52.

*Adherance to jurisdiction/ Jurisdiction cannot be ousted* During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a Preliminary
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) v. EIJI* YANAGISAWA Injunction.
G.R. No. 175303 | April 11, 2012 | DEL CASTILLO, J.
At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook
…This is a Petition for Review filed by PAFIN of the August 1, 2006 Decision of not to dispose of the properties registered in her name during the pendency of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944 which annulled and set the case, thus rendering Eijis application and motion moot.
aside the decision dated April 20, 2003 of the RTC Branch 258, and entered
the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage executed on Aug. 25, 1998 in In its its October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or
favor of PAFIN. encumber the properties registered in her name was annotated on the TCT of the
Paranque Townhose Unit.
Doctrine: when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate Sometime in after, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 PAFIN. To secure the
authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a real estate mortgage (REM) in favor
co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is of PAFIN over the Paranaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791. Which
applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The was duly annotated on the TCT by the Registry of Deeds on the same date.
principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and
while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and At the time of the mortgage, Eijis appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending
courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyns marriage, and
prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the
process. Paraaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided between the
parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996
Facts Order.
Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese married Evelyn F. Castaeda (Evelyn), Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on the TCT. Deeming the mortgage as
a Filipina, on July 12, 1989l a violation of the Makati RTCs October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a complaint
for the annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and
On August 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located at PAFIN. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0431, was raffled to Branch
Bo. Sto. Nio, Paranaque, Metro Manila (Paranaque townhouse unit). The Registry 258 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City (Paranaque RTC).
of Deeds for Paraaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to
Evelyn P. Castaeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,] Both PAFIN and Evelyn denied being aware of the impediment on the mortgage.
both of legal age.
Paranaque Regional Trial Court Decision
In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). The complaint, The RTC dismissed Eijis complaint. The RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-776, was raffled to Branch 149 of the Regional national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. Without ownership, or any
Trial Court of Makati (Makati RTC). other law or contract binding the defendants to him, Eiji has no cause of action that
may be asserted against them.
Eiji appealed the trial courts decision arguing that the trial court erred in holding that
his inability to own real estate property in the Philippines deprives him of all interest Issue:
in the mortgaged property, which was bought with his money. He added that the
Makati RTC has even recognized his contribution in the purchase of the property by Whether the Paranaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same
its declaration that he is entitled to half of the proceeds that would be obtained from issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.
its sale. Ruling:

Eiji also brought up the undertaking of Evelyn to not dispose of, alienate, or No. The Paranaque RTC cannot rule on the issue of ownership. Contrary to
encumber [dae] the properties registered in her name while the case was pending. petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Eiji and
This commitment incapacitates Evelyn from entering into the REM contract. Evelyn owns the Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC
had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been
Court of Appeals Decision interfered with by the Paranaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was
improper for the Paranaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
The CA found merit in Eijis appeal.
The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties
The CA noted that the Makati RTC ruled on Eijis and Evelyns ownership rights over acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the
the properties that were acquired during their marriage, including the Paranaque resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine
townhouse unit. It was determined therein that the registered properties should be of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the
sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof to be divided between Eiji and Makati RTC over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the
Evelyn. subsequent assumption by the Paranaque RTC.

The appellate court determined that the Paranaque RTCs Decision was It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also,
improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of equal axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate jurisdiction over each courts."
other. For this reason, the CA annulled and set aside the Paranaque RTCs decision
to dismiss Eijis complaint. In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent
jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its
The CA noted that Eiji anchored his complaint upon Evelyns violation of her authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is
commitment to the Makati RTC. This commitment created a right in favor of Eiji to finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority
rely thereon and a correlative obligation on Evelyns part not to encumber the is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases,
Paraaque townhouse unit. Since Evelyns commitment was annotated on TCT No. to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to
99791, all those who deal with the said property are notified of the burdens on the the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance
property and its registered owner. That being said, Evelyn would have been might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not
aware of her impediment, while PAFIN showed wanton disregard of rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly,
ordinary prudence expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.
Thus, the CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or
The Evelyn and Pafin filed separately motions for reconsideration on August 22, encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
2006, which were both denied for lack of merit by the appellate court in its encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a
November 7, 2006 Resolution.
standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who
are not in good faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The August 1, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78944 is AFFIRMED.
53. *Adherance to jurisdiction/ Jurisdiction cannot be ousted* PDIC. Consequently, on February 4, 2002, the lawyers of PDIC took over
the case of RBCI.
LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE BALLESTEROS v. RURAL BANK
OF CANAMAN INC., THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE On May 9, 2003, RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the
CORPORATION ground that the RTC-Iriga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
G.R. No. 176260 | November 24, 2010 | MENDOZA, J.: the action. RBCI stated that pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No.
7653 (RA No. 7653), otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act, the
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised RTC-Makati, already constituted itself, per its Order dated August 10,
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the August 15, 2006 Decision of the 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 82711, modifying the decision of the liquidation of RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case No. IR-3128
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC-Iriga), in Civil Case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation court. Lucia
No. IR-3128, by ordering the consolidation of the said civil case with opposed the motion.
Special Proceeding Case No. M-5290 (liquidation case) before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 (RTC-Makati). On July 29, 2003, the RTC-Iriga granted the Motion to Dismiss. To which
Lucia appealed the RTC ruling to the CA on the ground that the RTC-Iriga
Facts: erred in dismissing the case because it had jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
IR-3128 under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.
On 2000, Lucia filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary On2006 the CA rendered the questioned decision ordering the consolidation
Injunction against her children, Roy, Rito, Amy, Arabel, Rico, Abe, Ponce of Civil Case No. IR-3128 and the liquidation case pending before RTC-
Rex and Adden, and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Makati. For The consolidation is desirable in order to prevent confusion, to
Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga. avoid multiplicity of suits and to save unnecessary cost and
expense. Needless to add, this procedure is well in accord with the principle
Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left 2 parcels of land that the rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in order to promote
located in San Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur, each with an area of 357 their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
square meters; that on March 6, 1995, without her knowledge and consent, inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
her children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the
estate of her husband wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot Lucia filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
the two parcels to Rico; that, still, without her knowledge and consent, Rico
mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of RBCI which mortgage was Issue:
being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured by the lot; and that
Lucia was occupying Parcel B and had no other place to live. Whether the case of Lucia can be properly consolidated with the liquidation
proceeding of the Bank in the RTC- Makati without violating the doctrine
RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico on adherence of jurisdiction.
which represented her share in the estate of her husband.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial, RBCIs Ruling:
counsel filed a motion to withdraw after being informed that Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had YES. The Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction Such
already been closed and placed under the receivership of the is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this
matter, thus: One of the exceptions is that when the change in (citing Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482
jurisdiction is curative in character. For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is [1988]).[9]
curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the The cited Morfe case held that after the Monetary Board has declared that a
disputed claims against the Bank. bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes
the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including
depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in trust
Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot
upon report of the head of the supervising or examining obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment,
department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank: execution or otherwise.
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the
ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include Thus, to allow Lucias case to proceed independently of the
inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by liquidation case, a possibility of favorable judgment and execution
financial panic in the banking community; thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice the other
creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko liquidation court was constituted as well.
Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or
In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation is proper
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses considering that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over Lucias action. It
to its depositors or creditors; or would be more in keeping with law and equity if Lucias case is consolidated
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 with the liquidation case in order to expeditiously determine whether she is
that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount entitled to recover the property subject of mortgage from RBCI and, if so,
to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which how much she is entitled to receive from the remaining assets of the bank.
cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for
prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation as receiver of the banking institution. SO ORDERED.

In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the Supreme Court
says: The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the *in this case liquidation proceeding was explained*
liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent
multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish
due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the
proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness
(citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The lawmaking body
contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible, should pass
upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court
should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations
54. *Adherance to jurisdiction/ Jurisdiction cannot be ousted* Subsequently, Union Bank decided to break away from the consortium
and, without notifying its members, filed a slew of civil cases against
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANILO L. CONCEPCION EYCO, et al.
G.R. No. 160727 | June 26, 2007 | GARCIA, J.: Of relevance is the first, a complaint for a sum of money instituted
on September 23, 1997 before the RTC-Makati, against four (4)
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, members of the EYCO Group and spouses Eulogio and Bee Kuan
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) assails and seeks Yutingco, as sureties of the corporate obligations, with application for
the setting aside of the Decision [1]dated July 22, 2003 of the Court of preliminary attachment. The next day, the Makati RTC issued the
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75355, as effectively reiterated in its desired writ of preliminary attachment, pursuant to which levy on
Resolution[2] of November 7, 2003 denying the petitioners motion for attachment was annotated on the titles, i.e., TCT Nos. V-48192 and V-
reconsideration. 48193 of the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City, of two parcels of
land under the name of Nikon Plaza, Inc. and EYCO Properties,
FACTS: Inc., respectively. Also attached, per herein respondent Danilo L.
Concepcion (Concepcion, for brevity), without denial from the
On September 16, 1997, the EYCO Group of Companies (EYCO or petitioner, is a parcel of land covered by TCT No. V-49678 of the same
EYCO Group) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission registry allegedly held by the Yutingcos in trust for Nikon Industrial
(SEC) a PETITION for the declaration of suspension of payment, Corporation.[11]
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver/committee and approval of
rehabilitation plan with an alternative prayer for liquidation and On October 22, 1997, Union Bank moved, on jurisdictional ground, for
dissolution of corporations (Petition for Suspension of Payment, the dismissal of SEC Case No. 09-97-5764. On the same date, EYCO
hereinafter). In it, EYCO depicted the Groups composite corporations as submitted its rehabilitation plan.
having a combined asset that are more than enough to pay off all their
debts, but nonetheless unable to pay them as they fall due. Joining In January 1998, the SEC Hearing Panel appointed the regular members of
EYCO as co-petitioners were Eulogio Yutingco and two other the newly created ManCom for EYCO.
individuals holding controlling interests in the composite corporations Meanwhile, Union Bank, without awaiting for the SECs ruling on its
(collectively, the Yutingcos). motion to dismiss SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, filed with the CA a petition
SEC Hearing Panel, by an order of September 19, 1997, directed the for certiorari to nullify what it tagged as the precipitate September 19, 1997
suspension of all actions, claims and proceedings against EYCO, et al. SEC suspension order[12] and its creation of the ManCom. In the same
pending before any court, tribunal, board or office[6] (the Suspension petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45774, Union Bank alleged that the
Order). At the same time, the Panel set the petition for hearing. jurisdiction over the basic petition for declaration of suspension of
payment pertains to the RTC under Act No. 1956, as amended, or
Meanwhile, a consortium of private banks which had granted credit the Insolvency Law.
facilities to EYCO, among them, Union Bank, convened to map out their
collective collection options. The formation of a management committee On December 22, 1997, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45774, the CA rendered
(ManCom) to represent the creditor banks was agreed upon in that judgment declaring Union Bank guilty of forum shopping and
meeting. accordingly dismissed its petition for certiorari. This Court, in its
Decision] dated May 19, 1998 in G.R. No. 131729, in turn affirmed that of
the CA, but proceeded further to declare the SEC as possessed of
jurisdiction over EYCOs petition for suspension of payments filed
pursuant to Section 5(d) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, but
not insofar as the Yutingcos petition was concerned. With respect to the purpose. xxx (Words in brackets and emphasis
Yutingcos, the Court held that the SECs jurisdiction on matters of supplied.)
suspension of payments is confined only to those initiated by corporate
entities, as the aforecited section does not allow an individual to file, or join
in, the corresponding petition. In line with the rule on misjoinder of parties,
the Court directed the SEC to drop the individual petitioners from the
petition for suspension of payment. Another en banc order[15] of March 31, 2001 followed, with the SEC this
time appointing respondent Concepcion to act, vice the dissolved
Conformably with this Courts Decision aforementioned, the Makati Liquidation Committee, as EYCO Liquidator. Among Concepcions first
RTC issued, in Civil Case No. 97-2184, an Order[14] dated August 17, act as such liquidator was to file, on March 8, 2002, in Civil Case No.
1998 thereunder indefinitely suspending the proceedings in that 97-2184, a Motion to Intervene and To Admit Motion to Set Aside Order
collection suit until further orders. of Attachment[16] (Motion to Intervene, for brevity). Three days
In a related development, the SEC Hearing Panel, over the objection of later, Concepcion submitted before the SEC a Liquidation Plan[17] for the
the consortium of EYCOs creditor banks, approved, on December 18, EYCO Group.
1998, the rehabilitation plan prepared by the Strategies and Alliance
Corporation for EYCO. The consortium lost no time in appealing to the
SEC en banc the Hearing Panels After due proceedings, the SEC approved, on April 11, 2002, the
approval order and prayed for the liquidation and dissolution of EYCO, Concepcion-submitted Liquidation Plan.[18] Concepcions motion to
the appellate recourse docketed as SEC AC No. 649. intervene, however, met a different fate. For, by Order[19] of August 8,
2002, the Makati RTC denied Concepcions motion to intervene in Civil
Case No. 97-2184 on the ground of lack of standing to intervene, his
On September 14, 1999, the SEC en banc issued in SEC AC No. 649 an appointment as Liquidator being, according to the court, of doubtful
order finding for the consortium, disposing as follows: validity. The order, in addition, granted Union Banks earlier motion to
declare EYCO in default, and set a date for the ex-parte reception of
Union Banks evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is, as it is hereby granted
and the Order dated 18 December 1998 is set aside.
The Petition to be Declared in State of Suspension of Concepcion then moved for reconsideration questioning the basis of the
Payment is hereby disapproved and the SAC Plan denial of his motion to intervene. Questioned, too, was the default aspect
terminated. Consequently, all committees, of the order, Concepcionarguing in this regard that the collection
conservator/receivers created pursuant to said Order proceedings were suspended until further Orders from this Court [20] and
are dissolved. xxx the RTC of Makati has yet to issue the suspension-lifting order. The
Makati RTC denied the motion on December 16, 2002.

The Commission, likewise, orders the liquidation and

dissolution of the [EYCO Group]. The case is hereby Earlier, however, Union Bank presented evidence ex parte, on the basis
remanded to the hearing panel below for that of which the Makati RTC rendered, on December 27, 2002, partial
judgment[21] ordering EYCO to pay the bank P400 million plus interests and
attorneys fees.
 3. In giving due course to respondent Concepcions petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Via a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Procedure despite its being the improper remedy.
CA, Concepcion challenged the RTCs partial judgment aforementioned and
its earlier order denying the motion to intervene. His recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 75355.
The appellate court eventually issued the herein assailed
Decision[22] reversing the Makati RTCs impugned issuances and We DENY.
allowing Concepcion to intervene, thus:

As the Court distinctly notes, the petitioner does not assail the CAs judgment
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the insofar as it nullified the RTCs partial judgment or its default order. As thus
petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders and partial couched, the petition particularly sets its sight on that part of the appellate
judgment are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. courts ruling allowing respondent Concepcion to intervene in Civil Case No.
Public respondent [RTC Judge Oscar Pimentel, Branch 97-2184. Of the three errors assigned, the more critical relates to the
148, Makati City] is ordered to allow petitioner challenged validity of the respondents appointment by the SEC as liquidator
[Concepcion] to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184. of the EYCO Group, his right to intervene predicated as it is on his being
such liquidator.

SO ORDERED.
It is the petitioners posture, following the Makati RTCs line, that the
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, [23] Union Bank has respondents appointment as liquidator of EYCO was invalid for lack of
interposed this petition ascribing to the CA the following errors: jurisdiction on the part of SEC to preside, in first place, over EYCOs
liquidation and dissolution. Pressing on, the petitioner states that EYCO is
already insolvent and insolvency proceedings fall under the jurisdiction of
1. In ruling in favor of respondent Concepcions right to regular courts under the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended) in
intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184 pending in the lower relation to the pertinent provision of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise
court despite his lack of legal interest in the matter in known as the Securities Regulation Code.
litigation. We are not persuaded.

2. In ruling in favor of respondent Concepcions right to As it were, the underlying petition[24] EYCO filed with and
intervene in said Civil Case No. 97-2184 despite his lack over which the SEC assumed jurisdiction was one for declaration of
of legal personality, his appointment by the SEC as suspension of payment, appointment of a rehabilitation
liquidator of EYCO being null and void for lack of receiver/committee, approval of rehabilitation plan with alternative
jurisdiction; and prayer for liquidation and dissolution. That the SEC, along the way,
ordained EYCOs liquidation and dissolution did not, without more, strip
the SEC of jurisdiction over the liquidation process. Albeit jurisdiction
over a petition to declare a corporation in a state of insolvency strictly We are of course aware of the argument [of] petitioner
lies with regular courts, the SEC possessed, during the period material, [Union Bank] that the petition of [EYCO] should be
ample power under P.D. No. 902-A,[25] as amended, to declare a entirely dismissed and taken out of the SECs jurisdiction
corporation insolvent as an incident of and in continuation of its already on account of the alleged insolvency of [the latter]. In
acquired jurisdiction over the petition to be declared in the state of this regard, petitioner theorizes that [EYCO has] already
suspension of payments in the two instances provided in Section 5(d) become insolvent when [the composite corporations]
thereof.[26] Said Section 5(d)[27] vests the SEC with exclusive and original allegedly disposed of a substantial portion of their
jurisdiction over petitions for suspension of payments which may either properties hence suspension of payments with the SEC is
be: (a) a simple petition for suspension of payments based on the not the proper remedy.
provisions of the Insolvency Law, i.e., the petitioning corporation has
sufficient assets to cover all its debts, but foresees the impossibility of
meeting the obligations as they fall due, or (b) a similar petition filed by Such argument does not persuade us. Petitioners
an insolvent corporation accompanied by a prayer for the creation of a allegations of [EYCOs] supposed insolvency are
management committee and/or rehabilitation receiver based on the hardly of any consequence to the assumption of
provisions of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended by P.D. No. 1758.[28] jurisdiction by the SEC over the nature or subject
In the case at bench, EYCOs petition for suspension of payment was, at matter of the petition for suspension of payments. Aside
bottom, a mix of both situations adverted to above. For, while EYCO, in the from the fact that these allegations are evidentiary in
said petition, alleged being solvent but illiquid, it nonetheless pleaded for the nature , we have likewise consistently ruled that what
constitution of a rehabilitation receiver/committee, with an alternative prayer determines the nature of an action, as well as which court
for liquidation, if warranted. Clearly then, the SEC has, from the start, or body has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the
jurisdiction over EYCOs petition for suspension of payment, such complaint, or a petition as in this case, and the character
jurisdiction, following Ching,[29] continuing for purposes of liquidation after of the relief sought. That the merits of the case after
it (SEC) declared EYCO insolvent. The SEC appeared to be aware of the due proceedings are later found to veer away from the
continuity angle as it even ordered the remand to the SEC Hearing Panel of claims asserted by EYCO in its petition, as when it is
SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 for purposes of liquidating and dissolving the shown later that it is actually insolvent and may not
EYCO Group. be entitled to suspension of payments, does not divest
the SEC at all of its jurisdiction already acquired as
its inception . (Words in brackets and emphasis added.)
If the SEC contextually retained jurisdiction over the liquidation of EYCO,
is it not but logical then that it has competence to appoint the respondent or
any qualified individual for that matter as liquidator?
And lest it be overlooked, the Court had, in G.R. No. 131729, already The Court is certainly aware of the transfer, effected by R.A. No. 8799, to
rejected the petitioners thesis about the SECs purported lack of jurisdiction the RTC of the SECs jurisdiction defined under Section 5(d) of P.D. No. 902-
over EYCOs suspension of payment case owing to its supervening A.[30] Such transfer, however, did not, as the petitioner and the RTC posit,
insolvency. Therein, the Court stated: divest the SEC of its jurisdiction over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, given that
it had already issued, as early as September 19, 1998, the suspension order
after it found the petition for suspension filed on September 16, 1998 to be
sufficient in form and substance. Subsection 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799
prescribing the jurisdiction transfer and the rules on transition provides as suspension of payment,[33] to order the dissolution/liquidation of a
follows: corporation and accordingly appoint a liquidator. In fine, the continuing
exercise of jurisdiction by the SEC over the liquidation and dissolution
of the EYCO Group is warranted. Once jurisdiction attaches, the court
5.2. The [Securities and Exchange] Commissions cannot be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new
jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another
5 of [P.D.] No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the body. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no sway in
appropriate [RTC]: Provided that the Supreme Court the present case, arise when the statute expressly so provides or when
may designate the [RTC] branches that shall exercise the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its
jurisdiction over these cases. xxx The Commission enactment.[34]
shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension
of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30
June 2000 until finally disposed. (Words in bracket Given the above perspective, the Court is at a loss to understand
and emphasis added.) petitioners challenge against the right of the respondent to intervene in
Civil Case No. 97-2184, on the postulate that the latter lacks legal
interest in the matter in litigation.

EYCOs petition for suspension for payment was, for all intents and Intervention is a procedure by which a third person, not originally party
purposes, still pending with the SEC as of June 30, 2000. Accordingly, to the suit, but claiming an interest in the subject matter, comes into the
the SECs jurisdiction thereon, by the express terms of R.A. No. 8999, case, in order to protect his right or interpose his claim. [35] Its main
still subsists until [the suspension of payment case and its incidents purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting
are] finally disposed. In the words of the CA: claims of or the whole controversy among the persons involved. [36] To
warrant intervention under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
[37]
two requisites must concur: (a) the movant has a legal interest in the
As held by this Court Section 5.2 of RA 8799 matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must not unduly delay
specifically provided that the SEC shall retain or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the
jurisdiction over pending suspension of claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of June 30, separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must
2000until finally disposed. The records are clear that involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
the suspension of payment was filed on September 7, character[38]that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
1998. As such, the petition is still pending with the operation and effect of the judgment.[39]
SEC as of the cut-off date set in the rules. xxx[31]
Just like the CA, the Court has no doubt about the respondent, as the
duly-appointed liquidator of EYCOs remaining assets, having a legal
interest in the matter litigated in Civil Case No. 97-2184. This is
When the law speaks of until finally disposed, the reference should particularly true with respect to the parcels of land covered by the writ
include the final disposition of the liquidation and dissolution processes of attachment which, in the implementation of the SEC-approved
since it is within the power of the SEC by law, [32] or as incident of or in Liquidation Plan for EYCO, had been conveyed to the respondent [40] in
continuation of its already acquired jurisdiction over the petition for trust for the benefit of creditors, EYCOs stockholders and other persons
in interest. At the very least, the respondent, as liquidator-trustee, is so Court, an order denying intervention being final in character, not merely
situated as to be affected by the distribution or disposition of the interlocutory. Petitioner thus faults the CA for allowing respondent
attached properties which were under threat of being levied on execution Concepcions petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules as a
and sold at public auction. Respondent would be unfaithful to his trust if vehicle to impugn the denial of his motion for intervention. It stresses
he does take a bona fide effort to intervene in Civil Case No. 97-2184 to that the availability of appeal proscribes recourse to the special civil
thwart the attempt of the petitioner to collect unpaid loans ahead of other action of certiorari.
legitimate creditors similarly situated. Under the SEC Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Recovery pursuant to which the SEC appointed We are not convinced.
the respondent to liquidate the remaining assets of EYCO, the liquidator
is empowered and duty bound to [R]epresent the debtor in any case
filed by or against the debtor in any tribunal and [B]ring any action on Petitioners statement of the rule on the availability of the extraordinary
behalf of the debtor to collect, recover or preserve any of its assets, or to writ of certiorari under the premises is impeccable. So too is its citation
resist or defend against any claim.[41] of supporting jurisprudence. Petitioner conveniently forgot, however, to
include in its formulation settled exceptions to and qualifications of the
rule, even as it glossed over another holding that intervention is merely
Any suggestion that allowing intervention would unduly accessory to the principal action and, as such, is an interlocutory
delay the final closure of the collection case cannot be accepted. Far proceeding dependent on the case between the original parties.[42]
from unnecessarily prolonging or complicating the case, the desired It is true that certiorari may not be resorted to when appeal is available
intervention, if allowed, would possibly enable the court in one single as a remedy. However, it is also true that the Court has allowed the
action and judgment to protect the collective interests of the creditors of issuance of a writ of certiorari when appeal does not afford a speedy and
the EYCO Group that are seriously threatened by the imminent adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As in the past, the Court
exclusion of certain properties from the pool of assets that should has ruled that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose recourse to
legally, if not ideally, be equitably distributed among them. Disallowing the ordinary remedies or certiorari or prohibition where appeal is not
intervention would pave the way for the petitioner to seize the adequate, equally beneficial, expeditious and sufficient. [43] Stated a bit
proceedings before the Makati RTC to work entirely in its favor. Such differently, certiorarimay be availed of where an appeal would be slow,
course of action trifles with the entire liquidation process. And any inadequate and insufficient. The determination as to what exactly
decision rendered therein would unlikely be left undisturbed by other constitutes plain, speedy and adequate remedy rests on judicial
legitimate but unpaid creditors whose interest in the attached properties discretion and depends on the particular circumstances of each case.
can hardly be disputed.

In the case at bar, the CA did not commit any reversible error in
Moreover, the claim of the respondent over the attached properties could allowing the petition for certiorari filed by the respondent. As it were,
not possibly be better threshed out in a separate but subsequent the respondent was able to convince the CA of the urgency of his cause
proceedings given that he had already secured titles over them. and that an appeal from the denial of the motion for intervention would
not constitute speedy and adequate remedy, thus necessitating the resort
to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. And in an instance justifying
The third and last issue turns on the propriety of certiorari as a the invocation of the remedy of certiorari, it would appear too that the
recourse to the denial of a motion for intervention. The correct remedy, CA found the RTC to have exercised its judicial authority in an
according to the petitioner, is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of oppressive manner,[44] so much so that the CA stated the apt observation
that: In the first place, it [RTC] should not have taken cognizance of the
case when it was notified of the pending petition [for suspension of
payments] before the SEC at the time the complaint was filed.[45]
Certainly not lost on the Court is an obvious reality: the Makati RTC
virtually interfered with and invalidated the appointment made by the
SEC when it has no jurisdiction over the latter.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the impugned
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 22,
2003 and November 7, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
55. *Adherance to jurisdiction/ Jurisdiction cannot be ousted* The DENR Regional Office decreed that portions of the subject mining
claims be awarded to Mingson, considering that said claims have
APO CEMENT CORPORATION vs. MINGSON MINING encroached its Yellow Eagle I to VII claims.
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
PERLAS-BERNABE,J. | G.R. No. 206728 | November 12, 2014 However, upon Apocemco’s motion for reconsideration, the DENR
Regional Office’s Legal Division issued a Resolution, recommending that
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated the subject mining claims be awarded, instead, to Apocemco, subject,
June 13, 2012 and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Court of however, to the outcome of Luvimin’s appeal. In a subsequent Order, the
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100456 which affirmed the Decision dated DENR Regional Director affirmed the foregoing resolution, but subject to
July 31, 2007 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources the review and concurrence of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7
(DENR) Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) in MAB Case No. 02-96 (POA - Panel of Arbitrators (POA), considering that pursuant to Section 218 of
Case No. CEB-001 ). DENR Department Administrative Order No. (DAO) 95-23, Series of
1995, the POA has been mandated to resolve, among others, disputes
Facts: involving rights to mining areas.

The instant case arose from a dispute involving the mining claims known as In a Decision, the POA upheld the Resolution and the Order, reiterating the
"Allied 1 and 2" and "Lapulapu 31 and 32" (subject mining claims) between findings therein made, without, however, requiring the parties to file any
petitioner Apo Cement Corporation (Apocemco) and respondent Mingson pleading or setting the matter for hearing.
Mining Industries Corporation (Mingson).
Aggrieved, Mingson appealed the POA’s Decision before the DENR MAB,
For the supposed failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive averring that the said Decision was not supported by facts and the evidence
use the mineral properties found in the area, Apocemco submitted a Mineral on record, and that it was arbitrary and issued with grave abuse of authority.
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal on June 19, 1991 before Subsequently, in Mingson’s letter dated August 8, 1996, it claimed denial of
the DENR, essentially seeking to take over their current holder, Luvimin due process.
Cebu Mining Corporation (Luvimin).
In a Decision dated July 31, 2007, the DENR MAB granted Mingson’s
On August 18, 1992 and March 2, 1993, the DENR Regional Office appeal and thereby reversed and set aside the POA’s Decision. It found
declared the subject mining claims, among others, abandoned and open for that the POA merely conducted a review of the case and Mingson, in
location to other interested parties, prompting Luvimin to file an particular, was not given an opportunity to be heard, which is repugnant to
appeal. Similarly, Mingson assailed the aforementioned declarations on the due process.
ground that its own mining claims, i.e., "Yellow Eagle I to VII," overlapped
with the subject mining claims. Particularly, Mingson averred that its Apocema appealed to the CA.
"Yellow Eagle IV" claim was registered on February 7, 1983 and was found
to have overlapped with the "Allied 1 and 2" claims, while its "Yellow In a Decision dated June 13, 2012, the CA dismissed Apocemco’s appeal
Eagle III" claim was registered on April 12, 1982 and overlapped with and sustained the DENR MAB’s finding that Mingson was not afforded
the "Lapulapu 31 and 32" claims. by the POA its right to due process, given that none of the applicable
procedures found in DENR DAO 95-23 were followed. As an added ground
for dismissal, the CA held that Apocemco failed to perfect its appeal in
accordance with the Rules of Court, considering that the DENR MAB was Besides, an apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any
not served a copy of its petition. time since due process is a jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether
administrative or judicial, are duty bound to observe.
Unconvinced, Apocemco filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013. Hence the petition. In Salva v. Valle,43 the Court pronounced that "[a]decision rendered without
due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at any time directly or
Issue: collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision
in any action or proceeding where it is invoked." The Court sees no
Whether the CA correctly ordered the dismissal of Apocemco’s appeal. defensible reason as to why this principle should not be herein applied.

Ruling: That being said, and considering too Apocemco’s failure to comply with
Sections 5 and 7, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in the proceedings before
the appellate court, the instant petition is hereby denied and the rulings of
Yes. It has been established thatthe POA proceeded to resolve the present the CA are affirmed.
mining dispute without affording either party any fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard in violation of the aforementioned provisions of
DENR DAO 95-23. Thus, as correctly ruled by the DENR MAB and later WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 13, 2012
affirmed by the CA, Mingson’s due process rights were violated, thereby and the Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
rendering the POA’s Decision null and void. SP No. 100456 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Sections 223 (on preliminary conference), 224 (on hearing), and 227 (on the
proceedings before the POA), as well as Sections 221 (on due course) and
222 (on answers) of DENR DAO95-23, or the Implementing Rules of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, clearly require that the parties involved in
mining disputes be given the opportunity to be heard. These rules – which
were already in effect during the time the dispute between the parties arose
– flesh out the core requirement of due process; thus, a stark and unjustified
contravention of the same would oust the errant tribunal of its jurisdiction
and, in effect, render its decision null and void. As explained in PO2
Montoya v. Police Director Varilla:

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional

rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
56. *effect of lack of jurisdiction* Tagbilaran City sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 608.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES PLACIDO and
CLARA DY ORILLA After trial on the merits, the SAC rendered a Decision Fixing the just
G.R. No. 194168 | February 13, 2013 | PERALTA, J.: compensation of the land of petitioner subject matter of the instant action at
₱7.00 per square meter, which shall earn legal interest from the filing of the
This is a petition for revievv on certiorari assailing the Decision dated April complaint until the same shall have been fully paid.
17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70071, and the
Resolution dated Septernber 30, 2010 denying petitioner's Motion for LBP filed a Notice of Appeal. Subsequently, Spouses Orilla filed a Motion
Partial Reconsideration. for Execution Pending Appeal, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and the consolidated cases of Landbank of the
Facts: Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. and Department of Agrarian Reform
v. Court of Appeals, et al. Respondents argued that the total amount of
Respondents spouses Placido and Clara Orilla were the owners of a parcel ₱1,479,023.00, which is equivalent to ₱7.00 per square meter for 21.1289
of land situated in Bohol, identified as Lot No. 1, 11-12706, containing an hectares, adjudged by the SAC as just compensation, could then be
area of 23.3416 hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. withdrawn under the authority of the aforementioned case.
18401.
On December 21, 2000, the SAC issued an Order granting the Motion for
In November 1996, the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Agrarian Execution Pending Appeal, petitioners are hereby ordered to post bond
Reform Office (DARPARO) of Bohol sent respondents a Notice of Land equivalent to one-half of the amount due them by virtue of the decision in
Valuation and Acquisition dated November 15, 1996 informing them of this case. The respondent Land Bank of the Philippines, is therefore,
the compulsory acquisition of 21.1289 hectares of their landholdings ordered to immediately deposit with any accessible bank, as may be
pursuant to the C.A.R.L1 (R.A.6657) for ₱371,154.99 as compensation designated by respondent DAR, in cash or in any governmental financial
based on the valuation made by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines instrument the total amount due the petitioner spouses as may be computed
(LBP). within the parameters of Sec. 18(1) of RA 6657. Furthermore, pursuant to
the Supreme Court decisions in "Landbank of the Philippines vs. Court of
However, respondents rejected the said valuation. Consequently, a summary Appeals, et al." G.R. No. 118712, promulgated on October 6, 1995 and
hearing was conducted by the Provincial Department of Agrarian Reform "Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," G.R. No.
Adjudication Board (Provincial DARAB) to determine the amount of just 118745, promulgated on October 6, 1995, the petitioners may withdraw the
compensation. After the proceedings, the Provincial DARAB affirmed the same for their use and benefit consequent to their right of ownership
valuation made by the petitioner. thereof.

Not content with the decision, respondents filed an action for the On December 25, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Partial
determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Reconsideration of the amount of the bond to be posted, but it was later
denied in an Order dated January 11, 2001.
For its part, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
likewise denied in an Order dated December 29, 2000.12

1 COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW

On March 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action affirmed the decision of the SAC. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, should the SAC find upon
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary recomputation that the just compensation previously rendered is bigger than
injunction. It questioned the propriety of the SAC Order granting the the recomputed value, the petitioners-appellees are ordered to return the
execution pending appeal.13 excess considering that payment may already have been given by LBP in
In its Decision dated July 29, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition on the pursuant to the finality of the motion for execution pending appeal.19
ground that the assailed SAC Order dated December 21, 2000 granting Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
execution pending appeal was consistent with justice, fairness, and equity, Reconsideration.20 Petitioner argued that when the CA set aside the
as respondents had been deprived of the use and possession of their valuation of the SAC amounting to ₱1,479,023.00, it necessarily follows
property, pursuant to RA 6657 and are entitled to be immediately that said amount can no longer be the subject of an execution pending
compensated with the amount as determined by the SAC under the principle appeal. Petitioner theorized that by annulling the SAC decision and,
of "prompt payment" of just compensation. Petitioner filed a Motion for consequently, remanding the case to the trial court, the latter’s decision was
Reconsideration, but it was denied.14 voided and, therefore, it could no longer be executed.
Petitioner then sought recourse before this Court in a petition docketed as On September 30, 2010, the CA issued a Resolution21 denying the motion.
G.R. No. 157206.1âwphi1 After due proceedings, this Court rendered a The CA held that the issue of the validity of the writ of execution was
Decision15 dated June 27, 2008, affirming the decision of the CA. The already resolved by the Supreme Court with finality in G.R. No. 157206.
decretal portion reads: That was precisely the reason why it stated in the decision that "should the
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 2002, SAC find upon recomputation that the just compensation previously
is AFFIRMED.16 rendered is bigger than the recomputed value, the petitioners-appellees are
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied with finality ordered to return the excess, considering that payment may already have
by the Court. been given by the LBP in pursuant to the finality of the motion for
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70071, the CA rendered a Decision 17 dated execution pending appeal."22
April 17, 2009, granting the appeal filed by the petitioner. The dispositive Hence, the petition assigning the lone error:
portion reads: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian DECISION, WHICH WAS ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, CAN STILL
Court is hereby SET ASIDE. BE THE SUBJECT OF EXECUTION.23
This case is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper determination of Petitioner argues that when the CA set aside the valuation of the SAC, it
just compensation for the land taken. necessarily means that such valuation can no longer be the subject of an
SO ORDERED.18 execution pending appeal. It adds that the writ of execution ordering the
The CA held that there was no valid and sufficient legal basis for the SAC LBP to pay respondents the amount of ₱1,479,023.00 remains
in fixing the just compensation for the subject property at ₱1,479,023.00. unimplemented as of the time the CA rendered the decision annulling the
Thus, the CA remanded the case to the SAC for the proper determination of aforesaid valuation.
just compensation. Petitioner posits that once a decision is annulled or set aside, it is rendered
In disposing the case, the CA also took into consideration the Motion for without legal effect for being a void judgment. Petitioner maintains that
Execution Pending Appeal that was granted earlier by the SAC and affirmed while the issue of the validity of the writ of execution issued by the SAC
by the CA and this Court, to wit: had been upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 157206, the enforcement of the
Finally, the petitioners-appellees filed a Manifestation for Early Resolution writ had been rendered moot and academic after the decision of the SAC
before this Court revealing that the petitioners-appellees filed before the was reversed and set aside by the CA.
SAC a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted. This Court
On their part, respondents contend that having attained finality, the decision tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of
of this Court in G.R. No. 157206 could no longer be disturbed. Moreover, the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
the reason advanced by the CA in denying the motion for partial efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create
reconsideration was merely an affirmation of the decision of this Court in rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
the said case. those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment
The petition is without merit. are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
At the onset, it should be noted that although this Court, in Land Bank of regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there
the Philippines v. Orilla,24 held that the SAC validly issued the Order were no judgments. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
granting execution pending appeal in the exercise of its sound discretion in position they were in before the trial."29
issuing the same according to the Rules, still what this Court deemed was Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source
justified in that particular case was the propriety of the issuance of the said of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
Order and not the amount of monetary award that respondents were entitled claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
which, in turn, corresponds to the valuation of the subject property as final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to
determined by the SAC in its Decision. Thus, this Court stated in the said be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
case that "while this decision does not finally resolve the propriety of the ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."30
determination of just compensation by the SAC in view of the separate As correctly maintained by petitioner, since the valuation made by the SAC
appeal on the matter, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the in its Decision dated November 20, 2000 having been annulled by the CA
SAC Judge in allowing execution pending appeal."25 for its lack of sufficient and legal basis, the void judgment can never be
Anent the present controversy, in its Decision annulling the SAC valuation, validly executed.
the CA opined: Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the situation contemplated by the
x x x In granting the award, the SAC merely granted the amount prayed for CA in the assailed Decision was one wherein payment has already been
by the spouses and did not provide any computation or explanation on how made by petitioner to the respondents during the pendency of the appeal.
it arrived at the amount. There was therefore no valid and sufficient legal Nowhere in the disquisition of the CA can it be inferred that it is enjoining
basis for the award.26 the LBP to enforce the writ of execution in accordance with the valuation
The CA, therefore, concluded that there was no sufficient legal basis for the made by the SAC. On the contrary, the CA respected the finality of the
valuation arrived at by the SAC in the amount of ₱1,479,023.00. In fine, the motion for execution pending appeal should the same have already been
CA effectively set aside and voided the Decision of the RTC fixing the enforced. As pronounced by the CA:
amount of just compensation for the subject property. As correctly argued x x x Therefore, should the SAC find upon computation that the just
by petitioner, being the fruit of a void judgment such amount cannot be the compensation previously rendered is bigger than the recomputed value, the
proper subject of the Order granting the motion for execution pending petitioners-appellees are ordered to return the excess considering that
appeal issued by the SAC. payment may already have been given by LBP in pursuant to the finality of
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy the motion for execution pending appeal.31
for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment Verily, it appears that the writ of execution pending appeal remains
or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is unimplemented as of the time the CA rendered its decision annulling the
involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void valuation made by the SAC. The monetary award having emanated from a
judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.27 void valuation, it follows that the writ of execution pending appeal cannot
In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison,28 this Court held be properly implemented. As contemplated by the CA, the situation would
that: have been different if the writ was already enforced during the pendency of
x x x "A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid the appeal, for at that time the writ could still be validly enforced since the
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
valuation made by the SAC still stands. Necessarily, as directed by the CA, prejudice to the recomputation of the just compensation for the subject land
any excess amount paid to respondents should be returned to petitioner. by the Regional Trial Court.
Nonetheless, the amount of ₱371,154.99 representing the compensation SO ORDERED.
offered by the petitioner for the land taken, can still be properly awarded to
respondents in accordance with Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals.32In the said case, the Court allowed the release of the offered
compensation to the landowner pending the determination of the final
valuation of their properties. The Court opined that:
We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of
private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the
government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his
favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can
negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated
property. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, but
subject however to the limitation that he can only be entitled to a "just
compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the valuation
of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just
compensation. If we are to affirm the withholding of the release of the
offered compensation despite depriving the landowner of the possession and
use of his property, we are in effect penalizing the latter for simply
exercising a right afforded to him by law.33
Of course, this is without prejudice to the outcome of the case which was
remanded to the SAC for recomputation of just compensation. Should the
SAC find the said valuation too low and determine a higher valuation for
the subject property, petitioner should pay respondents the difference.
Conversely, should the SAC determine that the valuation was too high,
respondents should return the excess. To be sure, the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss.34
WHEREFORE, subject to the foregoing disquisitions, the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 17, 2009 and September 30,
2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70071, are AFFIRMED. Petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines is ORDERED to release the amount
of ₱3 71,154.99 to respondents spouses Placido and Clara Orilla, without