1. G.R. No.

L-23079 February 27, 1970

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO vs.

HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal

FACTS: On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present
petitioners, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition
was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the estate of
Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents all-surnamed Cruz, all of
whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. More than two
years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed
executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will,
notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.

Petitioners: They filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the
nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted
by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the
decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. The court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention.
More than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners moved the lower court to set
for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the
late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-
Meñez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed a motion
asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be
permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent. The lower court issued an order
delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in
the will.

Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of respondent court.

The ruling of the lower court: Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that, one who has no compulsory
heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. The lower court must have assumed
that since the petitioner’s nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest
which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is
confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate
succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.

Petitioners: Article 850 of the Civil Code reads that, the statement of a false cause for the institution of
an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. The petitioner’s nephews and
niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of
the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will.

ISSUE: Whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that
the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

RULING: YES.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory
heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the
respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed
what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Her
express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that
statutory scheme. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific
or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Furthermore, the disposition of the free
portion of her estate which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the
children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the
relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the
petitioners.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to
prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. At all
events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate
action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

2. G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, vs. ANDRE BRIMO

FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The
judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

Oppositor: Andre argues that there is denial of his participation in the inheritance. He also contest the
approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not
to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro
Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws. The appellant's
opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G.
Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality.

ISSUE: Whether the testamentary dispositions in the will are valid.

RULING: YES. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns
as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of
certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give the oppositor
another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in
the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force must be
complied with and executed.

Conditional Institution of Heirs: The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this
condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
expressed, is prevented from inheriting. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for Article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to Article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly
valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

3. G.R. No. L-3891 December 19, 1907

ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant, vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:

1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband,
Gumersindo de la Santa.

2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry
anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the
property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and
remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.

3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located,
which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix.
Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the
will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she
alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-
mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure
followed by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper and from that
holding the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena
Morente, appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the conditions imposed by the testatrix is valid.

RULING: The Court denied the petition. The appellant claims that by the mere act of marriage the
husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children
have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides
that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and Article 793 provides that a prohibition against
another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower.

But the question in this case is, did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift
which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is to be observed that by the second clause she
directs that her husband shall not leave her brothers. It is provided in the third clause that he must
continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To
no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the
legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. In other words, there being no express condition
attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be
implied from the context of the will.

4. [G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA

MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in a special
proceeding. The lot was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in
1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children including Johnny (petitioner).

Plaintiff: On August 21, 1989, Maria brought a complaint against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-
heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. It was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)
piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
 3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that
in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey the lot to the
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

Findings during the Pre-trial: On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain
Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-
in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar. However, there was no compliance
with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery.

RTC: On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint on
the ground that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet
arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the
lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.

CA Division: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It ratiocinated that the
evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually
out of the produce of the lot. The punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code,
of seizure of lot and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this
Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over lot.

Defendant: It maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and
the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - that the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be
substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein
private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of the defendants to fulfill their obligation to herein plaintiff shall warrant
the reconveyance of the subject lot to the descendants of the testatrix.

RULING: Yes. The petition is not impressed with merit. The petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily,
the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to
the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being
demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a
cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution.
In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of
the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or
be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does
not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix
imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest. However, the testatrix
did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not
complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

5. G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905

CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA vs. MARIA JUANA UGARTE E ITURRALDE

FACTS: Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana
Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no
legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner
presented herself as a collateral descendant — that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. The
petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings
were instituted, and she was declared, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased. In
the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed
one-half of all of the estate of the deceased. The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree
of succession as Maria. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son of Maria Josefa
Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

Manual Josefa
Iturralde Gonzalez

Maria Ramon Maria

Juana Iturralde y Josefa
Iturralde y Gonzalez Iturralde y
Gonzalez Gonzalez

Maria Pablo
Juana Linart
Ugarte
Iturralde

Carmen
Linart
Plaintiff: Although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde
y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart,
by representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the
estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana.

RULING: No. After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative nearest in degree
excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921,
par. 1 of the Civil Code); and (2) that the right of representation in the collateral line shall take place
only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).

The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was
entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place
in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a
daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a
sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart,
had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria
Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the
estate corresponding to her father's.

The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take into consideration and
give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the children for the heirs first named by
him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as included in the term "children," unless they are
expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of
the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain
beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

6. G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO vs. ANA DEL VAL, ETC.

FACTS: Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence at Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of
each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza,
who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before
Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses. Among the many legacies and
devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece
named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo
building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the
legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was
not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Petitioner: Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had
no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene
as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera. The oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was
the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. The probate court rendered its
decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico
void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession.

ISSUES: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she
acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

RULING: Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in
the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected
by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee
of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and
while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of
it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion
of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she was a legal heir of the
deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. The law does not give her any right to succeed to the
estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father. The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter
and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child
except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and
the collaterals of the adopting parents.

The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not
extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be
considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not
extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this
probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate.
Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly
attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her
signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this
respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for
she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the
attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other
witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the
witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who
asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later
to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution
of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the
will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the
witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the
testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly
executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in
the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence.
On this point the court a quo made the following observation:

The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is
no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue
influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her
witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence
of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May
17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet
they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had
she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and
express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses,
the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and
accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to
exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution
of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from
her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses
had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the
occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence
must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate
the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such
influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a
will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained
in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for
the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it
does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the
law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental
doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be
punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals.
(Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed
with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the
only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has
no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil.
426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the
legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess
of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was
not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor
of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set
aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs.
7. G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE
DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES

FACTS: On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen and Kamille Oanes-Wei, represented by
their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration. Private respondents alleged
that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City
on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal
properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina,
George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.

Petitioner: He prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts
and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. He
further alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished by reason of Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

RTC: The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of
right occurred. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their
successional rights.

RULING: The petition lacks merit. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince intent to abandon a right. In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary
rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It
merely states that Remedios received P300, 000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by
way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind”.
Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. Moreover, even assuming
that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the
latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code which provides that parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and
will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. In the present case,
private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to
prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the
same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the
Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was
Article 285 of the Civil Code, stating that if the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws,
it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of
the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in
proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has
been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts.

8. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin, G.R. No. L- 27860-27896 | 1974-03-29

Facts: Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During their
marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in
Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50
years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral
expenses, to her husband Charles. Should Charles die the will provided that the remainder of her estate
shall go to her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die
before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceased’s
sibling’s place. When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor,
then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family
business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes. Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her
heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have
Roy’s name included. As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was
administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule
"M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing
the will". On the question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he
answered: “None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and
interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.”

Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes her
share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed
Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles). Magno was appointed,
but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special
Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also
appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration were issued to
Hodges and Mirasol. Much much later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a
claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s death.
Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs would be prejudiced, so she continued acting
in her capacity as administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these acts, the
PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ estate, to which she responded by locking up the
premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s properties.

PCIB’s Claims: Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions.
Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will. Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved
and applied in the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply. Under Philippine and Texas
law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between
them.
Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their
conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as
partner in the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnie’s estate,
cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings,
rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. “All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate
as he may need or desire."

Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or
descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2)
of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly
affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of
her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886). In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s estate,
Charles appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business
and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just
as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his
death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control,
and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets. As the sole
and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate. Neither was there any asset left to
Linnie’s estate at the time of Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate” which would go to her siblings in the event of Charles death. The
provision is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.

There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil Code
(Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will
of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the
part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. At
most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that a vulgar or simple substitution can be
valid, three alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die
before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do
so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the
above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa
even said, “when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second
designation can have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not
that was the true intention of said testator.”
Avelina’s Claims: Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and
gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate, to her relatives. After Linnie’s
death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and
written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate
and usufruct. Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles in the
combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’
repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments and
income.

Issue:
1. Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings void? – NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? – REMAND!

Ruling:
1.To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s testamentary substitution, when viewed as a
substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Linnie’s will provides neither
for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution because there is no provision for
either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to
accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution
therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof
for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that
the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the
light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV,
Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so
that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the
present case, no such possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or
may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also
heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory
insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and
sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter
vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what
might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as
the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the
event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.

Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in
Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although
the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his
disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself.
The Court saw no legal impediment to this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime
of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no
surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIB’s claims that he had adjudicated to
himself all of Linnie’s estate. While he may have used language like “herein executor (being) the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated…
there is no other person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account
to be given notice,” he would’ve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very
motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He even moved to include Roy’s name
included in the probate court’s order, lest Roy’s heirs think that they had been omitted.

Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wife’s estate from his own share of the
conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than 5 years after that of his wife. He never
considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one
can gather from this is that he could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his
wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his
lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return
in the US. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the
Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his
recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his
wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her
sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon
the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such
remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due
time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles’ intentions several questionnaires in solemn forms in
filing estate taxes abroad, though they have not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to
several times by the parties.

It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in settling Linnie’s estate, and his sole administration
of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making it difficult to properly make an accounting of
their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its own. What would be just and proper is
for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated
from each other.

2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be applied. On the one
hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her death,
under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi,
what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her
estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as
already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have disposed of nor
burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie died a resident of
the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth
in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her
residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for
any legitime, hence, Linnie’s brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share
of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in
any event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven
by the documents touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal
significance of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the parties
appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. No
clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented
(Remember judicial notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the genuineness of documents relied
upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other
relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter to be
held for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her
heirs in accordance with her duly probated will. Linnie’s estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal
partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws of
Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since
PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the
other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them
or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them.

The only questions that remain to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) Whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no
legitime provided therein
(2) Whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at
least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges
spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Charles after
Linnie’s death, from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent
documents as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his
own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a
long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals,
corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of
Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December
11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the
jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife;

(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the
properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products of "physical
changes" of the properties of her estate which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided
that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should
go to her brothers and sisters;

(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only
the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the administrator of the estate of
Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could
such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal
partnership automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her
brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration.
Accordingly, these constructions of Linnie’s will should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order
of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question.
9. G.R. No. L-25913 February 29, 1969

HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners, vs. APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on
October 26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the
petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating
circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender. Both respondent and petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent asking that appellate, court acquit him and petitioners
praying, on the other hand, that respondent be convicted of murder, that the portion regarding what said
respondent will receive from the GSIS be deleted and that he be ordered to pay petitioners "the
aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity and actual, moral, temperate and exemplary damages." The
Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying that of the trial court insofar as it concerned that in view
of the presence of two mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating one to offset them, the award
of moral and compensatory damages should be eliminated. From this amended decision, only petitioners
have appealed to Us.

RULING: We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We grant fully the prayer in the petition. In
the instant case, recovery of such damages is being sought in the criminal proceedings but even if it
were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be the same, for generally, the items of
damages are identical in both procedures, except with respect to attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil action is instituted. It is to be noted that in
the matter of damages, the original decision of the Court of Appeals, while correct in making a
particularization in the award of indemnity and damages, nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with
the constitutional requirement that all decisions of courts of record must state both the facts and
the law on which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII, Constitution)

Indeed, it must have been this failure to refer to the pertinent legal provisions which induced the
appellate court, at the mere invocation by respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error
of readily eliminating in the amended decision the items on moral damages and compensation for loss of
earning of the decedent which its original decision had correctly contained. Having held that it had
discretion in the premises, the court easily yielded to the argument that simply because it had credited
the respondent with two mitigating circumstances, it was already justified in eliminating the items of
damages already adverted to, presumably having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides that:

In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to

the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the quoted provision does
not warrant a complete deletion of said items of damages. In any event the court evidently failed to take
into account that several other provisions can come into play considering the circumstances in this case.

Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of
damages:

1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense — P12,000.00, without the need of any
evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the offense.

2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased — an amount to be fixed by the
Court according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the time of
death and his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the
court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said time on account of
permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support,
under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the
accused for not more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.

3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be
recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.

4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating

circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered
separate from fines.

5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, — the actual amount thereof, (but only when a
separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are
awarded).

6. Interests in the proper cases.

7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and for
moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these damages may, however,
be respectively increased or lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.

The heirs entitled to the civil indemnity are the intestate heirs of the deceased in the order of intestate
succession. The term "heirs" includes testamentary heirs. The heirs, whether testate or intestate, are a
continuation of the juridical personality of the decedent. The award of moral damages to the surviving
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants of the deceased, should be made to each
of them individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental anguish and the depth or
intensity of the same. Where it is shown that one or some did not suffer mental anguish or could not
have suffered the same, no award of moral damages should be made to him or to them.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in eliminating in its
amended decision, the items of moral damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased.
10. G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,

REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband,
CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had
married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claim to be their children. On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo
were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation. Both cases were
decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. Doribel was their
legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. Consequently, the
three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In his decision
dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the
defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned
evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision the
respondent court ruled that the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Petitioner: The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued
on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting; that Doribel herself is
not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who
manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother.

Issue: Whether the adoption of Delia and Edmundo should be annulled on the ground that Teodoro and
Isabel already had a legitimate daughter.

Ruling : On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree
of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the
petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be
faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of
the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement
in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never
offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in
line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for
that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who
the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of
her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have
directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents
were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relatives of either party.
11. [G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000] OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, petitioner,
vs. PASTORA PIEDAD, respondent.

FACTS: On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special
Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H.
Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the
order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the
proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice
of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion,
prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding
merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but
questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.

Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC
erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest
over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of
the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and
terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the
jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:

"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in
dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of
Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such,
intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad; that the notice of hearing was
published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order of
closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the intestate court has already
issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.

Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the
alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a
collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third
civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among
collateral relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal
aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
 The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to
govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a
person upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system
set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division
between the paternal and maternal lines."

By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law,
"raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not
from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.

"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited."

"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded."

In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending,
line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.

"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the full or half blood."

"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per
stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the
person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."

"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall
inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
 The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree"
(to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference
following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and
ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly,
the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in
the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the
degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives
direction.

"Article 966. x x x

"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person
with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother,
three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."

Accordingly

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code

"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship
by the whole blood."

"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in
the collateral line." -

invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other
collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be observed
"by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a
paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood,
but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the
fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree
relative.