No. L-47941. April 30, 1985.* Penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for parricide, correct.

Penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for parricide, correct.—We hold that the fact that the appellant
intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME TOMOTORGO y ALARCON, resulting and more serious crime committed. In the case of People vs. Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. 651,
defendant-appellant where the accused therein had choked his mother in a fit of anger because the latter did not prepare any
food for him, it was ruled that the crime committed by Demiar is parricide (Article 246, Revised Penal
Criminal Law; Parricide; Husband guilty of parricide, not serious physical injuries which he allegedly
Code), the deceased victim of his criminal act being his legitimate mother. Said crime was declared as
intended to commit, as under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code he is criminally liable for all the
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. As held by this Court in that case, the appellant is only
consequences of his felonious acts.—Appellant maintains the belief that he should be punished only for
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. (Article 13 (3 Id.) The
the offense he intended to commit which he avers to be serious physical injuries, qualified by the fact that
penalty imposed on the herein accused is therefore correct in the light of the relevant provisions of law
the offended party is his spouse. Pursuant to the sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 of Art. 263 of the Revised
and jurisprudence.
Penal Code and as his wife is among the persons mentioned in Art. 246 of the same code, appellant
contends that the penalty imposable should then be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum Same; Same; Same; Recommendation for executive clemency or commutation of sentence; appropriate,
periods. On this mistaken premise, appellant therefore claims that the penalty prescribed by law for his in view of manifest repentant attitude of the accused, absence of objection of the Solicitor General and
offense is divisible and he should thus be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. the more than seven years he had been imprisoned; Case at bar.—Considering the circumstances which
These contentions of the accused are manifestly untenable and incorrect. Article 4 of the Revised Penal attended the commission of the offense, the manifest repentant attitude of the accused and his remorse
Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) for his act which even the trial court made particular mention of in its decision and the recommendation
although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that the accused is liable for all made by the Office of the Solicitor General as well as the number of years that the accused-appellant had
the consequences of his felonious acts. been imprisoned, this Court can do no less than recommend that executive clemency be extended to the
accused-appellant, Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, or that his sentence be commuted so that he can now
Same; Same; Same; Where the wife died very soon after she was assaulted by her husband, Article 263
qualify and be considered eligible for parole. This recommendation of the Court should be promptly
of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries
brought to the attention of the President of the Republic of the Philippines by the proper authorities in
committed, is not applicable.—The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal
whose custody the herein accused has been placed.
Code which prescribes graduated penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely
misplaced and irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted. APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Br. IV.
It will be, therefore, illogical to consider appellant’s acts as falling within the scope of Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code. The crime committed is parricide no less.

Same; Same; Same; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Accused not entitled to the benefits of the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as Art. 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more
serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act and that parricide is ALAMPAY, J.:
punished with reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 246 of the Code.—We are in complete accord with
Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, the accused-appellant in this case, appeals from the decision rendered on
and we sustain the ruling made by the courts below that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the
December 22, 1977, by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch IV, in Criminal Case No.
Indeterminate Sentence Law. The court sustains the submissions of the appellee that—“x x x Article 49
403 of said court finding him guilty of the crime of parricide for having killed his wife Magdalena de los
of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by
Santos. The dispositive portion of said judgment reads, as follows:
the offender result from his felonious act because, under Article 4, par. 1 of the same Code, he is liable
for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to commit so grave a “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the accused Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon is
wrong is, at best, mitigating (Article 13, par. 3). “Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime committed hereby condemned to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
is different from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (People vs. Magdalena delos Santos in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment, plus costs. And
Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150) “Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punished parricide with the penalty of considering the circumstances under which the offense was committed, the court hereby recommends
reclusion perpetua to death, which are two indivisible penalties. As the commission of the act was executive clemency for him, after serving the minimum of the medium penalty of prision mayor.
attended by mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty, which is
reclusion perpetua, should be imposed (People vs. Laureano, et al., 71 Phil. 530; People vs. Francisco, “Let copy of this decision be furnished, his Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and the Chairman
78 Phil. 697; People vs. Belarmino, 91 Phil. 118)” Appellee’s Brief, pp. 6-7). (Italics supplied) of the Board of Pardons and Parole.

Same; Same; Same; Penalty; The fact that the accused intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict “SO ORDERED.
physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime committed; “Given at Naga City, this 22nd day of December, 1977.
 SGD. ALFREDO S. REBUENA With the imposition by the court below of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the herein accused and the
“Judge” (Rollo, pg. 10) subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered against him, the accused
The facts of this case as recited in the decision of the trial court and in the appellee’s brief stand through his counsel filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
uncontroverted and undisputed. From the evidence submitted it is disclosed that the victim, Magdalena
de los Santos, was the wife of the herein accused. Several months prior to the occurrence of the fatal In his appeal, accused argues and contends that the lower court erred:
incident on June 23, 1977, Magdalena de los Santos had been persistently asking her husband to sell
“1. In disregarding its own findings of fact which showed manifest lack of intent to kill;
the conjugal home which was then located at Sitio Dinalungan, Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of
Siruma, Camarines Sur. She wanted their family to transfer to the house of her husband’s in-laws which “2. In disregarding the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes the proper
is in the town of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. (TSN, pp. 6-10, December 13, 1977). Accused Tomotorgo applicable penalty where the crime committed is different from that intended;
would not accede to his wife’s request. He did not like to abandon the house wherein he and his wife
were then living. Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave because he has many plants and “3. In not following the mandatory sequence of procedures for determining the correct applicable penalty;
improvements on the land which he was then farming in said municipality of Siruma, Camarines Sur, a
town very far from the place of his in-laws where his wife desired their family to transfer to. “4. In denying the appellant the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.” (Appellant’s Brief, pg. 1,
pars. 1-4)
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o’clock in the morning, the accused left his home to work on his farm.
Upon his return at about nine o’clock that same morning. He found his wife and his three-month old baby We find no merit in the appeal of the accused herein which assails only the correctness of the penalty
already gone. He proceeded to look for both of them and sometime later on, on a trail about two hundred imposed by the trial court on him.
(200) meters from their home, he finally saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of
Appellant submits that the penalty for the felony committed by him which is parricide being higher than
clothes. He asked and pleaded with his wife that she should return home with their child but she adamantly
that for the offense which he intended to commit, and which he avers to be that of physical injuries only,
refused to do so. When appellant sought to take the child from his wife, the latter threw the baby on the
the provisions of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code which relate to the application of penalties should
grassy portion of the trail hereby causing the latter to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the ire of the
have been observed and followed by the trial court. The said provision of law which accused invokes
herein accused. Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, appellant picked up a piece of wood
provides that:
nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of severe pains on her
chest. Realizing what he had done, the accused picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. “ART. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that
He then returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise took this infant home. Soon intended.—In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to
thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains. commit, the following rules shall be observed;
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain “1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense
of their place who brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused surrendered. He also brought which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its
with him the piece of wood he used in beating his wife. maximum period.”
Charged with the crime of parricide, the accused at his arraignment on November 24, 1977, with xxx xxx xxx
assistance from his counsel de-oficio, pleaded not guilty to the said offense. However, when his case was
called for trial on December 13, 1977, his counsel manifested to the court that after his conference with Continuing, appellant argues in his appeal brief submitted to this Court, that:
the accused, the latter expressed a desire to change his previous plea of not guilty to that of guilty.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, and upon motion by the counsel of the accused and without objection on the part of the
prosecution, the trial court allowed the accused to withdraw his original plea. Upon being re-arraigned, “The felony actually committed, parricide, has a higher penalty (reclusion perpetua to death) than the
the accused entered a plea of guilty. He confirmed the manifestations made by his counsel to the court felony intended, qualified physical injuries (reclusion temporal medium and maximum). Hence, since the
regarding his desire to change his initial plea. He expressed his realization of the gravity of the offense penalty corresponding to the felony intended shall be imposed in its maximum period, the prescribed
charged against him and the consequences of his plea. His counsel was then permitted by the court to penalty is therefore reclusion temporal maximum. This is a divisible penalty.
establish the mitigating circumstances which were then invoked in favor of the accused.
“Under Article 64, sub-par. 5, of the Penal Code.
After the accused had testified and upon his plea given in open court, the court below found him guilty of
the crime of parricide, but with three mitigating circumstances in his favor, namely: voluntary surrender, “When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
plea of guilty, and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
obfuscation. applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.”
“The trial court itself found “that the accused is entitled to three (3) mitigating circumstances with no parricide (Article 246, Revised Penal Code), the deceased victim of his criminal act being his legitimate
aggravating circumstances, namely: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and obfuscation.” We submit that mother. Said crime was declared as punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. As held by this Court in
the plea of guilty, which, as we had shown earlier, was improvidently made, should no longer be that case, the appellant is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave
considered. This leaves only two mitigating with no aggravating. Sufficient compliance with the law, a wrong. (Article 13 (3 Id.) The penalty imposed on the herein accused is therefore correct in the light of
Hence, an automatic lowering of the penalty by one degree, or to reclusion temporal medium. This being the relevant provisions of law and jurisprudence.
a case where a period constitutes the entire range of the penalty prescribed, and therefore, also a degree.”
(Appellant’s Brief, pp. 8-9) Appellant maintains the belief that he should be punished only for the offense The trial court in its consideration of this case had added a recommendation that “executive clemency be
he intended to commit which he avers to be serious physical injuries, qualified by the fact that the offended extended to the accused-appellant after his service of the minimum of the medium penalty of prision
party is his spouse. Pursuant to the sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code mayor.” The Solicitor General likewise concludes and prays in the People’s Brief that in view of the
and as his wife is among the persons mentioned in Art. 246 of the same code, appellant contends that circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, a recommendation for the commutation of
the penalty imposable should then be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. On this the penalty would be appropriate. (Appellee’s Brief, pg. 7). This Court is constrained to take note that the
mistaken premise, appellant therefore claims that the penalty prescribed by law for his offense is divisible accused-appellant is said to have been in detention since June 23, 1977 or for more than seven years
and he should thus be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. already. This Court can do no less than express its hope that the accused-appellant can be now extended
an absolute or conditional pardon by the President of the Republic of the Philippines or that there be a
These contentions of the accused are manifestly untenable and incorrect. Article 4 of the Revised Penal commutation of his sentence so that he may qualify and be eligible for parole.
Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that the accused is liable for all WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed without any pronouncement as to costs.
the consequences of his felonious acts.
Considering the circumstances which attended the commission of the offense, the manifest repentant
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code which prescribes graduated attitude of the accused and his remorse for his act which even the trial court made particular mention of
penalties for the corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced and irrelevant in its decision and the recommendation made by the Office of the Solicitor General as well as the number
considering that in this case the victim died very soon after she was assaulted. It will be, therefore, illogical of years that the accused-appellant had been imprisoned, this Court can do no less than recommend that
to consider appellant’s acts as falling within the scope of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code. The executive clemency be extended to the accused-appellant, Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, or that his
crime committed is parricide no less. sentence be commuted so that he can now qualify and be considered eligible for parole. This
recommendation of the Court should be promptly brought to the attention of the President of the Republic
We are in complete accord with and we sustain the ruling made by the courts below that the accused is of the Philippines by the proper authorities in whose custody the herein accused has been placed.
not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The court sustains the submissions of the
appellee that— Aside from this, let copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Parole.
“x x x Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to cases where more serious consequences
not intended by the offender result from his felonious act because, under Article 4, par. 1 of the same SO ORDERED.
Code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his tudawful act. His lack of intention to
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
commit so grave a wrong is, at best, mitigating (Article 13, par. 3).
Judgment affirmed.
“Article 49 applies only to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended and where the
felony committed befalls a different person (People vs. Albuquerque, 59 Phil. 150). ——o0o——
“Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punished parricide with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
which are two indivisible penalties. As the commission of the act was attended by mitigating
circumstances with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should © Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. Al People vs. Tomotorgo, 136 SCRA 238, No. L-47941 April
be imposed (People vs. Laureano, et al., 71 Phil. 530; People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 697; People vs. 30, 1985
Belarmino, 91 Phil. 118)” Appellee’s Brief, pp. 6-7). (Italics supplied)

We hold that the fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries does
not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime committed. In the case of People
vs. Climaco Demiar, 108 Phil. 651, where the accused therein had choked his mother in a fit of anger
because the latter did not prepare any food for him, it was ruled that the crime committed by Demiar is