1

Rule 17 – Dismissal of Actions when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent
court an action based on or including the same claim.
Sec.1 Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff Under this provision, it is mandatory that the trial court issue an
order confirming such dismissal and, unless otherwise stated in the notice,
Dael v. Spouses Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008 the dismissal is without prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff
through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to approval
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice
Procedure raising pure questions of law, and seeking a reversal of the Resolution dated unless otherwise stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to
May 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, Negros Oriental, consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such
Dumaguete City, in Civil Case No. 13072, which dismissed with prejudice, petitioner’s dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of the ground.
complaint for breach of contract and damages against the respondents. Also assailed is Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismiss they filed
the trial court’s Resolution dated December 5, 2002, denying petitioner’s motion for precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed by petitioner and hence, the trial court
reconsideration. correctly gave it precedence and ruled based on the motion.

Petitioner's Claim: Ruling: YES, Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. The
1) Respondents’ non-disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted provision specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of dismissal before
breach of contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided under service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon the filing of the
Article 1547 of the New Civil Code. Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents became
2) He was entitled to damages because he had to pay for the property moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the case without
twice. prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would
Respondent's Action: erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case
Filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner had no cause of against respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove
action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the otherwise.
vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not the petitioner. Petitioner’s recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is proper. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It
Facts: On November 23, 2001, petitioner Frederick Dael filed before the RTC, is not interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; it leaves nothing more to
Branch 34, Negros Oriental, a Complaint for breach of contract and damages against be done by the lower court. Therefore, the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
respondent-spouses Benedicto and Vilma Beltran. In his complaint, petitioner alleged Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a
that respondents sold him a parcel of land covering three hectares located at decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law.
Palayuhan, Siaton, Negros Oriental and that respondents did not disclose that the land WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
was previously mortgaged. May 28, 2002 and December 5, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Negros
On August 6, 2001, petitioner discovered that an extrajudicial foreclosure Oriental are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that the case is dismissed
over the property had already been instituted, and that he was constrained to bid in the without prejudice.
extrajudicial sale of the land conducted on August 29, 2001. Possession and
ownership of the property was delivered to him when he paid the bid price of P775,100.
Petitioner argued that respondents’ non-disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure Rule 17
constituted breach of contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property as Sec. 1- DISMISSAL BY THE PLAINTIFF
provided under Article 1547 of the New Civil Code. He likewise claimed that he was G.R. No. L-58986 April 17, 1989
entitled to damages because he had to pay for the property twice. DANTE Y. GO vs. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, Judge, etc., CITY SHERIFF OF
On January 10, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground CALOOCAN CITY, and CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,
that petitioner had no cause of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor
was Benedicto Beltran and the vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not the The dismissal of civil actions is always addressed to the sound judgment and
petitioner. discretion of the court; this, (a) whether the dismissal is sought after a trial has been
On February 12, 2002, in a hearing on the motion, Atty. Dirkie Y. Palma, completed or otherwise, (b) whether it is prayed for by a defending party , (c) or by a
petitioner’s counsel, disclosed that petitioner is the father of Frederick George Ghent plaintiff or claimant. There is one instance however where the dismissal of an action
Dael whose name appears as the contracting party in the Contract to Sell dated July rests exclusively on the will of a plaintiff or claimant, to prevent which the defending
28, 2000. Atty. Palma moved to reset the hearing to enable the petitioner to withdraw party and even the court itself is powerless, requiring in fact no action whatever on the
and have the complaint dismissed, amended, or to enter into a compromise agreement part of the court except the acceptance and recording of the causative document. This is
with respondents. dealt with in Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
The RTC on the same day ordered petitioner to clarify whether or not he and SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be
Frederick George Ghent Dael were one and the same person; whether or not they were dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice
Filipinos and residents of Dumaguete City; and whether or not Frederick George Ghent of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a
Dael was of legal age, and married, as stated in the Contract to Sell. Petitioner did not motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the
comply. Instead, he filed a Notice of Dismissal on February 20, 2002 but was dismissed notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice
with prejudice on May 28,2002. operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action
on respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his Notice of based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be
Dismissal, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
a Resolution dated December 5, 2002. FACTS:
Hence, this petition. On October 26, 1981, California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (hereinafter, simply, California)
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dante Go, accusing
Issue: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the Complaint for Breach of Contract and him of unfair competition. [The gravamen of California's complaint was that Dante Go,
Damages based on the Motion to Dismiss filed by herein respondents and not on the doing business under the name and style of "Sugarland International Products," and
Notice of Dismissal promptly filed by herein petitioner before respondents could file a engaged like California in the manufacture of spaghetti, macaroni, and other pasta was
responsive pleading under Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. selling his products in the open market under the brand name, "Great Italian," in
packages which were in colorable and deceitful imitation of California's containers
Arguments of: bearing its own brand, "Royal.”] Its complaint contained an application for preliminary
injunction commanding Dante Go to immediately cease and desist from the further
Petitioner: Citing, Serrano v. Cabrera and Makabulo in his Memorandum, manufacture, sale and distribution of said products, and to retrieve those already being
argues that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that before the offered for sale.
defendant has served his answer or moved for a summary judgment, he has, as a However, on November 12, 1981 (two weeks later), California filed a notice of dismissal
matter of right, the prerogative to cause the dismissal of a civil action filed, and such with the Court.
dismissal may be effected by a mere notice of dismissal. He further argues that such Four days afterwards, or on November 16, 1981, California received by registered mail
dismissal is without prejudice, except (a) where the notice of dismissal so provides; (b) a copy of Dante Go's answer with counterclaim dated November 6, 1981, which had
where the plaintiff has previously dismissed the same case in a court of competent been filed with the Court on November 9, 1981.
jurisdiction; or (c) where the dismissal is premised on payment by the defendant of the On November 19, 1981 a fire broke out at the Manila City Hall destroying among others
claim involved. He asserts it is the prerogative of the plaintiff to indicate if the Notice of the sala of Judge Tengco and the records of cases therein kept, including that filed by
Dismissal filed is with or without prejudice and the RTC cannot exercise its own California against Dante Go.
discretion and dismiss the case with prejudice. On December 1, 1981, California filed another complaint asserting the same cause of
action against Dante Go, this time with the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City. This
Respondent: On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum, second suit was docketed as Civil Case No. C-9702 and was assigned to the branch
counter that the RTC is correct in dismissing the case with prejudice based on their presided over by Judge Fernando A. Cruz.
Motion to Dismiss because they filed their motion on January 10, 2002, ahead of On December 3, 1981, Judge Cruz issued an ex parte restraining order directing "the
petitioner who filed his Notice of Dismissal only on February 20, 2002. They further defendant ... to immediately cease and desist from the further manufacture, sale,
argue that although it is correct that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure a promotion and distribution of spaghetti, macaroni and other pasta products contained in
complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal before service packaging boxes and labels under the name 'GREAT ITALIAN,' which are similar to or
of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment, the petitioner filed the Notice of copies of those of the plaintiff, and ... recall ... all his spaghetti, macaroni and other
Dismissal only as an afterthought after he realized that the Motion to Dismiss was pasta products using the brand, 'GREAT ITALIAN.'"
meritorious. On the day following the rendition of the restraining order, Dante Go filed the present
Further, they point out that petitioner deceived the court when he filed the petition for certiorari, etc. with this Court praying for its nullification and perpetual
action knowing fully well that he was not the real party-in-interest representing himself inhibition. On December 11, 1981, this Court, in turn issued a writ of preliminary
as Frederick George Ghent Dael. Respondents also argue that petitioner’s recourse to injunction restraining California, Judge Cruz and the City Sheriff from enforcing or
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari was not proper since the proper implementing the restraining order of December 3, 1981, and from continuing with the
remedy should have been to file an appeal of the order granting the Motion to Dismiss. hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in said Civil Case No. C-9702. The
He contends that the petitioner should have appealed to the Court of Appeals under scope of the injunction was subsequently enlarged by this Court's Resolution of April
Rule 41 instead of assailing the ruling of the RTC by way of a petition for review on 14,1982 to include the City Fiscal of Manila, who was thereby restrained from
certiorari before the Supreme Court. proceeding with the case of unfair competition filed in his office by California against
As to the propriety of dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, Section 1, Dante Go.
Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Dante Go's thesis is that the case filed against him by California in the Manila Court
SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. – A complaint remained pending despite California's notice of dismissal. According to him, since he
may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at had already filed his answer to the complaint before California sought dismissal of the
any time before service of the answer or of a motion for action three (3) days afterwards, such dismissal was no longer a matter of right and
summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court could no longer be effected by mere notice in accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the
shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise Rules of Court, but only on plaintiff s motion, and by order of the Court; hence, the
stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, Caloocan Court acted without jurisdiction over the second action based on the same
except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits
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cause. He also accused California of forum shopping, of selecting a sympathetic court There was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the
for a relief which it had failed to obtain from another. subject case, because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for dismissing a case
Issue: due to failure to prosecute is present. That the RTC dismissed the application for land
Whether or not the first case filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila has been registration of the petitioner for failure to prosecute after the petitioner presented all its
validly dismissed upon filing of the Notice of Dismissal. evidence and after said court has rendered a decision in its favor, is highly irregular.
Ruling: There is no substantive or procedural rule which requires a witness for a party to
YES. What marks the loss by a plaintiff of the right to cause dismissal of the present some form of authorization to testify as a witness for the party presenting him or
action by mere notice is not the filing of the defendant's answer with the Court her. No law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion that such omission can be
(either personally or by mail) but the service on the plaintiff of said answer or of a considered as a failure to prosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. All
motion for summary judgment. This is the plain and explicit message of the that the Rules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all the qualifications
Rules. "The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders and other papers and none of the disqualifications provided therein. Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
with the court, according to Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, means the delivery provides:
thereof to the clerk of the court either personally or by registered mail. Service, on the SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding
other hand, signifies delivery of the pleading or other paper to the parties affected section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
thereby through their counsel of record, unless delivery to the party himself is ordered to others, may be witnesses.
by the court, by any of the modes set forth in the Rules, i.e., by personal xxxx
service, service by mail, or substituted service. Cavili v. Judge Florendo20 speaks of the disqualifications:
Here, California filed its notice of dismissal of its action in the Manila Court after Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.1âwphi1 Section 19
the filing of Dante Go's answer but before service thereof. Thus having acted well disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or
within the letter and contemplation of the afore-quoted Section 1 of Rule 17 of the immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for
Rules of Court, its notice ipso facto brought about the dismissal of the action disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for
then pending in the Manila Court, without need of any order or other action by the disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not
Presiding Judge. The dismissal was effected without regard to whatever reasons or be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
motives California might have had for bringing it about, and was, as the same Section 1, be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
Rule 17 points out, "without prejudice," the contrary not being otherwise "stated in the x x x The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of
notice" and it being the first time the action was being so dismissed. causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized
There was therefore no legal obstacle to the institution of the second action in the utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or
Caloocan Court of First Instance based on the same claim. The filing of the complaint saving clause excludes other exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167) As a
invested it with jurisdiction of the subject matter or nature of the action. In truth, and general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on
contrary to what petitioner Dante Go obviously believes, even if the first action were still the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. (Sutherland on
pending in the Manila Court, this circumstance would not affect the jurisdiction of the Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 90) The Rules should not be
Caloocan Court over the second suit. The pendency of the first action would merely give interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied.)
the defendant the right to move to dismiss the second action on the ground of auter A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence would show that Ms. Aban is qualified
action pendant or litis pendentia. to testify as a witness for the petitioner since she possesses the qualifications of being
able to perceive and being able to make her perceptions known to others. Furthermore,
she possesses none of the disqualifications described above.
G.R. No. 188956 March 20, 2013 The RTC clearly erred in ordering the dismissal of the subject application for land
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION registration for failure to prosecute because petitioner’s witness did not possess an
BENEFITS SYSTEM, Petitioner, authorization to testify on behalf of petitioner. The court a quo also erred when it
vs. concluded that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly authorized representative
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. of the petitioner. The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
FACTS: Verification/Certification21 of the application, and neither did they question the authority
Petitioner created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, 4 as amended, was of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application on behalf of the petitioner. Case records
designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the would reveal that the application was signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in his capacity as
Armed Forces of the Philippines military retirement system as provided for in Republic the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as authorized
Act No. 340."5 by petitioner’s Board of Trustees. 22 The authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title 6 over three parcels of land located application was established by a Secretary’s Certificate 23 attached to the said
in West Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. These three parcels of land application. The asseveration that the subject case was not prosecuted by a duly
constitute a land grant by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, issued by former authorized representative of the petitioner is thus unfounded.
President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, 1998.7
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta (Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation vs. Explorer Maritime Co.
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was duly authorized to
do so by the Board of Trustees of the petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized Secretary’s FACTS:
Certificate8 dated August 18, 2003.
After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, the court a quo issued an Petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC), as insurer-
order of general default against the whole world, and the petitioner was allowed to subrogee, filed with the RTC of Manila a Complaint against respondents, to wit: the
present evidence ex-parte.9 unknown owner of the vessel M/V "Explorer" (common carrier), Wallem
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice Philippines Shipping, Inc. (ship agent), Asian Terminals, Inc. (arrastre), and
President and Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified, inter alia, that: Foremost International Port Services, Inc. (broker). PCIC sought to recover from the
among her main duties is to ensure that the properties and assets of petitioner, respondents the sum of P342,605.50, allegedly representing the value of lost or
especially real property, are legally titled and freed of liens and encumbrances; the damaged shipment paid to the insured, interest and attorney's fees. On the same date,
subject properties were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under PCIC filed a similar case against respondents Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc.,
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Asian Terminals, Inc., and Foremost International Port Services, Inc., but, this time,
Republic of the Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful the fourth defendant is "the unknown owner of the vessel M/V "Taygetus."
possession and occupation of the subject properties in the concept of an owner to the
exclusion of the world since time immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the Respondents filed their respective answers with counterclaims. PCIC later
Philippines transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, assumed open, filed its answer to the counterclaims. PCIC filed an ex parte motion to set the case for
continuous, exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation, and pre-trial conference, which was granted by the trial court. However, before the
exercised control over them in the concept of owner, and likewise assumed the scheduled date of the pre-trial conference, PCIC filed an Amended Complaint. The
obligations of an owner; petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on the subject "Unknown Owner" of the vessel M/V "Explorer" and Asian Terminals, Inc. filed anew
properties; and the subject properties are not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted. 10 their respective answers with counterclaims.
Finding the Petition meritorious, the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS AND ORDERS the
registration of AFPRSBS’ title thereto. Foremost International Port Services, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss, which
In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration was later denied by the trial court. On December 5, 2000, respondent common carrier,
arguing that the petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its "the Unknown Owner" of the vessel M/V "Explorer," and Wallem Philippines Shipping,
name and the petitioner failed to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that PCIC failed to prosecute its action
to appear for and in its behalf. for an unreasonable length of time. PCIC allegedly filed its Opposition, claiming that
The court a quo dismissed the Application for Registration upon motion of the OSG. the trial court has not yet acted on its Motion to Disclose which it purportedly filed on
ISSUE: November 19, 1997. In said motion, PCIC supposedly prayed for the trial court to order
respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. to disclose the true identity and
Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed whereabouts of defendant "Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V 'Explorer.'" In said
petitioner’s application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to motion, PCIC supposedly prayed for the trial court to order respondent Wallem
prosecute the subject case? Philippines Shipping, Inc. to disclose the true identity and whereabouts of defendant
HELD: "Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V 'Explorer.'"
We answer in the affirmative.
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only The Trial Court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to prosecute for
three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute: an unreasonable length of time. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, PCIC allegedly
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.–If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to realized that its Motion to Disclose was inadvertently filed with Branch 38 of the RTC of
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to Manila, where the similar case involving the vessel M/V “Taygetus” was raffled to, and
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules not with Branch 37, where the present case was pending.
or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant
or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to Thus, PCIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration explaining that its Motion to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall Disclose was erroneously filed with Branch 38. PCIC claimed that the mistake stemmed
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the from the confusion created by an error of the docket section of the RTC of Manila in
court. stamping the same docket number to the simultaneously filed cases. According to PCIC,
Jurisprudence has elucidated on this matter in De Knecht v. CA: 18 it believed that it was still premature to move for the setting of the pre-trial conference
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) with the Motion to Disclose still pending resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was
if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action denied.
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or
any order of the court. Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the On appeal, the CA affirmed the Order of the RTC. The MR filed by PCIC was
effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing also denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. In other words,
unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the ISSUES: Whether or not dismissal was due to the fault of the plaintiff
dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. RULING: YES. On June 27, 2007, this Court required the counsel of the "Unknown
(Emphasis supplied.) Owner" of the vessel M/V Explorer and Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. to submit
Clearly, the court a quo’s basis for pronouncing that the petitioner failed to prosecute its proof of identification of the owner of said vessel. On September 17, 2007, this Court,
case is not among those grounds provided by the Rules. pursuant to the information provided by Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc., directed its
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Division Clerk of Court to change "Unknown Owner" to "Explorer Maritime Co., Ltd." in questioned the lifting of the sequestration orders against defendant corporations.
the title of this case. With these two cases at bay, the counsels for the Republic divided their responsibilities
as follows: Special PCGG Counsel Maria Flora A. Falcon (Falcon) attended to Civil
In affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-73340, the Court of Appeals Case No. 0014, while OSG Senior State Solicitor Derek R. Puertollano (Puertollano)
held that PCIC should have filed a motion to resolve the Motion to Disclose after a handled G.R. No. 154560.
reasonable time from its alleged erroneous filing. PCIC could have also followed up After receiving the Answers, the Sandiganbayan scheduled pretrial dates for Civil Case
the status of the case by making inquiries on the court's action on their motion, No. 0014. However, the court failed to conduct pretrial hearings from 2002 to 2007. For
instead of just waiting for any resolution from the court for more than three years. five years, it reset the hearings in view of the pending incidents, which included G.R. No.
The appellate court likewise noted that the Motion to Disclose was not the only 154560, and because the case "was not yet ripe for a pretrial conference."5
erroneous filing done by PCIC's former counsel, the Linsangan Law Office. The records On 28 June 2007, Civil Case No. 0014 was called for the initial presentation of plaintiff's
of the case at bar show that on November 16, 1997, said law office filed with Branch 37 evidence, but the proceedings did not push through. Finally, two decades after the
a Pre-trial Brief for the case captioned as "Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. inception of the case, both parties moved to set the pretrial and trial hearings on 1, 2,
Unknown Owners of the Vessel MV 'Taygetus', et al., Civil Case No. 95-73340." The firm 29, and 30 October 2007. The Sandiganbayan granted their motions in this wise:6
later filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the same was intended for Civil Case When this case was called for initial presentation of plaintiff's evidence, both parties
No. 95-73341 which was pending before Branch 38. All these considered, the Court of moved for postponement. In the interim, the contract of Falcon with the PCGG
Appeals ruled that PCIC must bear the consequences of its counsel's inaction and terminated on 1 July 2007.8 Through a letter dated 21 September 2007, she informed
negligence, as well as its own. Puertollano that she was no longer connected with the PCGG. She also turned over to
him the records of Civil Case.9 However, Puertollano belatedly received the letter on 8
PCIC claims that the merits of its case warrant that it not be decided on technicalities. October 2007. For all he knew, Falcon had attended the hearings prior to that date,
Furthermore, PCIC claims that its former counsel merely committed excusable while he was pursuing G.R. No. 154560.
negligence when it erroneously filed the Motion to Disclose with the wrong branch of the Thus, on 1 October 2007, no representative appeared on behalf of petitioner.
court where the case is pending. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan issued its 1 October 2007 Order dismissing the case
without prejudice. The court ruled thus:10
The basis for the dismissal by the trial court of Civil Case No. 95-73340 is Section 3, On motion of Atty. Nini Priscilla D. Sison-Ledesma for the dismissal of this case, since
Rule 17 and Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which respectively provide: plaintiff's counsel failed to appear despite due notice and there was no representative
from the plaintiff, this case is ordered DISMISSED without prejudice. However The OSG
Section 3. Dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff. — If, for no belatedly learned the dismissal of the of Civil Case No. 0014. Petitioner brought to the
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation Sandiganbayan's attention the fact that Falcon, who was assigned to Civil Case No.
of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an 0014, had diligently attended to the civil action. But since she was no longer connected
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of to the PCGG, and given that the OSG only learned of this circumstance seven days
the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or after the hearing on 1 October 2007, counsels for petitioner failed to appear during the
upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant hearing.17
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This Hence, petitioner comes before this Court to seek the reinstatement of the 26-year-old
dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits, unless case. Therefore, this Court is tasked to resolve the two issues raised by petitioner as
otherwise declared by the court. follow
xxx xxx xxx ISSUE:
I. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 0014 for the
Section 1. When conducted. — After the last pleading has been failure of petitioner to appear during the hearing.
served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte RULING:
that the case be set for pre-trial. This Court rules in favor of the Republic.
As worded, Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that the court may
In the fairly recent case of Espiritu v. Lazaro in affirming the dismissal of a case for dismiss a complaint in case there are no justifiable reasons that explain the plaintiff's
failure to prosecute on account of the omission of the plaintiff therein to move to set the absence during the presentation of the evidence in chief. Generally speaking, the use of
case for pre-trial for almost one year from their receipt of the Answer, issued several "may" denotes its directory nature,20 especially if used in remedial statutes that are
guidelines in effecting such dismissal: known to be construed liberally. Thus, the word "may" in Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, operates to confer on the court the discretion21 to decide between the
Respondents Lazaro filed the Cautionary Answer with Manifestation and dismissal of the case on technicality vis-à-vis the progressive prosecution thereof.
Motion to File a Supplemental/Amended Answer on July 19, 2002, a copy of In Perez v. Perez, we held thus:
which was received by petitioners on August 5, 2002. Believing that the The records show that every time the case was set for hearing, the plaintiffs and their
pending motion had to be resolved first, petitioners waited for the court to act counsel had always been present; however, the scheduled hearings were either
on the motion to file a supplemental answer. Despite the lapse of almost cancelled by the court motu propio and/or postponed by agreement of the parties, until
one year, petitioners kept on waiting, without doing anything to stir the court the case was eventually set for trial on the merits on February 15, 1967. It was only at
into action. this hearing where the plaintiffs and their counsel failed to appear, prompting the court to
issue its controversial order of dismissal. Considering that it was the first time that the
In any case, petitioners should not have waited for the court to act on the plaintiffs failed to appear and the added fact that the trial on the merits had not as yet
motion to file a supplemental answer or for the defendants to file a commenced, We believe that it would have been more in consonance with the essence
supplemental answer. As previously stated, the rule clearly states that the of justice and fairness for the court to have postponed the hearing on February 15,
case must be set for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Since 1967.
respondents already filed a cautionary answer and [petitioners did not file We are not unmindful of the fact that the matter of adjournment and postponement of
any reply to it] the case was already ripe for pre-trial. trials is within the sound discretion of the court; but such discretion should always be
predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of
It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby.
absent any allegation and proof of the plaintiff's lack of interest to Postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of
prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant resulting dispensing justice.
from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The failure of in this case no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, it
the plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within is sound judicial discretion to allow them.
a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is This Court further considers that based on the records, the contract of the handling
no longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for. lawyer, Falcon, with the PCGG terminated without the knowledge of Puertollano. After
Falcon's resignation, it was only on 5 October 2007 that the case was transferred to the
In this case, there was no justifiable reason for petitioners' failure to file a new lawyer. These facts then explain the nonattendance of petitioner on 1 October
motion to set the case for pre-trial. Petitioners' stubborn insistence that the 2007, and why it failed to keep abreast with the succeeding 2, 29, and 30 October 2007
case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is erroneous. Although petitioners state hearings.
that there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a liberal application Moreover, this Court understands the absence of Puertollano in Civil Case No. 0014.
of the rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that The OSG has explained that he attends to G.R. 154560, as the main case has been
there are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case delegated to the PCGG. We find this arrangement sensible, given that case
unjustified is on petitioners, and they have not adduced any such management is needed to tackle this sensitive case involving a number of high-profile
compelling reason. (Emphases supplied.) parties, sensitive issues and, of course, numerous offshoots and incidents.
Here, we find it incongruous to tip the balance of the scale in favor of a technicality that
In the case at bar, the alleged Motion to Disclose was filed on November 19, 1997. would result in a complete restart of the 26-year-old civil case back to square one.
Respondents filed the Motion to Dismiss on December 5, 2000. By that time, PCIC's Surely, this Court cannot waste the progress of the civil case from the institution of the
inaction was thus already almost three years. There is therefore no question that the complaint to the point of reaching the trial stage. Not only would this stance dry up the
failure to prosecute in the case at bar was for an unreasonable length of time. resources of the government and the private parties, but it would also compromise the
Consequently, the Complaint may be dismissed even absent any allegation and proof of preservation of the evidence needed by them to move forward with their respective
the plaintiff's lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant cases. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage of justice in its truest sense, and considering the
resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The burden is now on exceptional and special history of Civil Case No. 0014, this Court applies a liberal
PCIC to show that there are compelling reasons that would render the dismissal of the construction of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1
case unjustified. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of its cause.26"Adventitious resort to technicality resulting in the dismissal
-petition is denied of cases is disfavored because litigations must as much as possible be decided on the
merits and not on technicalities."27 Inconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice to
REPUBLIC V. ENRIQUEZ its refiling as in this case, merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties.
In the absence of a clear intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief
FACTS: continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the case before the court.28
On 23 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the IN VIEW THEREOF, the 11 March 2008 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Office of the Solicitor petitioner is GRANTED. The 1 October 2007 Order and 25 January 2008 Resolution of
General (OSG), filed a Complaint against respondents. Docketed as Civil Case No. the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) are REVERSED. Consequently, Civil Case No.
0014, this civil action sought the recovery of ill-gotten wealth from respondents for the 0014 is hereby REINSTATED.
benefit of the Republic. Allegedly, these properties were illegally obtained during the
reign of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and, hence, were the subject of
sequestration orders.Thereafter, Civil Case No. 0014 went through a series of inclusions G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014
of individual defendants and defendant corporations. As a result, respondents finished VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.;
filing their separate Answers eight years later, or in 1995. FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL;
In May 1996, some of the defendant corporations filed motions for dismissal. Six years and CATALINO L. IBARRA, Petitioners,
thereafter, the Sandiganbayan resolved the motions. It ruled in favor of defendant vs.
corporations and lifted the sequestration orders against them.2 PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO L.
Aggrieved, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari3 before this IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L.
Court on 23 August 2002. Docketed as G.R. No. 154560,4 the Rule 65 petition IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO
 4
IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is
CANDELARIO,Respondents. whether or not the dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the
merits that would complete the requirements of res judicata.
Facts: In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and Court, to wit:
respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on
Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of a parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717. comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without
to their ten (10) children ownership over the subject property. prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication
partition against petitioners. The case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Tarlac. However, the trial court dismissed the case for failure of the parties, as well as The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a
their counsels, to appear despite due notice. complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on
As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final, the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he
as evidenced by a Certificate of Finality it eventually issued on August 22, 2008. fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure
instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in favor of to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood
the ten (10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order
No. 390484 was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for
the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses. failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order
property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without
By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and prejudice. In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language
an Agreement of Subdivision purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. say that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal
390484 was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the be on the merits is present.
Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion. We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against the above-cited rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. It is, thus,
respondents alleging that during their parents’ lifetime, the couple distributed their real understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster their
and personal properties in favor of their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, they claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time,
likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
possession of the property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable
title thereto. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
by estoppel when one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided share of the Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners common, insofar as his share is concerned.
that the property is not entirely theirs. Respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the
partition of the property. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period
The quieting of title case was eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court. of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
During pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having filed an action for agreement.
partition, that petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served as A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and that the Agreement of Subdivision twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No
that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
was falsified. Despite the admissions of respondents, however, the RTC dismissed so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (emphasis supplied)
petitioners’ complaint. The court declared spouses Candelario as the absolute owners of From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the law generally
the 7/10 portion of the subject lot and ordered the partition of the subject lots between does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested
the herein plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses Candelarios. instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA, pleading portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may
the same allegations they averred in their underlying complaint for quieting of title. demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common.
However, they added that the partition should no longer be allowed since it is already Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
barred by res judicata, respondent siblings having already filed a case for partition that granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
was dismissed with finality, as admitted by respondents themselves during pre-trial. construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the
The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners’ promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle,
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition. which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by
a procedural rule.
This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code, viz:
Issue: Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already barred by res proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are
judicata. consistent with this Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold
Ruling: that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to
No. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment. In their the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on
answer to the counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for partition has whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
already been barred by res judicata. This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same
as to the claim or demand in controversy, between the parties and those privy with parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-owners have
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat been determined with finality by a competent court with jurisdiction or if the court
the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which must have been determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
offered for that purpose and all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. It
precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo, We ruled in the following wise:
final judgment. Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership
whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.
As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian: Thus, on the one hand, a co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the
It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time
put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On the other hand, there is no co-
policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
end to litigation — republicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-
causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and ownership, and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratitude identification of a litigious disposition on Court, which he may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned. Article 1079 of
the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. the Civil Code defines partition as the separation, division and assignment of a thing
The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be vexed twice held in common among those to whom it may belong. It has been held that the fact that
concerning the same cause. Indeed, res judicata is a fundamental concept in the the agreement of partition lacks the technical description of the parties’ respective
organization of every jural society, for not only does it ward off endless litigation, it portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by the same certificate of
ensures the stability of judgment and guards against inconsistent decisions on the same title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each
set of facts. were determined and became separately identifiable.
There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: ( 1) the The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise
formal judgment or order must be final; ( 2) it must be a judgment or order on the Agreement in Civil Case No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent
merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or any showing that said Compromise Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress,
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; ( 3) it must have been the court cannot set aside a judgment based on compromise. It is axiomatic that a
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; compromise agreement once approved by the court settles the rights of the parties and
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the ground of vice of
subject matter and of cause of action. consent or forgery.
In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order No. 36-C settled as well the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued
dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to attend the scheduled hearings. to the parties separately as their proportionate shares therein. Through their subdivision
Respondents likewise admitted that since they no longer appealed the dismissal, the survey plan, marked as Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement and made an integral
ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the subject property in Civil part thereof, the parties segregated and separately assigned to themselves distinct
Case No. 02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the same, and that in both portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was immediately executory, having been
cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent accomplished and completed on December 1, 1971 when judgment was rendered
spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is approving the same. The CA was correct when it stated that no co-ownership exist when
identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and
those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described. (emphasis supplied)
In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata applied because after the
parties executed a compromise agreement that was duly approved by the court, the
 5
different portions of the owners have already been ascertained. Thus, there was no
longer a co-ownership and there was nothing left to partition. This is in contrast with the
case at bar wherein the co-ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting
30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar
preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition of the property through
counterclaim.