Aggravating Circumstances - Crimrev 2019 1
Aggravating Circumstances - Crimrev 2019 1
Aggravating Circumstances - Crimrev 2019 1
DOCTRINE: The courts below failed to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public position." The mere fact that the
three (3) accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed them in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were
not police officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos into boarding the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over
their money. Precisely it was on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact committed a crime and
would be brought to the police station for investigation unless they gave them what they demanded.
FACTS: Diosdada and Mario Montecillo (siblings) were waiting for a ride home when a mobile patrol car of the Western Police District
with three policemen on board stopped in front of them. The policeman seated on the front right, PO3 Eduardo Garcia, alighted and
without a word frisked Mario. He took Mario’s belt and uttered “evidence.” Mario was motioned to board the car. Terrified, Mario
and Diosdada obeyed and seated as the of the car together with another policeman, PO2 Recardo Fortuna.
The driver, PO3 Ramon Pablo, asked why Mario was carrying a “deadly weapon,” to which Mario answered, “for self-defense” since
he was a polio victim. Pablo(driver) and Garcia(seated in front) grilled Mario. They fightened him that he would be brought to Bicutan
police station where he would be interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the press.
Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the driver and was told to go behind the vehicle. There, she was
forced to take out her wallet and rummaged through its contents. He counted her money. She had P5,000.00 in her wallet. The driver
took P1,500.00 and left her P3,500.00. He instructed her to tell his companions that all she had was P3,500.00.
Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front passenger seat to place all her money on the console box near
the gearshift. The car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to disembark. From there, their dreadful
experience over, they went home to Imus, Cavite.
Eventually, the police officers were found guilty by the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of robbery by intimidating complainants
Diosdada and Mario to give their money. They were sentenced to imprisonment and to restitute in favor of complainants the sum of
P5,000 and to indemnify them in the amount of P20,000.00 for moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
Fortuna appealed this case to the Supreme Court; that his silence inside the car during Mario’s interrogation confirmed his claim that
he did not participate in the offense. Thus, he cannot be considered to have conspired with his companions in perpetrating the offense
charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fortuna, who was only silent during the robbery, should not be held guilty of the crime. – He is guilty.
HELD: As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all means the commission of an offense. As such, he should not have kept
his silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting colleagues. This accused- appellant failed to do. His
silence then could only be viewed as a form of moral support which he zealously lent to his co-conspirators.
in conspiracy all those who in one way or another helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony were co-conspirators.
Hence, all of the three (3) accused in the present case should be held guilty of robbery with intimidation against persons.
THE SUPREME COURT HOWEVER OBSERVED THAT THE COURTS BELOW FAILED TO APPRECIATED THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF “ABUSE OF PUBLIC POSITION.” The mere fact that the three (3) accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed
them in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos into boarding
the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it was on account of their authority that the Montecillos
believed that Mario had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the police station for investigation unless they gave them
what they demanded.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par. (5), of The Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple
robbery is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. In view of the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of public position, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its periods the range of which is four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter has not
given any provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords
to human abode. As one commentator puts it, one's dwelling place is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another
in the latter's house is more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere. According to Cuello Calon, the commission of
the crime in another's dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver alarm.
FACTS:
On November 6, 1997, at around 7:30 p.m., Amy de Guzman (Amy) was tending a Video Rental Shop owned by her employer and
cousin, Ana Marinay (Ana) located at 153 Loreto Street, Morning Breeze [S]ubdivision, Caloocan City. Thereupon, accused-
appellant Alexander Taño, a relative of Ana's husband Gerry Marinay (Gerry), arrived at said shop. Alexander Taño then asked
Amy about the time when Gerry would be coming home, to which she replied, 10:00 p.m. He then asked about the time when
Ana would be coming home and Amy replied that she did not know.
Thereafter, but still on the same date, Alexander Taño kept on going in and out of the Video Shop, and on the last time that he
went inside said shop, he jumped over the counter of the shop to where Amy was and seized the latter by placing one of his arms
around Amy['s] neck, while his other hand held a knife which he poked at her neck.
Terrified by the attack, Amy started shouting for help but Alexander Taño increased the volume of a karaoke which was on at the
time to drown Amy's cries for help.
Alexander Taño then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop where, at knife point, he ordered the latter to undress and he
thereafter started raping her.
However, while Alexander Taño was raping Amy, somebody knocked at the door of the shop prompting the former to stop what
he was doing and ordered Amy to put on her clothes.
Alexander Taño then directed Amy to go upstairs to the second floor of the shop to change clothes as he will be taking her with
him. But suddenly thereafter, Taño pulled her down and punched her in the stomach thrice causing her to lose her balance. Taño
then started cursing her and again placed himself on top of her while poking a knife at her neck. Amy then pleaded with Taño to
just take anything inside the shop and to spare her life, to which Taño replied "no, I will not leave you here alive."
But after a while and upon Amy's pleading, Taño put down his knife and while he was kissing Amy, the latter got hold of the knife
which she surreptitiously concealed under the stairs.
Therafter, Taño became violent again and banged Amy's head on the wall causing the latter to lose consciousness. When she
regained consciousness she found herself and Taño inside the toilet of the shop and the latter again banged her head, this time
on the toilet bowl, several times causing Amy to again lose consciousness.
Thereafter, Taño went upstairs and looted the place of valuables belonging to Amy's employer, Ana. Amy, herself lost her ring,
bracelet and wristwatch during the incident in question (id., p. 10).
At about 9:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day, Amy's employer Ana arrived and found the shop in disarray with the "karaoke" in full
volume. After turning off the "karaoke["], Ana proceeded to the toilet where she found Amy bathed in blood.
Ana immediately sought the help of Barangay officials of the place and Amy was brought to the "MCU" Hospital where she was
initially treated of her injuries. Amy was, later on, transferred to Jose P. Reyes Memorial Medical Center (JPRMMC) where she
was confined for four (4) days.
RTC= The lower court accepted the judicial admission of the accused that he stole valuables belonging to private complainant and
her employer, and then proceeded to determine "whether or not the prosecution evidence has sufficiently established the rape
angle of the case. In fine, the [a]ccused having already admitted the robbery charge coupled with the fact that the prosecution
has established with clear and convincing evidence [a]ccused's culpability for sexually assaulting the pri[v]ate complainant leaves
no room for doubt of the guilt of the accused for the complex crime of robbery with (aggravated) rape. Furthermore, the trial
court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance because the incident took place supposedly at the residence of private
complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video rental shop." Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 7659, it imposed the maximum penalty provided under Article 294 of the same Code as amended, which is death.
Thus, this automatic review by this Court.
HELD:
Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter has not given
any provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to
human abode. As one commentator puts it, one's dwelling place is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another
SC= WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant Alexander Taño y Caballero is found guilty of two
separate offenses: rape and robbery. For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and to pay Private
Complainant Amy de Guzman P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65 as actual damages.
DOCTRINE:
For Dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it is not necessary that the victim actually owns the house where he
expired. Dwelling may be considered when the victim considered it “home” even for a short moment. As in this case, the house of the
victim’s parents were considered dwelling.
FACTS:
Balansi is the uncle of victim Dalsen.
According to Canao, a niece of Balansi, she saw Balansi standing at the door of the house of Dalsen’s parents armed with a
gun and when asked what he was doing, only replied he is waiting for Dalsen.
Thereafter, Canao heard two gunshots. People from the wedding about 3 meters away from the house also heard the
gunshots and tried to locate it. They were lead to the house of Dalsen’s parents and saw Dalsen dead.
It so happened that Dalsen was known to be sleeping in his parents’ house at that time (5pm).
Balansi was then charged with Murder due to presence of Treachery, Evident Premeditation Means to weaken defense, and
Dwelling.
Trial court rendered him guilty of Murder finding those aggravating circumstances present.
3. Employed means to weaken the victim's defenses: NONE. As we said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we
can not say for sure, based on the evidence before us, that the appellant did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.
4. Dwelling: YES. Dwelling need not be owned by the victim so long as it is the place primarily for sanctity of privacy worthy of respect.
Dwelling includes house of another while the victim was a guest. The dwelling may not be that of the victim but so long as for a brief
moment it was home to him is enough.
In this case, Dalsen died in the house of his parents thus such is indeed dwelling to him.
Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the accused-appellant responsible for taking the life of
Elpidio Dalsen.
We hold him liable for simple homicide aggravated by dwelling. Under the Revised Penal Code, he must suffer reclusion temporal in
its maximum period, there being no mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. The grant of damages is affirmed
DOCTRINE:
For Dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it is not necessary that the victim actually owns the house where he
expired. Dwelling may be considered when the victim considered it “home” even for a short moment. As in this case, the house of the
victim’s parents were considered dwelling.
FACTS:
Accused was charged of Arson with Multiple Counts of Homicide for the death of her employer and his family.
The accused admitted to setting the building on fire but reasoned out that it was mainly because her employer did not pay
her.
Information contained that : th e sa id a c cu se d , wit h i ntent to c au se da mage , d id th en a n d th er e w il lf u lly ,
u n la w fu l ly, f e lon i ou sly an d del ibe ra tel y se t fi r e upon th e t wo - sto re y re sid enti al hou se x x t h at b y
rea son and o n the o c c a sio n o f t he sa id fi re , th e fo llo w in g (S ep a ra fa m ily ) su sta in ed b u rn in j u ri e s
wh i ch w er e th e d i r ect c au s e of th ei r d eath i m m ed i at ely th er ea ft er
The Lower Courts relied on the circumstantial evidence to convict the accused with the corresponding death penalty:
1. Th a t i m m ed i at ely b e fo re th e b u rn in g of th e h ou s e, th e a c cu se d h u r ri ed ly an d w ith h e ad tu r n in g
in d i ff e re n t d i re ct ion s (p alin ga -l in ga) w en t ou t of th e said h ou se a n d rod e a p ed i cab ap p ar en t ly
n ot kn o w in g wh er e to g o x x x ;
2. Th a t i m m ed iat ely a ft er th e f ir e, u p on a r ep o rt th at t h e r e wa s a wo ma n in Ba la san St .
wh o a p p e ar s con fu s ed a n d ap p r eh en si v e (b al i sa ) , th e Bar an g ay Ch ai rm an an d h i s tan od s
w en t th er e, fou n d th e a ccu s ed an d ap p r eh en d e d h er an d b r ou gh t h e r t o th e b ar an g ay
h all a s sh o wn b y th e t e s ti mon y of Ba ran gay Ch a i rm an R e m ig io B ern a rd o ; an d
3. Th a t wh en sh e wa s a p p reh en d ed an d in v e st ig a ted b y th e b a ran gay o ff ici al s an d wh en
h er b ag wa s op en ed , th e sa m e c on ta in ed a d i sp osa b l e l igh t er a s lik e wi s e sh o wn b y th e
te st i mon y of th e B aran g ay Ch air m an .
2. T H E P E N AL Y S HO U LD B E M O D IF I ED .
PD 1 61 3 wh i ch r ep ea led Art s. 32 1 to 3 26 - B o f T h e R e vi s ed P en al Cod e r e mai n s t h e go v ern in g la w f or S imp le
Ar so n . Th i s d e cr e e con t e mp l at e s th e mal ic iou s b u rn in g of p u b li c a n d p r iv at e st ru c tu r e s, r eg ard l e s s o f siz e,
n ot in clu d ed in A rt. 3 20, a s a men d ed b y R A 7 65 9, an d cl a ss i fi ed as o th er c a se s of ar son . Th es e
in c lu d e h ou se s, d we l l in gs , go v ern m en t b u i ld in g s, far m s, m il l s, p la n tat io n s, rai l way s, b u s sta tio n s, a irp ort s,
wh a r ve s an d o th e r in d u s tria l e st ab l i sh me n t s . A lt h ou gh th e p u rp os e o f th e la w on S i mp l e Ar s on i s to p r e v en t
th e h i gh in ci d en c e o f f ir e s an d oth er cri m e s in vol v in g d e st ru c tion , p rot ec t th e n ati on al ec on o my an d
p re s er v e th e s oc ial , ec o n om ic an d p o lit ic al stab ili ty o f th e n at ion , P D 16 13 t e mp er s th e p e n a lty to b e m et ed
to o f fe n d e r s. Th i s s ep a rat e cla s s if ic ati on o f Si mp l e Ar s on r e co gn i ze s th e n ee d to le s sen t h e se ver it y o f
p u n i sh m en t com m en s u r ate to th e ac t o r a cts com m itt ed , d ep en d in g on th e p ar t icu la r f act s an d
cir cu m st an ce s o f e ach c ase .
DOCTRINE:
1. When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of
attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be
relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
2. Congress clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal
possession of firearms and explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Antonio, George, and Danilo (appellants) were charged and convicted with murder with multiple frustrated murder.
Robert Agbanlog, the victim, along with several others, were drinking at Robert’s house (specifically the terrace) when they
noticed appellants walking. Appellants stopped in front of the house and Antonio threw a hand grenade which fell at the roof
of the terrace. It exploded, killing Robert and injuring the others.
RTC convicted all of them. (Main case is about conspiracy among the accused, but will just discuss Antonio’s liability)
ISSUE: W/N treachery and illegal use of explosives were correctly applied as aggravating circumstances?
HELD: There was treachery, but there was no proof that the use of the explosive was illegal.
Its essence lies in the adoption of ways to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the offended party. In this
case, the suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not
afford the victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime without
risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery therefore attended the commission of the crime.
Aside from treachery, the information also alleges the “use of an explosive” as an aggravating circumstance. Since both attendant
circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, we should determine which of the two
circumstances will qualify the killing in this case. (Doctrine #1)
When the illegally possessed explosives are used to commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death
of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance.
(Doctrine). However, before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,
it must be adequately established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority
or permit to possess. Here, not only was it not alleged in the information, but no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show
that the possession by appellant of the explosive was unlawful. And even if it was not alleged, the prosecution did not prove its
presence beyond reasonable doubt.
DOCTRINE: Evident premeditation may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance after the following requisites are sufficiently
established: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
FACTS: On December 30, 1994, in the City of Manila Matt Campomanes and Edwin Rosita conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Loreto Alkonga y Benid by then and there holding his
arms and stabbing his body several times with a fan knife, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Meanwhile, Aureada brought Alkonga to the Philippine General Hospital. Alkonga died in the hospital at 2:00 a.m. the following day
due to multiple stab wounds.
Campomanes and Rosita were presented as witnesses to proffer their own version of what transpired, and to bolster their theory
of incomplete self-defense.
According to Campomanes, he was in front of the Rizal monument taking pictures of a customer on December 30, 1994, at about
10:00 p.m when he heard someone asking for help.
He turned around and saw Alkonga holding a knife and running after Rosita.
He tried to pacify the two, placing himself between them, but he was instead hit on the head with a camera by Alkonga. He
felt dizzy and lost consciousness.
When he recovered, he was already being apprehended by the park security guard.
According to Rosita, he was at the Rizal Park at about 10:30 p.m. on December 30, 1994 talking to four female customers regarding
taking their pictures when Alkonga came and asked that he be introduced to the women.
Rosita complied, but after the introduction, Alkonga insisted that he be the one to take the womens’ pictures. Rosita and
the women refused.
The group then transferred to another spot, but before Rosita could take the pictures, Alkonga followed and kicked him on
the abdomen.
Alkonga also hit Rosita on the face using a camera. They engaged in a fistfight, and suddenly, Alkonga drew a balisong and
stabbed Rosita on the left chest and on the waist. Rosita tried to run away from Alkonga.
Just then, Matt Campomanes came and tried to intervene, but Alkonga hit him on the head.
When Alkonga was about to stab Campomanes, Rosita grabbed Alkongas hand and they grappled for the knife. Rosita was
able to take the knife from Alkonga, and because of his confusion, Rosita stabbed Alkonga several times.
On November 11, 1999, this Court received a letter from Edwin Rosita manifesting his intention to withdraw the appeal of his case.
He now proposes that since there was no concerted action between him and co-accused Rosita, there should be no finding of
conspiracy and each of them should be held liable for his own act.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation was attendant to qualify the crime (main issue related to the topic).
As to the existence of conspiracy, the fact that Campomanes was not the one who stabbed Alkonga does not negate his
participation in the conspiracy. Eyewitness Aureada saw Campomanes holding Alkonga’s arms while the latter was being stabbed by
Rosita. Such positive act of Campomanes forms part of the concerted action to achieve the common intention and design to kill the
victim. The act of holding the victim to render him immobile, or defenseless, thus enabling the other companions to consummate
the dastardly act, constitutes an active participation in a conspiracy.
It is present where the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the crime. Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime need not be shown.
Neither is it necessary that all the participants deliver the fatal blow, as the act of one is the act of all.
As to the existence of treachery, eyewitness Aureada testified that when Alkonga was stabbed by Rosita, he was in a sitting position
with arms raised and held by Campomanes. It is clearly deducible that Alkonga was killed was deliberately and consciously adopted
by Campomanes to ensure the execution of the act without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
In a sitting position with arms restrained by Campomanes, Alkonga becomes a helpless and defenseless object of the attack.
It is immaterial that he was initially grappled with Campomanes and was even able to hit the latter with the camera.
Crucial is the moment when Rosita came with a bladed weapon, and with Alkonga in a sitting position with his arms raised
and held by Campomanes, said victim was repeatedly stabbed by Rosita. Such manner of killing had been declared by this
Court in a plethora of cases to be attended by treachery.
As to theory of incomplete self-defense, the SC refused to allow the same as the presence of the first element, unlawful aggression,
a condition sine qua non to the presence of self-defense, was not sufficiently proven by clear and convincing evidence.
The contention of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim-- that the victim kicked Rosita on the right front hip, hit him
on the face, and stabbed him below his (Rositas) left nipple and on the waist --was not sufficiently proven by the evidence
on record.
Worthy to note is the contention of the Solicitor General that assuming there was unlawful aggression on Alkonga’s part,
the same ceased the moment Campomanes held his arms. When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists,
the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
Lastly, the number of wounds on Alkonga’s body negates the claim of self-defense, complete or incomplete. In this case, he
suffered quite a large number of stab wounds, and Rosita himself admitted during the cross-examination that he stabbed
the victim about 19 times.
DOCTRINE:
1. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.
2. In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous
and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
FACTS:
8 December 1994: At around 12:30-1:00 PM, 7 members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity (SR) were eating lunch at the Beach
House Canteen, near the Main Library of UP Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats
and lead pipes.
Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina died from his injuries.
Information was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity (SJ) with RTC QC. Information stated that the
accused were wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats,
lead pipes, and cutters, attacked, assaulted, and employed personal violence upon Dennis F. Venturina, by then and there
hitting him on the head and clubbing him on different parts of his body, inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
Separate Informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of SR members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Cristobal
Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated murder of SR members Mervin Natalicio and Arnel Fortes. Only 11 of the
accused stood trial.
TC found Alvir, Feliciano, Jr., Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder
and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. TC acquitted Ablanida, Fajardo, Magpantay,
Morano, and Narag. The case against Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC, with 3 members concurring and 1 dissenting.
ISSUE: W/N the accused appellants’ constitutional rights were violated when the Information against them contained the aggravating
circumstance of the use of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove the masks fell off.
HELD:
An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense.
Appellants argue that the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them. They argue that the prosecution should not have included the phrase “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused
were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.” This includes the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and “to be informed of the nature
and accusation against him.”
People v. Wilson Lab-eo: The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to
know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. xxx The purpose is to allow the accused to fully
prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in
the information does not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to
state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent
on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the
information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous
and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks
fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.
What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the
accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
CA AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER.
Facts:
On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by
theMarcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta
andstarted an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between.
When the authorities arrived and no permit could be produced, they were told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver
Lozano, turned to his group and said “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators,” and a commotion ensued. They eventually
fled, and later, some of them converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta.
Another commotion ensued and the loyalists started attacking persons inyellow, the color of the “Coryistas,” one of which
was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed, kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them,
but several accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the
Philippine General Hospital. The appellants in this case are now contending that the CA erred in finding them guilty for murder qualified
by abuse of superior strength.
Issue: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present in this case
Ruling:
Yes. As the lower courts found, the victim’s assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number and were armed with
stones with which they hit the victim.
They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free
himself. They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even
when he was already fallen on the ground.
There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face.
But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself.
A Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for
mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a
defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
DOCTRINE:
ELEMENTS OF TREACHERY AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE:
1. At the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
2. The accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him
Ambush exemplifies treachery.
Treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus.
FACTS:
Rolly Adriano was charged with 2 counts of Murder for killing Danilo Cabiedes and Ofelia Bulanan.
According to the Prosecution, PO1 Garabiles and PO2 Santos, in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga,
riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road. While they were at San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota
Corolla, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV. When the Corolla
reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in
the canal in the road embankment. 4 armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the
CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near the road
embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The 4 armed men hurried back to the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO1
Garabiles and PO2 Santos followed the Corolla but lost track of the latter. Both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot
wounds. They later learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio Rivera. Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted
that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which
he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by PO2 Santos
and PO1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants. He was immediately arrested.
Meanwhile, according to the Defense, Adriano was in Magalang, Pampanga when the incident happened. He allowed a certain
Boyet Garcia to borrow the Corolla, which he rented from Rivera. When he got the car back, Adriano went to Rivera to return
the Corolla. He was then arrested by police officers.
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other three accused remained at large.
RTC: rejected Adriano's defense of alibi and convicted Adriano of Murder for the death of Cabiedes and Homicide for the death
of Bulanan.
CA: affirmed
HELD: YES. CA affirmed with modifications. Adriano is found guilty of two counts of Murder.
The prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2)
the positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating circumstances.
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the
same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim—ambush exemplifies the nature of
treachery.
Par. 16 of Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the
crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano, together
with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national highway and by surprise,
fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of multiple gunshot wounds.
When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to the road embankment,
finally falling into the canal where his CRV was trapped, precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical
conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano, together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose,
was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed was
deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
DOCTRINE:
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly
or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The
essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus,
depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.
Likewise, even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
FACTS:
While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s
body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing
incident, Villacorta fled.
The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave
chase but failed to catch Villacorta.
Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound as per the medical charts and diagnosis of his injury, and eventual
death.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
The appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Villacorta was stabbed until his death.
HELD 1:
The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection and not the stab wound.
In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab
wound he inflicted upon Cruz.
If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22
days later. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection
with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death.
The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed
to the time of his death. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused
caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
As the Court noted in Urbano v. CA, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that
exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can
only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been
the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
ISSUE 2 (one directly related to the topic in the syllabus): Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery be appreciated
in this case?
HELD 2:
Yes. Treachery should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in the Information and
proved during trial.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which
tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended
party might make.
What must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely:
o the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and
o the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the essence of qualifying
circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving
DOCTRINE:
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The
evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the
crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his
companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya
at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions
suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the
said ambush is murder.
FACTS:
The record shows that on April 21, 1989 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, U.S. Col. James N. Rowe was killed while his driver,
Joaquin Vinuya, was wounded in an ambush at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City.
It appears that on April 21, 1989 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint
U. S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in
Quezon City. Initial investigation by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS for brevity), National Capital District Command, Camp Crame,
Quezon City which was led by Capt. Gil Meneses, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the date and
time of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that
they were at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG Compound along
Tomas Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col.
Rowe and seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer
car when it sped away from the site of the
ambush. The same Toyota Corolla car was later recovered on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary (PC), North
Sector Command, led by PC/Sgt. Fermin Garma, at No. 4 Windsor Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.
Police investigation resulted in the arrest of Donato B. Continente and Juanito T. Itaas who were subsequently charged in court
together with other John Does with the crimes of 1) murder and 2) frustrated murder, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, for having conspired in killing Col. Rowe and wounding his driver.
After trial on the merits, the trial court found appellants Continente and Itaas guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged and
sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for killing Col. James N. Rowe, and ten (10) years and one day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for the crime
committed against Joaquin Vinuya.
HELD:
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The
evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the
crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his
companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya
at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions
suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the
said ambush is murder.
DOCTRINE: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.
FACTS: On April 21, 1989 at around 7:00am, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military Assistance
Group (JUSMAG), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by the
CIS, shows that on the date and time of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being
driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on their way to
the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired
at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen was
followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away from the site of the ambush. The same Toyota Corolla car was later recovered
on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary, at No. 4 Windsor Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.
Upon further investigation of the case, the CIS agents established through a confidential intelligence information the involvement of
appellant Donato Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush. After accosting appellant
Continente inside the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City for questioning. During the interrogation
in the presence of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente admitted to his participation in
the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver as a member of the surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the CPP-
NPA. Among the documents confiscated from appellant Continente by the CIS agents, and for which a receipt dated June 16, 1989
was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz, was a letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right hand side of the
letter appear the acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team,
Regional Command".
Another confidential intelligence information established the participation of appellant Juanito Itaas in the said ambush of Col. James
Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas, who was a known member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City
was arrested in Davao City and was brought to Manila for investigation. CIS investigated and took down the statements of appellant
Itaas who disclosed during the investigation that he was an active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City and
confessed, in the presence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights, that he was one of
those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe. The said appellant identified the Toyota Corolla car that the
assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. Rowe.
Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a certain Meriam Zulueta. Zulueta was
about to cross the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG
Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board
a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance of more or less one meter at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in
Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the street to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and covered her head
with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were firing at the gray car. She recognized appellant Juanito Itaas when
the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person, directly behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body
was half exposed while he was firing at the gray car with the use of along firearm. The shooting incident lasted for about five seconds
only after which the maroon car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue toward the direction of Quezon Boulevard while being followed by
a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.
Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato Continente whom she had encountered on at least three occasions at a carinderia outside
the JUSMAG Compound. Her first encounter with appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the afternoon on April 17, 1989
when she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a carinderia nearby. She mistook the said appellant for a tricycle driver who was
simply walking around the premises. She saw appellant Continente in the same carinderia again on the following day, April 18, 1989,
and she was even teased by her companions that he was her escort. On April 19, 1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third
time inside the same carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She came to know the identity of appellant Continente when
Continente was presented to her in Camp Crame for identification. She thought that he was the tricycle driver whom she had seen in
the carinderia near the JUSMAG Compound.
Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as the same person whom she had encountered on two
occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the morning of April 19, 1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side of Tomas
Morato Street which was near the corner of Scout Madrinas Street. Her attention was caught by the driver of the car, who was then
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as driver, and assigned to Col. James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he
fetched Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG. While he was making a
right turn at the intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed 4 people on board a red car, 2 of whom
suddenly opened fire at the car that he was driving hitting him in the process. The shooting incident happened very fast and that he
had no opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the incident, Vinuya managed to drive the car to the JUSMAG
Compound. Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found out that Col. James Rowe, who was sitting at the back seat of the car,
was also hit during the shooting incident.
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. Subsequently, they
were transferred to the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga but then Capt. Rowe was already dead. Vinuya was treated in the Clark
Air Base Hospital in Pampanga for four days for the injuries he sustained on his head, shoulder, and on the back portion of his left
hand. Thereafter, he was taken back to JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate.
For the foregoing, 2 informations were filed against Itaas and Continente for the crimes of murder and frustrated murder. RTC
rendered its decision finding both appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes.
Continente and Itaas separately instituted the instant appeal.
HELD: Yes. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste
and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse."
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The evidence
clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without
the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were
all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog
Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said
car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.
Appellant Juanito Itaas should be held liable for the crimes of murder and attempted murder for his direct participation in the killing
of Col. James Rowe and in the wounding of his driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is reclusion perpetua for the murder of Col.
James Rowe and the medium period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of Joaquin Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in the latter case, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor
and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense,
that is, prision correccional.
DOCTRINE: It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising
from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that
such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate or conscious choice was
held non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.
FACTS:
Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker
session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around midnight. Debdani, however,
failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for two (2) players
only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing
at around 9:00 oclock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where
the prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios.
o The prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause, Antonio
pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to
accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose
Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
o The defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their
argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle of a heated altercation where they
traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed
that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared,
Tuadles fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the trigger. In
fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted
the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen the actual shooting since
he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles
had already been shot and was lying on the floor.
o While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead,
and there is no dispute in these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards, prosecution
eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after
which they proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the San Juan Police
Force. They remained at Antonios residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and
summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself
and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two security
guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for the police investigators. Sometime
thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his statement at the police station, a statement which he
would repudiate three (3) days later.
An Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1
Honorio Cartalla, Jr.
RTC = After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged, imposing on them the appropriate penalties
and ordering them to pay to the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and damages, set forth in the
dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed separate appeals assailing the trial courts findings and disposition.
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JOSE JIMMY BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS
DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED STATEMENT
HELD: NO.
According to the accused, the witness made inconsistencies. First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan
authorities averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs leading to the second floor
where the crime took place when he heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern Police District
(EPD) and in his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis negated his earlier statement, this time averring that he had indeed
seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with neither warning nor provocation, aim the gun at the head of
Tuadles and shoot the latter pointblank. Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the San Juan Police
investigators false information in his first statement, saying that nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS THE EXISTENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
HELD: NO.
In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun
which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun
against him (Antonio), so he grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare testimony,
uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us that Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis
shows that Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonios loud invectives, and it would be hard to imagine Tuadles as
the aggressor under such a situation. And even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that Tuadles
intended to keep the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against him considering the state
of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be a more believable scenario since even appellant Antonio
admitted that he was suffused with anger, his temper short due to three (3) consecutive sleepless nights.
There is no evidence, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no convincing proof that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of Tuadles. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The burden of proving unlawful
aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented incontrovertible proof that would stand careful scrutiny before
any court. Lacking this requirement, appellant Antonios claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot even claim it
as an extenuating circumstance.
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the
table. Antonio himself admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage. Such a threatening stance
could be interpreted as a provocation which could have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that appellant Antonio, in his
anger, would not be able to use it against Tuadles. If ever there was provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant
Antonio, not from Tuadles.
Re: the claim of the accused that it was an accident: The trial court upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory
that if Antonio indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected of him would be to immediately see to it that
Tuadles be brought to a hospital or get medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant Antonio left
Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on the floor for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both
had their hands on the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree that appellant Antonio should
have seen to it that no one else would touch the gun barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun
to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for preserving the fingerprints on the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed
the gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could have proven his claim of self-defense or
accident was unfortunately lost due to his lack of presence and due care.
ISSUE: WON THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY SHALL BE
APPRECIATED
HELD: NO.
To avail of this mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the provocation originated from the offended party. However,
apart from his own testimony, appellant Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence that he was provoked by Tuadles.
He claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused or could not pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a
mitigating provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot, and never will, be a reason to shoot the
debtor dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof that he won and that the argument arose from Tuadles refusal
to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, self-serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation.
HELD: NO.
There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack
to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to
murder. The trial court did not explain the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a sudden attack
and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
There was no treachery in this case. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a
conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows that the incident was
an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime.
It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising
from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be
appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate
or conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.
There was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. In People v. Salvador, we pronounced
that: There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated argument preceded the
attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforseen.
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v. Chua, we reiterated our
consistent view that: While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts of appellant
showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard.
Treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the
accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant
Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with
treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot
of their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because treachery requires that the
mode of attack must have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence.
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however,
cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery, on the other hand, the
means employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control,
cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. Thus, the killing of
Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
HELD: NO.
DOCTRINE:
Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery.
FACTS:
On July 12, 1991, Jussi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes
Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they
stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went back to
Leino's house to eat.
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Chapman tagged
along. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany St., about a block away from her house
in Campanilla St. She wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in going back to her
house. She did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany St. When they reached the corner of Caballero and
Mahogany Sts., a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind
them and stopped on the middle of the road. Teehankee alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you?
(Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to Teehankee his Asian Development Bank I.D. Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just
grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it.
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired what was going on. He stepped
down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled
out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot me?"
Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed the gun at him and asked: "Do you want trouble?" Leino
said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will
somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered
Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from
him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's car. Accused tried but failed
to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a
minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino.
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two meters away and directly in front of them stood accused. For a
moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell
backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot (forehead) and saw Maureen fall beside
him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away.
Three people witnessed the incident: Domingo Florece (private security guard of another resident), Vicente Mangubat (driver
of another resident), and Agripino Cadenas (another private security guard).
The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical
Center for treatment.
Maureen who was treated and operated on eventually died on October 17, 1991 or 97 days after the incident.
RTC convicted Teehankee of 2 counts of Murder for the death of Chapman and Hultman, and 1 count of Frustrated Murder
insofar as Leino is concerned.
ISSUE: Whether the killing of Chapman and Hultman, and the shooting of Leino was attended by treachery. – There was treachery
insofar as Hultman and Leino was concerned, but none in Chapman’s case.
HELD:
Teehankee claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not
shown that he consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. He asserts
that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, The Court held that treachery clearly attended the commission
of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, Teehankee ordered Leino to sit on the pavement.
Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of Teehankee's car. When Teehankee went after her, Maureen moved around
his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, Teehankee got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside
Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by Teehankee. Clearly, Teehankee
purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time
between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a period which Teehankee used to prepare for a mode of
attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court
against Teehankee insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
RTC is Affirmed with Modifications. Teehankee was held guilty of Homicide instead of Murder for the death of Chapman. He was still
held guilty of Murder for the death of Hultman and Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Leino.
DOCTRINE:
Where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position but also the dog position, the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rene Siao together with Reylan Gimena were charged before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu
with the crime of rape of Estrella Raymundo, a minor, 14 years old.
CHARACTERS
o Rene Siao – son of Jose Siao, owner of the house in which the crime occurred; employer of Reylan Gimena and Ester
Raymundo
o Ester Raymundo – housemaid of Siao family
o Reylan Gimena – helper of Siao family
Prosecution Version:
Joy Raymundo and private complainant Estrella Raymundo are cousins. They worked as house maids of appellants family.
Reylan Gimena was also a helper of appellants family. Estrella was then a 14-year old "probinsiyana" from Palompon, Leyte.
One day, at about 3:00 p.m., in the Siao residence located at 417-A Basak Brotherhood, Cebu City, appellant ordered Reylan
Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to pull Estrella to the room of the women. Gimena dragged her toward the womens quarters
and once inside, appellant pushed her to the wooden bed (naomog). Appellant pointed a pistol colored white at Gimena and
the face of Estrella
Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, appellant asked Estrella to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite.
He also told Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester." (Reylan do something to Ester.) Appellant lighted the candle and dropped the
melting candle on her chest. Estrella chose a bottle of sprite because she was afraid of the pistol. She was made to lie down
on her back on the bed with her head hanging over one end. Whereupon, appellant poured sprite into her nostrils as she was
made to spread her arms. While appellant dropped the bottle of sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the gun at her face.
Estrella felt dizzy and her eyesight became blurred. She tried to fold her arms to cover her breasts but appellant ordered
Gimena to hold her hands.
Appellant then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face down on the bed. After that,
appellant untied her hands and feet but tied her back with the same wire. As appellant pointed his pistol at her, he ordered
Estrella to remove her pants and T-shirt, she sat on the bed and did as she was told and when she was naked, appellant
commanded her to take the initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not understand what appellant meant. At this point,
appellant poked the gun at her temple.
Appellant then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But Gimena refused. Gimena did not remove his shorts but let his
penis out. Appellant spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and shouted for help
twice. Appellant ordered Gimena to rape Estrella. At first Gimena refused to heed the command of appellant to rape Estrella
(birahi) because, according to Gimena, he has a sister. Appellant said that if they would not obey, he would kill both of them.
Appellant told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!" Estrella was made to suck the penis of Gimena at gunpoint.
She complied with the order of appellant and when the penis of Gimena was inside her mouth, appellant kept looking and
pointing his handgun at them. Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the sexual act (kayatan). She felt
excruciating pain. Gimena made push-and-pull movements for around 10 minutes. Appellant looked on and said, "why did it
take you long to penetrate?" While Gimena was making the push-and-pull movements, appellant held the legs of Estrella to
keep them apart.
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down. Not long after, appellant said: "You do it again." Gimena
said that he could not do it again because he was already very tired. But appellant pointed the pistol at Gimenas temple.
Gimena obeyed the order of appellant because the pistol was pointed at him. They were made to lay side by side while
appellant kept on pointing the pistol at them. Gimena, who was behind Estrella made a push-and-pull movements so that his
organ would reach her private part
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog position (patuwad). Appellant commanded her to do it
but she refused because she was already tired. Appellant pointed the pistol at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I
will not do that because I am already tired." At that, appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena. Thus, Gimena copulated with
Estrella in the manner dogs perform the sexual intercourse. Gimena shouted for help. Somebody knocked on the door and
they heard the voice of Teresita Paares, the older sister of appellant. Appellant ignored Paares and kept on pointing the pistol
at Estrella and Gimena, as he looked at them with wide-open eyes (siga) (pp. 30-31, TSN, September 20, 1994). Shortly,
appellant told them to go to the boys room. They complied with his order tearfully, after he followed them laughing all the
while. Appellant then warned them: "If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers."
HELD:
YES. The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and has found accused-appellant’s contentions to be without
merit. Against the victim’s story, accused-appellant urges us to accept his own version. But we cannot do so, for we agree
with the trial court’s observation that a 14-year old girl from the province, naive and innocent to the ways of the world, is
incapable of concocting serious charges against her employer and fabricating a story of aberrant sexual behavior as can only
be told by one who has been subjected to it.
Accused-appellant’s assertion that the failure of the prosecution to present the gun used by him to force and intimidate Ester
Raymundo and Reylan Gimena to perform sexual intercourse is fatal to the prosecution’s cause is clearly untenable. This
Court has held in People vs. Travero, that “[t]he non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of the rape is not
essential to the conviction of the accused. It suffices that the testimony of the rape victim is credible because the established
rule is that the sole testimony of the offended party is sufficient to sustain the accused’s conviction if it rings the truth or is
otherwise credible.”
It can readily be seen that the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential considering that they refer to trivial matters which
have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation.
This Court has consis tently adhered to the rule that inconsistencies on minor details of the testimonies of witnesses serve to
strengthen their credibility as they are badges of truth rather than an indicia of falsehood. If at all, they serve as proof that
the witnesses were not coached and rehearsed.
The points raised by accused-appellant are trite and of no consequence. First of all, the important consideration in rape is not
the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Well-settled is the rule that penetration,
however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Thus, this factor could not affect the case for the prosecution.
Second, accused-appellant’s argument that it is impossible to commit a rape in house where there are many occupants is
untenable. We have held in a number of cases that lust is no respecter of time and place. It is not impossible to perpetrate a
rape even in a small room. Rape can be committed in a house where there are many other occupants. Third, Ester and Reylan
could not be expected to flee or even to attempt to flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, considering that Ester was
only fourteen-years old and a newly employed housemaid, while Reylan Gimena a seventeen-year old houseboy, they were
easily intimidated and cowed into submission by accused-appellant, who aside from being their “amo” or employer, was
menacingly threatening to kill them or their family with a gun if they did not do as he commanded them to do. Thus, it was
not improbable for them not to attempt to escape when as accused-appellant perceived they had an opportunity to do so.
Moreover, while most victims will immediately flee from their aggressors, others become virtually catatonic because of the
mental shock they experience. It was also not improbable for them to report the incident to an old man they met on the road
as there was no one else to turn to.
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. But the trial court overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced
accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in
committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e., male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as
dogs do, i.e., entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy attended the commission thereof.
The use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty. Since the use of a deadly weapon increases the penalty as opposed to a
generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, said fact should be alleged in the information,
because of the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Considering that the
complaint (which was later converted into the Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, specifically, that
herein accused-appellant was armed with a gun, the penalty to be reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would
be reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Simple rape
is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, which must be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed. Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed by the trial court is correct.
DOCTRINE: A person who kills another by means of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death; but when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, like voluntary surrender, and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
FACTS:
Rufino Mallari was charged with Murder before RTC for death of Joseph Galang by fatally bumping Joseph with a vehicle (Elf
Truck)
Prosecution Testimonies:
o Joseph told Rufino and his brothers not to drive fast while passing by Joseph’s house, instead Rufino challenged
Joseph to a fight
o Joseph ignored but his brothers apologized to Rufino
o While watching basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, arrived and attempted
to stab Joseph
o Joseph was able to run away
o When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court
and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
o Medico Legal: cause of death was [c]rushing injury on the head secondary to vehicular accident. Josephs head was
deformed with multiple skull fractures and lacerations and brain tissue evisceration. [7]
Defense testimony:
Rufino:
o While Rufino was driving a truck at 80kph, with his wife Myrna in passenger seat, on his way to the garage to park
the truck, blew thrice the horn when Joseph was 4 meters from the road
o But Joseph went to the middle of the road and threw stones, which went through the windshield and hit Rufino on
the chest
o Rufino lost control of the truck, and ran over Joseph
o He went to municipal hall where he was immediately detained
Rufino’s wife Myrna:
o prior to the incident in question, she saw Joseph at the basketball court, drunk and carrying balisong.
o Joseph gave a dagger look but Myrna simpy went inside her house
o Later the driving incident occurred
Dr. Divina Palarca testified that she examined Rufino and found him to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, which
possibly could have afflicted him six months prior to its discovery.
RTC: convicted and sentenced to death
Automatic Appeal before SC accdg to Art 47 RPC where Rufino seeks:
o downgrading from murder to homicide on the grounds that no evident premeditation was proved and
that the motor vehicle was merely incidental to the commission of the crime
o voluntary surrender should have been appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in his favor
HELD:
No, it cannot be downgraded, only the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua from death.
DOCTRINE:
The use of a motor vehicle qualified the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof.
FACTS:
Thadeos Enguito was charged with the crime of Murder with Multiple Less Serious Physical Injuries. He allegedly chased with
his white Ceres Kia (plate no. 722) and hit the motorela which Wilfredo Achumbre was riding.
Due to the impact, the motorela to fall on the road and caused the drive Felipe Requerme and its passenger Rosita Requerme
to sustain serious injuries.
On the other hand, Wilfredo was able to run towards the railing of Marcos Bridge, CDO, but Enguito rammed and hit him with
his vehicle which cut his right leg and then ran him over again causing his death.
Enguito claims that the death of Wilfredo was purely accidental. He claimed that he was a co-employee of the victum and
they were close friends as they used to play basketball together.
He claimed that he was about to bring Wilfredo home but he refused to go down from the Kia as he was drunk. They allegedly
fought and Wilfredo attempted to take over the car by pressing on the brake. The car suddenly stopped and Enguito jumped
out of the car and ran away from Wilfredo but he was caught by him and Wilfredo told him, “You are a braggart”.
Thereafter, Wilfredo punched Enguito and this continued until he left. The Ceres Kia was left parked near Enguito.
Enguito decided to drive back in order to report the incident but on his way he saw Wilfredo in the motorela and decided to
chase him to force him to surrender to the police. Suddenly, Wilfredo jumped towards the right of the Ceres Kia and even
with the brake he was not able to stop the vehicle and did not check on what happened. He was only informed that Wilfredo
died after he was apprehended by the police.
RTC: Found Enguito guilty of homicide with less serious physical injuries with the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle.
CA: Ruled that Enguito should be held liable for murder and not homicide because he killed the victim by means of motor vehicle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Enguito is guilty of murder by use of a motor vehicle
HELD:
YES. The use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof.
Enguito’s claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his
actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing.
Enguito could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-
appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit.
He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased who was hit when Wlifredo was at the railing of the Marcos bridge.
Further, he used the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from the place of the
incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.
Clearly, Enguito’s state of mind after he was mauled and before he crushed Wildrefo to death was such that he was still able
to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen the police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he resorted to the dastardly
act which resulted to the death of Wilfredo and the injuries of Sps. Requerme.
Enguito is guilty of the crime of Murder with less serious physical injuries. The sentence to reclusion perpetua is affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
The mere decapitation of the victim's head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to
murder.
Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of
the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse
of superior strength.
FACTS:
Accused and deceased (Elsa) were lovers. They met at Apex Motor Corp where accused was the manager while Elsa was the
Assistant Personnel Manager, they were both married but were estranged from their respective spouses. Elsa resigned to
avoid rumors but they continued their relationship.
Demetrio, driver of accused was instructed by accused to fetch Elsa. He then did so and brought Elsa to accused’s
condominium.
While Demetrio was in the servants’ quarters, accused came in. He asked him how long he wanted to work him, he replied
that he was willing to work for him forever. Upon hearing this, accused shed tears and told him that:
o Accused: May problema ako, Rio. Elsa is dead.
o Demetrio: Bakit mo sya pinatay?
o Accused: I did not kill Elsa, she died of bangungot
They went to a mall and bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers. When they returned to the condominium, he asked him
to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered the bathroom and found the dismembered hands,
feet, trunk and head of a woman. He helped accused place the other body parts in 3 separate garbage bags. They packed all
the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper and rolles. They then loaded it in the trunk of accused’s car. They boarded the
car.
Accused told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City, while in a narrow road, accused told him to stop the
car. Accused alighted and told him to get the bag. Accused took the plastic bags and dumped them by the roadside. They
boarded the car and ordered Demetrio to drive to Bataan.
While on their way, accused ordered him to stop the car on top of a bridge and told him to get off and to throw a bag into
the river. This happened again as they passed another bridge, they also threw out the belongings of Elsa.
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family about what happened. The following morning, he went to the
Department of Justice and gave his statement.
At first, they thought that Demetrio was exaggerating, they dispatched a team of NBI agents to verify it, they were
accompanied by Demetrio. There they found a crowd of people gathered around the mutilated parts of a human body. The
next morning, accused was arrested.
In his defense, accused alleged that he stayed home because he was not feeling well, and that he had no reason to kill her
since he was in love with her.
TC: convicted accused of the crime of murder
ISSUE: Whether or not the circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was proven. (YES)
HELD:
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of
the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse
of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim.
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing.
Nowhere in Demetrio's testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately
took advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the photograph of
accused-appellant that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the
victim's person or corpse. This circumstance was both alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the time of its
commission, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death. No aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged
or proved; hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Therefore, the trial court's imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.