Constitutional Law Digests
Constitutional Law Digests
Constitutional Law Digests
David vs. Senate Election Tribunal by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on 22 July
2005.
Facts:
On 07 July 2006, respondent executed an "Oath
Respondent is a foundling. Her Certificate of Live of Allegiance" to the Republic of the Philippines,
Birth states that she was found in the Parish Church and three days later, on 10 July 2006, filed with
of Jaro, on 03 September 1968, at about 9:30 the Bureau of Immigration a Petition for
A.M. by Mr. Edgardo Militar. The fact of her Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship pursuant to R.A.
finding was reported to the Office of the Local 9225. The said petition was granted by the
Civil Registrar on 06 September 1968 by Mr. Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated 18 July
Emiliano Militar, under whose custody she was at 2006 signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M.
the time of the reporting. Respondent was Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.
registered as Mary Grace Contreras Militar.
Respondent's biological parents were unknown and Between 2006 and 2009, respondent made
to date remain unknown. several trips to the USA using her USA Passport.
When Respondent was five (5) years old, she was Respondent was appointed Chairperson of the
adopted by the couple Ronald Allan Poe (also Movie and Television Review and Classification
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. or FN) and Jesusa Board (MTRCB) on 06 October 2010. Prior to
Sonora Poe (also known as Susan Roces) as taking her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson
evidenced by a Decision dated 13 May 1974 of on 21 October 2010, respondent executed an
the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Riza1. "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
On 13 December 1986, having reached the voting American Citizenship" on 20 October 2010. The
age of eighteen (18) years, Respondent was original copy of the Affidavit was submitted to the
issued a Voter's ID by the Commission on Elections. Bureau of Immigration also on 20 October 2010
She was issued Philippine Passports by the by her legal counsel, Escudero Marasigan Valiente
Ministry/Department of Foreign Affairs on 04 & E.H. Villarea1. On 26 October 2010,
April 1988, 05 April 1993, 19 May 1998, 13 respondent assumed office as MTRCB Chairperson.
October 2009, 1.9 December 2013, and 18
March 2014. On 12 July 2011, Respondent executed an
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality
In 1988, Respondent enrolled at Boston College in of the United States" before Vice-Consul Somer E.
Chestnull Hill, Massachusetts, U.S.A., where she Bessire-Briers. She likewise accomplished on the
obtained her Bachelor of its degree in Political same date the "Questionnaire Information for
Studies in 1991. On 27 July 1991, she married Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship'
Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, who is a
citizen of both the Philippines and the United Respondent's Certificate of Loss of Nationality was
States at the Sanctuario de San Jose Parish at San executed by Vice Consul Jason Galian on 09
Juan City, Metro Manila. Two days later, on 29 December 2011 and was approved by the
July 1991, she joined her husband in United Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on
States. 03 February 2012.
Respondent became a naturalized American In the 2013 elections, respondent ran for the
citizen on 18 October 2001. She was issued USA position of Senator. Her Certificate of Candidacy
Passport No. 17037793 on 19 December 2001. (COC) executed on 27 September 2012 was filed
with the Commission on Elections on 02 October
Respondent came home to the Philippines in 2005 2012. She was declared senator-elect by the
and was issued a Tax Identification Number (TIN) Commission on Elections on 16 May 2013. To this
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day, respondent is sitting as a member of the On 1 September 2.015, the representatives of the
Senate. Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics
Office attended the hearing and submitted the
On 6 August 2015, Petitioner Rizalito Y. David required documents.
("Petitioner") filed before the Tribunal a Petition
for Quo Warranto against Respondent, contesting On the same date, Respondent filed her Verified
her election as Senator of the Republic for failure Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2)
to comply with the citizenship and residency Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for
requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution. Immediate Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3)
Motion to Cite Petitioner for Direct Contempt of
On 11 August 2015, the Tribunal, through Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect Contempt
Resolution No. 15-01, required Petitioner David to of Court.
correct the formal defects of his petition within a
non-extendible period of three (3) days from The issues having been joined, the Executive
receipt of the said Resolution.' Committee of the Tribunal, in Resolution No. 15-05
dated 2 September 2015, resolved to call the
On 17 August 2015, Petitioner tiled his Amended parties and their respective counsel to a
Petition. On the same date, Atty. Manuelito R. preliminary conference to be held on 11
Luna, entered his appearance as counsel for September 2015. The Tribunal likewise required
Petitioner. the parties to file not later than 09 September
On 1 August 2015, the Tribunal, through its 2015 their respective Preliminary Conference
Executive Committee, issued Resolution No. 15-02, Brief.
directing the Secretary of the Tribunal to issue the During the Preliminary Conference, Petitioner
corresponding summons to Respondent, requiring agreed to drop the issue of residency on the
her to file her ANSWER to the Amended Petition ground of prescription.
within a non-extendible period often (10) days
from receipt of the summons.' Thereafter, on 21 September 2015, the Tribunal
heard the parties in Oral Argument, at the
On 25 August 2015, pending submission of conclusion of which, the parties were required to
Respondent's Answer, Petitioner moved to submit their respective Memorandum, without
subpoena the Bureau of Immigration Record of. prejudice to the submission of DNA evidence by
Application of Citizenship Re-Acquisition and Respondent within thirty (30) days from the said
related documents, including the record of travels date.
and NSO-Kept Birth Certificate of Respondent.
On 21 October 2015, Respondent moved for an
The aforesaid Motion was granted by the extension of fifteen (15) days or until 05
Executive Committee of the Tribunal in Resolution November 2015 within which to submit DNA test
No. 15-04 dated 26 August 2015. The Secretary results. The motion was granted by the Executive
of the Tribunal was directed to issue the Committee in its Resolution No. 15-08 dated 27
corresponding subpoenas to the respective officials October 2015.
of the Bureau of Immigration and the National
Statistics Office having official custody of the However, on 05 November 2015, Respondent
documents requested. The subpoenas commanded filed a Manifestation (re: Results of DNA Testing),
them to appear at the Office of the Secretary of stating that none of the tests that Respondent took
the Senate Electoral Tribunal on 01 September provided results that would shed light to the real
2.015 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and to bring identity of her biological parents. While she would
and produce three sets of the documents continue her efforts to find personal closure with
enumerated in their respective subpoenas. respect to this issue and undertook to inform the
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Tribunal should a positive development arise, 2. Poe invokes Art. 7 of the UNCRC and Art.
Respondent submitted the issue of her natural-born 24 of the ICCPR. Both treaties are ratified
Filipino citizenship as a foundling for resolution by the Philippines.
upon the legal arguments set forth in her
submissions to the Tribunal. In Resolution No. 15-10 a. These treaties create an obligation on
dated 06 November 2015; the Tribunal noted the the part of the Philippines to recognize
manifestation and considered the ease submitted a foundling as its citizen from the time
for resolution. of the foundling’s birth.
ISSUE: Whether Grace Poe is eligible to sit as a b. Although neither the ICCPR nor the
Senator of the Republic. UNCRC was in force when she was
born in 1968, each may apply
ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONER: Poe is not retroactively to the date of her birth.
qualified to be a member of the Senate on To rule otherwise would be to
account of her not being a natural-born citizen. discriminate against foundlings born
before the ratification of these treaties.
1. Poe does not fall under any of the classes
of natural-born citizens enumerated in Sec. 3. Poe invokes Art. 15 of the UDHR which
1, Art. IV, 1987 Constitution recognizes the right of everyone to a
nationality.
a. To be a natural-born citizen, one’s
parents must be Filipino citizens. Poe 4. Poe invokes Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague
cannot claim natural-born status as her Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws.
parents are not known and cannot be The presumption that a foundling is a
presumed as Filipino citizens. citizen of the State in which she is found is
a generally accepted principle of
2. The provisions of the 1930 Hague international law.
Convention on Certain Questions Relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 5. Poe invokes Art. 2 of the UN Convention on
1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which expresses a rebuttable
Statelessness are not applicable because presumption of descent from a citizen,
the Philippines has yet to accede to both consistent with jus sanguinis.
Conventions.
6. Finally, Poe argues that she validly
3. Poe’s adoption did not confer upon her the reacquired her natural-born status pursuant
status of natural-born citizen. The effect of to R.A. No. 9225.
the adoption is to confer unto her
legitimate status. RULING OF THE SET ON POE’S CITIZENSHIP:
ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT: Poe asserts 1. From the deliberations of the 1934
that she is a natural-born citizen and is eligible to Constitutional Convention on citizenship,
sit as a Senator it was never the intention of the framers
to exclude foundlings from natural-born
1. As early as the 1935 Constitution, it was citizenship status.
always the intention of the framers to
consider foundlings found in the Philippines “Children or people born in a country
as Filipino citizens. of unknown parents are citizens of this
nation” and the only reason that there
was no specific reference to foundlings
in the 1935 provision was that these fiction, as an exception to the jus
cases “are few and far in between.” sanguinis rule
Evident intent was to adopt the concept This is evident from Art. 1 (State to
found in the Spanish Code “wherein all determine who are its nationals)
children of unknown parentage born in and Art. 2 (questions on nationality
Spanish territory are considered to be determined by the law of
Spaniards, because the presumption is that State) of the 1930 Hague
that a child of unknown parentage is Convention
the son of a Spaniard.”
4. Poe validly reacquired her natural-born
2. Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath
of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws), of Allegiance to the Republic, as required
a foundling is presumed to have been under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225
born on the territory of the State in which
it was found until the contrary is proved. Before assuming her position as MTRCB
Chairman, Poe executed an affidavit
Although the Philippines is not a of renunciation of foreign citizenship.
signatory to said convention, its This was sufficient to qualify her for her
provisions are binding as they form appointive position, and later, her
part of the law of the land pursuant to elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not
the incorporation clause. require that her Certificate of Loss of
Nationality filed before the U.S.
Sr. Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional Embassy be first approved in order
Convention remarked “By international that she may qualify for office.
law the principle that children or
people born in a country of unknown Records of the Bureau of Immigration
parents are citizens in this nation is show that Poe still used her U.S.
recognized…” passport after having taken her Oath
of Allegiance but not after she has
By referring to this rule in renounced her U.S. Citizenship.
international law (which was no
other than Art. 14 of the Hague 5. Hence, the petition for quo warranto is
Convention of 1930), what was DISMISSED.
effectively created in the
Constitution itself, was an exception
to the general rule of natural-born
citizenship based on blood descent.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to Issue 2: W/N the filing of a motion for
correct manifest mistakes concerning the cancelled reconsideration of the COMELEC en banc’s ruling is
candidacy of Alvin John and a motion to proper
consolidate Alvin John’s votes with the votes he Held:
garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to
consolidate the votes because Alvin John was not a No, the motion for reconsideration is a
nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed prohibited pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the
Angelica as the winner. COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits
the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an en
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
petition before the COMELEC to annul the election offense cases. Consequently, when a
proclamation of Tan, which was granted and COMELEC en banc ruling become final and
affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. However, executory, it precludes a party from raising again
Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed in any other forum the nuisance candidacy as an
office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby issue.
rendering the adverse resolution on her
proclamation moot. Issue 3: W/N Wigberto’s petition for certiorari
of the COMELEC en banc’s ruling was timely
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed
a certiorari assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC Held:
en banc’s ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance
candidate and an election protest claiming that No, the petition assailing the COMELEC’s en banc
fraud has been perpetrated. The SC, noting that ruling was filed beyond the 5-day period
the proclaimed candidate has already assumed provided by COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Rule
office, dismissed the election protest and directed 37, Sec 3 thereof provides that decisions in pre-
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in
the case. the Senate alone.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket
investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 prohibition against a witness testifying at all,
of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing simply because he is already facing charges
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the
refer to the implementation or re-examination of Constitution allows him to interpose objections
any law or in connection with any proposed whenever an incriminating question is posed or
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses,
They may also extend to any and all matters
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but not to refuse to take the witness stand a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
completely. Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly
the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential
veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., Vicente Jayme, Carlos Dominguez,
Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr. Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson,
Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De
Facts: Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague,
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C. Domingo from
Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for implementing RA 6688. No Restraining Order was
the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or issued by the Supreme Court.
decreased certain items included in the proposed Gonzales et al.’s cause is anchored on the
budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the following grounds: (1) the President’s line-veto
constitutional provision on the passage of bills, power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
Congress presented the said Bill to the President item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore,
for consideration and approval. she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) which
Bill into law, and declared the same to have are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
Provisions and Section 55, a “General Provision,” exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
were vetoed. On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
Resolution 381 (“Authorizing and Directing the with it the power to strike out conditions or
Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the restrictions for that would be legislation, in
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be
Special and General Provisions, particularly provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is
Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of also vested with the prerogative to impose
1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes”) restrictions on the exercise of that power.
was adopted. The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et
On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ al., counters that the issue in the present case is a
Mandamus was filed by Neptali A. Gonzales, political question beyond the power of the
Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales et al.
T. Alvarez, Edgardo J. Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, had a political remedy, which was to override the
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose veto; that Section 55 is a “rider” because it is
D. Lina, Jr., John Osmeña, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene extraneous to the Appropriations Act and,
A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Mamintal therefore, merits the President’s veto; that the
Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Tañada, Jovito R. power of the President to augment items in the
Salonga, Orlando S. Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, appropriations for the executive branches had
Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, already been provided for in the Budget Law,
Jr., Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as
ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988); and that
the Senate and as “substantial taxpayers whose the President is empowered by the Constitution to
vital interests may be affected by this case,” with
veto provisions or other “distinct and severable promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section
parts” of an Appropriations Bill. 16 (FY ‘90) because they nullify the authority of
the Chief Executive and heads of different
Issues and Held: branches of government to augment any item in
1. Whether or not the President exceeded the the General Appropriations Law for their
item-veto power accorded by the Constitution or respective offices from savings in other items of
differently put, has the President the power to veto their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by
provisions of an Appropriations Bill Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment
No. The veto power of the President is expressed from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution. When Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90)
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of prohibit the restoration or increase by
the President and if exercised would result in the augmentation of appropriations disapproved or
veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional
Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item- and statutory authority of the President and other
veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the key officials to augment any item or any
exercise of the veto over a particular item or items appropriation from savings in the interest of
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such
specified, the President may not veto less than all authority in respect of disapproved or reduced
of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other items by no means vests in the Executive the power
words, the power given the executive to to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted
disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations being delimited to transfers within the department
Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of or branch concerned the sourcing to come only
an item and to approve the remaining portion of from savings. More importantly, for such a special
the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in power as that of augmentation from savings, the
Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution same is merely incorporated in the General
of any reference to the veto of a provision, the Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is “one
extent of the President’s veto power as previously the primary and specific aim of which is to make
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. appropriation of money from the public treasury”.
This is because the eliminated proviso merely It is a legislative authorization of receipts and
pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and expenditures. The power of augmentation from
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a savings, on the other hand, can by no means be
separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged considered a specific appropriation of money. It is
by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a non-appropriation item inserted in an
a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only appropriation measure.
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and
severable part of a bill may be the subject of a 2. Whether Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional (FY ‘90) are provisions, not items, in the
mandate that any provision in the general appropriation bill
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some No. Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90)
particular appropriation therein and that any such are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the
provision shall be limited in its operation to the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987
appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in Constitution provides: “Sec. 25 (2) No provision or
the true sense of the term, a provision in an enactment shall be embraced in the general
Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation to which it relates, some particular appropriation therein. Any such
and does not relate to the entire bill. The President
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provision or enactment shall be limited in its Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.” money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness.
Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to “It is not enough that a provision be related to the
some “particular appropriation” therein. The institution or agency to which funds are
challenged “provisions” fall short of this appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed “provisions” do not included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such
relate to any particular or distinctive a connexity with money items of appropriation
appropriation. They apply generally to all items that they logically belong in a schedule of
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or appropriateness.” Tested by these criteria, Section
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) must also be
face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have held to be inappropriate “conditions.” While they,
to be made to the original recommendations made particularly, Section 16 (FY ‘90), have been
by the President and to the source indicated by “artfully drafted” to appear as true conditions or
the “Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring limitations, they are actually general law measures
Office.” Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of more appropriate for substantive and, therefore,
an expression of Congressional policy in respect of separate legislation. Further, neither of them shows
augmentation from savings rather than a the necessary connection with a schedule of
budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section expenditures. The reason is that items reduced or
55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) although disapproved by Congress would not appear on
labeled as “provisions,” are actually inappropriate the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act
provisions that should be treated as items for the itself. They can only be detected when compared
purpose of the President’s veto power. with the original budgetary submittals of the
President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY
3. Whether the Legislature’s inclusion of ‘90) themselves provide that an item “shall be
qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if
on expenditure of funds in the Appropriation Bill no corresponding appropriation for the specific
was proper purpose is provided in this Act.” Herein, there is no
There can be no denying that inherent in the condition, in the budgetary sense of the term,
power of appropriation is the power to specify attached to an appropriation or item in the
how money shall be spent; and that in addition to appropriation bill which was struck out. For
distinct “items” of appropriation, the Legislature obviously, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90)
may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, partake more of a curtailment on the power to
conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure augment from savings; in other words, “a general
of funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive provision of law, which happens to be put in an
is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation bill.”
appropriation while allowing the appropriation 4. Whether the legislature has a remedy when it
itself to stand. The veto of a condition in an believes that the veto powers by the executive
Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of were unconstitutional
the items to which the condition related was
deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever. Yes. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
be such in the real sense of the term, not some unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the
matters which are more properly dealt with in a Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto
separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds of
1. YES. The petition is granted and the decision of Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on
the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set local initiatives, which is “the power of local
aside. initiative shall not be exercised more than once a
year.”