VI.

Kindred Torts/Medical Malpractice

 Batiquin vs CA, GR 118231 July 5, 1996

FACTS:
In September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy and O.R. Nurse Arlene
Diones and some student nurses performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros
Oriental Provincial Hospital. after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains
and complained of being feverish. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered
Mrs. Villegas no end despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin. When the pains became
unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's
Hospital in Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989. Blood test shown that Mrs. Villegas had an infection
inside her abdominal cavity. Thereafter Dr. Kho suggested to Mrs. Villegas to submit to another
surgery to which the latter agreed.

When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found a "foreign body" looked like a piece of
a "rubber glove". . . and which is [sic] also "rubber-drain like". . . . It could have been a torn section of
a surgeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the
infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her
delivery on September 21, 1988.

ISSUE: Whether or not a doctor may be held liable for damages for alleged negligence in the conduct
of an operation on the ground of finding a foreign object inside the body of the patient in a
subsequent operation.

HELD:
Yes. The rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had occasion to delve into the nature
and operation of this doctrine:

This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen in those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.

In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this
light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body,
which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence.
Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no
other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her
uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean
section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr.
Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical profession
plays in the lives of the people, and the State's compelling interest to enact measures to
protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma." Indeed, a
physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving
them always his best talent and skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner
endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and
in contravention of the legal standards set forth for professionals, in general, and members
of the medical profession, in particular.

 Ramos vs CA, GR 124354 December 29, 1999

FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the
De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a
good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3
hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain
damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of
Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that
Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable
care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating
the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good
anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the
negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed
to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly
and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused
the comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO:

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence
of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily
in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony
to prove that the attending physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda
Ramos already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete
and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain
damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of

negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate
cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether
or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme
Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the
day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act
of negligence and irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed
the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with
the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The
hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their
“consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert
significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which
is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was
allocated a share in the liability.

Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or

compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.

 Ramos vs CA, April 11, 2002 (MR)

The case is about an action for damages filed by petitioners against Dr. Orlino
Hosaka (surgeon) and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez (anaesthesiologist) for negligence in
the performance of their duties during the operation conducted to Erlinda Ramos for
the removal of a stone in her gall bladder, which resulted to her comatose condition.
Delos Santos Medical Center (DLSMC) was impleaded being solidarily liable as their
employer. Based on the evidence presented, it was shown that Dr. Gutierrez had
wrongfully inserted the endotracheal tube into the esophagus instead of the trachea.
Consequently, oxygen was delivered not to the lungs but to the gastrointestinal tract.
This resulted to a decrease of blood supply to the patient’s brain. The brain was thus
temporarily deprived of oxygen supply causing Erlinda to go into coma. Another
factor that lead her into coma is the three (3) long waiting hours lying in the operating
bed while waiting for Dr. Hosaka to arrive, which lead to increase her anxiety that
adversely affected the administration of anesthesia. Hence, there is negligence on
the part of Dr. Hosaka in not arriving promptly on the scheduled time.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner holding private
respondents negligent in the performance of their duties. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court’s decision and directed petitioners to pay their unpaid medical bills.
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari to the SC. The SC reversed the
CA’s decision finding private respondents solidarily liable to Erlinda. Aggrieved,
private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. The SC rendered a resolution
affirming partly its decision, holding solidarily liable Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez
only, while absolving DLSMC from any liability. The reason for this is that there is no
employer-employee relationship exists between the surgeons and the hospital. The
amount of damages awarded to petitioners was modified due to the death of Erlinda
at the time of hearing of this motion for reconsideration. Hence, temperate damages
was eliminated.

REACTION ON THE DECISION

I was amazed how come the decision reached in this case is different from those
rendered in the cases of PSI vs. Agana (2007), and Nogales vs. CMC (2006). I think
it’s because this decision was rendered in 2002, which is much earlier than the two
(2) above mentioned cases. In this case, the Supreme Court did not yet adopt the
doctrine of Apparent Authority. It just relied on the control test to determine whether
these specialists are employees of the hospital or not. The fact that these specialists
were not under the control of the DLSMC with regards to means on how the end of
their tasks will be achieved made them not employees of the hospital. Unlike in the
doctrine of apparent authority, once the plaintiff had relied on the fact that they are
employed in the hospital through means which would make an ordinary person
believed that they are such, the hospital is estopped from claiming that they are not
its employees.

With the current set up of private hospitals nowadays, on how they operate their
businesses, it is clear that most of their consultants and specialists are not
employees of the hospital, but rather considered as an independent contractor. I
believe that this decision is not in consonance with the rule on fair play and equity,
because the hospital escaped from liability despite the fact that in case the operation
succeed, it will profit substantially. The doctrine laid down in this decision was
abandoned in subsequent medical negligence cases, in which the SC ruled liberally
in favor of patient with regard to the interpretation of employer-employee relationship.
It adopted the modern views enunciated by US Courts to compel hospital owners to
exercise due diligence in the supervision and selection of their employees.

However, the SC with regard to Dr. Hosaka’s liability, it did apply the Captain of
the Ship theory considering that he is the one overall in-charge of the operation. He
became solidarily liable with Dr. Gutierrez because it is his duty to ensure that the
latter is working her task diligently. Furthermore, Dr. Hosaka is the one who referred
Dr. Gutierrez to the Ramos to be Erlinda’s anaesthesiologist because they have been
altogether for a long time every time he performed an operation. The SC belie the
claim of Dr. Hosaka that the trend in US jurisprudence should be followed as it do
away with the Captain of the Ship doctrine because each doctor has different
specialization. Thus, he has no right of control over his anaesthesiologist Dr.
Gutierrez. Yet, the SC affirmed its decision to made him liable because he exercise a
certain degree of supervision on how the operation to Erlinda should be performed.

Finally, with regard to Dr. Gutierrez, I think his negligence is the proximate cause
which made Erlinda to comatose, considering the fact that he erroneously inserted
the endotracheal tube into the esophagus instead of the trachea. Hence, the oxygen
instead of going to her lungs, was diverted into his gastrointestinal tract, which lead
to the loss of supply of oxygen in her brain. If she just performed diligently the pre-
operation evaluation, this tragic incident will not happen.

 Reyes vs Sisters of Mercy, GR 13547, Oct 3, 2000

Legal Issue:Whether or not Sisters of Mercy Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge
Reyes.

Facts:
Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five
days before the latter
death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring fever with chills. The doctors confirmed
through the Widal test that Jorge has typhoid fever. However, he did not respond to the
treatment and died. The cause of his death was “Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to
Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”

Consequently, petitioner filed the instant case for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, which dismissed the case and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.The contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death
was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had
respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not have
recommended and rushed the performanceof the Widal Test, hastily concluded that
Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and administered chloromycetin without first
conducting sufficient tests on the patient’s compatibility with said drug.

Ruling:
Sisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.D.

Reasoning of the Court:

There is no showing that the attending physician in this case deviated from the
usualcourse of treatment with respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was given antibiotic
choloromycetin andsome dose of triglobe after compatibility test was made by the doctor
and found that no adversereactions manifested which would necessitate replacement of
the medicines. Indeed, the standardcontemplated is not what is actually the average
merit among all known practitioners from
the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable aver
age meritamong the ordinarily good physicians. Here, the doctors did not depart from the
reasonablestandard recommended by the experts as they in fact observed the due care
required under thecircumstances.E.
Policy:
In Medical Negligence cases, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the
usual procedure in treating the illness is not followed by the doctor. Failure to prove this,
the doctor isnot liable. Physicians are not insurers of the success of every procedure
undertaken and if
the procedure was shown to be properly done but did not work, they cannot be faulted for
suchresult.

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, G.R. No. 130547, Oct. 3, 2000

CONCEPT:
Petitioner’s action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which
consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that
degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by theprofession generally, under
similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue
such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he
or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have
done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are thus four
elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate causation.

Elements of Medical Malpractice

 duty – the existence of a physician-patient relationship

 breach of duty
 injury caused
 causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury caused

Evidentiary Rule
TWO-PRONGED EVIDENCE:

 evidence of the recognized standards

 the physician negligently departed from these standards

EXPERT TESTIMONY ESSENTIAL:

In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed
between respondent doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to
use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes
actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the
reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Inasmuch
as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the
light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. (Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy
Hospital, supra)
EXCEPTION:
There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. As held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals:

Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove
that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the
need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the
proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert
testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and
not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified
to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest
conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of
negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but
how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to
produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitor is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions,
by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. (Reyes vs. Sisters
of Mercy Hospital, supra)

Standard of Diligence Required

- the standard of care in the locality (“Locality” Rule)
- a physician is not liable for error in judgment (“Error in Judgment” Rule), provided he
applied reasonable skill and care

STANDARD OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED:

Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all
known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the least
experienced, but the reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians.

STANDARD IS NOT EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE:

The standard of extraordinary diligence is peculiar to common carriers. The Civil Code
provides: "Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
the circumstancesof each case. . . ."

The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a

right earned through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the
state through professional board examinations. Such license may, at any time and for
cause, be revoked by the government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct of
doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an ancient code of discipline
and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition and
acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there is no
need to expressly require of doctors the observance of “extraordinary” diligence. As it is
now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of
diligence. And, as we have already noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is
simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians. That is
reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of Appeals called it, the reasonable “skill
and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar locality . . . should apply.”
(Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, supra)

 Nograles vs CMC, GR 142625, December 19, 2009

FACTS:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales (“Corazon”), who was then 37 years
old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (“Dr. Estrada”)
beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While
Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her
blood pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a
dangerous complication of pregnancy. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon
started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales
(“Spouses Nogales”) to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr.
Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (“CMC”).
The following day, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the CMC after the staff
nurse noted the written admission request of Dr. Estrada. Upon Corazon’s admission
at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales (“Rogelio”) executed and signed the “Consent on
Admission and Agreement” and “Admission Agreement.” Corazon was then brought
to the labor room of the CMC. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was
“hemorrhage, post partum.”
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against CMC, Dr. Estrada, and the rest of CMC medical staff for the death of
Corazon. In their defense, CMC pointed out that Dr. Estrada was a consultant to be
considered as an independent-contractor, and that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the former and the latter.
After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court rendered judgment on 22 November
1993 finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages. Petitioners appealed the trial
court’s decision. Petitioners claimed that aside from Dr. Estrada, the remaining
respondents should be held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed out the
extent of each respondent’s alleged liability.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling and applied the
“borrowed servant doctrine” to release the liability of other medical staff. This doctrine
provides that once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge of the
proceedings, the acts or omissions of operating room personnel, and any negligence
associated with such acts or omissions, are imputable to the surgeon. While the
assisting physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or engaged by the
patient, they normally become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in
charge while the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed upon the
surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
ISSUE: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada as its
attending independent-contractor physician considering that facts of the instant case.

HELD: YES.
In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-
physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be
liable if the physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This exception is also
known as the “doctrine of apparent authority.”xxx The doctrine of apparent authority
essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent-contractor
physician. The first factor focuses on the hospital’s manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make
express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of
the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied. xxx The second
factor focuses on the patient’s reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry
on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
xxx
In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical
staff. Through CMC’s acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby
leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent
of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority. The records show that the
Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment relationship with CMC in
accepting Dr. Estrada’s services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically
chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s delivery not only because of their friend’s
recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr. Estrada’s “connection with a
reputable hospital, the [CMC].” In other words, Dr. Estrada’s relationship with CMC
played a significant role in the Spouses Nogales’ decision in accepting Dr. Estrada’s
services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for Corazon’s delivery. Moreover, as earlier
stated, there is no showing that before and during Corazon’s confinement at CMC,
the Spouses Nogales knew or should have known that Dr. Estrada was not an
employee of CMC. xxx CMC’s defense that all it did was “to extend to [Corazon] its
facilities” is untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals,
such as CMC, are in the business of treatment.
xxx
The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada. The amounts of P105,000 as actual damages and
P700,000 as moral damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Court
affirms the rest of the Decision dated 6 February 1998 and Resolution dated 21
March 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641.
 Nogales vs Capitol Medical Center
GR No. 142625 December 19, 2006

Facts: Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales, who was then 37 y/o was
under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month
of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester
of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and development
of leg edemas indicating preeclampsia which is a dangerous complication of
pregnancy. Around midnight of May 26, 1976, Corazon started to experience mild
labor pains prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his home.
After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to Capitol
Medical Center (CMC). Upon her admission, an internal examination was conducted
upon her by a resident-physician. Based on the doctor’s sheet, around 3am, Dr.
Estrada advised for 10mg valium to be administered immediately by intramuscular
injection, he later ordered the start of intravenous administration of syntociron
admixed with dextrose, 5% in lactated ringer’s solution, at the rate of 8-10 micro-
drops per minute. When asked if he needed the services of anesthesiologist, he
refused. Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously and her cervix was fully
dilated and she experienced convulsions. Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of 10g of
magnesium sulfate but his assisting Doctor, Dr. Villaflor, only administered 2.5g. She
also applied low forceps to extract Corazon’s baby. In the process, a 10 x 2.5cm
piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apric, cyanatic
weak and injured condition. Consequently the baby had to be intubated and
resuscitated. Corazon had professed vaginal bleeding where a blood typing was
ordered and she was supposed to undergo hysterectomy, however, upon the arrival
of the doctor, she was already pronounced dead due to hemorrhage.

Issue: Whether or not in the conduct of child delivery, the doctors and the
respondent hospital is liable for negligence.

Held: Yes. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician. There is, however an exception to this principle. The hospital
may be liable if the physician is the ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is
also known as the doctrine of apparent authority.

Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for
the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether
the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have
known, that the physician is an independent contractor.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must
show that 1.) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of the hospital; 2.) Where the acts of the agent create the
appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge
of and acquired in them; and 3.) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

Borrowed servant doctrine provides that once a surgeon enters the operating room
and takes charge of the acts or omissions of operating room personnel and any
negligence associated with each acts or omissions are imputable to the surgeon,
while the assisting physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or
engaged by the patient, they normally become the temporary servants or agents of
the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed
upon the surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

 PSI vs Agana, GR No 126197, 126467, 127590, February 11, 2008

FACTS:

PSI, together with Dr. Miguel Ampil (Dr. Ampil) and Dr. Juan Fuentes (Dr. Fuentes),
was impleaded by Enrique Agana and Natividad Agana (later substituted by her heirs), in a
complaint10 for damages filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96,
for the injuries suffered by Natividad when Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes neglected to remove
from her body two gauzes which were used in the surgery they performed on her on April 11,
1984 at the Medical City General Hospital. PSI was impleaded as owner, operator and
manager of the hospital.

In a decision dated March 17, 1993, the RTC held PSI solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes for damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), absolved Dr. Fuentes but
affirmed the liability of Dr. Ampil and PSI, subject to the right of PSI to claim reimbursement
from Dr. Ampil.

On petition for review, this Court, in its January 31, 2007 decision, affirmed the CA
decision. PSI filed a motion for reconsideration16 but the Court denied it in a resolution dated
February 11, 2008.

With prior leave of court,1 petitioner Professional Services, Inc. (PSI) filed a second
motion for reconsideration urging referral thereof to the Court en banc and seeking
modification of the decision dated January 31, 2007 and resolution dated February 11, 2008
which affirmed its vicarious and direct liability for damages to respondents Enrique Agana
and the heirs of Natividad Agana (Aganas).

ISSUE:

Whether a hospital may be held liable for the negligence of physicians-consultants

allowed to practice in its premises.

What is the relationship that governs hospitals and its consultants.

HELD:

PSI cannot be liable under doctrine of corporate negligence since the proximate cause
of Mrs. Agana's injury was the negligence of Dr. Ampil, which is an element of the principle of
corporate negligence.

After gathering its thoughts on the issues, this Court holds that PSI is liable to the
Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employment
relationship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of
Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to
perform its duties as a hospital.

While in theory a hospital as a juridical entity cannot practice medicine, in reality it

utilizes doctors, surgeons and medical practitioners in the conduct of its business of
facilitating medical and surgical treatment.
 Within that reality, three legal relationships crisscross: (1) between the hospital and
the doctor practicing within its premises; (2) between the hospital and the patient being
treated or examined within its premises and (3) between the patient and the doctor. The exact
nature of each relationship determines the basis and extent of the liability of the hospital for
the negligence of the doctor.

Where an employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable
under Article 217634 in relation to Article 218035 of the Civil Code or the principle of
respondeat superior. Even when no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the
hospital holds out to the patient that the doctor is its agent, the hospital may still be
vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation to Article 143136 and Article 186937 of the
Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.38 Moreover, regardless of its relationship
with the doctor, the hospital may be held directly liable to the patient for its own negligence or
failure to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation.

In fine, as there was no dispute over the RTC finding that PSI and Dr. Ampil had no
employer-employee relationship, such finding became final and conclusive even to this Court.

Nonetheless, to allay the anxiety of the intervenors, the Court holds that, in this
particular instance, the concurrent finding of the RTC and the CA that PSI was not the
employer of Dr. Ampil is correct. Control as a determinative factor in testing the employer-
employee relationship between doctor and hospital under which the hospital could be held
vicariously liable to a patient in medical negligence cases is a requisite fact to be established
by preponderance of evidence. Here, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the
power of control or wielded such power over the means and the details of the specific process
by which Dr. Ampil applied his skills in the treatment of Natividad. Consequently, PSI cannot
be held vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under the principle of respondeat
superior.

There is, however, ample evidence that the hospital (PSI) held out to the patient
(Natividad) that the doctor (Dr. Ampil) was its agent. Present are the two factors that
determine apparent authority: first, the hospital's implied manifestation to the patient which
led the latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital's agent; and second, the patient’s
reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.

This Court must therefore maintain the ruling that PSI is vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil as its ostensible agent.

The Court notes that PSI made the following admission in its Motion for
Reconsideration:

51. Clearly, not being an agent or employee of petitioner PSI, PSI [sic] is not
liable for Dr. Ampil's acts during the operation. Considering further that Dr. Ampil
was personally engaged as a doctor by Mrs. Agana, it is incumbent upon Dr. Ampil, as
"Captain of the Ship", and as the Agana's doctor to advise her on what to do with her
situation vis-a-vis the two missing gauzes. In addition to noting the missing gauzes,
regular check-ups were made and no signs of complications were exhibited during her
stay at the hospital, which could have alerted petitioner PSI's hospital to render and
provide post-operation services to and tread on Dr. Ampil's role as the doctor of Mrs.
Agana. The absence of negligence of PSI from the patient's admission up to her
discharge is borne by the finding of facts in this case. Likewise evident therefrom is
the absence of any complaint from Mrs. Agana after her discharge from the hospital
which had she brought to the hospital's attention, could have alerted petitioner PSI to
act accordingly and bring the matter to Dr. Ampil's attention. But this was not the
case. Ms. Agana complained ONLY to Drs. Ampil and Fuentes, not the hospital. How
then could PSI possibly do something to fix the negligence committed by Dr. Ampil
when it was not informed about it at all. (emphasis supplied)

The significance of the foregoing statements is critical.

 First, they constitute judicial admission by PSI that while it had no power to control
the means or method by which Dr. Ampil conducted the surgery on Natividad Agana, it had
the power to review or cause the review of what may have irregularly transpired within its
walls strictly for the purpose of determining whether some form of negligence may have
attended any procedure done inside its premises, with the ultimate end of protecting its
patients.

Second, it is a judicial admission that, by virtue of the nature of its business as well as
its prominence in the hospital industry, it assumed a duty to "tread on" the "captain of the
ship" role of any doctor rendering services within its premises for the purpose of ensuring the
safety of the patients availing themselves of its services and facilities.

Third, by such admission, PSI defined the standards of its corporate conduct under
the circumstances of this case, specifically: (a) that it had a corporate duty to Natividad even
after her operation to ensure her safety as a patient; (b) that its corporate duty was not limited
to having its nursing staff note or record the two missing gauzes and (c) that its corporate duty
extended to determining Dr. Ampil's role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and
correcting his negligence.

And finally, by such admission, PSI barred itself from arguing in its second motion for
reconsideration that the concept of corporate responsibility was not yet in existence at the
time Natividad underwent treatment; and that if it had any corporate responsibility, the same
was limited to reporting the missing gauzes and did not include "taking an active step in fixing
the negligence committed." An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and is conclusive as to him, and all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether or not objection is
interposed by a party.

To begin with, PSI could not simply wave off the problem and nonchalantly delegate
to Dr. Ampil the duty to review what transpired during the operation. The purpose of such
review would have been to pinpoint when, how and by whom two surgical gauzes were mislaid
so that necessary remedial measures could be taken to avert any jeopardy to Natividad’s
recovery. Certainly, PSI could not have expected that purpose to be achieved by merely hoping
that the person likely to have mislaid the gauzes might be able to retrace his own steps. By its
own standard of corporate conduct, PSI's duty to initiate the review was non-delegable.

While Dr. Ampil may have had the primary responsibility of notifying Natividad
about the missing gauzes, PSI imposed upon itself the separate and independent
responsibility of initiating the inquiry into the missing gauzes. The purpose of the first would
have been to apprise Natividad of what transpired during her surgery, while the purpose of
the second would have been to pinpoint any lapse in procedure that led to the gauze count
discrepancy, so as to prevent a recurrence thereof and to determine corrective measures that
would ensure the safety of Natividad. That Dr. Ampil negligently failed to notify Natividad did
not release PSI from its self-imposed separate responsibility.

Corollary to its non-delegable undertaking to review potential incidents of negligence

committed within its premises, PSI had the duty to take notice of medical records prepared by
its own staff and submitted to its custody, especially when these bear earmarks of a surgery
gone awry. Thus, the record taken during the operation of Natividad which reported a gauze
count discrepancy should have given PSI sufficient reason to initiate a review. It should not
have waited for Natividad to complain.

As it happened, PSI took no heed of the record of operation and consequently did not
initiate a review of what transpired during Natividad’s operation. Rather, it shirked its
responsibility and passed it on to others – to Dr. Ampil whom it expected to inform Natividad,
and to Natividad herself to complain before it took any meaningful step. By its inaction,
therefore, PSI failed its own standard of hospital care. It committed corporate negligence.

It should be borne in mind that the corporate negligence ascribed to PSI is different
from the medical negligence attributed to Dr. Ampil. The duties of the hospital are distinct
from those of the doctor-consultant practicing within its premises in relation to the patient;
hence, the failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct
liability to the Aganas distinct from that of Dr. Ampil.

All this notwithstanding, we make it clear that PSI’s hospital liability based on
ostensible agency and corporate negligence applies only to this case, pro hac vice. It is not
intended to set a precedent and should not serve as a basis to hold hospitals liable for every
form of negligence of their doctors-consultants under any and all circumstances. The ruling is
unique to this case, for the liability of PSI arose from an implied agency with Dr. Ampil and an
admitted corporate duty to Natividad.

Professional Services, Inc. is ORDERED pro hac vice to pay Natividad (substituted by
her children Marcelino Agana III, Enrique Agana, Jr., Emma Agana-Andaya, Jesus Agana and
Raymund Agana) and Enrique Agana the total amount of P15 million, subject to 12% p.a.
interest from the finality of this resolution to full satisfaction.

Professional Services, Inc. v. Natividad and Enrique Agana

Facts:

 Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital)
because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical
examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
 Dr. Ampil, assisted by medical staff, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad.
He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating
the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s
husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes to perform hysterectomy on her.
 However, the operation appeared to be flawed, with the attending nurses including in the
Record of Operation that 2 sponges were missing, but closure was nonetheless ordered.
 Natividad was released from the hospital. Her hospital and medical bills, including the
doctors’ fees, amounted to P60,000.00. After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region.
 Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further
treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was
told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines.
 Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it,
Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
 Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad
to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. A foul-smelling gauze was detected,
measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A rectovaginal fistula
had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina.
Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984,
Natividad underwent another surgery.
 Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for
damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital,
Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes for negligence in leaving 2 pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s
body, and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
 Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes.
 The RTC found PSI, Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes guilty.
  Pending appeal before
the CA, a motion for partial execution of the RTC decision was granted.
 The PRC Board of
Medicine held that the prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was the one who left the
2 pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body; and that he concealed such fact from Natividad.

Issue:

 Is Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice?

 Is Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice?
 Is PSI liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil?

Ruling:

AS TO DR. AMPIL

 YES, Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence and malpractice.

 The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together, as specified by the Court
of Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party.
 An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the
sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign
substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence
by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due
care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect
that such act is negligence per se.
 Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required by the urgent necessities of the case
to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen, because of the dangers attendant upon delay,
still, it is his legal duty to so inform his patient within a reasonable time thereafter by
advising her of what he had been compelled to do. This is in order that she might seek relief
from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit.
 This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To
successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider
either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done;
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
 Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
o Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as
gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do
so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties.
o Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by
American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate
cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision
despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were
still missing.
o That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link
between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such
injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of
Natividad and her family.

AS TO DR. FUENTES
 NO, Dr. Fuentes is not liable for negligence & malpractice
 Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge
of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his
orders.16 As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the
"Captain of the Ship."
  That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct:
1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy;
2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order;
3) granting Dr. Fuentes’ permission to leave; and
4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure
of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for,
that caused injury to Natividad’s body.
 Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands
of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.

AS TO PSI
 YES, PSI is liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
 It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance
of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As
such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or
constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the
attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing.
 The plaintiffs did plead that the operation was performed at the hospital with its knowledge,
aid, and assistance, and that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of
the patient’s injuries.
 The Court found that such general allegations of negligence, along with the evidence
produced at the trial of this case, are sufficient to support the hospital’s liability based on the
theory of negligent supervision.

VII. SPECIAL TORTS IN HUMAN RELATIONS

a. Abuse of Rights (Art 19)
 Carpio vs Valmonte, 438 SCRA 446

FACTS

Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and

Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte

went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she

arrived at the Suite, several persons were already there including the bride. Among

those present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing

to dress up for the occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items

needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She

proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held.

She went back to the suite after, and found several people lstaring at her when she

entered. . It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words
to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan
ka

pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.” Petitioner then
ordered

one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left

the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry

which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Hotel Security

was later called.

A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding

a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’

relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner’s

imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20

February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Valmonte is entitled to damages.

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong

inflicted by the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff.

Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of

action.

In the our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission,

whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to

obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law

are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are

designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience

and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these

fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as “abuse of rights” under

Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that “Every person must, in the exercise of his

rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty

and good faith.” To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements
must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;

(3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. When a right is exercised in

a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong

is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.

The following provisions Complement the abuse of right principle:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another,

shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to

morals or good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party

who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal

provision, or an act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law,

nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly

uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought

such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right

to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota

of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any

standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to

respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did

not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind

but to prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of

Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.

FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del

Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church weddinng on October
10, 1996. At about 4:30 pm on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel and when
she arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there including Soledad
Carpio, the aunt of the bride.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite to go to the reception hall
to give the meal allowance to the band and to pay the suppliers. Upon entering the
suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her and it was at this juncture that
Soledad Carpio allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha” It turned out that after Valmonte left the room
to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she
placed ins i de the comfort room in a paper bag were lost and these include diamond
rings, earrings, bracelet and diamong necklace with a total value of about 1M pesos.
Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by the police
officers, but the pe titioner kept on saying the words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto.” Valmonte’s car was also searched but the search yielded nothing.

Few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a
formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds’ relatives
and guests to redeem her smeared reputation but the petitioner did not respond.
Valmonte filed a suit for damages.

The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that when sought investigation for
the loss of her jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage results
from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that no
proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in
bad fai th in pointing to her as the culprit.
The CA ruled out differently and opined that Valmonte has clearly established that
she was singled out by the petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her
jewelry. However, the court find no sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual
damages.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to the award of actual and moral damages

HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent in entitled to moral damages but not to
actual damages.

In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is the
principle known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find
existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: 1) there is
legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or
prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good
faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
The Court said that petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly
uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such
kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no
right to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely inquisitve but
outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went
out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein,
and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded
respondent as the thief. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. Certainly, petitioner
transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 20 for which she should
be held accountable.

Facts: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon
Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding, as such Valmonte went to the Manila
Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived there, several persons
were already there including the bride, the bride’s parents and relatives, the make-up artist
and his assistant, the official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those present
was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the
occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the
wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila
Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal
allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed
the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following
words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one
of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag.

It turned out that after Valmonte left the room, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry pieces
consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with
a total value of about one million pesos.

All the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched,
interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. During all the time
Valmonte was being interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words
"Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car which was parked at the hotel premises
was also searched but the search yielded nothing.

Issue: Whether or not respondent can recover damages from petitioner based on the latter's
act.

Held: Yes, the court awarded moral damages in favor of respondent.

To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.

Moreover, a claim for damages based on abuse of right inorder to prosper must have the
following elements:
(1) there is a legal right or duty;
 (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.

When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. One is not
allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to
another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with
her innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the
presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched,
petitioner virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain
the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was
the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is
impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is
contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing jewelry
cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for
apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she
should be held accountable.

Respondent’s claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence
during the trial and must therefore be denied. However, respondent is clearly entitled to an
award of moral damages.

Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in
the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Though
no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated,
courts are mandated to take into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and
assess damages according to their discretion. Worthy of note is that moral damages are not
awarded to penalize the defendant, or to enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendant’s culpable action. In any case, award of moral damages
must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.

Considering respondent’s social standing, and the fact that her profession is based primarily
on trust reposed in her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner
has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect her future dealings
with her clients, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages appears to be a fair and
reasonable assessment of respondent’s damages.

CARPIO v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 151866; September 9, 2004; Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario
and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day,Valmonte we
nt to the Manila Hotel to where the bride and her family were
billeted. When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were already
there including the petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who waspreparing to
dress up for the occasion. After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite
carrying the items
needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to
the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She went back to the suite
after, and found several people staring at her when she
entered. . It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte:

“Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mongbag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw
lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.”
Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag.

It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitionerdiscovered
that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in apaper bag were
lost.A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmontedemanding a
formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to thenewlyweds ’relatives and
guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner’s imputations against
her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus,on 20February 1997, Valmonte filed a
suit for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE:
W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages

RULING:
Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbalreproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her ownaccount nobody knew
that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside thepaper bag. True, petitioner
had the right o ascertain the identity of the malefactor,but to malign respondent without
an iota of proof that she was the one who
actuallystole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law isimpermissib
le. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in amanner which is contrary to
morals and good customs. She did not act with justiceand good faith for apparently, she
had no other purpose in mind but to
prejudicerespondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of
Article 19 inrelation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable

 SEA Comm’l vs CA, 319 SCRA 211

FACTS

SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing

agricultural machinery, products and equipment. On September 20, 1966,

SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement whereby SEACOM

appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo. Tirso

Jamandre executed a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly and severally with

JII to pay for all obligations of JII to SEACOM. The agreement was subsequently

amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership

agreement on a non-exclusive basis. In the course of the business relationship

arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85

for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus

interest and attorney’s fees.

JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for

damages representing unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System

Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers.

In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in

1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be

financed by said corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but

the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith, went directly to

FSDC and dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units of said tractors, thereby

depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-five thousand four hundred fifteen and

61/100 pesos (P85,415.61).

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as

regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of

his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good

faith.”

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal

remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human

foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one’s

acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to

abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any

unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of

the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would

render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as

understood by men of affairs.

While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the

“cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to certain

rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly

or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good

faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article

19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the

sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By appointing as a dealer of its

agricultural equipment, SEACOM recognized the role and undertaking of JII to

promote and sell said equipment. Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as

a middleman to sell SEACOM’s products, in its area of operations, i.e. Iloilo and

Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other places, to send its men to Manila for

training on repair, servicing and installation of the items to be handled by it, and to

comply with other personnel and vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of

the dealership After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted to

promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JII’s expense

conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service and parts) by

FSDC, SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower

price, placing itself in direct competition with its own dealer. The actuations of

SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.

Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis,

SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping

with honesty or good faith; otherwise it opens itself to liability under the abuse of

right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-quoted. This provision,

together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to embody

certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between

human beings and for the stability of the social order.” What is sought to be written

into the law is the pervading principle of equity and justice above strict legalism.
 Citytrust Banking vs Villanueva, 361 SCRAA 446

 Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes, 452 SCRA 925

b. Acts & Omissions Contrary to Morals (Arts 20-21)

 Ruiz vs Sec of National Defense, 9 SCRA 925

 Tenchavez vs Escano, 122 SCRA 752

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-
in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,
all surnamed "Escaño," respectively

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer
and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil register.

Her parents were disgusted when they found out about the marriage and considered
a Re-celebration of the marriage as they believed it to be invalid.
The re-celebration never took place.

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, Vicenta applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and
she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The
application was approved, and she left for the United States.

On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the
County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open
court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta
sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in

Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating
her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from
plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran;
while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

Issue:

WON Vicenta’s parents are liable for damages.

Ruling:

No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided
and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears
to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was
best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed
until the contrary is proved.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment
and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to
recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

 Pe vs Pe, 115 SCRA 186

CECILIO PE, ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

Facts:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the
petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit
their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The
defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each
other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral
damages was dismissed.

Issue:
WON defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and
public policy due to their illicit affair.
Ruling:

“The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead
to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and
love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the New Civil Code.”

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good

customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant
took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a
reason to get close with Lolita.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby

sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

 Wassmer vs Velez, 120 Phil 144

FACTS

Velez and Wassmer decided to get married and set the wedding day for September

4, 1954. On September 2, 1954, Velez left a note for Wassmer stating that the

wedding would have to be postponed because his mother opposes it, and that he

was leaving for his hometown.

The next day, however, he sent her a telegram stating that nothing changed and that

he would be returning very soon. But then, Velez did not appear nor was he heard

from again.

Wassmer sued him, and he was declared in default. Judgment was rendered ordering

Velez to pay actual damages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Velez filed a petition for relief from judgment and motion for new trial and
reconsideration. Since he still failed to appear during the hearings set by the lower

court, and because his counsel had declared that there was no possibility for an

amicable settlement between the parties, the court issued an order denying his

petition. Hence this appeal. Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts

organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a

parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school’s supervisor. He

boarded a jeep, took hold of the wheel and drove it.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Velez is liable to pay damages to Wassmer.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

VELEZ LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES.

In support of his motion for new trial and reconsideration, Velez asserts that the

judgment is contrary to law because there is no provision in the Civil Code

authorizing an action for breach of a promise to marry. Moreover, the same thing

was declared by this court in the cases of Hermosisima and Estopa.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to

law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the NCC

provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner

that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter

for the damage.”

Here, the invitations had already been printed out and distributed, and numerous

things had been purchased for the bride and for wedding. Bridal showers were given

and gifts had been received.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a

wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it at

the last minute, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good

customs for which defendant must be held answerable for damages.

Petition DENIED. Lower court’s decision AFFIRMED.

Facts:
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided
to schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as:
making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other
apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of
wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to
attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day
before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing
has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an
answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded
exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable
for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which
such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and
moral damages against him.

Issue: WON the award of damages is proper.

Ruling:

Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also
unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to
marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding.
Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of
the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case.
Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton,
reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

c. Unjust Enrichment (Arts 22-23)

 Perez vs Pomar, 2 Phil 682

 Pacific Merchandising vs Consolacion Insurance, 73 SCRA 564

 CIR vs Friedman’s Funds Ins., 148 SCRA 316

 Velayo vs Shell, 100 Phil 186

Velayo, etc. vs Shell Co., of the Philippines, et al. | Felix, J.

G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956 | 100 PHIL 186

FACTS

Commercial Air Lines (CALI) was supplied by Shell Co. of the Philippines Islands

(defendant) ever since it started its operations

As per the books of the defendant, it had reasons to believe that the financial

condition of CALI was far from being satisfactory.

The management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors on August 6,

1948, and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop

operations.

The creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue

the discussion of the payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain creditors,

and it was further agreed that said working committee would supervise the

preservation of the properties of the corporation while the creditors attempted to

come to an under standing as a fair distribution of the assets among them.

To this committee, Mr. Fitzgerald the credit manager of the defendant, Mr. Agcaoili

of the National airports corporation and Atty Alexander Sycip were appointed.

It was agreed upon that the creditors would not file suit to achieve a fair pro-rata

distribution, although CALI announced that in the event of non-agreement, it was

to file for insolvency proceedings.

However, on the very day of the meeting of the working committee, which Mr.

Fitzgerald attended, the defendant effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit against

CALI to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., assigning its credit,

which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10,

1948.

The American corporation then sued CALI in the superior court of californinia,

USA for the amount of the credit thus assigned. And a writ of attachment was

issued against a C-54 PLANE in Ontario International Airport. And on January 5,

1949, a judgment by default had been issued by the American court against CALI.
The stockholders of CALI were unaware of this.

When the suit in the american court was found out, on the first weeks of September

1948, CALI immediately file for voluntary insolvency and the court issued the order

of insolvency accordingly on the same day. The court appointed Mr. Velayo as

Assignee.

On December 17, 1948, Velayo filed for a writ of injuction to stop the foreign court

from prosecuting the claim, and in the alternative, he prayed for damages in double

the amount of the plane which was attached.

The plaintiff having failed to restrain the progress of the attachment suit in the US

by denial of the application of the writ of injuction and the consequences on

execution of the C-54 plane in the state of California, USA, he confines his action to

the recovery of damages against the defendant.

The complaint was dismissed, hence this petition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the defendant acted in bad faith and btrayed the trust and confidence

of the other creditors of CALI.

W/N by reason of the betrayal,, defendant may be made to answer for the

damages prayed for by the plaintiff.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Moreover, we might say that DEFENDANT could not have accomplished the

transfer of its credit to its sister corporation if all the shell companies throughout the

wworld would not have a sort of union, relation or understanding among

themselves to come to the aid of each other. The telegraphic transfer made without

the knowledge and at the back of the other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and

surprise move that enabled the DEFENDANT to collect almost allif not the entire

amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice cannot countenance cuch attitude at

all, and much less a foreign corporation to the detriment of our Government and

local business.

Chapter 2 of the preliminary title of the civil code on human relations,

proveides the following;

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the

performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declaration of principles and

while such statement is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is

implemented by Article 21and the sequence of the same chapter, which

prescribe the following:

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner

that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the

latter for the damage.

d. Judicial Vigilance (Art. 24)

e. Thoughtless Extravagance (Art. 25)
f. Right of Privacy (Art. 26)
 St Louis Realty vs CA and Aramil

FACTS
• This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the
Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house
of
Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
• The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated January 5, 1969.
Doctor
Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon
Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St.
Louis Realty the following letter of protest:
This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the December 15, 1968 and
January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday Times which boldly depicted my house at
the above-mentioned address and implying that it belonged to another person. I
am not aware of any permission or authority on my part for the use of my house for
such publicity.
This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain and much more the
apparent distortions therein are I believe not only transgression to my private
property but also damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have had
invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and
friends to my house and after reading your December 15 advertisement some of
them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional and
personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks
like your house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife
portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no
little mental anguish on my part.
I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association
and
their final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting ownership papers.
I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against your corporation unless
you
could satisfactorily explain this matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.
• The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge
of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted
Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology
was published.
• On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual,
moral and exemplary damages of P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10,
St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so
desired, rectification would be published in the Manila Times
• It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new
advertisement
with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to
Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
• On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in
the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF
RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches:
This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart is' which appeared
in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 is a rectification of the same ad that
appeared in the Manila Times issues rectification of the same ad that appeal of
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house of
another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was
mistakenly used as a background for the featured homeowner's the Arcadio
family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio family with their real house in the
background, as was intended all along.
• Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately
published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's
mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental
anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
• W/N St Louis Realty liable for damages
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES, St Louis Realty liable for damages
• St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26
of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful
house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
was annoyed by that contretemps.
• St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case
was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues
that the case is not covered by article 26 which provides that "every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence"
and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another"
and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".
• The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and
2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions
mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts
and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
• St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and
Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To
suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup.
It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
• Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio
or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was
mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and
mental anguish.

 Castro vs People, GR 180832, July 23, 2008

FACTS

Justin Albert was the son of Mr. Tan.

Justin was a Grade 12 student of Reedley International School (RIS). He was

dismissed for violating the rules of his probation

Tan requested for a reconsideration and RIS imposed non-appealable conditions

such as not allowing Albert to participate in the graduation ceremonies.

Tan filed a complaint in the DepEd, claiming malice and bad faith

DepEd nullified RIS sanctions as unreasonable and a denial of due process. DepEd

orders readmission of Albert without any conditions.

Albert finally participated in the graduation ceremonies.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan talked to a fellow parent Ching, intimating his

contemplating suit against officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including Asst.

Headmaster Castro.

Ching relayed the information to Castro. At the end of the conversation, Castro said

“be careful talking to Tan, that’s dangerous”

Ching then relayed the information to Tan, and Tan filed a grave oral defamation

suit against Castro.

MetC ruling: December 2005, Castro was guilty

RTC ruling: Action had prescribed, as action was filed 5 months after discovery

(should have been within 4 months). But held guilty of only slight oral defamation.

SolGen: RTC misinterpreted the facts and should not have lowered the offense to

slight oral defamation only.

CA: Reinstate MeTC ruling.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N petitioner can still be held liable, or has double jeopardy set in?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. PETITIONER CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE AS DOUBLE JEOPARDY

HAS SET IN.

double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3)

after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused

was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated

without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by

the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double

jeopardy.

The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as

we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the

OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the

State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.

The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court

with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason,

void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC's finding on the nature of petitioner's

statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG

premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's "erroneous"

evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving

misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a petition for

certiorari, cannot review the public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and

factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ

of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the

commission of grave abuse of discretion).

Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking

cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC.

We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional

prohibition against double jeopardy.

At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil

Code[:

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of

mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for

damages, prevention and other relief:

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(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

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Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model

for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due

and observe honesty and good faith.

g. Dereliction of Duty (Art. 27)

 Pilar vs SB, 128 SCRA 173
 Phil. Match vs City of Cebu, GR-L-30745, Jan 18, 1978

h. Unfair Competition (Art. 28)

 US vs Manuel, 7Phil 221
i. Article 29
 Velasco vs Meralco, 40 SCRA 342
 Meralco vs CA, 114 SCRA 173
 Bengson vs Pangasinan, 62 Phil 816
 HOA of El Deposito vs Lood, 47 SCRA 174
 Solis vs Pujeda, 42 Phil 699
 Ramcar vs Milar, 116 Phil 825
 Timoner vs People, 125 SCRA 830