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2006 IEEE PES Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition Latin America, Venezuela

Regulatory Mechanisms to Mitigate the

Vulnerability of Power Systems to Blackouts
O. P. Veloza, and R. H. Cespedes, Senior Member, IEEE

blackouts and to establish the actions applicable to maintain a

reliable operation was performed.
This study focuses on the transmission system reliability,
study in order to determine the vulnerability of electric systems to given that most of the available literature is dedicated to the
this type of incidents, and to establish the applicable actions to
causes and recommendations related to high voltage grids and
maintain a reliable operation. The study presented in this paper is
based on the lessons learned about prevention and management because of their major impacts on power systems.
from the most representative incidents worldwide, as well as from
the regulations governing reliability and relevant aspects in some II. CASE ANALYSIS
countries. The analysis of international experiences is centered on
For nine major blackouts that occurred in the world during
the revision of nine major incidents that occurred in the world
during the last decade, their comparison and classification, the the last decade [1]-[12], the conditions previous to those
recognition of the conditions previous to the blackouts and the incidents, the available reaction times, and their causes were
available reaction times, as well as the verification of the causes of verified. The main characteristics of the incidents also were
said incidents. The most important subjects about regulatory analyzed, compared and classified.
mechanisms to be emphasized to avoid the occurrence or
minimizing the impact of blackouts are identified and a revision A. Blackout Previous Conditions and Reaction Times
about those topics in some representative international Table I shows some conditions before the start of the
regulations is carried out. The paper concludes by establishing
studied blackouts, the hour in which the sequence of events
main deficiencies found in regulations related to the vulnerability
of the power systems and suggesting concrete regulatory actions began, and the time the operators had to react until there was
that may solve the deficiencies found. no form to avoid them.
It is observed that transmission lines and generators under
Index Terms--Power system faults; Power system monitoring; maintenance were among the preexisting conditions for four of
Power system protection; Power system reliability; Power system the studied blackouts. Regarding reaction times, for three of
security; Power system stability. the incidents with available information, the operators had
between 30 minutes and four hours to take appropriate actions
I. INTRODUCTION
to avoid or minimize the blackout consequences.

I N the last ten years, several blackouts catalogued as very

serious occurred in Europe, North America, South
America, and Asia. Only in 2003, five major blackouts with
TABLE I
PREVIOUS CONDITIONS AND REACTION TIMES
Reaction
Blackout Previous Conditions Start Hour
worldwide repercussion and important economic, social and Time
North America - Normal temperature
even political consequences were reported. These incidents November 9, 1965 - Normal load level
17:16 Few minutes
affect the commercial and industrial sectors; in the social level North America
- High temperature 14:24 One minute
July 2, 1996
they affect the population well-being, the security, the North America
- High temperature 15:48 One hour
entertainment, the educative and cultural activities, etc., and in August 10, 1996
Brazil - Normal temperature
the political level they generate distrust and credibility loss in March 11, 1999 - Normal load level
22:16 N.a.
the governments and are a direct cause of the loss of prestige Iran
- High load level
- Some plants and transmission 21:20 N.a.
of the involved electrical companies. March 31, 2003
lines out of service
Knowing these consequences and the importance of London - Two transmission lines out of
18:11 Few minutes
August 28, 2003 service
preventing this type of incidents to occur in any country a - Five transmission lines and
study to determine the vulnerability of electric systems to Denmark and Sweden
four generation units out of
service 12:30 Few minutes
September 23, 2003
- Normal temperature
- Normal load level
R. H. Cespedes is associate professor at the National University of - Normal temperature
Italy
- High power transfers toward 3:01 Half and hour
Colombia and Director Latin America with KEMA Inc., Bogotá. (e-mail: September 28, 2003
the country
[email protected]). - High temperature
O. P. Veloza obtained her M.Sc. E.E. degree of the National University of North America - High load level
12:15 Four hours
Colombia and is Analyst Engineer at KEMA Inc., Bogotá. (e-mail: August 14, 2003 - Some generators and five
[email protected]). capacitor banks out of service

1-4244-0288-3/06/$20.00 ©2006 IEEE

 2

B. Causes of the Blackouts largest amount of load was lost and is also the one reporting
The analysis of the blackout causes lead to the following: the longest duration. The more localized blackout with the
- The incorrect operation of protection elements was the fewest customers affected, was the blackout occurred in
predominant factor, in five incidents, and a factor that London in the same year.
accelerated the system outage for two additional ones. Other two indices used to study the incidents were Affected
Inadequate operation was reported in an additional one. Population (%) that run out of electricity due to the blackout
- The contact of lines with trees by inadequate vegetation (1), and Severity (System - minute) (2) [1]. These are
trimming was a common element for four of the incidents. calculated as,
Number of customers without service
- The inadequate defense or load shedding plans were Affected Population (%) = × 100 (1)
Population of the affected country(ies)
reported for three incidents, while design problems were
evidenced for two additional ones. Energy not served (MWh)
- Deficiencies in voltage stability support and the supplying S everity (System - minute) = ( 2)
Base of Power (MW)
of reactive power appeared in four of the incidents.
- The lack of inspection and maintenance programs, as well TABLE II
INDICATORS (PART I)
as inadequate system sizing criteria were reported for one of
the blackouts. In general, the reports call for more robust Customers without
Lost Load
Blackout Service Time Duration
networks to minimize the impact. (MW)
(Number)
- Absence of the sense of urgency before the situation North America
30.000.000 20.000 More than 13 hours
November 9, 1965
degraded, as well as communication failures and regulatory
North America
2.000.000 11.850 30 minutes to some hours
and institutional problems were reported in two incidents. July 2, 1996
- The reliability organizations not bringing the necessary North America
7.500.000 28.000 Few minutes to 9 hours
August 10, 1996
support, the operators’ inadequate training, information Brazil
75.000.000 24.731 Up to 4 hours
technology problems, and partial visibility of the transmission March 11, 1999
Iran
system were reported in one of the incidents. The lack of March 31, 2003
22.000.000 7.063 8 hours
generation reserves was also evident in another one. London
410.000 724 37 minutes (0.62 hours)
These results are summarized in the following graph: August 28, 2003
Denmark and Sweden
Reliability Organizations 4.000.000 6.550 5 hours
Reserves September 23, 2003
Support
Global visibility of the Italy
57.000.000 24.000 5 to 9 hours
system September 28, 2003
Protection elements North America 16 to 72 hours in United States
IT Problems 50.000.000 61.800
August 14, 2003 and up to 192 hours in Canada
Sizing

M aintenance The classification of incidents according to the Severity

Regulatory and level is as follows:
institutional problems TABLE III
DISTURBANCE SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION
Classification Severity
Training, Remedial Interpretation
Communication (Level) (System – minute)
Actions
0 <1 Acceptable
1 1 to 10 Not severe
Design 2 10 to 100 Severe
3 100 to 1000 Very severe
4 >1000 Catastrophic
Voltage and reactives Vegetation

Fig. 1. Causes of analyzed blackouts

Table IV shows the indicators for each one of the nine
C. Characteristics of the Studied Blackouts incidents, and the blackouts’ classification as per Table III.
The indices analyzed correspond to Number of Customers N.a. indicates that there was no available information for some
without Service, Lost Load (MW), Blackout Time Duration, incidents.
Affected Population (Percentage of total country population), From the calculated indices it is clear that the blackout of
and Severity (System-minute). Italy was the most severe, with 100% of Affected Population
Table II shows the indicators corresponding to the first and a Severity Level of 3, ranking it as Very severe. The next
three indices for each one of the nine incidents analyzed. severe one is the blackout of Brazil, with the same Severity
These figures were determined from the blackout final analysis Level but with Affected Population of 44,6%. The North
reports. American blackout in 2003 had an Affected Population of
It is observed that the blackout that affected the largest 15,5% and a Severity Level of 2.
amount of customers occurred in Brazil, followed by the In order to have a graphical presentation of the results a
blackout of Italy, and the blackout of North America in suggested way to present the blackouts is shown in Fig. 2. The
August, 2003. This last incident was the event in which the six blackouts with data are shown there, using a logarithmic
 3

scale for the Severity in the Y-axis, and presenting the III. MAIN ASPECTS ABOUT RELIABILITY
Affected Population in the X-axis. From left to right the The revision of the final reports showed that the causes and
blackouts of London, North America, Denmark and Sweden, recommendations are directly related to reliability problems.
Iran, Brazil and Italy are represented. This indicated the need to review the regulations governing
TABLE IV
this subject in some countries.
INDICATORS (PART II) The selected ones were: In Europe UCTE (Union for the
Blackout
Affected Population Severity Classification Coordination of Transmission of Electricity) [13] and Nordel
(%) (System – minute) (Level)
(entity for the cooperation between the Transmission System
North America
November 9, 1965
14,12 N.a. N.a. Operators of the Nordic countries) [14], in South America
North America
0,68 N.a. N.a. Argentina [15], and in North America NERC (North American
July 2, 1996
North America
Electric Reliability Council) [16].
2,54 N.a. N.a.
August 10, 1996 The case analysis and the revision of the international
Brazil regulations have permitted to establish the main aspects
44,65 117 3
March 11, 1999
Iran regarding reliability that are relevant to be treated by
32,22 30 2
March 31, 2003 regulations to avoid the occurrence of possible blackouts or at
London
August 28, 2003
5,43 2 1 least to diminish their impact. The following gives a
Denmark and Sweden
27,86 33 2
description of those aspects, which were classified in five main
September 23, 2003
Italy
thematics: Human factors (HF), Information systems (IS),
100,00 225 3
September 28, 2003 System restoration (SR), Maintenance (M), and Planning and
North America Operation (PO).
15,51 28 2
August 14, 2003
A. Human Factors (HF)
In addition, to enhance the classification of the blackouts, a 1) Training Regulation
color code based on the relation between those two indices is The control center operator training, the obligatory
proposed. The transition from a yellow color for less impact existence of a training program and a permanent training
blackout with a trend towards red for the most serious is record must be considered essential. Also the amount of
proposed. Table V shows the meaning given to each color. annually training and its duration, trainers qualifications, the
training subjects, and the evaluation procedures to verify the
knowledge assimilation by the operators must be regulated.
Likewise the use of tools such as Operator Training
Simulators (OTSs) to allow the operator to face emergency
conditions, and the use of simulator models that match the real
time conditions have to be considered.
2) Staff Certification Regulation
The regulation must establish certification procedures for
the control center operators involving the approval of a
proficiency test certifying their capability to handle reliability
related issues.
B. Information Systems Regulation (IS)
Fig. 2. Severity vs. Affected Population
1) State Estimator and Contingency Analysis
TABLE V The regulation must establish the obligatory use of state
PROPOSED COLOR CODE estimator and contingency analysis in real time as basic
Color Meaning analysis tools of the control centers. The entire system plus
international interconnections has to be modeled to the
Low impact: It corresponds to Low Severity blackouts and a Low
percentage of Affected Population necessary extent allowing monitoring the elements neighboring
Middle – Low impact: It corresponds to Middle Severity blackouts networks that could directly impact system reliability. The
and a Low percentage of Affected Population, or Low Severity model must be timely updated.
blackouts and a Middle percentage of Affected Population
Middle impact: It corresponds to Middle Severity blackouts and a The state estimator observability must be system wide and
Middle percentage of Affected Population, High Severity blackouts it must run every thirty seconds or faster.
and a Low percentage of Affected Population, or Low Severity
blackouts and a High percentage of Affected Population 2) Screens
Middle – High impact: It corresponds to High Severity blackouts and The regulation has to mention the requirements that the
a Middle percentage of Affected Population, or Middle Severity control centers must meet about visualization screens to allow
blackouts and a High percentage of Affected Population
operators to easily detect changes in the power system state.
High impact: It corresponds to High Severity blackouts and a High
percentage of Affected Population
3) Alarms
The regulation must address the requirements that have to
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be met by the alarming systems, indicating the existence of a contingency situations, and consider load shedding to avoid
notification mechanism to the operators in case the main voltage collapses. These actions must be included in the
alarming system fails, as well as the means to easily identify emergency system operation procedures.
the equipment with problems, and the alarms priority scheme. It must also indicate the planning of reactive reserves by
The alarms handling by the system under the most severe zones, and that the reactive power be generated near
emergency must also be established. consumption points.
4) Continuous Upgrade of IT Systems 2) Emergency Plans
The regulation must establish the convenience to use The regulation must mention the need to develop an
emerging technologies such as Synchronized Phasor obligatory emergency plan and that the operation demonstrates
Measurements as a mean to improve system reliability, and compliance with the performance plan for emergencies.
benefit-cost studies must demonstrate the applicability of 3) Manual Load Shedding
systems such as WAMS (Wide Area Measurement Systems), The regulation must indicate procedures for an obligatory
[19]-[24], enhancing the grid real time monitoring. manual load shedding plan to be applied during emergency
5) Redundant telecommunication systems cases.
6) Communications during emergencies 4) Distance Protection Relays
7) Exchange of information between areas or systems The regulation has to be specific about the technical
requirements that the distance protection relays must meet. It
C. System Restoration Regulation (SR)
has to establish the minimum value of the current detected by
1) Restoration Plan relays in zone 3 so that they do not act on overloads during
The regulation must establish that the control centers follow
emergencies. Another option to prevent undesirable operation
a restoration scheme, it must further indicate its periodic
of these relays is to link them with information obtained from
verification, and the need to train the operation personnel in its
remote sites confirming the action as necessary.
implementation.
5) Electrical Islanding
2) Relays Operation During the System Restoration The regulation must indicate the controlled separation of
The regulation must indicate that synchronism checking
the system in electrical islands with enough generation during
relays have to be installed to supervise the automatic reclosing
serious emergencies, preventing as far as possible the amount
and manual closing, and the adjustments of these relays to
of affected customers and reducing the service restoration
avoid potential problems during reclosing.
time. It must establish to carry out studies to define the
The regulation must establish the periodic review of the
separation criteria, the number of islands, the opening points,
constrains regarding phase angles preventing the line reclosing
and the approaches for re-synchronization.
during emergencies addressing the adjustment of the
6) Security Criterion (N-1)
synchronism checking relays, and the required alternative The regulation must indicate that the operation procedures
means to allow the direct closing of critical interconnections to and the training addressing multiple contingencies, and the
maintain stability during emergencies. convenience to review the N-1 criterion if applicable to the
3) Black Start and House Load Operation power system. It must also address the requirements for new
The regulation must include the capacity of starting from
ties with other countries, and the analyses required to
collapse conditions among the services that generators must
determine meeting reliability criterion of N-2 or N-3.
provide. It has also to address the need to have sufficient
7) Dynamic Models
number of units to restore the system in case of a large event, The regulation must indicate the obligatory nature of
and to determine suitable locations. The periodic obligatory carrying out periodic tests to generation units upon failures to
evaluation of this capacity must also be regulated. know their dynamic behavior.
D. Maintenance Regulation (M) The generation unit dynamic models must be carefully
1) Vegetation Management established with the purpose of reviewing, validating and
The regulation must be specific about the periodic updating their dynamic characteristics, since they must
maintenances required to insure security distances. A periodic consider the variation of their behavior during any operating
program of vegetation management must be formulated. condition.
2) Relay Maintenance 8) Interruptible Customers
The regulation must require the periodic adjustment, The regulation must specify measures of demand
maintenance and testing of the protection relays, their management during emergencies to improve system reliability,
calibration and verification of settings, and the documentation establishing measures such as agreements with interruptible
of those procedures. customers, to put them in practice during emergency
3) Maintenance coordination situations.
9) SCADA and Communication Security
E. Planning and Operation Regulation (PO) The regulation must establish the obligatory nature to
1) Reactive Power Management and Voltage Control implement the necessary measures to maintain the security in
The regulation must establish system bus voltages during the SCADA system, and in the communications, preventing
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the accesses of non-authorized operations to the SCADA TABLE VII

FAIRLY REGULATED SUBJECTS
systems. This must include the handling of users
Regulation
authentication, passwords, use of security related hardware and Thematic Subjects about reliability
UCTE NOR. ARG. NERC
software with firewalls and on-line detection of computer PO Technical requirements of the
system virus. × ×
supervision and control system
10) Permanent verification of the protection system PO Grid stability × ×
11) Under frequency load shedding HF Staff certification × ×
12) Redundant telecommunication systems State estimator and contingency
IS × ×
analysis
13) Upgrade of information for planning and operation
IS Alarms × ×
14) Communications during emergencies
Relays operation during the
15) Regulation Reserves SR × ×
system restoration
16) Specification of functions for reliability entities Continuous upgrade of IT
17) Technical requirements of the supervision and control IS
systems × ×
system PO Interruptible customers ⊗ ×
18) Grid stability PO Back up control center × ⊗
19) Back up control center
In addiction, the color code of the main identified causes of
IV. ANALYSIS OF REGULATIONS AND RESULTS the blackouts shown in Fig. 1 is kept in the following table to
The verification of the treatment given to the aspects highlight those regulatory aspects that are related to them.
identified in the previous section by the examined regulations
governing reliability was carried out and its results are TABLE VIII
presented in Tables VI to VIII with the following conventions: POORLY OR NON - REGULATED SUBJECTS
Regulation
"×" means that the regulation addresses the identified subject, Thematic Subjects about reliability
UCTE NOR. ARG. NERC
"⊗" denotes detailed treatment, “blank” indicates the lack of SR House load operation ×
regulation. PO SCADA and communication security ×
This allows their classification in those aspects Strongly M Relay maintenance ×
regulated, Fairly regulated, and Poorly or not regulated, as IS Screens ×
well as to identify the main strengths and weaknesses of the PO Dynamic models
M Vegetation management
regulations in relation to reliability. PO Distance protection relays
TABLE VI
STRONGLY REGULATED SUBJECTS The tables above show that some aspects such as distance
Regulation
Thematic Subjects about reliability protection relays, vegetation management and dynamic models
UCTE NOR. ARG. NERC
associated to the causes that are common to most of the
SR Restoration plan ⊗ × × ⊗
SR Black start × × × ×
blackouts are not regulated. In addition the relay maintenance
PO Reactive power management and and the screens, also related to the causes of blackouts, are
× × × ×
voltage control poorly or not regulated.
PO Emergency plans ⊗ × × ⊗ The human factor impact on system reliability is heavy.
PO Manual load shedding × × × × Although addressed in some regulations, their participation as
PO Electrical islanding × × × × a main cause of blackouts may indicate the need to revise such
PO Security criteria × × × × regulations to emphasize additional training in particular for
PO Permanent verification of the
× × × × emergency and restoration conditions, and make the
protection system
PO Under frequency load shedding × × × × certification processes stricter.
Redundant telecommunication A key factor to avoid the occurrence of blackouts is that
IS, PO × × × ×
systems operators have sufficient high quality information about the
M Maintenance coordination × × × × system state. Deficiencies about some aspects related to
PO Upgrade of information for
× × × × information systems, specially about the tools of network
planning and operation
Communications during analysis, visualization screens, and alarms have been detected.
IS, PO × × × × Counting on suitable maintenance procedures and to
emergencies
PO Regulation reserves × × × × implement them appropriately is fundamental to prevent
IS Event record systems × × × × blackouts, given that it has been demonstrated that they are
Exchange of information related to the main detected causes. Improvements in relation
IS × × ×
between areas or systems
to the vegetation trimming, and maintenance of protection
HF Training × × ⊗
PO Specification of functions for relays are mandatory.
× × × In order to get the proper system operation and to avoid the
reliability entities
occurrence of blackouts it is necessary to guarantee the
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suitable operation of the protection elements and to have [7] Elkraft, “Power failure in Eastern Denmark and southern Sweden on 23
September 2003 - Final report on the course of events”, Nov. 2003.
adequate dynamic models for the generation units. [8] E. Erik, “The Black-out in southern Sweden and eastern Denmark,
The new emerging systems based on technologies such as September 23, 2003”, presented at CIGRÉ Large Disturbance
the Synchronized Phasor Measurements are the future for real Workshop, Paris, 2004.
time system monitoring and control. They shall be addressed [9] Svenska Kraftnät, “The Black-out in southern Sweden and eastern
Denmark, 23 September, 2003”, Oct. 2003.
in regulations for further improved reliability. [10] UCTE, “Final Report of the Investigation Committee on the 29
September 2003 Blackout in Italy”, Apr. 2004.
V. CONCLUSIONS [11] C. Sabelli, “The 28th September 2003, Black-out in Italy”, presented at
CIGRÉ Large Disturbance Workshop, Paris, 2004.
One of the aspects analyzed in this study is to characterize [12] U.S. – Canada Power System Outage Task Force, “Interim Report:
the blackouts about their incidence and their effect on the Causes of the August 14th Blackout in the United States and Canada:
Causes and Recommendations”, Apr. 2004.
electrical systems and the affected customers. Indicators have [13] UCTE Operational Handbook, Nov. 2004. Available:
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measuring units. In this form a “ranking” of blackouts can be [14] NORDEL System Operation Agreement, Apr. 2004. Available:
http://www.nordel.org
started to record them in the future.
[15] CAMMESA, Procedures for the Operation Programming, the Load
The proposed color code to classify the blackouts respect to Dispatching and the Prices Calculation, XX Version, Jun. 2004.
the relation between their Severity and the Percentage of the Available: http://www.cammesa.com.ar
Affected Population, helps to visualize the level of importance [16] NERC Operating Manual, Jun. 2004. Available: http://www.nerc.com
[17] Colombia CREG Resolutions 025, 058, 061, 062 and 066 of 1995; 030,
of each blackout with respect to the selected indices. This 054, 061, 062, 092, 093, 095, 102 and 134 de 1996; 002 and 003 of
color code could be adopted in a global map in which the most 1997; 131 of 1998; 001, 019, 080, 081 and 083 de 1999; 061, 062, 065,
prone zones to this type of phenomena could be shown. 073 and 098 of 2000; 022, 023 and 026 of 2001; 004 and 009 of 2003;
014 and 060 of 2004. Available: http://www.creg.gov.co
The compilation of information made about the main [18] CNO Agreements 58 of 2000; 151 and 165 of 2001; 228 and 254 of
blackouts that have occurred worldwide, allows to establish 2002; 260 and 263 of 2003; 292 and 297 of 2004. Available:
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preventive measures be taken to avoid them or to quickly [20] G. Benmouyal, E.O. Schweitzer, A. Guzman, “Synchronized Phasor
restore the systems. Measurement in Protective Relays for Protection, Control and Analysis
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shown commonalities that also illustrate potential remedies. [21] R. Nuqui, “State Estimation and Voltage Security Monitoring Using
The compiled information for the time the operators had to Synchronized Phasor Measurements”, Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia
react confirms that some of these blackouts could had been Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2001.
[22] I.C. Decker et al, “Synchronized Phasor Measurement System:
avoided by taking the appropriate timely actions. Development and Applications”, Presented at IX Symposium of
The methodology followed could be easily applied to Specialists in Electric Operational and Expansion Planning, Rio de
extend to the analysis of regulations of any country. The paper Janeiro, 2004.
[23] D. Karlsson, M. Hemmingsson, S. Lindahl, “Wide Area System
suggests a classification of relevant matters that could be Monitoring and Control”, IEEE Power and Energy, vol. 2, No. 5, pp.
adopted in a standardized approach for this type of studies. 68-76, Sept. /Oct. 2004.
[24] B. Bhargava, G. Rodriguez, “Monitoring the Power Grid”, IEEE
VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Transmission and Distribution, pp. 28-34, Dec. 2004.

The authors thank the National University of Colombia for VIII. BIOGRAPHIES
their support in the development of this study, that was
developed as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Olga Veloza was born in Bogota, Colombia. She graduated as Electrical
M.Sc. degree in Electrical Engineering of O. P. Veloza. Engineer (1998) and as M.Sc. in Electrical Engineer (2005) at the National
University of Colombia. She is Analyst Engineer at KEMA Inc., Bogota.
VII. REFERENCES
Renato Cespedes is Colombian. He graduated as Electrical Engineer (1972)
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at the University of the Andes (Colombia). He obtained the M.Sc. Degree in
lessons learned from Large Blackouts”, presented at Proceedings of the
Electrical Engineering (1973), DEA in Electrical Engineering (1974) and
IEEE PES 2004 General Meeting, Colorado, 2004.
Ph.D. in Engineering, Electrical Engineering (1976) of the National
[2] G. Vasell, “Northeast Blackout of 1965”, IEEE Power Engineering
Polytechnique Institute of Grenoble, France. He is associate professor at the
Review, pp. 4-8, Jan. 1991.
National University of Colombia and Director Latin America with KEMA
[3] X. Vieira, L. Pilottto, N. Martins, A. Carvalho, A. Bianco. “Brazilian
Inc., Bogota.
Defense Plan Against Extreme Contingencies”, presented at IEEE/PES
Summer Meeting, Canada, 2001.
[4] A. R. Shirani, “Iranian Electric Power System Blackout on 31st of
March 2003”, presented at CIGRÉ, Paris, 2004.
[5] National Grid Transco, “Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply
Incident affecting parts of South London at 18:20 on Thursday, 28
August 2003”, Sept. 2003.
[6] I. Welch, “Update on Recommendations, Decisions, Actions – London
28 August 2003”, presented at CIGRÉ Large Disturbance Workshop,
Paris, 2004.