SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner,

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and August 20, 2001 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete
perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square
meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It
presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and
which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17,
1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report.
The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No.
5450. The land allegedly covered by respondent’s titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base
(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint
for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
(as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos,
Jr. as counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court ordered the
issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial,
postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other
procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and
Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In
particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how
respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.

During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos,
respondent’s former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an
unsigned draft to respondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was
not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to
declare respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that,
since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him,
the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it
was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republic’s motion. 4 It found
respondent’s answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court
ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to
present its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court
denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari 5 seeking to
set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court
erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements
in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. The
appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer 6 and concluded that he
assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect
the answer may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It
directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial
with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared respondent in default for its
failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’s statement. 7 Where it appears
that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of another, evidence of
those statements is admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is

10
(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;

11
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;

12
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points which he
or she has heard the other make 13 or

14
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At no
instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to great lengths to explain
Atty. Garlitos’ testimony as well as its implications, as follows:

1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the
pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who
signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The
important thing was that the answer bore a signature.

2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does
not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was
what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no moment as long as
counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to
whom it may concern" such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he resumed
acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos
conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the
comment 15 and memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive
admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his
counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party
or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly convert a
pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.

Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any
person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. 16Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these
matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to
another lawyer 17 but cannot do so

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

18
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the
law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or
ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to
the signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We give no value whatsoever
to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer.
The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its
answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their
own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result
in arbitrariness and injustice. 19

20
The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show
any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent
in default is hereby REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his
possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
PARTS OF A PLEADING – SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS

G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner,

DOCTRINE: A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it
to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay.

NATURE OF THE CASE: The case is a petition under Rule 45 as an appeal to the ruling of the CA
against the Republic and lifting the trial court’s order of default against Kenrick for failure to file an answer
to the Republic’s complaint.

FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind the Civil Aviation Training
Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) claiming ownership over those lands. Its encroachment
resulted to the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Kenrick justified its
action by presenting TCTs issued in its name and which allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the
name of Alfonso Concepcion.

When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it has no record of them and that their
ascendant title, allegedly in the name of Concepcion, was non-existent in their office. Thus, the OSG filed
a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic
against Concepcion and Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty.
Onofre Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be located and be served with summons, the trial court
ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him.

While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human
Rights investigated Kenrick’s acquisition of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos was summoned
and testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president,
Victor Ong. Apparently, the signature appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized
anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not know who finally signed it.

Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick and Concepcion in default for failure to file a valid
answer because the person who signed it was not the counsel for the respondents. Thus, the answer was
effectively an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the ROC, an unsigned pleading is a mere scrap
of paper and produced no legal effect.

RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled Kenrick’s answer “to be a sham and false and intended to
defeat the purpose of the rules.” It also ordered that the answer be stricken from the records, declared
Kenrick in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.

Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So, it elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari.

CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s petition for certiorari and lifted the trial court’s
order of default against Kenrick Then, it ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It ruled so
because it found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not
subjected to cross-examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer and
concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.

Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground that its pleading was unsigned
by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.
HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed by the party or counsel representing
him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty and authority to sign a pleading is personal to him and may
not be delegated to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it
is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature,
who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of
a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the
law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any
act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or
ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to
the signing of the answer by another “as long as it conformed to his draft.” We give no value whatsoever
to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer.
The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its
answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their
own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result
in arbitrariness and injustice[1].

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure[2]. In this case, respondent failed to
show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

PETITION GRANTED