DANTE LIBAN VS.

RICHARD GORDON

 Motion for clarification and/or recon filed by Gordon of the decision

 decision: Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the
PNRC Board of Governors as office of the PNRC Chairman
 PNRC is not a gov office or an office in a gocc for purposes of the prohibition in Sec 13 Art6 of
Const
 declared void the PNRC charter (RA 95) insofar it creates the PNRC as a private corp
 Respondent: issue of constitutionality of RA 95 was not raised by the parties; court went beyond
its decision
 PNRC: (motion for partial recon) constitutionality of RA 95 was never an issue in the case; current
charter of PNRC is PD 1264 and not RA 95; PNRC's structure is sui generis, separate and
independent of gov control

___________________________

PNRC

worldwide humanitarian movement

to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health and
ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other
emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social
welfare, to encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of
the Movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and
assistance

National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in
the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and social
programmes.

-directly regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast to other private entities,

including NGOs

Auxilliary status: it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service organization
because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State

It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and
effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither
"be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality" as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law
and is treated as an auxiliary of the State
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHIL VS. COA

 COA: issued Resolution 99-011 (defining the commissions policy with respect to the audit of the
BSP)
 Resolution stated that BSP was created as a public corp under CA No. 111, as amended by RA
7278; that in BSP vs NLRC, the court ruled that BSP was a gov-controlled corp within the meaning
of Art 9(2)(1) of the Const; that BSP is regarded as a gov instrumentality inder Admin Code
 COA: to conduct an annual financial audit of the BSP; BSP belongs to gov corp classified under
Educational, SOcial, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector
 BSP: sought recon; signed by its Pres (Jejomar Binay)
 audit was deferred for 30 days
 BSP: pet rev w/ prayer for prelim injunction before the COA; denied
 Arguments:
 BSP: in respect to its functions, it is akin to a public corp but this was not synonymous to holding
that it is a gov corp subj to audit by the COA
 governance of BSP has come to be overwhelmingly a private affair or nature, with government
participation restricted to the seat of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
 COA: BSP is a public corp created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31, 1936, and
whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of citizenship and patriotism and the
general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth
 funds and property owned or held in trust by the BSP are subject to the audit authority of
respondent
 Republic Act No. 7278 did not change the character of the BSP as a government-owned or
controlled corporation and government instrumentality

_____________________

BSP: a public corp

The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to
implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution (The State recognizes
the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affair)

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations defined by paragraph 2, Article 44
of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.

Admin Code

classified as an attached agency of the DECS

The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which
does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16 (formation organization
regulation of private corp) of , notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which
are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there
exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as public
corporations. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government
which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria
relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their
administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

BSP v NLRC: regarded BSP as both a government owned or controlled corporation with original charter
and a public corporation

the BSP still remains an instrumentality of the national government. It is a public corporation created by
law for a public purpose, attached to the DECS pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of
1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and
be economically viable to justify its existence under a special law

PHIL SOCIETY FOR PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS VS. COA

 petitioner was incorporated over 100yrs ago by virtue of Act No 1285 (1905) by the Phil
Commission; composed of animal aficionados and propagandists
 enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or their protection
 original corp law was not yet in existence at time peitioner was incorporated
 petitioner was imbued w/ its charter the power to apprehend vioolators of animal welfare laws
and to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and collected
 CA 148: power to make arrests and retain a portion of the fines were recalled
 Manuel Quezon issued EO 63: deprived petitioner of said power
 COA: conduct an audit survey
 Petitioner: demurred; stated that it was a private enntity not under jurisdiction of COA
 Arguments:
 Petitioner: even though it was created by special legislation (no general law yet existed) such was
revoked by CA 148 and EO 63
 charter did not state it is a public corp
 employees covered by SSS and not GSIS
 did not receive financial ssisstance from gov
 Respondnets:
 petitioner is a body politic created by virtue of a special legislation and endowed with a
governmental purpose
 Animal Welfare Act of 1998, designates the petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal
Welfare which is attached to the Department of Agriculture.
  petitioner exercises sovereign powers, that is, it is tasked to enforce the laws for the protection
and welfare of animals which ultimately redound to the public good and welfare, and, therefore,
it is deemed to be a government instrumentality

______________________

Charter Test

test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature

is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation
under the general corporation law?

Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory
members of the Government Service Insurance System

Exc to charter test: (none were present in the case)

when the law itself so expressly provides;

in case of remedial statutes;

in case of curative statutes;

in case of laws interpreting others;

in case of laws creating new rights

In a legal regime where the charter test doctrine cannot be applied, the mere fact that a corporation has
been created by virtue of a special law does not necessarily qualify it a

The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was a private corporation
and not an agency of the government. This was evident in Executive Order No. 63, issued by then President
of the Philippines Manuel L. Quezon, declaring that the revocation of the powers of the petitioner to
appoint agents with powers of arrest corrected a serious defect in one of the laws existing in the statute
books.s a public corporation.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO (rep by Gov. Jesus Sacdalan) VS GOV OF THE RP PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN

FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern
(Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2,
Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a
vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment
The Framework declares that the new Bangsamoro political body (BG) shall be established to replace the
ARMM. It also plainly declares that its form of government shall be “ministerial,”—without further
elaboration—but it is being explained to be parliamentary by the GPH and representatives of MILF to the
media. It shall be governed by the BBL, succeeding the Organic Act that established the ARMM. Its
territory shall be composed of the present geographical area of ARMM plus at least 12 other
municipalities.

Framework also expands the definition of the “Bangsamoro” people or identity to include all descendants
of original inhabitants of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan Islands, at the time of colonization, and that they
shall have the right to identify themselves as Bangsamoro by ascription or self-ascription. Under the
ARMM’s Organic Act, the Bangsamoro people are defined as Filipino “citizens who are believers in Islam
and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.”

The expanded definition under the Framework is a sweeping generalization, considering that in the island
of Mindanao alone, there are around 18 non-Muslim indigenous ethnic groups, collectively known as the
“Lumad,” with a population of approximately 9 million. However, in the current territory of the ARMM,
the Lumads are clearly a minority, numbering around 60,000—accounting for 2% of the population, while
the Muslims’ approximate number of 2.5 million account for 90%.[26]

The Framework itself is incomplete, as its four “Annexes” on its Articles on “Power Sharing,” “Wealth
Sharing,” “Transitional Arrangements and Modalities,” and “Normalization

The Framework declares the GPH-BG relationship to be “asymmetric,”—without explicitly stating which
party is favored by such asymmetry—with the former having “reserved powers,” encompassing, among
others, common market and global trade, and defense and external security. BG shall have “exclusive
powers” and “concurrent powers” to be shared with GPH. Considering that the GPH retains powers over
foreign policy, the regulation of the whole Philippine economy, and national defense, it is reasonable to
conclude that the GPH is favored by this assymetric relationship, in line with its sovereignty over the whole
of the Philippines including the autonomous region, but with certain concessions of power to the BG
limited to the latter’s regional territory.

However, the Framework removes the Central Government’s exclusive powers under the ARMM Organic
Act over matters such as national elections, and transportation and communications. These, along with
the expansion of both the autonomous territory[39] and jurisdiction of the Shari’ah or “Muslim”
courts,[40] appear to constitute the decisive differences between ARMM and the BG—marking a real and
further shift in power away from the Central Government and towards the regional government.

On “Wealth Sharing,” the most notable feature of the Framework is the BG’s power to create its own
auditing body, without prejudice to the authority of the national and constitutionally-created Commission
on Audit (COA). However, while this appears to be consistent with BG’s goal of fiscal autonomy, such an
unprecedented structure would entail a massive jurisdictional and logistical challenge. Under the ARMM
Organic Act, the auditing function is explicitly under the exclusive domain of the Central Government, and
the COA never had to share its general auditing authority with that of an equivalent or similar body from
any regional government—autonomous or not. Moreover, if the BG auditing body’s authority would be
without prejudice to that of the COA, the existence and operation of the new body might only serve as
both additional bureaucratic red-tape that hampers effective public service and as venue and opportunity
for graft and corrupution.

On “Transitional Arrangements and Modalities,” the Framework calls for the creation of an independent
15-member Transition Commission, which shall draft the BBL. However, the Framework provides no
qualifications for their appointment. Moreover, Executive Order No. 120, which constituted the said
Commission, funded the same with an initial allocation of 100 million pesos—an amount which is arguably
excessive for its purposes. Thus, the Commission’s composition and funding could, again, become a
delicate and highly politicized issue with the potential to replicate the same concerns (i.e., corruption and
inequitable representation) that led to MILF’s dissatisfaction with the present ARMM.

Finally, the Framework defines “Normalization” as the means through which “communities can return to
conditions where they can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable
livelihoods and political participation within a peaceful deliberative society.” The Framework provides that
it will achieve this through the decommissioning of the MILF’s armed forces, and the establishment of “a
program for transitional justice to address the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, correct
historical injustices, and address human rights violations.” Unfortunately, the Framework only provides
this one-sentence provision on transitional justice and does not appear to make the latter a centerpiece
program of its overall normalization plan for the region.

FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS

 Assymmetrical v Associative
 The use of Congress' constitutent power
 Congress has broad discretion to determine the shape and powers of the autonomous region with
the limitation that everything should be consistent with the Constitution. Now comes the
Bangsamoro bill. The challenges to it are aplenty, some on the basis of unwisdom but the more
serious ones are on the basis of unconstitutionality
 If Congress presents the law in a plebiscite without the specification of constituent intent, the
result will be an ordinary statute. What are considered as unconstitutional in such statute will be
challenged as such before the Supreme Court. But if the plebiscite is clearly constituent in intent,
the result can be beyond the reach of the review powers of the Supreme Court
 for the plebiscite to create a constituent effect, it must be nationwide. It will be recalled that the
current Bangsamoro organic act was not approved in a nationwide plebiscite. The plebiscite on
the original Bangsamoro law was considered sufficient to satisfy the requirement “that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.” If, however, the new law will contain constitutional amendments, it will
affect not only a limited number of provinces but the entire nation. This should require a
nationwide plebiscite

EX CJ ARTEMIO PANGANIBAN

 MOA-AD - the negotiators unfortunately committed to deliver things the Pres cannot do on his
own ( e.g. amendment of the Const)
  Allows ministerial form of gov in the Bangsamoro (political parties will vote and members thereof
will elect their chief minister of the bangsamoro)
 Not national gov - it will not change the Cosntitution (far from concession)
 Areas to be careful: institutions to be created by that basic law

RAUL PANGALANGAN

 How can we consent in advance to terms that do not exist and retroactively write them into the
Framework?” The point is well taken, considering the oft-repeated saying that “the devil is in the
details.” We might like the framework, but not necessarily like certain details, and there
will/should still be many and important details to follow.
 What will be in the “Annex on Power Sharing,” “Annex on Wealth Sharing,” and “Annex on
Transitional Arrangements”? How exactly will power and wealth be shared in the future? There
can be no “just and lasting peace” unless we agree on these
 Analyzing what is in the Framework itself, I am concerned that the Bangsamoro’s relationship to
our constitutional bodies remains unclear. For example, the Framework treats constitutional
accountability for funds as a triviality. The government peacemakers’ website highlights that the
porous auditing of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao funds has been a real pain.
 the Bangsamoro gets a free pass to the expected bonanza from gung-ho foreign sponsors and, if
the negotiators have their way, without even having to amend the Philippine Constitution.
 strange clause in the framework: Bangsamoro rulers may block grants and subsidies from the
Central Gov
 Framework needs constitutional amendment bec of the Bangsamoro shift to a ministerial and
federal system of gov
ATTY HUMBERTO ET AL. BASCO VS. PAGCOR (Phil Amusement and Gaming Corp)

 Petitioners: filed a petition to annul the PAGCOR Charter (PD 1869) bec it is allegedly contrary to
morals public policy and order
 Allegations: constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a 3rd person w/ a right recognized by law
(waived Mannila City Gov right to impose taxes and license fees); violates equal protection clausee
(legalizes gambling); etc.
 Basco (chairman of the committee on laws of the city council in Manila)

_______________________________________-

PAGCOR - grated a franshise to establish and maintain gambling casinos; proved to be potential source of
revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling
does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law"

The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes; Its "power
to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the "inherent power to tax"

The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress"; The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on
gambling, has long been revoked.

only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of
"licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government
HON JOSE LINA VS. HON FRANCISCO PAO

 IN 1995: Tony Calvento was appointed by the PCSO to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation
of lotto; asked Mayor Cataquiz (Laguna) for permit to open the lotto outlet; denied
 Ground for denial: ordinance passed by Sangguniang Panllawigan (Kapasiyahan Blg 508)
 Calvento: complaint for declaratory relief w/ prayer for prelim injunction and tro
 Judge Pao: in favor of Calvento
 Petitioners: assialed resolution is a valid policy declaration; police power under LGC; lotto
operation is illegal bec no prior consultations and approval by the local gov were sought
 Calvento: national legislature declared lotto as legal; authority given by PCSO, w/c was given a
franchise by the Congress
 OSG: provincial gov of Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling w/c was authorized by
the gov; municipal gov are merely agents of the national gov

______________________________

While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it.
Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an
ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature.
It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR LIMBONA VS. CONTA MANGELIN

 Petitioner Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sanggunniang Pampook, representing

Lanao del Sur; was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly (Batasang Pampook of
Central Mindanao)
 Congressman Matalam (Chariman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the HoR) invited speaker
Razul and petitioner
 Petitioner; sent a telegram to acting sec Alimbuyao to wire all assemblymen that there shall be
no session in Nov as his presence is required
 Nov: Assembly held seeion in defiance of petitioner's advice
 After quorum: ousted petitioner from his position
 Petitioner: assails legality of his ouster as speaker (in violation of the rules of Sangguniang
Pampook since assembly was then on recess); assuming it was valid, ineffective bec no quorum

___________________________________

Pres shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions

decntralization of administration - central gov delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions

decentralization of power - abdication of political power in favor of lgus declared to be autonomous

(autonomous gov is free to chart its own destiny..)

LGUs enjoy autonomy in 2 senses

territorial and political subdivisions enjoy local autnomy = under supervision of national gov

there shall be created autnomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in Cordilleras... = subj alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it

If the Sangguniang Pampook is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under
our jurisdiction.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of
power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Granted petition.
ARSADI DISOMANGCOP & RAMIR DIMALOTANG VS. SEC. OF DPWH (SIMEON DATUMANONG) & SEC OF
BUDGET AND MNMGNT (EMILIA BONCODIN)

 1989: RA 6734 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao) enacted; held a plebiscite; only 4 provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous
region (Lanao del Sur; Maguindanao; Sulu; Tawi-Tawi- provinces of ARMM)
 1990: Pres Corazon Aquino issued EO 426 (Pacing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of
the Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes)
 ARMM was formally organized
 1999: DPWH Sec Vigil`ar issued DO 119; created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH
within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur
 2001: Pres Estrada approved DO and signed into law; RA 8999 ( An Act Establishing an Engineering
District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating funds therefor);
funds included in the annual General Appropriations Act
 RA 9054 (n Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734)was enacted; lapsed into law and
was ratified ina plebiscite
 Petiitoners Disomangcop (officer in charge) and Dimalotang (district engineer): petition to annul
and set aside DO119, to prohibit DPWH Sec from implementing DO 119 and RA 8999; point out
that the challenged Dept order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with
functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao
del Sur

______________________________________

The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified
as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a
plebiscite.

Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case.
The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.

DO 119 & RA 8999- unconstotutional

R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by
detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is
its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the
National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently
inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter laws objective.

Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734
and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the
ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true
decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Area of Public Works - not excluded in the powers of autonomous regions it holds over and neither is it
reserved for the National Gov

E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and
Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices
within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government.

The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O.
426 in the instant case.

R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. With the repeal
of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus
officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
BATANGAS CATV, INC. VS. CA

 History: late 1940s John Walson (appliance dealer in Pennsylvania) suffered a decline in the sale
of tv sets bec of poor recepcion of signals in community; built an antenna on top of nearby
mountain= CATV (Community Antenna Television)
 1986: Sangguniang Panlungsod(SP) enacted Resolution 210; granting petitioner a permit to
construct install and operate a CATV system in Batnagas and impose charges which cannot be
increased w/o approval of Sangguniang Bayan
 1993: petitioner increased its subscriber rates from 88 to 180 per month
 Mayor threatened petitioner ro cancel pemrit unless it secures approval of SP
 Petitioner: petition for injunction; a;;eged that SP has no authority to regulate subscriber rates
charged by CATV bec under EO 205, the NTC (National Telecommunications Commission) has the
sole authority to regulate CATV operation
 RTC: in favor of petitioner; Resolution 210 violates State's dereulation policy set forth by NTC;
LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation
 Respondents: police power; general welfare clause; power to prescribe regulations; LGC
 CA: reversed

_______________________

NTC - regulatory power over the CATV industry (P.D. No. 1512, E.O. No. 546 and E.O. No. 205; Pres Marcos;
Pres Aquino)

The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs

Resolution 210 - invalid

violates the mandate of existing laws

violates States deregulation policy over CATV industry

Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily,
its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal

Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by
the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC

There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever
authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No.
1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously
granted by local governments.

Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or
cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate
and maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area
HON MERCEDES DADOLE VS. COA (COMMISSION ON AUDIT)

 1986: RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of 1,260 each
through yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Sangguninang Panlungsod
 1991: Mandaue city increased amount to 1,500
 1994: DBM issued Local Budget Circ 55; allowances should not exceed 1k (provonces and cities)
and 700 (municipalities); immediate effectivity w/o publication
 Mandaue City Auditor: issued notices of disallowances to petitioners in excess of the amount
authorized by LBC 5; allowances reduced to 1k and asked to reimburse amount received in excess
 Petitioner: filed protest against notices of disallowances; COA: denied
 Won: city ordinance providing for a higher rate of allowances may prevail over that fixed by the
DBM
 Petitioner: LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a
uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
stationed therein; said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the
supervisory powers of the President. They further allege that said circular is void for lack of
publication
 SolGen: DBM and respondent are only authorized under LGC to promulgate a budget operations
manual for lgus
 COA: constitutional and statutory authority of city gov to provide allowances to judges not
absolute; congress may set limitations

__________________________________

LBC 55-void

Const: guarantees autonomy of lgus subj to limitations

President an only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that
the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local
government units

RA 7160 - does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to additional allowances granted to judges
(DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that
did not correspond with the law it sought to implement; prohibitory nature of LBC 55 had no legal basis)
AQUILINO PIMENTEL VS. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE (Exec Sec) & EMILIA BONCODIN (Sec of DBM)

 1997: Pres issued AO 372 (Adoption of Economy Measures in Gov); lgus reduce total expenditures
by at least 25% for non-personal services items
 1998: Pres Estrada issued AO 43 amending AO372; reduced to 5% the amount of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) to be witheld from the LGUs
 Petitioner: Pres was exercising power of control over LGUs; Const only vests in him general
supervision, consistent with the principle of local autonomy; to withold 10% of their IRA is in
contravention of the LGC
 SolGen: AO 372 issued to alleviate economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation

__________________________________

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter

Exec power is vested in the Pres; members of the cabinet and other exec officials are merelly alter egos,
they are subj to the power of control of the Pres

Heads of political subdv are elected by the people - subj only to supervision of the Pres

AO 372 - merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that
interferes with local autonomy

Sec 4 thereof cannot be upheld - A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding 10% of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the
country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS (Gov Hermilando Mandanas) vs. HON ALBERTO ROMULO (Exec Sec and
Chairman of Oversight Committee)

 1998: Pres Estrada issued EO 48 (Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization); enhancing capacities of LGUs in the discharge of functions and services
 Oversight Committee has been tasked to formulate and issue appropriate rules and regulations
necessary
 Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created
 GAA (1999): Local Gov Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) 96,780,000,000 was alloted as the share
of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes; provided 5 billion shall be earnmarked for LGSEF;
provided such amount shall be released to LGUs subj to guidelines by Oversight Committee on
Devolution
 Oversight Committee: issued Resolutions (approved by Pres Estrada); allocation of 5billion LGSEF
 GAA (2000): 111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes;
also contained the earmarking 5billion of the IRA for the LGSEF; GAA (2001): failed; re-enact GAA
2000
 Petitioner: assailing constitutionality of GAAs 1999-2001, relating to LGSEF and the Resolutions
issued by the Oversight Committee; violate the LGC and the Const
 Const: just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them

__________________________

The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the
constitutional precept on local autonomy

(COnst Art 10) Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them

The distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.

The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and
release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time makes the release not
automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs
shall be automatically released to them
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT (ACORD) VS. HON
RONALDO ZAMORA

 Pres Estrada: proposed an internal revenue allotment (IRA) following the formula provided under
LGC
 LGC: first r of effectivity of code - 30%; 2nd: 35%; 3rd yr and thereafter: 40%
 2000: Pres approved House Bill 8374; became RA 8760 (GAA for yr 2000); allocations to LGUs that
the IRA shall amount to 111,778,000,000
 GAA: undeer the heading "unprogrammed fund" - 10billion shall be used to fund the IRA, which
shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the Pres to COngress can
be realized
 Petitioners (NGOs and peoples orgs and brgy officials): provisions of the GAA yr 2000 are violative
of the Const (autonomy of local gov); unlawfully reducing 10 billion IRA due to them and
witholding the release of such by placing them under unprogrammed funds
 Respondents: Const. mandate is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive hence, does
not prevent legislature from imposing conditions upon release of IRA

___________________________

Provisions 1 & 4 of GAA yr 2000 - unconstitutional

COnst Art 10 Sec 6: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them

Only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the
release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or
impede the automatic release of the IRA

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA (in representation of Maguindanao Federation of Autonomous Irrigators
Assoc Inc) vs. Senate of the Phil (Senate Pres. Juan Ponce Enrile)

 2011: upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153; postponed the regional elections in ARMM
(pursuant to the const mandate of synchronization) scheduled 2nd monday of Aug 2011; became
2nd Monday of May 2013; and recognized Pres power to appoint OICs to temporarily assume
these positions upon expiration of terms of the elected officials
 Petitioners: Constitutional mandate of synchronization does not apply to the ARMM elections; RA
No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from
the House of Representatives and the Senate; it negates the basic principle of republican
democracy

__________________

Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections; not expressed to synchronize
national and local but intention can be inferred from Transitory provisions

the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not
enough reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections (when the
law does not distinguish we should not distinguish)

RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054

A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it
does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections.

In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not
amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054.

In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054

RA 9054 (Second Organic Act): first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001

RA 9140: scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of RA No. 9054, the new date of the ARMM regional
elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA
No. 9054.

RA 9333: further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through
a plebiscite

Clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.

Passage of RA 10153 does not violate 3 readings on separate days requirement - exc: when Pres certifies

RA No. 10153 as an interim measure

Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM
regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the
scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM
with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in August
2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the
synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address
the problem created by synchronization –

(a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover
capacity;

(b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM
regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs
to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms.

We have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the
last available option.

President’s authority to appoint OICs – valid

GOV LUIS RAYMUND VILLAFUERTE JR. & PROV OF CAMARINES SUR VS. HON JESSE ROBREDO (SEC OF
DILG)

 2010: Robredo issued MC No. 2010-83 (Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids
and Public Offerings) which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency
and accountability of LGUs
 Issued MC No. 2010-138; reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable
social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional
objective of a quality of life for all
 Issued MC No. 2011-08; directing for the strict adherence to Section 90 of R.A. No. 10147 or the
General Appropriations Act of 2011
 Petitioner Villafuerte & Provincial Gov of CamSur: pet cert seeking to nullify the assailed issuances;
issued with GAD; violation of local and fiscal autonomy; DILG Sec assumed legislative powers in
promulgating circulars

____________________________

The assailed memorandum circulars do not transgress the local and fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs

Petitioner: respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local legislative council in
enacting its annual budget and specifying the development projects that the 20% component of its IRA
should fund

Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization

A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC - It
was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It must
be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial
portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects
but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC

Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for sanctions

It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing rules to consider in the disbursement of the
20% development fund and that non-compliance therewith may render them liable to sanctions which
are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws - LGUs must be reminded that the local autonomy
granted to them does not completely severe them from the national government or turn them into
impenetrable states. Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state

The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their priority projects
and the allocation of their budgets. The posting requirements are mere transparency measures which do
not at all hurt the manner by which LGUs decide the utilization and allocation of their funds.

The Court believes that the supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to embrace the power
to require the publication of certain documents as a mechanism of transparency
BAI SANDRA SEMA VS. COMELEC & DIDAGEN DILANGALEN (Rep of SK Province w/ Cotabato City)

 Ordinance appended to the 1987 Const apportioned 2 legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao; 1- Cotabato City and 8 municipalities
 Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM (RA 6734 amended by RA 9054)
 Ordinance: Although Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao's 1st legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM; part of Region XII
 2006: ARMM's Legislature enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No 201 (MMA Act 201)
 MMA 201: created Province of Shariff Kabunsuan; composed of 8 municipalities in the 1st district
of Maguindanao
 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9 constituting Shariff Kabunsuan (total: 11);
Cotabato although part of 1st legislative district of Maguindanao, it is not part of the Province of
Maguindanao
 Voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuan's creation
 SPanlungsod of Cotabato City: requested COMELEC to clarify its status in lieu of conversion of 1st
district of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA 201
 COMELEC: issued resolution; Cotabato part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the 1st legislative district of
Maguindanao
 2007 elections: COMELEC stated that Maguindanao's 1st legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City bec of MMA 201
 COMELEC: issued resolution; renamed; "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City"
 Sema (candidate in 2007 elections for Rep. of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City: prayed for
nullification of COMELEC Resolution
 -SK is entitled to one rep in Congress under the Const
 Dilangalen: Resolution is constitutional bec it did not apportion a legislative district for SK or
reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renammed Maguindanao's 1st
legislative district
 Sema: Sec 19 Art 6 of RA 9054 (delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) is valid; COMELEC & Dilangalen: invalid

__________________________________

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.

However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflct arises with any provision of the Constitution

Sec 19 Art 6 of RA 9054 - Congress delegated to ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces
cities municipalities and brgy wihin ARMM

A province cannot be created w/o a legislative district bec it will violate Const; The power to create a
province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district; each province has one rep.

Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by act of Congress

 Nothing in the Const authorizes autonomous regions to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress

Sema: MMA ACt apportioned a legislative district to SK upon its creation; this will leave Cotabato City as
the lone component of the 1st legislative district of Maguindanao - Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself (lacking in population)

Sec 19 Art 6 of RA 9054 - unconstitutional

MMA Act 201 - void

COMELEC Resolution - valid

LEAGUE OF CITIES (LCP) represented by LCP National Pres. Jerry Trenas VS. COMELEC

 11th Congress: enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities; did not act on
bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities
 12th Congress: enacted RA 9009; RA 9009 amended Sec 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from 20M to 100M (accrdg to
Pimentel: to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite incapability of fiscal independence)
 HoR: Joint Resolution No 29; sought to exempt from the 100M income requirement the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress
 13th Congress: HoR re-adopted the said joint resolution; 16 cityhood bills exempting 16
municipalities from the 100M requirement
 Cityhood bills lapsed into Cityhood Laws
 Cityhood Laws: direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve their conversion into a city
 Petitioner: declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec 10 Art 10 of the Const
and equal protection clause; will reduce share of existing cities in the IRA bec more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities

__________________________

2008 decision

Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6 and 10 of Art 10 of the Const

Sec 450 of the LGC does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement

applying the 100M income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not
retroactive application (RA 9009 tooke effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than 5yrs later)

Const requires that the Conggress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the
LGC and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws

Cityhood Laws prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to LGUs
2009 decision

Cityhood Laws - valid

Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood
bills w/c became the cityhood laws in question; Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to
be exempted form the income requirement

Cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009; to exempt respondent LGUs from the 100M
requirement

The hearings of the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference

The exemption accorded is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the
enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for
cityhood (not violative of EP clause); Also, each of the 16 municipalities met the 20M income level
from the original Sec 450 og LGC

2010 decision

Cityhood laws unconstitutional

Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Const; Cityhood Laws
which are laws other than the LGC provided an exemption form the increased income
requirement

6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc decision in 2008 as well as the majority
resolution in 2009 denying the reconsideration

Operative Fact Doctrine

the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of such law, prior to it nullity,
may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play

Effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to its nullity

payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts may be recognized as valid and effective

2011 decision

Cityhood Laws - valid and constitutional

Do not violate Art 10 Sec 10 of the Const

When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and
the intent of the law
 Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher
income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009; these municipalities have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. It is also
acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing
tourism spots. In this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent
municipality

Do not violate EP clause

Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws,
recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners
in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC

RODOLFO NAVARRO VS. EXEC SEC EDUARDO ERMITA

 Petitioners Rodolfo Navarro (vice governor), Victor Bernal (member of provincial board) and Rene
Medina (member of provincial board): taxpayers and residents of Province of Surigao del Norte
 Petitioners: allege that creation of Dinagat Islands as a new province is an illegal act of Congress;
deprives people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk of its territory, IRA and rich resources
 Mother province of SdN was created under RA 2876; composed of 3 main grps (Mainland and
Surigao City; Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; Dinagat Island)
 Population of Dinagat: 106, 951
 LGC: creation of province; population not less than 250k
 Provincial Gov of SdN: w/ assistance of NSO; determine a special census; result: 371,576; however
NSO did not certify
 land area: 802.12sqm
 RA 9355 was enacted by Pres Arroyo; a plebiscite was held; approved creation of Province of
Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province; new set of officials took their oath
 Petiitoners: Province of Dinagat Islands under RA 9355 not valid; failed to comply w/ population
or land area requirement by LGC
 Respondents: Art 9 par 2 of IRR of LGC; land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of 1/more islands

________________

2010 decision

LGC requires a contiguous territory of at least 2ksqm; however the territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises 2/more islands or is separated by a charted city or cities that do not
contribute to the income of the province

word "territory" has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over w/c the
political unit exercises control
 "contiguous" - used to describe physical contact or a touching of sides of two solid masses of
matter

Sec 2 Art 9 of the IRR - null and void

Proclamation of Province of Dinagat Islands - null and void

RA 9355 - null and void

2011 decision

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces.

In fact, considering the physical confguration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater
likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine
legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus,
when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC — and to refect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of
the LGC-IRR.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20M for the
creation of a province.

Ratio legis est anima - The spirit rather than the letter of the law
JOSE MIRANDA VS. HON ALEXANDER AGUIRRE (EXEC SEC)

 RA 7720: converted municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city; people
of Santiago ratified said law in a plebiscite
 RA 8528: amended RA 7720; changed status of Santiago from an independent component city to
a component city
 Petitioners: assail constitutionality of RA 8528; lack of provision in said law submitting the law for
ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite

_________________

RA 8528 - unconstitutional

Sec 10 Art 10 Const: creation, division, merger, abolition or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator — material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the
people therein.

It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
units directly affected."

MOISES SAMSON VS. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE (EXEC SEC)

 1998: Pres Ramos signed into law RA 8535; creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 brgy of QC
 Samson: incumbent councilor of 1st district of QC; challenging the constitutionality of RA 8535
 grounds: failed to conform to the criteria under LGC (income, population, land area, seat of gov);
law will amend the Const; no certification that QC will not be adversely affected
 Respondents: petitioner had burden of proof to overcome legal presumption of said law

____________________

Petitioner failed to overcome presumption - did not present any proof , but only allegations that no
certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local Gov

Income and population requirement complied with

average annual income of 13 brgy: 26,952,128.26; population: 347,310

Failure to specify seat of Gov in RA 8535 is not fatal to validity

RA 8535: does not provide for a seat of gov. - this omission is not fatal to the validity thereof

ordinance appended to the Const merely apportions the seats of the HoR to the diff legislative
districts in the country - nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of
only 17 cities and municipalities
SEN. HEHERSON ALVAREZ VS. HON TEOFISTO GUINGONA (EXEC SEC)

 Petitioners: assail validity of RA 7720 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an Indeoendent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago); alleged that it did not
originate exclusively in the HoR ; claim that munisipality of Santiago has not met the minimum
average annual income required
 HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Indeoendent Component
City to be known as the City of Santiago) filed in HoR w/ Rep Antonio Abaya as principal author;
hearings conducted and resulted in a favorable report; approved on 3rd reading
 Counterpart bill: SB 1243 (same title) was filed in the Senate; introduced by Sen Vic Sotto
 Enrolled bill submitted to the President: RA 7720
 Questions raised: whether IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual
income for purpose of conversion; whether it originated in the HoR

_________________________

Annual income of a LGU includes IRAs

Santiago's income - 13,109,560.47 (deducting IRA)

Income - all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of
the LGUs

IRA are items of income - they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU; IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury w/o need of further action on the part of
the LGU

It is not the law but the revenue bill w/c is required by the Const to originate exclusively in the HoR

JUANITO MARIANO JR. ET AL. VS. COMELEC

 Petitioners (residents of Makati): assail provisions of RA 7854 "An Act Converting the Municipality
of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati"
 grounds: law increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the charter) w/c is in
vioaltion of the const provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress
w/in 3yrs ff the return of every census; increased in legilsative dictsrict was not expressed in the
title of the bill; addition of another legislative district in Maktai is not in accord w/ Const bec
population stands only at 450k

_________________

Petitioners have not demosntrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati
will cause confusion as to its boundaries - delineation did not change any inch in the land area covered by
Makati as a municipality

Petitioners argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence; the law
restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously
served by them - hypothetical issue not yet ripen into an actual controversey
Reapportionment of legislative district

Const provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members unless otherwise
fixed by law; Const did not preclude Cpngress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law

reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city

BENJAMIN CAWALING JR. VS. COMELEC

 Pres Estrada: RA 8806 "Act Creating the City of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsofon in the Province of Sorsogon"
 COMELEC: conducted a plebiscite and submitted for ratification; approved
 Petitioner (resident taxpayer): constitutionality of RA 8806 (created the City of Sorsogon by
merging the municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon); violated the one subject one bill rule (only
subject embraced in said law is the creation of the City of Sorsogon); plebiscite was beyong the
120-day period from approval; creation of Sorsogon City by merging 2 municipalities violates the
LGC (only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city)
 Petitioner assails the mode of creation not the compliance with the criteria

____________________

The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a merger of existing LGUs is recognized under
the Const provided that such merger or division shall compy w/ the requirements prescribed by the Code

The phrase a municpality or a cluster of brgys may be converted into a component city is not a
criterion but simply one of the modes by w/c a city may be created

One Subject One Bill Rule

abolishing the two municipalities - incidental effect

the rule is complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object w/c
the statute seeks to effect

Plebiscite - w/in the 120-day period from effectivity

Publication should be the reckoning point in determining the period and not from the date from
approval; publication is indispensable
SEN BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III & MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO VS. COMELEC (Chariman: JOSE MELO)

 Petitioner Aquino (one of the senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate)
 Petitioner Robredo (Mayor of Naga City; part of the former 2nd district)
 Petitioners: seek the nullification of RA 9716 : An Act Reapportioning the Composisition of the 1st
and 2nd Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Creating a New Legislative District from
such reapportionment); signed into law by Pres. Arroyo
 RA 9716: created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the 1st and 2nd legislative districts of the province
 Camarines Sur: population - 1,693,821, distributed among the 4 legislative districts
 Petitioners: reapportionment against Const (requiring 250k for creation of legislative district);
proposed 1st district will end up w/ a population of less than 250k
 Respondents: 250k requirement has no application w/ respect to the creation of legislative district
districts in provinces; applicable only in cities

______________________

Sec 5 (3) Art 6 Const: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative"

Clear distinction bet entitlement of a city to a district on one hand and the entitlement of a
pprovince to a district on the other

A 250k minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province

Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factor in the composition of the additional
district

the reapportionment of the 1st and 2nd legilsative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that
resulted in the ceration of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new
district is 176,383

factors mentioned during the deliberations on House bill: dialects spoken in grpd municipalities;
size of original grpings compared to that of the regrpd; natural division separating the municipality
subj of the discussion from the reconfigured distrinct one; balancing of the areas of the 3 districts
resulting from the redistricting of district 1 and 2
PATRICIO TAN VS. COMELEC & PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

 Enactment of BP Blg 885: An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as
the Province of Negros del Norte
 Petitioners (residents of province of Negros Occidental): prohibition for purpose of stopping
respondents Comelec from conducting the pelbiscite; BP 885 is not in accord w/ LGC and
unconstitutional
 Petitioners: the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del
Norte; excluded voters from the province of Negros Occidnetal
 Respondents: the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidenta; not
included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte do not fall w/in the scope of the
term "unit or units affected" under the LGC

________________________

Parliamentary Bill 3644 enacted into BP 885

the boundaries of the new province of Negros del Norte were defined and its boundaries stated

The existing province of Negros Occidental would be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte

2 politcal units would be affected; 1st- parent province of Negros Occidental; 2nd- composed in
the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province

The voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed
to participate in the questioned plebiscite

Total land area – also not complied w/

BP 885 - unconstitutional; proclamation of new province of Negros del Norte and appointment of officials
- null and void
WHITE LIGHT CORP. VS. CITY OF MANILA

 1992: Mayor Alfredo Lim enacted an Ordinance 7774

 Ordinance: prohibited short-time admission and wash-up rates in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses, similar establishments ; (short-time: room rates less tahn 12 hrs or renting more
than twice a day)
 Malate Tourist & Dev Corp (owner of Victoria Court): filed a complaint for declaratory relief w/
prelim injunction and tro; ordinance be declared unconstitutional; it was authorized under PD 259
to admit customers on a short time basis and charge wash up rates
 White Light Corp: motion to intervene; affect their business interests
 RTC: Ordinance invalid; strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Const
 CA: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
 Petitioners: ordinance is unconstitutional; violates right to privacy and freedom of movement;
unreaosnable and oppressive

_________________________

Ordinance - invalid

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty; Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

Valid Test of an Ordinance; Strict Scrutiny Test applied

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON. JOSE ATIENZA (Mayor City of Manila)

 City of Manila: enacted Ordinance 8027

 Ordinance: Oil depots Pandacan and Sta. Ana and adjoining areas are reclassified from Industrical
to Commercial; directed to owners and operators of Pandacan terminals of the oil companies of
Caltex, Petron, and Pilipinas Shell
 Owners and operators: given 6mos to cease and desist from operation of business
 City of Manila & DOE: entered into memoramdum of understanding with oil companies; agreed
to the scaling down of Pandacan Terminals; (removal of 28 tanks; oil companies establish shared
facilities and limited joint operations of oil companies; sole responsibility of oil companies for
development of safety and green buffer zones from their properties)
 City of Manila: depot facilities contained million liters of highly flammable products; open to
attack; populated; in case of explosion, could spread in communities

_______________________

Ordinance - valid exercise of police power

In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary

Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose
billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable,
property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to
property, the former should prevail.