UNITED STATES AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN

WAR OF 1971 US-Pakistan relations have undergone wide fluctuations in the last
twentyfive years. The amorphous cordiality of the early years gave way to unqualified alignment in the
fifties based on a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties. In a bi-polar world marked by active
rivalries between the communist and noncommunist Powers, with the 'third world' trying to steer clear
of these rivalries under the cover of non-alignment, Pakistan's policy of alignment reflected a deliberate
decision on her part to link her policies with the West and more particularly the United States. In the
sixties, the exigencies of the internal and external developments led to a gradual arosion of the cohesive
links of the fifties and ushered in the third phase in her relationship, the period of 'qualified alignment'.
Pakistan's relations with America have been motivated primarily by a set of political and economic
factors. Politically, Pakistan expected the alliance with America to provide security against India and
large-scale military aid which she considered to be necessary to ensure a power equilibrium in the
subcontinent. Added to it, was the desire to get enhanced economic and technical assistance to
accelerate the process of economic development. Pakistan was thus drawn into the vortex of alliances
with America till she acquired the questionable distinction of being the most allied ally of the United
States in Asia. But the policy of alignment in the heyday of non-alignment visibly strained her relations
with the communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union - who became openly hostile - and also
isolated her in the 'third world'. It also gave India the formal excuse to unilaterally renounce her
international commitments on Kashmir. As against this, it brought Pakistan large-scale military aid and
considerably enhanced economic assistance. These were substantial material gians. But in terms of
security against India, or even diplomatic backing in the disputes with India, she was sorely
disappointed. The United States did not consider it politic to alienate the most important country in
South Asia to gratify Pakistan. Thus while Pakistan became America's most loyal ally in Asia, the latter
refused to be her patron against India. The US reservation to the SEATO Treaty in 1954, clearly bore this
out. It was further underlined in 1959, when Pakistan signed the Bilateral agreement of Cooperation
with the United States. Under the terms of this Agreement, the United States was required, in certain
circumstances, to assist Pakistan if she became the victim of aggression. India demanded and, according
to Mr. Nehru, received, a specific assurance from Washington that this agreement could not
CHINA'S DIPLOMACY DURING THE INDO-
PAKISTAN WAR, 1971 The outbreak of the East Pakistan crisis in March
1971, gave rise to certain political issues of international importance such as those of separatism, East
Pakistani displaced persons, foreign intervention and external armed aggression. These issues because
of their serious nature and repercussions on the situation in the subcontinent, had to be considered by
China or for that matter any other country in the light of its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the
nature and extent of China's support to Pakistan during the crisis and the ensuing war must be
considered in the light of these issues and the relative Chinese stance towards them. The Chinese official
attitude towards the crisis and the issues arising out of it, was made public, for the first time, on 12
April, in a message1 by Mr. Chou En-lai to President Yahya Khan. A close study of this letter shows the
Chinese point of view regarding the crisis, namely: (i) That China considered the "happenings inPakistan"
as "a purely internal affair" to be settled by the Pakistani people without "foreign interference". This
adherence to the principle of non-intervention could also be seen in China's protest Note to India of 6
April 1971 ; (ii) That China opposed the separatists as was reflected in the expression: "the unification of
Pakistan and the unity of the people of East and West Pakistan are the basic guarantees" for Pakistan's
prosperity and strength; (iii) That China considered the separatists to be in a minority, "a handful of
persons who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan"; (iv) That as regards the means for settling
the problem, China's preference for negotiations can be easily discerned in the expression that "through
the wise consultation and efforts" of the Government and "leaders of various quarters in Pakistan", the
situation would be restored to normal; (v) That taking note of the "gross interference" by India in the
affairs of Pakistan, China considered the USSR and the US guilty of collusion with India. In its protest
Note of 6 April also China had accused India of flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan;
(vi) That China's firm support to Pakistan was assured if "the Indian expansionists dare to launch
aggression against Pakistan;"2 (vii) That the message made no mention of the "refugee" problem as
emphasised by India.
THE USSR AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR,
1971 The role played by the USSR in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 had a great impact on the
pattern of politics in South Asia. It was primarily responsible for imparting to the conflict an
international dimension by drawing the subcontinent into the vortex of big Power rivalries. In the
months preceding the war, the USSR's attitude towards the crisis in East Pakistan was on the whole
ambivalent. On the one hand, the Soviet Union repeatedly stressed that it upheld the territorial integrity
of Pakistan and it carefully refrained from giving overt support to the insurgents. But on the other hand
Moscow adopted a posture of hostility towards Islamabad. At a time when Indo-Pakistan relations had
reached their nadir, the Soviet Union extended full diplomatic and military support to India. Without
tacit support from the Kremlin, it is unlikely that Mrs. Gandhi's Government would have sustained since
its inception the guerrilla movement in East Bengal and pursued its policy vis-a-vis "Bangla Desh" with its
underlying danger of a military conflict. Publicly the USSR upheld the territorial integrity of Pakistan but
covertly it worked to destroy the unity of Pakistan by extending assistance by proxy to the insurgents.In
fact it is generally believed that India not only launched the attack on East Pakistan with Moscow's
knowledge but with its specific approval.1 I When the war broke out, the Soviet Union cast aside all
pretentions of neutrality and non-partisanship it had fostered since the Tashkent meeting of January
1966. During the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the Soviet leaders had sought to promote accommodation
between the two parties. But in 1971, operating in the context of nuclear parity with the United States
and superiority in conventional land forces, the Russians were in no hurry to terminate the fighting since
their interest was better served by the continuation of hostilities leading to an Indian victory. Soviet
policy was directed towards the attainment of this goal and to this end it provided an umbrella under
which the war could run its course. The factors which decisively determined the outcome of the war
were : first, Soviet military assistance to India; secondly, the USSR's role in the UN Security Council; and
thirdly, Russian strategy to prevent a direct Chinese intervention in the war.
THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT OF 1971-
LEGAL ASPECTS Introduction The tragic action of 25 March 1971 and the
subsequent events leading to the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 22 November 1971 are too well known to
require detailed repetition. The constitutional deadlock between the leaders of the Awami League and
the Government of the day over the autonomy question, the postponement of the meeting of the
National Assembly, the civil disobedience and subsequent secessionist movement of the Awami League
and the decision of President Yahya Khan to use force in order to re-asserthe authority of the
Government were matters clearly of domestic concern to Pakistan. However, when armed force was
finally resorted to the separatist movement had already spread widely and extensive military operations
were required to quel the revolt. This inevitably resulted in an exodus of refugees across the border into
India. The figures of the refugees in India were greatly exaggerated, and this eventually gave India the
excuse it needed for the use of force against the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Initially, India armed the
refugees instigating them to cross the international border for terrorist activities. However, when it
became increasingly clear that such activities were not achieving sufficient success, India resorted to the
use of direct force against Pakistan. Although substantial incursions had been taking place across the
international border for some time, it was on 22 November 1971 that India launched its first major
armed attack against East Pakistan and on 3 December 1971 the fighting spread to West Pakistan when
Indian forces engaged Pakistani troops along the West Pakistan border. While the conflict raged at both
ends of the subcontinent the Security Council was rendered impotent by repeated Soviet vetoes thus
enabling India to achieve her military objectives in East Pakistan. On 16 December India, facing
increasing criticism from the world and mounting diplomatic pressure, declared a ceasefire in the
Western theatre. On 17 December, Pakistan agreed to the ceasefire in accordance with the resolution of
the General Assembly of 7 December 1971. The ceasefire having taken effect, the Security Council,
rather belatedly, adop