Chapter V

Penalties and Forfeitures

"Where a contract provides that on breach thereof the party in breach shall
pay a sum of money to the other party, the sum may be an agreed sum for
damages, known as liquidated damages, or the sum ma y
over the other parry in terrorenL" be a penalty to be held

—Snell's Principles of Equity, p. 534.

"Equity regarded the performance as the principle intent of the parties to
the contract, and the penalty as a mere accessory .... according to the maxim
'Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form'."

—Maxims of Equity
"Penalty involves a payment or a loss of a sum of money; forfeiture
involves the loss of an interest in property."
SYNOPSIS
rA Penalty
I. Nature, Definition and Principle (') Damage exceeding penalty
2, Analysis (ii) Misusing penalty clause
4. In India
(a) Existence of a breach B. Forfelturt
(b) Grounds of relief
(c) Penalty I. Nature and Meaning
and liquidated 2. Basis and Extension of Relief
damages distiguishej
Cd) Exceptions: 3. Threatened Forfeiture
(i) Default in instalments 4. Distinction: Forfeiture and penalty
(ii) Several breaches 5. In India
(iii) Pre-estimate almost an 6. Cases of concession and privilege
Impossibility distinguished
3. Some Questions

A. PENALTY
1. NATURE, DEFINITION AND PRINCIPLE
Before 1863 there was a rule of Common Law that a person was absolutely
bound by the obligations he had undertaken and he could not claim to be
excused by the mere fact that performance had subsequently become
impossible. Paradine v. Jane' and Thus v.
Byres, 2 are its leading examples.
Similarly
when the contract provided for a penalty or forfeiture those provisions
were strictly enforced regardless of the cir
cumstances, and were never relieved,
consequently creating a positive injustice to the promisee.
During the reign of William and Anne the rigour of these rules was softened
by passing two statutes-3
whereby relief could be granted by the law courts as
well as the equity courts. The Judicature Acts reduced the importance of these

I. (1647) Alyn 26
2. (1876)IQBD2
3. 8&9 Will 3 C, II, 1697 and 4&5 Anne C 3.
1705.
[133]
 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief
I Chap.
1 34

statutes, and the SC0C of relief given by the Equity Courts thus widened and it
applied not only to money-bonds but also to a number of other cases.
It is within the competence of the parties to a contract to provide therein as
to the extent of liability arising out of its breach.' The loss so occasioned may be
compensated by a sum liquidated or fixed therein. It may be that the sum so
agreed may be far greater than the actual loss sustained; if so it is a penalty. But
where the sum so agreed and provided is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss it is
not penalty. Sncll 5 puts it this way that in cases where a contract provides that
on breach thereof, the defaulting party shall pay a sum of money to the other,
the sum so agreed may he equal to the damage suffered or loss sustained by the
party, or it may be a penalty to punish the defaulting party and called a sum in
in Law
terrorctn. A very early irurney-bond case referred to by Simpson
Quarterly Review s has been cited by Snell wherein it was provided ihat non-
payment of the principal sum with interest within a fixed period would make the
debtor liable for a greater sum, usually double. This is obviously a penalty
clause and a proper subject for equity courts to intervene.

2. ANALYSIS

(a) Existence of a breaclz.—Whcre, however, there is no breach, the question

of penalty need not arise. As expressed in Associated Distributors Ltd. v. Hall'
(hire purchase agreement case), where an option was given in a contract to put an
end to it and to pay the agreed penalty, such a sum cannot be considered to be a
penalty because the hirer had exercised his option and thus had to pay the amount
which he had made himself liable to pay. There is no breach: but according to
Lord Denning and Lord Dev1in 8 the question is still open.
(b) Grounds of relief.—The courts of equity gave relief against penalty On
the ground that such a relief is the original intent of the case. 9 In such cases.
therefore, the court looked to the intention rather than to the form. In Sloman v.
Wal teriQ , where the agreement was to allow the use of a particular room when
wanted and in default, to pay pcnaUy stipulated in the bond, it was held that as
pnrial intent of the deed, and the penalty
mc en j uyiueiit of t}1c objcct wa te
being only on accessional intent, it could not be recovered; but actual damage
could be recovered.
(c) Penalty and liquidated damages distinguished.— TO find out whether a
particular provision in a contract is a penalty clause devised to punish a party or
is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that would arise on its breach, the following
rules have been framed by the courts.°

4. Wallis v. Smith. (1882)21 Ch D 243.

5. Snell's Principles of hqusty. 27th Edn., 1973, p. 534.
6. A. W8. Simpson. (1966) 82 ELQR 392.
7. (1938)1 All ER 511 CA: (1938) 2 K 83.
8. Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. lid., 1962 AC 600.
9. PemhV v. Duke of Somerset. (1742) I Stra 447.
tO. (1784) 1 BroCC 417.
II . S,,eII Principles ofiquite. 27th Edn., 1973. pp. 535-536.
 VJ Penalties and Forfeitures 135

Ordinarily when the word penalty or liquidated damages is used by parties

to a contract, they must be taken to mean what they say. But this cannot be
considered to be final and conclusive.' 2 The court therefore must find out
whether the sum so named is penalty or liquidated damages. Penalty is a sum
fixed in terrorem to punish the offending party for a default or by way of
securing the performance of a collateral object, while liquidated damages is a
genuine pre-estimate of damage reduced to di'mensions which truly represent the
loss. Liquidated damages can be fully recovered. Penalty is extravagant and
unconscionable amount in relation to actual loss suffered or following from the
breach. 13 As decided in Kemble v. Farren 14 ,
when payment of a smaller sum is
secured by a larger, that larger sum is penalty. But the largeness of the sum does
not itself make it a penalty. Solution of the problem therefore depends upon
construction of terms of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances of
each case' s at the time of making the contract, but not at the time when the
breach is made. Breach of an agreement gives rise to a cause of action to
recover the smaller amount, because, if it is otherwise, that is not a genuine pre-
estimate of damages.
(d) Exceptions: (i) Default in instalments.—But where it is agreed that a
loan received is to be returned within the appointed time by instalments and that
on default in paying a single instalments as agreed, payment of all the remaining
instalments would become due, that is not a penalty provision.
(ii) Several breaches..—The second exception to the penalty provision is
expressed in the decision in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. ' 6. There it was agreed
that "a single lump sum made payable by way of compensation on the
occurrence of one or more of all or several events, some of which may occasion
serious and others but trifling damage" will not be penal. There is thus a clear
provision (of payment of lump sum) for penalty here, but it is no more so,
because, where every possible breach is incapable of being precisely
ascertained, the provision for payment of a particular sum is not necessarily a
penalty provision.
(iii) Pre-estj,nate almost an impossibility.—Besides, the cases wherein the
precise pre-estimate of damage is almost an impossibility, it may be probable
that the pre-estimate of the damage stipulated by the parties was the true bargain
between them. It must he noted that the latter two instances raise a presumption
against penalty but such a presumption may also be rebutted.

3. SOME QUESTIONS
(i) Damage exceeding penalty—A question that has been posed is, what
would be the position if the damage exceeds the penalty? Can the plaintiff
ignore the penalty clause? Is it not that his only right is to recover the agreed

2. Price y . Green. 16 M&W 346.

13. Financing Lid. V. ha/dock, (1963)2 QB 104.
14. (1829)6 fling 141.
15. Price Y. (;r,',:. 16 M&W 346
6. /)u,il,,1 , /',,ew,,og,,' Iv,,. ( o. v Ne;, (j(, ruXe (1,1(1 ,%'f,,t(,r Co.,
1915 AC 79 Sec also Clydebank
Co. v. I). Ji,,e. 1 905 AC 6. For contra see Neuman, Re, (18716)
4 Ch D 724.
136 Equity, Trusts and Speqflc Relief [Chap.

sum and no more?. The answer to these questions has been given by Snell:17
"Probably he can 18 (sue), although he clearly cannot do so where the contract
shows that if there is a breach of the contract, the right to recover the specified
sum is to be his only right."9
(ii) Misusing penalty clause.—When it is agreed to perform or to abstain
from doing a certain act, and in default to-pay a penalty, can a party in default
get rid of the agreement by just electing to pay penalty and consequently
justifying his breach? Can he be compelled to act as agreed upon? The answer
to this is obviously in the affirmative. 20 The courts cannot allow a party to
escape from his liability. In contracts for sale by instalments, there is a provision
for forfeiture of instalments when an instalment is not paid as agreed; in such
cases the proviso being an integral part of the contract, the contract can be
rescinded and the instalments paid can be retained by the vendor. This is not a
penalty clause. In such cases, equity granted relief if the purchaser carried out
the contract at the time of action.2'
4. IN INDIA
Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act has abolished the distinction between
penalty and liquidated damages as it exists under English law, and contains the
equitable rule of the English law as to relief against penalty. It thus gets rid of
the questions whether a particular amount is liquidated damages or penalty,
but the duty of the courts in India as well as in England is more or less the same
for all practical purposes. 23 A court in India will not allow a party to escape
from his contractual liabilities simply by paying a penalty in every case. 24 In
India, therefore, the courts have powers to allow "reasonable compensation not
exceeding :he amount so named, or as the case may be, the penalty stipulated
for". Under this section, actual proof of loss or damage is dispensed with and
the party gets reasonable compensation, but the compensation will not exceed
the amount named in the contract. The court is to carry out the primary contract
between the parties and is not bound to carry out the secondary contract which
comes into existence due to breach.-'

B. FORFEITURE
1. NATURE AND MEANING
In cases where on the failure of one party to perform the contract, a specific
property is to be transferred by that party to the other, or where as a result of his

17. Snell's Principles of Equity. 27th Edn., 1973, p. 536.

18. Wall v. Rederiaktiebologet Lggude, (1915)2 KB 66.
19. Cellulose Acetate Silk W. Lid v. Widnes Foundry, (1925) Lid., 1933 AC 20.
20. French v. Macale, (1842) 7 &Ware 269.
21. S:ockloserv. Johnson. ( i954) 1 All ER 630 CA.
22. Panna Singh v. Ajban Ntr.gh. 33 CWN 949.
23. Michel Habib v. Sheikh Suleiman, AIR 1941 PC 101.
24. cf., French v. Macale, (1842) 2 Dr&Ware 269.
25. Per Justice Sundara Aiyer in Muthu Krishnan case, (1912) 36 Mad 229.
 V] Penalties and Forfeitures 137

having done or abstained from doing a particular act, the party loses some right,
benefit, privilege or property. it is called a forfeiture.

2. BASIS AND EXTENSION OF RELIEF

Courts of equity relieved against this, but only in appropriate cases. Where
the primary object of the bargain is to secure a stated result and the provision for
forfeiture is added as security for the production of that resull, 26 equity will
grant relief against forfeiture for breach of covenant or condition. But where
forfeiture is imposed not by act of parties but by statute, equity will give no
relief. The most common instance of forfeiture lies in case of breach of a
covenant in a lease. For example, the right of re-entry (on the lease property) of
the landlord was considered as security for the payment of rent.
In granting such a relief, the appellant's conduct, graveness of the breach
and the disparity between the value of the property forfeited and the damage
caused by the breach would be inquired into by the court. Thus in a case where
purchase money was payable by instalments and where there was a proviso that
the vendor may rescind the contract and retain the instalment's already paid, it
was held to be a forfeiture clause against which the court would not normally
relieve, but relief could be granted if the purchaser was ready and willing to
carry out the contract at the time of action.27
Relief against forfeiture also extended to cases of assignment of a lease, and
non-payment of rent or fines, lease of land, hiring or lease of chattels; the
underlying principle being that a forfeiture in substance was a mere security for
the payment of a monetary sum. To ordinary breaches 28 of covenant this
jurisdiction did not extend and forfeiture took place, but it is now conferred by
statute.2'

3. THREATENED FORFEITURE
As decided in Barton case-10 , in case of thereatened forfeiture where the
lessor did not take possession nor commenced proceedngs therefor, the court
would not probably exercise this jurisdiction.

4. DISTINCTION: FORFEITURE AND PENALTY

The main difference in equity between forfeiture and penalty is that in the
former, relief is not always given although compensation can be given, while in
the latter, relief is alwa y s given if compensation can be given. Forfeiture involves
loss of an interest in property. For example, in case of a lease there is generall y a
provision that on committing a breach of any covenant by the lessee the landlord

26. Snell'.r Principlc.v of Equirv, 27th Edn., 1973, p. 537, Citing

Shah Spinners lad. v. Harding,
(1973) 2 WLR 28,
27. Kilmer Lose, 1913 AC 319.
28. e.g. a covenant to repair or to lay out a specific sum on repairs in given time.
29. Snell's Principles of Equit y, 27th Edn., 1973, p. 538, note 38,
30. Barton Thompson & Co. Lid. v. Stapling Machines Co., 1966 Ch 499.
138 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

may re-enter and the lease be forfeited. Insofar as penalty is concerned, in case of
failure of performance the payment of a sum of money is stipulated.
5. IN INDIA
Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 incorporates the rule with
regard to forfeitures and Sections 114 and1 14-A incorporate the equitable rule
of English law regarding relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent.
Forfeiture is one of the eight ways to determine a lease as provided in
Section 111(g). Forfeiture is incurred in three ways: where (i) a lessee breaks an
express condition, providing for re-entry on land, (ii) where a lessee claims a
title in the lease land or sets up a title thereof in a third person and renounces
his character as lessee as such, and (iii) where he is adjudged an insolvent. In
any of these cases the lessor must give a notice to the lessee of his intention to
determine the lease. Notice by the landlord is thus a condition precedent to a
forfeiture and the right of re-entry. On the fulfilment of anyone of the above
three conditions, a lease does not automatically come to an end or become void.
It only gives a right to the landlord to avoid the lease and to re-enter the land,
and for this purpose to give notice to the lessee of his intention to do so.
Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act incorporates the equitable rule
of English law regarding relief against forfeiture of a lease. It lays down that in
case of forfeiture of lease incurred due to non-payment of rent where the lessor
sues to eject the lessee, the court will pass an order relieving the lessee against
the forfeiture if he is prepared to pay within fifteen days the rent in arrears with
interest due, and full costs of the Suit, or gives security such as the court thinks
sufficient. Thereupon the lessee shall hold the property as if the forfeiture had
not occurred.3'
This section indicates the principles that wherever compensation is an
adequate remedy or an alternative, relief against forfeiture should be granted.
The English principle in this regard is also the same.
In Namdeo case 3i it was observed that according to Debendra case 33 , the
court in granting such relief has no discretion and must grant relief LU the tenant,
but this is not so. Because "in exercising this discretion.. .under Section 114 a
court in India is not bound by the practice of a Court of Chancery in England
and I am not disposed to limit the discretion that it possesses. Those who seek
equity must do equity, and I do not think merely because a tenant complies with
the conditions laid down in Section 114 that he becomes entitled as of right to
relief'. Thus every case must be judged by relief. Besides he who comes in
equity must come with clean hands and must do equity. It is the conduct of the
tenant that disqualifies him for such relief in equity. This view is affirmed in
various cases.34

3l. Dhnranualla Properties v. Dhunbai, AIR 1931 Cal 457.

32. Namdeo Lokinan Ladhi v. Narrnadabai, 1953 SCR 1009.
33. fleF,endrn La! Khan v. F.M.A.. Cohen, 1927 1LR 54 Cal 485.
34. Appa y wz Slietty v. Mohn.ed Henri, 1916 ILR 39 Mad 834; Ran,akrishna Ma!hya v. Babiiraya.
(1914) 24 IC 139 and Rania Brahman v. Rand Rddi, AIR 1928 Mad 250. Sec also Stanhope
 V} Penalties and Forfeitures 139

Section 114-A gives relief against forfeiture in certain other cases. The
section contemplates covenants for repairs, maintenance or insurance of the
property leased. It does not apply to breach of the covenant to pay rent and no
relief is given by this section where the lessee incurs forfeiture by denying his
landlord's title.
Where there are stipulations in contract it is the duty of the Court not to
enforce the forfeiture clause, but only to award reasonable compensation which
does not exceed the amount specified in the contract as liable to forfeiture. The
award of compensation in all such cases should be reasonable. 35 If a stipulation
for forfeiture amounts to penalty it is relieved against where the case is covered
under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act. 36 As held in K.P. Subbarama
Sastri v. K.S. Raghavan 37, if on a proper construction of a contract it is found
that the real agreement between the parties was to the effect that the whole
amount was on the date of the bond a debt due but the creditor for the
convenience of the debtor allowed it to be paid by instalments intimating that if
default should be made in paymeni of any instalment he would withdraw the
concession, then the stipulation as to the whole amount of the balance becoming
payable would not be penal. If however, it appears that the debt itself arises or
becomes due and payable by the debtor only on the respective dates fixed for
the instalments, the stipulation that on default being made jr :ie payment the
whole of the balance should become due and payable would be in the nature of
a penalty.38
Similarly where there was a clause in the agreement that special benefit of a
share in the property at a lower price would be offered to a party under the
agreement would not be available in case of default in payment of instalments of
the price by the party within stipulated time, the stipulation was held to be valid
and not a penalty clause.39
A well recognised exception in regard to penalty may be noted. The
exception is that where a beneficial right is to arise under a contract, conveyance
or a will, upon the performance of some act in a stated manner or at a stated
time by the beneficiary, the act must be performed accordingly in order to
obtain the enjoyment of the right, and there is no fraud, accident or surprise in
the transaction, equity will not relieve against a breach of the terms.°
Insofar as the question of forfeiture of earnest money is concerned it may in
certain circumstances amount to penalty.
Earnest money is a nominal sum of money sometimes given by the buyer to
seller as a token that the parties are bound or are in earnest (eager or sincere to

v. Haworth, (1886) 3 TLR 34.

35. F g eh Chand v. Balkishan Das, AIR 1963 SC 1405; Naresh Chandra v. Calcutta Slack
Exchange lid., AIR 1971 SC 422.
36. Maula Box v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1955.
37. (1987)25CC424. 427; AIR 1987 SC 1257.
38. Approving 1'. K Achuthan V. Stare Bank of Travancore. 1974 KLT 806.
39. Soya Ra y v. Gust/ia Gopal Dey, (1988) 2 SCC 134: AIR 1988 SC 981.
40. Simrazhnjujl v. Nanjalingiah Gowder, AIR 1963 SC 1182.
140 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief

do something) about the bargain .4t The amount is legally unnecessary but in
practice in most cases of sale of immovable property it is given and taken.
If earnest money is given and the transaction proceed ahead, the same forms
a part of purchase price. But if the transaction falls through due to buyer's fault
or failure, the amount is forfeited. If the transaction goes through, the amount
operates as a part payment.42 If the amount of earnest is reasonable and if it is
orfeited, it is not like imposing penalty .43 But this depends upon circumstances
of a case.
6. CASES OF CONCESSION AND PRIVILEGE
Cases of penalties and forfeiture can be distinguished from cases of
concession and privilege fixed by agreement. In such cases of concession and
privilege, if a required condition is not fulfilled, no relief would be obtainable in
case of loss of that concession or privilege. Decisions in Shanmugam Pillai v.
Anna LaxrniA and Burjorji v. Madhavla!45 explain this principle. For example, A
covenants to pay Rs 25,000 to B within thirty days. If payment is made as
agreed, B would give up the balance of Rs 40,000, the amount due, but if it is
not so made by A within the stipulated time, he will have to pay the whole
amount of Rs 40,000 and the concession would be cancelled. A in such cases
acts against the agreement and therefore equity is not on his side. Even the
courts of equity in such cases have no power to relieve A from the consequences
of his failure to act according to the agreement.

41. Walker: Oxford Companion to Law. 1980. p. 387.

42. Maula liux. supra.
43. !Ianwnan Cotton Mills v. Tata Aircraft Lid.. SCC AIR 1970 SC 1986.
44. AIR 1950FC38.
45. AIR 1934 Born 370.
 Chapter VI
Mortgages, Liens and Merger

"A mortgage at Common Law was strictly an estate upon condition that the
estate will be forfeited upon the breach of the condition....Equity thus turned an
absolute conveyance at Common Law into a real security or a pledge for the
repayment of a debt."

—Williams on Real Property.

'Security 'for the debt, 'Right to Redeem' and 'Right to Foreclose' are the
essential characteristics of a mortgage.
SYNOPSIS
A. Mortgages
20. Consolidation
I Meaning and Definition 21. Marshalling of Securities
2. Object
22. Cont?rbution
3. History
23. Subrogation
4. Characteristics of a Mortgage (a) Origin
5. Mortgagor's right: Equity of (b) Definition
Redemption
(c) Test
6. Modern trend
(d) Types
7. In India
B. Liens and Merger
(a) History
24. Liens
(6) Definition
(a) Definition
(c) Classification
(b) Legal and Equitable Lien
8. Simple Mortgage
(c) Lien and Pledge
9. Mortgage by Conditional Sale (d) Particular and General Lien
tO. Usuluctuary Mortgage
( c') Types of Lien
II. English Mortgage
25. Solicitor's Lien
12. Mortgage by Deposit of Title Deeds 26. Banker's Lien
13. Anomalous Mortgage 27, Agent's Lien
14. Nature of Equitable Mortgages in
28, Bailce's Lien
England and in India
29. Salvage Lien
(a) How it comes into being
30. Pawnee's Lien
(6) In India
15, Mortgagor's Equity of Redemption
31. Vendor's Lien
32. Vendee's Lien
(a) Origin
33. In India
(1') Description
(c) Nature
(a) Charge
(i) Vendor's Lien
16. Doctrine of Clog on Redemption
(ii) Lien: When lost
(a) Description
(b) Charge and Lien
(b) Tests
(c) Charge and Mortgage
(e) Modern [rend
(d) Charge by Act of Parties and
IT Foreclosure
by Operation of law
18. Opening the Foreclosure
34. Lien of the Finder of Goods
19. Tackine 35. Merger

[141 1
142 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief° [Chap.

A. MORTGAGES
1. MEANING AND DEFINITION

/What is generally understood by the-term 'mortgage is a conveyance of land

or other immovable or other property as security for the payment of money'
Such mortgage is -made to secure the repayment of money borrowed by the
owner of the property mortgage} In such a case the borrower incurs a debt or
personal obligation to repay by whatever means. Where such a personal
obligation is not incurred there is an express covenant for repayment. A
mortgage at Common Law was strictly an "estate upon condition", that is, the
estate was forfeited upon the breach of the condition.
¶AT mortgage can be said to be a conveyance of some interest in land or other
proërty "as a security for the p yment of a debt or the discharge of some other
obligation for which it is giv n

/ 2. OBJECT
ut insofar as a mortgage is a transfer of property, its object is to confer on
the mortgagee a propnetory right, by exercising which he will be enabled to
raise money payable to him; so that he shall have the means of securing himself
from loss in the event of his debtor being personally unable to pay, or of
attaining the desired end, where there is no personal liability to payment. 2 In
other words, the object of. a mortgage is to secure the performance of the
primary obligation.

3. HISTORY
The history of mortgages goes back .to Roman Law wherein due
performance was secured by "pressurising the debtor's will or causing him
inconvenience" by keeping him Out of possession or ownership or forcing
serfdom upon him so that he would repay the amount early. But this way of
dealing with the debtor was hardly satisfactory and by eftliix of time, a more
C3C f b cur l iy wiiercunder irrespective or the debtor's will, the
creditor could put the property to sale and recover his amount, came into vogue.
Hypotheca of Roman Law was of this nature.
"The term mortgage first appears in Glanville 3 in whose time either
land or goods might be pledged as security for a debt, A pledge of land was
e
effected by a conveynce thereof to the cr ditor to hold until the debt was
paid, with an agreement either that the creditor should apply the rents and
profits in reduction of the debt, or that he should receive them without any
liability to account. In the latter case the transaction was called mortuum
vadium (which in French is mort-deed and gage-pledge, whence mortgage);
because although the debtor might redeem the land on payment of the
principal sum, in the meantime it was dead or unprofitable to him. The

I Santh!v v. Wilt/e. (1899)2 Ch 475,

2. Joshua Williams: Principles of the Law of Kea! Property. 21st Edn., p. 544
3. Glanvillc Lib. x. c. pp. 6-8.
 ViJ Mortgages, Liens and Merger 143
object of the mortuu,n vadium
was to give the creditor the profits of the land
in lieu of interest; the taking of which under the name of usury was
anciently regarded as an unchristian abomination. But these ancient
methods of pledging lands seem to have fallen out of use at an early date,
and to have been succeeded by a more stringent contract under which the
land was given in pledge until a certain day fixed for payment, with a
stipulation that on failure to pay at the appointed time the land should
remain to the creditor in fee in the first instance with a proviso for re-entry
on payment. Littleton, describing this, states that this is
called a mortgage
because, it the feoffer, do not pay (the feofee) then the land pledged is taken
from him forever and so dead to him. The nature of this mortgage at law
was that of a conveyance of land from one to another for an estate in fee, or
other estate, which is to be determined or reconveyed on condition of the
payment of money by the former on a certain day. If the condition was
broken by non-payment of the money at the appointed time, the estate of the
person to whom the land was so conveyed becomes absolute or discharged
from the condition. So that, at law, he will be entitled to hold the land as his
own, for all the estate limited to him. For in the courts of law the parties
were held to the terms of their bargain by which the land was to be
redeemed on a certain day, or if not, to be forfeited by the debtor."5
Courts of equity gave relief to the mortgagor against this strict construction of
a mortgage. The relief was first given in cases of failure to pay at the appointed
time by accident or of some trifling default
cases Of forfeiture and was afterwards extended to all
of mortgaged land by failure to pay money when due. During
the reign of Charles I this state of affairs was established. 6
Equity granted relief
because it considered it unfair that the borrower should lose his land absolutely for
default in payment. On its own principles and maxim that "equity looks to the
intent rather than to the form", it enforced the original intention of the parties. It
was also against the conscience of
the lender that he should retain, the property
which he received from the borrower as a mere security. Equity thus turned
an
absolute conveyance at common Law into a real security or a pledge for the
repayment of a debt, so
that if the borrower paid the principal amount with interest
and costs within a reasonable time even after he had lost his legal right to redeem,
equity granted him an equitable, right to redeen, which came
mortgagor's equity of rede p,-zpjjQn. to be known as a
The effect of this kind of help to the mortgagor
by equity caused
Maitland to remark that the express words of the proviso for
recont'eyance as included in the mortgage deed become, "owing to the action of
equity" a "long suppressjo veri and suggestiofa/sf'.
It does not in the least explain
the rights of the parties: it suggests that they
are other than really they are. 7 The
assurances given by the deeçl were thus left
unaltered by equity, by granting the
mortgagor a right to redeem by pa
yme nt at any time before a sale or foreclosure-of

4. Joshua Williams: Principles of the Law of

Rea' Property, citing Plowden on Usury Part i.
5. Joshua Williams: Principles of
the Law of Real Property. See also Snell's Principles
Equit y , P. 37. of
. F/ow Y . Vigur(',v, IChRcpJ3.
1. Mai(laniJ : J.'cjj1re e,n Eqjjy,
1Q9 p. 182.
 Equity. Trusts and Specific Relief (Chap.
144

the mortgage took place. The right of redemption is thus a right given by equity
contrary to an agreement.
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF A MORTGAGE
'The first essential characteristic of a mortgage is the mortgagor's "right to
red which had its origin in the idea canvased by equity that 'stipulation as
to time for the payment' was a penalty and was therefore required to be relieved.
This one-sided concession granted to a mortgagor, however, could not be
allowed to continue indefinitely in point of time and the equity courts were
required to set limits to their own generosity, because one has to be just before
he professes to become generous. "OB_ this principle, after a reasonable time
expired, the mortgagee was allowed to foreclose the right of redemption of a
in who not only lost his legal right to redeem but also lost his equitable
right to redeem. This right to forecloses according to Hanbury, is an equitable
right given to a mortgagee to counterbalance the mortgagor's right to redeem
and is the second essential characteristic of a mortgag
As the Common law judges strenuously resistethe introduction of this new
principle and adhered in their courts to the principle of forfeiture, 9 the Judicature
Act, 1873, 10 exclusively assigned the redemption and foreclosure of mortgages
to the Chancery Division of the High Court.
5. MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT: EQUITY OF REDEMPTION
From the characteristics of mortgage enumerated above, it follows that a
right to redeem cannot be fettered or circumvented even by express agreement
of the parties, and the maxim "modus et conventio vincunt legum " , that is "the
agreement of parties overrides the law" has no application to mortgage. The
mortgagor or anyone standing in his place, shall be admitted in equity to redeem
a mortgage after the day fixed by the contract for redemption has gone by, and
the estate has become forfeited at law. ' 1 As Coote has explained, 12 it was further
laid down as a general rule, subject to very few exbeptions, that wherever a
for money whether this
conveyance of estate is oricyinally intended as a securit y
intention appears from the deed itself or by any other instrument or even by
parol evidence, 12 it is always considered in equity as a mortgage and
redeemable even though there is an express agreenent of the parties that it shall
not be redeemable or that the right of redemption shall be confined to a
particular time, or to a particular description of persons. L-3 In other words, it was
established that no agreement of the parties to a mortgage, that the mortgage
should not be redeemable according to the rules of equity, should have any
effect in equity. Upon this principle it was held that any attempt to fetter the

8, Salt '. Marquees of Northampton, 1892 AC 1.

9. Snell 's Principles of Equity, 27th Edn.. p.
377.
10. Section 34(3). Principles of Real Property. p. 547.
II. Tarn v. Turner. 39 Ch D 456 cited in Joshua Williams:
Section 3. cited in Joshua Williams: Principles of Real
12. Coofe on Mortgages. Chap. Iii,
Property , P. 547; see also England v. Cordingi.on. I Eden 169.
13. ILid., Chap. 111, Section 2.
VI] Mortgages, Liens and Merger 145

equity of redemption with any other condition than the payment of principal,
interest and costs should be void.' 4 This principle is summed up briefly in the
phrase "once a mortgage alwa y s a mortgage". Furthermore, it was held that in
equity, the right of the mortgagee was to the money secured, and he held the
land only as security for his money; so that in equity he had a mere charge for
the amount due to him, even though he were absolute tenant in fee at law. It was
therefore decided that the benefit of a mortgage should go along with the rest of
the mortgagee's personal estate to his executor or administrator, not his heir)'
And although at law the estate of a mortgagee in fee would go to his heir or
devisce, yet in equity the heir or devisee was held a mere trustee thereof for the
executor or administrator.' 7 Consequently in equity the owner was regarded as
the owner of the mortgaged land, subject only to the mortgagee's charge; and
the mortgagor's equity of redemption was treated as an equitable estate in the
land, of the same nature as other equitable estates)8

6. MODERN TREND
Thus, what was in the beginning an equitable right became an equitable
estate, which amounts to ownership of the property subject to the mortgage and
which a mortgagor could settle, devise, mortgage or otherwise dispose of in any
way he liked. 19 Even a mortgagee can buy the equity of redemption, and nobody
can prevent him, 2 ° And the collateral benefits if they continue beyond the
redemption can be obtained by the mortgagee if they do not prevent free
dealings with the property. 2 ' As decided in Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat
Co. 21 , this is the modem trend.

7. IN INDIA
(a) IJ/siory.—The idea of a mortgage witnessed a similar evolution in
India, and as a result of its intimate contact with English legal principles we
have the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sections 58 to 104 whereof cover this
tpic. Under the Hindu and M amcan in
vogue and it passed through a similar process of evolution as in Roman law.
Mortgage by conditional sale and usufructuary mortgage, which resembled
Pignus of Roman law, were known to Hindu law. Manusmriti 2 gives details23
thereof. The ancient Hindu law did not make any distinction between pledge
and mortgage. For both pledge and mortgage a common term, Adhi (3TTflI ) has
been used in Smritis. The word Adhi came to be used because the article or

14. Jennwg v. Ward, 2 Vern 520; Noakes v. Rice. 1902 AC 24; F/award v. Harris, (1683) I Vern
33; Samuel v. Jarrah Timber Carporaiion, 1904 AC 323.
15.Lord Nottingham in Newcomb V. Ban/jam, I Vern 7.
16. Thornborough v. Baker, I Ch Ca 283.
17. Coute on Mortfiges. Chap LXXIX, Section I.
18. (rsbor,w v. Scone. I Aik 603, 605.
19. Sod! . Pruiipler of Lquuv. pp. 378, 379.
20. Reeve Y. L,,Ie, 1902 AC 461.
21. 1914 AC 25.
22. CI1;Lp. S. vcre 143.
23 See tiho Sir William Jones: Munu.o,,,jti, Chap. 3. p. 142.
146 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [C/zap.

immovable property goes under the Control (adhina) of the creditor. Manu uses
the word Adamana for mortgage (Manu VIII 165) and I3rihaspati employs the
word bhogya (tflT) for mortgage.
In laying down the law on thetopic of Adhi, the ancient Indian law givers
have taken care to incorporate conditions reasonable to both the parties and they
are comparable in several aspects to the present laws on the topic.
In Muhamedan law a mortgage is called "bye-bil-wufa" and resembles an
English, mortgage. The Muslim religion prohibits charging of interest. To
counter this religious restraint a mortgagee resold the mortgaged property to the
mortgagor at a higher price. If the debtor did not repay the money obtained, the
creditor (mortgagee) becomes the absolute owner thereof. The word "byc-bil-
wufa" is an Arabic expression meaning a sale based on confidence, i.e. it is a
sale with a condition to retransfer the property .21
Before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in India, the
principles of English law along with the principles of equity were applied, The
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 converted equitable rights into legal rights.26
(b) Definition—Section 58 defines a mortgage as under: "A mortgage is
the-
(i) transfer-of an interest;
(ii) in the specific immovable property;
(iii) for the purpose of—
(a) securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by
way of loan,
(b) an existing or future debt, or
(c) the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a
pecuniary liability."
This definition is a very satisfactory one. Out of various interests in
property three are prime and basic: ri ght of oosscssinn • rht nf and
right to sell the property. In an outright sale, a person transfers all these rights
which go to make the other an owner of the immovable property; in a mortgage
he transfers any one of these, but not all.
A mortgage is different from a pledge. In a pledge the ownership of goods
or personal chattels (not immovable property) remains with the pledgor; what is
transferred to the pledgee is possession of the property. In a mortgage what is
transferred is an interest in specific immovable properly (not goods or personal
chattels), the ownership and possession of the property being retained by the
mortgagor except in case of an usufructuary mortgage.

24. Rama Jois: I.e,c,'aI and Constitutional Hi.vtors' of India, 1985 Edn., Part II, Ch. 5. pp. 115.130
(It gives interesting details on this topic).
25. For details sec Muhla: Transfer of Property Act, 5th Edn.. 1966. p. 364.
26. Lahiri: Transfer of I'ropertv Act, 81h Edn.. 1965, p. 292.
 VI] Mortgages, Liens and Merger 147

(c) Classification. —The Transfer of Property Act recognises six kinds of

mortgages: simple mortgage, mortgage by conditional sale, usufructuary
mortgage, English mortgage, mortgage by deposit of title deeds and anomalous
mortgage. Instead of reproducing their definitions, 27 we shall go through and
discuss in brief their important features hereunder.

8. SIMPLE MORTGAGE
A simple mortgage which is made without delivering possession of the
mortgaged property has the following ingredients:
(1) Possession and enjoyment of the property subject to mortgage
remains with the mortgagor.
(2) The mortgagor binds himself personally to pay the mortgage money.
(3) In the event of his failing to pay, the mortgagee shall have a right to
put the property to sale only through court and recover his money.
(4) Such a mortgage, irrespective of the amount of consideration, must be
effected by a registered document.
In such a mortgage the mortgagee has two ways open to him: either to use
his power of sale of the mortgaged property through sale and
to recover his
amount or to sue on the mortgage and obtain a money decrr against the debtor.
A simple mortgage has to be distinguished from a charge. As pointed out by
Snell, 28 for most practical purposes a charge can be regarded as a species of
mortgage; for whereas a mortgage is a conveyance of property, a charge merely
gives the chargee certain rights over the property as security for the loan. Where
the amount is to be realised from the income of a definite and specified item of
property and there is no right to put the property to sale, the transaction is only a
charge and not a mortgage.

9. MORTGAGE IY CONDITIONAL SALE

In a mortgage by conditional sale there is:
(1) An ostensible sale of the mortgaged property. I

(2) There is also a condition that in case of failure to pay the money on a
certain date the sale shall become absolute, but on such payment
being made the sale shall become void and the mortgagee (the buyer)
shall retransfer the property to the seller (the mortgagor).
(3) Such a condition has to be embodied in the same document if the
transaction is to be a mortgage.29
(4) The remedy of the mortgagee in such a transaction is a suit for
foreclosure.

27. See Sections 58(0) to 58(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
28. Snell Principles (f Lquuv. p.375.
29. Pandit (/,unC/,00 i/rn V. S/re,k)j Ebdüt/ (1955)1 SCR 174.
 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief lChap.
148

(5) If the consideration exceeds Rs 100 the registration of the document is

compulsory.
Whether a transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale has to be
decided with reference to the "intention of the parties", 30 which can be gathered
from the document itself. 3 ' In every case tho question is "what, upon a fair
construction, is the meaning of the instrument. No extrinsic evidence or
evidence de hors the document is allowed, as what the document expresses has
to be accepted".
10. USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE
The salient features of an usufructuary mortgage arc:
(1) Delivery of possession of the property to the mortgagee or a binding
to that effect.
(2) Till the amount obtained is repaid such possession is authorised to be
retained.
(3) Rents and profits accruing from the property are to be appropriated in
lieu of interest on the principal amount. On realisation of the amount
the property is redeemed.
(4) The mortgagor has no personal liability.
(5) The mortgagee has no power either of sale or of foreclosure.
(6) Registration, if the consideration exceeds Rs 100, is compulsory.
Moreover, a binding to deliver possession of the mortgaged property must
be plain and without any condition. The mortgaged property will remain with
the creditor as long as the debt is not satisfied; but if the possession is for a
definite number of years the transaction is not an usufructuary mortgage but an
anomalous mortgage.
11. ENGLISH MORTGAGE
In an Eiwlish morlaa'e
(1) The mortgagor binds himself personally to repay the mortgage money
on a certain date.
(2) There is transfer of the mortgaged property absolutely to the
mortgagee.
(3) Possession is delivered.
(4) The property so, transferred is to be retransferred to the mortgagor
when there is repayment.
(5) The mortgagee's remedy is only a sale.

I SCR 174 flhiii Wi lVanjan JOSII( v. N.R.

30 Pandit ('Iirincliuii JIM V. Shtli H)adatali, (1955)
Agarwal. (1960) 2 SCR 327. Scc also State of Kerala v. Cot/un Re/inerie.n lid . AIR 1968 SC
v. lgge. 27 IA 58. 22 All 149. hlo/ur.uannV. (1966) 2 SCR I
1361 hall. I ,hamla s

31. Allcru,,i V. White, ( 1 859) 2 DG 97: 44 ER 924. 928.

Vfl Mortgages, Liens and Merger 149

(6) Such a power of sale can be out of court.

It must be noted that like a simple mortgage, there is a personal undertaking
to repay the amount. There is no personal undertaking in a mortgage by
conditional sale, but in an English mortgage it is there. Similarly, there is a
transfer of the mortgaged property absolutely in an English mortgage, but in a
mortgage by conditional sale the transfer is an ostensible sale.

12. MORTGAGE BY DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS

A mortgage by deposit of title deeds is restricted to the following towns:
Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. Persons residing in these places can avail of its
benefits. The recognition of this type of mortgage is for the benefit of the
mercantic community to enable them to raise quick money. 32 Its essential
characteristics are:
(I) There should be delivery of documents of title to the creditor with
intent to create a security thereon. The property can be situate
anywhere.
(2) Registration is not necessary, except that a memorandum evidencing
the deposit of title deeds is required to be drawn and the terms of the
mortgage are incorporated therein.
(3) No possession of property is delivered.
(4) The remedy available to the mortgagee is a suit for sale.
(5) Provisions in respect of simple mortgage are applicable to this type of
mortgage also.

13. ANOMALOUS MORTGAGE

An anomalous mortgage is an admixture of any two or more types of
mortgages mentioned above. However, it is not necessary that whenever a
mortgage does not fall within any one of the five categories mentioned in
Sections 58(b) to (I) it must necessarily be treated as an anomalous mortgage.
This is so because the classification of mortgages by the Act is not an
exhaustive one but projects only a cross-section of the common types of
mortgages prevalent in India.

14. NATURE OF EQUITABLE MORTGAGES IN ENGLAND AND IN INDIA

In England, where a legal estate in property is conveyed as a security for
payment of a debt there is a legal mortgage, and where the estate conveyed is
equitable there is an equitable mortgage. What remains with the mortgagor after
the first mortgage is made is the equity f redemption which is an equitable
estate. This was the position prior to 1926, but even after 1926 there has not
been any substantial change and the equitable mortgage continues to remain in
vogue, because under the Law of Property Act, 1925, the mortgagor only grants

32. This was a practice prevalent in presidency towns and in moffusil before the passing of the
Act. The Privy Council accepted it and experience has justified its retention. See Gour, H.S.:
111F lAW OF 1 iANsi1R. 8th Edit., 1973. pp. 2301-2302.
150 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

a legal term of years to the mortgagee and retains with himself the fee-simple
estate, whereon he can create still further legal mortgages.
An equitable mortgage passes only an equitable interest in property unlike a
legal mortgage which passes the entire legal interest in property to the
mortgagee.
(a) How it co,nes into being.—(I) Where a legal mortgagor either by
design or by accident does not fully convey the legal estate or does or refrains
from doing something which falls short of conveying the legal estate, the
resultant mortgage would be an equitable mortgage but not a legal one. This can
happen in the following cases too:
(2) Where there is a written agreement to execute a mortgage, the
agreement gives rise to a liability in equity which can be specifically enforced.
Of course, in India this does not happen.
(3) Where there is a writteh declaration that the land of the mortgagor is
charged with the repayment of a loan, an equitable mortgage comes into
existence.
(4) Where title deeds to the property are deposited with intent to create a
mortgage, the land concerned being the security for the payment of a debt, it is
yet another instance wherein an equitable mortgage is created without a writing,
on the principle of implied agreement and part performance.33
(b) In India.—In India all mortgages are legal mortgages. 34 Indian law
knows no distinctn between legal and equitable estates, rights and mortgages.
The right of redemption of a mortgage is a legal right under Section 60 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A mortgagor can therefore create a second
mortgage on this right. As could be seen from the definition of mortgages in
Section 58, a mortgagor in India does not transfer the whole interest in the
property but retains a legal interest in the property which may be further
subjected to a subsequent mortgage.
Under English law a legal mortgage takes precedence over an equitable
mortgage subject to certain exceptinnc hit in. !'dia -s ni u, because,
according to Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, all mortgages rank in
order of the time of creation, subject to provisions of Sections 78 and 79.
Mortgage by deposit of title deeds in India differs from an English equitable
mortgage, because, whereas the latter is an insufficient security 35 and can be
postponed toa subsequent legal mortgage, the former is a sufficient security, a
completed transfer, and takes effect and precedence as against any mortgage
deed subsequently executed and registered.
A mortgage by deposit of title deeds in England is accompanied by a
written memorandum and that memorandum alone determines the scope and
extent of the security, as it is the memorandum only which governs the bargain.

33. Maitland: Lectures on Equity. 1969 Edri.. p. 198.

34. imperial Bank of India v. U. Rai Gyaw, (1923) 1 Rang 637 (PC).
35. "Equitable mortgages are not very safe things", Maitland: Lectures on Equity. 1969 Edn., p. 199..
 VI] Mortgages, Liens and Merger
151
If the memorandum is merely the record of
an already completed bargain, its
position is not so strong. In India, if
such a memorandum is an integral part of
the transaction, it is required to be registered and it will not be allowed to be
contradicted by extrinsic oral e v idence. 36
Moreover on the ratio of Pranjivantjas
Me/ita v. Chan Ma Phee 37 and per Lord Cairns in
Show v. foster38 and National
Bank v, Nazjr & Co. per Justice Tayabjf one may say that the question of
registration depends on the question whether the written memo contains the real
bargain between the parties or riot. If it contains, it must be registered.

15. MORTGAGOR'S EQUITY OF REDEMPTION

OR RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
(a) Origin.-.---- The
origin, nature and the elevation of the equity of
redemption from an equitable right into an equitable estate has already been
discussed in para 5 above.
(b) Description.—As
could be seen from Section 60 of the Transfer of
Property Act, a right of redemption can be described as the mortgagor's right to
get retransferred the mortgaged property, free from any encumbrance, on his
repaying the mortgage debt with due interest, before his rig/it to redeem is
foreclosed or the property mortgaged is got sold by the mortgagee.
It is a right
which requires the mortgagee to do three things on repayment of his money:-
(i) to deliver all the documents relating to the property;
(ii) to deliver possession of the property if he is in possession thereof; and
to retransfcr the property as the mortgagor directs or to execute a
registered ack nowledgement in writing that no rights in derogation
the interest transferred subsist or exist. of
(c) Nature.—A
right of redemption in India is a legal right (as discussed
before) which a mortgagor can exercise by virtue of his residuary ownership in
the property. It has been properly pointed out by SneII 40
that the mortgagor's
equitable right to redeem, coupled with his other rights in the property,
constitute his "equity of redemption". In other words,
it is the sum total of his
residual rights and interests in the mortgaged property.
There can be no partial
redemption (except in one case under Section 60) because the mortgage securit
y
is indivisible. If a piecemeal redemption is allowed the security may d
epreciatc, 41
and the integrity of a mortgage may be broken. 42
Thus the indivisibility of the
mortgage security is a statutory concept. The right to redeem, in India, subsists
until a final decree of sale or order of foreclosure has been actually passed as per
Rules 3 and 5 of Order 34 of the Civil Procedure Code.

36. 0b117 Nararan, (1930)35 CWN 925 (PC); Rnehpal

V. Bhaewan AIR 1950 Sc 79.
37. (1916) LR 43 IA 122.
38. 1872 LR 5 HL 32.
39. 34BLR784.7j.
40 .. .nell l'nn 1/)I's af Lqu,t %'
27 ii I tin. . 1 973,[, . 378.
41. NclA4tn,Jj v. Sidreth (1886> 12 IA 171.
42. Rnn,chand v. /'rabliu Darn!. (1942)69 1A 98.
 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relkf [Chap.
152

16. DOCTRINE OF CLOG ON REDEMPTION

Though equity of redemption under the English law in the same form is not
recognised in India, the doctrine of clog on the right of redemption has been
recognised.43
(a) Description—A clog has been dcscribcd .as any contrivance or method
whereby the mortgagor's right of redemption is impaired. Explaining this in
Noakes v. Rice it has been said:
"There are three doctrines of the courts of equity in this country. The
The
first is expressed in the maxim "One a mortgage, alwa y s a mortgage".
second is that the mortgagee shall not reserve to himself any collateral
advantage outside the mortgage contract; and the third is that a provision
or stipulation which will have the effect of clogging or fettering the equity of
redemption is void. The third doctrine to which I have referred is only a
corollary from the first, and might be expressed in this form 'once a
mortgage, always a mortgage and nothing but a mortgage.' The- meaning is
that the mortgagee shall not make any stipulation which will prevent a
mortgagor who has paid principal, interest and costs from getting back his
mortgaged property in the condition in which he parted with it."
This rule has been applicable in India too as could be observed from
Sherkhan case45 decided by the Privy Council. Thus any agreement which
directly bars the mortgagor's right to redeem or a stipulation which directly or
indirectly may have the effect of making the mortgage irredeemable or the
property being still subject to incumbrances after redemption, are clogs on the
equity of redemption.
(b) Tests.—The test whether a particular agreement or stipulation is a clog
or not depends on the nature, import and scope of the stipulation and whether
the same has been a part of the mortgage agreement itself. The needy mortgagor
cannot bargain on equal terms with the mortgagee and it is to save him from
pressures of the mortgagee that this rule has been made by equity. James
Fairlouc'li cace" and Rp,'vp rl7 c ,,48 in Png1nd , nd 5.kzrdir c" '. !rdia
are leading examples on the topic.
(c) Modern Trend.—Courts in England were at one time inclined to rule
even further than this that any benefit or advantage which may endure beyond
the period of repayment of the debt with interest and costs (called "the price of
redemption") 50 was invalid 5 ' but the modem trend is not so harsh; it restricts the
rule to the clogging of equity and will not allow it to go further. Consequently,

43. Gangadhar v. Shankar, AIR 1958 SC 770.

44. 1902 AC 24. per Lord Davey.
45. MahomedSherkhflfl v. Rain Seth Swamy Daval. (1921)20 AU 476.
46. Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th Edn., p. 379.
47. 1912 AC 565.
48. Reeve v. l,icle, 1902 AC 461.
49. (1912) 34 All 620.
50. See SneIl'.v Principles of Equity. pp. 410-413 for details.
51. Noakes v. Rice, 1902 AC 24: Brad/er v. ('arritt, 1903 AC 253.
 V11 Mortgages, Liens and Merger 153
in Kreg1nger case, Lord Mercey described this doctrine as an unruly dog,
which if not chained and confined to its own kennel, was prone to wander into
places where it ought not to be. It was observed in that case that if the collateral
advantage is not unconscionable, unfair, extravagant or oppressive, or in the
nature of penalty or inconsistent with the right to redeem, the same is valid.53
This view finds expression in Kanahayalal v. Nationa1 Bank of India
54 and is in
line with the construction 55 of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act in
India.
As to who can exercise this right and how, is laid down in Section 91 of the
Transfer of Property Act. It can be exercised before it is foreclosed, or the
mortgaged property is sold by the mortgagee or before it becomes time barred.
17. FORECLOSURE

As said by Hanbury, the right to foreclose is an equitable right given to the

mortgagee to counterbalance the mortgagor's right to redeem. This was a proper
move on the part of equity courts because one has to become just before he
professes to become generous. Foreclosure can be effected only by an order of
the court. The court thereby gives the mortgagor and all the parties interested in
the equity of redemption an Opportunity to redeem the mortgage. The
mortgagor, who in such proceedings is already too late to redeem at law, shall
be deprived even of his equitable right. 56 As Strahan puts it, it is simply the right
to ask the court to withdraw its relief against a forfeiture which is created by the
mortgage. In suitable cases, therefore, a court passes first of all a conditional
order of foreclosure, called aforeclo cure nisi,
which if not complied with by the
mortgagor will become absolute, and the mortgagor will be barred forever from
redeeming his property. Resultantly the mortgagee will hold the land absolutely
both at law and in equity. Section 67 of the Transfer of Property Act provides
for this. The position of various mortgagees under the Act is that in case of a
simple mortgagee and a usufructuary mortgagee, no foreclosure is allowed,
while in case of a English mortgagee and a mortgagee by deposit of title deeds
the remedy of sale is allowed. It is only in case of a mortgage by conditional
sale that a foreclosure is allowed.
An anomalous mortgagee may have, according to the terms of the
mortgage, both or any one of the two remedi es—foreclosure or sale. A dismissal
of the redemption suit on failure of the mortgagor to redeem operates to
foreclose his right of redemption; and he will not be allowed to sue for
redemption again, as it amounts to harrassment of the mortgagee.57

52. 1914 AC 25.

53. Riggs cave, (1893)2 Ch 307.
54. (1923) IA 162.
55. Anibu Nair V. Kefu Nmr, (1930) 53 Mad SOS.
56. Sad/s Principles of Iqum . p. 401.
57. Riggs v. Ilodthnort (1893)2 Ch 307. 312.
 Equir1, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.
154

18. OPENING THE FORECLOSURE

As said bafore, although the absolute foreclosure order appears to be final, a
court will open a foreclosure in circumstances compelling and inducing it to do
so. They are, as enumerated by Sne11 58 : (i) an accident at the last moment
preventing the mortgagor from raising the money, (ii) any special value of the
property to the mortgagor, (iii) a marked disparity between the value of the
property and the amount lent, (iv) the promptness of the application, 59 and
(v)
where the mortgagee pursues another remedy after obtaining an order of
foreclosure absolute. It was for this reason that Maitland remarked that "one is
not very safe in purchasing a foreclosed estate". In India no such provision for
reopening a final decree of foreclosure exists as could be gathered from Order
34, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Besides suing a mortgagor personally and foreclosing his right of
redemption, in India, a mortgagee has the remedies of a judicial sale, sale
without intervention of court, appointment of a receiver and taking possession
of the mortgaged property.
19. TACKING
Tacking is the union of two securities on the same property by the
mortgagee who has a legal-estate. This union is achieved in such a manner
and with such a result that the intermediate equitable purchaser is prevented
from claiming a title to redeem. This contrivance had the effect of modifying
the rules of priorities. Putting this principle into practice resulted in injustice
as when a subsequent equitable mortgagee might tack his right by getting in
the legal estate and could squeeze out a second mortgagee. This is an extreme
and unjust extension of the principle underlying the maxim "where there is
equal equity, the law shall prevail". This curious doctrine was therefore
abolished in 1925 . 60 and after 1925 a legal or equitable mortgage was allowed
to tack further advances to rank in priority to intervening legal or equitable
mortgages. 61 In India, tacking for the purpose of squeezing out an
intermediate mortgagee is not recognised. 62 It is expressly prohibited by
Stn' .3 f th y Trar..fvrf Property Act. The sectan caota that when a
third mortgagee pays off the first mortgagee, he is subrogated to the position
of the first mortg agee. The section in such cases explains that the third
mortgagee cannct join his own mortgage to the first and claim priority over
the intermediate mortgagee- Tacking of this nature is prohibited but tacking
further advances as set out in Section 79 of the Act is permitted. In short,
what a third mortgagee gets by paying off the first mortgagee is not priority,
but subrogation or substitution.

58. Snells Principles of Equity. p. 403.

59. Campbell V. ii1 "land, (1877)7 Ch 0 166.
60. Law of Properly. 1925, Section 94(3).
61. Law oI . I'roperly. 1925, Section 94.
62. Gokulnath v. I- P. La!, ( 1878) 3 Cal 307.
63. imperial Bank of India v. US.!. and Co., 51 Cal 86.
 VI] Mortgages, Liens and Merger 155

20. CONSOLIDATION
The doctrine of consolidation had its origin in the maxim "he who seeks
equity must do equity". Where distinct estates have been separately mortgaged
by the same mortgagor to the same mortgagee, the mortgagee is in a better
position as if the whole of the lands had been mortgaged to him for the total
amounts advanced by him. He can therefore consolidate those mortgages
against the mortgagor and refuse to allow him to rcdccrn one without redeeming
the oilier, in other words, when a party is entitled to the mortgages he can insist
upon the mortgagor to redeem all at a time or none. Redemption here is allowed
only upon cquitablc terms that is, when the mortgagor's right to redeem at law
was lost ;nd he seeks to enforce his equitable right to redeem, the mortgagee
can subject the mortgagor to an equitable condition of redeeming all the
mortgages, because otherwise a mortgagee would be exposed to the risk of
deficiency of the other security. He is thus left to his luck, which is not fair.
The doctrine applies to real or personal property mortgaged and also to legal or
equitable properties. This doctrine was abolished in England. The Transfer of
Property Act, Section 61, in India, also enacts to this effect. Section 61 enacts
against conso]idation 5 but provides that if there is a contract to the contrary
consolidation will be permi 1tcd.' But a mortgagee cannot compel a mortgagor
to redeem all the mortgages as is provided in Section 67-A of the Transfer of
Property Act. It must be noted that the old unameiidcd section referred to
separate mortgages of different properties but the amended section now covers
the situation where the same property is mortgaged under successive mortgages.
As explained in Jankinath v. Pramatlznath 67 , such a situation may arise not due
to consolidation but because of making a second mortgage of the same property
to the same mortgagee.

21. MARSHALLING SECURITIES

To marshall means to arrange, to systematize, to methodize or to place in
order.
The doctrine of marshalling represents the concept of natural justice and it
is that a mortgagee cannot be allowed to act, either with design or with caprice,
whim or rashness, in such a way as to prejudice the rights of the other. Aldrich
v. Cooper" lays down the principle thus that
"it shall not depend upon the will
of one creditor to disappoint another". Moreover, "if a creditor has two funds,
the interest of the debtor shall not be regarded, but the creditor having two funds
shall take that which paying him will leave another fund for another creditor".69

64. Fischer on Mortgages p. 597.

65. Shanibhu Cha ran V. Harprasad. (1962) SC CA 11.
66. Adjty a v. Rania Ratan, 1930 PC 176.
67. 1940 PC 38. per Lord Roamer.
68. (1803)8 Vcs 382, per Lord Eldon. Sec also Well v. Smith. (1885) 30 Ch D 192;
offlthole, 2 ATK 446. lno' v. Duke
69. /tnn1qlirfl ( , v. Roozraijair , 40 C'VN 1173: sec also
National Pr,, in,.-ja/ 11(1,1k lid. v
(1959) 3 All FR 740 (equity aticnip[s to do justice among all beneficiaries on an equal
fooling).
156 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

This idea has been incorporated in Section 81 of the Transfer of Property Act
thus:
81. Marshalling securities.—If the owner of two or more properties
m rtgagcs them to one person and then mortgages one or more of the
properties to another person, the subsequent mortgagee is, in the absence of
a contract to tne contrary, entitled to have the prior mortgage debt satisfied
out of the property or properties not mortgaged to him, so far as the same
will extend, but not so as to prejudice the rights of the prior mortgagee or of
any other person who has for consideration acquired an interest in any of
the properties.
The section is clear and enacts that whcrr two mortgagees claim to be
satisfied out of the same property, it is for the court to apply this doctrine of
marshalling whcreundcr it will so arrange the securities that both the mortgagees
are paid as far as possible. This could be done b' directing the first mortgagee
(at the instance of the subsequent mortgagee) to s tisfy his claim first from the
property not mortgaged to the subsequent mortgagee and then to extend his
claim to the other. The result would be that it will leave the other security or so
much of a part of it, not required for the satisfaction of the first, for the
subsequent mortgagee. One has to note that the section includes the words "in
the absence of a contract to the contrary", which means that this "right" of the
mortgagee can be excluded by contract of the parties. Since the first mortgagee
has two estates in his hands he. of his own will, cannot be allowed to act in a
way to cause injusc and inflict loss to the other. But, if by marshalling the
securiti's the first mortgagee's interest is prejudiced or persons getting interest
through him are put to a loss, this principle will not be applied.70

22. CONTRIBUTION
The doctrine of c',ntribution is based on the maxim "equity delighteth in
equality". 71 The principle underlying this doctrine is equality; for example,
where severa l persons are debtors all shall be equal, and if the creditor does not
mt. p rhm tr ;ti ,- .i.. +i.. .•
-------
achieved-by making them to contribute equally. In other words, it involves the
fixation of the proportion or share in which two or more owners of an estate,
subject to a common charge, ought to contribut for its redemption. This
principle is incorporated in Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. Dr
GhOSC72 in his treatise has clearly explained thus:.......a mortgage debt is one
and indivisible and if several distinct parcels of land are hypothecated to the
creditor, which belong to two or more mortgagors, or subsequently pass to
different owners, the creditor may. as a rue, proceed against any one of such
parcels, and the only way to prevent a sale or foreclosure would be to pay the
whole of the mortgage debt. It is but reasonable that in such a case, the person

70. Devkinandan v Par,ne.vhwari, 1941 Punj LW 582. Sec also Lahiri: Transfer of Property Act,
8h Edn.. 1965. p. 404 quoting Jo,u'c on Mortgage.
71. Craythorne v. Swnburne, (1807) 14 Ves 160.
72. IR)v of Mortgnes in India. 8th Fdn.. V. 415.
 VI] Mortgages, Liens and Merger 157

who is compelled to discharge the common burden should be permitted to seek

indemnification from the others and no fairer rule can be suggested than that
cch of them should contribute according to the value of he property owned by
him or the extent of his interest in it. For the law would not suffer the creditor to
select his own victim, 'nd from caprice or favoiritism to turn a 'common
burden' into a gross personal oppression".' Principles of natural justice can be
seer working here.
Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act incorporates not only the case of
a property once mortgaged and subsequently divided into several shares but also
the case of a mortgage of several properties mortgaged. In other words, where
the debt is one and the properties mortgaged are several, and where there are
two properties and the debts are several the principle applies. It should be noted
that contribution is regulated by the principle of marshalling and where there is
a conflict between the two, principles of marshalling shall prevail. Section 82
will apply only up to the time the mortgage continues. Moreover, the liability
created by contribution is lot personal but it is attached to the property and the
liability though statutory can he avoided or excluded by a contract, as the
section itself provides. Looked at from a proper angle, one may say that
contribution is marshalling in a different form. Leading cases on the pril ciple
are Kidar La II v. Hari Lajj13 and Narayan v. NaIIarninal74.

23. SUBROGATION
(a) Origin . —The term subrogation is said to he derived from the Latin r ot
sub rogo suhrogatuni—from sub and rogo to ask, meaning substitution. Dr
Oglive explains that subrogation is a term of civii law meaning the substitution
of one person in the place of another giving him his rights, but in the general
sense it implies a succession of the kind tithe , of a person to a person or a
person to a thing.
(b) Definition,—The Law Commissioners in their report" say that
technically the term is confined to cases where the right arises by operation of
law. In Roman law, a creditor who lent money to the debtor for the purpose of
paying off a mortgage on condition that he was to he substituted in the place of
the mortgagee, was entitled to claim the benefit of the security discharged with
his money; 76 and this right has been recognised in all modem systems derived
from Roman law.... The principle of subrogation however ought to apply
generally to all cases other than those of a mortgagor who pays off his own debt
or of' a mere volunteer.77
This doctrine is a doctrine of equity jurisprudence. As defined by Mukrjee,
J. in B/sses'ta; Prascid v, Lala Sarnani Singh 78 it does not depend on privity of

73. 1952 SCR 79: 1952 SO 17.

74. (1942)2 MLJ 525.
75. 13th report in 1929.
76. Sec Donait,r Civil liiiv, Section 1774 and Flunier's Roman Lsiiv, pp. 441. 443.
77. Sec CrartI,orne V. Sit':nbu yne (1807) 14 Vcs 160, 162, per Sir S. Romilly In England.
78. 1907 Cal Li 134. 137-138.
158 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

contract, express or implied, excet in so far as equity may be supposed to be

imported into the transaction and thus raise contract by implication. It is
founded on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and on the
principles of natural justice. While therefore the 1octrine will be applied in
general, (i) wherever any person other than a mere volunteer pays a debt or a
demand which in equity or good conscience should have been satisfied by
another, or (ii) where the liability of one person is discharged out of a fund
belonging to another, or (iii) where one person is compelled for his own
protection or that of some interest which he represents to pay a debt for which
another is primarily liable, or (iv) wherever a denial of the right would be
contrary to equity and good conscience, it will never be permitted, where the
application of it would work injustice to the rights of those having equal or
superior equities.
(c) Test.—The test of the right of subrogation79 is found in an answer to the
inquiry (i) whether the person who paid the mortgage debt is the one whose duty
it was to pay it first of all: (ii) if the debt was not primarily his, and he only
occupied the position of a surety to the mortgagor, he is entitled to be
subrogated to the position of the mortgagee when he has paid the debt: (iii) but
if the debt is the debt of the person who paid it, or is a debt which he has
covenanted to pay, his payment of it raises no right of subrogation, but is simply
a performance of his obligation or covenant. This important doctrine of equity,
in simple language, means to say that one who removes another's burden is
entitled to step into his shoes, the characteristic features being that
reimbursement is the foundation of this principle and the encumbrance that is
paid off is treated as alive and not as one extinguished.
(d) Types—Subrogation is of two types; legal and conventional. Legal
subrogation comes into existence when a mortgage debt is paid off by one who
has to protect his interest. It is subrogation by law or legal subrogation. 80 Legal
subrogation does not end the liability of the property; the liability herein is
simply transferred in favour of one who pays off the mortgage debt. A
conventional subrogation which may be said to be conscnsii] cihrng rrn or
subrogation by agreement is by act of parties.
Payment made to an infant for necessaries, 82 necessaries supplied to a
deserted wife and the executor carrying on the business of his testator, are the
well-known examples wherein subrogation on principhs of equity have been
allowed.
The Transfer of Property Act, Section 92 and the Indian Contract Act,
Section 69 incorporate this principle. 83

79. Jones on Mortgages, para 1119.

80. Gokuldasv.Rambux,(I884) 10 Cal 1036 (PQ: lilA 126.
81. Man Mohan v. Jankiprasad, 1945 PC 23.
82. Marlow v. Pitfield, (1719) 1 P Wims 558. See Section 68 of Indian Contract Act, 1872.
83. Hirasing v. Jaising, 1937 All 588; Kidari La!! v. Hari La!!, 1952 SO 37.
 Mortgages, Liens and Merger 159

Subrogation can be achieved by redemption only and in no other way.84

This right is available only from the date of redemption of the mortgaged
property and not from the date of the right of redemption.

B. LIENS AND MERGER

24. LIENS
f (a) Dej7nitio,L—A common law lien is the right of a person to retain
posion of the goods of another until his claims are satisfied. 85 Story defines
it to the same effect 86 and explains that it is the right of a person to have his
claim satisfied out of the property belonging to another. The main elements are
right to possess and retain the property until the discharge of a charge. It is good
against the world at large SC) long as it exists.
Lien is either legal or equitable and either particular or general. It differs
from a mortgage or a pledge. The point of difference is that a lien does not give
any active ri/ir in regard to the property; the right given is a mere
passive right
to possess.
(b) Legl and Equitable Lien.—Legal lien is that which is recognized and
enforced by the common law courts, while an equhable lien is that which is
recognised and enforced in a court of equity only. A legal lien is lost when the
possession of the property subject to it is given up. It is however good against
the whole world. Equitable lien, for its existence and continuance, does not
depend upon retention of possession of the property subject to it; it affects
everybody who obtains property with notice thereof. In other words "equitable
lien confers a charge on property" and arises by "operation of equity from
relationship between the parties rather than by act of parties. 1t exists
independently of possession but will not avail against a purchaser for value of a
legal estate without notice of it. It is enforceable by means of an order for
salc")
The distinction between a legal and an equitable lien is maintained in Indian
Law too, as could be seen from the decision of the Privy Council in Nippon
Kaislza case".
(c) Lien and Pledge.—A common law lien confers merely a right to possess
and retain the property as security, which can be said to be a mere passive right
to possess. 90 In a pledge there is a delivery of possession of property and a
power of sale is its necessary concomitant.

84. Gurudev v. Ciandrjka, AIR 1944 PC 96.

85. Snell's Principles of Equity citing Flarninondv V. Barclay, (1802)2 East 227, 235.
86. Story: Equit y JurL'.'rudence, 3rd Edn., p. 331.
87. Itarrati V Cough Thomas (No. 2). 1951 Ch 242.
88. .Snell '.v Prrncp!e.r of Lquirt'. 27th Edn., p 438.
89. Nippon ko,.v/ia v. Roinjibon (1938) 42 CWN 677 (PC).
90. Burrati case, (1951) Ch 242.
160 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

(d) Particular and General Lien.—A particular lien is attached and

confined to a particular charge whereas a general lien extends to all claims
against the owner, whether or not in relation to particular goods, i.e., it stretches
and expands to the general balance due.
(e) Types of Lien.—Liens are of diverse kinds, as already mentioned. Liens
by custom and usage add to this list. The iinportant liens may be listed as
follows;
solicitor's lien,
( banker's lien,
(35 agent's lien.
(4) vendor's lien,
(5) purchaser's lien
(6) bailee's lien,
(7) stockbroker's lien,
(8) factor's lien,
(9) trustee's lien,
(10) personal representative's lien,
(11) salvage lien,
(12) equitable lien,
(13) statutory lien,
(14) lessee's lien,
(15) lien of finder of goods, and
(16) pawnee's lien.
But these categories of liens are not exhaustive. Nos. 1, 4, 5, 9 and 10 may
be cited as examples of equitable lien and Nos. 1, 2, 7 and 8 as those of general
lien by custom or agreement. These liens may however, exist concurrently.

SOLICITOR'S LIEN
A solicitor has as per common law a lien on his client's property in his
possession and an equitable lien on his client's property recovered and
preserved through him. The first kind of lien is a passive right to retain the
property, while the second kind of lien is an active right which he can assert by
taking steps to realise the property by sale. He has also a particular lien on his
client's property for his costs of the suit (recognised by Section 28 of the
Solicitors' Act, 1860). has a general lien on all deeds and documents
(except a will) of his client with him and until he is paid they can be retained
and withhThis lien extends to the property of his client coming into the

91. Now the Solicitors' Act, 1957, Section 72, replacing cariicr provisions.
 VIJ Mortgages, Liens and Merçer 161

solicitors hards as a solicitor, but not otherwise, 92 and is confined to his costs
and does not include debts.

26. BANKER'S LIEN

Regarding securities deposited, the banker has a general lien. It extends to
the general balance of account. As laid down by Section 171 of the Indian
Contract Act, bankers, factors, wharfingers, attorneys of the High Court and
policy brokers have such a lien to retain the goods bailed to them.

,-2( AGENT'S LIEN

This has been incorporated under the ia-4 Contract Act, Section 221,
whereby the agent is entitled to retain goods, papers and other property, whether
moveable or immovable, of the principal received by him until his charges etc.
are paid out. The lien is lost as soon as the possession is parted with.93

28. BAILEE'S LIEN

Under Section 170 of the Indian Contract Act, when a bailce has done some
work by his skill which is relevant to or in pursuance of a contract of bailment,
he can retain them until he is suitably paid for it. Of course, this is subject to a
contract to the contrary. Thus artisans working on goods, packers, carriers and
auctioneers are entitled to this kind of lien.94

29. SALVAGE LIEN

According to the doctrine of maritime law, salvors (those who by their
assistance salvage the property, cargo or lives of persons in a ship), by the
presumption of law have an implied contract with the owner of the ship
whereby they have a retaining lien for their remuneration on the property
rescued. The doctrine has been accepted in India, the most important features
whereof are two' (i) bona fides of the person acting. and (ii)
preservation of the
estate in question. 95 The doctrine of salvage is different and therefore can be
distinguished from subrogation.

30. PAWNEE'S LIEN

Section 173 of the Indian Contract Act lays down that "the pawnee may
retain the goods pledged, not only for payment of the debt or the performance of
the promise, but for the interest of the debt, and all necessary expenses incurred
by him in respect of the possession or for the preservation of the goods
pledged".

92. Ex porte fuller, (188 1) 16 Ch D 617,

Tvabji Dah y
Born LR 1196; Sadanand v. Parashram, (1928) 30 abhaj v. Jetha Devji and Co.,
Born LR 157.
(1927) 29
93. Kishanda.c v. Ganesh Rain, AIR 1950 Pat 481;
see also Rant Prasad v. State of MI',, AIR
1970 SC 1818.
94. Beaven v. Waters, (1828) 3 Carr and P 520,
All 1894.
per Best, J. See also Skinner v. Jugar, (1883) 8
95, Dak.shjamc1, v. Saroda, 21 Cal 142 PC.
 Equity, Trust's and Specific Relief [Chap.
162

31. VENDOR'S LIEN

The concept of "vendor's trusteeship"' has been emphasised by the
vendor's lien. This is not an ordinary trusteeship. Cotton, L.J. said that the
vendor was a trustee only in a qualified sense. Lord Green, M.R. called him a
quasi-trustee and Lord Cairns said that the trustee was entitled to protect his
own interest in the property. A vendor becomes the trustee of the property sold
to the vendee as the property passes at once to the purchaser, on a specifically
enforceable contract for sale having been made. On such a contract having been
made the seller has a lien on the property sold for unpaid purchase money. He
can therefore retain it until the same is paid. 2 If the vendor parts with the
possession both of property and the title deeds thereof, he still has an equitable
lien on property in respect of the purchase money unpaid to him. The relationship
between the parties contains a number of aspects and facets wherein they are
hostile and the vendor self-intcrcstcd. The terminology of trusteeship therefore
must be received with reserve. Maitland explains this idea thus: "Usually there
are two distinct acts in law the agreement on the one hand, the conveyance on
the other; and weeks or months elapse between the two". 3 According to him
Austin did commit an error' when he said that "the mere agreement for sale
transfers the dominium, the jus in re". The most that it does is that it gives to the
purchaser an equitable estate in land, a right good against those who claim under
the vendor by gratuitous title, or who have or ought to have notice of it. The
purchaser has only an equitable estate in the land, though one which is subject
to the vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase money. The 'ndor has as yet the
legal estate in the land, and anyone who purchases from the purchaser must
purchase subject to those legal rights. Unless in the case of some very peculiar
agreement the vendor may keep the legal estate, and may keep possession of the
land until he is paid his price. If you say that the contract passess ownership, be
careful to say that it does so only in equity.5
(i) the
As laid down in Mackreth case this lien can be enforced against
purchaser himself, (ii) his heirs or persons claiming through the purchaser as
vucr, () uu .¼uLLIL ,ui Lmci oi vaiue 'uui widi iiuiice of inc lien, and
(iv) the assignee in bankruptcy of the purchaser. The vendor may waive or
abandon his lien and may lose it by ]aches or under the statutes of limitation.

32. VENDEE'S LIEN

Where a vendee pays the purchases money or a part of it in advance or by
way of deposit to the vendor, he has also a lien on the estate in the vendor's
hands. This lien exists not only when "the contract goes off for want of title, but

Maitland Lectures
.SnelI'r Principles of Equity. p. 445 ; Hanhury : Modern Equity, p. 233 ;
Lysaght v. Edwards, (1876)2 Ch D 499.
on Equit y . pp. 314-317. See also Jcsscl, M.R. in
2. Mackreth v, Svrnmons, (1808) 15 Ves Jr 329.
3. Maitland: Lectures on Equity, 2nd Edn., 1969. p. 314.
4. Ibid., p. 106, cuing Austin: Jurisprudence. p. 388.
pp. 314-315. Sec also Mackreth v. Swnmons, (1808) 15 Ves
Ji
5. Maitland: Lectures oil
329.
 Vi] Mortgages, Liens and Merger 163

also where he rescinds the contract under a condition enabling him to do so, or
the vendor repudiates the contract; 6 but if the contract goes off through the
purchaser's default, the lien is gone".' In order to bind the subsequent
purchasers it is necessary that it should be registered.
When the lien comes into being under an express contract between the
parties, it is a charge. As Strahan puts it, a lien and it are identical for all
practical purposes.

33. IN INDIA
(a) Charge—Section 100 defines a charge thus: "Where immovable
property of one prison is by act of the parties or operation of law made security
for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a
mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property,...".
The section recognises that there can be charges both by operation of law
and by act of parties. Charges by operation of law are, under Section 55(4)(b)
which deals with vcndce's charges for unpaid purchase money; under Section
55(6)(b) which deals with a purchaser's charge for the purchase amount paid in
anticipation of delivery of property; under Section 73 with respect of surplus
sale proceeds of a revenue sale; and under Section 82 for contribution.8
(1) Vendor's lien—The right of 'ccovery of unpaid purchase money,
called, a non-possessory lien, or vendor's lien, can be enforced by him against
the vendee and also against any person claiming through him with notice of
sale. But the vendor cannot claim back the possession; 9 he can retain possession
by virtue of it and when sued by the vendee for possession the court shall pass a
conditional decree, decreeing possession only on payment of the unpaid
purchase money.'° This lien is, however, an equitable lien quite independent of
the provisions of Sections 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. Being
purely of personal character vendor's creditors cannot enforce it)' It can
however he assigned, and the assignees can enforce it.12
This lien is available against the purchaser or any other person claiming
through him with notice of the sale,' 3 or against a transferee without
consideration (see Section 40), but not against a purchaser's transferee for
valuable consideration and without notice of the charge.14
(ii) Lien: When lost

6. Lee-Parker v. Iz.zet, (1971) 1 WLR 1688.

7. SneIl's Principles of Equity, 448.
8. All under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
9. Valaudlici v. Go'indswamj 39 Mad 524.
10. Prnnadii'i v. Satdeo Tiivari, Ill IC 761 Subraniania v. Puran, 27 Mad 28. For contra see
Kev1das v. Narnindas, III BLR 383.
11. Marital v. Bhagwandas, 31 Mad 443.
12. Dalchand v. Ganpat, 1927 Nag 332.
13. Ramanand v. Shivdas, 43 All 314.
14. Gurudayal v. Karan Singh, 38 All 254.
164 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

(1) When the vendor accepts a collateral security from the vendee,
the hen is lost, but by accepting an additional security it is not
lost. 15 There should be evidence of the vendor's abandoning it.
(2) When the vendor by his conduct gives the vendee an impression
that it will not be claimed, an etoppcl is raised against him and
the lien is lost. 16 But the lien is not lost because there is a recital
in the conveyance that the consideration is fully paid up. This is
SO because it is the usual practice in India that although no
consideration is in fact paid before recital, the documents are
executed.
(3) When the purchase money has been left with the vendee for
payment to the vendor's creditor, the lien cannot be enforced but
a mere direction by the vendor to the vendee cannot deprive him
of his lien.
A vendee's lien is lost when he improperly refuses to accept delivery of
property from the vendor.
(b) Charge and Lien—A charge differs from a lien in that a charge can
come into existence by act of parties or by operation of law, whereas a lien can
be created only by operation of law. Moreover, a charge is only with respect to
immovable propety. whereas a lien can be with respect to movable as well as
immovable property.
(c) Charge and Mortgage.—(i) A charge gives a right to payment out of a
particular fund or property without transfer of the fund or property, whereas a
mortgage is in essence, a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property.
(ii) In other words, a charge is a jus ed rem, i.e., a right to a thing, whereas a
mortgage is a jus in rem, i.e., a right against a property. (iii) Consequently, a
mortgage prevails over subsequent transferees, while a charge cannot prevail
against a transferee for consideration without notice of the charge. (iv) A charge
can be a floating charge over all the assets of a company under the company
law, while a mnrtc'n p P crn h rr'td o"er 2 'pecifc ppy. ()
mortgage, like a simple mortgagor, involves a personal liability, in a charge it is
not so. (vi) A charge can be created either by operation of law or by act of
parties, whereas a mortgage can be created only by act of parties. (vii) A
mortgage gives the power of recovery of money by sale of the mortgaged
premises whereas a charge directs the realisation of money from a particular
property, without reference to a sale.
(d) Charge by act of parties and by operation of law.—A charge by act of
parties may be oral, if created by a document in writing it must be registered
under Section 17(1-b) of the Registration Act, but if the amount secured is less

15. Grant v. Mill 2 V & B 306 Webb v. Macpherson. 31 Cal 57 Pc.

16. Kttk,wel v. Walson, 26 Ch D 501.
Lord
17. Mcghraj v. Abthl!a. 12 AIJ 1032: Tinuilrao v. municipal Comnar., 3 Born 172 and
per

Eldon in ,%fackri)i V SupIon%, IS Vcs 329.

IS. Mukcrji. J.. in Go y u,da Chandra v. Dwarka Nails, (1908)35 Cal 837.
 Vi] Mortgages, Liens and Merger 165

than Rs 100, it need not be registered. The property charged must be definite
and specified or else it would be void for uncertainty. 19 As said before, the
principles of vendor's lien and vendee's lien are incorporated in Sections
55(4)(b) and 55 (6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act in India and they are
similar to the corresponding equitable lien under the English law, Besides,
Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act speaks about the floating charge in
respect of a Hindu widow's right of maintenance and Section 51 of the Act
speaks about the equitable rule regarding improvements made on land by the
holder of a defective title. Similarly, government revenue arrears under the local
Revenue Acts form a charge under the Transfer of Property Act. A trustee,
under Section 32 of the Indian Trusts Act, has a right to reimburse himself from
trust property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and
therefore Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act rightly excludes this from
charge. He can insist and can compel that his charges be paid first before
disposition of trust property. While being a trustee he cannot sell or destroy the
trust property, he can get it sold after he ceases to become a trustee.20

34. LIEN OF THF FINDER OF GOODS

A finder of goods has a right to retain the goods found until he receives
suitable compensation; if a reward is offered, he can sue for the reward and
retain the goods until the same is paid. This is provided in Section 168 of the
Indian Contract Act and Section 169 gives him a right of sale when the goods
are perishable. When the owner cannot be found in spite of reasonable inquiries
and if found refuses to pay, the finder in such cases can sell the goods if his
charges amount to two-thirds of the value of the goods.

35. MERGER
As explained by Blackstone, according to the common law rule in
England, "whenever a greater estate and a lesser estate coincide and meet in
one and the same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is
immediately annihilated, or in the law phrase, is said to be merged, that is
sunk or drowned, in the greater". As decided in Forbes v. Moffat21 , that
means that when a charge and ownership of an estate are united in the same
person, the charge is automatically extinguished. Of course, this depends
upon the intention of the person in whom the interests are united and the same
may be express or implied. Equity will find out this intention and consider
what is most beneficial for him.
When a mortgage and the equity of redemption both come into the same
hand such a question arises. The common law rule, as laid down by Blackstone
and explained in forbes' case, was that the merger was automatic irrespective of
the intention of the person, but equity ruled that it depended on the person's

19. Mohini Debi v. Purnashashj. ([932)36 CWN 153.

20. Peary Mohan Mukerfee v. Narendra Na:h,(1901) 37 IA 27:,4bkan Sahib v. Soranbibi,(1915)
38 Mad 260.
21. (1811) 18 Ves 384.
166 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief

intention and where merger was against that person's interest, equity presumed
against the same.22
Now, after the Judicature ACt ç 873, both at law and in equity, merger
depends on intention.23,
In India, the Transfer of Property . Act before its amendment in 1929
accepted the rule laid down in Toulniene e'. Ser4re 2' under which
"extinguishment" (of a lesser estate into a bigger o) was. the rule and "keeping
alive" (both the estates, lesser and bigger) was the exception. But the Privy
Council25 declined to follow this rule of automatic merger. The amended
Section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, lays down that the court
presumes that the person who discharges an incurrrance, kept it alive if it
would be for his benefit, i.e., where a property is mortgaged once and there is a
subsequent mortgage, the prior mortgagee if he purchases the equity of
redemption will not bring about a merger because it would be in his own benefit
to keep it alive. If he keeps it alive then and then the subsequent mortgagee will
be able to redeem the prior mortgage, otherwise not. It is therefore the rule that
there will be no merger and the application of the doctrine of intention is no
longer required. Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that the
mortgagee's interest is not merged by reason of the fact that the mortgagee's
interest and the mortgagor's equity of redemption have been united in the same
person. Section 101 represents the converse case. According to Mulla, this right
which is statutory can be waived by contract and therefore it is unnecessary to
apply the equitable principle in India.

22. Ingle v. Vaughani Jenkins, (1900)2 Ch 368.

23. Snell's Principles of Equity, p. 406.
24. (1817)3Mer2I0.
25. Gokuldas v. Rambux, (1884) 10 Cal 1036 (PC): II IA 126.
 Chapter VII
Married Women, Infants, Idiots and Lunatics
"At common law, a wife's separate and distinct personality was considered
to be merged into that of her husband who enjoyed power and domination over
her.,.."
"itt India the wife got an honoured position on marriage', and as the old
writers put it, 'a woman is half husband and completes him, and the highest
law for husband and wife was mutual fidelity'."
Vedic Index 1, pp. 484-486
Manu IX, p. 96; Manu 111, pp. 55-56
"An infant is not absolutely, incapable of binding himself by contract, but is,
generally speaking, incapable of absolutely binding himself."
An Irish judgment
SYNOPSIS
A. Married Women B. Infants
1. History - Jurisdiction
2. Equitable Relief 2. Purpose and Procedure
(a) Wife's Equity to a Settlement 3. In India
(b) Wife's Separate Estate C. Persons of Unsound Mind
(c) Restraint on Anticipation In India
(d) Modern Position
3. In India

A. MARRIED WOMEN

1. HISTORY
To appreciate the modern law in respect of the legal position of married
women, it is necessary to go through, though succinctly, into the history of the
penetration, invasion and inroads upon the harshness of the Common law rules
made, first by equity and later by statute. -
At Common law, on marriage and during marriage, all rights of a woman
were suspended, incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband with the
result that she could neither acquire nor hold property independently of her
husband. As the husband provided her with protection and cover and as he was
considered to be the ablest and the fittest to govern the family, the wife's
distinct and separate personality was considered to be merged into that of her
husband who enjoyed power and domination over her. On marriage therefore
the husband was entitled to all her property whether it belonged to her at the
date of marriage or came to her after marriage. Consequently she lost her
propertand distinct personalit','. She could not contract with her husband, She
could not sue or be sued either in tort or in contract without joining her husband
as a party. Against her husband's neglect she was remedi less. The husband had
full power to alienate her chattels without her consent and to alienate her real
property with her consent. He was entitled to receive rents and profits of her

I J67J
168 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

realty during coverture. If he survived the wife he could take the property
absolutely. The wife was thus without remedy against such rigid practices of the
Common law and was reduced to the status of a beneficiary under a trust or a
mortgagor in a forfeited mortgage.
2. EQUITABLE RELIEF
But the courts of equity, although on the principle that "equity follows the
law", in general protected the interests of the husband, thought it fit to depart
from these rigid rules of Common law in three instances. This it did by
innovating new ideas based on principles of natural justice and reciprocity.
(a) Wife's equity to a settlemenr.—If the husband wanted to enforce his
rights regarding property of the wife and in doing so if he took proceedings and
sought assistance from the courts of equity, the courts could compel him to
make provision out of that property for his wife and children. This it did on the
principle "he who seeks equity must do equity".' This principle was also
pressed into service in a case where the wife died and her children initiated the
action.2
(b) Wife's separate estate.—By ante-nuptial agreements when real or
personal property was given or settled upon a woman, at Common law such
agreements did not survive on marriage. But equity enforced such agreements in
furtherance of their common intention and object. Similarly, where a husband
abandoned his rights to the wife's property, where he gave his own property to
her, or some stranger gifted property to the wife, that property together with her
earnings, savings, pinmoney and cash investments in land formed her separate
property, which she could dispose of without her husband's consent either inter
vivos or by will,.' whether the interest therein was in reversion or possession."
This idea was an innovation whereby the wife was considered to be a femme
sole, capable of possessing independently of her husband's control, property
within her complete control, for her separate use, without the intervention of
trustees. An intention to reserve or keep apart such property was sufficient and
no particular form of words was necessar y to create the seprt
By recognising and injecting into practice these two novel ideas, equity
modified the Common law rights of a husband so that the position of a married
woman in society could be raised to a respectable level. A married woman now
could contract as her husband's agent and her debts could be satisfied out of her
separate estate only. But one thing is to be noted here, that when she died during
coverture and left her separate property undisposed, the husband's Common law
right to this extent was revived. 5 The Married Women's Property Act, 1882
converted these equitable rights into legal rights which brought into vogue a
popular aphorism that a husband could "break his wife's neck but not her

1. Elibank v. Moniolieu, (1801) 5 Vcs 737.

2. Murray v. Lard Etibank, (1804) 10 Vcs 84.
3. Feniplace v. Gorges, (1789) I Ves Jun 46.
4. Sturgis v. Corp., (1806) 13 Ves 190.
5. Before 1926 the husband took such rights.
 ViiJ Married Women, infants. Idiots and Lunatics 169

watch" which was her separate property. By the Administration of Estates Act,
1925, Section 46 as amended 6 from time to time the husband's rights are now
regulated. Neither spouse, however, has any rights consequent on the death
intestate of the other spouse while a decree of judicial separation is in force and
the separation is continuing, for the property of the intestate spouse devolves as
if the other spouse were already dead.7
(c) Restraint on anticipation.—The third step to secure and protect the
married woman's property rights against her husband's imperceptible but
powerful persuasion or coercion was the invention by Lord Thurlow 5 of the
doctrine of "restraint on anticipation". This doctrine was a creation of the equity
courts and was especially brought into existence for guarding the wife's
property. In course of' time, the married woman's "separate property" became
her "property -9 , and the fetters of "restraint on anticipation" attached by equity
courts to it, which would otherwise be—in case of restraint on property of a
man—void, as being repugnant to the nature of property, were modified as
circumstances required in order to further the object for which it was created.
This restraint was attached as soon as she married and would cease on her
husband's death or on divorce. On remarriage it again attached. Thus it attached
and reattached toties quoties'°. As this restraint on anticipation, whereby a
woman was prohibited or disabled during coverturc from aliei''-g the property
or anticipating the future income out of the property, and which was recognised
by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, worked against her creditors, in
1935, new restraints were prevented from taking form and the existing
restraints were abolished from December 16, 1949, 12 thus bringing and raising
her position to that of a man. It has therefore been rightly said that on account of
successive Married Women's Property Acts the old status of a married woman
and the principle of the fictitious unity of the husband and wife now no more
exists; they stand abrogated and therefore the subject can be said to be obsolete
here being a fit subject for discussion under the Law of Property generally.
(d) Modern position—As presented by Snell 13
the modem position in
general is that a married women is now,
(i) capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of, any property;
(ii) capable of rendering herself and being rendered, liable in respect of
any tort, contract, debt or obligation;

6. By the Intestates' Estates Act, 1957, the Family Provision Act,

Reforms Act, 1969. 1966 and the Family Law
7. Matrimonial Proceedings & Property Act, 1970, Section 40(1),
Equity, 27th Edn., 1973, p. 516. cited in Snell's Principles of
8. In Pybu.c v. Smith, (1791) 3 Bro ,CC 340;
Brandon v. Robinson (1811) LC 18 y es 429 at
Nathan No. 72 on p. 314.
9. See Law Reforms (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act,
1935. Ss. 1 and 2.
10. For detailed account see Site!!'s Principles of
Equity, 24th Edn.. 1954, pp. 457, 462.
It. Law Reforms (Married Women and Tortfcasors) Act, 1935.
12. Married Woman (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act, 1949.
13. Snell's Prs.iciple.r of Equity, 27th Edn,, 1973.
p. 517. For detailed account see p. 517-530.
170 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

(iii) capable of suing and being sued, either in tort or in contract or

otherwise; and
(iv) subject to the law relating to bankruptcy and to the enforcement of
judgements and orders, in all respects as if she were a femme sole.
Moreover, she is no longer able, as her hisband's agent of necessity,
to pledge his credit or borrow money on his credit.

3. IN INDIA
The fictitious principle of unity of persons between husband and wife as
recognised in England in the beginning and abrogated at present, is not accepted
in India 14 as is evident from the Indian Succession Act, 1925, Section 20. The
section provides:
"20. Interests and powers not acquired nor lost by marriage.—(I) No
person shall, by marriage, acquire any interest in the property of the person
whom he or she marries, or become capable of doing any act in respect of
his or her property which he or she could have done if unmarried.
(2) This section—
(a) shall not apply to any marriage contracted before the first day of
January, 1866;
(b) shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to any
marriage, one or both of the parties to which professed at the time
of the marriage the Hindu, Muhammadan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jam
religion."
The Transfer of Property Act, Section 10, which enacts that a condition
restraining alienation is void provides in case of a married woman by making an
exception, that property may be transferred for the benefit of a woman (not
being Hindu, Muhammadan, or Buddhist) with a condition that she shall not
have power during her marriage to transfer or charge the same or her beneficial
interest therein.
Non-Hindus and NonMuhammadanS.—Limited to persons other than
Hindus and Muhammadans, the Married Women's Property Act, 1874, by its
Sections 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10, provides on this point as follows.
Purpose.—The preamble states that, "And whereas by force of the said
Acts all women to whose marriages it applies are absolute owners of all
property vested in or acquired by them, and their husbands do not by their
marriage acquire any interest in such property, but the said Act does not protect
such husbands from liabilities on account of the debts of their wives contracted
before marriage and does not expressly provide for enforcement of claims by or
against such wives".
Separate property.—According to Section 4, a married woman's earnings,
together with all the savings therefrom and investments thereof, from any

14. Proh y v. Proby, 5 Cal 357.

 VII] Married Women, Infants, Idiots and Lunatics 171

employment, occupation or trade carried on by her or through the exercise of

any literary, artistic or scientific skill, shall be her separate property.
A married woman, according to Section 7, can sue and be sued in her own
name with regard to the separate property in the same way as if she were
unmarried. Section 8 provides for liability in respect of contracts based on such
property and at the same time it enacts a proviso for restraint on anticipation and
explains that no person who enters into a contract with her will be entitled to
recover anything by attachment and sale or otherwise out of any property which
has been transferred to a woman or for her benefit on condition that she shall
have no power during her marriage, to transfer or charge the same or her
beneficial interest therein. Sections 9 and 10 provide for the husband's non-
liability in respect of the wife's ante-nuptial debts or unless he intermeddles
therein, for any breach of trust or devastation committed by her.
Sections 56, 58 and 68 of the Indian Trusts Act also refer to and provide
with regard to restraint on anticipation. A Muhammadan woman on her
marriage does not merge her separate existence or entity into that of her
husband, but retains it. She can therefore deal with her separate property in any
way she likes and her husband has no control over it. This is so because of the
fact that the doctrine of coverture is not recognised under Mimmadan law.
Thus a Muhammadan marriage does not invest a husband with power over the
property of his wife.
The position of a Hindu woman in regard to her personal property may be
succinctly stated as follows:
"From the commencement of the Rigvedic age marriage was a well-
established institution. 15 The wife got an honoured position on marriage and as
the old writers put it, "a woman is half her husband and completes him"
6, and
the highest law for husband and wife was "mutual fidelity".]' Stridhana or
woman's peculiam literally means woman's property. 18
In its etymological
sense it includes all kinds of property of which a woman has become the owner.
In modern Hindu law it denotes not only the specific kinds of property
enumerated in the Smritis but also other species of property acquired or owned
by a woman over which she has either absolute control or control subject only to
her husband's dominion. 19 It devolves on her own heirs."
This shows that unlike the English law, a woman's right to hold separate
property was recognised from the very early times.20
Stridhana can be of a number of kinds, namely—
(1) What is given before the nuptial fire (3WTfT).

IS. C. H. I.
Vol. 1, 88, Madlik, 396, Mahabbara, Adi Parva Ch. 122 cited by Mayne:
101h Edn., 1938, Chap. IV, p. 105. Hindu Law,
16. Vedic Index I. 484-6; Manu IX 96.
IT Manu III, 55-76.
18. Jolly, Tagore Law Lectures, p. 228.
19. Mayne: Hindu Law. 101h
Edn., 1938, Chap. XV!, p. 734 by S. Snivas fycoagar.
20. Ibid., p. 735.
 [Chap.
172 Equity. Trusts and Specific Relief

(2) What a woman receives while she is conducted from her father's
house to her husband's dwelling (3uli).
(3) What is bestowed in token of love (1flT or
(4) What is obtained through affection from, mother-in-law, father-in-law
and also what is termed as, what is obtained at the time of
bowing at the feet of elders.
(5) What is gifted by father, mother or brother.
(6) Gifts subsequent, that is that which is received from her husband's
family or her father's family subsequent to marriage
(7) Gifts on supersession (TfT), a gift on her husband's marriage to
another wife.
(8) Gifts by bandhus gifts by relations of her mother or father.
(9) or the fee which a girl receives as the price 01 flOUSCUOIU
furniture, conveyance, much cattle and ornaments. Moreover,
according to Devala (k) cited in "Her subsistence (),
ornaments, fee or T77 or her gains (T{ are the separate property
of a woman" 21
(10) All saving made by stridhana and all purchases made by it are of
course stridhana.
(11) All gifts made by strangers, whether during covertrue or when she is a
widow, will be stridhana.
(12) Money or property given to a woman absolutely in lieu of
maintenance and all income of her husband's estate and investments
and purchases out of it are stridhana.22
From the above it is clear that the doctrine of coverture is accepted in Hindu
law. A woman has a right to hold separate property and she has complete
control over it. During maidenhood, coverture and widowhood she has
unrestricted power over stridhana acquired through gifts and bequests from
relations but regarding other types of stridhana, during coverture a married
woman cannot dispose of it without her husband's consent. After her husband's
death her power over this is absolute, so that she can give it by transfer inter
she could
vivos or through a will. Before the Hindu Succession Act, 1954,
inherit her husband's properties and had a widow's estate or a limited property
therein. She could not dispose of the corpus of the property and on her death the
property did not go her heirs, but to the reversioners. But now under Section 14
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a woman takes through inheritance her
husband's property as an absolute owner, except some land tenures in U.P. in
certain cases, where her life interest is still retained.
Thus under Muhammadan law, a wife has complete control over her
separate property and it is independent of her husband's control. Under Hindu

21. Ibid., pp. 737-738

Mayne: Hindu Law, 10th Edn., 1938, Chap. XVI, p. 734 by S. Srinivas Iycngar, pp. 744-745
22.
V/fl Married Women, !nfiinrs, Idiots and Lunatics 173

law also the position is very clear that she is the full owner of her separate
property. Regarding the non-Hindu and non-Muhammadan women, the Indian
Succession Act, 1925, Section 20, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section
10 and the Married Women's Property Act, 1874, Sections 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10
clear the position which comes as near as that under the English law.

B. INFANTS
1. JURISDICTION
The origin of the jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts over infants or minors,
though a subject of much discussion, 23 remains undisputed that from the earliest
times it was exercised by the Court of Wards on the prerogative of the crown as
parens parriae. In course of time it was delegated to the Chancellor. 24 The Court
of Probate also had such jurisdiction.
Guardianship is a right, a duty and a trust. The persons having the care of a
minor and the custody of the estate of an infant are called their guardians. Under
the Common Law a father is his child's natural guardian up to the age of 21
years. A mother is the guardian of her illegitimate child and she has the same
right as the father. It is very difficult to remove a natural guardian unless a very
strong case is made out against him. Where a natural guardian is insolvent or his
conduct is loathsome or he is ill-treating the child, he can be removed. The court
will thereafter appoint a guardian who will protect the person and property of
the infant.

2. PURPOSE AND PROCEDURE

The purpose of such jurisdiction was to protect minors and lunatics against
their mental unripeness, defects and deficiencies. Appointment of a guardian is
therefore of paramount importance. As a delegation of the rights and duties of
the Crown, the Court of Chancery supervises the person and property of infants.
In short, the courts have authority to appoint and remove guardians, to maintain
infants, to get infants married and to manage and dispose of their property.
As Snell-1 notes, in the list of matters specially assigned to the Chancery
Division by the Judicature Act, 1873, "the wardship of the infants and the care
of infants' estates" were of great importance and in matters "relating to the
custody and education of infants the rules of equity should prevail over the rules
of Common law".
A father has a right to appoint the guardian by his deed or will but when the
court appoints one, the father's wishes ought to be .agarded as far as possible.
A ward of court is a person who is under a guardian appointed by the court.
All dealings with the person and property of the ward of court are subject to
sanction and approval of the court. Disregard of the court in this connection will

23. Family Law Reforms Act, 1969, Sections 1(2), 12.

24. Snell's Principle.', of Equity. 27th Edn.. 1973, p. 531; Official Soiwilor v. K.. 1965 AC 201.
25. Ibid.
174 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

amount to contempt of the court. For example, to marry a ward without the
courts's previous permission is a gross disrespect to the court. Not only the
persons committing the contempt but those who aid and abet it are liable to
Pu fli shment.26
As a natural guardian a father has a legal right to control and direct the
education and to bring up and maintain his child. Courts will not interfere with
this parental authority except when the guardian forfeits this right by his
conduct or tries to remove the child being the ward of court, out of the court's
jurisdiction without its permission. As regards the maintenance, marriage and
management and disposal of the property of the ward, the court has complete
power of superintendence and vigilant care.
By the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949 it is now
provided in England for making an infant a ward of court even though no
property was involved. This goes to explain that the jurisdiction is now
concerned more with the welfare of an infant than with his property. This is a
changed trend. According to Sne11 27 since the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division has been replaced by the Family Division of the High Court, the
Chancery jurisdiction over the infants was transferred to that division from
October 1, 1971. As a result this subject now falls outside the scope of this
book.
3. IN INDIA
Unless the personal law of an infant or a party provides in this regard the
law on this point is represented by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the
Indian Majority Act, 1875 and Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973. The British Minors Act, 1874 (on which is based our Guardians and
Wards Act) is now repealed. Hindu law determines who is entitled to an infant's
custody and care, but since the subject has been codified the Hindu Minority
and Guardianship Act, 1956 governs the same. Under Muhammadan law, the
father, paternal grandfather, their executors and executors of such executors are
near guardians who are entitled to management of an infant's property. The rest
of the persons being remote guardians, are not encitied to it. A court in India
may appoint a guardian for an infant or for his property -or for both, but in doing
so it will look to the welfare of the child. The proposed guardian's age, sex,
character, religion, nearness of relation and wishes of the deceased parents and
near relations are matters which will be looked into for this purpose.
The High Courts in India can appoint guardians of the person or property of
minors, lunatics and idiots, irrespective of the Guardians and Wards Act. This
power is conferred upon the High Courts by the Letters Patent establishing
them. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, High Courts can issue a
writ in the nature of habeas corpus for production of any person detained within

26. Eyre v. Countess of Shaftthury, (1772) 2 P Wms 103. See also Guardianship of Infants Act.
1925 in England.
27. Manu 111, 55-76.
28. Snell. Principles of Equirv, 27th Edn., 1973. p. 531.
 VII] Married Women, infants, idiots and Lunatics 175

its jurisdiction. Under Section 491 of the CrPC, High Courts can also direct to
set free a minor who has been illegally or improperly detained in private custody
within the limits of its appellate criminal jurisdiction. A person seeking to
recover the custody of a minor may proceed under Section 25 of Guardians and
Wards Act, or by a regular Suit or under Section 498 of the CrPC.

C. PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND

Under the Mental Health Act, 1959, "idiots and lunatics", being incapable
by reason of mental disorder to manage their person and property, are now
known as "patients" or "mental patients". 29 Lunatics are persons non compos
mentis.
Jurisdiction over such persons and their property was the prerogative of the
Crown and it existed long before the existence of the Chancery Courts.
Originally it is based on the so-called statute of the crown known as De
Praerogariva Regis dating between 1255 and 1290. As noted by Holdsworth3°
the ninth and tenth chapters related to idiots and lunatics. 31 The Crown by sign
manual especially delegated his authority to the Lord Chancellor. From his
decision an appeal lay to the King in Council and to none else. 32 In 1851 a'court
of appeal was established and in 1853 the Lunacy Regulation Act was passed,
which was reenacted with some modifications as the Lunacy Act, 1890. This
jurisdiction was continued as before by the Judicature Act, 1873 and it was then
entrusted to the High Court of Justice or court of appeal. It is now exercised by
the Lord Chancellor, the Master of Rolls and the Lord Justices. 33 In practice,
nearly all the work is done by an office of the Supreme Court, called the Court
of Protection (formerly the Management and Administration Department) under
a Master and a Deputy Master, subject to appeal to the judge, and thence to the
court of appeal and the House of Lords. The jurisdiction is exercisable over any
person "incapable, by reason of mental disorder, of managing and administering
his property and affairs".34
Insofar as the interest of a lunatic in trust property is concerned, the
Chancery Division will exercise its jurisdiction only when the following three
conditions are fulfilled. It will then be rendered unnecessary to file proceedings
in the Court of Protection.
(a) The income from the fund is so small that all of it will be used for
maintaining him.
(b) Proceedings in this regard before the Courts of Protection are not
contemplated.

29. Section 101, Mental Health Act, 1959, in England.

30. History of English Law, p. 473.
31. Thid., p. 533, cited in Snells Principles of Equity.
32. Story's Equity Jurisprudence, p. 560.
33. See Smith Principles of Equity, 4th Edn.. p. 475; Snells Principles
533. of Equity, 27th Edn. p.
34. Sections 100 and III of the Mcntal Health Act, 1959.
176 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief

(c) Proceedings in Chancery Courts are already pending.

IN INDIA
The Indian Lunacy Act, 1912, which is mostly based on English law, covers
this subject and its provisions can be broadly divided into—
(a) the reception, care and treatment and discharge of a lunatic,
(b) judicial inquisition as to lunacy, and
(c) custody of the lunatic and management of his estate.
In presidency towns the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras have
jurisdiction, and outside the presidency towns the magistrates (as defiled
therein) have such jurisdiction. Upon an application by any relative of the
lunatic or by the Advocate General, the court may make an order for inquisition
to find out whether the alleged lunatic is of unsound mind or is incapable of
managing himself and his affairs. It will also conduct inquiry as to the time
during which he has been of unsound mind, as to his' relatives and as to the
property belonging to him. After he is adjudged a lunatic, orders for
management of his property and his custody will follow. A manager appointed
for his property shall not sell, charge, gift, exchange, mortgage or lease for more
than ten years, the property of the lunatic. But the court for just reasons and for
the benefit of the lunatic has such powers provided the money so secured,
obtained or raised is to be applied or has been applied to paying Out the lunatic's
debts, or in discharging the incumbrances on his property or for maintenance of
the lunatic or his dependents. When the unsoundness of mind has ceased, the
proceeding in lunacy shall also cease or be set aside. Outside the presidency
towns an application in this regard can be made by the husband or wife of the
alleged lunatic, or by the nearest relative of the alleged lunatic. If there is no
husband or wife, or if the husband or wife is prevented due to lunacy or is
absent from India, the nearest relative can apply.
 Chapter VIII
Accident, Set-off, Fraud and Undue Influence
ACCIDENT

'The doctrine cannot be precisely formulated, since of its very nature it

contemplates the undefined case: the case where through the happening of
some unforeseen event, or through the omission or misstatement of some
term, an obligation good in its essence stands in danger of being thrown
awa y . The cau'e of the defect must be purely accidental, in the sense that it
could not have been foreseen by reasonable prudence. Equity is not
procurator Jatuorumn and no man has a claim to he relieved from his own
weakness, unless lie was from the first at a disadvantage or his disability
was deliberately exploited. Out of
this doctrine grew the equicable
jurisdiction in regard to mistake, and, as a corollary, the rectification and
rescission of documents."

—C.K. Allen: Law in the Making

FRAUD

Equity did not pose as pure morality. It could no:, for example,
reject a defence based on a strict statutory rule merely because it was morally
unmeritorious, It could sometimes find a way round tech 'ical common law
rules in the interest of conscience. . . . But for the most part equitable fraud
came within the domain of things of confidence, resolving itself into cases—
Generically undue influence and catching bargains—where there was some
special relationship of trust or confidence between the parties,"
—C.K. Allen: Law in the Making, pp. 411-412
SYNOPSIS
A. Accident
5. Distinction
I. Nature of Jurisdiction
6. Undue Influence
2. Types of Relief
7. Abuse of Confidence
(a) D ocuments lost or destroyed 8. Un conscionable Bargains
(b) Erroneous payments
(a) With ignorant and poor
(c) Defective execution of powers (b) With expectant heirs (catching
B. Set-off
bargains)
C. Mistake
Post-obit Bonds
In India Pardanashin Woman
D. Fraud (c) Money-lending Transactions
I. Actual Fraud (d) Transactions Contrary to
2. Doctrineof Construct i ve Fraud Policy of Law
3. Types of Fraud 9 . Fraud on Power
4. Jurisdiction

A. ACCIDENT
1. NATURE OF JURISDICTION
Due to the rigid application of the Common Jaw rules in case of accident,
mistake, mis
representation undue influence and fraud, courts of equity in their
[177 1
178 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

concurrent jurisdiction intervened and granted relief. "There were many frauds
which the stiff old procedure of the courts of law could not adequately meet and
'accident', in particular, the accidental loss of a document, was a proper
occasion for the Chancellor's interference. No one could set any very strict limit
to his power, but the best hint to its extent that could be given in the sixteenth
century was given by the words 'fraud, accident and breach of confidence'. On
the other hand the Chancellor was not to interfere where a court of Common law
offered an adequate remedy".
In cases of accident or mistake when a bond, or document under seal, or
title deeds, or a negotiable or a non-negotiable instrument was lost or destroyed,
there could be no profert (production) and over (reading) of the document. To
prevent injustice in such cases from taking shape, equity courts came forward.
Executors were relieved when the estates in their hand were lost without their
default, but unless they could show that they had duly administered them, or that
they were lost due to some accident without their fault, they were answerable
for their loss or destruction. If goods of the deceased are stolen,' or being
perishable, depreciate, 3 or are reduced in value by act of parliament, 4 the
executors were not liable, but they were liable for their devastaviz. 5 At the same
time one has to note that accident was no excuse for not fulfilling obligations of
a contract.
2. TYPES OF RELIEF
In cases of accident equity granted relief in the following three instances—
(a) where a document was lost or destroyed by accident,
(h) where payments are erroneously made but in good faith and
accidently, and
(c) where there was an imperfect or defective execution of powers.
An accident for this purpose has been defined as an uncontrollable,
unforeseeable and injurious occurrence, which is not attributable to mistake,
'JI IhI1'..-'JLIUU'L.

(a) Documents lost or destro y ed —Lost or destroyed documents could not

be offered or produced in evidence as support of title or interest. In order to get
relief in equity for this purpose a special loss or inconvenience to the party
concerned was to be shown. For this a desire to get into possession of some
property or a desire to assert a right or claim in future was to be shown which
moved the conscience of the Chancellor to intervene. In India, Section 65(c) of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes provisions for offering secondary
evidence in such cases and acceptance of such evidence is a secondary evidence

1. Maitland: Lectures on Equity , 1969 Edn.. p.7.

2. Jones V. Lewis, (1750)2 Vcs Sen 240.
3. Clough v, Bond, (1837) 3 Mys & CR 490.
4. F)avfrs v, Wotijer, (1823) I Sim & St 463.
5. S,u'lI.v I'riciph'.c of Equity, 27th FLdn.. 1973, p. 340.
 VIII] Accident, Set-off Fraud and Undue Influence 179
of the original registered document.' Order 7, Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure
Code lays down the procedure in this respect.
(b) Erroneous pa yments.—Jnsofar as administration of estates of a deceased
person was concerned, equity exercised a concurrent jurisdiction over such
matters. Where the executor or administrator pays off a debt or legacy
completely misconceiv i ng a deed erronedusly in an honest belief that the
property in question is sufficient to discharge all the debts or legatees, and it
later on turns out that it is not so, because some new claims so far unknown
have come to light, or because there is a depreciation in the value of the
property, equity in such unforeseen and injurious occurrence granted relief. But
it must be noted that mistake of law is not an accident. 7
Similarly, accident is no
excuse for not fulfilling the obligations of a contract and equity did not
intervene in such cases, e.g., a lessee had to pay his rent even if the premises
were destroyed.
In India, the Indian Succession Act, 1925, Section 359
provides that when
the executor or administrator has paid away the assets in legacies and he is
afterwards obliged to discharge a debt of which he had no previous notice he is
entitled to call upon each legatee to refund in proportion.
As in England so in India, no relief is granted by equit y in case of positive
contracts because it is presumed by equity that the parties must have contracted
subject to those future events or contingencies. Section 13 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 makes provision to this effect.
(c) Defective execution of powers.—A power is an authority vested in a
person to deal with or dispose of property not his own. 8
In order that equity
could intervene and grant relief in suitable cases, first of all it is necessary that
power must be exercised or executed. If it is not executed, equity cannot help.
For example, properties are transferred by P to Q with a power of appointment
granted to Q which he was to exercise. Now, if Q does not exercise this power
or exercises it in a manner unauthorised by the instrument creating the power, in
each case the power will prima facie be treated as unexercised and consequently
the object of the power will take nothing. This was the rule at Common law. In
the above example if Q was required to exercise the power by deed but he
exercises it through a will, the exercise though technically improper, was treated
by equity as proper and effective. Now the Law of Property Act,
159(2) and (3) 1925, Sections
has made provision to this effect and dispensed with the
requirements of two witnesses and the requirement of a deed if the appointment
complies with the terms of the power. To the same effect are the provisions in
Section 2(2) of the Wills Act, 1963.
One has to note further that a defect such as this should not go to the root,
or in other words it should not hit the very essence and substance of the power.
Where consent to the execution of power is necessary but it is executed without

6. Nan jbaj v. Gi:abai, AIR 1958 SC 706.

7. Milliard, 4 Ch D 389.
8. freme v. Clement, ( 18 81) 18 Ch D 499.
 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.
180

obtaining consent, equity cannot help, unless it was impossible to obtain the
same. Thus accident would be relieved against all the formal defects (by equity
supplying the same) which do not go to the root and therefore are not of the
essence of the transaction and which are not irremediable by the statute. 9 Such
relief was granted only in assistance of certain favoured persons provided a
clear expression of an intention to execute power is manifested: they were
purchasers for value, creditors, charities, children and wives. This was so
because these persons are regarded to have supplied good consideration and
therefore a sort of moral obligation. But in case of husbands, illegitimate
children, remote relations and volunteers, no such consideration existed and
therefore no relief was granted by equity)°
Abridging the foregoing details we may note that accident will not be
relieved against where (a) there is a positive contract to the effect, the injury in
the case not being unforeseen, (b) the concerned parties themselves are
thoughtless and unprepared against future uncertain events. (c) the accident took
place due to the gross negligence of the applicant, (d) the party seeking relief
has an expectancy only and not a vested right, and (e) the party against whom
the relief is applied for has equal equities.

B. SET-OFF
See under maxim 3, para (b)(viii) in Chap. Ill.

C. MISTAKE
As Snell's editors Meggary and Baker note in their 27th edition (at p. 539):
"Mistake is not now regarded as exclusively resting on equitable principles, but
has been absorbed by the Common law: and the remainder of the jurisdiction of
equity to grant relief against accidents is of little importance." It is therefore not
very necessary to discuss those principles here but we may consider the Indian
position.
IN INDIA
Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the Indian Contract Act incorporate the law
relating to the effect of mistake on contracts:
to an agreement are under a mistake as to
20. Where both the parties
matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void.
21. A contract is not voidable because it was caused by a mistake as to
any law in force in India. But a mistake as to a law not in force in India has
the same effect as a mistake of fact.
22. A contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of
the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact.

9. Cockerell v, ChomeIev, (1830) I Russ & M 418.

10. Manseli, 2 Bro CC 450.
Viii] Accident, Set-off Fraud and Undue Influence 181

Thus a contract is vitiated by a mutual mistake and the same should be

essential to the agreement." Mistake of law does not make a contract voidable,
it does not afford a relief. Ignorantia juris non excusat. If a mistake of law was
allowed as a defence or a ground of relief one does not know or cannot imagine
how far it would be carried. But to this maxim there are three well-known
exceptions:
(a) The maxim applies to the general law of the land and not to a mere
private right. 12
(b) Mistake as to a law not in force in India has the same effect as a
mistake of fact.13
(c) Mistake as to a plain and established rule of law raising a presumption
of undue influence, fraud and the like.
In all these cases, equitable relief as could be contemplated by the relevant
sections of the Indian Contract Act may be given.
Section 72 of the Contract Act lays down:
72. A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by
mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.
The right granted under this section is a statutory right. The question of
granting equitable relief is therefore solved by it, but this right cannot be
rejected on equitable considerations, unless the plaintiff by estoppel or other
statutory bars, disentitles himself. Such relief is available in case of money paid
under coercion. The word 'coercion' does not have the same meaning as defined
in Section 15 of the Contract Act but it should be taken in the ordinary and
general sense: for example, money paid under protest in order to obtain a release
of property under attachment can be recovered under this section. 14
Sections 18(a) and 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 also afford relief in
case of mistake.
In case of "family arrangements" where the members of a family claim an
interest in the family property, claims which if not settled or set at rest at the
earliest would create disputes thaf tarnish the reputation of the family, rules of
equity and justice are applied. In arriving at such compromises full disclosure of
the facts has to be made by all, and the claims advanced must be bona fide and
honest. One should not take advantage of the ignorance of the other party.
Moreover, there should be no imposition or surprise exercised by one over the
other. In short, the claims must be bona fide, the solidarity of the right being of
no worth. Lading English authorities on this point are Wesrby v. Westby'5,

II. Sec Raffles v. W,chelhau,c. (1864) 2 H&R 906: Cooper v. Phibbs, (1867) 2 HC 149;
Kalvanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar, AIR 1954 SC 165.
12. Coope: v, Phibbs, (1867) 2 HC 149.
13. Scion 21 Indian Contract Act, 1872.
14. Kanhavalal v. ,'.'azi'nnI Ban?., (1923)40 Cal 598 (PC).
15. (1842) 2 D&W 503,
182 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

Stapilton v. Siapilton 16 and Gordon v. Gordo& 7. The Privy Council in the case
of Cashin v. Cashin 18 has explained the principle in the following words:
"Where family arrangements have been fairly entered into, without
concealment or imposition on either side, with no suppression of what is
true, or suggestion of what is false, then although the parties may have
greatly misunderstood their situation, and mistaken their rights, a court of
equity will not disturb the quiet, which is the consequence of that
arrangement: but when the transaction has been unfair, a court of equity
would have very great difficulty in permitting such a contract to bind the
parties."
Minors cannot challenge an arrangement when they come of age unless
there was a fraud. 19 A person not authorised in this behalf cannot enter into such
an agreement and call them a family settlement or family arrangement. 20 Section
15(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 also provides in this connection, that a
compromise of doubtful rights between members of the same family may be
enforced by any person beneficially entitled thereunder.

D. FRAUD
Fraud is far-reaching—for centuries the rule has been that fraud unravels
all.2 ' The idea of fraud in equity embraces a very large cross-section of human
behaviour. It includes fraud in law or actual fraud and fraud in equity or
constructive or equitable fraud.
1. ACTUAL FRAUD
Actual fraud has been defined as a false statement of fact, made before
another, without belief in its truth or recklessly, whether it be true or false, with
the intention that the person before whom it is made may rely upon it and act to
his disadvantage or loss. Fraud is thus composed of (a) a false
misrepresentation, 22 or (b) a concealment of a material fact fitted to deceive. As
decided in Poihil v. Walter23 it consists in knowingly asserting that which is
fc iv ilic inj ury of another. it is not necessary that the person representing
should profit out of it, but there is always a design to do evil present therein. 24 It
is practised by either suppressing the truth (suppressio yen) or by suggesting the
untruth (suggesrio falsi) or by the combination of both. It is therefore
"something said, done or omitted with the design of perpetrating what the party
must have known to be a positive fraud".

16. (1739)1 Atk27.

17. (1816) 3 Swan 400.
18. AIR 1938 PC 103.
19. Binda v. Lalita. (1936)41 CWN 161 (PC).
20. Pratap v. Sant Kaur. (1938) 42 CWN 817 (PC).
21. Master v. Miller, (1791)4 1'R 320.
22. Derry v. Peek. (1889) 14 AC 337.
23. (1832)3 13 & Eld 116, per Crcswcll. J.
24. Nian v. Axhbur:€m, 1914 AC 932: 30 TLR 602 HL.
 VIII] Accident, Set-off Fraud and Undue Influence 183

2. DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD

Constructive fraud encompasses all types of behaviour or conduct which
falls short of the standard demanded by equity courts. This extension of the
Common law definition and its practice was so wide that it prevented Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke from defining it, because, in his own words, "Fraud is
infinite and were a court of equity once to lay down rules, how far they would
go and no further in extending their relief against it, or to define strictly the
species of evidence of it, the jurisdiction would be cramped and perpetually
eluded by new schemes which the fertility of -man's invention would
contrive"
As Walker puts it. at Common law in England, fraud was limited to actual
deceit. Equity, however, gave a more extended meaning to the concept of fraud,
by developing the doctrine that if one man enters into a transaction with another
in circumstances in which the latter is not a free agent and not fully able to look
after his own interests, the latter is emitted to the protection of the court and may
rescind the transaction. This principle applies where a confidential or fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties, where a party has placed himself in such
a position that it has become his duty to act fairly towards and have regard to the
interest of the other party, where the bargain appears clearly unconscionable and
inequitable, and where the principle of undue influence applies.26

3. TYPES OF FRAUD
It has therefore been rightly described by John Titcy 27 that "the equitable
jurisdiction to intervene on the ground of fraud is very broad. It ranges from the
doctrine of fraud on power to fraud inducing a contract. It covers conduct of a
sort that offends conscience once a relationship has seen established (e.g., under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel) as well as untruths inducing the formation of
the relationship. The interference with the normal rules of priority between
interests in property is another example of this jurisdiction. . . . The expression
"equitable fraud" may, however, still be used to indicate the doctrine whereby
equity will prevent the abuse of a confidential relationship".'-'
In Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen 29 , however, the same Lord Chancellor
tried to lay down the classification of fraud as—(a) fraud in which evil design is
actual and plain, (b) bargains which are unequitable and unconscientious, (c)
taking advantage of the weakness, ignorance and necessity of another, (d)
Imposition and deceit on the other persons, not parties to the agreement, and (e)
catching bargains with heirs, reversioners and expectants, and mixed cases of
these species. In his own words:

25. Parkes: History of the Court of Chancery. p. 508, quoted in Sue/i's Principles of Equity, 27th
Edn., 1973, P. 546. A letter to Lord Karnes dated June 30, 1759 by Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke.
26. The Oxford Companion to 14w, 1980 Edn., p. 489.
27. 4 Casebook of h.quitv & Succession, 1968 Edn., 44.
p.
28. ibid.
29. (1750)2 Vcs Sen 125.
184 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

"1. Fraud, which is dolus malus, may be actual, arising from facts and
circumstances of imposition; which is the plainest case.
2. It may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain
itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the
one hand and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other; which are
unequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of such even the Common law
has taken notice; for which if it would not look a little ludicrous might be cited,
James v. Morgan [(1663) 1 La y 111].
3. A third kind of fraud is, which may be presumed from the circumstances
and condition of the parties contracting and this goes farther than the rule of
law; which is, that it must be proved not presumed; but it is wisely established
in this court to prevent taking surreptitious advantage of the weakness or
necessity of another; which knowingly to do is equally against the conscience as
to take advantage of his ignorance: a person is equally unable to judge for
himself in one as the other.
4. A fourth kind of fraud may be collected or inferred in the consideration
of this court from the nature and circumstances of the transaction, as being an
imposition and deceit on the other persons not parties to the fraudulent
agreement. It may sound odd that an agreement may be infected by being a
deceit on others not parties: but such there are, against such there has been
relief. Of this kind have been marriage-brokerage contracts; neither of the
parties herein being deceived: but they tend necessarily to the deceit on one
party to the marriage, or of the parent, or of the friend, So in a clandestine,
private agreement to return part of the portion of the wife or provision stipulated
for the husband to the parent or guardian. In most of these it is done with their
eyes open, and knowing that they do: but if there is fraud therein, the court
holds it infected thereby, and relieves. So where a debtor enters into a deed of
composition with his creditors for lOs. in the pound, or any other rate, attended
with a proviso that all creditors pound, or any other rate, attended with a proviso
that all creditors executed this within a certain period, if the debtor privately
A,
agrees with one creditor to induce him to sign this dcd, that "AC " pay or
secure a greater sum in respect of this particular debt: in this there can be no
particular deceit on the debtor, who is party thereto: but it tends to deceit of the
other creditors, who relied on an equal composition, and did it out of
compassion to the debtor. This court therefore relieves against all such
underhand bargains [Spurret v. Spiller, (1740) 1 Atk 105: 1 Wins 7681. So of
premiums contracted to be given for preferring or recommending to a public
office or employment: none of the parties are defrauded; but the persons, having
the legal appointment of these offices are or may be deceived thereby: or if any
person agreeing to take the premium has authority to appoint the officer, it tends
to public mischief by introducing an unworthy object for an unworthy
consideration. These cases show what courts of equity mean, when they profess
to go on reasons drawn from public utility. . . (If the word politics is taken in its
original meaning these are not political arguments. In its true original meaning,
it comprehends everything that concerns the government of the country; of
which the administration of justice makes a considerable part). To apply this and
 VIII] Accident, Set-off Fraud and Undue Influence
185.

in this sense, is relief in a court of equity founded on public ut i

lity. Particular
persons in contracts shall not only transact bona fide
between themselves but
shall not transact mala fide in respect of
other persons, who stand in such a
relation to either as to be affected by the contract or the consequences of it; and
as the rest of
mankind beside the parties contracting are concerned, it is
probably said to be governed on public policy.
5. The last head of fraud, on which there has been relief, is that which
infects catching bargains with heirs, reversioners or expectants, in the life of the
father, against which relief always extended. These have been mixed cases
compounded of all or several species of fraud; there being sometimes proof of
actual fraud which is always decisive. There is always fraud presumed or
inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting:
weakness on one side, usury on the other, or extortion or advantage taken of that
weakness ..... . 30

4. JURISDICTION
Courts of Chancery and Common law courts exercised a concurrent
jurisdiction in cases of actual fraud from the earliest times. For some of these
cases, the greater freedom which in early days the court of chancery exercised in
admitting the testimony of parties to the proceedings, made . i
more suitable
tribunal. Moreover its remedies were more elastic. Operating
in personam as a
court of conscience it could order the defendant, not indeed, in those days, to
pay damages as such, but to make restitution, or to compensate the plaintiff by
putting him in as good a position pecuniarily as that in which he was before.3'
In its exclusive jurisdiction it dealt with cases which did not involve an
element of dolus malus
and thus the term "fraud" in chancery courts came to
be used to describe what fell short of deceit, but imported a breach of duty to
which equity had attached its sanction.

S. DISTINCTION
The fundamental distinction between actual and constructive fraud may be
drawn as, that in the former there is necessarily "a design to do evil", in the
latter it is not so; but equity would not allow
that position to stand or prevail as
it would do greater injustice by opening the door for all possible evils in other
cases. As could be seen from what has been said before, equitable fraud is but
an extension of the legal doctrine of actual fraud. We may thus lay down the
definition of equitable fraud as something said, done or omitted which from the
viewpoint of equity would operate to the prejudice of public welfare and of an
individual even though a design to do evil is absent.
Fraud in equity therefore resolves itself into the following chief species:
(1) Undue Influence.

30. Per Lord Chancellor Hardwtcke in

Eari of Ches;erfldd v.
jansien. High Court of ChanccTy,
(1750) 2 Ves Sea 125: ALk 301: Wi15 Ch 286: I W&T LC 248, q'.x
Casebook on Equity SucCfsSto fl Chap. xed in John They:
4.
31. Nocto,, v. Ashburton, 1914 AC
932 (}{L).
 Equip, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.
186

(2) Abuse of Confidence.

(3) Unconscionable Bargains.
(4) Fraud on Power.
6. UNDUE INFLUENCE
Undue influence has been said to be constructive fraud. It is either express
or presumed. The latter category arises out of fiduciary relationships . In
Mehboobkhan v. Abdulrahim 32 it has been laid down that "undue influence is
said to be a subtle species of fraud whereby mastery is obtained over the mind
of the victim by insidious approaches and seductive artifices. Sometimes the
result is brought about by fear, coercion, importunity or other domination
calculated to prevent expression of the victim's true mind. It is a constraint
undermining free agency overcoming the powers of resistance, bringing about a
submission to an overmastering and unfair persuasion to the detriment of the
other". Equity granting relief not only in such cases where the actual proof of
undue influence was available but also in cases where such influence was
, Ailcard v. Skinner and inche Noriah v.
presumed. Huguenin v. Baseley33
36 Such bargains were set aside by
Sheikh A11ie35 are leading cases on the point.
equity. Where sales are made at an excessive price or purchases are made at an
undervalue such presumption arises. Undue influence Is presumed to arise
between a parent and a child, a guardian and his ward, a trustee and a
beneficiary, a spiritual adviser and his follower, an advocate and his client and a
dcotor and his patient. But it should be noted that it is no monopoly of equity
courts to save people from consequences of their own follies. 37 In other words,
extravagant liberality and immoderate folly do not themselves provide a
passport to equitable relief
But where it can be proved that the will was exercised spontaneously by the
donor without anybody's advice or that the exercise of it was by the donor as a
free persoii, no presumption of exercise of undue influence can stand. Moreover,
was so uvipow.&cd a uidcd
steps to obtain reliet by the party, whose will,
should be taken during the period so long as such influence exists. If steps are
taken after that period is over, they should be within a reasonable time. In India,
Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act provides in this regard, its first part laying
down the general principle about undue influence and the second part laying
down a presufnptiOn against such persons who are capable of dominating the
thereby guiding and streamlining it in a direction desired by
will of others, 39
them. The third part of Section 16 explains that since such dominating persons

32. AIR 1964 Raj 250.

33. 1807 14 Ves 237.
34. (1887) 36 Ch 145.
35. 1929 AC 127: AIR 1929PC3. AIR 1945 Pc 8.
36. See als Twigabal Kw,thhojkar v. Yeshwa,U Jag,
37. Alleard v. Skinner. (1887) 36 Ch 0 145.
in infion v Sperni. (1952)2 TLR 516.
38. Sir Rayrnord Ev'hcd, M. R.
Mohd. Bzk.vh v. H ni (1888) 15 Cal 684 (PC).
39.
VIll1 Accident, Set-off Fraud and Undue Influence 187

are able to suppress the evidence of undue influence it lies on them to prove that
the contract was not obtained by them through undue influence. The court under
Section 19-A may set aside the contract, or the contract may be voidable at the
option of the party whose consent was so obtained.
In English law4° there is a modem trend to recognise the economic situation
and circumstances wherein the parties are placed, as a variety of coercion and
duress4 ' liable to such relief.
7. ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
It is difficult exactly to distinguish and therefore draw a line between the
permissive forms of coercion and persuasion on the one hand and undue
influence on the other. The line of distinction between them is regulated by
public policy. Similarly, the principles of undue influence and abuse of
confidence may seem to overlap but as Snell notes, they do not coincide. In the
case of a person who is in a fiduciary position to the other and thereby obtains
and procures a benefit for himself from that position in disregard of that duty,
the transaction will be set aside. 42 Similarly, a. trustee purchasing from the
beneficiary at an undervalue is liable to be proceeded against under this
principle.
8. UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAINS
Bargains against morality, which are improper and unreasonable and
unconsiderable in particular circumstances are unconscionable bargains . 41 They
resolve themselves into the following sections—
(a) bargains with the ignorant and the poor, who are without independent
advice;
(b) bargains with expectant heirs;
(c) moneylending transactions;
(d) transactions contrary to the policy of the law.
An expectant heir is a person who is expecting either some reversionary
interest or a benefit under a will or intestacy of a person still alive. If a bargain is
made with a person, the person enforcing the contract has to prove that he did
not misuse or take advantage of the circumstances, situation and the urgent need
of the expectant heir so that he was induced to sacrifice his future. He must have
paid a fair price without exercising any kind of oppression or extortion. "Fraud
here does not mean deceit or circumvention; it means an unconscientious use of
the power arising out of the circUmstances and conditions; and when the relation
of the parties is such as prima facie to raise such presumption, the transaction
cannot stand unless the person claiming the benefit of it is able to repeal the

40. See Law Quarterly Review, 1979. Vol. 95, pp. 475-77; Anson: Law of Contract, 25th Edo..
1979. p. 270
41 Doctrine of economic durcss, North Oeon Shipping Co., ((978) 3 All ER 1170.
42. Nocwn v. A.thburion, 1914 AC 932.
43. See also Walker. D. M.: The Oxford Companion to Law: 1980 Edn.. p. 1247.
188 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

presumption by contrary evidence, proving it to have been in fact fair, just and
reasonable". Here again application to the court for help (to set aside the
transaction) must be made within a reasonable time after coming into possession
of the property. If the transaction is confirmed, it will not be relieved against.45
Post-obit Bonds.—Under such bonds a borrower agrees to pay a lump sum,
higher than the amount obtained by borrowing, if and only if he gets some
property on the death of some definite person.46
The doctrine of unconscionable bargains has nothing of fraud in it, but
looking from the point of view of reasonableness and the unequal position of the
parties, it is very plain that a party in a dominating position cannot be allowed to
extract undue profit or benefit by transacting a hard and cruel bargain Sales of
reversions at undervalue are also fitting examples of the situation. The court in
such cases will not set aside the whole transaction but order the repayment of
what is due, ex aequo ci bono, i.e., the sum actually advanced with reasonable
interest.
Pardanashin woman—In India the position of a pardanashin woman is
open to undue influence. 47 Such a woman observes a pardah i.e. a complete
seclusion from others. To observe pardah is a custom in some castes or
classes in India. As the woman does not come out in society, she is not in
Contact with persons in society, meaning thereby that she is in contact with
only a few persons and these persons can easily influence her. Her position
therefore is to a certain extent analogous to that of the expectant heir who by
force of circumstances is susceptible to force, advice, persuasion and
influence. Law therefore throws around her a special cloak of protection
whereby those who deal with her have to prove affirmatively and conclusively
that the deed was not only executed by, but was explained to and was readily
understood by her; she signing it, not under duress but as a free and
independent agent. 45 But it is not absolutely necessary to prove that she had
independent and disinterested advice from outside .49 In short, she must have
understood the bargain "substantially" so that it may be said to be her own
"mental or conscious act".5°
There i4z nn such c l ass a quasi-pa.-danashit, woiitan and therefore the
question of protection of law depends upon the facts and merits of each case.5'
A woman who comes out in society as often as needed, goes to the court, gives

44. Earl of Ay!e.iford v. Mrirris, (1873) 8 Ch 484.

45. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 8 Ch App 484.
46. Ibid. Walker, D.M.: The Oxford Companion to Law, 1980 Edn., p. 972. In Gujarat an
aphorism explains this. It is WR Tft W47T —It means that the borrower will pay double the
amount on his fathers death. Only on this condition he borrows.
47. Kaminisundari v. Kali !'ros.cunno Gho.ce, (1885) 12 Cal 225: 12 IA 215.
48. Kalibux v. Ramgopal, (1914) 36 All 81 (PC); Ismail v. !Iufizboo, (1906) 33 Cal 773. 783
(PC).
49. Ibid.; Faridunnisa v. Mukhtnr, (1925) 30 CWN 337 (PC).
50. FaridunnLca v. Mukhtar, (1925) 30 CWN 337 (PC).
SI. Hodges v. Delhi & Landon Rank, (1901)23 All 137 (PC).
 V/I[]
Accident, Set-off Fraud and Undue Influence
189
e v idence, fixes rents with tenants and collects rents and
co mmunicates with men
other than members of the family in matters of business, is not pardanashjn lady.
In money-lending transactions where the terms of the loan were
unr
easonable, equity relieved against the transaction and the lender had to
remain satisfied with the repayment of the amount advanced plus a fair interest.
This situation of unconscionable m
oney-lending transaction prevailed and
existed up to the pre-1900 period. After the coming into operation of the
Mon
ey-lenders Act, 1900 and 1927, the equitable doctrine of catching bargains
with expectant heirs has lost importance because the transactions are regulated
by the Act, particularly in case of those whose business is to lend money.
Banking and insurance companies are excluded from its scope. The Act also
provides for reopening settled accounts if the transaction is harsh and
un conscionable 52 Under the Act,
m oney-lenders are required to take a licence,
53
and an unlicenced money-lender cannot sue the borrower.
In India, the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 governs the transactions of money-
lending. It is based on the analogy of English law. States in India have also
passed their own Acts to this effect. If the transactions is su
bstantially unfair and
the interest is excessive, the transaction may be reopened or set aside. It is for
the court to decide whether the interest is excessive or not. Thus the equitable
relief as provided in England is available in India through the Central and
States' legislation on mon ey-lending business.
As explained in Chesterfield v. Janssen 54,
imposition and deceit on other
persons not parties to the contract are relieved by equity in so far as they
constitute fraud on third parties or upon the public generally. Under this
category are included, marriage brokage contracts, payment to a parent to
consent to the marriage of his child (called
sale of a fiT sale of a bridegroom or T
bride), loans to a woman to swell her dowry and thus deceive her
husband, rewards for inf
luencing a testator and contracts in restraint of trade and
a clandestine deed by a debtor with one of his creditors to the disadvantage of
other creditors. Being against public policy such agreements are void but on
principles of public interest suitable relief may be granted by equity.
9. FRAUD ON POWER
A power is an authority vested in a person to deal with or dispose of
P roperty not his own. 55
Where the power is special the donee is to exercise it
subject to restrictions as to its objects or persons. It should thus be exercised
bona Jide
for the end designed and not for any purpose foreign to the power.
One who exercises it beyond the scope of the instrument or for a purpose not
justified by it commits a fraud on power, which equity will relieve. As pointed
out by Snell, there are three main types of such fraud. Here also it should
noted that the word 'fraud' has a special connotation or meaning, differing be

52. B.S. Lyle Lid. v. Peass00,

(1941) 2 KB 391
53. Section I, Money-lenders Act, 1927.
54. (1750)2 Ves Sen 125.
55. Walker D.M.: The Oxford Companion to Law, 1980
Edn., pp. 973.974.
190 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief

widely from actual fraud. The three main categories are (a) appointment made
57 or (c) for the
(b) or for purposes foreign to the power
with a corrupt purpose. 56 Such appointments are void and will be set aside, but a
benefit of non-objects- 58
purchaser for value from such an appointee has been protected (up to
bona fide
the value of appointee's share only) by the Law of Property Act, 1925. Section
157 lays down that the purchaser must show that he purchased after 1925, for
value without notice of the fraud and that the appointee from whom he
purchaed was not less than 25 years. There are certain well-recognised
power, release of power and
exceptions to the fraud on power, as revocation of
power to joirlture.59

v. Seymour, (1789) 1 Bro CC 395.

56. Lord Hinchinbro ke
57. Dick, re, 1953 Ch 343.
58, NicholsOn's Settlement, re, 1939 Ch 11.
27th Edo., 1973, pp. 559-60.
59. For details see Sneils Principles of Equity,
 Chapter IX
Administration of Assets, Equitable Estoppel
and five great Doctrines

Prepare for death if here at night you roam,

And sign your will before you sup from home."
—Dr Samuel Johnson: "London"
"Estoppel is a rule of equity flowing out of fairne.ss striking on behaviour
deficient in good faith. It operates as a check on spurious conducting by
preventing the inducer from taking advantage and assailing forfeiture already
accomplished. It is invoked and applied to aid the law in administration of
justice. But for it great many injustices ma y have been perpetrated.
—Sahai, J., in Indira Hai v. Nand Kishore,
(1990)4 SCC 668 at 670.
'There is no estoppel against a statute."
—K.N. Saikia, J., in Plasma Machine Mfg. Co. v.
Collector of Central Excise, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 57 at 59.
SYNOPSIS
A. Administration of Assets 6. Distribution
I. Assets: Meaning of 7. In Ir3dia -
2. Jurisdiction B. Equitable Estoppel
3. The rules C. Five Great Doctrines
4. Collection
5. Payment

A. ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS

1. ASSETS: MEANING OF
The administration of assets is the function that an heir, executor or an
administrator is required to discharge. The word 'asset' has been derived from'
the french word 'assez' (meaning 'enough') and the Latin word "ad satis"
(meaning 'to sufficiency'). As the connotation of the word denotes, assets is the
property of the deceased which is available to meet the deceased person's debts
and other liabilities. These assets include personally as well as realty. So that an
executor or administrator can administrate well, it is necessary that the assets be
collected and realised and are available for the payment of debts and distribution
of the surplus among the beneficiaries entitled under the will or intestacy.
The combination of three functions—
(a) collection,
(b) payment, and
(c) distribution,

[1911
192 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.

is called "administration of assets". These are the duties, therefore, of the

deceased's personal representatives i.e. his executors (appointed by the
deceased) and otherwise his administrators (appointed by court). As expressed
by Bowen, L.J. in Stanhope v. Stanhope', the executor or administrator "does
not act for a dead man or in his name but for the estate of the dead man". Snell
has rightly pointed out2 that the administration is normally conducted by the
personal representatives out of court, but difficult or complex administrations
may take place in court.
2. JURISDICTION
Formerly, i.e., before 1925, ecclesiastical courts, courts of probate and the
High Court dealt with the problem of administration of the assets of a testator or
intestate. At the end of -the seventeenth century the chancery courts practically
took over this jurisdiction from the ecclesiastical courts and slowly but certainly
acquired a concurrent jurisdiction with the Common law courts. In the
beginning it followed, and in suitable cases supplemented, the law of the courts
but gradually and steadily it modified this law and developed its own rules. As
has been pointed out 3 , "its success in acquiring jurisdiction was in large part
due to its superior administrative machinery and jiot least its ability to take
complicated accounts. A Common law court would merely resolve the
particular dispute brought before it by the parties to it, whereas the Court of
Chancery looked at the estate as a whole; if it interfered at all, it would
administer the entire estate for the benefit of all the creditors and beneficiaries
alike. The result is that the law of administration of assets, though based in part
on the principles of ecclesiastical and Common law, is largely equitable".
3. THE RULES
Before 1926, only the chattels or personalty of the deceased were available
for the payment of debts. Realty was usually not available for the deceased's
creditors. Chattels were the legal assets of the deceased. The executor had
complete control and oower over these assets and 'ou!d give a valid dischargc
in case of debts due to the testator and in case of a sale, mortgage or a pledge
by him, the purchaser obtained a valid legal title. Moreover, against his giving
away without consideration any part of the assets to the donee, creditors and
legatees had no claim or remedy at Common law. Looked at from this point of
view at equity courts, the equitable estates were also available for distribution.
Equitable estates included also the realty of the deceased.
The Administration of Estates Act, 1925 superseded the foregoing old rules
and made available the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased for
payment and distribution. Personal representative has been defined therein to
include "the executor, original or by representation, or administrator for the
time being of a deceased person" and for liability regarding estate taxes, an

1. (1886)11 PD 103.
2. Snell's Principles of Equity, 27th Edn., 1973. p. 295.
3. Ibid. p. 296.
4. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 0 880) 16 Ch D 236.
 IX] ,ldminisrrwion of/t.sse:s, Equitable Estoppel and/lie ,'reil Do(-trines 193

"executor (IC son tort " is also included. Chattels real (i.e.. leaseholds) and land
in possession, remainder or reversion, and every interest in or over land, to
which the deceased was entitled at his death is included in asset. With some
exceptions, ''real estate held on trust, including settled land, realty appointed by
the deceased's will under power of appointment and an entailed interest
disposed of by the will" formed part of the real estate. In so far as payment of
debts is concerned, all real and personal estates whether they be legal or
equitable, form part of his assets. Any real or personal estate appointed by him
under his will under a general power of appointment is a part of his assets,

4. COLLECTION
The personal representative has to take possession of the property and for
this purpose he is to collect the same by suitable means within a reasonable
period. He must first pay. before he proceeds further, from the ready money
available for the following—
(a) funeral expenses,
(b) testamentary and administrative expenses. and
(c) debts and liabilities, so far as the ready money amount permit
according to the rules in this behalf.
The residue is to he distributed in the manner provided in Section 46 as
amended from time to time, or is to be held in trust as the section requires.
So far as the powers of disposition are concerned, an administrator derives
his title solely from the grant of letters of administration from the court: whereas
an executor derives the title from the instrument of the will itself, so that where
an administrator has no power before a grant is made, the executor has wide
powers as per the Instrument even before his title is confirmed by the grant of
probate by the court. Pos'crs of disposition of a personal representative are wide
as conferred by the Land Transfer Act, 1397 and the Administration of Estates
Act, 1925. The latter Act provides for the protection of purchasers from the
personal representatives for money or money's worth. With certain exceptions
the personal representatives can conduct and carry on the business of their
testator, though virtue officil they cannot.

5. PAYMENT
Within the executor's year' the personal representative has to pay the debts
of' the deceased with interest and perform "all enforceable contracts" of the
deceased, even though to break them and pay damages would be more
beneficial to the estate. All the debts are to be paid without distinction. Partiality
and preference in payment will make him personally liable. The Ac t 6 rays down
rules as to the order in which they must be paid 7 , the funeral and other
administrative expenses taking priority. If the estate is able to pay debts but is

5. Administraton of Estates Act, 1925, S. 44—Generally one year from the death of the deceased.
6. Administration of Estates Act, 1925.
7. For details sec SnrIl Pr!n(ip/c... '1 Lquitv.
pp. 310 io 322.
194 Equity. Trusts and Specific Relief

unable to pay administrative charges, it is termed insolvent and in such cases the
court will make a suitable inquiry to find out whether it is so or not. Formerly a
person entitled to land could require the personal representative to pay it off, out
of the deceased's estate but now by a series of statutes known as the Locke
Kings Act or the Real Estate Charges Acts and the Administration of Estates
Act, 1925, the beneficiary takes the property subject to the charge,. and if the
charge exceeds the value of the property he is not allowed to call on the estate to
pay off the charge. The rule, of course, is subject to certain details.
6. DISTRIBUTION
After the debts of the deceased have been paid off and liabilities discharged,
the remaining estate has to be distributed to the persons. beneficially entitled,
provided, of course, no proceedings under the Inheritance (Family Provision)
Act, 1938 are pending. But in no case can a personal representative be
compelled to distribute before the expiration of the executor's year. After this is
cleared off, he holds the residue in trust for the residuary legatees or next of kin.
7. IN-INDIA
In India, the Indian Succession Act, 1925, by Part IX, Sections 217 to 369
makes provisions with regard to probate, letters of administration and
administration of assets of the deceased.
For Administration suit and its details see Civil Procedure Code, Order 20,
Rule 13. The Indian Succession Act contains provisions relating to executors
and administrators and their powers, duties and liabilities.

B. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
[See maxim 3, para (b)(vi) in Chap.I1I1

C. FIVE GREAT DOCTRINES

1. Conversion [See maxim 8, para (b)(i) in Chap. III]
2. Reconversion [See maxim 8, para (b)(i) in Chap. 1111
3. Election [See maxim 3, part (b)(ii) in Chap. III]
4. Performance [See maxim 9 para (b)(i) in Chap. III]
5. Satisfaction [See maxim 9 para (b)(i) i n Chap. 1111
PART III
TRUSTS
 Chapter X
History of the Trusts
'Invention of trust has been 'a most powerful instrument of social
experimentation'."
"The trust has given us a liberal substitute for a law about personified
institutions. . . (and) a liberal supplement for a necessarily meagre law of
corporations.
—C.K. Allen: Law in the Making. pp. 415-416,
citing Maitland: Lectures on Equity
"A trust is the binding of the conscience of one to the intention of
another."
-.--Bacon.
"A trust is the very centre and kernel of equity.
—Hanbury: Modern Equity
"Of all the exploits of equity the largest and the most important is the
invention and development of the trust. Jr is an 'institute' of great elasticity
and generality; as elastic as general as contract . . . it involves the
conception of obligation and ownership."
"The modern trust developed from the ancient use."
—Maitland: Lectures on Equity, p.23
"Parents of trusts were FRAUD and FEAR and a court of conscience
was the nurse."
—A.G.V. Sands, (1669)2 Freem 129
SYNOPSIS

1. Concept ofaTrust 5. Use Develops into a Trust
2. How a Trust Arises (a) Before 1535
3. Origin (b) After 1535
(a) In English law 6. In India
(b) In Roman law 7. Institution of Trust—Its Benefits
4. Use and Fidel Commisawn and Hazards

I. CONCEPT OF A TRUST
/All efforts for defining a trust have remained unfruitful in so far as no
complete definition of it has been produced. According to D. Hanbury,
therefore. it is better to describe what a trust is and to compare the idea with
other like concepts in order to understand its nature.(k trust may be described as
an equitable obligation binding a person (called trustee) to deal with the
property over which he has control (called the trust property) for the benefit of
persons (called the beneficiaries or cesniis que trust) of whom he may himself
be one and anyone of whom may enforce the obligation))
Ea

1. Underhill: Law of Tnus.. 12th Edn.. 1970, p. 3.

[197
198 Equity, Tr'ust. ,and Specific Relief [Chap.

From the above descriptcve ddfiñitiôn it i . Very clear that a trust is an

obligation—An equitable obligation binding a person's conscience. It is
concerned with property which is to be held in confidence and managed for the
benefit of certain persons called beneficiaries.

2. HOW A TRUST ARISES

A trust may come into being in various ways but a very simple way in
which it arises may be, when A transfers his property to B for the 'use' of and in
trust for X. A is the owner of property, X is the beneficiary and B is a trustee in
whom confidence by the owner of the property is reposed. According to
Common law, A was the legal owner and B was to.look after the property and
manage it for the benefit of X. These were B's moral obligations. English
Common law could not enforce this arrangement because enforcing moral
obligations was not within its competence which was its prominent drawback.
In the equity courts also it was quite difficult in: the beginning to enforce this
obligation as 'equity followed the law', but in course of time ingenuity of the
chancery lawyers and judges found a way out, so that B was , recognised as the
legal owner and an obligation was attached to his title whereby his conscience
was bound to carry out the moral obligations in favour of X. B was thus bound
to hold and manage the property, and not to give it away to anybody or damage
it. If he did it, he was punishable. In other wbrds,' equity' converted moral
obligation into equitable obligation by dissociating beneficial interest from legal
title and gave the essence or the kernel to X and the husk to B. A trust thus
arises when beneficial interest is dissociated from legal tit!e and confidence is
reposed in the legal titleholder'.

3. ORIGIN
(a) In English law.—Regarding the. origin of trust, opinions are divided.
Some authorities hold that the English trust is connected with the Roman Fidei
Commissum while others hold that it is of indigenous growth. Maitland
maintains that it did not come from outside England but developed from ancient
use. Story holds the opposite view. Pomeroy joins Maitland and expininQ tbt
"ihcsc essennai aitterences are as marked as their superficial similarity and it is
a grave error to represent the entire equity jurisprudence concerning uses and
trusts as derived from Roman law".
Maitland supports his thesis by advancing the following arguments.2
(i) The word 'use' is not derived from Latin usus but from the Latin word
opus. Owing to the similarity of terminology and its-pronounciation one ' y., be
tempted to draw an inference that the: term. 'use' is derived from usus, but it is
not so. In Latin ad opus means 'on behalf of' and this terminology was in vogue
as could be, seen from the ancient Lombard and Frank legal documents; It. was
due to the transliteration of the phrase ad upus that.i was alternatively used for
usus. Maitland points out that in the 13th century when land'. was held

2. Lectures on Equity. 1969 Edn.. pp. 23-32.

 XJ History of the trusts 199

permanently by one man on behalf of another, the term ad opus came to acquire
its modem connotation and significance,
(ii) The Roman terminology fidei cornmissu,n
was used in Roman law to
express the obligation of the heir to execute the last wishes of the deceased. In
other words, the appointed heir who got property in trust for another was termed
fidei comnhissum. The expression thus belonged to the land
of testament,
whereas the English word 'use' had its origin in an agreement, inter vivos,
between the parties as a result of which one person held the property of another
for the benefit of a third person. Thus .. ....use,
trust or confidence originates
in an agreement. As to the want of valuable consideration for the trustee's
promise, it might, I think, fairly be said that even if there is no benefit to the
promisor, the trustee, there is at all the events detriment to the promisee, the
trustor, since he parts with legal rights with property and with possession. Men
ought to fulfil their promises, their agreements; and they ought to be compelled
to do so, that is the principle. . .
(iii) From the very beginning the chancellors seem to have treated the rights
of a cestui que use as analogous to an estate
in land. They brought to bear upon
it the rules of the English land law as regards such matters as descent and the
like. 4 The Roman "fldei comrnissarius" S
ownership. (the beneficiary) had no such right of

(b) In Roman
law.—Under Roman law, a citizen while appointing a
testamentary heir had but a limited choice in so far as he could not appoint an
alien, not a posthumous child outside his family, nor a woman, to inherit his
property. This was quite unfair. A method, therefore, was found out to bypass
the State rules, statutes and prohibitory orders. They appointed a qualified
person as heir according to law, and as prearranged with him under a request or
direction, this qualified person would transfer the property to the person who
was to be the real object of the bounty. This subsequent transfer was in the form
of a gift which the person receiving was not prohibited to receive. The qualified
person was thus to hold the property in trust for another until he transferred it to
the real object. The inheritance so given was termed fi
dei commissum, the heir
or trustee was termed asfiduciarjus and the beneficiary the
fidei commissarius.
4. USE AND FIDEl COMMISSUM
These two concepts under two different legal systems had between them
their own similarities, of course, not praiseworthy. (i)
Both were designed as an
instrument or a device to get rid of the clutches of the prevailing law, and (ii)
in
both, it was left to the heir's or the trustee's sense of honour and confidence to
hold and use or transfer the land for the benefit of another.
But the distinctions between these are also noteworthy. The Privy Council
accepted the same in Abdul Hamid case'.

3. Maitland: Lectures on Equity,p. 29.

4. Ibid.. p. 32.
5. Pomeroy: Equity Jurisprudence 891.
p.
6. Abdul Hamid v. De Saram, 1946 App
Cas 208.
 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief [Chap.
200

(i) The essence of a trust lies in the distinction between legal and equitable
ownership whereas in afidei commissum no such double estate idea or division
of ownership existed.
(ii) The legal and equitable ownership which rests in two different the persons
legal
in a trust, is simultaneous and concurrent while in afldei commissum
ownership begins where the fiduciary ownership ends.
(iii) In a trust the interest of a beneficiary is quite ineffective and impotent
fidel
against a bona fide purchaser of an estate for value without notice. In fidel
commissum this is not so. There, once an interest is vested in the
commissarios, it holds good against the whole world and aflduciarius (trustee/
heir) cannot destroy it or cannot burden it by a transfer as a charge.

5. USE DEVELOPS INTO A TRUST

The history of the growth of trust falls into two natural divisions: the period
before the Statute of Uses and the period after the Statute of Uses, 1536.
(a) Before 1535.—After the Norman conquest by William the Bastard, the
Duke of Normandy, better known as William the Conqueror, 7 a controversy of
Norman versus Anglo-Saxon law came to surface. William had brought with
him the feudal law. He made certain that every acre of English land was held,
directly or indirectly, from the king. He had the political foresight to avoid
decentralization which feudalism had introduced in the rest of Europe. He got
compiled the famous "Doonesday Book" by referring to which his agents
could find out at once who the owner of the land was. He did not destroy the
Germanic legal system of Anglo-Saxon England but gradually got both of them
merged just as the two languages merged to form the English tongue. 9 The
merger of the two systems gave England its Common law. 9 Under this system,
the king was the supreme lord and the feudal lords held the lands distributed by
the king on his behalf and at his pleasure. In turn, these lords also distributed the
land received by them to their friends and followers, which consequently
resulted in a feudalistic arrangement wherein the immediate superior at the top
C:hain wasthc
WaE the fetal lord, 'tbject to the krg, and the lnv.cet link the
poor helpless life tenant, whose position was no better than a serf in so far as the
lord had complete control over his person and property)° In the beginning the
land held by the life tenants was inalienable, non-transferable and non-
hereditary, but after a prolonged battle and owing to the force of circumstances,
concessions were wrenched out which made the land hereditary and transferable
but in no case was it absolutely transferable without the king's prior approval, as
in principle, all lands belonged to him. This position held good roughly up to the
end of the twelfth century.
/'The thirteenth centuryj4itnessed for the first time an incident wherein land
was conveyed by one person to the other, the first holding the same for the use

7. R.A. Wormscr: The Story of the Law. 1961 Edn.. pp. 238-239
8. Ibid., Part VII. William Begins a New System'. pp. 240-242.
9. William ruled from 1066 to 1087.
10.Story: Equity Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn., p. 396.
 X] History of the trusts 201

of another(Ihc monasteries had their rule that no monk or man was to have any
wealth or property at all. But it was impossible to run them unless they had
some means to live upon. And this was supplied by a device, by which land was
conveyed to the borough community to the use of the Franciscan friar-English
Common law had a similar provision so that no land could be conveyed to
religious houses and monasteries by reason of the Statute of Mortmain. 11 But in
spite of this so many Englishmen had sought to save their souls by making
donations to the church that it seemed as though all the land of England. sooner
or later, might pass into the hands of the church corporations. This in turn
increased the power of the church.
As the above contrivance worked well people were tempted to use it more
and more. The growing power of the church was a serious challenge to the
king's powers and the powers of the feudal lords.
This popular device, which was originally used for conveying lands to
religious houses, was in the 14th century employed profitably i2 to get rid of (i)
the feudal burdens of wardship and marriage, (ii) the law of forfeiture for
treason and escheat for felony, (iii) the Statute of Mortmain, and (iv) one's own
creditors. (v) Lastly. by means of this device, one could give oneself the power
of making something very like a will of lands. The use was thus a cloak for the
real owner.
In the 15th century the use became popular for transfer of land for all
Purposes. The ordinary Common law lawyers found this system very distasteful.
Common law itself did not and could not recognise and enforce it as it was too
vague as an agreement and did not fulfil the requirements of a contract. It
therefore fell within the province of the Chancellor who enforced it efficiently.
The Chancellor enforced it not as a contract but as a confidence binding the
conscience of the feoffee who was to hold the land for the cestui que use (the
person called beneficiary) and a remedy was given to the beneficiary to enforce
it. The right of the beneficiary was recognised as an equitable ownership in
land-an equitable estate in the land, which in course of time was available
against all except a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the equitable
interest. Common law lawyers rejected the 'deed to a use' entirely and prevailed
upon the Parliament to enact the Statute of Uses, which converted a deed to the
use of another into actual title in that other. Thus the feoffee could not serve the
purpose of a cloak to the real owner and the use, in the words of Snell, became
the land.
(b) After 1535.—With the passing of the Statute of Uses the second period
in the development of USC into a trust began. The statute was designed to put an
end to the use. For example, when land was conveyed to X to the use of Y, the
statute deprived X of any interest in the land and the equitable interest of Y was
recognised by it as a legal estate. The statute however did not apply to personal
chattels, leaseholds and cop y holds, but it applied only to frecholds. It. also did

It. 'Morin-tain' means'dead hand'. Land was no longer to be transferred in such a way that it
would be forever owned by a dead hand.
12. Maitland: Lectures on Equity, 1969 Edn.. p.27.
 202 Equity, Trusts and Spec if
i c Relief [Chap.

not apply where there were. duties to be performed by the trustee, the person to
whom the land was conveyed, and it did not recognise a use upon use) 3 i.e.,
where land was conveyed by X to Y to the use of Z to the use of P Z was
considered to be the legal owner and P got nothing. This gave a fresh and
further chance to equity courts to decide in favour of the second" use, under the
argument that the statute when applied to the first use, recognised the holder of
the first use as a legal owner and thus the statute was exhausted in its
application. The result would be that in the above example Z would be the legal
owner and P the holder of an equitable estate. The second use came to be
known as trust due to the invention of the chancery lawyers. In the words of
Lord Hardwick& 5 , the net result of passing the "statute, made upon great
consideration, and introduced into a solemn and a pompous manner by this strict
construction, had no other effect than add at most three words to a
corlveyance",i.e., 'to the use'.
In 1660, military tenures were abolished and the 17th and the 18th centuries
saw its smooth working with the extension of the doctrine to chattels, funds of
every kind, actionable claims and money, till we come to the Law of Property
Act, 1925 which repealed all the previous enactments relating to trusts) 6 From
January 1, 1926, a trust of any property can be created by an instrument without
the aid of a use. Thus A can convey property to B in trust for C. At present trusts
in England are created by way of settlements, and the beneficial interest of such
a trust may be enjoyed by a number of persons in succession.

6. IN INDIA
In India the law regarding trusts has been incorporated in the Indian Trusts
Act, 1882. Recapitulating succinctly what has been said before regarding the
essential characteristics of a trust in England, we can say that there are two
kinds of estates, legal and equitable, of which two different persons can be the
owners and these owners can well transfer their respective interests to any
person or perscns. This peculiar position of double ownership is the distinctive
and original feature of an English trust) Justice Peacock 17 and Justice Markby'8
were of the opinion that no such precise idea as expressed by the English "use"
and the Roman "fidei commissum" existed or was ever known to Hindu or
Muslim law. But Macpherson, J19 opined to the contrary and said that a number
of trusts for religious and charitable purposes were enforced by the courts in
India and gift made to an idol tantamounted to a trust, which was beyond doubt.
d In Ganendra Mohan Tagore v. Upendra Mohan Tagore 20, it has been clearly

13. Tyrrel case, (1557) Dyer's Rep 155(a).

I& Santhach v. Dat cron, (1634) Tothil 188.
15. Hopkins v. Hopkins, (1938) 1 Atk 581.
the Trust
16. The Statute of Uses. 1535, the Trustees Act, 1850. the Trustees Act, 1888,
Investment Act. 1889, and the Trustees Act, 1893.
17. Kumar Asimkrishna Dev v. Kumar Kumarkrishna, BLR (Original Cases) 36.
IS. Smz Krishna Ramini Dasi v. Anand Krishna Bose, BLR (Original Cases) 231.
19. In appeal in these cases.
20. BLR (OC) 134.


K] History of the trusts 203

expressed by Frier, J. that the double-ownership idea was unknown to Hindu

and Mahomedan law but that is not a ground for drawing a baseless conclusion
that trusts were unknown to Hindu and Mahomedan law. On the contrary, the
variety of fiduciary relationship and the meticulous way in which they have
been expressed in Indian law are quite unparalleled- 21 This proposition also
finds support in his speech by Stokes on the Trusts Bill in the Legislative
Council in the year 1881. Before 1882, trusts under Hindu law and Mahomedan
law were enforced, but in doing so principles of English equity, justice and good
conscience were applied where necessary.22
It is true that before 1882, no systematic effort was made to present the law
relating to trusts which was scattered in different provisions in various other
enactments. A commission 23 for this purpose was appointed, which gave its
report on November 15, 18,79 and in 1882 it was passed as an Act called the
Indian Trusts Act, 1882. TNô U tnc-i -,jjç f' C11 Cfl
(-,
7. INSTITUTION OF TRUST—ITS BENEFITS AND HAZARDS24
Trusts grew out of Fraud and Fear and their nurse was the court of
Conscience. They are the product of evasion of law by society. However it is not
an overstatement when one says that trust implies power arid uig trusts imply
and generate 'big power, a group power'.
No doubt trusts have contributed to the progress and development of society
in every sphere. In several striking passages Maitland has vigorously
, emphasized that the English trust has "supplied a personalized substitute for the
far more comprehensive use of corporate devices in German law".
Maitland was true when he said that the personalized English concept of a
trust was more useful to society than the impersonal collectivized German
concept of an association (verein); Charitable trust therefore should be confined
not to corporations but to natural persons, because men are more conscientious
when they are acting in their own names than when they are using the name of a
corporation (or associations of foundations etc.).
Besides, the giant trusts (corporations) wield a gre8t hidden group power, so
far not satisfactorily controlled by the State. One may, therefore, join W.
Friedmann when he says that: "Ironically enough, the immense sociological and
juristic aspects of the problem of group power within the State have largely
remained hidden behind accidents of legal form, especially in the Anglo-
American system". The greatest problem is "the social and political danger of
the assumption that an association, corporate or unincorporated, merely by
being in form private rather than public, should still enjoy the far-reaching
immunity from judicial or other official control which the courts have accorded
it". Giant trusts are thus a constant source of hidden power, which if not
properly controlled bY the State, would result into a continuous menace and

21. Ibid.
22. Kahandas and Narandas, Re. (1880) 6 Born 154.
23. Whirley Stokes, C.A. Turner and Raymond West were its mchibcrs.
24. Based on W. Friedmann: Law in a Changing Society, Chaps. 9 and 10, pp. 231-254, 268.
204 Equity, Trusts and Specific Relief

challenge to the social, political and economic life of the country, as is the
experience of the Western world. Ransacked as a subject of research "Use of
Trust Power" would expose equally shocking results in India too.25
As a solution to the riddle of abuses of group power eight types of controls
or remedies have been suggested:
(i) Total socialization,
(ii) Mixed public and private enterprise,
(iii) Cooperatives,
(iv) Mixed companies,
(v) Partnership of capital and labour,
(vi) Regulatory public authorities,
(vii) Anti-trust law, and
(viii) Social restraints.
To examine these is not within the scope here, but it would be profitable to
look to Friedmann when he explains how this can be achieved: (i) By
safeguarding of "due process" in the personal, political and social life of the
individual, and (ii) by response of law largely in terms of judicial interpretation
and extension of reviewability of unfair practices and lack of procedural
safeguards in the affairs of association, this is possible. Of course, continuous
administrative supervision over private institutions (unions, associations,
foundations and the like representing group power-congeries) would jeopardize
that minimum freedom without which democracies can slide to the brink of
totalitarianism. No country can be an exception to this, much less India.

by the then Chief Minister

25. Cf. The Scandal about Indira Pratibha Praiishthan and other tru.cts
of Maharashtra State. U.S. Stall Corporation, Standard Oil Company, American Tobacco
Company arc the American examples of notorious Trusts. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890,
outlawed many of their practices and The American Supreme Court decreed dissolution of such
Trusts, (Walker D.M.: The Oxford Companion to law, 1980 cdii., pp. 1241, 1267.