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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[ISSUE 3] THAT SECTION 3-C AND 3-D OF FOSTERS PRADESH UNDERTAKING

(ACQUISITION) AMENDMENT ACT, 2009 IS A VALID PROVISION.
It is humbly contended before the court that Sections 3-C and 3-D of Fosters Pradesh
Undertaking (Acquisition) Amendment Act, 2009 herein referred as ‘Act, 2009’ are valid and
cannot be challenged on the grounds of legislative incompetency. The same argument is
presented in two prong arguments: [3.1] that the State Legislature of Foster Pradesh does not
entrench the legislative field of the Parliament under Entry 52 List I. [3.2] that each Entry in
the three Lists is a category of subject matter of legislation and must be construed widely.
[3.1] THAT THE STATE LEGISLATURE OF FOSTER PRADESH DOES NOT ENTRENCH THE
LEGISLATIVE FIELD OF THE PARLIAMENT UNDER ENTRY 52 LIST I.

It is contended that the State has not entrenched the Parliament by enacting Section 3-C and
3-D in the Act, 2009. The submission is produced in following two arguments: [3.1.1] that the
Central Act, 1951 does not restrict the State from making laws. [3.1.2] that the State of Foster
Pradesh is not denuded of the power to make law regarding Sugar Mills.
[3.1.1] That the Central Act, 1951 does not restrict the State from making laws.
It is submitted that the Central Act, 1951 does not deal with the ownership of Industrial
Undertaking and is only concerned with the development and regulation of the Scheduled
Industries.1 Therefore, the Central Act does not have absolute power and thus it does not
restrict the state from making laws on selling, transferring, and changing the land use.
Further, the Central Act, 1951 empowers the Central Government to take the management
and control of certain industries2 but with restrictive ambit as the term ‘Certain Cases’ in the
said provision does not give exclusivity to the Centre to form laws.
Notified Order
It is contended that the question of repugnancy is to be determined by the dominant intention
of the two legislation. Since, the subject matter of the two legislations are different therefore
merely because the two legislations refer to the same allied subjects does not mean that they
cover the same field.3 The doubtfulness of overlapping effect of laws gives rise effectuating
both the enactments.4 Further, abiding by the general principle of Statutory Construction it is
established that repugnancy in law must exist as a fact, and not as a mere possibility. 5
1
Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd v State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors (1980) 4 SCC 136.
2
The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 s. 18A.
3
Vijay Kumar Sharma & Ors v State of Karnataka & Ors (1990) 2 SCC 562.
4
Ibid.
5
Shyamakant Lal v Rambhajan Singh & Ors AIR 1939 FC 74.
Therefore, the Act, 1951 does not restrict the State of Foster Pradesh from making law
regarding sugar mills.
[3.1.2] That the State of Foster Pradesh is not denuded of the power to make laws regarding
the Sugar Mills.
It is submitted that the State of F.P. is not denuded from making laws and has every right to
make laws regarding the subject matter. The same is contended as follows: [3.1.2.1] that
matters of economic policies without mala-fide have a broad ambit. [3.1.2.2] that the parent
legislation of the State empowers the State to make laws regarding the subject matter.
[3.1.2.1] that matters of economic policies without mala-fide have a broad ambit.
It is submitted before the court that the matter in issue arose out of economic problems 6 and
therefore it should be broadly viewed. Also, “Laws relating to economic activities should be
viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights”7 and general provisions of
Constitutional Laws should not restrict the state narrowly to State power over State domestic
economic affairs.
Further, it is submitted that in general parlance no legislative sanction was required to adopt
closure or change land use and the same could be done in exercise of administrative power.
The decision of coming with an Act is taken by the State of Foster Pradesh as a measure to
maintain transparency and therefore there was no mala-fide intent at the first place. The
insertion of provisions through Amendment merely gives sanction to the Act, 1971 which has
been declared constitutionally valid by the Apex Court.8
The amendments acted as positive measure to dispose-off the recessional Industry of Sugar
Mills and therefore the act must be considered in good faith for the development and
betterment of the economy. Additionally, it is a fact that the policies have to develop with the
developing surrounding circumstances and economic conditions and therefore “what may
have been good for public at a point of time cannot be good for them forever.”9
Unless the decision of the Government is mala-fide of arbitrary it cannot be challenged in the
court and the Government has discretion to make policies which are in good faith. 10 Hence,
the act not being with a mala-fide intent rather an economic measure cannot be questioned.
[3.1.2.2] that the parent legislation of the State empowers the State to make laws regarding
the subject matter.
6
Moot Proposition ¶3.
7
RK Garg v Union of India & Ors (1981) 4 SCC 562.
8
Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd & Ors v State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors (1980) 4 SCC 136.
9
Balco Union Employees’ Union v Union of India & Ors (2002) 2 SCC 333.
10
Southern Structurals Staff Union v Southern Structurals Ltd & Ors (1994) 81 Comp Cas 389.
It is submitted that under the Act, 1971 every Scheduled Undertaking is by virtue of Section 3
‘vested’ under the Corporation.11 The term “vested” cannot be read in a narrow sense rather it
has a broad meaning, it is defined as “having the character or given the rights of absolute
ownership; not contingent, not subjected to be defeated by a condition precedent.”12
Additionally, the right to transfer such ownership subsumes an absolute dominion over the
property in all respects.13 Further, ownership is a sum total of various subordinate rights 14
which gives it a very extensive ambit to cover closure and change of land use.15
It is contended that since there is not conflict between the State Act, 1971 and Central Act,
1951, therefore, the Corporation even if amenable to the authority and jurisdiction of Act,
1951 is vested with the absolute right to exercise its ownership.
[3.2] THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT ACT IS IN PITH AND SUBSTANCE IN
RELATION TO MANAGEMENT OF THE MILLS.
It is submitted before the court that each Entry in the three Lists of Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution must be construed as widely as possible. It is a well settled principle that when
some of the Entries in the different Lists or in the same List overlap or may appear to be in
direct conflict with each other, it is the duty of the Court to reconcile the Entries and bring
about harmony between them.16
Supposing but not conceding, if the State and the Central Act were in conflict, it is submitted
that the regard must be given to the enactment as a whole from its objects to the scope and
effect of its provision.17 The act of the State Government in totality highlights the bona-fide
intent to overcome the set-back from the recurrent losses which was affecting the economy of
the State at large.18 Therefore, if somehow there is any incidental trespass to the Central Act,
1951 the same has to considered under the Doctrine of Pith and Substance and duly done
away with.19“
A thing is incidental to another if it merely appertains to something else as primary. Surely,

such work should not be extraneous or contrary to the purpose of the establishment but need
not be integral to it either. 20” In the present case the enactment of provisions Section 3-C and
11
The Uttar Pradesh Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971 s. 2(c).
12
Mst. Bibi Sayeeda & Ors v State of Bihar & Ors (1996) 9 SCC 516.
13
Mohd Noor & Ors v Mohd Ibrahim & Ors (1994) 5 SCC 562.
14
Ibid.
15
Indar Sen & Anr v Naubat Singh & Ors ILR (1885) 7 All 553.
16
M/s Siel Ltd v Union of India AIR 1998 SC 3076.
17
Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheik v State of Maharashtra & Ors (2010) 5 SCC 246.
18
Moot Proposition ¶2.
19
State of Karnataka v Ranganatha Reddy AIR 1978 SC 215.
20
Royal talkies Hyderabad and others v Employee State Corporation 1978 (4) SCC 204.
3-D are incidental because the management of mills was done by FPSSCL and its
21
subsidiaries and the act of closure and changing the land use is related to the management
and forms a part of it.
Therefore, the application of the Doctrine of Pith and Substance (i.e. the true object of the
legislation) even when the State enactment incidentally trespasses into the matters not within
its competence, it should be held intra-vires22 and “every attempt must be made to harmonize
the apparently conflicting Entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to
reject that construction which will rob one of the Entries of its entire content and make it
nugatory.”23
1. Pith and substance

International torism corp v state of Haryana
fn balsara case
substantial and incidental
2. Legal fiction
3. Section 18 and section 3d link.
21
Moot proposition para 2.
22
Union of India v HS Dhillon AIR 1972 SC 1061.
23
Calcutta Gas Company Ltd v State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

[ISSUE 3] THAT SECTION 3-C AND 3-D OF FOSTERS PRADESH UNDERTAKING

LEGISLATIVE FIELD OF THE PARLIAMENT UNDER ENTRY 52 LIST I.

RELATION TO MANAGEMENT OF THE MILLS.

A thing is incidental to another if it merely appertains to something else as primary. Surely,

1. Pith and substance

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