AIDA PADILLA vs.

GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS CORPORATION

(G.R. No. 207376, August 6, 2014; VILLARAMA, JR., J.)

Facts: From the years 2005 to 2008, Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into several Contracts to Sell (CTS) Facility
Agreements with respondents Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) and Filmal Realty
Corporation (Filmal), represented by Delfin and Dexter Lee. PNB thereby agreed to make available to Globe Asiatique and
Filmal CTS Facility in the amount not exceeding P 200M. These availments were later increased to a total amount of P
1.2B. As a condition for the CTS Facility availments, respondents executed in favor of PNB several Deeds of Assignment
covering accounts receivables in the aggregate amount of P 1.195B. However, in 2010, respondents defaulted in the
payment of their outstanding balance and delivery to PNB of transfer certificates of title corresponding to the assigned
accounts receivables, for which PNB declared them in default under the CTS Facility Agreements. Thereafter, PNB
instituted Civil Case for recovery of sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment before the
RTC of Pasay City against the respondents.

PASAY RTC CASE:

PNB’s Allegation (Pasay RTC): PNB alleges the fraudulent acts and misrepresentations committed by respondents in
obtaining PNB’s conformity to the CTS Facility Agreements and the release of various sums to respondents. PNB also
accused respondents of falsely representing that they have valid and subsisting contracts to sell, which evidently showed
they had no intention to pay their loan obligations.

Defendants Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee (Pasay RTC): In their Answer with Counterclaim with motion to dismiss, they argued
that PNB has no cause of action against them as there is nothing in the CTS Facility Agreements that suggest they are
personally liable or serve as guarantors for Globe Asiatique and Filmal.

Defendants Globe Asiatique and Filmal (Pasay RTC): In their Answer with Counterclaim, they denied PNB’s allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation and they asserted that the allegations of fraud in the complaint are without basis and no
proof was presented by plaintiff on the existence of preconceived fraud and lack of intention to pay their obligations,
citing their timely payments made to PNB. They further assailed the affidavit executed by petitioner PNB SVP Aida Padilla
who they claimed has no personal knowledge of the subject transactions and there being no allegation of threat or
possibility that defendant corporations will dispose of their properties in fraud of their creditors.

Pasay RTC Ruling: Denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, motions to discharge preliminary attachment and to expunge or
suspend proceedings, as well as PNB’s motion to expunge. Defendants filed an MR, which was denied by the Pasay RTC.

PASIG RTC CASE:

Pasig RTC: Respondents Lee, Globe Asiatique, et al. filed against petitioner Padilla for damages before the Pasig RTC,
contending that Padilla’s filing of civil action against them was malicious and ruined their reputations. As for As to the CTS
Facility Agreements with PNB, respondents alleged that these were already novated by the parties who agreed upon a
term loan. But despite her knowledge of such novation and that the obligation was not yet due and demandable;
petitioner with evident bad faith still executed a "perjured" Affidavit in support of the application for writ of preliminary
attachment before the Pasay City RTC. Respondents likewise sought to hold Judge Gutierrez personally liable for issuing
the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of PNB notwithstanding that the obligation subject of PNB’s complaint was
sufficiently secured by the value of real properties sold to it by virtue of the CTS Facility Agreements and deeds of
assignment of accounts receivables.

Respondents thus prayed for a judgment ordering petitioner and Judge Gutierrez to pay moral damages, exemplary
damages, litigation expenses, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
Judge Gutierrez moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the following grounds: (1) respondents have no cause of
action against him; and (2) the Pasig City court has no jurisdiction over the case and his person, movant being of co-equal
and concurrent jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed her Answer With Compulsory Counterclaims, praying for the dismissal of respondents’ complaint on the
following grounds: (1) submission of a false certification of non-forum shopping by respondents and their blatant
commission of willful, deliberate and contumacious forum shopping; (2) litis pendentia; (3) respondents’ failure to attach
the alleged actionable document, i.e.the supposed "new term loan", in violation of Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court;
(4) failure to state a cause of action against petitioner; and (5) petitioner cannot be held personally liable for her official
acts done for and in behalf of PNB.

On January 5, 2012, petitioner filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses, contending that respondents
are parroting the very same arguments raised and relying on the same evidence they presented before the Pasay City RTC
to establish the alleged novation and purported insufficiency of the attachment bond, which issues are still pending in the
said court.

Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition, arguing that there is nothing in their complaint that would slightly suggest
they are asking the Pasig City RTC to issue any injunction or otherwise issue an order setting aside the writ of preliminary
attachment issued by the Pasay City RTC, and neither did they ask for a ruling on whether said writ is illegal or whether
Judge Gutierrez committed a grave abuse of discretion. They asserted that what they seek from the Pasig City RTC is to
allow them to recover damages from Judge De Leon for his tortious action in approving PNB’s attachment bond. They also
insisted that forum shopping and litis pendentia are absent in this case, contrary to petitioner’s claims.

PASIG RTC Ruling: On April 2, 2012, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 73132 for lack of
jurisdiction. On October 22, 2012, the Pasig City RTC denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the April 2, 2012
Order dismissing their complaint. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal under Section 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not a court can take cognizance of a compulsory counterclaim despite the fact that the corresponding
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Held: On the lone issue raised in the petition, we rule for the petitioner.

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. It is in the nature of a cross-
complaint; a distinct and independent cause of action which, though alleged in the answer, is not part of the answer.
Counterclaims may be either compulsory or permissive. Section 7, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Compulsory counterclaim.– A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts
of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount
and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

In this case, petitioner’s counterclaim for damages raised in her answer before the Pasig City RTC is compulsory, alleging
suffering an injury caused to her as a consequence of the unwarranted filing of the baseless complaint filed by
respondents. Said court, however, dismissed her counterclaim upon the same ground of lack of jurisdiction as its
resolution supposedly would entail passing upon the validity of orders and processes still pending before the Pasay City
RTC.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of the complaint due to failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action." The effect of this amendment on previous rulings on whether the dismissal of a complaint
carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaims as well was discussed in the case of Pinga v. The Heirs of German Santiago,
thus:

To be certain, when the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amended Rule 17, those
previous jural doctrines that were inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
were implicitly abandoned insofar as incidents arising after the effectivity of the new procedural rules on 1 July
1997. BA Finance, or even the doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed along with the complaint,
clearly conflicts with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of BA Finance as doctrine extends as far
back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new Rules of Civil Procedure. … we thus rule that the dismissal of a
complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute any pending
counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous
rulings of the Court that are inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.

Subsequently, in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation this Court held that while the declaration
in Pinga refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 on dismissal of complaints due to the fault of plaintiff, it does
not preclude the application of the same rule when the dismissal was upon the instance of defendant who correctly argued
lack of jurisdiction over its person.

Still anchored on the pronouncement in Pinga, we then categorically ruled that a counterclaim arising from the unfounded
suit may proceed despite the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant-
counterclaimant.

In the present case, the RTC of Pasig City should have allowed petitioner's counterclaim to proceed notwithstanding the
dismissal of respondents' complaint, the same being compulsory in nature and with its cause not eliminated by such
dismissal. It bears stressing that petitioner was hailed to a separate court (Pasig City RTC) even while the dispute between
PNB and respondents was still being litigated, and she already incurred expenses defending herself, having been sued by
respondents in her personal capacity. The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury and misrepresentation in
executing the affidavit in support of the application for writ of attachment before the Pasay City RTC) with hints at possible
criminal prosecution apart from that criminal complaint already lodged in the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. The Pasig City
RTC clearly erred in refusing to hear the counterclaims upon the same ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e., lack of
jurisdiction in strict observance of the policy against interference with the proceedings of a co-equal court.