statement, to which Facts: Felled by a gunshot wound on the neck, which caused his death
defendant’s argued that the confession was taken without the accused approximately, was Christian Langel y Philippe, a Swiss tourist who was
being represented by a lawyer and right to remain silent. vacationing on the Boracay Island together with his sister and some
friends. A police report was entered in the police blotter of the Malay
Issue: Whether or not right to custodial investigation has been violated. Police Sub-station, Malay, Aklan. Suspect Benny Dy voluntarily
surrendered to the sub-station commander with his caliber 38.
Held: NO. The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial Acting on the report, Chief of Police Tambong prepared a
interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons." As the Complaint charging the Accused, Benny Dy, the owner of "Benny's Bar"
Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning situated on the Island, with the crime of Murder With the Use of
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into Unlicensed firearms. After trial, the lower Court find the accused guilty of
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant the crime of Murder. Hence, this appeal.
way."It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of Issue Whether the trial court erred in holding that compliance with the
law enforcement." constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the case.
commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be Held: No. The case history and the documentary evidence attest
informed of such right, strongly to Appellant's oral confession and voluntary surrender. The
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by
vitiates the free will shall be used against him; and the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession.That
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal
inadmissible in evidence. Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards facts therein stated. The fact of Appellant's surrender is further borne out
laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being by the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, categorically
regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the reciting that "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the
suspect. accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the
filing of the complaint."
Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession
made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that he had shot a tourist and that the
gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police is competent evidence against him. The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged
may be given in evidence against him (See. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae. The rule is
that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if
he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. What was told
by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited
People vs Pinlac through questioning, but given an ordinary manner. No written confession
165 SCRA 674, PARAS, J. was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial
investigation.
Facts: Accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate
information. The trial court found the accused guilty. Hence the automatic
review. According to Pinlac, at about 2:00 P.M., April 9, 1986, three (3)
Policemen, came to his house in Taguig and arrested the accused for
robbing Mr. Sato and for killing Mr. Osamu, without any Warrant of Arrest
shown to him despite his demand. Before he was brought first to the
houses of Mr. Sato and Mr. Osamu, they walked him around and showed
him the destroyed window; and thereafter brought him inside the house. In
short, he was ordered to reenact according to what the police theorized PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES
how the crime was committed. It was at this moment that the prints of the G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995, PUNO, J.
sole of accused's shoes were all over the premises of Osamu and Sato's
houses. That during the investigation at the Police Headquarters, he was Facts: The appelant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape
tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged. with homicide against the person of a minor Khazie Mae Penecilla (four
years old). Alicando was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He
Issue:Is the constitutional right of the accused Pinlac under custodial verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
investigation to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations,
complied with? the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie
Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow
Held: NO. The right must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and prosecution.

The appellant was arraigned and pleaded guilty. The trial G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991,Davide, Jr., J.
court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death. The case is on
automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Facts: In the criminal case filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
private respondent Salas and his co-accused were charged for the crime
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused. of rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). At the time the Information was filed, Salas and his co-
Held: Yes. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of accused were in military custody following their arrest. A day after the filing
the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered of the original information, a petition for habeas corpus for Salas and his
by the trial court in convicting the appellant. It is now familiar learning that co-accused was filed with the Supreme Court which was dismissed in the
the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled Court’s Resolution on the basis of the agreement of the parties under
confession or admission as provided under Section 12 paragraphs (1) and which Salas "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. It is not only the uncounselled having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-
confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but
therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by person.Salas filed with the trial court a Motion to Quash the Information.
the police from the appellant. Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash. Subsequently, Salas filed
The Court have not only constitutionalized the Miranda a petition for bail, which herein petitioner opposed on the ground that
warnings in our jurisdiction. They have also adopted the libertarian since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of
exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree". According to Presidential Decrees (PD), which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by
this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) promote, maintain, or head a rebellion so the accused is no longer entitled
derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other On 5 June 1987, the President issued an Executive Order (EO) repealing,
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all among others, the PDs and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
evidence subsequently obtained. the RPC. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under
custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of Issue: Whether or not the right to bail may, under certain circumstances,
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not be denied to a person who is charged with a bailable offense
tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged
by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III Held: Yes. Bail cannot be denied to Salas for he is charged with the crime
of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver — the waiver must of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is
be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus: All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
INOCENCIO BASCO vs. JUDGE LEO H. RAPATALO Salas has, however, waived his right to bail in the criminal case. In
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997, ROMERO, J. agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the pendency of the trial
of his criminal case, he has expressly waived his right to bail.This Court
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the
accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to counsel and
to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just to remain silent; and the right to be heard. The only limitation to the waiver
file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the of right to bail is that provide in Art. 6 of the Civil Code. Rights may be
court. waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
Facts: The complainant Inocencio Basco, father of the victim, charged recognized by law.
respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union
with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for People vs. Fortes
granting bail to an accused Roger Morente in a murder case without G.R. No. 90643, June 25, 1993, Davide, JR., J.
receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
In his comment, respondent Judge alleged that he granted Facts: The conviction of Agustin Fortes for the rape of a 13-year old sixth
the petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as grade pupil and the denial by the trial court of his application for bail
well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in
P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose these consolidated cases.
the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court. The court a quo, in its Decision, found the accused guilty
Issue: Whether a petition for bail can be granted without conducting a beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
hearing. of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00.
In G.R. No. 91155, the subject matter we are concerned with, the accused
Held: No. When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the seeks to annul and set aside two related orders of the said trial court
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. denying his application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his
However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is provisional liberty pending the resolution of his appeal.
strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after Issue: Whether or not before conviction by final judgment, the accused
the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence, and is therefore
is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot entitled to bail as a matter of right
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the Ruling: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that:
of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." . . . before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion xxx xxx xxx
of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. If a party is denied the perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
process. whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . .
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required is The clear implication, therefore is that if an accused who is charged with a
for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. The absence of sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a
accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of
accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. guilt is strong which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before
conviction – it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the
accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
People vs. Donato conviction.

In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would
Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his granting bail should be considered void on that ground. Even if the
application for bail during the pendency of the appeal. prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection
to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the
Comendador vs. De Villa strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991, Cruz, J. The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that he did
conduct a hearing is belied by the fact that the order granting bail leaves
Facts: These four cases have been consolidated because they involve much to be desired. It does not contain the requisite summary of the
practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of
incident. bail.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation
in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation ‘MANOTOC V. CA
(PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986, Fernan, J.
creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try them.
Facts: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc., where he acts as
No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to president and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. Together with his co-stockholders, he filed a petition with the Securities
In G.R. No. 95020, the subject matter we are concerned with, the orders and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management
of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are committee for the aforesaid companies, which petition was granted.
assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM Pending disposition of the SEC case, SEC requested the then
No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a
private respondents. memorandum to this effect was issued. When a Torrens title submitted to
and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be fake, six of
Issue: Whether or not the right to bail invoked by the private respondents its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and the
in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not vice-president of Manotoc Securities, Inc. Corresponding criminal charges
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in for estafa were filed and in all cases, petitioner was admitted to bail.
the Bill of Rights Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to
Held: Yes. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and both trial judges
the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of denied the same. Petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner
Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military requesting the withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said request
where the right to bail does not exist. The unique structure of the military was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional the CA seeking to annul the orders of the trial courts. CA denied the
coverage on the right to bail. National security considerations should also petition. Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents Petitioner filed a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite, but the Court
constitutes a damaging precedent. denied said motion. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the
would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different
from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is
extended to civilians. Held: No. The object of bail is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and
the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same
time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he
were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
BAYLON V. SISON available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates
A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995, Regalado, J. as a valid restriction on his right to travel. To allow the accused from
leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines would render nugatory the courts'
Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an orders and processes and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
information for double murder against several accused and thereafter which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
raffled to respondent judge. The accused filed a petition for reinvestigation would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the
which was granted by the trial court. During the reinvestigation, the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
accused filed a petition for bail on a Saturday, and requested that it be set he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
for hearing the immediately following Monday. On this latter date, the
prosecution filed an opposition to the petition for bail alleging, among
others, that the information was filed on the bases of the sworn statements
of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitutes clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of all the accused. Nevertheless, a hearing on the TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN
petition was purportedly held by the trial court and bail was granted for the G.R. No. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, Yap, J.
provisional liberty of each of the accused. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the prosecution but the same was denied by respondent Facts: Complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed
judge. Significantly, the orders granting bail, and that denying "a report" with the Legal Panel of PSC on October 1974, containing
reconsideration thereof, became the subject of a petition for certiorari filed charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of
by the prosecution and were subsequently annulled and set aside by CA. Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in
The private complainant filed a motion for respondent judge to inhibit the office of the PSC until December 1979, when the 1974 complaint was
himself from the case. Respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit and resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan.
later also denied the motion for reconsideration. To support and justify his The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint in April 1980 by referring the
grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge avers that time was of the complaint to the CIS, PSC, for investigation and report. In June 1980, the
essence, considering that the accused had been detained since October CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
21, 1991 and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and
granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to prove the strength of the Antonio L. Cantero. By October 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits
evidence of guilt against the accused. were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However,
it was only in July 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge was justified in his grant of bail to Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal
the accused. informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan in June 1985, all against
Held: While the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is petitioner Tatad. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion may be exercised the constitutional mandate of "due process" in unduly prolonging the
only after evidence is submitted to the court. The prosecution must be termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence

informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the private complainant. In this petition, Alonte avers that respondent
of the purported offenses. Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when respondent Judge rendered a decision in the case
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to thereby depriving him of his Constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
due process. Issue: Whether or not the presumption of innocence stands in favor of
Alonte.
Held: The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by Held: NO. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of
the Tanodbayan is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to
the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case,
by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally whether in the prosecution or defense. There can be no short-cut to the
guaranteed by the fundamental law. It has been suggested that the long legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost
fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right
not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. In the case at bar,
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan does not contain any
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary statement that disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to
a device for setting back time. discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. In People vs. Ballabare
we have said that any recantation must be tested in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. A retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a
witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the
original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should
determine which testimony should be given credence through a
comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the
general rules of evidence.
GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR 72670, Sept. 12, 1986
PEOPLE vs. DRAMAYO
Facts: On October 22, 1983, then President Marcos created a Fact- GR 21325, Oct. 29, 1971
Finding Board to investigate the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. The
minority and majority reports of the Board both agreed that Rolando Facts: In a drinking session, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin brought
Galman was not the assassin but was merely a fall guy of the military up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the
which plotted the assassination itself. The minority report tags 26 persons, robbery case which Dramayo and Ecubin was a prime suspect thereof.
headed by General Ver, as respondents to the case. Marcos rejected the That same night, Ecubin hit Estelito with a piece of wood on the side of the
reports of the Board and stuck to his claim that it was Galman who killed head while Dramayo repeatedly stabbed him with a short pointed bolo.
Aquino. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan acquitted the The next morning, Dramayo went to the house of the deceased and
respondents of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of
absolving them of any civil liability. In this petition, Petitioners Saturnina Estelito. Upon interview, the Chief of Police noticed blood stains on the
Galman, wife of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 others filed the present trousers of Dramayo and asked the latter to explain where he obtained it.
action alleging that respondent courts committed serious irregularities Dramayo answered that it was caused by his daughter who has a skin
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross ailment. It was on this basis that Dramayo and Ecubin were charged of the
violation of the constitutional rights of the sovereign people of the crime of murder. Upon trial, the lower court found Dramayo and Ecubin
Philippines to due process of law. Allegedly, then President Marcos had guilty beyond reasonable doubt basing on the testimonies offered by the
ordered the respondent courts to whitewash the criminal cases against the prosecution. In this appeal, Accused-Appellants invoke their constitutional
26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. In his right to be declared presumptively innocent.
comment, the Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, affirmed the
allegations and revealed that Malacañang had planned the scenario of the Issue: Whether or not the Accussed-Appellants constitutional right to be
trial. Respondents-accused prayed for its denial. presumed innocent can stand against judgment of conviction against
Issue: Whether or not the trial was a mock trial and that the pre- them.
determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict Held: NO. The presumption of innocence could not come to appellants’
and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was
aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason offered by the prosecution. Accusation is not, according to the
to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore,
at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and
the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the
the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at
entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could
the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty. With the testimony of record pointing to no other
conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by appellants, the effort of
ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO their counsel should not be attended with success.
GR 131652, March 9, 1998 By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it
is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
Facts: Juvie-lyn Punongbayan charged Bayani Alonte, the incumbent inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
mayor of Biñan, Laguna, with the crime of rape. According to certainly of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to
Punongbayan, on or about September 12, 1996, Alonte offered her a convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
drinking water which made her dizzy and weak. Thereafter, Alonte certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with her against her will the offense.
and consent. During the pendency case, however, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit People v. Holgado
desisting her testimonies against Alonte. Nonetheless, respondent Judge GR 2809, March 22, 1950
Savellano found Alonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous
crime of rape. Accordingly, the accused did not present any countervailing Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance
evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the
deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without
aforementioned affidavit. They left everything to the so-called "desistance" justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of

Antero Holgado for about eight hours. On the day set for trial, he appeared to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.
alone without the assistance of a lawyer. He was subsequently arraigned The administrative complaint is dismissed.
and pleaded guilty upon the instruction of a certain Mr. Numeriano
Ocampo. . Judgement was rendered convicting him of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
PECHO V. PEOPLE
Issue: Whether the accused was afforded of his right G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, Davide Jr., J
to be heard by himself and counsel?
FACTS: Petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre were alleged to have
Held: No. Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea conspired in representing Pecho as a representative of Everson
given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, which turned out to be not-existent.
say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding Pecho was then tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a Section 3(e) of R.A No. 3019.
heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, The SC modified the Sandiganbayan decision, holding the
without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
case. falsification of official and commercial documents. Although the petitioner
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section 3(e)
beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section of R.A No. 3019, as amended — because the said section penalizes only
3, that: If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be consummated — he could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex
asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
attorney. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration as the conviction
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court for estafa after his acquittal from violation of R.A. 3019 constitutes double
has four important duties to comply with: 1 — It must inform the defendant jeopardy. As such, he could not be convicted without violating his right to
that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After giving be informed of the accusation against him.
him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an
attorney; 3 — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction for estafa after acquittal from the
must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If the accused original crime charged violates his right to be informed of the nature of the
desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a accusation against him?
reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The HELD: NO. Under the Rules of Court, when there is variance between the
record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to offense charged in the complaint of information, and that proved or
have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
court failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to employ an necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
oficio. The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have charged included in that which is proved.
an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question The Court explained the objectives of the right to be
fail to inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before informed: to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed that it could against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail
have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution. alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had.
AMION V. CHIONGSON In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be
A.M. No. RTJ-97-137, January 22, 1999, Martinez, J. stated: not conclusions of law. What determines the real nature and cause
of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
Doctrine: information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
The accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his information.
choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime
which would preclude other equally competent and independent counsels which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter.
from representing him.
Facts: At the scheduled hearing of the criminal case against Amion, trial
was not held because on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was
informed that his retained counsel, Atty. Depasucat, was ill. The hearing
was reset with a warning that no further postponement would be
entertained. On the date of re-scheduled hearing, Atty. Depasucat again
failed to appear. To avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Jacildo of
PAO as counsel de oficio who was however, prohibited to represent a SORIANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
party who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice. At the G.R. No. L-65952, July 31, 1984, ABAD SANTOS, J.
next scheduled hearing Atty. Depasucat still did not show up in court. In
view of the fact that the victim's wife, Mrs. Vaflor and another government FACTS: Thomas Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged
witness both reside about 70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, assigned for investigation to the
the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge Chiongson, petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the
appointed Atty. Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent Amion investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for
without prejudice to the appearance of Amion's counsel de parte. Amion dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of
filed a complaint charging respondent judge with Ignorance of the Law and Investigation which set up an entrapment.
Oppression relative to the former's criminal case. Amion asserts that his The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner as guilty for
right to due process was violated and that he was deprived of his violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 which penalizes:
constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own "Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
choice. percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
oficio constitutes a violation of accused-complainant's right to due process under the law."
and a deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of Petitioner contends that the preliminary investigation of a
his own choice. complaint does not constitute a "contract or transaction" and thus he
cannot be convicted for violation of R.A. 3019. And if acquitted, he cannot
Held: The concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more be subsequently convicted of direct bribery because that would violate his
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation. Even if application right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
would be extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such
preferential discretion cannot partake of one so absolute and arbitrary as ISSUES:(1) Whether or not preliminary investigation constitutes a
would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of "transaction or contract."
the accused and thus make the pace of criminal prosecution entirely (2) Whether or not, if previous conviction for violation of R.A.
dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the 3019 were wrong, he can now be convicted for direct bribery without
case. Moreover, Amion was not deprived of his substantive and violating his right to be informed.
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his HELD: (1) NO. The term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its
defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all
his counsel at the scheduled hearings. Finally, there is no denial of the kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would
absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not.
The investigation was also not a contract. Neither was it a transaction

because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is
absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.
3019. SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN RE: MANZANO
(2) YES. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be 166 SCRA 246, 1988
convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so
would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature FACTS:
and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the Judge Manzano was designated member of the Ilocos Norte
information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of Provincial Committee on Justice by the Provincial Governor. The function
bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be of the Committee is to receive complaints and make recommendations
informed. towards the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
who are poor.
ISSUE: May the Judge accept the designation?

BORJA V. MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-45667, June 20, 1977, FERNANDO, J. HELD:
No. The committee performs administrative functions, that is,
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Borja, accused of slight physical injuries, was functions which “involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules
days of arresto menor by respondent Judge Senining, despite the absence and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
of an arraignment.. The judge proceeded with the trial in absentia and are devoted upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
promulgated the assailed decision. An appeal was duly elevated to the existence.
Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court
Without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered against performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
him. Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
ISSUE: Whetherornot thedecisionwasvalidlyrendereddespite administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution. This
the absence of an arraignment. declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City
HELD: NO.Arraignment isanindispensablerequirementinany Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the
criminal prosecution. The Constitution requires that the accused be structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
penal offense he has to face. This duty is an affirmative one which the officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
court, on its own motion, must perform, unless waived. To emphasize its Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
importance, no such duty is laid on the court with regard to the rights of assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for
the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably
are rights which he must assert himself and the benefits of which he incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must
act of its own volition.
It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why SEPARATION OF POWERS
the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. He is thus in a ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is G.R. NO. 45081. JULY 15, 1936
not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash.
LAUREL, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Angara and respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position
of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas in the September 17, 1395 election. Petitioner was proclaimed to
be a member-elect of the National Assembly by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers. Thereafter, petitioner took his oath.
The National Assembly passed a Resolution, confirming
proclamation of Angara. Ynsua filed before the respondent Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of petitioner, and
praying that said respondent be declared elected member, or that the
election of said position be nullified.
The respondent denied petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest." Petitioner argues that: the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly, and that the Constitution
excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative
Department of the Government or the National Assembly.
The Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf
of the respondent, interposing the special defense that the Commission
has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the
election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it
by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out
the powers and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental
law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted
in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or
control of the Supreme Court, among others.
Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of
injunction against the Commission, which petition was denied "without
passing upon the merits of the case."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of
its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however,
HELD: as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid delegation of power.
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The HELD:
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of
government. the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
VI of the Constitution. The nature of the present controversy shows the There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
were left undecided and undetermined, a void would be created in our complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
constitutional system, which may in the long run prove destructive of the that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
entire framework. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all
and qualifications of the members of the Legislature long lodged in the the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its
by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. The delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally
law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. The certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have
creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. From the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule
deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose and its non-delegation the exception.
was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
to the Convention to provide for this body known as the Electoral problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious,
majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the assigned to them.
Supreme Court. The reasons for the delegation of legislative powers in
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
it had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
that power by the National Assembly. If the power claimed for the National legislation."
Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
off the power of the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not
which protest should be filed were conceded, the grant of power to the have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
commission would be ineffective. promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as
The Electoral Commission in such a case would be invested the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new
with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the
National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate SEPARATION OF POWERS
control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral CASIBANG VS. AQUINO
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the G.R. NO. L-38025. AUGUST 20, 1979
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
MAKASIAR, J P:
FACTS:
SEPARATION OF POWERS Respondent Remigio Yu was proclaimed as the elected
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. POEA Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan over his rival, petitioner, who seasonably
G.R. NO. 76633, OCTOBER 18, 1988 filed a protest with the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, who
initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable
CRUZ, J.: controversy.
FACTS: In the meantime, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; thereafter, a new
when he was killed in an accident. His widow sued for damages under Constitution was adopted. Yu moved to dismiss the election protest on the
E.O. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
the vessel owner, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — (principally)
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed — a political question has intervened in the case. Yu contended that "the
jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have
favor of the complainant. been superseded by the 1973 Constitution.
Petitioner came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General Respondent Judge sustained the political question theory
to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Hence, this petition.
remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed

ISSUE: Whether or not the electoral protest filed by the petitioner judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
remained a justiciable question even after the 1973 Constitution was people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
adopted, thus remains to be under the jurisdiction of the Court of First authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
Instance. government."
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether
HELD: certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be
respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article settled by the Courts.
XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to
of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity legality, of a particular measure.
and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, Such is not the nature of the question for determination in
for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the the present case. Here, the court is called upon to decide whether the
pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of
question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government." member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
The electoral protest case herein involved has remained a the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest
Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a
respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary
question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The
of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues in connection therewith.
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Tañada
vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957).
SEPARATION OF POWERS
SANIDAD V. COMELEC
SEPARATION OF POWERS G.R. NO. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976
TAÑADA VS. CUENCO
G.R. NO. L-10520, FEBRUARY 28, 1957 FACTS:
Pablito Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview,” a
CONCEPCION, J.: weekly newspaper circulating in Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
FACTS: Constitutionality of Sec 19 of the Comelec Resolution 2167 which provides
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tañada and Diosdado Macapagal that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
sought to oust respondent senators from the Senate Electoral Tribunal. plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
Petitioners allege that the that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing or against the plebiscite issue. Petitioner contends that it violates the
these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had freedom of expression and of the press. Hence, constitutes as a prior
"acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear restraint in his constitutional right. Solicitor General contends that it does
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming not violate the Constitution for it is a valid implementation of the power of
membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite
oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without period and can express his news through the Comelec space & airtime.
color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec is granted the power to regulate mass
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal." media during election or plebiscite period under Article 9C of the 19987
Respondents assail the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Constitution.
petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred HELD:
by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft It is given that what was granted to Comelec was the power
submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits, or
parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and utilities, media communication or information to the end that equal
that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion." equal rates therefore, for public information campaign and forums among
candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented is the possibility
ISSUE: Whether or not the case at bar raises merely a political question. that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate.
HELD: Neither the Constitution nor RA 6646 can be construed to
Willoughby lucidly states: "Elsewhere in this treatise the well- mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their
executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern plebiscite. Comelec Resolution No 2167 has no statutory basis.
themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these
discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and SEPARATION OF POWERS
executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of DAZA VS. SINGSON
government because in very many cases their action is necessarily 180 SCRA 496, 1989
dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These
considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the FACTS:
legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise Petitioner was a member of the Commission on
authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within Appointments representing the Liberal Party. With the organization of the
these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some congressional members
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and belonging to the Liberal Party resigned from said party to join the LDP.
these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, When the Commission on Appointments were reorganized, petitioner was
may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the replaced by an LDP representative.
United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.). To the same effect is Petitioner contends that the organization of the LDP cannot
the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:. "It is affect the composition of the Commission on Appointments because LDP
well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of is not a registered party and has not yet shown the stability of a party.
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions
has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory ISSUE: Does the situation present a “political question”?
provisions. "It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political
question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is HELD:
frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the

The question is justiciable. The issue is one of legality not of Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the
wisdom. The ascertainment of the manner of forming the Commission on Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have
Appointments is distinct from the discretion of the parties to designate any force and effect.
there representatives. And even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come under the expanded power of review in Article VIII, ISSUE: Whether or the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any
Section 1. force and effect.
HELD:
DELEGATION OF POWER Yes. Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
GARCIA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY provides: “In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may
G.R. NO. 100883. DECEMBER 2, 1991 by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
CRUZ, J P: carry out a declared national policy”.
FACTS: Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by
The petitioner challenges RA 7042 on the ground that it virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined
defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds;
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the restrictive in duration, extent or scope." The words "limited period" as used
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
trade practices. He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency."
investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
complicity of their own government. Specifically, he argues that under approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the
Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100% of its capital legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of
without need of prior approval. The said section makes certain that "the its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations on would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different
the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the
provided in this Act." delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
The petitioner also attacks Section 9 because if a Philippine indefinite, negative and uncertain. Furthermore, this would create the
national believes that an area of investment should be included in List C, anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In
are met. It is alleged that Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. It is also argued that by take them back.
repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Section 4 of the Act goes far to settle the legislative intention
Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and
by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until
Philippines. the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of
Finally, the petitioner claims that the transitory provisions of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the
RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in
three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National
Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would
would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act
country. was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for
this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a justiciable question present in the case and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or
at bar. annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law
itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not
HELD: only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones
What is present in the case at bar is not a debate on the already annulled by the legislature.
wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which the Court is It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No.
not competent to rule. As Cooley observed: "Debatable questions are for 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May
the legislature to decide. The courts do not sit to resolve the merits of 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
conflicting issues." In Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Laurel issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead
made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act,
justice or expediency of legislation." And fittingly so for in the exercise of we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and may not annul legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9,
an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to
impractical. It is true that, under the expanded concept of the political legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
question, we may now also "determine whether or not there has been a organic law.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted.
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Court,
however, did not find any irregularity that exist in the case at bar.
The petitioner is commended for his high civic spirit and his DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
zeal in the protection of the Filipino investors against unfair foreign RODRIGUEZ V. GELLA
competition. His painstaking study and analysis of the Foreign (G.R. NO. L-6266 FEBRUARY 2, 1953)
Investments Act of 1991 reveals not only his nationalistic fervor but also an
impressive grasp of this complex subject. But his views are expressed in PARAS, C.J.
the wrong forum. The Court is not a political arena. His objections to the FACTS:
law are better heard by his colleagues in the Congress of the Philippines, Petitioners herein seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos.
who have the power to rewrite it, if they so please, in the fashion he 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first appropriating the sum
suggests. of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second
setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities
visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS other calamities. Such Executive Orders were issued in virtue of
ARANETA V. DINGLASAN Commonwealth Act No. 671, also known as the Emergency Powers Act.
(G.R. NO. L-2044 AUGUST 26, 1949) Petitioners’ primary contention rests on the fact that the
National Assembly intended such powers to exist only for a limited period.
TUASON, J.:
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are valid.
The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the
President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. HELD:
Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, No. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
Concerned in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
control exports from the Philippines. On the other hand, case No. L-3054 restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly
operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national
period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other
Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2) authorizing the
1949. President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such

rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national
policy declared in section 1." LAUREL, J.
Act No. 671 was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional FACTS:
provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to Petitioners, the People of the Philippines and the Hongkong
be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the
duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of
emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be the defendants, in a criminal case. Respondent Jose O. Vera, is the Judge
obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the ad interim of the seventh branch of the trial court who heard the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the
his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the President aforesaid criminal case.
disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The trial court rendered judgment, convicting Unjieng. Upon
The situation will make the Congress and the President or either as the appeal, the court modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of
principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six
legislative powers, — in palpable repugnance to the constitutional months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment
provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, in all other respects.
necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the The instant proceedings have to do with the application for
arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President. probation filed by Unjieng before the trial court, under the provisions of Act
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Unjieng states in his
that the powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
world war which factually involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good
passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency, which naturally conduct in the future. However, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an
terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the opposition to the granting of probation to the Unjieng. The private
members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the actual state of prosecution also filed an opposition, elaborating on the unconstitutionality
war could prevent it from holding its next regular session of Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
Moreover, Section 26 of Article VI of the 1935 constitution, in provincial boards of several provinces
virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the delegation of
powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of
emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section legislative power.
1 of the Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national
emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes HELD:
such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly Yes. Under the constitutional system, the powers of
the typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially
result from the last world war but were and could not have been independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of
contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress is available for these departments of the government derives its authority from the
necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down without Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each
somehow being answerable thereover. has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
Even under the theory of some members of this court that supreme within its own sphere.
insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a
given matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral
pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the
declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been approving acts escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other
appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional
many others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative task the and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest.
Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the "One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President. If conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of
appropriations, none can remain in respect of special appropriations; the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the
otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution
Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of the itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or this high prerogative has been entrusted cannot relieve itself of the
otherwise become inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still responsibilities by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of
make new appropriations. The specific power "to continue in force laws any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide
and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is this sovereign trust."
a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power
may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions
and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally delegate legislative powers to local authorities. "It is a cardinal principle of
functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local
has any residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while
confusion and overlapping, if not conflict. the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self
President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation
speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the
because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations, according to
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior
primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and based on in cases of necessity." Doubtless, also, legislative power may be
the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI
amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly
and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and
disagreements between, inaction or even refusal of the legislative and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates,
executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16
prompt official action, deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or
must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the
men for obvious reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine
emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions,
Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more the President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested
efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been
cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and removed by the Constitution itself.
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions
officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution. hereinabove mentioned.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
declared null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from reads as follows:
appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
aside therein. provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
DELEGATION OF POWERS; PROBATION be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
PEOPLE V. VERA In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of
(G.R. NO. L-45685 NOVEMBER 16, 1937) legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was

complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee HELD:
or delegate of the legislature. In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho No. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: “... The governing
an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a functions of the Administration (POEA). “
crime. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
administrative boards. ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when delegate.
the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz , the completeness test
delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof — in delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to
some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of and exercise a power essentially legislative.
the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all
rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in
be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its
In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial
boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally
not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have
standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule
of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any and its non-delegation the exception.
standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious,
the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to assigned to them.
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary
provincial boards. to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may
promulgation by executive or administrative officials of rules and implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details
regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the
boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
(G.R. NO. 76633 OCTOBER 18, 1988) the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding
the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
CRUZ, J.: discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine
FACTS: Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
P192,000.00 by the POEA for the death of her husband. The decision is WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no against the petitioner.
jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. .
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris
when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. His DELEGATION OF POWER
widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO
vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by G.R. NO. 17122, FEBRUARY 27, 1922
the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State
Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after JOHNS, J.:
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the FACTS:
complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature
P12,000.00 for burial expenses. passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing
urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and the Governor- General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue
consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation
Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are enumerated.
Commission. Furthermore, the petitioner questions the validity of August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non- (Executive Order No. 53) fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been August 8, 1919, Ang Tang Ho charged with the sale of rice at an excessive
given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such price and was accordingly convicted.
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative The question here involves an analysis and construction of
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the
price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,

to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of right to be heard before a competent and impartial cout as guaranteed by
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the due process. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the said
Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define order and the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and
leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power in
Governor- General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise relation to the disposal of the confiscated properties
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The
Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That
is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says
that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is HELD:
authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency No. We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property
such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and shall “be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,
has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal ad the
left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say Director of the Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.” The
what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse
or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. and even corruption, One searches in vain for the usual standard and the
Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries
a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose
but, if the Governor- General found the existence of such facts and issued the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion.
a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.
DELEGATION OF POWER
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
ISSUE: Whether or not the legislature under Act No. 2868 has delegated TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ
its power to the Governor-General G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
HELD: FELICIANO, J .:
Yes. The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the FACTS:
maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand." The law The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of
is a general law and not a local or special law. medicine for the school year 1987- 1988. However, the petitioners either
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for
different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you Educational Measurement (CEM).
would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985 and
the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
respective localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor- securing certificates of eligibility for admission and from administering the
General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was NMAT.
even a sub delegation of that power. The trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224
Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" with one of its basic
words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General objectives was to provide for the standardization and regulation of medical
to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and education.
what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical
rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at Education with the functions specified in Section 5 of the statute include
which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say the following:
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not (a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a
the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the recognized college of medicine;
law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what (f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school
was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from
palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue
the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, (h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or regulations for the proper implementation of the foregoing functions.
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities (Emphasis supplied)
of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for
by Executive order No. 53." applicants to medical schools and one of these is a certificate of eligibility
We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education.
so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his MECS Order No. 52, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the Sports established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
Private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to
DELEGATION OF POWERS medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987 and the year
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 1987.1988.
148 SCRA 659, NO. L- 74457, MARCH 20, 1987 The fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or
order assailed. Petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and
CRUZ, J: (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional
FACTS: principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing
Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transport of the to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
carabaos or carabao meat across the provincial boundaries without Board of Medical Education.
government clearance, for the purpose of preventing the indiscriminate
slaughter of those animals. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a sufficient standard to be followed by
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in the Board
a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the
police station commander for violation of EO 626-A. The executive order HELD:
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed Yes. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The petitioner claimed that exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the

Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As Then, also, the power of control of the President over
explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta — executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau,
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads . exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control, which he
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words,
forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are President less power over local governments than that vested in him over
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
principle. does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive
departments, bureaus or offices.
DELEGATION OF POWERS In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative
SEC. 1, ARTICLE VI & SEC. 10 (1) OF ARTICLE VII, 1987 powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised
CONSTITUTION Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed
EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is
G.R. NO. L-23825, DECEMBER 24, 1965 utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null
CONCEPCION, J.: and void ab initio.
FACTS: We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set
The President of the Philippines, pursuant to Section 68 of forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and
the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Petitioner Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
instituted a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary principle.
injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him and his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and
void, on the ground that Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND
Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
power.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 I
became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered General Provisions
nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in Referendum Act."
the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act
upon the chief executive is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms
HELD: shall mean:
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle for the purpose.
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently amendments to the Constitution;
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
performance of his functions. national legislation; and
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to
meet these well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy ordinance.
to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a
the first sentence of Section 68, the President: legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such classes, namely:
place therein as the public welfare may require. c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause that an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject
preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local
government may be transferred. legislative bodies.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law (d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
ordains: (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the
The President shall have control of all the executive Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general (f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the
supervision over all local governments as may be provided required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as
the Commission.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of (g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and
the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be barangays.
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or (h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental (i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal
law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be.
said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as Sec. 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may
provided by statutory enactments. be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions,
Upon the other hand if the President could create a provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a Sec. 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or
new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a
without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
denied to him by the Constitution. twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as

signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at III
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on Local Initiative and Referendum
the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the Sec. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand
thereafter. (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of
(c) The petition shall state the following: municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing
or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or
c.2. the proposition; resolution.
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the (c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The
petition. Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or (d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of
ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the
the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at required number of signatures.
least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be (f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the
therein. proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or
shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be
tenper centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which established in as many places as may be warranted.
every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the (g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on
registered voters therein. Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been
deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the
registered voters in said barangay. proposition.
Sec. 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a (h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission
special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be
initiative or referendum. submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities,
II forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
National Initiative and Referendum barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the
Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. Within a Elections.
period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, Sec. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved
upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been
circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails
be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Sec. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative
shall not be exercised more than once a year.
Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the
Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes (c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall
cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for
majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, initiative in the manner herein provided.
approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following Sec. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and
general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or
the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months
votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by
shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first
Philippines. six (6) months.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be Sec. 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect. 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
day of the plebiscite. approved.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the
votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-
fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission. five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of barangays.
an initiative or referendum petition: The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to referendum.
the electorate; and Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition
specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of
referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as IV
defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Final Provisions
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus
summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions
organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature. of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby
enactment of any legislative measure before the House of empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
over the pending legislative measures on the committee. Sec. 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of
Sec. 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year.
be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of
thereof. this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Sec. 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional
invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall representation in the election of representatives to the House of
remain valid and effective. Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
Sec. 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
Approved: August 4, 1989 constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest
scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
239 SCRA 106 national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
FACTS: parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
The municipality of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
only one legislative district. R.A. 7675 aims to make Mandaluyong into a party-list system.
city. The petitioner contends that the said law aims to increase the (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
membership of the House as the conversion of Mandaluyong into a city of parties.
will result in the creation of a separate congressional district for (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
Mandaluyong. ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati into a city is adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
constitutional. members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
HELD: of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the creation of a new the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
congressional district for Mandaluyong was but a natural consequence of comprising the region.
Mandaluyong’s conversion into a city. The Constitution provides that “a city (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
should have a population of at least 250,000” and having met this any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
requirement Mandaluyong is qualified to be converted into a city and as advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
provided in the Constitution entitled to at least 1 representative. (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
242 SCRA 211, 1995 Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party,
organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not
FACTS: register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with
R.A. 7854, which aims to convert Makati into a city, is the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
assailed as being unconstitutional on the grounds that R.A. 7854 aims to manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
increase membership of the House which the Constitution fixes and that Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a
R.A. 7854 being a special law cannot change members of the Houses. party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of Makati into a city is election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
constitutional. participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
HELD: thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
Yes. The Supreme Court held that as was already decided officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
by the Supreme Court in Tobias vs. Abalos, the Constitution provides that COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
the compositions of the House should not be more than 250 members, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
UNLESS otherwise provided by law. The natural result in the creation of a handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
new legislative from a special law whose purpose is to convert a professionals.
municipality into a city is sanctioned by the Constitution. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in
MONTEJO VS. COMELEC no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
242 SCRA 45 Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse
FACTS: or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
Biliran, a sub-province of Leyte was made into a province regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
which caused the reduction of the Municipalities under the 3 rd district of grounds:
Leyte. Because of this inequality the COMELEC reapportioned some of (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
the Municipalities from one district to another. Montejo now wants to association, organized for religious purposes;
transfer a municipality (Tolosa) from his district to another district (3 rd) (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
allegedly because of some inequality in the number of registered voters. (3) It is a foreign party or organization;
COMELEC through resolution 2736 permitted the transfer. (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC have the power to reapportion
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
districts. through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
HELD:
relating to elections;
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC does not have
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
the power to reapportion districts but only to make minor adjustments. The
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
Court added that the creation of a new province though results in an (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
imbalance and devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of the equal protection or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
clause of the Constitution the only remedy is for Congress, to make a cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
reapportionment of the legislative districts. elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not
later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national,
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941
regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied
or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST
system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND
polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later
than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the
five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
obtains the required number of votes. purposes of this Act.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation
given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the
include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General
bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change Appropriations Act.
of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and
same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the
the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes party-list system.
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be and effective.
considered resigned. Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of Act are hereby repealed.
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the Approved, March 3, 1995.
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during 248 SCRA 300, 1995
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term. FACTS:
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) Montejo then incumbent congressman of the first district of
votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Leyte petitions for the disqualification of Imelda Marcos as a candidate for
Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the the same position because the latter supposedly lacks the residency
party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of requirement of one-year. Marcos had only lived in Tolosa recently and
Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral have yet to “reside” in the first district for the required 1 year. The
organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: petitioner is contending that Imelda had set up residency in various places
Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be throughout her lifetime from teaching in Tacloban up to the time she
held in May 1998. married where she stayed for years in San Juan, Metro Manila.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for
purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system. ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda Marcos lacks the residency requirement in
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list her candidacy.
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total
number of the members of the House of Representatives including those HELD:
under the party-list. No. The SC held that Tolosa remains as his “domicile of
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political origin”. Residence is to be synonymous with domicile particularly in
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of election law. Marcos domicile of origin was established in Tolosa because
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall she followed the domicile of her parents. This domicile of origin was not
not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. lost because she got married as residence and domicile have different
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following meanings under civil law.
procedure shall be observed: The SC even added that considering that her husband died
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked and she went free to choose her domicile, her intentions were manifest in
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes her actions that Tolosa was to be her domicile.
they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list AQUINO VS. COMELEC
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That 248 SCRA 400, 1995
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total FACTS:
number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, Butz Aquino’s residence requirement is being contended as
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than he intends to run for congress in the newly created legislative district of
three (3) seats. Makati. Butz Aquino was contending that his lease of a condo unit in
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. Makati is indicative of the fact that he has chosen Makati to be his domicile
The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or and not just residence.
coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Aquino in leasing a condo unit in Makati
according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, is indicative of his desire to make it his domicile.
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. HELD:
Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list No. The Court ruled against Aquino because his “leasing” of
representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of a condo unit is by no means indicative of his desire to make Makati his
names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to permanent home or domicile, considering that he was still a known
the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list. resident of Concepcion, Tarlac for the past 52 years of which happens to
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a be his birthplace.
term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by The Supreme Court reiterated how to successfully effect a
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No chage of domicile:
party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive · Actual removal/actual change of domicile
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not · Intention to abandon former domicile and establish a new
be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full one
term for which he was elected. · Definite act which correspond with the purpose
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list
representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, CO VS. HRET
he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his 199 SCRA 293, 1991
new party or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list FACTS:
representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next Ong, a candidate for congressional elections in his local
representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the district is being assailed as to his qualifications that his being a natural-
COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve born citizen is questionable along with not having complied with the
for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization residency requirement.
coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List ISSUE: Whether or not Ong met the qualifications and the residency
Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as requirement.
regular members of the House of Representatives.
HELD:

Yes. As to the matter of citizenship the Court ruled in Ong’s favor presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
citing the following reasons: published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines,
· Ong’s father was already naturalized while he was just 9 on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
years old communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
· Ong’s mother was a Filipina plus the fact that a lot of either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
instances transpired after he reached the age of majority Hence, the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
than reinforces the fact that he elected Filipino citizenship. b. No. The letter in question is not sufficient to support
· That the fact that his brother’s citizenship was in fact already plaintiff’s action for damages. It is true that the complaint alleges that an
answered favorably by the Constitutional Commission itself. open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that is false
As to the issue of residence, again the court ruled in Ong’s and with the intent to impeach plaintiff’s reputation, to expose them to
favor holding that he never had any intention to abandon his domicile of public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from
origin despite having stayed in Manila to study or pursue his personal their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
career. inconsistent with the contents of said letter and cannot prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. The very document upon
which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they might be
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be
DIMAPORO VS. MITRA merely unwitting tools of the planners. This statement is not derogatory to
202 SCRA 779, 1991 the plaintiffs to the point of entitling them to recover damages.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected
Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
the 1987 congressional elections and took his oath of office on January 9, OSMENA V. PENDATUN
1987. On January 15, 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a G.R. NO. L-17144 OCTOBER 28, 1960
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for FACTS:
February 17, 1990. Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., in a privilege speech
Upon being informed of this development by the delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59.
Representatives excluded petitioner’s name from the Roll of Members of Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other
the House of Representatives pursuant to sec.67, Art.IX of the Omnibus congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
Election Code, which states: “Any elective official whether national or local created by House Resolution No. 59 found said congressman guilty of
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a serious disorderly behavior; and acting on such report, the House
permanent capacity except for President and Vice President shall be approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution
considered ipso facto (by the mere act) resigned from his office upon filing No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended and suspending him from
of his certificate of candidacy.” office for fifteen months.
Petitioner contends that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Sec.67, Art.IX of the B.P. Blg.881 is not operative ISSUES:
a. Whether or not delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not
Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be
applicable to the present members of the Congress.
disciplined?
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner forfeited his seat, upon the filing of the b. Whether or not the resolution violated his constitutional
certificate of candidacy for another office. absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House?
HELD:
Yes. Forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon HELD:
the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Once the a. Yes. There is no question that Congressman Osmena made a serious
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new imputation of bribery against the President. The House is the judge of
election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The wording of the what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution
law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which
forfeiture dependent upon the future contingencies, unforeseen and can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
unforeseeable, since the vacating is expressly made as of the moment of adjudication by the Courts. The house has exclusive power; the courts
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. have no jurisdiction to interfere. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent
refusal to interfere.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG b. No. The resolution does not violate the constitutional parliamentary
G.R. NO. L-15905, AUGUST 3, 1966 immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Our Constitution enshrines
parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege in every
FACTS: legislative assembly of the democratic world. But it does not protect him
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words
Court of First instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a
Jiminez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the parliament
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of the or of Congress have bee, or could be censured, committed to prison,
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the letter suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question
is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court,
ZANDUETA VS. DELA COSTA
plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of
G.R. NO. L-46267, NOVEMBER 28, 1938
dismissal.
ISSUES: FACTS:
a. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged While petitioner Francis Zandueta was presiding over the 5 th
communication? Branch of Courts of First Instance of Manila, he received a new ad interim
b. Whether or not it is libelous? appointment, issued in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 145, to
discharge the Office of Judge in the Court of First Instance of the 4 th
HELD: Judicial District with authority to preside over the CFI of Manila and
Palawan. The National Assembly adjourned without its Commission on
a. No. The aforementioned publication does not fall within Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment.
the purview of the phrase “speech and debate therein” – that is to say in The Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly
Congress – used in Art.VI, sec.15 of the Constitution. Said expression disapproved the ad interim appointment of petitioner. Subsequently, the
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their President of the Philippines appointed respondent Sixto de la Costa, judge
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes of first instance of the 4 th Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills CFI of Manila and Palawan, and his appointment was approved by the
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings against
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as respondent and also questioned the validity of the appointment alleging
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized that C.A. No. 145 is unconstitutional.
to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts
in question. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may proceed to question the
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this constitutionality of C.A. No. 145 by virtue of which the new ad interim
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the
President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress

appointment of judge of first instance of the 4th Judicial District, to preside
over the CFI of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor? ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
HELD: SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.
No. Petitioner is estopped by his own act form proceeding to (G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1998)
question the constitutionality of C.A. No. 145. He likewise knew, or at least
he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the PANGANIBAN, J.:
approval of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly FACTS:
and that if said Commission were to disapprove the same, it would The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R.
become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office. The Osmeña as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 the first regular
petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment issued by session of the eleventh Congress. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested
the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
C.A. No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. When a public member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader.
official voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan, as Senate
reorganized by law – which new office is incompatible with the one President, comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for
formerly occupied by him – qualifies for the discharge of the functions him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters in the performance of his During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate
duties by executing acts "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to
inherent in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a
corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the office minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment, and he cannot consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the
question the constitutionality of the law by which he was last appointed. debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad
He was estopped form questioning the validity of said appointment by delivering privilege speeches.
alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad later
unconstitutional. He is exempted from said rule only when his non- instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5,
acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as
is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the
rightful minority leader.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ISSUES:

SECTION 14 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to settle the controversy?
PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN, JR. 2. In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
(G.R. NO. L-51122, MARCH 25, 1982) leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President
Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: HELD:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary 1. Yes. This Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well
Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent Associate within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Commissioner of the SEC granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747. abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Before he moved to intervene he had signified his intention 2. No. While the Constitution mandates that the President of
to appear as counsel for the respondent T.C. Acero, but which was the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
objected to by petitioners. Acero instituted at the SEC quo warranto of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will
proceedings, questioning the election for the 11 Directors of the not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could
International Pipe Industries Corporation, a private corporation. Acero thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
claimed that the stockholder’s votes were not properly counted. Justice defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
Acero to which petitioner Eugenio Puyat objected on Constitutional manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
grounds Sec.11, Art.VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
that “no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before… any officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be
administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. The cited such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
continue his appearance for respondent Acero. method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman

Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision. SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
AVELINO VS. CUENCO
HELD: (G.R. NO. L-2821, MARCH 4, 1949)
Yes. Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. FACTS:
Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the
the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate
be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of President and ordering the investigation thereof. When the meeting was
the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor called to order, Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel. but Senator Tirona opposed said motion. The roll was called.
However, he later had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of Senator Sanidad next moved to dispense with the reading of
stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and
He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the David.
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading
suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to continuously ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes,
appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was Senator Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would speak
he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the
matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at
Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. recognition of Senator Tañada.
Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the
indirect circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. An assemblyman Senate gallery. Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's
cannot indirectly follow the constitutional prohibition not to appear as followers, moved for adjournment of session. Senator Sanidad registered
counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying nominal his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
amount of share of one of the stockholders after his appearance as seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of
counsel therein was contested. A ruling upholding the “intervention” would adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblymen need to Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and
do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and
participation in the “interest” of the client and then “intervene” in the again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
proceedings. That which the Constitution prohibits may not be done by Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator
the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of
the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate

President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
and proceeded with the session. demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department,
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
— it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz 63 Phil., 139.)
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order Under our form of government, the judicial department has
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It
unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair. has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express
Upon motion of Senator Arranz which was approved, provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested
Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary. Senator Tañada, after the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a
being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said The Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the suspension which the Constitution did not impair. In any event, petitioner's
same was unanimously approved. argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of
the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
said resolution was unanimously approved. PAREDES, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Senator Cuenco took the oath. GR NO. 118364. JANUARY 28, 1997
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the
respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate. FACTS:
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners While Congressman was still Provincial Governor, charges of
asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines violations of the Anti-Graft Law were filed against him before the
senate and oust respondent. Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, he was elected to Congress. During his
second term in Congress, the Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive
ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? suspension on him pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law. Paredes challenged the
authority of the Sandiganbayan to suspend a district representative.
HELD:
None. The constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be suspended.
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor
taken over, by the judiciary. HELD:
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the YES. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, Constitution which deals with the power of each House of Congress inter
even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change alias to ‘punish its members of Congress for disorderly behavior ‘ and
the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. suspend or expel a member’ by a vote of two0thirds of the members
And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action subject to the qualification that the penalty of the suspension spoken of in
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations. Sec. 13 of RA 3019 which is not penalty by a preliminary preventive
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity measure presenting from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by Representative.
leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might
be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
US VS. PONS
34 PHIL 729. 1916
SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION FACTS:
OSMEÑA VS. PENDATUN The respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were
(G.R. NO. L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960) charged with illegal importation of opium. Pons and Beliso were tried
separately on motion of counsel. Lasarte had not yet been arrested. Each
BENGZON, J.: was found guilty of the crime, charged and sentenced accordingly. Both
FACTS: appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a become final. Respondent’s motion alleged to prove that the last day of
verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28 th day
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and of February, that Act No.2381 under which Pons must be punished if found
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special guilty, was not passed nor approved on the 28 th of February but on March
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment 1 of that year. Also, counsel for Pons alleged that the Assembly’s clock
of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary was stopped on February 18, 1914 at midnight and left so until the
immunity. He also asked, principally, that said members of the special determination of the discussion of all pending matters among which was
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly Act NO. 2381. to prove aid allegations, counsel argued the court to go
the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges of beyond the proceedings of the Legislature as recorded in the journals.
bribery against then President Garcia with the admonition that if he failed
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may go beyond the recitals of legislature
to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
journals or just take judicial notice of said journals for the purpose of
Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated
his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered determining the date of adjournment when such journal are clear and
in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and explicitly.
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took HELD:
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides YES. From their very nature and object the records of the
that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary. And to inquire into
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature when they are, as
subject to censure by the House.
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the
The Special Committee during the pendency of his petition,
spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine government was brought
found said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. The House
into existence, to invade and coordinate and independent department of
approved House Resolution No. 175 declaring him suspended from office the Government and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions
for 15 months. of the Legislature.
ISSUE: Can the House of Representatives discipline its members as in
the case at bar? ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENEZ
HELD: 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
Yes. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction FACTS:
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual Pursuant to the provisions of RA 7609 known as the Foreign
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank issued Circular NO. 95 fixing
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the a unified margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transaction and a
Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
memorandum establishing the procedure for application for exemption
whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
from payment of said fee. In November and December 1959, and in May
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
1960, Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., brought foreign exchange for
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The

the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid for the margin fee He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
therefore. Then as petitioner, the Central Bank declaring that separate quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. When the head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
back issue corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund, the auditor declared the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the
of the back issue the said vouchers upon the ground that the exemption Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation
granted by the Monetary Board is in violation of Sec. 2(18_ of RA 2609, of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo
according to the pertinent portion of the Act, “urea formaldehyde” is registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order. In the course of his
exempted from the margin fee. The National Institute of Science and interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
Technology further affirms that “urea formaldehyde” is different from urea question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
and formaldehyde. Hence, the separate importations of these two raw never did.
materials are not excluded from margin fee. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “urea formaldehyde” as used in the the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
statute should be read as “urea” and “formaldehyde.” finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
HELD: Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
NO. Hence, “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product
which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde” as ISSUE: Whether or not the passage of RA No. 8240 is in violation of the
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea rules of the House, hence making it null and void.
formaldehyde.” Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the term HELD:
“urea” and “formaldehyde”, not the latter as a finished product, citing in NO. First, it is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
support of this view the statements made on the floor of Senate, during alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No 8240 are
the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e. Article VI, Secs. 26-27. The
“urea formaldehyde” is a conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor Constitution provides that “each House may determine the rules of its
of the measure passed by the Congress and approved by the President. proceedings. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
227 SCRA 703. 1993 nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to
a particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
FACTS: qualification. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings
The Philippine Postal Corporation implemented RA 7534, a of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders,
measure withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC and as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
MTC along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are Second, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No.
members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and
will be prejudiced by the aforementioned measure. The petitioners assail the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
the constitutionality of the measure on the ground inter alia that it is passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
discriminatory and encroached on the independence of the judiciary. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is tenable. duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims
that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the
HELD: Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
YES. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts."
may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in
presiding officers of Congress. The aforementioned measure is declared question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996
unconstitutional insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the SC, which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
CA, RTC and MTC and other government offices. became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
It is alleged that RA No. 7354 is discriminatory because Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4). The Journal is
while withdrawing the franking privilege of the Judiciary, it retains the same regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
for the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, Constitution to be recorded therein. As already noted, the bill which
Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the Commission became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment
on Elections, former president of he Philippines, widows of former has been duly proven.
presidents of the Philippines, the national census and statistics Office and WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices or DISMISSED.
officers.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept
of the due process, as unfair discrimination offends the requirement of JURISDICTION; JUDICIAL REVIEW OF HRET DECISIONS
justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate ROBLES vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
clause in Article III, Section I of the Constitution to provide for a more TRIBUNAL (HRET)
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the (G.R. NO. 86647. FEBRUARY 5, 1990)
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of
the due process clause .but if the particular act assailed partakes of an MEDIALDEA, J.
unwarranted partiality or prejudice the sharper weapon to cut it down is FACTS:
the equal protection clause. Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo
Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1 st district
of Caloocan City in the May 1987 elections. Petitioner Robles was
SEPARATION OF POWERS; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE proclaimed the winner. Santos filed an election protest with respondent
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA HRET, alleging that the elections were characterized by the commission of
(G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997) electoral frauds and irregularities. He likewise prayed for the recounting of
the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested precincts. Petitioner alleged
MENDOZA, J. the late filing of the protest.
FACTS: The HRET issued an order setting the commencement of the
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. revision of contested ballots on September 1, 1988 and directed protestant
They brought this suit against the respondents charging them violation of Santos to identify 25% of the total contested precincts which he desires to
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally be revised first in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of the HRET.
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the On September 7, 1988, the revision of the ballots for 75 precincts,
Constitution. The present petition also challenges the validity of RA No. representing the initial 25% of all the contested precincts, was terminated.
8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision while
Code by imposing so-called *sin taxes” (actually specific taxes) on the Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts. But
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. the HRET did not act on the said motions. Santos then filed an Urgent
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest which was granted
No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 by the HRET. Hence the resumption of the revision of the ballots was
and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it ordered.
with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A Robles filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing denied. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner contends in the present
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. petition that when private respondent filed the Motion to Withdraw Protest
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing, respondent
the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence when respondent HRET
Rep. Exequiel Javier proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after subsequently ordered the revision of the unrevised protested ballots,
which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate.

notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without jurisdiction Commission on the other. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional
or with grave abuse of discretion. organ created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has lost its jurisdiction over the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
case. interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it
does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
HELD: adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
NO. It is noted that upon Santos’ filing of his Motion to restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
Withdraw on Unrevised Precincts on September 12, 1988, no action government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
thereon was taken by respondent HRET. The mere filing of the motion to fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the
withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the appropriate cases. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of
tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has
lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
terminated. present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
The Court agrees with the HRET when it held that “the and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
withdrawal becomes effective only when the motion is granted. To hold of the members of the National Assembly."
otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction (2) NO. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of
already acquired.” The Court therefore holds that this Tribunal retains the Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant’s Motion to Withdraw, "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
the will of the electorate is ascertained. Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
Since Protestant's "Motion to Withdraw Protest on the nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
Unrevised Precincts" had not been acted upon by this Tribunal before it the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior
was recalled by the Protestant, it did not have the effect of removing the Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
precincts covered thereby from the protest. If these precincts were not Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
withdrawn from the protest, then the granting of Protestant's "Urgent returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
Motion to Recall and Disregard Withdrawal of Protest" did not amount to imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this
allowing the refiling of protest beyond the reglementary period. constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning,
on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, import and significance.
a writ of certiorari will not issue. Where the court has jurisdiction over the The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of
orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. The
cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to
respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
and again been upheld by the Court in many cases. Thus, “judicial review Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
of decisions or final resolutions of the HRET is (thus) possible only in the remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in
exercise of this Court’s so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power
determination that the tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered by the National Assembly.
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time
part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing of its passage on December 3, 1935, cannot be construed as a limitation
the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED. upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election
of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide
SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATURE – ELECTORAL election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
COMMISSION the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge
(G.R. NO. L-45081. JULY 15, 1936) of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said
LAUREL, J. election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of
FACTS: its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all
Petitioner Jose Angara and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates for the position of in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
Tayabas in the September 17, 1935 elections. Petitioner was proclaimed confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
winner. Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member.
The National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was
effectively confirmed the election of petitioner to the said body. Ynsua filed acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
of petitioner. Meanwhile, on December 9, 1935, the National Assembly, in Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and
a resolution, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by them. and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
Angara then filed a petition praying for the dismissal of filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
Ynsua’s protest. He alleged that Resolution no. 8 was passed by the might prescribe.
National Assembly in the exercise of its constitutional prerogative to The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its Commission is hereby denied.
members should be presented. But said Motion to Dismiss was denied by
the Electoral Commission. Hence the present petition filed by petitioner
seeking to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking HRET
further cognizance of the protest made by Ynsua against the election of LAZATIN V. HRET
said petitioner. (G.R. NO. 84297. DECEMBER 8, 1988)
ISSUES: CORTES, J.
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the FACTS:
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy. Petitioner Carmelo Lazatin and private respondent Lorenzo
(2) Whether or not the Electoral Commission acted without Timbol were candidates for Representative of the first district of
or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest Pampanga during the May 11, 1987 elections. During the canvassing of
filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous the votes, Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain election returns.
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly. Since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections,
Timbol brought the matter to the COMELEC, which initially ruled the
HELD: suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate. It later ordered
(1) YES. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of
in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but votes and to proclaim the winner.
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government Petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioner’s
within its own sphere. proclamation void ab initio and another petition to prohibit petitioner from
In the case at bar, here then is presented an actual assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature petitioner was able to assume office. Later, the COMELEC declared
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged this

resolution before the Court, which sustained the petitioner. Thus, private discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
respondent filed in the HRET an election protest against petitioner. warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the protest on the ground that it WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
had been filed late. However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been Private respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.
filed on time. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the
protest filed by private respondent. To support his contention, he cited ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial 166 SCRA 651. 1988
and city offices . — A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member
of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall GANCAYCO, J:
be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a FACTS:
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten On October 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent
days after the proclamation of the results of the election. Senate Electoral Tribunal an election protest against 22 candidates of the
On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect. Subsequently, the
time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit: petitioners filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post resolution of the aforementioned case, as respondents therein. The
office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, petitioners urged the contest to be decided by only 3 members of the
together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each Tribunal.
protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on
November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the ISSUE: Whether or not the Senators-Members of the Electoral Tribunal
effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen may be compelled to inhibit themselves from hearing the contest.
(15) days from the date of the proclamation . Election contests arising from
the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of HELD:
Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal NO. It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a
shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and
“Legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of
ISSUES: deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
1. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the protest Senators.
filed by private respondent. Every member of the tribunal may, as his conscience
2. What provision of law governs the period for filing protests dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
in the HRET. sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way
3. Whether or not private respondent’s protest had been of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that
seasonably filed. in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
HELD: amendment of its rules can confer on the 3 Justice-Members along the
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election protest.
time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it. Protestant filed his
protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The
protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
by the Rules of the HRET. BONDOC VS. PINEDA
Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election 201 SCRA 792. 1991
Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous terms and needs
no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC GRIÑO-AQUINO, J:
contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa , or any FACTS:
regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read Marciano Pineda of LDP won against his rival Dr. Emigdio
together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the Bondoc of NP causing the latter to file a protest in the HRET. A decision
COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of 23
returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, votes. Hence, the LDP members in the tribunal insisterd on a re-
elective regional, provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts resulting to
2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 the increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman
Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the Camasura coted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles to
jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang proclaim Bondoc as the winner of the contest. Camasura later on revealed
Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC. to his chief, notified the Chairman of the Tribunal to withdraw the
That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as nomination and to rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET and
contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of seeks to cancel the promulgation of the tribunal’s decision in Bondoc v.
the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under Pineda.
the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. The Constitution now vests
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives could change its
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of representatives in the HRET at the request of the dominant party.
Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by HELD:
constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional, NO. If the HRET would reserve the interest of the party in
provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving power, the independence of the Electoral Tribunal, as embodied in the
municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)]. Constitution, will no longer be protected. The resolution of the House of
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in the favor of NP’s
House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to candidate, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election HRET to the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily Bondoc.
flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. To sanction such interference by the House of
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is Representatives in the work of the HRET would reduce the Tribunal to a
well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the 3
protests may be filed before it. Consequently, private respondent's election Justices of the SC and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of
latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. The the tribunal.
alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be nonpartisan.
by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, impartiality and independence – even independence from the political
is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to a party” and “breach of
judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET Tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the
any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, votes by the Tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave
as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a
abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the Congressman Camasura is therefore null and void.
exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of

Commission and the House Electoral Tribunal. On December 1988, the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT House of Representatives on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over
CHAVEZ V. COMELEC (211 SCRA 315 [1992]) the objection of Congressman Daza, LP, revised the House Majority
G.R. NO. 105323 JULY 3, 1992 membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new
political alignments. On February 1989, Coseteng filed a petition for quo
FACTS: warranto and injunction praying the Court to declare as null and void the
Petitioner Francisco Chavez prays in to this Court for the election of the respondent as members of the Commission on
issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent COMELEC Appointments.
from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate. And he also prays
that judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to re-open the ballot ISSUE: Whether or not the election of the respondents as members of the
boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces therein enumerated including Commission on Appointments should be enjoined for having violated the
Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which were invalidated constitutional mandate of proportional representation.
or declared stray and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in favor of
petitioner. HELD:
NO. After deliberating on the petition and the comments of
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the case at bar, this Court has jurisdiction to the respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed not
resolve issue regarding the instant regular election protest? because it raises a political question which does not, but because the
revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments
HELD: is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein as
No. The petitioner’s proper recourse is to file a regular provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election The composition of the House membership in the
Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Thus, sec.17, Commission on Appointments was based on a proportional representation
Art.VI of the Constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the the House. They represent 79% of the House membership. 88% of 12
sole judge of all contests relating to their respective Members.” The word members in the Commission would equal to 9 members, which may be
“sole” underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals’ jurisdiction over the rounded off to 10 members from the LDP. Even if KAIBA were to be
election contests relating to their respective Members. This Court has no considered as an opposition party, its lone member represents only 4% of
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral less than 1% of the House membership. Hence she is not entitled to one
Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments.
petitioner involving as it does, contest relating to the election of a member
of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner’s proper recourse is to file a regular ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning GUINGONA VS. GONZALES
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. The proper recourse is for 214 SCRA 789. 1992
petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial
measures. FACTS:
As a result of the national elections held last May 1992, the
Senate is composed of the following members representing the political
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT affiliation: LDP – 15 Senators, NPC -5 senators, LAKAS-NUCD – 3
DAZA V. SINGSON senators, LP-PDP-LABAN – 1 senator.
180 SCRA 497, DECEMBER 21, 1989 The resulting composition of the Senate based on the rule of
proportional representation of each party is as follows.
CRUZ, J: POLITICAL PARTY
FACTS: MEMBERSHIP PROPORTION
Herein petitioner Raul A. Daza was chosen and listed as MEMBERSHIP
representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on Appointments LDP
(CA). 15 7.5 members
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong NPC
Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized. Twenty four (24) members of the Liberal 5 2.5 members
Party resigned and joined the LDP. Based on this, the House of LAKAS
Representative revised its representation in the CA by withdrawing the 3 1.5 members
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the LDP member Luis C. LP-PDP-LABAN 1
Singson. .5 members
The petitioner argued that he cannot be removed from CA
because his election thereto is permanent. He further contended that LDP On September 23, 1992, Senator Guingona filed a petition to
is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political prohibit respondents Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tanada from sitting
stability because it was just established recently. and assuming the position of members of the Commission on
Appointments and to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales from allowing
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the question raised by the petitioner is political respondents to sit as members thereof on the ground that the
in nature. proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of
2. Whether or not the LDP is not entitled to a seat in the proportional representation as enunciated in Sec. 18, Art. VI of the 1987
Commission on Appointments because it does not suffice the qualification Constitution.
of being a political party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate acted with or in excess of jurisdiction
HELD: when it designated Senator Romulo as the 8th member of the CA upon
1. No. It is because what is involved in the case at bar is the legality, not nomination by the LDP and respondent Senator Tanada as LP nominee
the wisdom of the act of the House of Representative in removing the even if LDP and LP are entitled only to half a member.
petitioner from the CA. Even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come within the Courts power of review under the expanded HELD:
jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or ½ to
includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any converted fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
branch or instrumentality of the government. senator by adding one-half to be able to elect Senator Romulo as the 8 th
2. No. In the first place, the Commission on Election has already member. In so doing, the election of Senator Romulo gave more
approved the petition of the LDP for registration as political party. representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political
Furthermore, the petitioner’s contention that LDP must prove its party – either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. This is clearly a violation of
permanence and must exist in a longer period of time in not tenable. It is Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with the proportional
because even the Liberal Party in 1946 election is only four (4) months representation of the political parties. This provision of Section 18 on
old, yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
Commission. any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey the rule on
proportional representation. Otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or House of Representatives can be sheen
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT force of members impose its will on the hapless minority.
COSETENG VS. MITRA
187 SCRA 377. 1990 The SC laid down the following guidelines accordingly:
1. In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have
FACTS: at least 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the
Ablan was elected as the 12 th member of the Commission on Senate.
Appointments on September 22, 1987. A year later, the LDP was 2. Where there are more than 2 political parties
organized as a political party. The House Committee, including the House represent in the Senate, a political party or coalition
representation in the Commission on Appointments had to be reorganized with a single senator in the Senate cannot
because 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives are constitutionally claim a seat in the commission.
affiliated with the LDP. Petitioner Coseteng of KAIBA then wrote a letter to
Speaker Mitra requesting that she be appointed as a member of the

Furthermore, the SC said it is not mandatory to elect 12 Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law
senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives to the may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or
Commission on Appointments. What the Constitution requires is that there strengthen that law.
be at least a majority of the entire membership.

ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO
BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE 87 PHIL. 29, 1950
203 SCRA 767, 1991
FACTS:
FACTS: On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted a resolution
The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil case against creating a special committee to investigate on the purchase by the
Kokoy Romualdez, et al., in connection with ill-gotten wealth. During the government of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates owned by Ernest
pendency of the case, there were rumors that the properties involve in the Burt as represented by Jean Arnault.
case were already being disposed of by Romualdez. Senator Enrile in his The committee sought to determine who were responsible
privilege speech before the Senate called the attention of the Senate for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
regarding the matter. government.
On motion of Senator Mecado, the matter was referred to The special committee called and examined among other
the Committee on Acountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon witness, Jean Arnault. However, for the latter’s refusal to answer some of
Committee). The committee subpoenaed petitioner who was also one of the questions propounded on him, the name of the person to whom he
the defendants in said case. Petitioner declined to testify on the ground gave the money as well as answer to other pertinent questions in
that his testimony might unduly prejudice the defendants. The committee connection therewith, the Senate resolved to imprison him until such time
continued in its inquiry, thus the present petition for prohibition to restrain as he decided to answer relevant questions put to him in connection with
respondent from investigating. the investigation of a government transaction.
The committee commented that the Court cannot properly
inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has authority to punish petitioner for
investigations in aid of legislation under this doctrine of separation of contempt.
power. Petitioners contend that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's
inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of HELD:
legislation The Supreme Court said yes considering that he questions
were pertinent to the pursuance of the Senate Resolution.
ISSUES: The Supreme Court also held that the offender could be
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the imprisoned indefinitely by the State, it being a continuing body, provided
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations in that the punishment did not become so long as to violate due process.
aid of legislation under the doctrine of separation of power.
2. Whether or not such inquiry is within the power of the
Congress to conduct investigation. SECTION 24 – SHALL ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN HOR
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
HELD: 235 SCRA 630, 1994
1. YES, the Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of FACTS:
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private The value- added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
affairs in purported aid of legislation. exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
system of government. Each department of the government has exclusive money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution National Internal Revenue Code.
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the (defects), among others:
government. Law did not originate exclusively in the House of
The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties Representative as required by Section 24, Article VI – they contended that
between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to to be considered as having originated in the HOR, it should retain the
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In cases of conflict, essence of the House Bill.
the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since it
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. did not originate exclusively in the House of Representative as required by
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional Sec. 24, Article VI.
boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only HELD:
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution No. The Supreme Court held that the Senate is empowered
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to by the Constitution to concur with amendments and propose amendments,
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that even substitute the entire bill as a whole.
instrument secures and guarantees to them. A bill originating in the HOR may undergo such extensive
2. NO, the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of changes in the Senate that the result maybe rewriting of the whole; As a
both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced AND to insist
but in the present case, no legislation was apparently being that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill
contemplated in connection with the said investigation. would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with
The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not amendments” but also to “propose amendments.”
really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
violated the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears ALVAREZ, ET AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET AL.
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. 252 SCRA 695, 1996
The Court ruled that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it FACTS:
is only because SC hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of Law converting municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a city is
legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation being assailed that the Bill did not originate exclusively from HOR as
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution since it had a
government, ordained by the Constitution. counterpart in the Senate.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE CRUZ: ISSUE: Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243,
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to
and illicit acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for have originated in the House of Representatives.
the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. HELD:
It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the A bill of local application, such as one asking for the
disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into conversion of a municipality into a city, is deemed to have originated from
the expenditure of all public money is an indispensable duty of the the House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to the filing of
legislature." the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate approved its own
version.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The appropriation
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
receives the House bill. excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
SECTION 25 – APPROPRIATIONS liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
GARCIA VS. MATA Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
65 SCRA 517, 1975 provision on the appropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire
amount of P86B for said purpose.
FACTS: In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the AFP the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
until his reversion to inactive status pursuant to the provisions of RA No. use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According
2332. Petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus and recovery of a sum of to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be
money, to compel the former to reinstate him in the active commissioned covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose
service of the AFP, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
Petitioner anchored his claim to reinstatement at paragraph enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary,
11 of the Special Provisions for the AFP in RA 1600 which was the petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 as reads: intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
THAT RESERVE OFFICERS WITH AT LEAST 10 YEARS therefrom.
OF ACCUMULATED COMMISSIONED SERVICE WHO ARE STILL ON
ACTIVE DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT SHALL ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.
NOT BE REVERTED TO INACTIVE STATUS EXCEPT FOR CAUSE
AFTER PROPER COURT-MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS OR UPON THEIR HELD:
REQUEST. Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the special
Respondent, Judge Mata, declared paragraph 11 of the provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of
Special Provisions for the AFP in RA No. 1600 which was the the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1956-57 unconstitutional and therefore savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best
invalid and inoperative. position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are
Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
CFI. other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However,
it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may
ISSUE: Is the provision valid? be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be
HELD: aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures
The SC held that the said provision used by the petitioner as from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is
a basis was a RIDER because the Constitution provides that no provision for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill UNLESS transfer or realignment is to be made.
it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein (Art. VI, It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to
Section 25(2)). the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the amount appropriated in the bill, is an “inappropriate provision” referring
the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling to active duty to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It clearly The veto power while exercised by the President is actually
shows that the paragraph in question does not relate to the appropriation. a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than
Article VII.
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the
Congress can include in an appropriate to which it relates, “it follows that
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it
DEMETRIA VS. ALBA extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an
148 SCRA 208, 1987 inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to
be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional
FACTS: provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 states that the because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.
President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that
department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the payment of
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office in the one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank
Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have direct
ISSUE: Is the provision valid? connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the
appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said
HELD: provisos are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
No. The court said that such was unconstitutional as it The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein
department to any program, project, or activity of any departments without requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with
savings in the item from which the same are to be taken. the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
235 SCRA 506. 1994 AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25
and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.
QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and SECTION 26 – PASSING OF A BILL
approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ
president for the exercise of his veto power. 15 SCRA 489, 1965
One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with
respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member FACTS:
of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave
share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he does not and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of RA 3836 “insofar as
spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the leave to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both
special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations houses (of Congress).
for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that The constitutionality of the law is assailed on the ground that
this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. the provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of
They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of the
individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the Constitution.
savings as appropriated.

ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be legislation impossible.
expressed in the title thereof.
HELD: SECTION 27 – METHODS BY WHICH A BILL MAY BECOME A LAW

YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by RA TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to members of the 235 SCRA 630, 1994
GSIS who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of
age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of CA 186. On FACTS:
the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members The value- added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials would services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
relate to subject matter, not germane to CA 186. money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD National Internal Revenue Code.
151 SCRA 204, 1987 It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
(defects), among others:
FACTS: It is claimed that the conference committee included
PD NO 1987 is entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill – that these
Regulatory Board.” Section 10 thereof imposes a 30% tax on gross provisions were stealthily inserted by the conference committee.
receipts on video transactions. The petitioner argued that such tax impose
is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since
the conference committee included provisions not found in either the
House Bill or the Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Is section 10 a RIDER?
HELD:
HELD: A third version of the bill may result from the conference
NO. The requirement that every bill must only have one committee, which is considered may result from the conference
subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the substitute” the only requirement being that the third version be germane to
statute seeks to achieve. Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently the subject of the House and Senate bills.
related to the regulation of the video industry. As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of
The provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, Under congressional rules of procedure, conference
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already
The Supreme Court thus provided the following standards agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to
whether or not a provision is embraced in the title: enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating
· Title be comprehensive enough to include the general in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are
· If all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft
subject matter expressed in the title. essentially a new bill.
· So long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general The result is a third version, which is considered an
subject to the title. "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which
· Regardless of how diverse it is so long as it maybe being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the Senate bills.
method and means of carrying out the general object.
· Should not be construed as to cripple legislative power
· Given a PRACTICAL rather than a technical construction ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO
(237 SCRA 324 [1994])
PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO FACTS:
227 SCRA 703, 1993 Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 7496 is a
misnomer or, at least deficient f0r being merely entitled "Simplified Net
FACTS: Income Taxation Scheme For Self Employed and Professionals Engaged
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. in the practice of their Profession". It is the petitioner's view that the said
7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its law should be considered as having now adopted a gross income
Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from scheme, instead of having still deductions from gross income of single
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the proprietorships and professionals in the computation of their, taxable net
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land income, petitioner argued that this violated the requirement for uniformity
Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain in taxation and due process because single proprietorship and
other government offices. professional were taxed differently from corporations and partnerships.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel
ISSUE:
that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
WON RA No. 7496 is in violation of Art. VI Sec. 26 and 28 of the 1987
named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as the sending Constitution.
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
HELD:
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
On the basis of the language of the said questioned law, it
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on
would be difficult to accept the petitioner's view that the amendatory
the ground that its title embraces more than one subject and does not should be considered as now having adopted a gross income, instead of
express its purposes. as having still retained the net income, taxation scheme. The allowance of
deductible items may have been significantly reduced by the questioned
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7354 violates the Constitution for it was alleged
law in comparison with that which has prevailed prior to the amendment,
to embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose. limiting, however, allowable deductions from gross income is neither
HELD: discordant with nor opposed to, the net income tax concept.
NO. The franking privilege from some agencies is germane Art. VI Sec. 26 (I) of the Constitution has been envisioned
to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is so as (a) to prevent logrolling legislation intended to unite the members of
the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Court the legislature who favor anyone of the unrelated subjects in support of
ruled that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not the whole act; (b) to avoid surprise or even fraud upon the legislature and
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law. (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body proceedings are as usually made, of the subjects of legislations. The
of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the above objective of the fundamental law appears to have sufficiently met.
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of the law which
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not could have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient The contention of the petitioner that RA No. 7496 desecrates
compliance with the constitutional requirement. the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable
To require every end and means necessary for the is of no merit. The contention clearly forgets that such a system of
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496.
Uniformity of Taxation merely requires that all subjects or
122
objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated both in privileges emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered
and liabilities. Uniform does nor forefend classification as long as 1.) The by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
standards that are used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary. 2.) The As to the contention that the assailed law violates the
categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose. 3.) The law present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
applies all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1),
4.) The classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
same class. Shifting the income taxation of individuals to the schedules absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
system, this makes the income tax depend on the kind of taxable income, Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
and maintaining for corporations the global treatment which treats in "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
common all kinds of taxable income of the taxpayer. clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts,
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
(G.R. NO. L-114783 DECEMBER 8, 1994) glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
BIDIN, J.; possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
FACTS:
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute Republic Act
No. 7675, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill 235 SCRA 630, 1994
which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. Pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held to asked the people FACTS:
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of The value- added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided in the statute. The exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population where services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. First, that it National Internal Revenue Code.
contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit: (defects), among others:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace It is claimed that the conference committee included
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. provisions not found in either the House Bill or the Senate Bill – that these
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section provisions were stealthily inserted by the conference committee.
49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal
subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA 7716, since
urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San the conference committee included provisions not found in either the
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. House Bill or the Senate Bill.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI,
Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the division HELD:
of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under A third version of the bill may result from the conference
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the committee, which is considered may result from the conference
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a
Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend substitute” the only requirement being that the third version be germane to
that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the the subject of the House and Senate bills.
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emergency out of
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting a Conference Committee, it has been explained:
the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. Under congressional rules of procedure, conference
5(4) as aforecited. committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure
at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional. agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to
enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating
HELD: in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
No.Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city essentially a new bill.
but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly The result is a third version, which is considered an
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated Senate bills.
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. GONZALES VS. MACARAIG
Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the 191 SCRA 452
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should FACTS:
be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the The veto of a particular section in the 1989 appropriations
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general act was assailed for being unconstitutional on grounds that the president
subject." may not veto provisions with regard to appropriation bills and if the
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had president vetoes a provision in an appropriation bill that the entire bill
been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to should be vetoed. Further, item-veto power does not carry with it the
wit: power to strike out conditions.
“Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to veto provisions
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details with regard to appropriation bills.
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject HELD:
of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the Yes. The Supreme Court held the following:
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied). The President can veto an item or items in an appropriations
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues, alleging bill BUT nothing less than an item or items.
that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that o Item – an indivisible sum of money dedicated
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement to a stated purpose that a distinct and severable part of a bill maybe
of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative subject to a different veto.
districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. Therefore, regard to the petitioner’s contention that if a
7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the provision in an appropriations bill is vetoed the entire bill must be vetoed
regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the cannot be sustained. The said power to veto provisions has been carried
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment over the previous constitutions and has now been understood as
of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws broadened to include the item or items to which the provision relates.

In relation still to veto of provisions, the principle that distinct this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution.
and severable parts of a bill maybe the subject to a different veto is They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the
founded on Art. 6, Section 25(2) wherein provisions are limited to its individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the
operation to the appropriation to which it relates…a distinct and severable savings as appropriated.
part subject to a different veto. Therefore it doesn’t mean that if the Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
president vetoes a provision in an appropriations bill he’ll need to veto the appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The appropriation
entire bill. authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
Besides, the said provisions are inappropriate in the first foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
place because the provisions should relate to a particular appropriation in excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
the general appropriations bill. of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
That said sections of the appropriation bill cannot be subject provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
to veto if such are made to be conditions on the expenditure of funds liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
cannot be sustained because such conditions “inappropriate.” Restrictions Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
or conditions in an appropriation bill must exhibit a connection with money provision on the appropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire
items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Said sections amount of P86B for said purpose.
were in fact general law measures, there was no necessary connection In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
with the schedule of expenditures. the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
That in any case, the sections mentioned contravene the use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According
Constitution as it takes away the power of the President to augment any to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be
item in the appropriations law of their respective offices from savings in covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose
other items of their respective appropriations, since a statute has already pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
authorized such power. stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary,
petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
BENGZON VS. DRILON therefrom.
208 SCRA 133, 1992
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.
FACTS:
The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. HELD:
The law appropriated 500M Pesos “For general fund adjustment for Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the special
operational and special requirements as indicated hereunder.” Among the provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of
several authorized uses of the fund was the adjustment of pension of the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
justices as authorized by an earlier law. The President vetoed the use of savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best
such fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices. position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are
The funds pertaining to the payment of the adjusted savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
pensions of Retired Justices of the Supreme Court and CA was vetoed other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However,
and assailed as being unconstitutional. it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may
· RA 1797 was the law granted these benefits in 1957. be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of
· Section 3-A of RA 1797 was repealed by PD 644. approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be
· Congress thought to revive RA 1797 through HB No.16297. aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures
· But PD 644 never became a law! (not published) from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is
for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said
· President vetoed HB No. 16297.
transfer or realignment is to be made.
It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto act of the President the use of such fund
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
for the adjustment of the pension of justices is valid. the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of
the amount appropriated in the bill, is an “inappropriate provision” referring
HELD:
to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
The Supreme Court ruled:
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually
· In declaring the veto invalid, the Court said that it was not the
a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than
veto of an item. The item was the entire 500M peso
Article VII.
allocation out of which unavoidable obligations not
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the
adequately funded in separate items could be met. What the
Congress can include in an appropriate to which it relates, “it follows that
President had vetoed was the method of meeting
any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it
unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the 500M
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an
Pesos.
inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to
· When the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional
General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing RA provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws
1797 since PD 644 never took effect which is beyond the because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill.
power to accomplish. The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the
· The Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that
1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which may be the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the payment of
used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in
Court Resolution. As long as retirement laws remain in the no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank
statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have direct
government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the
1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA. appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as provisos are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately.
a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating unto the Presidency The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the
legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
less to repeal existing laws. The President’s power is merely to execute shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with
the laws passed by Congress. the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25
SECTION 1 ARTICLE 8, 1987 CONSTITUTION
and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ
235 SCRA 506. 1994
SECTION 28 – RULE ON TAXATION, TARIFF POWERS, EXEMPTIONS
QUIASON, J.: KAPATIRAN VS. TAN
FACTS: 163 SCRA 371, 1988
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and
approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the CASE:
president for the exercise of his veto power. The VAT law or EO 273 is being assailed on grounds among
One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with others that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member The Court overruled the contention holding that such was
of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate uniform because it operates with the same effect and force in every place
share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he does not where the subject may be found. It is also equitable since it is imposed
spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to
only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with
transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the
an aggregate gross annual sale exceeding 200,000.
special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations
for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that
sale of the stamps given to that church but was evidently to focus attention
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT not on the Eucharistic Congress but on its site, the idea being to attract
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS. AQUINO tourists to our country and not primarily the religious event, it was held that
162 SCRA 106, 1988 the stamp issue was not invalid.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed suit to annul and declare void the "Notice of ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building for non-payment of GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
real state taxes and penalties. 196 SCRA 221, 1991
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and
building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, FACTS:
determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), PD 1177 is being assailed on its constitutionality. It is argued
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject that the automatic reappropriation law for servicing foreign debts is invalid
college lot and building, which are contrary because it does not appropriate a fixed amount and is therefore an undue
Private respondents counter that the college lot and building delegation of legislative power
in question which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the
unpaid tax are used: (I) for the educational purposes of the r college; (2) ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.
permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, and his family
including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes HELD:
because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented Yes. The amount is fixed by the parameters of the law itself
by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation which requires the simple act of looking into the books of the Treasure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building is question are used
exclusively for educational purposes thereby exempting petitioner from ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
property taxes. OSMENA VS. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703, 1993
HELD:
NO. The lot and building are not used exclusively for FACTS:
educational purposes. It must be stressed however, that while this Court The Oil Price Stabilzation Fund (OPSF) was created to
allows a more liberal and non- restrictive interpretation of the phrase minimize the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate
"exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, adjustments and/or changes brought about by changes in world market
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. A Terminal Fund
emphasis has always been made that exemptions extends to facilities Balance deficit now aims to resolve the deficit by increasing petroleum
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment prices, contravening Section 29(3), Article VI where such fund shall be
of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or paid only for the purpose for which it was created.
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building ISSUE: Whether or not the increase of petroleum prices to resolve the
in the case at the bar for residential purposes of the Director and his Terminal Fund Balance deficit is valid.
family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purpose - educational, the lease of HELD:
the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any Yes. The Court held that it was a valid exercise of police
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of power.
education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived
at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
should be taxed, not because the, second floor of the same is being used PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ
by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the 235 SCRA 506. 1994
first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since
only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of QUIASON, J.:
the assessed tax be returned to the school involved. FACTS:
The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed and
approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill to the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT president for the exercise of his veto power.
SECTION 29 – RULES ON PUBLIC MONEY One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas each member
110 PHIL. 331, 1960 of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditures, a proportionate
share of the appropriation for the house which he belongs. If he does not
FACTS: spend for one item of expense, the questioned provision allows him to
The sum of 85,000 pesos was appropriated by Congress for transfer his allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the
the construction of a feeder road running through a private subdivision and special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocations
over a property owned by a private individual. Subsequently, the feeder for operational expenses to any other expense categorically claiming that
road is donated to the government. this practice is prohibited by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution.
They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House, not the
ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid? individual member of Congress, are the ones authorized to realign the
savings as appropriated.
HELD: Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing that the appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The appropriation
property sought to be improved with public funds was private in nature at authorized therein shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
the time the appropriation was made. The circumstance that the roads foregoing and domestic indebtedness; provided, that any payment in
were later donated to the government did not cure the basic defect of the excess of the amount therein appropriated shall be subject to the approval
appropriation as it was null and void ab initio. of the President with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
64 PHIL. 201, 1937 provision on the appropriations for debt service without vetoing the entire
amount of P86B for said purpose.
FACTS: In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
The Philippine government authorized a special stamp issue the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
on occasion of the observance in Manila of the 33 rd International use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. According
Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The to the President, the grant retirement and separation benefits should be
petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the covered by direct appropriation specially approved for the purpose
measure and contended that it violated the Constitution inasmuch as it pursuant to Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
benefited a particular region. The Supreme Court, on examining the facts, stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
discovered that the original design of the stamp featured a picture of a enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On the contrary,
Catholic chalice, but this was later rejected in favor of a map of the petitioners claim that said provision is a condition or limitation, which is
Philippines under which appeared the caption “Seat, 33rd International intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the stamp issue was valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.
HELD: HELD:
Yes. As the purpose of the stamp issue were not for the Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the special
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor money was derived from the provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of

the Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was
savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision
position to do so because they are the one who know whether there are never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have
savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of
it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the House as the case may Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of
be who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).
approval, those two officials will have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated
aligned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures Circular No.1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides that the proper
from which the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial agency, including ERB, is by way
for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. If the appeal is brought
transfer or realignment is to be made. to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by the wrong
It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal.
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds in excess of appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
the amount appropriated in the bill, is an “inappropriate provision” referring 93869, 12 November 1990).
to the funds other than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994. Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court promulgated
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990, Item No. 4 of which states that
a part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI rather than "[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by
Article VII. the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed". Also, paragraph (d)
As the constitution is explicit that the provision with the of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o transfer of appeals
Congress can include in an appropriate to which it relates, “it follows that erroneously taken to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to
any provision which does not relate to any particular item or which it whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be
extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is considered an allowed; continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will
inappropriate provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to not be tolerated."
be included in the category of inappropriate provision are unconstitutional Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held —
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's Resolution dated
because clearly those kinds of laws have no place in an appropriation bill. September 8, 1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for further
The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the disposition" was not a directive for this court to disregard the above
special provision of the item on debt services including the provisos that circulars and precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could mean only
the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for the payment of that this court should dispose of the subject petition in conformity with, and
one principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness and that in not in violation of, those circulars and precedents (Rollo, p. 26).
no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Board of Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have direct
connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power of the
appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent. Said ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
provisos are appropriate provisions hence, cannot be vetoed separately. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMMISION ON
The SC is sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the ELECTIONS
item on debt service can only be with respect to the proviso therein G.R. NO. 125416 SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
requiring that any payment in excess of the amount therein, appropriated
shall be the subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with FACTS:
the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan (Sangguniang
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use Bayan) passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Section 25 Economic Zone.
and Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution. Respondents Garcia, et al. filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye
1993. The Sangguniang Bayan promulgated Pambayang Kapasyahan
ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Bilang 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress to amend certain provisions
DIAZ VS.COURT OF APPEALS of R.A. No.7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items of
(G.R. NO. L-109698 DECEMBER 5, 1994) private respondents’ petition.
BELLOSILLO, J.: Not satisfied, private respondents resorted to their power of
FACTS: initiative. Respondent COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang
(DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. Thereafter, COMELEC issued a
the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service. The Resolution directing its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on
Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC at authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondent.
One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting a
Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00). “Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.” It then
DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos promulgated said Resolution, providing for “the rules and guidelines to
(P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
by DLPC in its operation. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
before this Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of Bataan.
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2428, petitioner
jurisdiction. instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
In Supreme Court’s resolution of 8 September 1992, it
referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
subsequently dismissed the petition. Among the grounds given was that discretion in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848
the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong which govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
mode of appeal. Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that Bataan?
the resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of
Appeals to disregard the above circular. They further claimed that E.O. No. HELD:
172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to replace the Board of Energy Yes. COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in
provides under Sec. 10 thereof that "[a] party adversely affected by a promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. The process started
decision, order or ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition to be known as by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC
petition for review with the Supreme Court." made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
Based on the definitions given by the Local Government
ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 10 of E.O. No.172 is constitutional. Code (R.A. 7160): Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact,
HELD: or amend any ordinance; while Local Referendum is the legal process
No. The predecessor of the Energy Regulatory Board was whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve,
the Board of Energy created under P.D. No. 1206. There under, appeals amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian.
from the decisions of the Board of Energy were appealable to the Office of In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the
the President. However, under the Interim Rules Implementing the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves
resolutions of the Board of Energy were made appealable to the without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
Intermediate Appellate Court (Sec. 9). representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
Furthermore, the 1987 Constitution, Sec. 30, Art VI provides: approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative
"No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will
concurrence." simply answer “yes” or “no” in the ballot.

In the case at bar, the exercise conducted is unquestionably articles of impeachment to the senate signed by 115 represenatatives or
an Initiative. more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives. On
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. The political
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS tension rose during the impeachment trial particularly during the
(177 SCRA 668) December hearings when Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of
Equitable-PCI Bank testified on the existence of the Jose Velarde account.
FACTS: The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the fateful day of
In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence
exile. Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Philippines under showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
a revolutionary government. name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the second envelope led to the
After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified resignation of the public and private prosecutors and the spontaneous
his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Aquino has stood outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is now referred to as the
firmly in the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family - EDSA dos.
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time Petitioner’s fall from power became more apparent starting
when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions January 19 when key officials from the armed forces, the PNP and his
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward. other cabinet members withdrew support. At about 12:00 noon of January
20 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
ISSUE: Whether or not in the exercise of the powers granted by the President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the hurriedly left Malacañang Palace while leaving a press statement
Philippines. indicating his strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of the proclamation of the respondent as President and
HELD: that he is leaving the Palace as he does not wish to “prevent the
Yes, the President has the Power under the Constitution to restoration of unity and order in our civil society.”
bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.
The Constitution says that the executive power shall be ISSUES:
vested in the President. It also enumerates certain specific powers. The 1. Whether or not the case at bar is a political question and hence, are beyond
enumeration, however, does not exhaust the totality of executive powers. the jurisdiction of this Court to decide
Tradition recognizes that the powers of the President are more than the 2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent
sum of enumerated executive powers. The duty of the government “to Arroyo is an Acting President.
serve and protect the people” as well as to see to the “maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the HELD:
promotion of the general welfare” argue towards the existence of “residual 1.)No the case at bar is not a political question. Accordingly, it is within the
instated powers.” jurisdiction of the Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v. Cuenco, the
Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
(178 SCRA 760) executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a
FACTS: great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
On October 1989, motion for reconsideration was filed by question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
petitioners raising the following major arguments among others: court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
1. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
country. there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
2. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
President Marcos. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
W/N the President has the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting
the Philippines. to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court
HELD: power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People
YES. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be denied that Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of
the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause,
but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. 2. ) No. President Estrada is not on leave, he resigned from office.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
PUNO, J.: write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
FACTS: Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, the Using this totality test, the Court holds that petitioner resigned as
petitioner experienced a sharp descent from power started on October 4, President. The petitioner’s resignation is shown in the following instances:
2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend a. he left Malacañang
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and b. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality
immediately ignited reactions of rage. Numerous investigations c. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
commenced both from the Senate and the House of Representatives. presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on October 11, process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter asking the any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral soon as the disability disappears
authority to govern. d. he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
Political tensions continued to heat up as key economic serve them.
advisers and members of the cabinet defected. On November 13, in a e. he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
tumultuous session, the house of representatives finally transmitted the may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference

is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
has given up; stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
f. he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
not give up the presidency. DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(177 SCRA 354)
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT FACTS:

SECTION 11 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION The special prosecutor officer filed in the Sandiganbayan an
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO information against petitioner Doromal, alleging:
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001) "That the above-named accused, a public officer, being then
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did
PUNO, J.: then and there wilfully and unlawfully have direct or indirect financial
FACTS: interest in the Doromal International Trading Corporation, an entity which
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito transacted or entered into a business transaction or contract with the
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower
was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner and the respondent were to and Youth Council, both agencies of the government which business,
serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.During his term, the contracts or transactions he is prohibited by law and the constitution from
petitioner experienced a sharp descent from power started on October 4, having any interest."
2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend The information was initially annulled for the reason that the
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and “TanodBayan” has no right to file information without the approval of the
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the
immediately ignited reactions of rage. Ombudsman to refile it. The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised
On November 13, in a tumultuous session, the house of that "some changes be made in the information." A new information, duly
representatives transmitted the articles of impeachment to the senate. On approved by the Ombudsman, was filed, alleging that:
November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the ". . . , the above-named accused (Doromal), a public officer,
petitioner. The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
fateful day of January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled Government, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, participate in a
against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated
under the name "Jose Velarde." The non-opening of the second envelope in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and
led to the resignation of the public and private prosecutors and the Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or
spontaneous outburst of anger by the people in EDSA which is now participation is prohibited by law and the constitution."
referred to as the EDSA dos. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that
On January 20, 2001, petitioner sent a letter to the Senate he, a PCGG Commissioner, has not signed any document, bid of the
and the House of Representatives claiming his inability to perform his family corporation of which he is member, submitted to DECS.
functions as a president. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her Sandiganbayn denied the motion to quash, hence this
oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m. petition.
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives as well as the
Senate issued House Resolution Nos. 175, 176 and 178 as well as ISSUE: W/N the prohibition under Section 13 of Article VII of the
Senate Resolution nos. 82, 83 and 84 recognizing and confirming the Constitution should not apply if an accused has not signed any document
assumption of the respondent of the presidency. of any bid of the family corporation of which he is member, submitted to
After respondent has taken her oath of office, petitioner any government departments.
postulated that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of HELD:
the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate No, the provision shall still apply because the DITC remained
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest.
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
11 of article VII."This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their
that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting deputies or assistants shall not . . . during (their) tenure, . . . directly or
President. indirectly . . . participate in any business." The constitutional ban is similar
to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law that "pursuit of private business .
ISSUES: . . without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations"
1. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in
2. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent the civil service.
for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada
3. Whether or not the petitioner is immune from the charges filed against
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
HELD: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
1. No, petitioner is not only temporarily unable to act as president. House (194 SCRA 317)
Resolution Nos. 175,176, and 178, as well as Senate Resolutions No. 82,
83 and 84 show that both houses of Congress have recognized FACTS:
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is President Aquino issued EO No. 284, which allows members
the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
It was assailed for it violates the Constitution.
2.) No. Conviction in the impeachment proceedings is not a condition Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 284 on
precedent for the criminal prosecution of the petitioner. The impeachment the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII
trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Since, the virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
will place him in a better situation than a non- sitting President who has member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object VIII.
of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have ISSUE: Whether or not an executive order allowing members of the
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
and civil cases may already be filed against him government offices in addition to their primary positions is valid.
3.) No. The petitioner is not immuned from the cases filed against him by HELD:
virtue of him being an unsitting president. The cases filed against Invalid. In the light of the construction given to Section 13,
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as
the 1987 Constitution itself. earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover,
those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation. But prohibited appointments are long- lasting and permanent
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30,1998 OF considered an election offense.
HON. M. A. VALENZUELA AND HON. P. B. VILLARTA AS RTC To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative
JUDGES need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the
(298 SCRA 408 [NOVEMBER 9, 1998]) executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the
membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or
NARVASA, C.J.: should the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious
FACTS: resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta were Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
appointed by the then President on March 30, 1998 as Judges of the RTC, Concerning Valenzuela’s oath-taking and “reporting for duty”
Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. On as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 62, Bago City, on May 14, 1998, it
May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from Malacanang the must be noted that it is a standing practice on the appointments to the
appointments of two (2) Judge of the RTC mentioned above. The Judiciary – from the highest to the lowest court – to be sent by the Office
appointments were questioned on the view that they were made during of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the appointments being
the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII addressed to the appointees. It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court
of the Constitution. in the Chief’s Justice behalf, who thereafter advises the individual
The issue was already ventilated at the meeting of the appointees of their appointments and also the date commencement of the
Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998 regarding the constitutionality pre-requisite orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial
of appointments of eight (8) Associate Justices to the Court of Appeals, Academy for new Judges. The procedure ensures the authenticity of the
specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was appointments, enables the Court, particularly the Office of the Court
drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reading as follows: Administrator, to enter in the appropriate records all appointments to the
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next Judiciary a well as other relevant data such as the dates of qualification,
presidential elections and up to the end of his, term, a President or Acting the completion by the appointees of their pre-requisite orientation
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to seminars, their assumption of duty, etc. The procedure also precludes the
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public possibility, however remote of Judges acting on spurious or otherwise
service or endanger public safety. defective appointments.
On the other hand, appointments to fill vacancies in the The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on
Supreme Court during the period mentioned in the provision just quoted March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14,
could be justified by Section 4(1) of Article VII of the Constitution which 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban.
states: Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition
Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be filled buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
Also pertinent although not specifically discussed is Section this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the
9 of the same Article VIII which provides that for the lower courts, the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already
President shall issue the appointments — from a list of at least three discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against
nominees prepared by the Council for every vacancy — within ninety days appointments made within the period of the ban.
from the submission of the list. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved
The Court issued a Resolution which states that ”pending to DECLARE VOID the appointments signed by His Excellency the
the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by the Court on the mater, President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
and until further orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon. Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be held in 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively and to
abeyance. order them, forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to
In compliance with the foregoing Resolution, Hon. forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta filed before the Court the required pleadings Courts to which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998.
and other documents. It is noted that Hon. Valenzuela had already taken
his Oath of Office a Judge on May 14, 1998 and explained that he did so
because on May 7, 1998, he “received from Malacanang copy of his ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
appointment *** which contained the following direction “By virtue hereof, BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO
you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. (188 SCRA 154 [1990])
The Court then deliberated on the pleadings and documents
above mentioned, in relation to the facts and circumstances on record and FACTS:
thereafter resolved to promulgate the following opinion. The petitioner, Binamira, was the former General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority by virtue of the designation of the Minister
ISSUE: Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed of Tourism with the approval of President Aquino. Subsequently, Garrucho
by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless was delegated by the President as the new Secretary of the Ministry.
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Garucho then had taken over the position of Binamira as the General
Article VIII. Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, this petition.
Whether the President can make appointments to the
judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service. ISSUES:
1. W/N a person designated to a position by a member of the
HELD: cabinet should step down to a person newly designated by
NO. The Court's view is that during the period stated in the President to that same position.
Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo months immediatey 2. Distinguished designation from appointment
before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" — the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor HELD:
allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean 1. YES.Thedesignationofthe petitionercannotsustainhis
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is thedecreeclearlyprovidesthattheappointmentofthe
not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only GeneralManagerofthePhilippineTourismAuthorityshall
once every six years. bemadebythePresidentofthePhilippines,notbyany
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
that any "vacany shall be filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence of whichbecauseofitsnaturecannotbedelegated.Legally
Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition Section 15, speaking,itwasnotpossibleforMinisterGonzalesto
Article VII, which is couched in stronger negative language — that "a assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President or Acting President shall not make appointments. . ." President.
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VI is directed against Hisdesignationbeinganunlawfulencroachmentona
two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was
made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting
similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was
Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, (albeit for a different reason).
Article VII consist of the so-called "midnight" appointments.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for 2. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment
filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power because it likewise involves the naming of a particular
of appointments, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in person to a specified public office.
case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention That is the common understanding of the term. However,
of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be

replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made
is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not without the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
confer security of tenure on the person named. To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided
for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission
SARMIENTO VS. MISON on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in
(156 SCRA 154, 1987) the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointment.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the
FACTS: Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section
The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom
seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c),
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. It
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and provides:
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of "(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on
the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the years without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's for the unexpired term of the predecessor."
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES: QUINTOS-DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
1. WhatarethegroupsofofficerswhomthePresidentshall (177 SCRA 259, 1989)
appoint?
2. W/N confirmation of the appointments of Commissioners of FACTS:
the Bureau of Customs by the Commission on Appointments Petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral
required. Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. However, the
HELD: appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as
1. Underthe provisions ofthe 1987Constitution,justquoted, members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
appoint.Thesefour(4)groups,towhichwewillhereafter representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission
refer from time to time, are: before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, House of Representatives.
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments ISSUE: W/N appointment of Sectoral Representatives requires
are vested in him in this Constitution; confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; HELD:
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law YES. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
to appoint; paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution,
Congress may by law vest in the President alone. it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to
the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Those belonging to second, third and fourth groups may be There are appointments vested in the President in the
appointed by the President without such confirmation with COA. Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no
confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and
2. NO. It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been
within the first group of appointments where the consent of extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.
the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of
fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution
includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
appointments need the consent of the Commission on CALDERON VS. CARALE
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, (208 SCRA 254, 1992)
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the FACTS:
Commission on Appointments. Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 amending the Labor
Code was approved. Sec 13 thereof provides that the Chairman, the
Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT appointed by the President subject to the confirmation by the Commission
BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA on Appointment.
(172 SCRA 160, 1989) Pursuant to said law, President Aquino appointed the
Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public
FACTS: workers and employees sectors. The appointment stated that the
President Aquino designated Mary Bautista as Acting appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of
Chairman of the CHR. Later on, the President extended to Bautista a the office.
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. She took her This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality of
oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the CHR. the permanent appointment extended by the President without submitting
Bautista received letters from the COA Secretary requesting the same to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation pursuant to
her to submit certain information and documents and to be present at a RA 6715.
meeting of the COA Committee on Justice and Judicial and Bar Council The Solicitor General contends that RA 6715 transgresses
and Human Rights, in connection with her confirmation as Chairman of Sec 16 Art VII by expanding the confirmation power of the Commission on
CHR. However, she refused to submit herself to the COA arguing that the Appointments without Constitutional basis.
latter has no jurisdiction to review her appointment as CHR Chairman.
The COA's secretary sent a letter to the executive secretary ISSUES:
informing the latter that COA disapproved Bautista's "ad interim 1. MaytheCongressexpandthelistofthosewhose
appointment" as Chairman of the CHR, in view of her refusal to submit to appointmentneedsconfirmationbytheCommissionon
the jurisdiction of the COA. It is the COA's submission that the President Appointments?
decides to the extent another appointment to Bautista, this time, 2. When is confirmation by COA can be said to be required and
submitting such appointment/nomination to the COA for confirmation. not?
ISSUE: Whether or not confirmation of the appointments of the Chairman HELD:

of the Commission on Human Rights requires the consent of the COA. 1. NO, the Court held that the Congress may not expand the
list of appointments needing confirmation.
HELD: TheNLRCChairmanandCommissionersfallwithinthe
No, since the office is not one of those mentioned in the first second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
sentence of Article VII, Section 16, nor is it specified elsewhere that such specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.
appointments needs consent of the Commission, it follows that the those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the effectiveness, the mayor of Olongapo shall be appointed as chairman of
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose the SBMA.
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was argued that said provision violates Sec. 7 Art IX: -B
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on which provides: that no elective official shall be eligible for appointment in
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is It was contended that the prohibition cannot be applied due
unconstitutional because: to the presence of a law authorizing the appointment. The Local
a. it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Government Code permits the appointment of local elective official to
Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto another position or post.
appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which
b. it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
the President elective officials to other government posts.
2. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is
required only for presidential appointees mentioned in HELD:
the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, YES. In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the
those officers whose appointments are expressly President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
sectoral representatives to Congress and members of Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional
the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to
and Election). conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the
Confirmation is not required when the President appoints Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be
other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code
(like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if
Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the
manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can
those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

TARROSA VS. SINGSON LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(232 SCRA 553, 1994) (143 SCRA 327, 1986)
FACTS: FACTS:
President Ramos appointed respondent Singson as The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II by the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Petitioner argues that this appointment is city mayor, Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent”
null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to the COA. The but the Civil Service Service Commission approved it as “temporary”
petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which subject to the outcome of the protest of the respondent.
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the The Civil Service Commission decided that respondent was
Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides: better qualified, revoked the appointment of petitioner and ordered the
"Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers appointment of respondent in his place. The private responded was so
and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko appointed by the new mayor, Mayor Duterte.
Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, The petitioner, invoking his earlier “permanent” appointment,
composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the is now before the Court to question that order and the private respondent’s
Philippines for a term of six (6) years. title.
The seven (7) members are:
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the ISSUES:
Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a 1. Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a
department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order
a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his replacement by the latter?
his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall 2. W/N the Civil Service Commission has the power to make a
designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . ." (Underlining permanent appointment into a temporary one.
supplied).
In their comment, respondents claim that Congress HELD:
exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the 1. NO. The Civil Service Commission is without authority to
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person
Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion
not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the vested solely in the city mayor.
Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the 2. NO. While the principle is correct, and we have applied it
Constitution. many times, it is not correctly applied in this case. The argument
begs the question. The appointment of the petitioner was not
ISSUE: May the Congress expand the confirmation powers of the temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Commission on Appointments and require appointment of other Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
16 of Article 7 of the Constitution? respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it
temporary.
HELD:
NO. In this case the Court used the same ruling as what was
held in the case of Calderon vs. Corale, where the ruled was that ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the COA and POBRE VS. MENDIETA
require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not (224 SCRA 738, 1993)
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution. FACTS:
This controversy began when the term of office of Honorable
Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mendieta
was the senior associate Commissioner and Pobre was the second
associate Commissioner of the PRC.
Then the executive secretary sought the opinion of acting
secretary of justice on whether the President may appoint as
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC any person other than the Senior
FLORES VS. DRILON Associate Commissioner. Acting secretary of justice answered that Sec. 2
(223 SCRA 568, 1993) of PD 223 does not limit or restrict the appointing power of the President.
President Aquino then appointed the petitioner, then an
FACTS: Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/Chairman.
Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman of Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory relief contesting
SBMA on account of RA 7227. Under said law, for the first year of its Pobre’s appointment as Chairman of the PRC because he allegedly

succeeded Francia as PRC Chairman by operation of law. The trial court Petitioners were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992,
ruled in favor of Mendieta. Hence, this petition. pursuant to E.O. 292 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
292. President Ramos issued A.O. 29, authorizing the grant of productivity
ISSUE: incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00
W/N the vacancy in the commission shall be filled by “succession” or and reiterating the prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of A.O. 268, enjoining
“operation of law. the grant of productivity incentive benefits without the President’s prior
approval. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "all departments, offices and
HELD: agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive
NO. The Court finds unacceptable the view that every Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are
vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate hereby directed] to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess
Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the
that would deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the heads of the
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners -- "all to be appointed by the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
President" under P.D. No. 223. The absurd result would be that the only herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or
occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes Thus, petitioners seek relief from this.
vacant. We may not presume that when the President issued P.D. No. Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292
223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint the and since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive issuances.
head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of Petitioners likewise assert that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach upon the
only the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures
in that agency. to strengthen the merit and rewards system and to promulgate rules,
regulations and standards governing the incentive awards system of the
civil service.
DRILON VS. LIM ISSUE: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
(235 SCRA 135, 1994) exercise of presidential control over the executive departments?
FACTS: HELD:
Pursuant to section 187 of the Local Government Code Yes. AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of
(Procedure for approval and effectivity of Tax Ordianance and Revenue presidential control over the executive departments. The President is the
Measures), the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised
companies and taxpayer, declared Manila Revenue Code null and void for and implemented through him. His power includes the control executive
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax departments. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
ordianance (there were no written notices of public hearings nor were set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
copies of the proposed ordinance published). duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It
In a petition for certiorari, RTC revoked Secretary’s has been held that "the President can, by virtue of his power of control,
resolution and sustained ordinance holding that all the procedural review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate in
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He can exercise
Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party."
compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of
days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence later incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
submitted to the trial court. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the incentive benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund
LGC as unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice of the excess over the prescribed amount, the President was just
to review tax ordinance and inferentially to annul them. His conclusion was exercising his power of control over executive departments. The President
that the challenged section gave the Secretary the power of control and issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity
not of supervision only. The 1987 Constitution provides that President incentive benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and
shall exercise general supervision over local governments. demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards.
ISSUES: The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying the
1. Distinguish control from supervision. acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees
2. W/N Section 187 of the LGC gave the Secretary the power without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby
of control and not supervision only. resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In the view of
the President, respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected.
HELD:
1. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do VILLENA VS. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The (67 PHIL 451)
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he FACTS:
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not It appears that the Division of Investigation of the
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior,
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse
except to see to it that the rules are followed. of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
respondent recommended to the President of the Philippines the
2. NO. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses,
precisely this (See No.1), and no more nor less than this, and so which recommendation was granted. The Secretary of the Interior
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. suspended the petitioner from office, and then and thereafter wired the
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but Provincial Governor of Rizal with instruction that the petitioner be advised
he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should accordingly. The respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the
be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of a special
a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was investigator to investigate the charges. The special investigator forthwith
a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in notified the petitioner that the formal investigation would be commenced
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were on March 28, 1939. Hence, the petition for preliminary injunction against
performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with the the Secretary of Interior to restrain him and his agents from preceding with
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the the investigation of petitioner which was scheduled to take place on March
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government 28, 1939.
Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision ISSUES:
1. W/N the Secretary of Interior has the power to order an
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered investigation.
REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar 2. W/N the Secretary of Interior has the power to suspend.
as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional
but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the HELD:
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. 1. YES. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active
power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies
authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA, ET AL. VS. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL. rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon
G.R. NO. 109406, SEPTEMBER 11, 1998 knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful
study and investigation. The principle there enunciated is applicable
FACTS: with equal force to the present case.

The Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to Proclamation No. 469 was later issued, which exclude from
order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to the reservation made in favor of the NPC, existing under Proclamation No.
appoint a special investigator for that purpose. 335, Series of 1952, and Proclamation No. 20, Series of 1962, certain
2. YES. The Secretary of Interior is empowered to investigate the parcels of land embraced therein." Lots 1,1-a, 3 and 4, containing
charges against the pwtitioner and to appoint a special investigator approximately an area of 29,681 square meters are described therein. The
for that purpose, preventive suspension may be a means by which Proclamation further stated "that upon the recommendation of the
to carry into effect a fair and impartial investigation. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant to Section
60 of C.A. No. 141, I do hereby grant, donate and transfer the
aforementioned parcels of land including the foreshores thereof, in favor of
Iligan City."
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT The Mayor of Iligan City wrote the Director of Lands to
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS. PANO inform him that the City of Iligan is the owner in fee simple of Lots 1, 1-a, 3
(21 SCRA 395, 1967) and 4 including the foreshores thereof by virtue of Proclamation No. 469,
Series of 1965, and requesting that the said property be excluded from the
FACTS: proposed auction sale." No action was taken on this request for exclusion.
Jose Magallanes, a permittee and actual occupant of a Hence, the City of Iligan filed a complaint for injunction with
1,103-hectare pasture land, ceded his rights and interests to a portion preliminary injunction against the Director of Lands, District Land Officer of
thereof to plaintiff. Subsequently, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff Lanao del Norte and the Marcelo Steel Corporation to enjoin and stop the
was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared sale and/or disposition of the afore described parcels of land.
agricultural land. President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 94 excluding
Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the from the operation of Proclamation No. 469 certain portions of the land
purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff corporation in turn embraced therein, situated in Iligan City and declaring the same open to
filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was disposition. Said portions of land, as described therein are Lots 1-a, 2-a
protested by Paño and his companions, claiming that they are actual and 3 of the parcels of land in question.
occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. After the trial on the merits, the court dismissed the
The Director of Lands rendered judgment, giving due course complaint and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the
to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose records of the case were certified to this Court as the issue of the validity
Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed. An appeal was of any executive order and the errors or the questions
made but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed of the law raised are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
the same.
When the case was elevated to the President of the ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to grant portions of
Philippines, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President, public domain to any government entity like the city of Iligan.
modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Plaintiff corporation took this decision to the trial court,
praying that judgment be rendered declaring that the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect. HELD:
Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept YES. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is
there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of fact the executive officer-in-charged with the duty of carrying out the provision
shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and of the Public Land Act thru the Director of Lands who acts under his
Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchant claim is that this statute is immediate control.
controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President. Section 4 thereof, also provides:
"Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall
ISSUE: May the President through his executive secretary undo an act of have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or
the Director of Lands, which a law provides that such act will be any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands
conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be
Resources OR W/N the administrative decision could still be appealed to conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
the President? Resources."
Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive
HELD: control among others in the lease, sale or any form of concession or
YES. The President's duty to execute the law is of disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the considering that under the Constitution the President of the Philippines
power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., 15
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his the President of the Philippines has therefore the same authority to
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his dispose of portions of the public domain as his subordinates, the Director
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department Resources.
secretary.
It may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
departments. And control simply means the power of an officer to alter or GASCON VS. ARROYO
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the (178 SCRA 582, 1989)
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. FACTS:
The Lopez family is the owner of two television stations,
namely: Channels 2 and 4 which they have operated through the ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
When martial law was declared, TV Channel 4 was closed
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT by the military; thereafter, its facilities were taken over by the Kanlaon
CITY OF ILIGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS Broadcasting System which operated it as a commercial TV station.
(158 SCRA 158 [1988]) In 1978, the said TV station and its facilities were taken over
by the National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it as
FACTS: the Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4).
Proclamation No. 335 was issued, withdrawing from sale or After the 1986 EDSA revolution, the PCGG sequestered the
settlement and reserved for the use of the NPC certain parcels of the aforementioned TV Stations, and, thereafter, the Office of Media Affairs
public domain. took over the operation of TV Channel 4.
Meanwhile, the NPC constructed Maria Cristina Fertilizer The Lopez family, through counsel, requested President
Plant, which was sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed to Marcelo Tire Aquino to order the return to the Lopez family of TV Stations 2 and 4. They
and Rubber Corporation, including the right of occupancy and use of the made a written request to the PCGG for the return of TV Station Channel
land described in Proclamation 335, Series of 1952. 2. The PCGG approved the return of TV Station Channel 2 to the Lopez
Proclamation No. 20, Series of 1962, and Proclamation 198, family. The return was made on 18 October 1986.
Series of 1964, were subsequently issued, excluding from the operation of Thereafter, the Lopez family requested for the return of TV
Proclamation No. 335, Series of 1952, certain areas occupied by the Maria Station Channel 4. Acting upon the request, respondent Executive
Cristina Fertilizer Plant, and declaring the same open to disposition under Secretary, by authority of the President, entered into with the ABS-CBN
the provisions of Public Land. Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez,
The Marcelo Steel Corporation and/or the Maria Cristina Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate", 3 pursuant to which an Arbitration
Fertilizer Plant, through the President, Jose P. Marcelo filed in the Bureau Committee was created, composed of Atty. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., for the
of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales Application for tracts of lands for industrial Republic of the Philippines, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for ABS-CBN, and
purposes. Director of Lands advised the public that the Bureau of Lands retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos, as Chairman.
will sell to the highest qualified bidder the tract of land covered by Thereupon, petitioners, as taxpayers, filed the instant
Miscellaneous Sales application. petition.

ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary has the power and authority to enter audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance
into an Agreement to Arbitrate. with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such
action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official
HELD: functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
YES. Respondent Executive Secretary has the power and mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
authority to enter into the Agreement to arbitrate with the ABS-CBN agencies but may not increase or add to them.
Broadcasting Corporation as he acted for and in behalf of the President
when he signed it.
Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Philippines (also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force ANG-ANGCO VS. CASTILLO
and effect when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the parties 9 SCRA 619 [1963]
thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the legislative
and executive powers of the Government. As Chief Executive, the FACTS:
President was (and even now) "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade requested for special permit
Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to to withdraw Pepsi Cola concentrates from the customs house. Petitioner
the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-angco advised the counsel for Pepsi-Cola
various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No- dollar Import
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Office. Aquiles Lopez of said office wrote petitioner, stating that it could not
Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the take action on the request, as the same is not within the jurisdiction of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and Office. Following Secretary of Finance Hernandez’s approval of the
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and release, petitioner authorized release of the concentrates.
through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such When Customs Commissioner Manahan learned of said
departments, performed in the regular course of business, are, unless release, he ordered the seizure of the goods but only a portion thereof
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts remained in the warehouse. Thus, he filed an administrative suit against
of the Chief Executive. petitioner.
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power After an investigation, respondent Executive Secretary
and authority to enter into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBN Natalio Castillo found petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President interest of the service and considering him resigned, with prejudice to
when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs. Petitioner wrote Pres. Garcia,
upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto. asserting that the action taken by respondent had the effect of depriving
him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by the CSC,
as well as of his right or appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals,
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT whose decision under RA 2260 is final. By authority of the President,
KILUSANG BAYAN VS. DOMINGUEZ respondent denied reconsideration, as well as the appeal. Hence, this
(205 SCRA 92, 1992) present petition.
FACTS: ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to make direct action on the
The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa entered into a case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the
contract with the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Nagtitinda sa provision now in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa (kilusan) for the latter's
management and operation of the Muntinlupa Public Market. When HELD:
Ignacio Bunye (petitioner in GR 91927) became Mayor of Muntinlupa, he The action taken by respondent executive Secretary, even
directed a review of such contract, claiming that the virtual, 50-year term with the authority of the President in taking direct action on the
agreement was contrary to Sec. 143 (3) of BP 337. He sought opinions administrative case, petitioner, without submitting the same to the
from the COA and the Metro Manila Commission after which the latter Commission of Civil Service is contrary to law and should be set aside.
granted the Municipality the authority to take the necessary legal steps for The following are the reasons:
the cancellation of the above contract. 1. Under sec 16 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Consequently, upon the presentation made by Bunye with Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction
the Municipal Council, the latter approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the
the contract. Bunye, together with men from the PC, proceeded to the classified service. The only limitation to this power is the decision of the
public market and announced to the general public that the Municipality Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil service Board of Appeals, in
was taking over the management and operation of the facility therein. The which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days
officers of the Kilusan filed suit for breach of contract and damages, and after the same has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such
continued holding office in the KB Building under their respective official cases shall be final. It is therefore clear that under the present provision of
capacities. the Civil Service act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the
Bunye, together with some heavily armed men, forcibly exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having
opened the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve them the been deprived of the procedure and down therein in connection with the
Order of then Sec. of Agriculture Carlos Dominguez, ordering 1) the take investigation and disposition of this case, it may be said that he has been
over by the Department of Agriculture of the management over the public deprived of due process guaranteed by said law.
market pursuant to the Department Regulatory and Supervisory Power 2. Let us now take up the power of control given to the
under Sec. 8 of PD 175 and Sec. 4 of EO No.3; 2) the creation of a President by the Constitution over all offices and employees in the
Management Committee which shall assume the management of Kilusan; executive department which is not invoked by respondents as justification
and 3) the disband, of the Board of Directors and 4) the turn over of all to override the specific provision of the Civil Service Act. The power
assets, properties and records to the Management Committee. Petitioners merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate
filed this petition praying that the Order to be declared null and void as the and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the
respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing President may set aside the judgment of action taken by the subordinate
the order. in the performance of duties.
3. Not the strongest argument against the theory of
ISSUE: W/N 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set aside at naught the
Agriculture is without or in excess of jurisdiction? beneficent purpose of the whole Civil Service system as implanted in this
jurisdiction which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who
HELD: belong to the classified service, in derogation of the provision of our
YES. P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly Constitution which provides the “No officer or employee in the civil service
mandate the manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” The
The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate,
procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in department if they are presidential appointee or do not belong to the
exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. classified service for to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are This is in line with the provision of our constitutional which says; “The
expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers in the
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what President alone
may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. in the courts or in the heads of department” and with regards to these
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act officers provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 159.
subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of
acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority NATIONAL MARKET CORP. (NAMARCO) VS. ARCA
of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations (29 SCRA 648 [SEPTEMBER 30, 1969])
of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently
and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) FACTS:
require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management

Respodent Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-Storage stationed in Mindoro. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major
Department of the NAMARCO. Pursuant to the General Manager’s Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy,
Administrative Order, he was investigated by a committee for violating disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as
Management Memorandum Order – declaring “that the allocation and Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area.
deliveries of merchansdise imported to its designated beneficiaries be During the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese
stopped” and causing the improper release of shipments intended for forces, the Bolo Area in Mindoro was a contingent of the 6th Military
delivery. District, which had been recognized by and placed under the operational
After due hearing, the investigating committee found Arive control of the US Army in the Southwest Pacific.
guilty of charges and he was dismissed. Arive appealed from the decision A change in the command in the Bolo Area was effected by
of the NAMARCO to the President. The NAMARCO was advised by the Col. Jurado, the then Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in
Office of the President of the appeal, and was asked to forward the Mindoro. Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding
records of the Administrative case. The Executive Secretary, presumably Officer of the Bolo Area. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners.
acting for the President, handed down a decision setting aside the After the commission of this crime, it is alleged that the petitioners
resolution of the board of directors and reinstating Arive. seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to
NAMARCO, through its General Manager, sought petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being contested.
reconsideration, contended that the Office of the President had no A trial by the General Court Martial ensued and which
jurisdiction to review any decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors resulted to the acquittal of Ramon Ruffy and dismissal of the case as to
removing suspending or otherwise disciplining any of its subordinate Victoriano Dinglasan and the conviction of Jose Garcia, Prudente
employees, because RA 1345 (the NAMARCO Charter), which grants that Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus.
power to the General Manager and to the Board of Directors, does not The petitioners who were convicted filed suit before this
provide for an appeal to any governmental body. This motion for Court, assailing the constitutionality of 93rd Article of War. It ordains "that
reconsideration was denied twice by the Executive Secretary on the any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of war
ground that the President had jurisdiction under his constitutional power of should suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. direct" It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made
The Office of the President, acting on complaints of Arive by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life
that he had not been reinstated in spite of the denial of the NAMARCO's imprisonment or death" it violated Art. VIII See 2 par 4 of the Constitution.
two motions for reconsideration, sent a telegram to the General Manager It provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme
requesting him to act on the case and to comment within forty-eight hours; Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty
but the said General Manager neither acted on the case nor commented. imposed is death or life imprisonment.
Respondent Juan T. Arive filed against the NAMARCO and
the members of its Board of Directors an action for reinstatement. Judge ISSUE: Whether or not the 93rd of Article of War unconstitutional?
Arca ruled in his favor, ordering NAMARCO to reinstate Arive. Defendants’
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition. HELD:
NO. The petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure
ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT the preident has the power to review and to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority for
reverse decisions of government corporations. their creation. Court Martial are agencies of executive character and one
of the authorities for ordering of court martial has been held to be attached
HELD: to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief,
YES. The Court hold that the President of the Philippines' independently of legislation.
authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Unlike court of law, they are not a portion of judiciary. They
Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
to order his reinstatement falls within the constitutional power of the Congress for the President as Commander in chief to aid him in properly
President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Under our commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein and
governmental setup, corporations owned or controlled by the government, utilized under his order Or those of his authorized military representatives.
such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or The petition is therefore has no merit and that it should be
offices, which are administratively supervised by the Administrator of the dismissed with costs.
Office of Economic Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be
that of a head of an Executive Department" and who "shall be responsible ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
to the President of the Philippines under whose control his functions . . . OLAGUER VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34
shall be exercised." (150 SCRA 144, 1987)
FACTS:
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT The petitioners were charged for subversion.
GUAZON VS. DE VILLA The respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP created the
(181 SCRA 623, 1990) respondent Military Commission No. 34 to try the criminal case filed
against the petitioners. An amended charge sheet was filed for seven
FACTS: offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3)
prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Manila. Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
The petitioners complains that police and military units attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and
without any search warrant or warrant of arrest goes to an area of more Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal
than one residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. Sometime thereafter, trial
in Metro Manila to search for evidence of offenses that may have been ensued.
committed. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a In the course of the proceedings the petitioners went to this
common pattern of human rights abuses. Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. They
Solicitor General argues just the contrary, that it had been sought to enjoin the respondent Military Commission No. 34 from
conducted with due regard to human rights. proceeding with the trial of their case. They likewise sought their release
from detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. The thrust of their
ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to order saturation drives. arguments is that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians
for offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial
HELD: law.
YES. There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which
denies the authority of the Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor ISSUE: W/N military commissions have no jurisdiction to try civilians for
General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising offenses alleged to have been committed during the period of martial law.
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants to
Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which HELD:
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where Military commission has no jurisdiction to try civilians when
individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of the civil courts are open.
security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions
limitations of the Bill of Rights. (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the
accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated
by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process.
RAMON RUFFY VS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are
(G.R. NO. L-533, AUGUST 20, 1946) not courts within the Philippine judicial system.
TUASON J.
FACTS: ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
It appears that at the outbreak of war in 1941, Ramon Ruffy QUILONA VS. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, (206 SCRA 821, 1992)
and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison

FACTS: be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
The petitioner is a policemen assigned at the WPD. He was Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
charged with murder before the respondent general court martial. act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
At the scheduled arraignment on December 15, 1990, under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
petitioner's counsel manifested to the General I Court Martial his client's proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
desire to be arraigned and to be tried instead by a civilian court. judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much
Arraignment was reset. less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
At the next arraignment on December 21, 1990, petitioner may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
filed a motion asking that the court mal1ial inhibit itself front pursuing the Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
arraignment of the accused and to have his case investigated by the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
civilian prosecutor or at least tried by a civilian court. choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not
Although set or oral argument of January 3, 1991, subject to judicial scrutiny.
respondent court decided to have the motion argued on the day it was
filed. The motion was denied, the same with the motion for
reconsideration. ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Petitioner refused to enter a plea and said that he would MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, JR.
elevate the case to the SC. Nevertheless, a plea of not guilty was entered (170 SCRA 190, 1989)
upon court order.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition. FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto and three
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of accused of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
discretion. documents.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court
HELD: which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
YES the respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with then Presiden Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted.
the arraignment of the petitioner. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
Republic Act No. 6975, 10 creating the Philippine National Treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
Police (PNP), which took effect on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC. 46. city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. Any provision of law to the contrary Petitioner’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of
notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the Finance for resolution. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: x x x. Provided, further, that reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not
criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also
arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge." the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the
Although Republic Act No. 6975 was not yet in effect when government.
petitioner was arraigned on 28 December 1990, nevertheless, respondent Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner
court martial knew or should have known that the said Act had already wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has
been signed or approved by the President on 13 December 1990 and that wiped put the crime which implies that her service in the government has
the same was published in two (2) national newspapers of general never been interrupted and therefore the date of reinstatement should
circulation on 17 December 1990 and that it would take effect on 1 correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
January 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent court martial backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not
decided to have the petitioner's motion to inhibit argued on 28 December be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4892.50.
1990 and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the same day despite his The Ministry of Finance referred petitioner’s letter to the
vehement refusal to enter a plea. Office of the President for further review and action.
Clearly, under the circumstances obtaining in the present The respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran
case, respondent court martial acted with grave abuse of discretion denied the petitioner’s request and holds that Monsanto is not entitled to
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted
arraignment of the petitioner. her, but must secure an appointment to her former position and that she is
liable for the civil liability to her previous conviction.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT denied, hence this petition.
TORRES VS. GONZALES
(152 SCRA 272, 1987) ISSUE: W/N a public officer who had been granted an absolute pardon by
the Chief Executive is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
FACTS: without need of a new appointment.
Petitioner was convicted by the trial court of the crime of
estafa and was sentenced to prison term. Petitioner was later granted a HELD:
conditional pardon on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any NO. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he have abandoned her appeal and her conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner has assumed the character of finality.
accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from The essence of pardon is the remission of guilt. Thus pardon
confinement. implies guilt. Pardon does not ipso facto reinstate a convicted felon to
The Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction. It should be
recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon noted that public office is intended primarily for collective protection, safety
granted to the petitioner. The evidence before the Board showed that on and benefit of the common good. Thus, it cannot be compromised to favor
22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with private interests. A pardon does not virtually acquit the accused of the
twenty counts of estafa, which cases were then pending trial before the offense charged.
Regional Trial Court of Rizal. The record also showed that petitioner had But the pardon restores the petitioner eligibility for
been convicted by the trial court of the crime of sedition: this conviction appointment to the said office. Thus, to regain her former post, she must
was then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending
cancellation of the conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner. ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Thereafter, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner. PEOPLE VS. SALLE
Respondent Minister issued "by authority of the President" (250 SCRA 581, 1995)
an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the FACTS:
unexpired portion of his sentence. Accused-appellants Francisco Salle, Jr. and Rickey Mengote
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and were found guilty beyond reasonable, doubt as co-principals of the
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon compound crime of murder and destructive arson. Appellants seasonably
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the estafa nor of the filed their notice of appeal. However, Salle filed an urgent motion to
crime of sedition. withdraw his appeal in view of his acceptance of the grant of conditional
pardon by the President. Mengote was also granted a conditional pardon
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is and was released from confinement, but the latter did not file a motion to
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted withdraw his appeal.
for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. The court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and
his case is considered closed and terminated, insofar as he is concerned.
HELD: Mengote, on the other hand, has not filed any motion to withdraw his
It depends. appeal.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may ISSUE:
W/N appeal of the case must be withdrawn for the effectivity of a pardon
136
granted. appeal, the appellate court modified the decision by eliminating the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-half
HELD: of the amount being involved.
YES. The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Finally, petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by
Section 19 of Art.VII of the present constitution prohibits the grant of the President, restoring him to 'full civil and political rights.' With this
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pending of instrument on hand, petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefore, service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom
if one is made, should no be acted upon or the process towards its grant teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.
should no begun unless the appeal is withdrawn or the conviction is final. Petitioner now prays to this Court for the following relief:
A judgment of conviction become final (a) when no appeal is 1. (that he be) Reinstated to his former position as
seasonably perfected" (b) when the accuse commences to serve the Elementary School Principal I;
sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, 2. His government services be made continuous since
except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) September 10, 1948 which is his original appointment until the present
then the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. time;
Thus, where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not 3. (that he be) Given his back salaries corresponding to the
yet therefore attained finality as in the case of Mengote, executive period from September 1, 1971 to November 23,1982;
clemency may not be granted to appellant 4. That all his service credits duly earned be restored;
The reason is that, the doctrine of separation of powers of 5. And,thatallotherrightsandprivilegesnot mentioned
demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully herein shall also be granted.
respected and kept unimpaired. The Solicitor General comments that there is no justiciable
controversy in this case because the issue involved is whether or not
petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior to his
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT conviction.
GARCIA VS. COA
(226 SCRA 356, 1993) ISSUE: Is there a justifiable controversy in this case where the petitioner
sought his reinstatement to his former position after given a pardon by the
FACTS: President?
Petitioner Vicente Garcia was a supervising lineman of the
Bureau of Telecommunication in Lucena City before he was summarily HELD:
dismissed on April I, 1975 on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with Yes. There is here a justiciable controversy. Petitioner claims
the decision of the Ministry of Public Works in Administrative Case No. 975 he must be restored to the same position he was in before he was
for the loss of several telegraphs poles. Petitioner did not appeal the convicted on a mere technical error and for which he was given an
decision. absolute pardon.
Based on the same facts, a criminal case for qualified theft This is not a hypothetical or abstract dispute. It is not
was filed against petitioner, which was resolved acquitting petitioner. In academic or moot for, to our mind, there is a definite and concrete
view of his acquittal Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position controversy touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
which was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Petitioner relations. This is a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency which relief through a court decree that is conclusive in character. The case does
was granted. not call for a mere opinion or advise, but for affirmative relief.
Thereafter, Garcia filed with the respondent COA a claim for This Court held that the absolute disqualification from office
payment of back salaries effective April 1975. This was denied by COA on or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed
the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the
the payment of back salaries and that he had not been reinstated in the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
service. Petitioner then appealed the COA decision to the Office of the Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not
President. Based on the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment
Factoran, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari. to said office.
However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to payment of back wages after having from September 1, 1971 to November 23, 1982 for he is not entitled to
been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency. automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the
government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his
HELD: reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to
YES. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally
service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what acquitted of the charge against them.
he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his
otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., government service be made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the
to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the compulsory age of
to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered retirement, he shall get the appropriate retirement benefits as an
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere classroom teacher.
There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations
aforementioned to entitle him to back wages.
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision LLAMAS VS. ORBOS
which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the (202 SCRA 844, 1991)
service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself
exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing FACTS:
his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the incumbent Vice Governor of
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his the Province of Tarlac. He assumed the position by virtue of a decision of
former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the the office of the President, the governorship. Private respondent Mariano
issuance of the clemency. Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was
suspended from office for a period of 90 days due to a verified complaint
filed by petitioner against respondent Governor before the Department of
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Local Government charging him with the alleged violation of the Local
ISABELO T. SABELLO, VS. DECS Government Code and the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law. Public
(G.R. NO. 87687, DECEMBER 26, 1989) respondent Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the
filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in that official capacity
GANCAYCO, J. for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution
FACTS: granting executive clemency to respondent governor.
Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant
and also the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the executive clemency only in criminal cases based on Art. VII, Sec. 19 of the
Division of Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that Constitution. According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase "after
time. Since at that time also, the President of the Philippines who was conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases and no other
earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for each law allows the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has
barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions allotted the amount of been convicted in an administrative case."
P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high school teachers, with the
honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the power to
as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in question. grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
The only part that the petitioner played was his being authorized by the
said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was HELD:
subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the YES. The President has the power to grant executive
Talisay Barrio High School. clemency in administrative case because the Constitution does not
Thus, petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by
charged with the violation of RA 3019, and both were convicted. On the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. SC also

held that there are no valid and convincing reasons why the President we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
less serious than criminal offense. political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN SEA TRADING settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
3 SCRA 351[1961] and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
FACTS: of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent was the consignee of several shipments of Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the
onion and garlic. Since none of the shipments had the required certificate House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
by the Central Bank Circular Nos. 44 and 45 for the release of goods thus on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings. The the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
Collector of Customs of Manila having been in the meantime released to changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
the consignees on surety bonds directed the same and its surety that the factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
amount of the bonds be paid, jointly and severally to the Bureau of disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
Customs. The Consignee thereafter sought a review with the Court of Tax another.
Appeal which reversed the decision and ordered that the bond be The instant petition is therefore dismissed.
withdrawn and cancelled. Hence, the present petition.
The petition is based upon the facts that insofar as the ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
license and a certificate authorizing the importation release of the goods MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
under the consideration are required by the Central Bank Circulars Nos. (G.R. NOS. 86540-41, NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
44 and 45, the latter are null and void and the seizure and the forfeiture of
the goods imported from Japan cannot implement an executive GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
agreement-extending the effectivity of our Trade and Financial agreement FACTS:
with Japan-which is dubious validity, because there is no government The President in the exercise of her legislative power under
agency authorized to issue the import license required by the the Freedom Constitution issued Proclamation No. 5O-A prohibiting the
aforementioned executive order. courts from issuing restraining orders and writ of injunction against Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) and the purchases of any assets sold by it, to
ISSUE: Whether the executive agreement is valid even without the 2/3 prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of
concurrence of the Senate. the executive branch of government, of its task of carrying out the
expeditious dispositions and privatization of certain government
HELD: corporations and or the assets thereof. The enforcement of such
YES. The concurrence of the House of Congress is required Proclamation was questioned by the petitioner arguing that the Court was
by our fundamental law in the making of treaties which are however deprived of its jurisdiction to hear the cases involved therein.
distinct and different from executive agreements which may validly entered
into without such occurrence. ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 50-A impair the inherent power of
The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus courts as defined in See I Art VIII of the Constitution.
present. In fact, the so-called parity right provided for in the ordinance
appended to our Constitution were prior thereto, the subject of an HELD:
executive agreement, made without the concurrence of2/3s of the Senate No. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe
of the United States. any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of
courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
DAZA VS. SINGSON of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
(G.R. NO. 86344, DECEMBER 21, 1989) Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not
CRUZ, J.: deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
FACTS: Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
After the May 11, 1987 congressional elections, the House of Constitution).
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the COA While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the
among the several political parties represented in that chamber. Petitioner truth is that under the system of separation of powers set up in the
Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and
of the Liberal Party. instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by them)
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their
four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned and joined the LDP, authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their 1987 Constitution).
former party to only 17 members. Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT,
On the basis of this development, the House of nor block, by any injunction, the discharge of its function and the
Representatives revised its representation in the COA by withdrawing the implementation of its decision in connection with the acquisition, sale or
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. disposition of assets transferred to it. There can be no justification for
The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency except
original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent when it violated a citizen's rights, or commit a grave abuse of discretion, or
Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
Petitioner came to this Court to challenge his removal from
the COA and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Respondent
counters that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
97 PH1LS 806 [1955]
ISSUE: Does the instant case fall on the jurisdiction of the Court?
FACTS:
HELD: The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No.
Yes. Contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has 2706 as amended, be declared unconstitutional. This act is entitled "An
the competence to act on the matter at bar. What is before us is not a Act Making the Inspection and Recognition of Private Schools and
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be Colleges Obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction."
reviewed by the Court because it is political in nature. What is involved Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and
here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any
question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
Cuenco. person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship, a practice
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, abhorrent to our system of laws and government. Petitioners, obviously
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other refer Sec. 3e of the Act which provides that before a private school maybe
words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which Education.
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or The Solicitor General on the other hand pints out that none
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues of petitioners has caused to present this issue because all of them have
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection And they do not assert the Secretary has threatened to revoke their
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we permits.
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,

broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use
ISSUE: Whether there exists an actual case or controversy. of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims
that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
HELD: COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the
There is no actual case or controversy. Mere apprehension 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be
that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw permit of required to do so again this year. Petitioner's
one the petitioners does not constitute a judicial controversy. allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide
"Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.
the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation."
"The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional
arises only when the interest of litigants the use of that judicial authority for ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
insufficient". G.R. NO. L-72119. MAY 29, 1987
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to
obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere CORTES, J.
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however, FACTS:
intellectually solid the problem maybe. This is The fundamental right of the people to information on
especially true when the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for them matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for
comes into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil
constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion. Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
JOYA VS. PCGG government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
225 SCRA 586, 1993 allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the
civil service examinations for sanitarians.
FACTS: Solicitor General challenges the petitioner's standing to sue
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be
ordered the sale at public auction of paintings by old masters and informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees
silverware alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of President Marcos, his relatives concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to
and cronies. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition to stop show his “actual interest” in securing this particular information. He further
the auction from proceeding. argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to
furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are the proper party to file the
instant case.
ISSUES:
HELD: 1. Whether or not petitioner possesses the legal standing to bring the
No. Petitioners failed to show ownership of the artworks, present suit.
they are not proper parties to enjoin the PCGG form proceeding with the 2. Whether or not the information sought by the petitioner is within the
auction sale. They do not stand to be injured by the action of the PCGG. ambit of the constitutional guarantee of the right of the people to
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the information on matters of public concern.
case is brought before it by a prty who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and HELD:
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will 1. YES. When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
challenged. the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT possesses the right.
TELEBAP VS. COMELEC The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
289 SCRA 337, 1998 personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of
the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the
FACTS: present suit.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television 2. YES. Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads: The right of the
broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners assail the validity of Section 92 data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
television time be given free takes property without due process of law; But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of
that it violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc.,
media the equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7,
the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern. But then, it is not enough that the
HELD: information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given
Petitioner TELEBAP is without legal standing. In cases in case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law
which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their standing in from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
view of the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public
raised which justified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon
as will presently be shown, petitioners' substantive claim is without merit. access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of
substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus,
TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen will be therefore lies.
allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by
favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
suffered harm as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Nor do
members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters
since this case does not concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in upholding its validity. Much less DUMLAO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the G.R. NO. L-52245. JANUARY 22, 1980
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a
taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he FACTS:
will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned Petitioners question the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
statute. Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to have the and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition
radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution
enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are

hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective FACTS:
officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction,
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of
under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in
be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as "lotto."
local office from which he has retired. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter, the PCSO decided to
2) "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. The Office of the
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact". President approved the award of the contract to, and entered into the so-
called "Contract Of Lease" with, respondent PGMC for the installation,
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 4, BP Blg. 52 is establishment and operation of the on-line lottery and telecommunication
valid. systems required and/or authorized under the said contract.
2. Whether or not the second paragraph of Section 4, BP Petitioners, question the legality and validity of the Contract
Blg. 52 is valid. of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A . No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries
HELD: "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
1. YES. Retirement from government service may or may not be a company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there The petitioners also point out that paragraph 10 of the
can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a
may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no
retiree. franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover,
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot,
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11,
as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that for a corporation to
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is operate a public utility, at least 60% of its capital must be owned by
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee Filipino citizens . Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the
has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract in question
to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result because all forms of gambling — and lottery is one of them — are
from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the
does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are capital is allowed.
similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause ISSUES:
does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification 1. Whether or not petitioners have the Locus standi to file the petition at
which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not bench. 2. Whether or not the challenged Contract of Lease violates or
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, contravenes the exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with" another.
30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The HELD:
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local 1. YES. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws,
(Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
547). instrumentalities.
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental
2. NO. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel aforecited cases.
(Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso 2.YES. A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of
before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of association , in the least, or joint venture , at the most, exists between the
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as contracting parties.
both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person The only contribution the PCSO would have is its franchise
disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been or authority to operate the on-line lottery system; with the rest, including
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person the risks of the business, being borne by the proponent or bidder PGMC
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with (which represents and warrants that it has access to “all managerial and
it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the technical expertise” to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of the
term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). contract..
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima Certain provisions of the contract confirm the indispensable
facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and role of the PGMC in the pursuit, operation, conduct, and management of
present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time the On-Line Lottery System. They exhibit and demonstrate the parties'
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering indivisible community of interest in the conception, birth and growth of the
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with each having a right in the
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of formulation and implementation of policies related to the business and
disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative sharing, as well, in the losses — with the PGMC bearing the greatest
body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings burden because of its assumption of expenses and risks, and the PCSO
between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person the least, because of its confessed unwillingness to bear expenses and
charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative risks. In a manner of speaking, each is wed to the other for better or for
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial worse. In the final analysis, however, in the light of the PCSO's RFP and
determination. the above highlighted provisions, as well as the "Hold Harmless Clause" of
Wherefore, paragraph 1 being consistent with the equal the Contract of Lease, it is even safe to conclude that the actual lessor in
protection clause is declared valid; while paragraph 2 is declared null and this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its franchise to
void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC which operates
guaranteed to an accused. and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight years. (In
effect, the PCSO leased out its franchise to PGMC which actually
operated and managed the same.)
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and
KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA, JR. the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby DECLARED contrary to law
G.R. NO. 113375, 5 MAY 1994 and invalid.
DAVIDE, JR., J.

Note: The separate opinions of Justices focused on the issue of Locus
standi of herein petitioners, in relation to the four (4) requirements that ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
must be satisfied before one can come to court to litigate a constitutional TATAD VS GARCIA, JR
issue, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the (GR NO. 114222, APRIL 6,1995)
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; QUIASON, J.
and (4) the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to FACTS:
the determination of the case itself. The DOTC planned to construct the EDSA LRT III. RA 6957
The Court did not resolve the issue on whether or not the was enacted, providing for two schemes for the financing, construction
Contract of Lease is in violation of section 11, Article XII of the and operation of government projects through private initiative and
Constitution. However, in the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Puno, investment: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Transfer (BT).
he explained that: “For even assuming arguendo that PGMC is a public The notice, advertising the prequalification of bidders, was
utility, still, the records do not at the moment bear out the claim of thereafter published. Five groups responded to the invitation namely, ABB
petitioners that PGMC is a foreign owned and controlled corporation. This Trazione of Italy, Hopewell Holdings Ltd. of Hongkong, Mansteel
factual issue remains unsettled and is still the subject of litigation by the International of Mandaue, Cebu, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. of Japan, and EDSA
parties in the Securities and Exchange Commission”. LRT Consortium.
After evaluating the prequalification bids, the PBAC declared
that only the EDSA LRT Consortium "met the requirements of garnering at
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT least 21 points per criteria, except for Legal Aspects, and obtaining an
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ over-all passing mark of at least 82 points".
(GR. NO. 113105 AUGUST 19, 1994) The EDSA LRT Consortium submitted its bid proposal to
DOTC. Finding this proposal to be in compliance with the bid
QUIASON, J.: requirements, DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in
FACTS: substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into an "Agreement to
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the
(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on terms of the BOT Law. Secretary Prado, thereafter, requested presidential
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on approval of the contract.
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon, Orbos’ replacement,
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to informed Secretary Prado that the President could not grant the requested
propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to approval for the following reasons: (1) that DOTC failed to conduct actual
realign their respective operating budgets. public bidding in compliance with Section 5 of the BOT Law; (2) that the
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of law authorized public bidding as the only mode to award BOT projects,
bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to and the prequalification proceedings was not the public bidding
the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the contemplated under the law; (3) that Item 14 of the Implementing Rules
President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become and Regulations of the BOT Law which authorized negotiated award of
Republic Act No. 7663. On the same day, the President delivered his contract in addition to public bidding was of doubtful legality; and (4) that
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed congressional approval of the list of priority projects under the BOT or BT
and on which he imposed certain conditions. Scheme provided in the law had not yet been granted at the time the
Sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President contract was awarded. In view of the comments of Executive Secretary
Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Drilon, the DOTC and private respondents re-negotiated the agreement.
Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco, sought the issuance of The parties entered into a "Revised and Restated Agreement
the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA"
Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, inasmuch as "the parties [are] cognizant of the fact the DOTC has full
and the National Treasurer. Suing as members of the Senate and authority to sign the Agreement without need of approval by the President
taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 380 and that certain
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the events [had] supervened since November 7, 1991 which necessitate[d] the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) revision of the Agreement". The DOTC, represented by Secretary Jesus
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Garcia vice Secretary Prado, and private respondent entered into a
Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges "Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and Restated
(SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for
the appropriation for debt service. EDSA" so as to "clarify their respective rights and responsibilities" and to
The Solicitor General claimed that the remedy of the submit [the] Supplemental Agreement to the President, of the Philippines
Senators is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they for his approval". Secretary Garcia submitted to President Ramos the two
do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits. agreements, which were approved. According to the agreements, the
EDSA LRT III will use light rail vehicles from the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republics and will have a maximum carrying capacity of 450,000
ISSUE: Do petitioner-senators have legal standing to assail the passengers a day, or 150M a year to be achieved-through 54 such
constitutionality of conditions imposed by the President in the items of the vehicles operating simultaneously. The EDSA LRT III will run at grade, or
GAA of 1994? street level, on the mid-section of EDSA for a distance of 17.8 kilometers
from F.B. Harrison, Pasay City to North Avenue, Quezon City. The system
HELD: will have its own power facility. It will also have 13 passenger stations and
YES a member of the Senate, and of the House of one depot in 16-hectare government property at North Avenue. Private
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the respondents shall undertake and finance the entire project required for a
validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an complete operational light rail transit system. Target completion date is
appropriation bill. Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or 1,080 days or approximately three years from the implementation date of
in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the the contract inclusive of mobilization, site works, initial and final testing of
issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the the system. Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, private
Legislature arises. To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is respondent shall deliver the use and possession of the completed portion
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to to DOTC which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution respondent rentals on a monthly basis through an Irrevocable Letter of
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Credit. The rentals shall be determined by an independent and
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which internationally accredited inspection firm to be appointed by the parties. As
can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any agreed upon, private respondent's capital shall be recovered from the
member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. rentals to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus earnings of the EDSA LRT III. After 25 years and DOTC shall have
Curiae, noted: completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the project shall be
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S. $1.00.
individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the question at R.A. No. 7718, an "Act Amending Certain Sections of
issue. It could likewise be said that there was the requisite injury to their Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing,
rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise any locus standi issue. Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the
Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Private Sector, and for Other Purposes" was signed into law by the
Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that President. The law expressly recognizes BLT scheme and allows direct
could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the negotiation of BLT contracts.
corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges ISSUES:
vested by the Constitution in his office (1) Whether or not petitioners’ as taxpayers have the legal standing to
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for institute the action.
overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available (2) Whether or not EDSA LRT Corp, a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT
only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political III, a public utility.
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the
latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line HELD:
where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative (1) YES. The petitioners have the legal standing to institute the action.
jurisdiction begin.

Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
to initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the action On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers. prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties. The foregoing
government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question.
the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated
[1989]). and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
(2) The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the

operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before
one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
does not operate them to serve the public. KILOSBAYAN, INC VS MORATO
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently (GR NO 118910, JULY 17,1995)
and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own
said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one MENDOZA,J.
may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the FACTS:
public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan,
owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract
owner thereof. of Lease between the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of PSCO’s
necessary to operate the EDSA. LRT III, it admits that it is not charter, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement.
enfranchised to operate a public utility. The parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to
and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings with the the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3% of the gross
public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. amount of ticket sales derived by the PCSO from the operation of the
lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial operation. The rental is to be
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any
OPOSA VS FACTORAN, JR year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the
(GR NO 101083, JULY 30,1993) PCSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket
sales.
DAVIDE, JR., J. Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of
FACTS: tickets is allotted to charity. The term of the lease is 8 years, commencing
Petitioners instituted a taxpayers’ class suit against the from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then DENR Secretary, alleging that delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule.
as citizens and taxpayers of the Republic of the Philippines, they are In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own
“entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource personnel. It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." arising from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair.
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Upon the expiration of the lease, the PCSO has the option to purchase the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of 30M hectares equipment for the sum of P25M. A copy of the ELA was submitted to the
and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case.
rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests This suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, the first case.
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals
that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a legal right which has been
land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of 54% for forest cover violated.
and 46% for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other
uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of HELD:
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action,
Factoran moved to Dismiss the complaint based on two the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with
(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. would positively result to them from the contract even though they did not
Respondent granted the motion. Hence, the instant petition. intervene in it, or who claim a right to take part in a public bidding but have
been illegally excluded from it.
ISSUES: These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have a cause of action against the distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate,
respondent; and or consequential interest. . . . The phrase 'present substantial interest'
(2) Whether or not the issue raised is a political question which properly more concretely is meant such interest of a party in the subject matter of
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the
evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the
HELD: defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him.
(1) Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well But petitioners do not have such present substantial interest
as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit. Denying to them the
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. The Constitution
considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created requires that the Ombudsman and his deputies, "as protectors of the
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter people shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and against public officials or employees of the government, or any
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof including government-
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their owned or controlled corporations." (Art. XI, §12) In addition, the Solicitor
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be
present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
the protection of that right for the generations to come. BENGZON VS DRILON
(GR NO 103524, APRIL 15,1992)
(2) After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be FACTS:

RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand
Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
rendered at least 20 years service either in the Judiciary or in any other
branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of 70 years
or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT LIMKETKAI
The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the SONS MILLING, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. (GR. NO. 118509 September 5, 1996)
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members FRANCISCO, J.:
of the Constitutional Commissions under RA. 1568, as amended by RA FACTS:
3595. Subsequently, President Marcos signed PD 578 which extended Involved in the instant case is the Motion of petitioner
similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of
them also the automatic readjustment features of RA 1797 and RA 3595. March 29, 1996, which set aside the Court's December 1, 1995 decision
However, PD 644 was issued, repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797 and RA and affirmed in toto the Court of Appeals' decision dated August 12, 1994.
3595 (amending RA 1568 and PD 578) which authorized the adjustment of It is argued, albeit erroneously, that the case should be
the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, referred to the Court En Banc as the doctrines laid down in Abrenica v.
Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Gonda and De Garcia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 43 SCRA
officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates 473, and Villonco Realty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et al., 65 SCRA 352,
of salaries. have been modified or reversed. A more circumspect analysis of these
Significantly, under PD 1638 the automatic readjustment of cases vis-a-vis the case at bench would inevitably lead petitioner to the
the retirement pension of officers and enlisted men was subsequently conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of the doctrines
restored by President Marcos. A later decree PD 1909 was also issued laid down in the Abrenica, Talosig and Villonco cases.
providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition
the Armed Forces who have retired prior to September 10, 1979. of the Third Division which deliberated on private respondents' motions for
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed the unanimous decision of
members of the Armed Forces who number in the tens of thousands was December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption
restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and
Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not. arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice Narvasa, the
members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions, Congress Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the
approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Third Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line.
RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was under the impression that PD 644
became law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of petitioner as to the composition
In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, of the third division meritorious.
the legislature saw the need to reenact RA 1797 and 3595 to restore said
retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of HELD:
the Constitutional Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the NO. We need only to stress that the change in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions membership of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by reason of
adequate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal
power of the peso has been diminished substantially by worldwide matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In
recession or inflation. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. fact, the current "staggered" set -up in the chairmanships of the Divisions
16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it would is similar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the Court's Third Division
erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere was likewise chaired by then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and
faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of Second Divisions were headed by the next senior Justices — Justices
compensation as articulated in RA 6758 known as Compensation and Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.
Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government Suffice it to say that the Court with its new membership is not
should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party's case when, after its
retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential re-examination, the same calls for a rectification. "Indeed", said the Court
treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants." in Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato, et al., 250 SCRA 130, 136, "a change in the
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous
Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, decision".
Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition asking this Court far a
readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with RA. 1797. They
reasoned out that PD 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
become law as there was no valid publication. PD 644 appeared for the DRILON VS. LIM
first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, (GR. NO. 112497 AUGUST 4, 1994)
No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but published only on September
5, 1983. Since PD 644 has no binding force and effect of law, it therefore CRUZ, J.:
did not repeal RA 1797. FACTS:
The Court acted favorably on the request. Pursuant to the The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of
above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:
Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the
payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of the Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with
ISSUE: Whether or not the attempt of the President to use the veto power the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary. ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall
HELD: render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the
YES. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
Ombudsman must have the independence end flexibility needed in the suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the jurisdiction.
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to
our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
cease to be a meaningless provision. policy.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the
General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and
its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section
the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its
use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is

constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at the
tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage
been observed. where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the
Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. However, investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is
on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the frequently waived.
decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is
the issues raised therein. incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of
degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is
ISSUES: difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
(1) Whether or not the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction to consider the power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the
constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. substantive rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that
(2) Whether or not the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over final boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This
judgments and orders of lower courts. being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should
step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
HELD: tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a
Yes to both. We stress at the outset that the lower court had harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to
the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive
incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law source and discarding old ones.
he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him,
particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article VIII,
Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or BP 129 (SECTION 9(3)), EO226 (ART. 82), AND SUPREME COURT
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, CIRCULAR 1-91
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to (GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994)
act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of
a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than NOCON, J.:
on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually FACTS:
the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the
to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate Opositor Mariwasa moved for reconsideration of said BOI decision. This
body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in motion having been denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
its discussion. respondent court.
The CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
decision. This TRO lapsed by its own terms 20 days after its issuance,
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed
BUSTOS VS. LUCERO a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground
(GR. NO. L-2068, March 8, 1949) that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the
same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article
TUASON, J.: 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987. The appellate court denied
FACTS: the motion to dismiss. Thus, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was
Petitioner, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with filed before this Court.
trial court, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of Petitioner claims that the CA acted without or in excess of its
the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that he might jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution. Petitioner argues that the
cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of
accused. The motion was denied. Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
counsel in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
appeared at the preliminary investigation. The justice of the peace contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
informed him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court.
guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel Mariwasa counters that whatever "obvious inconsistency" or
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between B.P. 129 and
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was
section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, promulgated four years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe
trial court. rules to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of
The Supreme Court upheld the assailed denial, saying that procedure.
respondent judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record for HELD:
the purpose set out therein. Hence, the motion for reconsideration. Yes. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its Constitutional
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
infringes section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. ( now Section courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91
5(5), Article 8, 1987 Constitution) prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final
orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies
HELD: to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure.
No. The Supreme Court, in its Resolution dated March 8, Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not
1949 opined that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive according to settled jurisprudence. In Inciong v. de Guia, a circular of this
law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be Court was treated as law. In adopting the recommendation of the
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who violated Circular
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular
normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is that part of the law No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979,
which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge
courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for that respondent could not go against the circular of this Court until it is
their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.) repealed or otherwise modified, as "Laws are repealed only by
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the subsequent ones, and their violation or non- observance shall not be
right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules
repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies
which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that
by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be
defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. An election protest
226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an
in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such office. Over and, above the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural public interest to determine the true choice of he people. For this reason, it
aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must
constitutional rule-making powers. be liberally construed to the end that the popular will expressed in the
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded election or public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be
Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the defeated
right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed of Appeals.
directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Appeal.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

JAVELLANA VS. DILG
GRN 102549, AUGUST 10, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. In 1989, City Engineer Ernesto
ARUELO VS. CA C. Divinagracia sued Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local
GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993 Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80- 38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6713," and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of
Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in authority.
Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana has
as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for
seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent that purpose, as required; that petitioner, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
alteration and tampering" of votes. Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition and Rolando Catapang, sued Divinagracia for "Illegal Dismissal and
protesting the same election. Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; and that
Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming that: (a) the petition Javellana also appeared as counsel in several cases without prior
was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the authority of the DLG Regional Director.
COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari praying that DLG
deposit on the petition. Memoramdum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new
The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition. However, the trial Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null
court denied Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his and void because:
answer to the petition. (1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a temporary and (2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court legal and medical professions for only sanggunian members who are
from implementing the Order of August 11 1992, regarding the revision of lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while
ballots. The CA belatedly issued a temporary restraining order. Meanwhile, dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others
Gatchalian filed with the CA another petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 (b-l]).
28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in issuing the Order, which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned memorandum circulars and
The CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit. Section 90 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional.
The CA rendered judgment, denying Gatchalian's petition,
but declaring, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter-
Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted
the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with HELD:
dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence this petition. NO. As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to
the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations
Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the entrusted to their jurisdiction With respect to the present case, we find no
running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of
file his answer. Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG
Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to
HELD: dismiss the administrative charge against him.
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343- In the first place, complaints against public officers and
M-92) with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are
Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional
Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in
of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment
1, Part I provides: against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against
the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining
"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City
and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No.
election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general 74-58 (in relation to Election 7[b-2) of RA 6713) prohibiting a government
or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
bill of particulars are not allowed in election protest or quo warranto cases Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
pending before the regular courts. Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81
violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's
rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90- 81 simply
in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 6 prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest
[5]). between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not
Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation.
a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11, Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members .may practice
1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely. during session hours. " If there are some prohibitions that apply
The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of
controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a

law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public perpetually enjoin respondent Commission of Internal Revenue and
service. Finance Office of the SC from making any deductions of withholding taxes
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. from their salaries. They submit that a tax withheld from their
compensation as judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT their salaries contrary to the provision of Sec.10 of Art.VIII of the
MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ Constitution mandating that "during their continuance in office, their salary
221 SCRA 464 [1993] shall not be decreased.
FACTS: ISSUE: Is the deduction in the said salaries in violation of Sec.10 of

Petitioner Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda seeks the review of Art.VIII?
the following orders of the office of the Ombudsman:
1.) The order dated September 18, 1991 denying ex parte motion refer to HELD:
the SC filed by the Petitioner and YES. The draft proposal of Sec 10 Art VIII reads as "their
2.) The order dated November 22, 1951 denying the petitioner's motion for salary shall not be decreased" and the words "not subjected to income
reconsideration and directing petitioners to file his counter affidavit and tax" was deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three
other controverting evidences. branches of government.
In his affidavit-complaint, respondent Napoleon Abiera Thus, the clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was
asserts that petitioner falsely certified that all civil and criminal cases to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 income tax to members of the Judiciary. In the course of deliberations, it
days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998 was made clear that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be
where in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been subject to general income tax does not fall within their continuance in
rendered in the cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent office.
Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificate of The court disregarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer that
service. declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of
Petitioner counters that he had been granted by this court an income tax and considered such payment as diminution of their salaries
extension of 90 days to decide said cases, and that the Ombudsman has during their continuance in office.
no jurisdiction over the case since the offense charged arose from the Furthermore, in constructing Sec 10 Art VIII of the 1987
judge's performance of his official duties, which is under control of this Constitution, it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a
Court. law fixing another rate of compensation of Justice and Judges but such
rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of the
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain criminal enactment, of if lower, it would be applicable only to the appointed after its
complaints for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted approval. It would be strained construction to read into the provision an
to the supreme court to the SC, and assuming that it can, whether a exemption from taxation when the true intent of the framers was to make
referral should be made first to the SC. the salaries of the Judiciary taxable.
HELD:
The Court disagrees with the first part if the petitioners basic ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
argument, there is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only DE LA LLANA vs. ALBA
to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge (G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982)
who falsifies his certificate is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the rules of Court FERNANDO, C.J.:
and criminally liable to the state under the revised Penal Code for his FACTS:
felonious Act. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
However, we agree with petitioner that in the absence of any Blg. 129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his Therefore and for other Purposes," the same being contrary to the security
certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the of tenure provision of the Constitution as it separates from the judiciary
Ombudsman over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
of separation of powers. municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
Articles VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its
from the presiding Justice of the CA that can oversee the judge's and court enactment and characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to
personnel's compliance commit any violation thereof. No other branch of the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date
doctrine separation of power. when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. The Solicitor
The Ombudsman cannot justify it's investigation of petitioner General maintains that there is no valid justification for the attack on the
on the powers granted to it by Constitution, for such a justification not only constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of the power
runs counter to the specific mandate of the constitution grating supervisory vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
powers to SC overall courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
the independence of the judiciary. independence of the judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of support in law.
petitioner's certificate of service to this court for determination of whether
said certificate reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the ISSUE: Whether or not BP Blg. 129 is unconstitutional.
Court has the necessary records to make such determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this court, as one of the three branches of HELD:
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on Yes. It is constitutional. After an intensive and rigorous study
this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit- of all the legal aspects of the case, the Supreme Court dismissed the
complaint. petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in been shown. It held that the enactment thereof was in answer to a
this case. Administratively, the question before us is this, should a judge, pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary; that
having been granted by this court an extension of time to decide before the attendant abolition of the inferior courts which shall cause their
him, report these cases in his certificate of service. As this question had incumbents to cease from holding office does not impair the independence
not yet been raised these cases less resolved by, this Court how could be of the judiciary and the security of tenure guarantee as incumbent justices
the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the and judges with good performance and clean records can be named anew
resolution of this question. in legal contemplation without interruption in the continuity of their service;
In fine, where the criminal complaint against a judge or other that the provision granting the President authority to fix the compensation
court employees arises from their administrative duties, the ombudsman and allowances of the Justices and judges survives the test of undue
must defer action on said complaints and refer the same to this Court for delegation of legislative power, a standard having been clearly adopted
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the therefor; that the reorganization provided by the challenged Act will be
scope of their administrative duties. carried out in accordance with the President's constitutional duty to take
Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby granted. The care that the laws be faithfully executed, and the judiciary's commitment to
Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by the public guard constitutional rights.
respondent Atty. Napoleon Abiera and to refer the same to this court for
appropriate action.
PEOPLE VS. HON. ESTAQUIO GACOTT
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995)
NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
152 SCRA 284 [1987] BIDIN, J.:
FACTS:
FACTS: Respondents Strom and Reyes were charged with violation
Petitioners David Nitafan Wenceslao Polo and Maximo of the Anti-Dummy Law. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss,
Savellano are duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC, NCR arguing that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-
Manila. They sought to prohibit and/or Dummy Board under RA 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has

no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos
Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request
Respondent judge granted the motion. The prosecution for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as
moved for reconsideration but respondent judge denied the same in an follows:
order, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: (1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume
“. . . . It may be ignorance of the law to insist that the law, and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
Republic Act 1130 was repealed or amended by Letter of Instruction (sic) (2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither
No. 2, Series of 1972 as what the City Prosecutor has harped all along. A violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12,
Letter of Instruction (sic) is not law by any standard and neither has it the Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B), both of
force and effect of law. A contrary contention would be violative of Article 7 the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my
of the New Civil Code which provides that laws are repealed only by present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court,
subsequent ones and of the Rules of Statutory Construction. First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; x x x”
Besides, penal statutes are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. The rules in all criminal ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Judge Manzano as member of
prosecutions is that all counts are resolved in favor of the accused. In the the Provincial Committeee on Justice violates the Constitution.
case at bar, the court seriously doubts that the City Prosecutor has the
power or the authority to investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law and HELD:
to file and to prosecute cases of this kind before our courts, as that is Yes. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
lodged with the Anti-Dummy Board under R. A. 1130.” Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12,
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash Art. VIII, Constitution).
gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
certiorari. Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is
HELD: constrained to deny his request.
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring
text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly “While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative
observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a
by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
[1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of the law reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to
legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility
martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. no leas than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied
1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or with nothing less."
repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7- This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should
8). adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form
ordains: part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
repealed, or revoked. assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably
inexcusable neglect to check the citations of the prosecution is the incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is
particular case devolves solely upon the Prosecution or whoever may be DENIED.
the advocate before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that
courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and
(Sec. 1, Rule 129 Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar (G.R. NO. 88709, FEBRUARY 11, 1992)
(and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments
The Court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a CRUZ, J.:
judge in the performance of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as FACTS:
in the present case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it not In its complaint, petitioners alleged that on January 24, 1980,
for public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a P2M loan from private
but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment
dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's thereof, executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land. The
error is not a simple error in judgment but one amounting to gross mortgage was foreclosed for alleged non-payment of the loan, and the
ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public's perception sheriff's sale was held without re-publication of the required notices after
of the court's competence. the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or
consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the
mortgaged lands were sold to it.
UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private
respondent Manuel Co, who transferred them to Golden Star Industrial
Corporation, another private respondent, upon whose petition a writ of
possession was issued to it. NICOS and the other petitioners filed suit for
"annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
IN RE: MANZANO injunction."
[A.M. NO. 88-7-1861-RTC. OCTOBER 5, 1988.] Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the
evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that
PADILLA, J: came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
FACTS: that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly
Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to
which reads: the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the
“By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable demurrer having been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties,
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June
designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on 6, 1986, issued the following —
Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 ORDER
December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986
1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable filed by defendants Victorino P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial
Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their
of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by
machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment. the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was

in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing
which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no
appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by
and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that his cause law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of
is actually-against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This
Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the corporation it has to discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person
and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more,
corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there
devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from
reposed upon them by the stockholders . . . " a subject matter not within responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must
the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same to be thereby cease.
impressed with merit. The above formulation of what is settled law finds no
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The application to the present situation. Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in
Defendants' respective counterclaims are likewise dismissed. accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a determination
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the
dissolved and set aside. examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the witnesses produced. No allegation to the contrary may be entertained.
principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of
requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and arrest previously issued to petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the
does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial circumstances, would not therefore lie.
court.
2. NO. BAIL is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure to state clearly and distinctly the flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a
facts and the law in which the order of dismissal is based. remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order
of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was
HELD: revoked by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such
Yes.The questioned order is an over-simplification of the actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion.
issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged
the Constitution.It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled
cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is
The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is intended
the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the
It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right
not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as
postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against
decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the
incidental matters." jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has
observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals that — been thus obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail.
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by The two basic objections are:
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a One was that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was still
case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable
laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should
the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose
always gives the legal basis. of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant
xxx xxx xxx bail to one who is free.'"
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never
the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in
resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of People v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail
a case. of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in
The order in the case at bar does not come under either of summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
the above exceptions. As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve
a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special
law on which it is based. civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court
granting bail should be considered void."
No grave abuse of discretion to justify the grant of the writ certiorari
prayed for has been shown. That is why our resolution sought to be
reconsidered should stand.
MENDOZA VS. CFI
G.R. NO. L-35612-14 JUNE 27, 1973 ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
BORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FERNANDO, J. (G.R. NO. L-82273, JUNE 1, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and PER CURIAM
mandamus. Said petitions were dismissed by the court for lack of merit FACTS:
due to the fact that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that Petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo charges Attys. Julieta Y.
his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the Carreon and Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst.
bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, Division Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.
this petition for reconsideration. Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office of this Court, with usurpation of
judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased,
ISSUES: fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in
WON the petitioner can invoke the habeas corpus rule. G.R. No. 82273.
Granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed
proceeding, is he, however, entitled to bail? charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several letter-
complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman Borromeo had
HELD: repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition
1. NO. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were
show the illegality of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3),13
characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is
that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the
148
signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and Petitioner challenged the foreclosure sale saying that it was
resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise null and void because the Deed of Release necessarily includes the
complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice mortgage to the PNB. The Court did not agree that the extrajudicial
and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole property is null and void. And
and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore due to the unfavorable decision Petitioner filed a pleading denominated as
"unconstitutional, null and void." a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration
The Supreme Court through its Third Division disposed of of the Resolution sayibg that the "minute resolutions" it assails are
Borromeo's petition in a four-page resolution which more than adequately supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the present
complies with the constitutional requirements governing resolutions Constitution. It insinuates that such procedure adopted by this Court is a
refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The petition and its culpable constitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment
incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the Third proceedings.
Division. The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it
disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them ISSUE: WON the minute resolutions of the court are in violation of Section
as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merits where 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from
is supported by: substantial evidence and, is in accord with the facts of the HELD:
case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the NO. It has been stressed that these "resolutions" are not
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for "decisions" within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold
non-compliance with the rules. that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the
ISSUES: decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound
1. WON the certification of the Chief Justice is imperative in judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court's denial
minute resolutions. since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
2. WON the resolution in question lacked necessary facts Court of Appeals' decision.
and law on which they are based. The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases
"submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs
HELD: or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is
1. NO. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the refused due course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis
Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and
sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in
resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient compliance with the
more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time could be constitutional requirement.
more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants
decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees
of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed
cases coming to it. Remedial-legislation to meet this problem is also from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of
pending in Congress. the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and
fun time and attention of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or
officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.
disgruntled litigants questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and
involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the Court itself. As
earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility: for all its PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO
acts. Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for (A.M. NO. 2756, MARCH 15, 1988)
acts of the Court.
PER CURIAM
2. NO. In Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. FACTS:
(May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a Respondent Grecia filed a "Petition for Redress and
decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition", praying that the decision of
based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall November 12,1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for
under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered
review ... shall be refused due course ...without stating the legal basis by this Court dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the
therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after respondent. Respondent’s ire results from an administrative case filed
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, against him and the subsequent collective decision of the Court to disbar
comments, or motions decides to deny due course to the petition and him.
states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the Respondent questions the validity of Court’s decision due to
respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated the fact that the said decision is violative of the 1987 Constitution due to
in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional lack of certification by the Chief Justice and that the conclusions of the
requirement. Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ISSUE: WON the certification of the Chief Justice is required for the
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS validity of the assailed decision.
(G.R. NO. 127682, APRIL 4, 1998)
HELD:
REGALADO, J. NO. The certification requirement refers to decisions in
FACTS: judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
NIDC granted petitioner KIPI a direct loan of P8M and a P2M resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been
guarantee to secure PNB. As security thereof, KIPI executed in favor of accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would
NIDC a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, covering, among others, a parcel be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to
of land with all its improvements. Upon full payment of KIPI's account with be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court.
NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond
Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, which provided that: doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
"Whereas, the credit accommodations had been fully paid by the Borrower consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC which subsequently took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per
returned the owner's copy of the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente
accordingly the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage was although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In
registered with the Registry of Deed. However, it appeared that there were such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
some accounts chargeable to KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened
which came to the knowledge of PNB only in 1981 and 1982. Hence, PNB
requested for the return of the owner's copy of TCT No. 469737 and the
said title was returned to PNB.
PNB filed a "Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse
Claim" with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and was able to
have the same annotated. It then filed a Petition of Sale to extra-judicially
foreclose various properties belonging to KIPI. KIPI received an undated ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Notice of Sheriff's Sale to the effect that the land covered by TCT No. OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19, 1983 at 9:00 G.R. No. 114323. July 23, 1998
a.m.
MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: cargo at the first instance but also the failure of the replacement cargo to
The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non- conform to the specifications of the contract, a matter clearly within the
delivery of the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner. The coverage of Clause 16.
petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation 2. As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. A contract No. 3/B -1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical declaration
was entered into between the two parties whereby the private respondent that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law of the arbitrator
undertook to supply the petitioner 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement for a as contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains
consideration of US$477,300.00. Notwithstanding the fact that the private an exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the
respondent had already received payment and despite several demands parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the
made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the foreign court's
cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they judgment the appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be
agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons a "simplistic decision containing literally, only the dispositive portion".
of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be
designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the
conform to the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact
to Clause 16 of their contract. and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if
dispute in petitioner's favor. To enable the petitioner to execute the award only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
in its favor, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is
Dun. India (foreign court), praying that the decision of the arbitrator be particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy
made "the Rule of Court" in India. The foreign court refused to admit the and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this
private respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single
Thus, an order was issued ordering privare respondent to pay petitioner. spaced pages.
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign
foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from
the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. Thus, if
a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the
court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the
following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and
cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived, executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The RTC dismissed private this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
respondent’s complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. Anent the issue because our rules provide otherwise.
of the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action, however, the RTC The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to
found the referral of the dispute between the parties to the arbitrator under be done than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner
Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. The RTC characterized the merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
erroneous submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a “mistake of law proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of
or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction”. Consequently, the proceedings the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the
had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer
therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of an necessary.
enforceable right.
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign A. COMMON PROVISIONS
court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, the ARULEO VS. CA
appellate court observed that the full text of the judgment of the foreign 227 SCRA 311 [1993]
court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact
and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be FACTS:
enforced by any Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in
provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without Batangas, Bulaean. Gatchalian was declared the winner. Thereupon,
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is Aruelo filed with the RTC a civil case protest in the same elections. Aruelo
based. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the claims that in elections contests, the COMELEC Rules give the
present petition. respondent only 5 days from summons to file his answer and that this 5-
day period has lapsed. According to him, the tiling of Motions to Dismiss
ISSUES: and Motion to Bill of particulars is prohibited by Sec. 1 Rule 13 of
(1) Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between COMELEC. Rules of Procedures, hence, the filling by Gatchalian of said
the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. pleadings did not suspend the running of the 5-day period.
(2) Whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this
jurisdiction in view of the private respondent's allegation that it is bereft of ISSUE: Is Aruelo’s contention correct?
any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based. HELD:
NO. Part VI of the Come lee Rules does not provide that
HELD: MTDE and Bill of particulars are not allowed in election contest pending
1. It is noted that the non- delivery of the oil well cement is not in the before the regular courts constitutionally speaking. Comelec cannot adopt
nature of a dispute arising from the failure to execute the supply a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The
order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure
materials as provided for in the Clause 16 of their Contract. That Clause in all courts is vested on the SC.
16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the Gatchalian received a copy of the RTC order denying his
contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose motion for Bill of Particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Sec.1 (b) Rule 12 of
of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer
upon by a person possessed with the required skill and expertise which I after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. His
may be otherwise absent in the regular courts. answer was filed right on time.
This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that
the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by
the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their
contract:
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of
or in connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the exclusive ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the A. COMMON PROVISIONS
place from which this supply order is situated. CUA VS. COMELEC
We believe that the correct interpretation to give effect to 156 SCRA 582 [1987]
both stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all
claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, FACTS:
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply The COMELEC First Division rendered a 2:7 decision on
order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes. August 10, 1987 favoring Cua as winner in the lone Congressional scat of
But the Court finds merit on the contention that the failure of Quirino but his proclamation was suspended due to lack of unanimous
the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of the contract is vote required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No.1669
a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16. Undoubtedly, what regarding transaction of official business of a Division.
was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of the

Pursuant to said rule, private respondent Puzon filed a that the Commission had no coercive powers — unlike a court — to
motion for reconsideration with the Comelec en banc. On October 28, enforce its final decisions/resolutions.
1987, three members voted to sustain the First Decision, with 2 dissenting Respondent court denied it on the ground that the "petitions
and one abstaining (one died earlier). But respondent insists that no valid (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said)
decision was reached by the COMELEC en banc because only three claim of damages."
votes were reached in favor of Cua and theses did not constitute a De la Fuente sought reconsideration, contending that the
majority of the body. Appellate Court had competence to award damages in a mandamus
action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have
ISSUE: Is the Cua’s contention correct? been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the
enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the CA had authority to issue such
HELD: writs only 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was changed by
Yes. The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts — the Supreme Court,
valid decision under Art.IX-A Sec.7 of the Constitution. the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals — were conferred
Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the CA was given
First division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues.
and voted thereon en bane. Their decision is also valid under the To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued,
aforesaid Constitutional provision. would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
Ontheother hand,inanattempttonullify theadverse
dispositions of the Court of
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Appeals — and obtain "the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing
A. COMMON PROVISIONS respondent de la Fuente's claim for damages" — the Solicitor General's
ACENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Office had instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends
193 SCRA 623 [1991] that the CA is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the
question of damages in a mandamus suit.
FACTS:
Petitioner Acena was appointed as an Administrative Officer ISSUES:
of Rizal Technological Colleges (RTC), a state college. He was approved 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil
as permanent by the CSC. Dr. Profets later extended to Acena a action of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the
promotional appointment as Associate Professor and at the same time matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer.
designated the latter as Acting Administrative Officer, despite the 2. Whether or not the Solicitor General may represent the defendant
promotional appointment. public officer in the mandamus suit, in so far as the claim for damages is
Dr. Estolas replaced Dr. Profets as RTC OTC. In a concerned.
memorandum Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of Acena as Acting
Administrative Officer. HELD:
Subsequently, petitioner Acena filed suit with the Merit 1. No. The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P. 129
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) against Ds. Estolas for illegal as the legal provision specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction of
termination. MSPB initially dismissed the complaint, but it subsequently the Court of Appeals. The section pertinently declares that the
reversed itself after having been informed of the opinion of the CSC "Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) shall
Chairman Gotdalera to the effect that Acena is still Administrative Officer exercise . .," among others: Original jurisdiction to issue writs of
of the RTC because his appointment as Associate Professor had been mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
withdrawn. auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
Dr. Estolas and Salvador (the one to replace Acena) filed a jurisdiction .
petition for review with the Office of the President, which refered said Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of
petition to the CSC. The CSC ruled in favor of Sr. Estolas and Salvador. Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to
Hence, this petition. claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the
word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to
ISSUE: Whether or not esc acted without in excess of jurisdiction or with try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages
grave abuse of discretion when it set the order of MSPB. accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their
specified jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is settled rule, that a respondent tribunal exercising judicial 2. No. As laid down in the Urbano and Co cases: (T)he Office of the
function acts without jurisdiction if does not have the authority by law to Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any
hear and decide the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the stage of a criminal case.
respondent has the legal power to decide the case but oversteps his This observation should apply as well to a public official who
authority. And there is gave abuse of discretion where the respondent acts is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly
in capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is
Under PD 1409 the CSC has the jurisdiction to review the for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the
decision of the MAPB. However, said the authority to review can only be Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in
exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of the M APB had such a civil suit for damages.
filed an appeal with the Commission within the I5-day reglementary It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here
period. Here, it is admitted by CSC and not disputed by the private charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a
respondent Estolas that the petitioner for review was filed outside the crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of
reglementary period. This being so, the public respondents exceeded its the Solicitor General.
jurisdiction when it entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with
the Office of the President. Having exceeded its jurisdiction the CSC
committed a reversible error when it set aside the order the MSPB which ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
had long become (final and executory. Final decision or order can no A. COMMON PROVISIONS
longer be subject to review. FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP VS. JAIME N.
Moreover, Estolas has not even bothered to offer an FERRER
explanation why she incurred delay and why she filed a petition with the G.R. NO. L-31455, FEBRUARY 28, 1985
Office of the President. Such being the case, the public respondent CSC
cannot legally invoke and justify the assumption of jurisdiction on grounds CUEVAS, J.:
of equality and substantial justice. FACTS:
In a bid for the manufacture and delivery of voting booths for
COMELEC, respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Members rejected Acme Company’s bid and instead awarded it to
A. COMMON PROVISIONS petitioner Filipinas. After an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted
VITAL-GOZON VS. COURT OF APPEALS was conducted and after the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted
G.R. NO. 101428, AUGUST 5, 1992 the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract
(for voting booths) to Acme.
NARVASA, C.J.: Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then CFI of Manila
FACTS: against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman
President Aquino reorganized the various offices of the and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent
Ministry of Health. Dr. de la Fuente was demoted but the CSC declared Acme. Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After
the transfer from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as illegal. hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge denied the writ
Three months elapsed without any word from Dr. Vital- prayed for.
Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Thereafter the public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss
Resolution would be obeyed. Dr. de la Fuente, apprehensive that the on the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of
funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert suit, and that the complaint states no cause of action.
to the General Fund, asked the CSC to enforce its judgment. He was Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the respondent Judge
however "told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief issued the questioned Order dismissing Civil Case No. 77972. Filipinas'
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant appeal. Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MWD)
employees, petitioners MWD Board Members conducted an investigation
ISSUES: on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then Gen. Manager. He was
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San Diego was
suit involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract designated in his place as Acting Gen. Manager. He was later dismissed.
arising from its invitation to bid; Challenging his dismissal, private respondent filed for Quo
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before the trial court.
the premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no
enjoin them from complying with their contract. jurisdiction over the disciplinary actions of government employees which is
vested exclusively in the CSC. Respondent Judge denied the motion to
HELD: dismiss and the motion for reconsideration.
1. Yes. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before this court, which
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of referred the case to respondent court. The CA dismissed the petition and
elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition.
upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving
the number of location of Polling places, and the appointment of election dismissal of an employee of quasi-public corporation?
inspectors and of other election officials. ... The decisions, orders and
rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme HELD:
Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution, which was then No. There is no question that MWD is a quasi-public
in force) corporation. Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court, not employees of government- owned and controlled corporations are
the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and
certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the Regulations.
conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, no appeal lies from the
We are however, far from convince that an order of the decision of the Service Commission, and that parties aggrieved thereby
COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid Court, within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7,
comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present
"final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by rules, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative
certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In
the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. any event, whether under the old rule or present rule, RTCs have no
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be employees covered by the Civil Service Law.
classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, Petition granted. Decision and resolution annulled and set
or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in aside.
character.
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the
Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995
legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective (REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was
issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE
authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION SERVICE,
favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the PHILIPPINES.
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed
as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Agencies.
Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. 1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
2. No. Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
premises to enjoin the COMELEC from pursuing its contract with Acme, exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
the winning bidder. Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities
While it may be true that the lower court has the jurisdiction over and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security
controversies dealing with the COMELEC's award of contracts, the same Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
being purely administrative and civil in nature, nevertheless, herein Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
petitioner has no cause of action on the basis of the allegations of its Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
complaint. Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657,
Indeed, while the law requires the exercise of sound Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
discretion on the part of procurement authorities, and that the reservation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
to reject any or all bids may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
petitioner has miserably failed to prove or substantiate the existence of Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
malice or fraud on the part of the public respondents in the challenged 2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or
award. final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, a bidder 3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to
may have the right to demand damages, or unrealized or expected profits, the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided,
only when his bid was accepted by resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
bid, although recommended for award of contract by the bidding of fact and law.
committee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared 4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
to have been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from
cause of action. the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its
In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
booths in Acme's favor, the Commissioners of the COMELEC had taken reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
into account that Acme's bid was the lowest; that Acme was a responsible agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
manufacturer; and that upon an ocular inspection of the samples Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the docket fee
submitted by the bidders, Acme's sample was favorable chosen subject to before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
properly exercised its sound discretion in making the award. petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen
(15) days.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS 5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified
A. COMMON PROVISIONS petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals,
MATEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the
(G.R. No. 113219. August 14, 1995) court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the
Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
PUNO, J.: Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of
FACTS: Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of

docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds TUPAS V. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION
relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall (G.R. NO. 49677, MAY 4, 1989)
pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the denial. REGALADO, J.:
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) FACTS:
state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the Petitioner TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a
courts or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a certification election in order to determine the exclusive bargaining
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied representative of the workers in NHC. The petition was dismissed. On
upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, the order of dismissal was
original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or reversed and the holding of the election was ordered. Upon a motion for
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such reconsideration, this order was set aside. Hence, the instant petition for
material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other certiorari.
supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing
that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) ISSUE: WON petitioner organization can be allowed to hold a certification
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as required in election.
Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The HELD:
failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements Yes. The civil service now covers only government owned or
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those
costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
grounds for the dismissal thereof. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or
respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
within ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the employees in both the governmental and the private sectors.
petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are
unsubstantial to require consideration. covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten controlled corporation without an original charter.
(10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by It is meet, however, to also call attention to the fact that,
clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory
referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the
insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, two types of government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws
and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For,
copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the
shall be filed with the Court of Appeals. civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other Resolution annulled and set aside. Conduct of a certification
pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of election granted.
Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the
bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie
that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE
petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the 97 PHIL 289 [1950]
court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall
be binding on the Court of Appeals. FACTS:
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner was appointed City
that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re- Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946 by the President, appointment which
quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible was confirmed by the CA on August 6. On June I, 1050, Gil Mallure was
certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The extended an "ad interim" appointment by the President to the same
record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to position, after which, on June 3, the undersecretary of the Department of
the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent the Public works directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works
correction of or addition to the record. for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office. The petitioner
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, rests his case on the Constitution which reads, ''No officer or employee in
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court the Civil Service shall be removed or suspend except for cause as
of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. provided by law."
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course,
the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of the petitioner was constitutional.
parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from
notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of HELD:
the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court NO. There are three classes of positions-policy-determining,
itself. primarily confidential and highly technical - as excluded from the merit
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed
Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals herein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involve the highest
filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this degree of confidence, or are, closely bound with the dependent 011 other
Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review positions to which they are subordinates or are temporary in nature.
hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate However, the office of the City Engineer is neither primarily confidential,
disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which policy determining nor highly technical. Thus, the constitutional provision is
may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall very much applicable in his case wherein he is protected from removal
likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the without cause.
Court of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in
Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may SALAZAR VS. MATHAY
require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the 73 SCRA 285 [1976]
submission of such further documents or records as it may deem
necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the mode of FACTS:
appellate review. Petitioner Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are Confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, GSIS. Her
appointment was noted by the Commission of Civil Service.
hereby
After six years, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor
repealed and superseded by this Circular. General that her service as confidential in the office of the Auditor OSIS
16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) has been terminated.
Thereafter, the Auditor General issued an appointment to the
newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.
petition as Junior Examiner receiving a lower compensation. On the day of
May 16, 1995. the appointment petitioner assumed the position.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Petitioner wrote the Commission of Civil Service that she be
Chief Justice reinstated to her former position as confidential agent in the office of the
auditor, GSIS. However, no action was taken.
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

ISSUE: Whether or not the service of petitioner as confidential agent was NO. It is noted that the appointment of the petitioner was not
validly terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution.
whether or not she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the
the position of Junior Examiner in the same office. right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and
call it temporary.
HELD: The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY"
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential ends did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly
upon loss of confidence because their term of office lasts only as long as described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form
confidence in them endures. No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval
of the appointment, not the appointment itself and what made the approval
temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION appointee to the position.
CORPUZ VS. CUADERNO The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
13 SCRA 591 [1965] determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
FACTS: appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When
Petitioner Corpuz, then holding the position of Special the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are
Assistant to the Governor in charge of the Export Department in the satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
Central Bank, a position declared by the President as highly technical in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Indeed, the approval is more
nature, was administratively charged by several co - employees in the appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and qualified for the position to which he has been named.
abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public official and Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must
of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank. be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
The Monetary Board suspended the petitioner. After which lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
he filed an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and damages qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
with preliminary injunction with the CFI of the Manila. The CFI declared the faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should
Board Resolution null and void and ordered the reinstatement of the have been preferred. It is different where the Constitution or the law
petitioner. As aforesaid, both the petitioner and respondent appealed the subjects the appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like
judgment. the Commission on Appointments under 1935 Constitution. Appointments
The appeal of the Central Band and Monetary Board is made by the President of the Philippines had to be confirmed by that body
planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions and could not be issued or were invalidated without such confirmation. In
may at anytime for lack of confidence by the appointing power be fact, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments was then
removed. It argued that for the three classes of positions (policy- considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only
determining. primarily confidential and highly technical) lack of confidence after such confirmation.
of the one making the appointment constitute sufficient and legitimate Significantly, the CSC acknowledged that both the petitioner
cause of removal. and the private respondent were qualified for the position in controversy.
That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and
ISSUE: Whether or not highly technical employees may be removed by prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the
reason of lack of confidence by the one making the appointment. petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was
HELD: better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment on the
The tenure of official holding primarily confidential positions discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
ends upon 19s5 of confidence, because their terms of office lasts only as WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Commission
long as confidence in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no on Civil Service dated March 22, 1984, is set aside, and the petitioner is
removal. But the situation is different for those holding technical posts, hereby declared to be entitled to the office in dispute by virtue of his
requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly permanent appointment thereto dated February 18, 1983. No costs.
distinguished the primarily confidential from highly technical, and to apply
the loss of confidence to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the
differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Moreover, it is ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
illogical that while an ordinary technician, say clerk, stenographer, enjoys B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
security of tenure and may not be removed at any pleasure, a highly PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA
technical officers such as an economist or a scientist of a avowed time, GR NO. 104639. JULY 14, 1995
without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical men
worthy would be willing to accept work under such condition. Ultimately, FACTS:
the rule' advocated by the bank would demand that highly technical Private respondent Tito Dato was appointed Assistant
positions be filed by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked at Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr. Since he had no civil
the humor of the superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, what was extended
technical positions will have to be filed with incompetents and yes-men. to him was a temporary appointment which was renewed annually.
Who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato’s employment
carry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the constitution in status from temporary to permanent upon the latter’s representation that
establishing and dignifying the civil service on the basis on merit should be he passed the necessary civil service exam. However, the CSC did not
thus negated. favorably act upon this change of status.
After criminal charges were filed against him and a prison
guard, Dato was indefinitely suspended. Lope Rama, head of the
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Camarines Sur Unit of the CSC, wrote the Governor of Camarines Sur,
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION informing him that the status of Dato has been changed from temporary to
LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
permanent, the latter having passed the required examination. The
(G.R. NO. L-69137. AUGUST 5, 1986) change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of
release of said examination.
CRUZ, J.: Dato was acquitted of the charges. Thus, he asked for
FACTS: reinstatement and backwages. When his request was not heeded, Dato
Petitioner Felimon Luego was appointed Administrative sued for mandamus before the RTC which ruled in his favor. On appeal,
Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon
the CA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence this present petition.
on February 18, 1983. The appointment was described as permanent" but
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved it as "temporary," subject to ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent
the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative suspended.
case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the HELD:
approval of the appointment." The CSC then found the private respondent NO. Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position, and time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Wasrden in 1974, he had not
accordingly, appointed Tuozo as administrative officer and revoked the qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position.
appointment of Luego. The private respondent was so appointed on June Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and
28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, in the without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the
present petition questions the order and the private respondent’s title. pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent
obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having
ISSUE: Is the CSC authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such
on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment since a
permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary
HELD:
appointment – these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority.

It is worthy to note that private respondent rests his case There is no question that the constitution recognizes the right
entirely on the letter dated March 19, 1976 communicated by Mr. Rama to of government employees to organize as shown in the following articles:
the Governor of Camarines Sur. The foregoing is a clear arrogation of XIII Sec. 3, Art.XI (B) Sec. 2 (1) and (5) Art. III Sec. 8.
power properly belonging to the appointing authority. It was already held However, those articles are silent as to whether such
before (Luego v. CSC) that the CSC has the power to approve or recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort of the intent of the
disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning
make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitution
the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person recognizing the right government employees to organize, the associations
qualified it must attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The only, without including the right to strike.
duty of the CSC is to attest appointments and after that function is The Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government
discharged, its participation in the appointment process ceases. In the employees may strike, for such are excluded from its coverage, but then
case at bench, CSC should have ended its participation in the the Civil Service Decree is equally silent on the matter.
appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed On July 1, 1987, to implement the constitution guarantee of
the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service the rights of government employees to organize, the President issued EO
eligibility. No. t 80 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize
Moreover, the Court is not prepared to accord said letter any government employees. In Sec. 4 thereof, it is provided that "the Civil
probative value the same being merely a purported photocopy of the Service law and Rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
alleged letter, initialed and not even signed by the proper officer of the government services shall be observed, subject to many legislation that
CSC. Based on the foregoing, private respondent Tito Dato, being merely may be enacted by congress by Congress." The President was apparently
a temporary employee, is not entitled to the relief he seeks, including his referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6 of the Civil Service Commission
claim for backwages for the entire period of his suspension. which "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning
Wherefore, premises considered, the appealed decision is strike by government employees enjoying under pain of administrative
hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus instituted by herein sanctions all government demonstration, mass leaves, walkouts and other
private respondent Tito Dato is hereby DISMISSED. forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service" the air was thus cleared 'of the confusion. At present, in
the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS recognize their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION are prohibited from striking. This being the case, the strike staged by
DE LOS SANTOS V. YATCO employees of the SSS was illegal.
GR NO. L-13932. DECEMBER 24, 1959
FACTS:
A compromise agreement was submitted referring to the sale
by installment of a parcel of land made by plaintiffs therein Pacita de los
Santos and Jose de los Santos to Franicsco Mendonez. The agreement
was subsequently approved.
Plaintiffs moved for execution because defendant had ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
allegedly neglected to pay monthly installments since January 1958. B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Defendant sought postponement of the hearing for the motion which was CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
granted by respondent Judge. Respondent then issued a motion for 194 SCRA 317 [1991]
execution but the defendant moved to quash the writ of execution. The
parties were heard and in view of a possible amicable settlement, the FACTS:
motion to quash was held in abeyance for two weeks during which period Petitioner contends that Section 13 run counter to See 13
they can settle the case. Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution -The President, Vice-m President and the
After the pre-trial conferences, respondent quashed the writ members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
of execution. Hence this petition for certiorari. otherwise provided in this constitution, hold any office of employment
during their tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of By virtue of the opinion rendered by then Secretary of
the respondent Judge. Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, construing Section 13 Art. VII in relation to
Section 7, par.2 Art.IX-B that cabinet members, their deputies and
HELD: assistants may hold other office including membership in the board of
NO. In the first place, there being opposition on the part of GOCC's when a) directly provided by the constitution as in case of Sec of
the defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent verbal agreement Justice which is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
amending the compromise, execution could not validly be decreed without Council; b) if allowed by law; c) if allowed by the primary functions of their
a hearing. respective positions, the President of the Philippines issued EO 284 two
In the second place, the allegations proved by Mendonez days before Congress convened.
about their verbal agreement, his having secured a loan from the GSIS Petitioners argue that the exception to the prohibition in See
and his consequent ability to discharge his obligation seemingly justified 7 Par 2 Art IX applies to the officers and employees of the Civil Service
the court’s refusal to eject defendant from the premises (on execution) Commission in general and do not or cannot be extended to Sec.13 Art.VII
with the consequent forfeiture in favor of the plaintiffs of more than 12,000 which applies specifically to President, Vice- Presiednt and members of
already paid by defendant as previous installments of the purchase price the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The difference in the contention
not to mention the loss of defendant’s use of the house and theater of the parties therefore lies in the interpretation of the phrase 'unless
erected on that parcel of land. Upon the other hand, the respondent otherwise provided in the Constitution' used in Sec.13 of Art.VII which has
judge’s action caused no irreparable or undue harm to plaintiffs, because petitioner claims to refer only to those expressly provided by the
the latter still have the judgment that may be enforced upon any further Constitution such as the Vice President being allowed to become member
default of defendant Mendonez. of the Cabinet or Secretary of Justice to become an ex-officio member of
Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has committed the Judiciary and Bar Council, while respondents insists it make reference
no grave abuse of discretion, the writ of certiorari may not be issued. to Sec 7 of Art IX-B in so far as the appointive official mentioned therein is
Petition denied, with costs against petitioners. concerned.
ISSUE: Does the prohibition in Sec.13 Art.VII insofar as cabinet members,

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS their deputies and assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION made for appointive officials in general under Sec 7 par 2 Art IXB unless
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. CA otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
175 SCRA 686 [1989] appointive officials shall hold any other office or employment in the
government.
FACTS:
When the SSS failed to act on the SSEA's demands, the HELD:
latter went to strike. The SSS filed with the RTC complaint for damages We rule in the negative. In construing the Constitution, it
and asked for a writ of preliminary injunctions to stop the strike. The trial should be borne in mind the objects it sought to accomplish by its
Court issued a TRO while the Union filed a Motion of Dismiss alleging the adoption, and the evils if any, it sought to prevent or remedy.
trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
The position of the union is that the RTC had no jurisdiction government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took
to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and advantage of this scheme for the purposes of self -enrichment. The blatant
the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the DOLE of the betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent
NLRC, since the case involves a labor dispute with the Marcos regime.
A comparison of Sec 13 Art VII with other provisions of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSS Employees have the right to strike Constitution on the disqualification of the public official such as Sec. 13 Art
VI on members of Congress, Sec 5 par 4 Art XVI on members of the
HELD: Armed Forces and even Sec '7 provisions on disqualification pertains to
an office or position in the government and GOCC's. Unlike Sec 13 Art. VI

the prohibition is all-embracing and covers both public and private office member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
and position in the government. Judicial and Bar Council.
Thus, while all the other appointive officials in the civil The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to
during their tenure when such is allowed by law and the primary function elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
of their office, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants may WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227,
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for the first year of its
words, Sec., Art IX- B is meant to officials while sec 13 Art VII is meant to operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of
the exception applicable only to the President, Vice-President, members of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer
the cabinet and their deputies and assistants. of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional; consequently, the
This being the case, the qualifying phrase 'unless otherwise appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent
provided in this Constitution' in see 13 Art VII cannot possibly refers to the Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
broad exceptions provided under Sec.7 Art.IX -B of the 1987 Constitution.
The position under See 13 Art VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
law or as requires by the primary functions of their office. B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Mandating additional duties and functions of the President, QUINTOS VS. OZAETA
Vice-President, Cabinet members and their deputies and assistants which 98 PHIL 705 [1956]
are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or
employment by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in FACTS:
their respective offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. Appellants Braulio Quimson was a deputy Provincial
It bears repeating through that such additional duties or functions may not Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. In addition from
transgress the prohibition must be required by the primary functions of the being treasurer, he was appointed as Agent Collector of Rural Progress
official covered, who is to perform the same in an ex officio capacity as Administration, a public corporation. He assumed the office without waiting
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefore. for the approval of the President.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment as agent is constitutional and if it is,

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS whether he is entitled to additional compensation.
B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FLORES VS. DRILON HELD:
(G.R. NO. 104732, JUNE 22, 1993) YES. The employment of appellant as agent collector is not
in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said
BELLOSILLO, J.: appointment and his employment as Deputy Provincial Treasurer and
FACTS: Municipal Treasurer. There is no legal objection to government official
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 occupying two government offices and performing functions to both as
otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of long as there is no incompatibility. The Constitutional prohibition refers to
1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City double appointments and performance of functions of more than one
was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay office.
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office . . C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
. ." CAYETANO VS. MONSOD
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the (G.R. NO. 100113 SEPTEMBER 3, 1991)
U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the
Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, PARAS, J.:
maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 of the said law infringes the FACTS:
constitutional provision set forth in Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
during his tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
official and the subject posts are public offices. years pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 1 (1) of the 1987 Constitution.
The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination.
ISSUE: Does the proviso in Sec.13, par. (d) of R.A. 7227 which states, Subsequently, respondent took his oath and assumed office as Chairman
"Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the of the COMELEC.
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violate Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner, as a
the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
elective officials to other government posts? praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
HELD: ISSUE: Whether or not Christian Monsod has been engaged in the
YES. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an practice of law for at least ten years as required by the Constitution?
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). HELD:
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to YES. “Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. give notice or render any kind of service which device or service requires
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill (III ALR 23).”
(LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the “practice of law," particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
for its validity. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling
In any case, the view that an elective official may be the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of
paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency; discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

HELD:
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS NO. COMELEC's statement that fake and spurious ballots
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS may have been introduced to increase the votes of protestant was taken
BRILLANTES VS. YORAC out of context. Thus, it cannot be made as basis for denying the execution
192 SCRA 358[1990] pending appeal. To be precise, the COMELEC merely said that there is a
possibility that fake spurious ballots were placed in the ballot box to
FACTS: increase private respondent's votes, but the COMELEC correctly ruled
President Aquino designated Associate Commissioner that an examination of the ballots to resolve that petition for certiorari is not
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of proper at said time for the only issue it resolved was whether there was a
Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact- grave abuse of discretion in granting the execution pending appeal.
finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d'etat attempt. In his petition for certiorari before the COMELEC, petitioner
Petitioner challenged the designation contending that the mainly anchored his opposition to the order of execution pending appeal
President has no power to make such designation in view of the following on his allegation that the trial judge did not examine the original ballots,
reasons: but relied only on the xerox copy of the ballots in deciding the protest
1. The status of the Commission on Elections as an case. However, this contention raises a factual issue and its determination
independent constitutional body, and; in best left in the appeal pending before the COMELEC. Its resolution will
2. The specific provision of Art IX-C Section 1(2) of the involve the merit of the case. We are only concerned with the issue of
Constitution that (1) no case shall any member of the whether grave abuse of discretion was committed in ordering execution
COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or pending appeal. And there was a good reason for ordering execution
acting capacity. pending appeal.
Petitioner invokes Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, where Thus, petitioner's recourse would be to pursue his appeal
President Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of with the COMELEC, where the opening of the ballot boxes and the
the COMELEC and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the examination of original ballots may be made so that the true will of the
Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior electorate can be finally ascertained.
member of the COMELEC, being outranked by Associate Commissioner It also bears emphasis that Rule 143 of the Rules of Court
Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. allows execution pending appeal in election cases upon good reasons
The Solicitor General counters that the designation should stated in the special order.In its Order of execution, respondent RTC
be sustained for reasons of 'administratively expediency,' to prevent Judge Dilag cited two reasons to justify execution of his decision pending
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC in the absence of legal appeal, viz: (1) the grant of execution would give substance and meaning
provisions for temporary succession similar to the Supreme Court's (Sec to the people's mandate, especially since the RTC has established private
12 Judiciary Act of 1948) as well as the CA (Sec 5 BP 129). respondent's right to office, and; (2) barely 18 months is left on the tenure
of the Ternate mayor and the people have the right to be governed by their
ISSUE: Does the President of the Philippines have the power to make chosen official. In the recent case of Gutierrez v. COMELEC, the same
designation of a COMELEC Chairman in an acting Capacity? grounds for execution pending appeal of the decision in the protest case
were relied upon by the trial court and we found them to be valid reasons
HELD: for execution.
No. President has no such authority and expediency is a
dubious justification. Art IX-A. Sec.1 of the Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as 'independent.' Although ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
President in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these GALLARDO V. JUDGE TABAMO
Commissions conducts in own proceedings under the applicable laws and (G.R. NO. 104848, JANUARY 29, 1993)
its own rules and the exercise of its discretion. The choice of a temporary
chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that DAVIDE, JR., J.
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, FACTS:
by the President of the Philippines. Petitioners seek to prohibit the enforcement of the TRO
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms issued by respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter
essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be acted whimsically, capriciously and without jurisdiction when he took
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the designation cognizance of the case and issued the said order. It is the petitioners'
of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections thesis that the said case—the hiring of hundreds of laborers in the different
may be withdrawn by the President at any time and for whatever reason projects continues unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v)
she sees fit and the respondent, having accepted such designation, will be and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, among others—
stopped from challenging its withdrawal. (Note: This illustrates how the principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the Omnibus
independence pf the Constitutional Commissions may be undermined.) Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no COMELEC.
justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending
the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The members of the ISSUE: Does respondent judge have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
COMELEC could have handled the situation themselves without the complaint or petition based on election offenses prior to the conduct of
participation of the President, however well-meaning. preliminary investigation by the Commission on Elections.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the
Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the HELD:
seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, No. The material operative facts alleged in the petition
that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to
make. alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of
LINDO VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS an election offense:
G.R. NO. 127311 JUNE 19, 1997 (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public
funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and
PUNO, J. those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their
FACTS: subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty
Petitioner Conrado Lindo and private respondent Rosario days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public
Velasco (incumbent mayor of Ternate, Cavite) were mayoralty candidates. funds for:
When petitioner was declared as the winner, Velasco filed an election (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the
protest with the trial court. following: xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge Napoleon Dilag took over the protest (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials
case. Velasco moved for execution pending appeal, which motion was for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. —
granted. Dilag thus issued the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a petition During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty
for certiorari and prohibition with the COMELEC, with prayer for the days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the
issuance of a preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in
Order and writ of execution. the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants
COMELEC denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things
preliminary injunction. It ruled that the trial court did not commit grave of value chargeable against public funds.
abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial
since on the basis alone of the physical count of ballots, private court is for the enforcement of laws involving the conduct of elections the
respondent would still be ahead of petitioner by 90 votes. It also held that present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid
the examination of original ballots shall be made at the appeal proper to statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible
dispose of all the issues relative to the merits of the case. powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from
Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to
depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time.
ISSUE: Is the petition proper? Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly independent
Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,

peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of
people's sacred right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed
a peaceful change of government and in achieving and promoting political perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July
stability. 1994.
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of
Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows: course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
and functions: divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since the motion for execution
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have
supplied). been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal.
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the
It is thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
account the Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the
Constitution was drafted and ratified, to: trial court.
xxx xxx xxx
Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
enforce and administer, . . . . 16 C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special EDDING V. COMELEC
Civil Action No. 465 before the court a quo are matters falling within the (G.R. NO. 112060 JULY 17, 1995)
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. It is not true that, as contended
by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the FRANCISCO, J.
election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus FACTS:
Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original During the May 1992 elections, petitioner Norbi H. Edding
jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. 27 Neither it and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the candidates for the
is tenable that the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga del Norte. When
the court below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said respondent was declared the winner, petitioner filed an election protest
action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election with the trial court, which proclaimed the latter as the winner and declared
offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further null and void the election of respondent.
commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are
Respondent appealed while petitioner moved for the
continuing.
immediate execution of the decision. Bernardo opposed Edding's motion,
The petition is granted.
claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction to order execution pending
appeal, and invoked Section 17 of Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which allows execution only if the judgment has become final.
The RTC approved Bernardo's Notice of Appeal but later
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
granted Edding's Motion, and ordered the records of the case to be
RELAMPAGOS V. CUMBA
forwarded to the COMELEC. Thereafter, Edding replaced Bernardo and
(G.R. NO. 118861, APRIL 27, 1995)
assumed office. Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari
with Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary
DAVIDE, JR., J.
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting
FACTS:
execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due course to the
Petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were
petition, and issued a temporary restraining order. Finally, the COMELEC
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes,
issued the assailed Order, ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist
Agusan del Norte. When Cumba was proclaimed the winner, petitioner
from enforcing the assailed Resolution.
filed an election protest with the trial court, which found the latter to have
Petitioner argues that the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to
won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent.
issue writs of certiorari; and that the power of the RTC to grant execution
Cumba appealed to the COMELEC. The trial court gave due
pending appeal in election cases has already been confirmed in the case
course to the appeal. Petitioner moved for execution pending appeal,
of Tobon-Uy vs. COMELEC where it was held that "the COMELEC is
which was granted. The corresponding writ of execution was thus issued.
bereft of authority to deprive Regional Trial Courts of the competence to
Since her motion for reconsideration was denied, Cumba filed with the
order execution pending appeal."
COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the assailed order of the trial
Respondents counter that the COMELEC has the power to
court.
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, invoking Sections 2(2)
COMELEC promulgated its resolution, declaring null and
and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part:
void the order and the writ of execution issued by the lower court.
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipality
following powers and functions: (2) …Appellate jurisdiction over all
Mayor.
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
Respondents contend that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), citing jurisprudent courts of limited jurisdiction.
where it was declared that, indeed, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its two divisions, and shall promulgate its rule of procedure in order to
appellate jurisdiction. expedite disposition of election case, including pre-proclamation
ISSUE: Whether the Commission has the authority to hear and decide controversies…
petitions for certiorari in election cases. ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has
jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the
HELD:
Yes. Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX -C, acts as a court of justice
HELD:
performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of
None. The court decided to abandon the rule laid down in
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
the aforecited cases. In Relampagos vs. Cumba and the COMELEC, the
or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari,
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
prohibition and mandamus over election cases where it has appellate
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
jurisdiction by virtue of Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which
In abandoning the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria
provides as follows:
cases, the Court held that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
Sec. 50. Definition. —
providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive
The commission is hereby vested with the exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus involving election cases, remains in full force and effect but
mandamus involving election cases.
only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of
But notwithstanding the decision in Relampagos vs. Cumba,
the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case
COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
when it enjoined the order of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
petitioner's motion for immediate execution. Private respondent's petition
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse
for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction before the
of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending
COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that the trial court acted
appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both
without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the decision
granting execution despite the filling of a notice of appeal by private
on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days from 1
respondent within the reglementary period. It appears however that on
July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending
July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent filed his notice of
appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. appeal with the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for immediate
Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably filed within the five-day
reglementary period for filling an appeal since the decision of the RTC was COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election
promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993. contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply
The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusion; and
does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
pending incidents. Where the motion for execution pending appeal was exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has
filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the been abused to the prejudice of either party. Petition is therefore
case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of dismissed.
no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve
the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal [Note: A short lesson in Remedial Law. You must distinguish the nature of
because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on which is not a mode of appeal, but rather an original action.]
the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the
matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the
opposing party. ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Considering however that the term of office for the disputed C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
mayoralty seat will already expire on June 30, 1995, in addition to the fact PEOPLE VS JUDGE INTING
that the election for the next term of office for the contested post has 187 SCRA 788 [1990]
recently been concluded, the instant petition has therefore become moot.
FACTS:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed letter-complaint against OIC Mayor
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC, for
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the
GAUDO VS COMELEC office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without
193 SCRA 78 [1991] obtaining prior pennission or clearance from COMELEC as required by
law.
FACTS: Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of Dumaguete City to conduct
position of mayor in the Garcia Herna.ndez, Bohol. Petitioner was the preliminary investigation of the case to file the necessary information in
proclaimed duly-elected Mayor. court and prosecute, if warranted.
In an election protest by private respondent before the RTC, After a preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas filed a
the court upheld the proclamation of petitioner as the duly-elected Mayor criminal case with the respondent trial court which in turn issued a warrant
of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of eleven (11) votes. of arrest against the Ole-Mayor.
Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the Subsequently, however, the trial court set aside its order of
COMELEC. Through its First Division, affirmed by COMELEC en bane, arrest on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine
reversed the trial court's decision and declared private respondent the probable cause pursuant to Sec 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and
duly-ejected mayor by a plurality of five (5) votes. The COMELEC held further required Atty. Lituanas to secure the written approval of the
that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial "C" provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the
after the name "Galido" (petitioner herein) were marked ballots and, supervision and control of the latter. Atty. Lituanas failed to comply so the
therefore invalid. case was dismissed.
Petitioner filed before the Supreme court a petition for
certiorari and injunction. Private respondent moves for the dismissal of the ISSUE: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial
petition contending the following: Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through
1. Final decisions, orders or ruling of the COMELEC in election the Provincial Fiscal, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
executory and not appealable citing Artkle IX (C), Section 2
(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which is HELD:
implemented in the Rules of Procedure promulgated by the NO. The Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the
COMELEC , particularly Part VII, Rule 39, Section 2 thereof, prosecution of election offenses. If ever the Fiscal or Prosecutor files
which reads: information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation or
"Section 2 Non-reviewable decisions-Decisions in appeals election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He
from courts of general or limited jurisdiction in election cases relating to does not do so under the sole authority of his office (People vs. Basilla, et
the ejections, returns, and qualifications of municipal and barangay al G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, ] 989). In the instant case, there is no
officials are not appealable." averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the
2. The petition involves pure questions of fat as they relate to Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to
appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power "approve" the COMELEC's preliminary investigation, which is not proper.
of review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writing
of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15) Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a "Sec. 2 The Commission on Election shall exercise the
pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. This following powers and functions:
finding should by conclusive on the Court. 1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
Petitioner, on the other hand, cites Article IX (A), Section 7 of conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative. referendum, and recall.
the Constitution, to support his petition. It states: "Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of xxx xxx
each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court xxx
2. File upon a verified complaint, or on its
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of votes,
copy thereof."
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of
ISSUE: May the decision by the COMELEC in election contest involving election laws, including acts or omission constituting election
municipal officials be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for frauds. offenses, and malpractices" (Emphasis supplied)
certiorari by the petitioner?
In effect, the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not
HELD: only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
YES. The fact that decision, final orders or ruling of the This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this
matter are enlightening. Thus-
"MR. REGALADO: It is understood, however, that while ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
these decisions with respect to barangay and municipal C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BASILLA
officials are final and immediately executory and
therefore not appealable, that does not rule out the (G.R. NOS. 83938-40, NOVEMBER 6, 1989)
possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari,
FELICIANO, J.:
prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under
FACTS:
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court"
As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in
We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC Masbate, complaints for violations of Section 261, par.a-1 (vote buying)
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of and par. p (carrying of deadly weapon) of the Omnibus Election Code (BP
jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the Blg. 881) were filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate
function f a writ of certiorari is toe keep an inferior court or tribunal within against the private respondents. After preliminary investigation of the
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate filed in the Regional
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Trial Court of Masbate the said criminal complaints. In three (3) separate
159
orders, accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed In its petition, the COMELEC contends that as an
the three (3) informations giving the following justification: “….. The record independent constitutional body, its actions on election matters may be
shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the fiscal and not with reviewed only on certiorari by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the
the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not investigate the case.” respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court by the
The Petition argues principally that the Commission on COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to
Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a
prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections reinvestigation.
2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec
did deputize such prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority to
of complaints for alleged violation of election laws and to institute criminal order the Commission on Elections through its Regional Election Director
information therefore. The respondent judge therefore committed grave of Region VII or its Law Department to conduct a reinvestigation
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the case.
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in deciding that YES. The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply
COMELEC in the case at bar failed to perform its function as provided in with the order of the trial court requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation
the 1987 Constitution. in this case and to submit to the court the record of the preliminary
investigation on the ground that only this Court may review its actions is
HELD: certainly untenable.
Yes. There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with It is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative
offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the
such offenses in court. Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) of 1987 Constitution exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the
provides…”investigate and, when appropriate prosecute cases of violation prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the
of election laws, including acts or omissions, constituting election frauds competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
offenses, malpractices." law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense
It must be noted that while Section 265 of the Omnibus and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in
Election Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject
same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1987 reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so
Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to ordered by the court.
carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone: The records of the preliminary investigation required to be
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the produced by the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court
following powers and functions: may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. who conducted the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the
xxx xxx xxx warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the record of the
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcementi preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
agencies and instrumantalities of the Government, including the Armed probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free . The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines. Only
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines in this
xxx xxx xxx proceeding. In the least, the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court should have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this
for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, petition. On this account alone, the petition should be dismissed.
prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. SILVA, JR
xxx xxx xxx (GR. NO. 129417 FEBRUARY 10, 1998)
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by
the Comelec of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be MENDOZA, J.:
warranted only before the elections and only to ensure tree, honest, FACTS:
orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to perform the peace- The COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto
keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing in Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of §27 of R.A. No. 6646,
Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate informations filed with the
pinched niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint Regional Trial Court of Bataan. Tanciongco and Castillo then filed a joint
as its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and "Omnibus Motion for Examination of Evidence to Determine the Existence
instrumentalities of the government. The prompt investigation and of Probable Cause; Suspension of Issuance of Warrant of Arrest; and
prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute an Dismissal of the Cases." Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, who had
indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful been designated by the Commission on Elections to prosecute the cases,
and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election filed a comment joining in private respondents' request. In view thereof,
offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance respondent judges Silva and Vianzon summarily dismissed the cases
of physical order in election precinct. ' against private respondents.
All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases
dismissed the criminal informations filed in this case. The cases he cited in to the Court of Appeals, but the respondent judges denied due course to
his identical orders can offer him no comfort at all; for these cases do not its appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the prosecutor,
relate to the authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute the cases, had earlier
arms of the Government for the investigation and prosecution of election taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC. Said prosecutor stated that
offenses and those cases are not in conflict with our ruling here. he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec
as it would not be consistent with his position that he would abide by
whatever finding the court may come up with on the existence of probable
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS cause as against the accused Erasto Tanciongco and Norma Castillo.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PEOPLE VS. DELGADO ISSUES:
(GR. NO. 93419-32, SEPTEMBER 18, 1990) (1) Is the order denying due course to the Notice of Appeal of the
COMELEC correct?
GANCAYCO, J.: (2) Who has authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders
FACTS: of dismissal — the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
Comelec filed an information against each of the private
respondents for violation of Section 261 (y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus HELD:
Election Code. In three separate manifestations, the Regional Election NO. Ther order of the respondent judges denying due course
Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the to the Notice of Appeal of the COMELEC is not correct. . The authority to
prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor. decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC.
Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for Art. IX-C, § 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and
reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the function to "investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
conducted. An order was then issued by respondent court directing the frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has held:
COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not
conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit his report within ten only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
(10) days after termination thereof. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary

investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of Section l(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for
in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until August 11,
Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
No. 6388) and the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the The instant case is different from a pre-proclamation
COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all controversy which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a
election offenses and to prosecute them in court. The purpose is to place summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246; COMELEC Rules
in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation and of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2). Pre-proclamation controversies
prosecution of election offenses. should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be
cases act as its deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. An election protest
their offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power of Chief State does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an
Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, office. Over and, above the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep
it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to public interest to determine the true choice of he people. For this reason, it
the trial courts the determination of whether there was probable cause for is a well-established principle that laws governing election protests must
the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases should be be liberally construed to the end that the popular will expressed in the
dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate election or public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be
preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was defeated
no probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
have discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. of Appeals.
If he disagreed with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
permission to withdraw from the cases. But he could not leave the
determination of probable cause to the courts and agree in advance to the
dismissal of the cases should the courts find no probable cause for ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave abuse of C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the manifestation ANTONIO VS. COMELEC
of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the GR NO. 135869, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.
FACTS:
The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. Protestee
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Rustico Antonio was proclaimed as the winner. Protestant Vicente
ARUELO VS. CA Miranda, Jr. then filed an election protest before the Las Piñas MeTC,
GR NO. 107852. OCTOBER 20, 1993 which declared Miranda as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.
Antonio appealed from this judgment. Meanwhile, Miranda
FACTS: moved to execute the court's decision but such was denied and records
Aruelo and Gatchalian were Vice-Mayoralty candidates in were forwarded to the COMELEC Second Division.
Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed The COMELEC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
as the duly elected vice-mayor. Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition It was stated therein that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the
seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent prescribed period. The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the
alteration and tampering" of votes. Aruelo also filed with the RTC a petition protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period deprives the
protesting the same election. Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.
Gatchalian moved to dismiss, claiming that: (a) the petition Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
was filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the
COMELEC; and (b) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash ISSUE: Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the
deposit on the petition. COMELEC in an election protest involving a barangay position five (5)
The COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition. However, the trial days per COMELEC Rules of
court denied Gatchalian's Motion to Dismiss and ordered him to file his Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act
answer to the petition. 66791 and the Omnibus Election Code?
Aruelo prayed before the CA for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court HELD:
from implementing the Order of August 11 1992, regarding the revision of In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section
ballots. The CA belatedly issued a temporary restraining order. Meanwhile, 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Gatchalian filed with the CA another petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. "SEC. 21. Appeal - From any
28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved
court in issuing the Order, which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. party may appeal to the Commission on
The CA dismissed this petition for lack of merit. Elections within five (5) days after the
The CA rendered judgment, denying Gatchalian's petition, promulgation of the decision."
but declaring, at the same time, that Gatchalian's Answer With Counter- On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of
Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed. The appellate court also lifted appeal from decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial
the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to "proceed with Courts involving barangay officials is governed by Section 9 of Republic
dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence this petition. Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 9 of
Republic Act 6679 reads:
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill "SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a
of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC barangay official may be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan
Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy
running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the
file his answer. proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the
election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision
HELD: of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10)
NO. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343- days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional
M-92) with the RTC, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt
Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and
Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-
expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules proclamation cases shall be allowed."
of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of Particulars, shall Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule provides:
1, Part I provides: "SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. - A sworn
"SEC. 2. Applicability. These rules, except Part VI, shall petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the
apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly
VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office
courts of general or limited jurisdiction It must be noted that nowhere in within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The
Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protest or quo thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be
warranto cases pending before the regular courts. appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty
rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final."
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6
in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3) grants and authorizes this Commission to
[5]). promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as such rules concerning
Private respondent received a copy of the order of the RTC pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify substantive
denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as

amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is rule of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated including pre proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
authority which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal. heard and decided in division, provided that the motions for
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
provides that from the decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party bane.'
may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the It is clear that election cases include pre proclamation
promulgation of the decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of controversies and all. such cases must first be heard and decided by a
Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in Division of the Commission. The Commission sitting en bane does not
election protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In the
Commission for failure to file the required notice of appeal within the Comelec Rules of Procedures, pre proclamations are classified as special
prescribed period. cases and in compliance with the provision of the constitution, the two
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the divisions of the Commissions are vested with the authority to hear and
trial court on the ninth (9) day from receipt of the decision appealed from decide these special cases. Rule 127 thereof governs special cases,
or four (4) days after the five-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed. especially See 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from ruling of the
Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that assigned and not by the Commission en bane.
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down Indisputably then, the Comelec en banc acted without
by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals
jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal within the of petitioners ion the special cases without first referring them to any of its
prescribed period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeating the divisions.
right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring Accordingly, the instant petitions are dismissed without
jurisdiction over the case. prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular election protests.
Petitioner's argument raises the presumption that the period
to appeal can be severed from the remedy or the appeal itself which is
provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and survive on its own. The ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
presumption cannot be sustained because the period to appeal is an C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy. Petitioner REYES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO
also cites the case of Flores v. COMELEC. However, when this Court (G.R. NO. 108886, MAY 5, 1995)
stated in the aforementioned case that "Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is
declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election MENDOZA, J.:
contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be FACTS:
appealable to the regional trial court", it meant to preserve the first two Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo
sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal and metropolitan trial Comia were candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang
courts to try barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by the Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is elections. On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of the Municipal
the logical and sound interpretation of subject portion of the Flores case. Board of Canvassers, private respondent moved for the exclusion of
We cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in
intended, by the said laws, to maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering
despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of that there was another candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same
the regional trial court, Republic Act No. 7166 amending the Omnibus surname. However, without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of
Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers to expedite the Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eighth winning
remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was approved on candidate with 7,205 votes. On May 25, 1992 petitioner took his oath of
November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which was promulgated on April office. Private respondent later filed an election protest before the trial
20,1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was court. He alleged that "a vital mistake [had been] committed by the Board
cognizant of the ruling in Flores. Said law provides the same five (5) day of Canvassers in the mathematical computation of the total number of
period to appeal decisions of the trial court in election contests for votes garnered by petitioner [now private respondent]. Petitioner filed a
municipal officers to the COMELEC. Section 22 thereof reads: motion to dismiss private respondent's petition on the ground that it was
"Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers. -All filed beyond the reglementary period of ten days from proclamation, which
election contests involving municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial petition was denied by the trial court.
Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the On June 23, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision
Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy annuling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring private respondent
thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal as the eighth winning candidate for the position of councilor of the
within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. A copy of the decision
(6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, was served on petitioner on June 26, 1992.
unappealable and executory." Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC. In
There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
period to appeal to the COMELEC should apply to election contests for Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly
barangay officials. proclaimed member of that body and prohibit it from further recognizing
And since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was private respondent. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because
created. Thus, the COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. The appellate court cited
appeal in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. As correctly Supreme Court Circular 28-91 which prohibits the filing of multiple
pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A14 of the 1987 petitions involving the same issues. Petitioner filed a motion for
Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate court's decision
rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have became final and executory on December 10, 1992.
provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal consistent with Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan met in inaugural
the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd session on July 3, 1992, during which private respondent was recognized
and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for as the eighth member of the body and thereafter allowed to assume office
barangay election contests. Hence, Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC and discharge its functions.
Rules of Procedure is not in conflict with any existing law. To adopt a On the other hand, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed
contrary view would defeat the laudable objective of providing a uniform on January 22, 1993 petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to
period of appeal and defy the COMELEC's constitutional mandate to enact pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.
rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases. Petitioner then brought the present action. Petitioner
The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division
discretion in dismissing the appeal. committed a grave abuse of discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction
over the election contest filed by private respondent despite the fact that
the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS the second i.e., the COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing petitioner's
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal
SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC fee.
212 SCRA [1992]
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated Article IX A of the
FACTS: Constitution.
Petitioner impugn the resolution of the Comelec as having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion in the, inter alias, the HELD:
Commission sitting en bane, took cognizance and decided the appeals Yes, petitioner violated Article IX A of the Constitution which
without first referring them to any of its division. provides that only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. In the present case, he filed the present
ISSUE: petition without first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
Whether or not the Comelec en banc has the jurisdiction over the said COMELEC en banc.
resolution. It is now settled that in providing that the decisions, orders
and rulings of COMELEC "may be brought to the Supreme Court on
HELD: certiorari" the Constitution in its Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil action
Sec. 3 Art IX-C of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: of certiorari under Rule 65, §1. Since a basic condition for bringing such
'The Comelec may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its action is that the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it follows

that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of
the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his present action. charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the
Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station.
with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might
This is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner involve the not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize,
of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations
law. effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so
Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is
COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being
clear from Article 9C pars. 2 & 3 of the Constitution: regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice
Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the possibility of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority
by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that is not
decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the Comelec might
en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much the
banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the
Supreme Court on certiorari." Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec
will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS judicial remedies at their disposal.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution
(G.R. NO. 102925 MARCH 5, 1992) may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec
FELICIANO, J.: for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for
FACTS: political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some
This is a consolidation of three cases filed before the limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or
Supreme Court which involves the same issue. Petitioners in these cases regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable
consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be
individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must
provincial office) in the May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of Petition denied for lack of merit.
the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that
Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners
maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
content, namely, media- based election or political propaganda during the C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS
media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.. VS. COMELEC
information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, (G.R. NO. 132922. APRIL 21, 1998)
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political MENDOZA, J.:
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the FACTS:
newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and
information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers,
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates
radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 runs a franchise granted by Congress. The Supreme Court explained that
TELEBAP has no legal standing to file the case. A citizen will be allowed to
contradictory to Articles III [4] and IX (C) (4) of the Constitution.
raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has
HELD: personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by favorable action. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have
huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation suffered harm as a result of the operation of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. The High
of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" Court, however, recognized the legal standing of Petitioner GMA to bring
except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, the constitutional challenge. GMA claims that it suffered losses running to
Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the
procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it
province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so. Petitioner’s
Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is required to provide
space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92 of
among all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code).
and television station involved. As pointed out in Osmeña v. COMELEC, §11(b) of R.A. No.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of 6646 and §90 and §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a regulatory
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in an election
freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns. These statutory
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provisions state in relevant parts:
provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code)
election period." SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure
It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is province or city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said
circumscribed by certain important limitations: [1] Section 11 (b) is limited newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or
in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in “Comelec Space” wherein candidates can announce their
its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge, equally
dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within
authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45, 1978
12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period; [2] EC).
Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio
(b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including and television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall
purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and
stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
qualifications, political parties and programs of government; [3] Section 11 television time, free of charge, during the period of the
(b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is

Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating because of the unique and pervasive influence of the broadcast media,
print space and air time to the candidates and requires the COMELEC “[n]ecessarily . . . the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
instead to procure print space and air time for allocation to the candidates. somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and
It will be noted that while §90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to print media.”
procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid for, §92 states To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public
that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of charge. broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of
public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights,
process clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right
payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm
revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people’s right to
advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a
authorize a taking which is not “a de minimis temporary limitation or social function and is subject to the state’s duty to intervene for the
restraint upon the use of private property.” According to petitioners, in common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in
1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with
of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour the holding of elections is for that common good.
on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and,
further, it stands to lose in the 1998 Elections, P58,980,850.00 in view of
COMELEC’s requirement that radio and television stations provide at least ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BLO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code is valid. (G.R. NO. 103956 MARCH 31, 1992)
HELD: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Yes, Section 92 of BP 881 is valid. FACTS:
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution,
as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other
frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other election laws. Section 15 of the said Resolution provides for lawful election
things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional propaganda while Section 21(f) thereof provides for what is unlawful. It
provision that “any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to states:
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit
so requires.” Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or
amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party,
thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or
Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for “the common one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such
good.” posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through The statutory provisions sought to be enforced by
which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given COMELEC are Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code on lawful
the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere election propaganda and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 on
privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with prohibited forms of election propaganda.
the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. Thus, in Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the 1992
De Villata v. Stanley, a regulation requiring interisland vessels licensed to elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
engage in the interisland trade to carry mail and, for this purpose, to give posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other
advance notice to postal authorities of date and hour of sailings of vessels moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section
and of changes of sailing hours to enable them to tender mail for 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No.
transportation at the last practicable hour prior to the vessel’s departure, 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio,
was held to be a reasonable condition for the state grant of license. television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the
Although the question of compensation for the carriage of mail was not in field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
issue, the Court strongly implied that such service could be without prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving
compensation, as in fact under Spanish sovereignty the mail was carried vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
free. senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not
and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the state spends received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."
would be strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render public
service by giving free air time. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may
Petitioners claim that §92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although §5 areas that it fixes.
of R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and
operate the stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use HELD:
and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated. The basic No. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and
flaw in petitioner’s argument is that it assumes that the provision for stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated
COMELEC Time constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
GMA Network, Inc. This is not so. Under §92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the grounds.
COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television The constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a
stations but only the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their
of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and the right to candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1
reply as mandated by the Constitution. Indeed, it is wrong to claim an in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by
amendment of petitioner’s franchise for the reason that B.P. Blg. 881, posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared
which is said to have amended R.A. No. 7252, actually antedated it. The to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of
provision of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed instead to be expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
incorporated in R.A. No. 7252. And, indeed, §4 of the latter statute does. marginal significance. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles
franchise to render “adequate public service time” implements §92 of B.P. needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of
Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the government to the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the
communicate with the people on matters of public interest. financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and,
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and
and television stations to provide free air time. They contend that without the means to spread out the same number of decals and stickers
newspapers and magazines are not similarly required as, in fact, in is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC we upheld their right to the and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can even prepare his
payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide under own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down
§90. In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly this right and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
be imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
already noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
print media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to justified by the Constitution:
provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what . . . The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
the industry gets. From another point of view, this Court has also held that setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether

proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in
of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on GUEVARA VS. GIMENEZ
its authority, either substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency (G.R. NO. L-17115, NOVEMBER 30, 1962)
in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In
its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the CONCEPCION, J.:
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the FACTS:
fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity Miguel Cuaderno, the then Governor of the Central Bank of
of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a the Philippines, acting for and in behalf thereof, asked petitioner to
logical. corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. cooperate with the legal counsel of the Central Bank in defending the
It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. same and its Monetary Board in a civil case. Accordingly petitioner entered
Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law. (Mutuc v. his appearance as counsel for the respondents in said case and argued
Commission on Elections, supra) therein, verbally and in writing.
Petition is granted. The portion of Section 15 (a) of The Governor presented to the Board and the latter
Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that approved by unanimous vote, the designation of Judge Guillermo Guevara
"decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting as counsel to collaborate with the Legal Counsel of the Central Bank. The
areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL Board also authorized the Governor to arrange with Judge Guevera the
and VOID. amount of fee which the latter will charge the Central Bank for handling
the said cases. Prior thereto the latter had sent to the Central Bank his bill
for the retainer's fee of P10, 000. The Bank Auditor sought advice thereon
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS from the Auditor General, who stated that he would not object to the
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS retainer's fees, provided that its payment was made in installments.
SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS With the understanding that, "in case there is no appeal from
(G.R. NO. 90878 JANUARY 29, 1990) the CFI decision, the balance will be paid in full", once, presumably, the
decision has become final. As regards the P300 per diem, the Auditor
MEDIALDEA, J.: General express however, the belief that it is "excessive and may be
FACTS: allowed in audit". Hence, the present action for mandamus to compel
RA 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC respondent to approve payment of petitioner's retainer fee and his per
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted diem aggregating P3,300, for the 11 hearings attended by him.
into law, pursuant to which provinces included therein shall take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act. The COMELEC ISSUE: Whether or not the Auditor General has the authority to disapprove
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite the expenditures he deemed unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. is unreasonable?
Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, assailed the HELD:
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which The Auditor General has no mandate to disapprove
provides: expenditures which in his opinion excessive and extravagant.
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or Under our Constitution, the authority of the Auditor General,
announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the
and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI,
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a determination
Petitioner maintains that if media practitioners were to of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether
express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity
plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said
disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions
issue. thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment
COMELEC counters that the Resoultion is not violative of the therefore has been authorized by the officials of the corresponding
constitution and it is a valid implementation of its power to supervise and department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the
regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass in audit the
Constitution. It stated that it does not absolutely bar petitioner from voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or
expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the
Act. He may still express his views or campaign for or against the act aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon
through the Comelec space and airtime. is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do so more than
discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI,
ISSUE: The constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. section 2), "to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer
2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the expenditures of funds or Property which, in his opinion, are irregular,
freedom of expression and of the press during the conduct of a plebiscite. unnecessary, excessive or extravagant". This duty implies a negation of
the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its
HELD: disapproval, if he had authority therefore, would bring to the attention of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse
and void and unconstitutional. action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the
It is clear in the Constitution that what was granted to the imposition of said duty unnecessary.
Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment
of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information OROCIO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. (G.R. NO. 75959 AUGUST 31, 1992)
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section
11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec FACTS:
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by An accident occurred at the Malaya Thermal Plant of the
media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during National Power Corporation (NPC), when the plug from the leaking tube
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of gave way, thereby releasing steam and hot water which hit two of the
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor employees working on the tube leak.
the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. The NPC initially advanced this amount by setting it up as an
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory account receivable from OPLGS (employees’ agency) and deducted on a
basis. staggered basis from the latter's billings against NPC until the same was
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's fully satisfied. OPLGS requested for a refund of the total amount deducted
freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum from their billings representing payment of the advances made by the
where he may express his view. NPC. Petitioner, as officer-in-charge, recommended favorable action on
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The OPLGS' request.
people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make Thus, the amount for the hospitalization expenses was
a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion refunded to the contractor OPLGS. In Certificate of Settlement and
of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues Balances (CSB) No. 01-04-83 prepared by respondent Jose M. Agustin,
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on Unit Auditor of the COA assigned to the NPC-MRRC, the refund of the
the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec hospitalization expenses was disallowed for "[u]nder the NPC-O.P.
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but Landrito contract, there is no employer-employee relationship between the
they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public

Corporation and the latter's employees." Hence, the NPC is not
answerable for such expenses. HELD:
A Debit Memorandum was issued in petitioner's name Yes. The Compromise Agreement entered between the City
debiting his account with the NPC for the amount of the hospitalization of Cebu and Sps. De la Cerna was constitutional.
expenses. Petitioner claims that he prepared the questioned legal opinion The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable
in the performance of his official functions as mandated by law. At the time settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a
he rendered it, he was the officer-in-charge of the NPC's Office of the compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority and
General Counsel. Section 15-A of its charter provides that all legal matters capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which
shall be handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation. As such, he it is involved as a party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only
provides legal advice and/or renders legal opinions on legal matters recognized but even encouraged by law.
involving the NPC. Since this function is quasi-judicial in nature, the That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities
discretion exercised in the discharge thereof is not subject to re- contemplated by law can hardly be doubted. The compromise agreement
examination or controversion by the respondents; when the latter did what was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
was proscribed, they in effect usurped the statutory function of the General which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure,
Counsel of the NPC. There is no law which expressly authorizes the particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30, 000.00 to the de la
respondents to re-examine or controvert the General Counsel's opinion. Cerna family. Neither may it be disputed that since, as a municipal
Petitioner additionally stresses that he is not personally liable for the corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued, it has the
amount disallowed as he was merely performing his official functions. authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just
Besides, his questioned opinion is not alleged to have been rendered with and valid claims against it.
malice and bad faith.
ISSUES: ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

(1) Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied upon for the D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
disbursement in question, preclude or bar the COA from disallowing in SAMBELI V. PROVINCE OF ISABELA
post-audit such disbursement? G.R. NO. 92279 JUNE 18, 1992
(2) Has the General Counsel of the COA the authority to decide a motion
to reconsider the disallowance in question? FACTS:
(3) Is the petitioner personally liable for the disallowance on the theory that An agreement was entered into by and between the Province of
the disbursement was made on the basis thereof? Isabela and ECS Enterprises for the purchase of 300 units of
wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set of radio communication
HELD: equipment. Out of the items delivered, a partial delivery was made. The
1. Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions conferred upon the COA a more Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% “pending receipt of
active role and invested it with broader and more extensive powers. These reply to the query to Price Evaluation Division of COA.”
were not meant to make it a toothless tiger, but a dynamic, effective, A second delivery was made and payment of 50% was allowed by
efficient and independent watchdog of the Government. the Provincial Auditor. Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation
In determining whether an expenditure of a Government agency or Division of COA, there has been an overpricing. The President/GM of ECS
instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive, Enterprises made no comment on the overpricing but instead proposed a
extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the 10% deduction on the unpaid balance. The Provincial Auditor forwarded
opinion of the legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may the matter to the COA Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand
have been the basis for the questioned disbursement; otherwise, it would of the Provincial Auditor.
indeed become a toothless tiger and its auditing function would be a ECS Enterprises appealed to COA, which denied the appeal.
meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon lights then should be nothing Hence the present petition.
more than the pertinent laws and its rules and regulations.
2. No. The General Counsel of the COA does not have the authority to ISSUE: Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
decide a motion to reconsider the disallowance in question The COA, both decision of the Provincial Auditor and the Regional Director?
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, is a collegial body. It must resolve
cases presented to it as such. Its General Counsel cannot act for the HELD:
Commission for he is not even a Commissioner thereof. He can only offer No. In the exercise of its regulatory power vested upon it by the
legal advice or render an opinion in order to aid the COA in the resolution Constitution, COA adheres to the policy that government funds and
of a case or a legal question. property should be full protected and conserved and that irregular,
3. Even if we assume that the disallowance was proper, there would still unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds
be no basis for directly holding petitioner liable. owned by, or pertaining to, the Government or any of its subdivisions,
If he rendered the opinion in the just performance of his official duties and agencies and instrumentalities (Article IX (D-1) Section 2(1), 1987
within the scope of his assigned tasks, he would not be personally liable Constitution) . That authority extends to the accounts of all persons
for any injury that may result therefrom. respecting funds or properties received or held by them in any
Compromise Agreement between the City of Cebu and accountable capacity. (Section 26, P.D. No. 1445). In the exercise of its
Spouses de la Cerna which involves monetary consideration was upheld jurisdiction, it determines whether or not the fiscal responsibility that rests
constitutional. directly with the head and whether or not there has been loss or wastage
of government resources.
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the petition is dismissed.
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
OSMEÑA VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
(G.R. NO. 110045 NOVEMBER 29, 1994) D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
BUSTAMANTE VS. COMMISSIONER ON AUDIT
FACTS: (G.R. NO. 103309, NOVEMBER 27, 1992)
Reynaldo de la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna Spouses
was stabbed by an unknown assailant. He was rushed to the Cebu City CAMPOS, JR. J.:
Medical Center but later died due to severe loss of blood. His parents FACTS:
claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it not for the "ineptitude, Petitioner is the Regional Legal Counsel of the National
gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the Power Corporation (NPC) for the Northern Luzon Regional Center
medical staff" of the hospital. covering the provinces of Rizal up to Batanes. As such he was issued a
The Spouses thus filed suit for damages against the city of government vehicle. Pursuant to NPC policy as reflected in the Board
Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Resolution No. 81-95 authorizing the monthly disbursement of
Medical Center. transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the use of
The parties entered into a compromise agreement, which government vehicle, claimed his transportation allowance for the month of
included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30, 000.00 to the January 1989. Ppetitioner received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable
plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu. The agreement was submitted to the from respondent Regional Auditor Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City, which ratified the same. The P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
sanggunian authorized "the City Budget Officer, Cebu City, to include in Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Regional
Supplemental Budget No. IV of the City . . . for the year 1989 the amount Auditor denied. Petitioner appealed to COA, which denied the appeal.
of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30, 000.00) PESOS for financial assistance to Hence, this petition.
the parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna, all of Cebu City.
Respondent COA disallowed the "financial assistance" thus ISSUE: Did the COA grave abuse of discretion in its denial to give due
granted to the Spouses, averring that it is not within the powers of the course to the petitioner’s appeal? Did the COA, in the exercise of its
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu to provide, either under the general constitutional powers, usurp the statutory functions of the NPC Board of
welfare clause or even on humanitarian grounds, monetary assistance Directors?
that would promote the economic condition and private interests of certain
individuals only. HELD:
No. It is beyond dispute that the discretion exercised in the denial
ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between the City of of the appeal is within the power of the Commission on Audit as it is
Cebu and Spouses de la Cerna which involves monetary consideration provided in the Constitution:
constitutional?

Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the following powers and
functions: HELD:
(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in accordance with law and regulations, and No. The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held the 1987 Constitution with the "exclusive authority, subject to the
in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
corporations; keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the
period vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting and prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
auditing rules and regulations including those for the prevention of extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures or uses of and properties." The authority granted under this constitutional provision,
funds and property. . . . (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution) being broad and comprehensive enough, enables COA to adopt as its
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of
Commission, in the exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also expand
usurped the statutory functions of the NPC Board of Directors for its leads the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its audit
to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of Directors of a government- jurisdiction. It is in this light that we view COA Memorandum No. 88-565
owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to issued on August 1, 1988.
naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by the majority of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being
the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power and moot and academic.
duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular
expenditures or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
rendering inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the BAGATSING VS. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
government's, and ultimately, the people's property. (G.R. NO. 112399 JULY 14, 1995)
WHEREOF, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. QUIASON, J.:
FACTS:
Petron is a government acquired company aimed to provide
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS for a buffer against the vagaries of oil prices in the international market by
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT serving as a counterfoil against price manipulation that may go uncheck if
SALIGUMBA all oil companies were foreign-owned. It owns the largest, most modern
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT complex refinery in the Philippines and is also the country's biggest
(G.R. NO. L-61676, OCTOBER 18, 1982) combined retail and wholesale market of refined petroleum products.
Following President Corazon Aquino’s desire to raise revenue for the
ABAD SANTOS, J.: government and the ideal of leaving business to private sector, the
FACTS: privatization of Petron was initiated. This privatization was subsequently
On the basis of the sworn complaint of Editha Saligumba, approved by President Fidel V. Ramos as recommended by PNOC and
the COA instituted the administrative case against Leonardo Estella, the Committee on Privatization. 40 % was to be sold to a strategic partner,
Auditing Examiner III, in the Auditor's Office of Misamis Occidental. The 40% was to be retained by the government and the remaining 20% was to
charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several be offered to the public. The floor bid price was finally set at us$440 million
occasions. The bidding for the 40% block share was participated by
On April 12, 1982, the COA rendered a decision with the PETRONAS, ARAMCO and WESTMONT. WESTMONT’s proposal was
following judgment: rejected for not having met the pre-qualification criteria of financial
Wherefore, for insufficiency of evidence, the instant charge is capability and lack of technical and management expertise. The bid of
hereby dropped. Respondent is, however, warned to comport himself ARAMCO was for US$502 million while the bid of PETRONAS was for
henceforth in such a manner as would forestall the filing of similar US$421 million. ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder.
complaints in the future. Petitioner argues that there was a failed bidding as provided
Editha Saligumba now wants The Court to review the COA for in COA circular No. 89-296. It provides that there is a failure of public
decision. She insists that the decision of the COA is contrary to the auction when: 1) there is only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are
evidence. non-complying or unacceptable.
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court review COA decisions on administrative ISSUE: Whether or not the public bidding was tainted with haste and
matters? arbitrariness because there was a failed bidding for having only one
offeror?
HELD:
No. The petition has to be dismissed for the following HELD:
reasons: No. While two offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for
1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to submitting a bid below the floor price and WESTMONT for technical
administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. reasons, not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding
2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be disqualified.
administrative matters as mentioned above, We can not do so on factual Petitioners urge that in effect there was only one bidder and
issues; Our power to review is limited to legal issues. that it can not be said that there was a competition on "an equal footing.
But the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors,
without distinction as to whether they were disqualified.
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding
ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS procedure to be followed by government offices and corporations, had
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. The
PHILIPPINE AIRLINESVS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight
(G.R. NO. 91890 JUNE 9, 1995) than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to
administer.
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
At the time of the filing of the petition, majority of PAL’s ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT
shares of stock was owned by the GSIS. To assure itself of continuous, BORJA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel, PAL adopted a system of bidding (G.R. NO. 133495 SEPTEMBER 3, 1998)
out its fuel requirements under a multiple supplier set-up whereby PAL
awarded to the lowest bidder 60% of its fuel requirements and to the MENDOZA, J.
second lowest bidder the remaining 40%, provided it matched the price of FACTS:
the lowest bidder. Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-
COA wrote PAL a letter stating: mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. In
It has come to our attention that PAL international fuel supply 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
contracts are expiring this August 31, 1989. In this connection, you are incumbent. In 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a 3-year term. On
advised to desist from bidding the company's fuel supply contracts, May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term.
considering that existing regulations require government-owned or Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
controlled corporations and other agencies of government to procure their relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja Jr.,
petroleum product requirements from PETRON Corporation. also a mayoralty candidate, sought Capco's disqualification, arguing that
PAL sought reconsideration but was denied by COA. A final the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms
appeal for reconsideration was also denied in the now assailed COA by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another
Decision No. 1127. term after that.
The COMELEC ruled petitioner’s favor and declared Capco’s
ISSUE: Did respondent commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to disqualification. However, on motion of private respondent, the
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering PAL to desist from bidding the
company’s fuel supply contracts?

COMELEC reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A.
mayor. CASIÑO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS Representatives RAFAEL
ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G.
by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to ESCUDERO, Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R.
have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit? TAÑADA III, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M.
REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN,
HELD: ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE,
No. Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides, that the term of GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA of KMP,
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for CONSTANTINO, JR., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R.
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the PHILIPPINES, and BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI, in his capacity as
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has Director-General of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the Administrator of the NATIONAL
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), respondents.
before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by
considering the following cases or situations: FACTS:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it
mayor in the next election? is unconstitutional. EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor on 13 April 2005, reads:
by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND
expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID)
office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
the full term only if the term is one "for which he was elected." Since A is DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER
was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His PURPOSES
resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term. Under EO 420, the President directs all government
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID)
twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are
election? to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and
Yes, because he has served only two full terms provide convenience to the people served by government entities. Section
successively. 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address;
because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8)
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two
has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing
three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number. Section
considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his resignation 5 of EO 420 prescribes the safeguards on the collection, recording, and
before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. The
elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected following safeguards are instituted:
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for
terms. purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor specified in Section 3 of this executive order; aEAIDH
by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in
the purpose of applying Art. X, §8. Suppose he is twice elected after that violation of a person's right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this
term, is he qualified to run again in the next election? order;
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither identification system shall be instituted;
had he served the full term because he only continued the service, d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;
in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by
only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to advanced security features and cryptographic technology;
choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall
a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such
him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall
mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is prescribe.
just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of the first
term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit. ISSUES:
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord (1) Whether or not EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the President.
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political (2) Whether or not EO 420 infringes on the citizen's right to privacy.
power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice
is not unduly curtailed. HELD:
Further, resort to historical examination would show (1) No, EO 420 is not a usurpation of legislative power by the President.
adherence to the fundamental tenet of representative democracy wherein Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. — All government agencies and
the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO
served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their
operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this functions under existing laws. These government entities have already
principle. been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these
government entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor's Office, LTO,
PRC and similar government entities. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these
2006 CASES government entities to "adopt a unified multi- purpose ID system." Thus,
all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under
[G.R. NO. 167798. APRIL 19, 2006.] existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR their IDs.
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. Second, the President may by executive or administrative
USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, order direct the government entities under the Executive department to
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, petitioners, vs. THE adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all
AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also
MANAGEMENT, respondents. mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
[G.R. NO. 167930. APRIL 19, 2006.] President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their

functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID government one (1) transponder free of charge for the government's
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and exclusive use for non-commercial purpose, as well as the right of first
convenience to the public. The President's constitutional power of control refusal to another one (1) transponder in the Philippine satellite, if
is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. available. 4 The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked
Of course, the President's power of control is limited to the under the MOU to secure from the InternationalTelecommunication Union
Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the required orbital slot(s) and frequency assignment(s) for the Philippine
the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply satellite.
to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The
authorized to issue voter's ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots, designated as 161º East
single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 June
Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the 1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking
laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the
government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites, which
improve public services. PASI had designated as the Agila satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr.
The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format replied in a letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming "the Philippine
under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in Government's assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is [PASI] for its [Agila] satellites."
simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from
faithfully executed. the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the
launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the
(2) No, EO 420 does not infringe on the citizen’s right to privacy. Section 3 availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business
of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite
ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary
(3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) for Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the
Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI."
index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her
features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number. offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding to other parties
These limited and specific data are the usual data required sometime in December 1997, despite the prior assignment to PASI of the
for personal identification by government entities, and even by the private said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently
sector. Any one who applies for or renews a driver's license provides to awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown to PASI.
the LTO all these 14 specific data. Thus, a complaint was filed against Lichauco for damages. A
The data collected and stored for the unified ID system Motion to Dismiss was then filed by Lichauco. She rooted her prayer for
under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a
will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent; that the
card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored complaint stated no cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to
and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420. exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek recourse with the Office
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in of the President.
determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored In an order 13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC denied the
for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and motion to dismiss. Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for
record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, which subsequently
addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these nullified the RTC order.
specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Court's ID shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to ISSUE: Whether or not the suit against Lichauco, the undersecretary of
government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, DOTC, is a suit against the State.
and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy.
Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted: HELD:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the
only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as
those specified in Section 3 of this executive order; the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
violation of a person's right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
order; violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
identification system shall be instituted; tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data; property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the
advanced security features and cryptographic technology; State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by
prescribe. the State's immunity from suit, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical admission has to be
system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government deemed a concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or
entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, damaging acts against the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable
reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject for damages.
of executive issuance under the President's constitutional power of control The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the RTC is ordered
over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under to try the case on its merits.
the President's constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive [G.R. NO. 171396. MAY 3, 2006.]
Order No. 420 is declared VALID. PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD
LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER
R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
[G.R. NO. 142362. MAY 3, 2006.] CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, petitioners, vs. GLORIA
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and MICHAEL C. U. DE GUZMAN, MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-
complainants, vs. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO Undersecretary CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO
for Communications, Department of Transportation and CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
Communication (DOTC), respondent. GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF,
FACTS: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, respondents.
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly
organized corporation, whose President and Chief Executive Officer is co- [G.R. NO. 171409. MAY 3, 2006.]
petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a NIÑEZ CACHO -OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC.,
consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of respondents.
a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch
of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the [G.R. NO. 171485. MAY 3, 2006.]
satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium (subsequently FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO,
organized as PASI). The consortium was to grant the Philippine TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA,

SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon
ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the
VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed
MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE outside the building.
ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily
VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL ISSUE: Whether or not PP1017 and G.O. 5 are constitutional.
LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, petitioners,
vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. HELD:
CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional
DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, respondents. suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed
[G.R. NO. 171483. MAY 3, 2006.] earlier. However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to
ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
(NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a
ROQUE M. TAN, petitioners, vs. HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE business affected with public interest.
SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP the President — acting as Commander-in-Chief — addressed to
DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, respondents. subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly,
it also provides a valid standard — that the military and the police should
[G.R. NO. 171400. MAY 3, 2006.] take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." But the words "acts of
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, respondents. punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said
G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law
[G.R. NO. 171489. MAY 3, 2006.] has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. determine the limits of the AFP's authority in carrying out this portion of
RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, G.O. No. 5.
FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C.
BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND REASONS FOR THE RULING (IMPORTANT POINTS TO REMEMBER):
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), petitioners, vs. HON. 1) The President is granted an Ordinance Power under
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, 1987). She may issue any of the following:
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a
PNP CHIEF, respondents. general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive
[G.R. NO. 171424. MAY 3, 2006.] orders.
LOREN B. LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL- Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to
ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN- particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR- administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
respondents. executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of
FACTS: administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 in memorandum orders.
declaring a state of national emergency, thus: Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . embodied in memorandum circulars.
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the
prevent or suppress . . . rebellion. . . ," and in my capacity as their President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent President Arroyo's ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances.
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President
or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
hereby declare a State of National Emergency. Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Thereafter, the President issued G.O. No. 5 implementing This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
PP1017. It called upon the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative
PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
Immediately after the issuance of PP1017 and G.O. No. 5, of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo's exercise
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power of legislative power by issuing decrees.
I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows
governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With
which to the President's mind were organized for purposes of respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only
media, can already be implemented”. order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
Those who staged rallies and public assemblies were suppress lawless violence.
violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained 2) A distinction must be drawn between the President's
policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise
tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18,
massed participants. Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
On the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, operatives of the constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
CIDG and PNP raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding constitutional issues arise.
team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two- thirds of both Houses in joint Thereafter, Richard married the respondent, Candelaria
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to Guersey-Dalaygon, a Filipino citizen. They had two children Kimberly and
declare the existence of a state of war. Kevin. He died with a will. He left his entire estate to his second wife,
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, Candelaria, except his shares of stocks with A/G Interiors. The latter was
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such bequeathed to Kyle Guersey. His will was also probated in the U.S.A and
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper in the Philippines.
to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by The ancilliary administrator in the probate of the will of
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next Richard here in the Philippines filed a project of partition with the probate
adjournment thereof. court wherein 2/5 of Richard's 3/4 undivided interest in the Makati property
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's
refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard
to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over
the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 3/4 undivided interest in the
have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first Makati property should be given to respondent. The respondent’s
authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national opposition was sustained by the probate court.
emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could The respondent also filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the for the annulment of the judgment of the probate court with regards to the
absence of a Congressional enactment. probate of the will of Audrey here in the Philippines. Respondent
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Audrey's estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property
materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely 3/4 thereof, and since
sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the
matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, now pertain to respondent. The Court of Appeals sustained the respondent
previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read and ordered the annulment of the decisions of the probate court.
together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. ISSUE: Whether or not the passing of the land to respondent is valid
This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to despite the fact that records do not show when and how the Guerseys
delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate acquired the Makati property.
a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet HELD:
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to Yes, the passing of the land to respondent is valid. The Court
allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
certain conditions, thus: who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show
(1) There must be a war or other emergency. when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution,
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public domain, and other
Congress may prescribe. natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic
national policy declared by Congress. 124 v. Quasha, the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946,
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in
the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation,
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
"the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15,
may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title
thereof. to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born
he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not citizen.
claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly
President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it
from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive title of the transferee is rendered valid. In this case, since the Makati
Power shall be vested in a President . . . . ;" that "he shall take Care that property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then
the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in- whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the
3) Sincethereisnolawdefining"actsofterrorism,"itis constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to achieved.
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is
absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over [G.R. NO. 146459. JUNE 8, 2006.]
the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN,
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY TORRES,
name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling- out power of TOMASITO TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING
the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the COSIL, petitioners, vs. JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF APPEALS,
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion respondents.
of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the FACTS:
military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and On advice of his lawyer and because there were already
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of many parcels of land recorded in his name, Sioco Cariño caused the
their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered survey of the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman. The latter
illegal. executed a public instrument entitled Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights
and Interests in Agricultural Land with Sioco Cariño. It stated that he is an
applicant for a patent over a parcel of land. That Mr. Sioco Cariño has
[G.R. NO. 139868. JUNE 8, 2006.] advanced all expenses for said survey for me and in my name, and also
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY- all other expenses for the improvement of said land, to date; that for and in
DALAYGON, respondent. consideration of said advance expenses, to me made and delivered by
said Mr. Sioco Cariño, I hereby pledge and promise to convey, deliver and
FACTS: transfer unto said Sioco Cariño, of legal age, married to Guilata Acop, and
Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title,
American citizens. They resided in the Philippines for thirty years. They rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be
adopted Kyle Guersey. When Audrey died she left a will. Her estate delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form, according to law, to
consisted of a real estate property in Makati City, a bank account and him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and
shares of stocks in A/G Interiors. She left her entire estate to Richard. Her
will was admitted to probate in Maryland, U.S.A and in the Philippines.
171
assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to me by proper
authorities.
Thereafter, Sico Cariño sold the said land to his son Guzman
Cariño through an Absolute Deed of Sale. Thereafter, Guzman performed
all acts of ownership over the land. He filed an opposition to the petition of
the heirs of Ting- el Dicman establishing ownership over the questioned
land. It was found by the court that Lot 76-A belongs to the Dicmans. But
there are still adverse claims over Lot 76-B. Thus, hearings should still be
held.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition
was pending in the trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the operation of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as 'Igorot
Claims' situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act."
The Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims" enumerated
therein shall be "subject to the condition that except in favor of the
government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired by
virtue of this proclamation shall not be encumbered or alienated within a
period of fifteen years from and after the date of issuance of patent." One
such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman,"
Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme
Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos which held that Courts of First
Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on
the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978,
the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No.
1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of
title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was
invalidated. The trial court stated that the remedy for those who were
issued titles was to file a petition for revalidation under Presidential Decree
No. 1271, as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and 2034.
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left
undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death on
August 19, 1982.
On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of
Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing case by filing a complaint for
recovery of possession with damages involving the subject property with
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R. The RTC rendered a decision
in favor of the private respondent. The RTC’s decision was appealed to
the CA. The latter affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dicmans as indigenous people are entitled to

the land in controversy.
HELD:
No, the Dicmans as indigenous people are entitled to the
land in controversy. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by
then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of
"segregating" and "reserving" certain Igorot claims identified therein,
including one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of Dicman," and
prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of
15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had
been issued, all rights over the property in question had already been
vested in private respondent. The executive issuance can only go so far
as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested
rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered or deprived by
executive fiat alone without contravening the due process guarantees of
the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to
be redistributed for public use without just compensation.
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of
indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and
institutions are vital concerns of the State and constitute important public
policies which bear upon this case. To give life and meaning unto these
policies the legislature saw it fit to enact Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating
measure to affirm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and
ethnic minorities on matters that affect their life and culture. The provisions
of that law unify an otherwise fragmented account of constitutional,
jurisprudential and statutory doctrine which enjoins the organs of
government to be vigilant for the protection of indigenous cultural
communities as a marginalized sector, to protect their ancestral domain
and ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
being, and to guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their
ignorance or ductility. As the final arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark
of the Rule of Law this Court has always been mindful of the highest
edicts of social justice especially where doubts arise in the interpretation
and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the loftiest ends
ordained by the Constitution this Court finds that the law is clear and
leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of right
and justice as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation of
the rights of all persons concerned.


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Alliance for Alternative Action

THE ADONIS CASES 2011

PHILIPPINES (1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES HELD:

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2. YES, the municipal corporation retains its administrative

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2. YES, 93d of the Articles of War was constitutional. It does HELD:

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

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THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

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THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct?

He filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict with FACTS:

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HELD: ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?

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ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

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As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the

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This question is first addressed to the government agency HELD:

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EPZA vs. Dulay

Issue: Whether the contested item of Republic Act No. 920

Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested

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c. The, equal protection clause. —

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San Beda College of Law the parties affected;

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