Puerto Rican Politics and The New Deal

THOMAS MATHEWS
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7 his book of Professor Mathews', quite apart from
exceptional quality
the
important kind of study to have made.
of its workmanship, is an
It is one of the few meticu
lous explorations of the preliminaries to the transformation of a
backward political and economic area into a leading one. Puerto
Rico, since the depression days of the early thirties, when despair
and poverty characterized it, has become a lively and advancing
Commonwealth. This change deserves analysis.
Mr. Mathews gives his work a proper practical cast. He empha
sizes the part played by politics — by parties and their leaders; but
he also shows how necessary the containing framework must always
be for such an improvement in well-being. It takes a long time to
build such a framework; and its foundations go deeper than the eye
can see. But if it did not exist the storms of change would soon
destroy it. The plans and work leading to the Puerto Rican revolu
tion are lessons for others to study, especially those who consider
that economic and social betterment are qualities that may be rubbed
on any sort of surface rather than ones that are built into the whole
structure.
There was a good deal of difference of opinion; there was the
usual struggle for leadership; there were the usual affected interests.
But behind all the maneuvers there was the historical fact that
Puerto Rico could not have entered into its later phase of rapidly
rising productivity if for several decades there had not been close
contacts with strengthening influences from the United States.
These were more than contacts; they were interpenetrations, a net
work of ties and influences and assistances. Let us see.
It has become fashionable now to disparage the colonial
phases,
as they are called, of United States policy after the taking over from
Spain. But it was during this same colonial period that a tradition
of efficient and honest government was established. The export was,
indeed, better than most of the home product in those years. That
there should have been such a contribution astonishes observers of
other Latin governments of comparable size and relationships. But
it began under the military occupation, without any doubt, and was
continued under subsequent appointed civilian regimes. The experts
V
539
vi FOREWORD
in finance and administration

who served in these early administra
tions were the best we had in the United States. Our cities and
states — and even the federal government — did not value them
greatly, often indeed rejected them. But they were allowed to func
tion in Puerto Rico. They influenced and trained and encouraged
several generations of Puerto Ricans; and it would be impossible to
overvalue services. The fashion of speaking about them as
their
though they were mere job-holders of the familiar sort needs drastic
correction.
There were very few of left by, say, 1933, when New
these
Deal efforts to relieve the deep distresses of those years in the island
began. Their job had been done. And the new agencies — the
Emergency Relief Administration and the Puerto Rico Reconstruc
tion Administration, for instance — were able to be manned almost
completely by Puerto Ricans themselves. And the subsequent in
geniously devised enterprises were the joint products of Puerto
Rican and continental cooperation. This could not have happened
— and did not happen — in any other Caribbean nation or colony.
One of the first and most characteristic programs of the early
occupation was the expansion of educational facilities, and the
reorganization of teaching methods. The benefits from this effort
have been obscured by the ultranationalist claims that it was an
attempt at cultural imperialism. And, of course, it did have the
familiar missionary tinge of that period of expansionism. If teachers
were sent from the United States to undertake the impossible task
of converting the schools to English and of inculcating democratic
ideals, they failed in conversion to English but they did have a
massive effect on democratization.
On the whole the missionary teachers were devoted and capable.
Many are still recalled in the communities where they taught with
affection and respect. They were a good influence. I wish the
reminiscences of my friends William O'Reilly and Thomas S. Hayes
could somehow have been made available in books. Their gentle
and humorous fondness for their pupils and their pupils' parents
are among my own treasured memorabilia. Both are gone now. All
that generation has gone; and only in retrospect is the honor due
them being acknowledged.
The effects of an invasion of this sort — teachers, civil servants,
engineers, doctors — are always complex. It has to be noted that
there was the resentment that might have been expected in a back
FOREWORD vii
ward land. Ignorant people and demagogues are a naturally reacting

combination. The teachers' jobs were ones that Puerto Ricans
coveted; and in the end they got them. When they were able to
take over the schools, they stopped all imports. But there are pen
alties for inbreeding, for inordinate self-praise. Xenophobia is a
dangerous indulgence for a school system to tolerate; and Puerto
Rico is a small and crowded island. While they were there the
continental teachers built up a respect for industrious study and
gave an example of dedication whose dissemination to others was
very important. Some of these virtues would be useful to this gen
eration of Puerto Rican teachers.
Another early influence that is often overlooked — deliberately
disparaged, of course, by the supernationalists — is the coming of
Puerto Ricans to the United States for training in the various pro
fessions. Before the University of Puerto Rico was much more than
an institution for the preparation of teachers for elementary schools,
it became customary for many of the most enterprising families to
send their sons and daughters to schools and universities on the
continent. By 1933, when they were needed for the new programs,
there were a good many engineers, accountants, lawyers, executives,
and so on, who were the product of our graduate schools, and many
more who at least had college degrees.
By that time Puerto Rico had begun to be admitted to the Fed
eral Aid system and was receivingfunds, allocated as they would
have been to the states, for vocational education, for road planning
and building, for agricultural experiment and extension work. These
were nuclei which could be expanded. They were also precedents
which could be copied for other public services; and in the later New
Deal years they were. The staffs of the administering agencies were
always mixed ones of Puerto Ricans and continentals. The building
up of a really vast structure for relief and rehabilitation had only
to follow a familiar pattern and use a prepared profession of tech
nicians. And these were notably stamped with the characteristic
integrity and honesty of public servants in the island.
I could go on. But it is not my purpose to insist that the United
States, in its relations with Puerto Rico, was always disinterested
and wise. Anyone who will examine my public papers will discover
that while I was governor, I was always protesting discriminations
and pointing out deficiencies. I felt that we had accepted a responsi
bility when we had taken over the island which we had not at all
viii FOREWORD
fully met. That PuertoRico was still poverty-stricken, still had

disgraceful tropical slums, still was one-third illiterate, still had high
sickness and death rates — all this was evidence that we had not
done enough.
Besides I felt that we had been mistaken to have tried for an
extinguishment of the indigenous culture in favor of Americaniza
tion — whatever that may mean. The early purpose to inculcate our
own views seemed to a later viewer to have been curiously certain
of a superiority which could be defended only by the most doubtful
arguments. Anyway, these efforts were failures and their pursuit
ought, I felt, to be finally abandoned. But I did not admit — and I
do not admit now — that the impulse to do good was wasted. It had
in it that necessary quality of good will toward others which, if
generalized, could be useful in the modern world where hate and
suspicion are so prevalent. It had been taken advantage of by those
who followed along to make money — merchants, planters, transpor
tation companies, insurance and banking corporations, and so on.
And these sometimes seemed to have been the whole reason for the
American interest. We ought not to have allowed them to trade on
the good will of our fraternal efforts.
This was some of the argument I
made for the policies I pursued
as governor. But I was always clear in my own mind that we were
by this time committed to a close relationship. It might be of one
kind or another; I thought in the end it would be statehood, which
Istill think; but at any rate it was a linking-up that could not be
severed without vast damage to the Puerto Ricans. There might be
demagogues among them who were willing to trade on resentment
against our businessmen and those who still wanted to push our
culture — English language particularly; but the solid interests of
the people were clear to them; they had a United States citizenship
which they valued and wanted to keep.
It is a conclusion anyone must come to, I think, who studies the
forerunner years, that the joining of veins running between a strong
economy and a weaker one, of a large and varied union with a small
and special one — that this joining made all the difference. Almost
without its being noticed by the taxpayers in the States, sufficient
economic assistance could be extended now to bring the insular
economy out into a wholly new stage, a self-sustaining one with the
promise of indefinite expansion. It could be done with no new or
novel departures.
FOREWORD ix
There was a good deal of talk about socialism and the like when
publicownership by the Puerto Rican government was extended.
Some land was taken over, the power facilities were expropriated,
and some other devices were used to disestablish the hold on the
economy of a tight-fisted monopoly of planters and merchants. But
this had been done in other times and places; and it did immedi
ately free the economy for the expansion that took place in subse
quent years. No one now would argue that the Canadian capitalists
who held the power facilities in so tight a grip were the ideal repre
sentatives of democracy and that their expropriation represented an
attack on the American way of life. Such arguments were made
freely at one time. But if I may, I will here repeat a question put
to me ten years after the events of the so-called revolution.
I was taken to lunch at the Bankers' Club — something that
would not have happened when excoriations were so popular. While
we were talking at a round table, an elderly banker, a Puerto Rican
came up to me, shook hands, and said, "Mr. Tugwell, what was it we
were so mad at you about?"
So the whole affair is history now. But there is a lesson in it
for those willing to consider the past. It is this: it is far better to
have this institutional linking-up, this steady flow backward and
forward of assistance and personnel, this year-to-year support on a
planned basis, than to offer assistance in the form of private capital
for development, or to introduce spectacular projects which are car
ried on for a time and then abandoned. That is what we have done
in the rest of America. I calculate that it has cost us about as much
that way as the way we took in Puerto Rico. And look at the results,
the comparative results.
There is nothing, I conclude, like a good schoolteacher, an
agricultural agent, an expert budget officer, an educated planner,
to create the conditions for further advance. They may not be noticed
for a long time, but neither are the foundations laid for a substantial
building.
Fortunately, when the time came for Puerto Rico to have respon
sibility for its own destiny, the United States was not only willing
but eager to help. The missionary impulse had passed. Fortunately,
too, the insular political leaders who were dominant were less dem
agogues than statesmen. They saw that basing their new appeals on
xenophobic insular afflatus might be popular but would also certainly
be fatal. There were still differences between yankees and islanders
x FOREWORD
which could have been exploited. Independence is a powerful in

toxicant. And cooperation has only the less spectacular appeal of be
ing necessary. But there was also the hard fact for any politician
to face that there were many — no one knows how many — Puerto
Ricans who felt themselves to be part of the American Union and
valued the connection beyond all other loyalties.
Professor Mathews takes his readers through the trials and
adjustments, the arguments and machinations, of some formative
years when Puerto Rico was on the verge of dramatic changes. It
is almost a miracle, I have sometimes thought, that Puerto Rico did
not in the forties become independent. The Philippines did; and
peoples adherent in one or another way with all the old Empires
were demanding it. And it was the way neighboring Cuba had
gone. Certainly the United States would have been willing. I
often said so when I
was governor. With President Roosevelt's con
currence, I
habitually told the Puerto Ricans that they need not try
to pose as minions, exploited and downtrodden. They were, I told
them, friends and brothers. And friends and brothers associate;
they do not quarrel. If Puerto Ricans should choose to sever the
old relationships, we continentals would see them go in peace and
with our best wishes.
The enlightened politicians understood that I meant it. And,
seeing beyond their island to a larger world, of which, whether or
not they liked it, they would have to remain a part, and feeling the
pulses of life-blood running through connecting veins, they chose
a status short of independence for the moment, keeping close
relationships but gaining more complete self-government in local
affairs.
It is my understanding that this study will eventually be ex
tended into later years. I hope so. It is salutary reading for those
inclined to credit social and economic miracles. It introduces a
politics of change. This is how it really happens. It is neither inevi
table nor impossible. It happens as it does because men make it
happen. It needs to be guided and shaped by those who can lead,
and who have the wisdom to lead in the direction determined by the
tidal forces of the age in which they live. Independence is a passing
and temporary phase. Cooperation and association are, I am sure,
the pattern of the future for all peoples, and Puerto Ricans no less
than others.
Rexford Guy Tugwell
7 his study attempts to investigate in detail the po
litical activity in Puerto Rico during the very short
but interesting period of the New Deal administration in Washing
ton. The interaction between the two governmental centers of San
Juan and Washington is, of course, an important center of focus.
After a brief introductory chapter, the analysis opens with an ex
position of the political picture prior to the election of 1932. The
study ends with the close of 1938 after the New Deal has definitely
lost its renovating drive on the island. Indeed, we will attempt to
show that it was at this time not renovating, but in some ways was
reactionary in character.
The research for the study was initiated in the late spring of
1954 while I was concluding, with the economic aid of the Uni
versity of Puerto Rico, my final year of residence at Columbia Uni
versity. My investigations carried me to Hyde Park and the Franklin
Delano Roosevelt Library. With the help of Dr. Herman Kahn and
his very capable staff, I was able to locate the available material on
Puerto Rico which was kept in the President's private library. In
Washington, D. C, I examined the records of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs and of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, all
of which are located in the National Archives.
Material gleaned from the records of these two government
offices forms the body of this work. The files pertaining to Puerto
Rico during this short period in which I was interested literally
mount up into the thousands. Since this was virgin territory, un
touched by other investigators, I was forced to rely heavily on the
very competent personnel working under Dr. Oliver W. Holmes. I
am particularly indebted to Richard Maxwell and Charles Dewing
for help on the Interior and War Department records and to Harold
Pinkert, who offered leads among the material of the Department
of Agriculture. For a more complete description of these records,
I would refer the reader to specific publications of the National
Archives listed in the Bibliography.
One final source of government records must be mentioned.
Through the courtesy of Governor Luis Munoz Marin, I was given
permission to examine pertinent records of the Executive Secretary
xi
xii PREFACE
to the Governor of Puerto Rico which were stored in the governor's

mansion, La Fortaleza.
In addition to official documents and files, I also had access to
several important private collections of letters and papers. Perhaps
the most important collection was that of the American Civil Lib
erties Union which is filed in the Princeton University Library. With
the permission of the American Civil Liberties Union and Roger
Baldwin, I was able to consult this collection.
Time for the preparation of the manuscript was made possible
in part by a small grant of funds from the Carnegie Foundation.
In the summer of 1956 a trip to Washington sponsored by the Uni
versity of Puerto Rico and the Carnegie fund permitted me to nego
tiate the purchase of a private collection of documents, letters, and
papers from Ruby Black, with whom I had talked in the spring of
1954. The fact that this invaluable collection of Puerto Rican
material is now found in the University of Puerto Rico's Library
was due to the generous gesture of this great friend of Puerto Rico,
Ruby Black. The late Thomas Hayes, university librarian, and
Chancellor Jaime Benitez, recognizing the importance of the Black
collection, made the necessary arrangements for its transfer to the
island. To all I am grateful for permission to include some of this
material.
Although I relied very little on any verbal accounts or unwritten
information, the orientation and valuable suggestions, which often
led to something more concrete, which I received from personal
interviews were quite helpful. I wish to thank James Bourne, Rafael
Fernandez Garcia, Bolivar Pagan, Ruby Black, Muna Lee, and Earl
Parker Hanson for their willingness to cede some of their valuable
time to answer my questions. To Governor Luis Mufioz Marin I am
particularly indebted for his having carefully followed the develop
ment of this study while offering many valuable comments. Others
who in one way or another contributed to it include Francisco J.
Cardona, Dr. William H. Beckwith, Julio E. Jacobs, Harry Taylor,
and Enrique Bird. To Henry W. Limper I am grateful for skillful
editing.
Above all it is an honor for me as a student of Latin America
to recognize the orientation I have received from Professor Frank
Tannenbaum.
Mayaguez, 1960 T.M.

Foreword by Rexford Guy Tugwell v
Preface xi
I. Background To Politics
....
1
II. 1932: A Year of Political Change 20
III. "Gore's Hell" 58
IV. Emergency Relief Measures 117
V. Relief or Reconstruction 143
VI. The Struggle for Control 189
VII. Seeds of Mistrust 249
VIII. The Harvest 288
Bibliography 327
Index 335
BACKGROUND OF POLITICS
f^Jn the eleventh of September, 1928, the radio

operator of the freighter "Commack" wired a mes
sage describing a well-formed tropical disturbance which had been
located at longitude 50° W., and latitude 15° N. This was the first
notice concerning a large and powerful hurricane which was moving
across the middle Atlantic from the direction of the Cape Verde
Islands.1 On the following day this hurricane broke with savage fury
across the feeble land barrier of islands separating the Caribbean
from the Atlantic. The center of the hurricane passed slowly over
the northern part of the French island of Guadeloupe during the
morning of the twelfth. It was moving in a west-northwesterly direc
tion at a speed of about ten miles an hour. Not only Guadeloupe but
also St. Kitts and Monserrate informed the outside world of the
great damage of property and high loss of life occasioned by the crea
ture of nature.
Another freighter, "Matura," out of Trinidad, found itself in the
path of the winds and registered a low barometer reading of 27.50 at
sea level. The position of the ship when taking this reading was about
ten miles to the south of St. Croix, one of the largest of the Virgin
Islands. The storm kept to its west-northwest course and penetrated
into the island of Puerto Rico at the southeast corner near the town
of Guayama early in the morning of the thirteenth of September.
Moving at a speed of about 1 3 miles per hour, the storm, known as
1. The account of this hurricane follows that offered by Dr. Luis Salivia
in his interesting Historia de los Temporales de Puerto Rico: (1508-1949*)
(San Juan: Imprenta La Milagrosa, 1950), pp. 316-28.
1
2 PUERTO RICAN POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL
San Felipe by the Puerto Ricans, ripped the island diagonally from
its southeast corner to the northwest area between Isabela and Agua-
dilla.
From Puerto Rico the storm moved on to the north of Santo
Domingo and into the Bahamas, passing south of Nassau and Turk
Islands. Finally on the morning of the sixteenth it entered Florida
near West Palm Beach. Here it changed direction and moved north
ward. Spending its force as it advanced up the Atlantic coast, it
disappeared finally around Lake Ontario. However, in Florida, par
ticularly in the Lake Okeechobee area, it did a great deal of damage.
The losses were calculated in the thousands of dollars and the Red
Cross estimated that nearly two thousand people lost their lives in the
storm.
This hurricane has been regarded as one of the strongest to
sweep across the West Indies. Its intensity did not diminish from the
time it broke into the Caribbean until the seventeenth, five days later,
when it was moving up the Atlantic coast. All authorities on the
tropical storms which have hit Puerto Rico agree that San Felipe was
the most powerful in modern times. The strength of its winds as it
passed through Puerto Rico is doubtful, because the cups of the
anemometer were carried off with the fury of the high winds which
lashed the island. The estimate of the velocity of these winds varied
from 160 to 190 miles an hour over the period of three to four
hours during which the storm was at its peak. San Felipe was ac
companied by heavy rains. In the mountainous area of Adjuntas,
where heavy rain can normally be expected, the questionable reading
of 29.6 inches for a 48-hour period was recorded.
The loss of life and property in Puerto Rico was high. Over 300
persons lost their lives. Without the radio warnings, many more
would have perished. Property damage was difficult to estimate.
Calculations varied from $50 million to over $85 million. The im
poverished little island, ironically called Puerto Rico (Rich Port),
was little prepared to meet such a catastrophe.
Puerto Rico is the smallest and most easterly of the Greater
Antilles which form the northern rim of the Caribbean Sea. Located
just within the Torrid Zone, this island enjoys the climate of the
horse latitudes since it is constantly fanned by the refreshing trade
winds. This perpetual spring brings one great disadvantage: the
frequent visits of hurricanes which, during the summer months, may
at any time convert its natural paradise into chaos. In the 30 years
BACKGROUND OF POLITICS 3
between the Spanish-American War and the disaster of San Felipe

the island had been swept by at least six destructive storms.
Rugged mountains cover over three-fourths of the total area
of the island. The mountain ranges are surrounded by a narrow but
fertile coastal plain which varies from two to ten miles in width.
The steep mountain peaks, some of which reach 4,000 feet in height,
are covered by heavy tropical rain forests. They shelter a number
of productive upland valleys, but their rich green tropical foliage
disguises the fact that a great part of the surface of Puerto Rico
is rough terrain, unproductive of either agricultural or mineral
wealth. In 1930, scarcely half of the island's 2,191,000 acres were
considered arable and of these, only half could be exploited profit
ably.
Along the coast and in the broad river bottoms, where most of
the productive land is found, the principal crop is sugar cane. In
the western mountain area, where rainfall is plentiful, the culti
vated land produces mainly coffee. In the central and eastern high
lands, the chief product is tobacco.
Sugar cane is the oldest of these three crops. It was introduced
by the early Spanish settlers in 1515, but its development on the
island was irregular. As Fernando Ortiz has observed with respect
to Cuba,2 sugar production in Puerto Rico fluctuated with the amount
of capital which was available. The most rapid growth of the indus
try occurred in the early decades of the twentieth century, just
prior to the period we are about to discuss. By the year 1930, some
$120 million of American capital had been invested in Puerto Rico,
chiefly in sugar production.3 The acreage planted in cane had more
than tripled, and the yield had reached more than 800,000 tons.
Investment in Puerto Rican sugar was regarded as a preferred risk
because Puerto Rican products entered the continental United
States without payment of duties.
In another sense also, sugar was a preferred crop. The hurri
canes which whipped across the Caribbean did little damage to the
sugar lands. The cane cutting season which began in January and
ended in July was over when the hurricane months of August, Sep
tember, and Octoberbrought dangerous winds. These disastrous
storms did indeed destroy the cane stalks: San Felipe reduced pro-
2.Cuban Counterpoint (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947).

3.Victor S. Clark et al., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1930), p. 418.
duction by about 200,000 tons in 1928-1929. But the following

year, Puerto Rico produced more tons of sugar than in any previous
year.
Sugar production in the nineteenth century was in the hands
of the wealthy rural proprietors whose estates were scattered along
the coastal belt which rims the island. The sugar cane which was
grown on these estates was ground for the most part in the pro
prietors' own mills. In 1888 there were 446 such sugar mills. More
than half of these (286) were known as trapiches because the
source of their power was oxen. Some 160, called ingenios, were
driven by steam, but even so the process of sugar making was on
a small and antiquated scale.
Within a few years of the American troops
after the arrival
and American capital, the structure of the sugar industry showed
a marked change. In 1910 there were 146 mills producing sugar.
However, 41 of these were large, modern plants, called centrales,
which turned out twelve times the amount of sugar produced by
all 446 mills just 22 years previously.4 With the shift to large-scale
production, a change in the system of land tenure occurred.
The proprietor who previously had ground his cane in his own
trapiche or ingenio now found it more advantageous to send it to
a nearby central. A single central might grind cane for as many as
200 farmers or, as they are called, colonos. A few centrales were
owned cooperatively by associations of colonos. Others, however,
ground their own cane exclusively. The term colono might then apply
either to an independent farmer or to a tenant farmer who worked
land belonging to the company which operated the central. Unless
otherwise indicated, the term, in this book, will refer to an inde
pendent farmer.
From 1910 to 1930 the number of large centrales remained
about the same. The small ingenios all but disappeared. Sugar pro
duction, however, increased steadily. World War I reduced the out
put of beet sugar in Europe and produced a boom in cane sugar
which lasted into the middle twenties. But by 1925 in the world
market, cane sugar was beginning to feel the pressing competition of
the revived European beet industry. Nevertheless, Puerto Rico, en
joying the protection of the United States tariff, continued to expand
its production. Cuban sugar, which supplied 54 per cent of the
United States market, began to exercise pressure on the domestic
4. Ibid. p. 615.
and Puerto Rican producers. The result was a slight decline in the
price of domestic sugar from about 1925 on. This growing competi
tion tended to favor the large corporations, which were able to
economize by expanding their control over sugar lands at the ex
pense of the independent colono.
. By 1930 four large corporations, operating some eleven centrales,
produced about half of the sugar in Puerto Rico.- The South Porto
Rico Sugar Company, which operated the largest central on the
island, the Guanica Central, turned out about a quarter of a million
tons of sugar annually. Through a subsidiary this corporation con
trolled over 50,000 acres of rich sugar land in the southwestern
section of the island. The Central Aguirre Sugar Company, produc
ing over 100,000 tons, controlled almost 40,000 acres of sugar
land in the southeastern section of the island.- The third largest
corporation was the Fajardo Sugar Company, located on the eastern
end of the island, where it produced some 75,000 tons of sugar
yearly. Finally, the fourth and youngest corporation, the United
Porto Rico Sugar Company, controlled some 26,000 acres of land
and produced about 65,000 tons of sugar.]
. In each of these four corporations at least 80 per cent of the
stock was in the hands of continental investors.- In the sugar indus
try as a whole, a conservative estimate credits two-thirds of the
capital invested to Americans living on the mainland.-For several
decades the American investor received liberal returns from his
Puerto Rican sugar stock.' Over a 23-year period, Fajardo Sugar
Company paid an average of 50 per cent return on the original
investment.5 ]
C Recognizing the limited agricultural resources of the island,
the United States Congress in 1900 incorporated a restriction of
land tenure into the Organic Act, which set up the civil government
of the island. -Any agricultural corporation authorized to operate
in Puerto Rico was forbidden to own or control land in excess of
500 acres.- For thirty years this important law had been a dead letter
on the statute books. -The result was the growth of the absentee-
controlled corporations in direct violation of the law of the land.
Tobacco was the second oldest commercial crop on the island.
Native to the new world and cultivated by the island inhabitants
before the arrival of the Spaniards, tobacco did not prosper under
5. Bailey W. and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New

York: The Vanguard Press, 1931), p. 59.
the strict administration of the Spanish government. At the end

of the nineteenth century, tobacco exports from the island were far
less valuable than coffee and sugar exports.
Under American tariff protection tobacco production rapidly
expanded. The Puerto Rican had always been a cigar smoker, but
as the cigarette became more popular, the use of cigars declined.
The year 1920 was the best in the history of the island's tobacco
industry. Some 321 million cigars were rolled for island consump
tion and exportation; over 576 million cigarettes were produced;
and about 20 million pounds of leaf tobacco were exported.6 In
that year tobacco was second only to sugar in export value.
[ In Puerto Rico, as in Cuba, tobacco is the poor farmer's product.
/Unlike the cane fields the land producing tobacco did not gravitate
toward the corporate interests. -But the final processing of the leaf
and the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes were under monopoly
control of an absentee corporation. -The Porto Rican-American To
bacco Company and its subsidiaries controlled over 80 per cent of
this phase of the tobacco industry.- Like the colono, therefore, the
tobacco farmer was forced to market his crop through intermediary
absentee corporations. ]
The tobacco crop is grown in extensive valleys located in the
island. The farms are usually small, and secondary crops are often
cultivated in addition to the tobacco leaf. The landscape of this
region, which is for the most part cleared, is dotted with curing
sheds. The hurricane of San Felipe, which struck the center of
the tobacco area, demolished the existing sheds. About 80 per cent
of the tobacco farmers, who had little capital set aside, were obliged
to mortgage land in order to finance new barns, to fertilize the
land, or to buy seed.
The third important commercial crop was introduced in the
island in 1722 from Europe by the way of Martinique. Coffee was
a new arrival in the field of commercial agriculture in the new
world, but it took hold rapidly in the western and central mountain
ous area of the island. Coffee did not prosper at altitudes over 3,000
feet, but on the steep slopes below, the shrub produced well.
The technique of coffee cultivation used in Puerto Rico is quite
different from that used in Brazil. The bush is protected from
the violence of the sun, wind, and rain by a covering of taller and
sturdier trees. The underbrush is cleared away and the ground is
6. Ibid., p. 91.
prepared for the small coffee shoot which may take five years to bear
mature fruit. While waiting the farmer may periodically harvest the
tropical fruit from the protecting trees. Even bananas are some
times grown in coffee acreage, although this practice is not recom
mended.
During the nineteenthcentury coffee production grew steadily
and maintained its position as the principal commercial crop of
the island. Land dedicated to coffee increased from 17,000 cuerdas
(a cuerda is approximately an acre) in 1830 to 122,000 cuerdas
in 1896. In 1895 some 40 million pounds of coffee were exported,
bringing over $9 million to the island. This was almost three times
the value of the sugar exported the same year. Puerto Rican coffee
during the latter half of the nineteenth century enjoyed great favor
among the European connoisseurs. The method of cultivation un
doubtedly enhanced the distinctive flavor of the bean.
Coffee producers, settled in inaccessible mountain valleys, had
to devise their own means of processing the ripe berry. Inadequate
transportation prevented processing centers from serving any ex
tended area. As a result each hacienda was equipped with machin
ery for the complicated process of converting the ripe berry into the
hard coffee bean. As in the sugar industry, the proprietor needed
capital to set up this equipment and maintain a working force dur
ing the long period of cultivation. The risk was great but the profit
possible was large enough to encourage many landowners to turn
their lands to coffee.
l When Puerto Rico was transferred from Spain to the United
States, the coffee industry suffered. -The United States tariff was
designed to protect continental products, which included sugar and
tobacco. -But Puerto Rico was the only area under the American
flag which grew a large amount of coffee. -This had little direct effect
on coffee production.- Cheap Brazilian coffee could not compete
locally with the rich native product, and Puerto Rico had never
marketed its coffee in the continental United States.-The European
market had been preferred. -With the change of sovereignty, lines
of communication and transportation were reorganized.- No longer
was it easy to secure direct contact with the European markets.]
More important than the change in sovereignty was the effect
of hurricanes. In 1899 one of the severest storms in modern times hit
the island. San Ciriaco, as it was known, took a heavy toll in life
and property on the island. The damage to the coffee industry was
counted in the millions of dollars. After a destructive hurricane,

coffee requires from five to fifteen years for full recovery. The winds
of San Ciriaco destroyed not only the shrubs, but also, and this was
more serious, the protective shade trees as well.
World War I restricted the European market for a long period.
A Cuban market developed, but it did not last long because Cuba
not only began to revive her own coffee industry but also turned
to the cheaper Brazilian bean. In 1926 another hurricane swept
through the coffee plantations. Losses to growers were estimated at
over $4 million. Forty per cent of the crop was destroyed.
Two years later when the destructive hurricane San Felipe
struck the island, the coffee industry was dealt a blow from which
it could not readily recover. Production dropped from 32 million
pounds in 1927-1928 to million in the following year. With the
5
forces of nature preventing a steady flow of the coffee bean to the

markets, Puerto Rico found that other countries, not afflicted by
periodicaldisasters, were taking over the European markets. Faced
with disappearing markets and a formidable task of reconstruction,
burdened with debt, the coffee farmer was in a serious plight.
The social and economic structure of the coffee hacienda was
almost feudal in nature.-The hacienda strove to be self-sufficient eco
nomically, since isolation prevented frequent visits to urban markets
or appeals to mechanical aid. -The acreage controlled was large
enough to allow subsistence crops to be grown in addition to the
market product. -The system of double cropping also augmented the
return from the land. ;
The common laborer on the coffee farm, known locally as the

jibaro, was usually a tenant Qagregado) who was either given a hum
ble hut or allowed to construct a small house on the farm.- Each
hacienda had its own store which handled some basic commodities
such as rice, codfish, fat, or salt. The agregado usually found himself
bound to the hacienda by debts accumulated at the store. - In the
nineteenth century some haciendas paid their wages in script nego
tiable only at the store of the patr6it, or owner. - The benevolent
patr6n, who often maintained a personal relationship with his agre-
gados, allowed the families to cultivate small plots of land to sup
plement their diet as best they could.
As coffee production declined, the jibaro was forced to look for
work elsewhere. Sometimes he migrated temporarily to the coastal
plains to join the mass of cane cutters during the zafra, which was
the six-months cane harvesting season. If

his migration was perma
nent he and his family swelled the ranks of the urban masses,
jammed together in ramshackle huts, which were built on piles over
stagnant water on the outskirts of the cities.
The town of Mayaguez at the western end of the island was
the center of a large needlework industry. For its labor supply this
industry drew upon the women of the coffee workers' families. These
women journeyed to the town periodically to pick up piecework and
deliver the results of their labors. The wages for such weekly work
fluctuated between one and three dollars. The sewing expected was
delicate and painstaking. The homes of the workers, needless to
add, were without electricity. Women would sit on the door sills
of their homes sewing away in an effort to make a small contribu
tion to the family income.
The population of Puerto Rico was increasing at an alarming
rate. In the thirty years of American rule, the population had in
creased 62 per cent. In 1930 the estimated total was a million and
a half. The island lacked an extensive and reliable census, but the
population density was estimated at 450. Although sugar produc

tion had increased markedly, coffee and tobacco production were
under serious strain. The sugar industry was responsible to foreign
investors and had little lasting effect on the standard of living of
the islander. The static conditions of Puerto Rican economic life
and the difficulties confronting the small rural upper class were
the result of a long trend and could not be thought of as temporary.
Chronic poverty, numerous unemployed, rising farm mortgages,7
and increase of sugar lands had been slowly developing since the
nineteenth century and before. In 1928 the thoroughness with
which the hurricane of San Felipe disrupted economic life focused
attention on the Puerto Rican and his plight.
Several socioeconomic studies of Puerto Rico were published
around 1930. The two studies which attracted the most attention
were the Brookings Institution work entitled Porto Rico and Its
Problems and the Diffies' study, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge. All
these studies agreed that the economic plight of the Caribbean
colony of the United States was a serious one which demanded im
mediate action. Unfortunately, the specialists did not show the
same unanimity respecting the cure as respecting the disease.
7. In six months in 1929 mortgages jumped from $11 million to $23

million. By 1930 Puerto Rico's total of mortgages was $346,013,952.
The authors of almost all these studies realized that the Puerto
Rican one-crop economy was dominated by absentee corporations.
The Diffies, while by no means the first to single out the four great
sugar companies as the culprits, backed their accusations with sta
tistics and vigorously condemned the violations of the 500-Acre
Law. Even the staid analysis of the Brookings Institution recognized
that while the real wages of laborers had not improved since the first
years of large-scale sugar production, the profits of the corporations
had well exceeded the initial capital investment. Unlike the other
investigators, however, the Institution concluded that it would be
a mistake to enforce the 500-acre limit lest the efficiency of sugar
production be impaired. Given the highly competitive industry and

high-cost production of Puerto Rican sugar, breaking up the land
holdings into 500-acre units would impose upon the island's main
source of revenue impossible obstacles which would spell prompt
economic disaster.8
Other writers were not so pessimistic. The Catholic Association
for International Peace published a small pamphlet drawn up by Dr.
Elizabeth Lynskey, in cooperation with its Committee on United
States Dependencies, entitled Porto Rico and the United States.9
This study not only declared that the limitation of the acreage con
trolled by large corporations was in accord with Christian doctrine
as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church, but even recom
mended government ownership of sugar mills in competition with
private sugar companies.
The bare facts of poverty were written on every page of these
studies. The numbers used were often different, but the impression
left upon the reader was one of hopeless despair. The Diffies cited
figures to the effect that one-third of the male population was out of
work in 1926. Of those who were employed many could expect
only seasonal employment during the cutting of the sugar cane.
Even then, during the zafra of 1929, one report estimated that
over 30,000 men were out of work. Those who found work during
the normal cutting season could expect wages of about a dollar
to a dollar and a half. Skilled or semiskilled workers could average
a somewhat higher daily wage receiving about two dollars when work
could be found. There were 28,000 semiskilled workers idle. The
8. Clark, op. cit. p. 630.

9. Elizabeth M. Lynskey, Porto Rico and the United States (Washington:
The Catholic Association for International Peace, 1931).
wages of the women, particularly those in the needlework industry

who did most of their work at home, were the lowest of all. Their
wages often fluctuated between 30 and 70 cents a day.10
An island legislative commission organized in 1929 to investi
gate unemployment in Puerto Rico estimated that for food alone
a bare minimum of 50 cents a day per person was necessary. The
fact that it was an ambitious ideal rather than a bare minimum is
demonstrated by a case cited by the Brookings group. The food
purchases of the head of a family of eleven who earns 50 cents a day
are detailed.11 A typical daily diet would consist of black coffee for
breakfast, rice or corn meal for lunch, and rice and beans for supper.
In an area of low wages, one would expect to find low food costs.
* The staples of the Puerto Rican diet — rice, corn meal, beans, and an
occasional slice of codfish — were all imported into the island and
sold at the same or higher prices than on the continent. "The same
tariff which protected the sugar stockholder prevented the islander
from taking advantage of the lower prices of the world market. 3
Facts and figures perhaps convince some of the skeptical, but
often too many statistics dull the sensitivities of the ordinary reader.
One forgets that the numbers and percentages refer to human beings.
Fortunately for the Brookings report, one specialist of the group had
little interest in contributing to the stock pile of figures. He took to
the mountains on muleback and visited with the jibaro, the island in
habitant of the mountain area. His account of his experiences in
terspersed among the tables and sober comments on mostly public
administration added a tragic realism to the somber recital of data.
One meets a woman who interrupts her mourning before the body
of her recently departed husband to offer the stranger coffee. Chil
dren in one-room rural schools candidly confess that their nightly
fast is not broken until noon. And yet, rare is the family that can
not, at one time or another, count among its members an adopted
(not legally) child.
One of the most vivid stories found repeatedly in the literature
about the social conditions in Puerto Rico tells of a poor family who
lived on the outskirts of the metropolitan area. This family suc
ceeded in securing permission from an upper-class home to pick up
their garbage daily so that they might fatten the family sow. As time
10. Diffie, op. cit., p. 171. Also La Fortaleza, #238/91, "What Porto
Rico Offers," by Hector Lazo, Dec. 1931.
11. Clark, op. cit., p. 563.
went on, the city family took an interest in the growth and health
of the sow, and finally decided to visit the befriended household on
the edge of the city. After some searching, the poor family was
found, but there was no sow to be displayed. It slowly became clear
through conversation that there never had been any sow. The refuse
had been sought to fill the needs of the growing children of the
family.12
When the United States occupied Puerto Rico a military gov
ernment was set up for a period of less than two years. -In 1900
Congress, through the Foraker Act, extended civil government to the
island. This measure was a temporary one which allowed the island
ers a limited form of self-government.- The governor and his six
departmental administrators, who with five islanders composed the
executive council, were appointed by the President of tlie United
States with the consent of the Senate, and were subject to the
Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department.- The Puerto Ricans
were authorized to elect a house of delegates and a resident com
missioner to speak for the island in the House of Representatives
in Washington.
In 1917, after much political pressure on the island and in
Washington, the civil government was liberalized. Much of the credit
for the change must go to Luis Mufioz Rivera, able politician and
tireless resident commissioner. It was perhaps due to his arduous
labors in this cause that he died without seeing the results of his
efforts. Under the modifications made in the Organic Act of the
island in this year, a popularly elected senate and house of repre
sentatives replaced the former executive council and house of dele
gates. Islanders were declared citizens of the United States.- The
President continued to appoint the governor, the attorney general,
and the commissioner of education.- The other four administrators
were named by the governor with the approval of the insular senate.
Congress, which exercised ultimate jurisdiction over the organ
ization of the Puerto Rican government, had made no change in
the Organic Act after 1917. Nor was any change contemplated in
1932, the year in which our study begins. Congress had the legal
power to annul any undesirable legislation approved by the island
12. M. W. Royse, Puerto Rico, An Account of Existing Conditions, p. 8.

(This is a pamphlet with no date or publisher.) See also Esteban A. Bird,
Report on the Sugar Industry in Relation to the Social and Economic System
of Puerto Rico (San Juan: 1941).
legislature.At the same time Congress could be called upon to enact

laws applicable solely to Puerto Rico in case of a default or a refusal
of the local legislature to act.
The judicial system of the island was integrated into the federal
system and cases could reach the Supreme Court. However, since
Congress had pointedly abstained from declaring Puerto Rico an
incorporated territory, the Constitution had limited application to
the island. There were advantages as well as disadvantages involved
in this undefined status.- Federal laws, such as the income tax law,
did not apply to Puerto Rico unless Congress specifically so stated. J
On the other hand, the right of jury trial, for example, was not
guaranteed.
The governor was the highest representative of the federal gov
ernment on the island. Since he was the personal representative of
the Chief Executive his appointment was sometimes made as pay
ment for political favors.- However, his position was that of an ad
ministrator and symbol of federal authority. - Unlike the governor
of Hawaii, he was not required to be an islander and his tenure of
office was not subject to direct popular control. He was expected to
be an objective administrator, in so far as that was humanly possible,
and to maintain himself and his position above the political strug
gles of the islanders.- His position was comparable more to that of
British colonial governors who represented the Crown than to that
of the elected governors of New York or New Mexico.
During the twelve years previous to 1932 the direction of Puerto
Rican affairs had been in the hands of Republican appointees.-The
appointees varied in personal quality and ability from the incompetent
if not corrupt E. Mont Reily, a fervent Republican selected by War
ren G. Harding, to the apolitical, competent if cautious incumbent,
James Beverley.13 - Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., ambitious son of the
dynamic President Theodore Roosevelt, proved to be a medium be
tween these two extremes. A staunch and active Republican with
aspirations to the governorship of New York, Roosevelt was a com
petent and aggressive governor of Puerto Rico.
Political activity in Puerto Rico under Spanish rule had fluctu
ated in successive periods of severe repression and enlightened lib
eralism.- One brief period of marked political freedom came at the
beginning of the nineteenth century — roughly from 1810 to 1814 —
13. Robert H. Todd, Desfile de Gobernadores de Puerto Rico (San Juan:

Imprenta Baldrich, 1943.)
while a period of marked restriction occurred much later, around

A 1887.- After the transfer of sovereignty to the United States, the
? islanders wasted httle time in forming political parties.- Scarcely had
the military government announced its intention to withdraw when
two factions began to contend for the elective posts in the new civil
government. j
The issue which divided these two groups was the chief issue
of Puerto Rican politics down to, and after, 1938, the last year to
be covered in this book.- In one way or another for over forty years
Puerto Rican politics has evolved around the question of the island's
relation to the United States.- The first two parties formed under the
American rule were the Republican party, which was openly sym
pathetic to the United States, and the Federal party, which was non
committal, if not hostile, toward United States supervision of island
affairs. 7
The Republican party, campaigning on a platform of eventual

statehood for Puerto Rico, was victorious in the first election held
on the island.'Some historians maintain, perhaps correctly, that this
victory was due to the gerrymandering of the seven legislative dis
tricts and to fraud at the polls.- The Federal party abstained from
voting in protest. J
In the next election year, 1904, the Republicans were decisively
defeated. -They never again held office completely on their own
power.- The victorious group was the Federal party under a new
name: the Union party. For twenty years this party controlled the
majority of the elected offices in Puerto Rico. The outstanding
leader of this group was Luis Muiioz Rivera, who has already been
mentioned. The platform of the Union party was built around the
/ demand for more autonomy. The party was not adverse to accepting
statehood if it were offered, but complete independence was the
ultimate goal most frequently expressed in campaign oratory.
The Union party was generally looked upon as the political
organization of the well-to-do classes of the town and country.-The
owner of a coffee hacienda, the proprietor of cane with a small
y ingenio, or a colono who sent his cane to an American-owned cen
tral, these were the people who formed the backbone of the Union
party. -They were the same people who had pressed Spain for great
er freedom. As leaders of the Puerto Rican economic and social life
they had felt uncomfortable under the control of the Spaniard..
When the gallego was exchanged for the gringo the same uncom
persisted. -As more and more sugar ingenios gave way to

fortableness
the centralesand coffee was no longer king, the backbone of the
Union party stiffened and the desire for independence grew."
f _ The pro-American
Republican party was frank in its admiration
of American democracy.-The small urban middle class — business
men who had long dealt with trading houses in New York, Baltimore,
^or Philadelphia, professionals, doctors who had been trained in
American universities, or white-collar workers who had found Span
ish rule too harsh or Puerto Rican society too inflexible — made up
the Republican party. -As commercial relations with the United
States grew, this group grew in numbers and influence.-The Repub
lican party tended also to change in character as the middle class
grew in power and prestige. ]
fEven before the end of the military government, the Puerto
Rican laborers organized trade unions. -The initiative was taken
by a Spaniard, Santiago Iglesias, who had been in difficulties with
the Spanish authorities because of similar activity before the arrival
of the Americans.- When the United States troops landed on the
island, Iglesias was in jail in San Juan. -With luck he was able to
place himself under the protection of the American forces. -Thus
protected, he continued his organizing activity, which now took
on more openly a political character.- In June of 1899, in a mass
assembly, the Federation Libre de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico and
the Partido Obrero Socialista were simultaneously organized. J
The federation was a craft-type union which hoped to be ac
cepted into the structure of the American Federation of Labor.- This
' integration was eventually realized through the cooperation of Sam-

uel Gompers and the driving initiative of Santiago Iglesiasr Gompers
visited Puerto Rico in 1905 and a Puerto Rican delegation in that
same year attended the A. F. of L. convention in San Francisco.
- The Socialist Workers party was an independent entity whose
members, however, had to belong to the federation > This political
group was eventually invited to associate with the Socialist party on
the continent. After several false starts the party changed its name
to simply the Socialist party of Puerto Rico/ln the special election
of 1917, under the new provisions of the Organic Act, the Socialist
y party elected one senator and one representative to the island legis-
lature.14-By 1920 the party commanded 60,000 votes, and in 1928
14. Rafael Alonso Torres, Cuarenta Anos de Lucha Proletaria (San

Juan: Imprenta Baldrich, 1939), p. 372.
it was powerful enough to fill 8 of the 1 9 seats in the senate and 18
of the 39 seats in the house.1

fBy 1932 Santiago Iglesias, the renegade Spaniard as he was
sometimes called by his political enemies, was the dean of the Puerto
Rican politicians. He had changed from a fiery radical organizer to
a staid and dependable politician with a well-oiled machine behind
him. Throughout his political career he had consistently demanded
economic and social reforms for the benefit of the working class.
While sympathetic to the United States, he charged the federal
government with neglect because it had allowed Puerto Rico to de
velop into a sweatshop.
The last political party with which we shall have to deal was
formed by men who seceded from the Union party in 1922 when
that party turned its back momentarily on the ideal of independence.
.The new group took the name of the Nationalist party. The growth
of this party was extremely slow and discouraging. In spite of its
political pretensions, it never participated officially in any of the
* elections of the twenties. Its members were not the poor or labor
ing people nor were they the landed elite.- For the most part the
Nationalists of this period were members of the struggling middle
section of the population — the men of letters, admirers of Spain and
Spanish culture, lawyers, and a few doctors. Their numbers were
small and their potential vote power negligible.
The leader of the Union party when this group broke away
was Don Antonio Barcel6, a seasoned politician who had worked his
way up through the ranks of the party. In 1916 he took over the
leadership of the Union party from Mufioz Rivera, who died in that
year. Don Antonio was a tall, sturdily built man with a square face,
a strong jaw, prominent chin, and a healthy stock of greying hair.
During the twenties, the Union party under the guidance of Barcel6
developed no new program. -The party managed to keep itself in
office by aggressively attacking the United States government and
its representative, the governor, and by bringing about a series of
shrewd political combinations.
Barcel6 was instrumental in the removal of Governor E. Mont
Reily, the appointee of President Harding. In the battle with Reily
he was aided by one of the few Americans who had been accepted
into the inner circles of island politics, Walter McK. Jones. Jones,
who had been a resident of the island since 1905, was a very active
member of the Union party. He accompanied Barcel6 on his infre
quent trips to Washington, serving as his interpreter. -The War De

partment officials did not regard Jones as a "helpful influence in
promoting harmonious relations between the Federal Government
and Puerto Rico."15. One Republican Secretary of War was urged to
exercise extreme caution and have witnesses present at any con
versation with Jones.16j
Early in 1924, after losing a small number of Union party
members to the newly formed Nationalist party, Barcelo managed to
bring about an alliance with a large group of the Republican party.
This Alianza, as it was called in Spanish, was successful in the elec
tions of that year.- Several Republican leaders refused to enter the
Alianza and formed a pure Republican group which joined in an un
successful coalition with the Socialists.
Before the elections of 1928, a dissenting group of the Repub
lican wing of the Alianza deserted to join the ranks of the coalition. ,
The Alianza was again victorious, but it was not a convincing vic
tory, since the coalition dominated three of the island's seven districts.
It had lost the fourth by only a small margin, and on the local level
had carried the city governments of all the most important towns
of the island.' Shortly after the elections, the Alianza showed signs
of cracking.- For reasons which are not yet adequately understood,
the Unionist wing of the Alianza divided into two groups.' Antonio
Barcelo, leader of one of these groups, then decided to take the initia
tive and dissolve the Alianza.17 !
Politics were at this stage when a type of human hurricane hit

the island in 1929. President Hoover had appointed the young,
dynamic, and ambitious Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., governor of Puerto
Rico. Young Roosevelt and his wife were appalled by the living con
ditions of the people they had been sent to govern. They saw the
hunger, sickness, and poverty, and set about to relieve a people who
suffered from the highest death rate in the Western Hemisphere.
Of the 33,000 who died in 1929, over half were children.
Roosevelt's special contribution was to direct the attention of
15. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, Bureau of Insular

Affairs (hereafter referred to as BIA), Personal File: Antonio Barcel6, Mem
orandum from Gen. Parker to Secretary of War, May 4, 1933.
16. Ibid., #22913-92, Data on Puerto Rico taken by Secretary of War
and President Hoover to Puerto Rico in 1931, Memo from Gen. Parker to
Secretary of War, March 18, 1931.
17. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter from Antonio
BarcehS to Gov. Roosevelt, Dec. 21, 1932.
American charitable institutions toward the needs of the Puerto

Rican people, particularly the Puerto Rican children. In a short time
over $200,000 was raised from individual donors and private chari
table institutions to be used in work with the young. A school lunch
program was also started. Funds were raised for a 500-bed tuber
culosis hospital. Over a five-year period, some $7 million was to be
spent in social and charitable projects J: Governor Roosevelt's critics,
while appreciative of his industry, pointed out that these were "mere
palliatives based on philanthropy."18
The governor got from Congress an appropriation of about $8
million for hurricane relief. - For the first time Puerto Rico was in
cluded among the 48 states as a recipient of federal aid for road
construction and repair. Some $3 million was secured for this pur
pose. -The governor obtained the cooperation of some large landown
ers in loaning plots for vegetable gardens to working-class families..
A modest homestead program which had been started earlier in the
twenties was carried along under the governor's encouragement. For
example, about 800 families were settled in a project called El
Duque, at a cost of $30,000.
I But these generous gestures did not eradicate the cause of the
island's problems. Yearly over 3,000 were dying of tuberculosis; 500
beds would be of slight help. The inhabitants of the slums in the
large coastal cities were increasing by the thousands; the relocation of
800 families had small effect. The hopeless indebtedness of the small
farmer was made clear by the increase of mortgages, which has al
ready been noted.
. However, TheodoreRoosevelt, Jr., was aware of a serious prob
lem and, unlike many predecessors, he felt that the United States
had certain obligations: Some19 reacted very negatively to his endeav
ors and protested vigorously because he publicized the poverty of the
islanders. Others felt that while he was well intentioned, his efforts
could bring only temporary relief and of that very little.- In 1932
Governor Roosevelt was transferred to the governorship of the
Philippine Islands.
* The charitable enterprises of Governor Roosevelt, the adminis
trative reforms urged by the Brookings Institution, the independence
18. Luis Munoz Marin, "T. R. of P. R." World's Work, LX (July, 1931),
21-24.
19. Pedro Josi Biaggi, The Puerto Rico Tragedy (New York: Editorial
Cronistas Ibero-Americanos, undated, but possibly 1933).
demanded by some frustrated islanders, the birth control preached

by writers in The Nation — all these were indications of steps which
might be taken.- But not one of the measures proposed could count
on the support of all the elements of society and not one could assure
permanent reliefs One writer, Alyce Harris, in a pamphlet published
in 1932, entitled Porto Rico: Fact and Fable, declared: "What this
island needs is a new deal all around, with an honest man shuffling
the cards."20 These words seem prophetic, because Puerto Ricans
were shortly to have a new dealer and a New Deal in their relations
with business and politics.
The economic and social conditions which prevailed in Puerto
Rico after thirty years of American rule were seriously aggravated
by the great hurricane of San Felipe, which was described at the
beginning of this chapter. Matters were brought to an even more
critical pass by another tropical storm, called San Cipriano, which
caused extensive destruction in 1932.
At ten o'clock at night on the twenty-sixth of September, 1932,
this hurricane tore into eastern Puerto Rico, passing over Ceiba
on its way to San Juan. Its winds while passing over the capital
were estimated at 120 miles per hour. Again we lack specific infor
mation because the cups of the anemometer were carried off with
the high winds. The storm continued its route westward, following
the northern coast line. Finally at 5:30 the next morning, it left
Puerto Rico's northwest corner and then veered southward to sea.
San Cipriano left some 225 dead and over 3,000 injured behind
it. The property damage was calculated at over $30 million. Since
it struck some of the heavily populated centers of the island, well
over 100,000 people were left homeless. The fact that most of the
homes destroyed were miserable huts built over stagnant swamplands
in no way mitigated the reality that home no longer existed for thou
sands. This hurricane did not affect the coffee zone, but the hurri
cane San Felipe had left little to be destroyed there. The greatest
agricultural losses were sustained by the small fruit farmers along
the northwestern coast, particularly near Aguadilla.
Credit gone, charitable sources exhausted, it looked as though
even nature had turned against Puerto Rico. It is with matters in
this desperate state that we turn to the history of Puerto Rican poli
tics and the New Deal.
20. Alyce Harris, Porto Rico: Fact and Fable (New York: Golden Galleon
Press, 1932), p. 21.
1932: A YEAR OF POLITICAL CHANGE
/
£7n Puerto Rico, as on the continent, the election
year of 1932 offered good possibilities of political
change. The rupture of the Alianza led to the end of the political
dominance of Antonio Barcel6. This local change, contrary to that *
on the continent, put markedly conservative interests in power.-
With the change in Washington the competent Governor James
Beverley was replaced by an untried and unknown Democrat.
The feeling of change permeated into the small group of Demo
crats on the island of Puerto Rico. Separated since the time of
Woodrow Wilson from the fertile fields of government positions,
the few active Democrats had restricted themselves to personal and
limited political activity. Not only was there no local party openly
sympathetic toward, or cooperating with, the national Democratic
party, but the local members of the party had not even been able
to maintain their legal status as an incorporated and separate party.
In 1912 there had been an organized Democratic party, but failure
to comply with the legal requirements had cost it legal recognition
by 1923.1
This one-sided state of affairs can easily be understood. Since
the island's political activity was restricted to local issues, the island
ers demonstrated little interest in national affairs. Above all, the
language and cultural barriers curtailed the activity of the national
parties in the insular field. These restrictions worked two ways and
limited the participation of the Puerto Ricans in the national groups
1. La Democracia, May 20, 1932.
20
1932: A YEAR OF POLITICAL CHANGE 21
to those few who met the cultural or racial requirements of the

local cliquet, which were often affiliated officially with, or other
wise related to, the national parties. Such unwritten restrictions
were rigidly enforced.
In addition to these circumstances, the official attitude of the
federal government did not encourage the setting up of local branches
of the national parties. General F. Lejeune Parker, then chief of the
Bureau of Insular Affairs through which the War Department ad
ministered the local government of Puerto Rico, argued that to
establish such nominal organizations within an already crowded field
of politics would be quite artificial. The only "genuine local interest
... in these political groups would center around . . . the control of
minor local federal patronage."2 J
The possibility of 1932 being a Democratic year brought re
newed life to the faithful few. This activity was necessarily of a
limited nature, since there was no party organization whose purpose
was to set up and to elect a local slate. The chief task was the selec
tion of the delegates to the National Convention. The few Demo
crats left over from the Wilsonian period expected little opposition
in the selection of this delegation.
The local Democratic group had been under the leadership of
Henry W. Dooley, a national committeeman of the Democratic party
since 19 12. 3 However, two months before the meeting to select the
delegates, Dooley's death threw the position of leadership wide open.
What had promised to be a comparatively uneventful session rapidly
developed into a hotly contested fight to control not only the dele
gation bound for Chicago but the leadership of the local organization
as well.
The contest narrowed down of strength between two
to a test
contending factions, both of which backed the candidacy of Gov
ernor Franklin D. Roosevelt.4 One faction was the old guard, man
aged by the widow of Henry Dooley, and the vivacious Jean Whit-
temore, who backed an attorney from Mayaguez, Benjamin Horton.
According to Governor Beverley, the lawyer had an honest reputa
tion and a likable personality.5
The other faction was controlled by W. Reese Bennett, who was
2. BIA, #9093 Appointments, Confidential B, Memorandum for the
Secretory of War from Gen. Parker, July 17, 1933.
3. New York Times, May 29, 1932. 4. Ibid.
5. BIA, #858 Executive Department, Confidential B, Letter from Gov.
James Beverley to Gen. Parker, April 5, 1933.
chief of police under a Republican administration, but who had

contributed an occasional ten dollars to the Democratic party.6 Ben
nett's hope for control was based on a move to incorporate into the
party persons who had not been active Democrats previously, but
who were recognized as such. This maneuver was tenaciously fought
by the old guard, since to accept these strictly wayward brethren
would have swung the voting balance from Horton to Bennett. It
was agreed that the more than twenty-five initiates would be wel
comed into the party fold, although they would remain ineligible
to vote upon matters to be taken up at that meeting. The vote on
this issue was close and the atmosphere was charged with tension.
The reporter for La Democracia, a liberal daily journal of San Juan,
judged the scene with the following comments :
The spectacle which of the Democrats offered at Saturday's

some
convention was not very edifying, as not only were coarse words
spoken, but even violent disputes occurred among some of the ladies
present, to the point of one lady attacking another.7
The result was a defeat for Reese Bennett and his group. This
element thereupon withdrew from the meeting and announced its
intention to summon a new convention at an early date. Before this
could meet, however, it was disclosed that the group led by Ben
jamin Horton spoke for no legally recognized entity. Bennett prompt
ly undertook to set up a Democratic party organized in accordance
with the laws of the island. Thus constituted, this group met and
selected their representatives to the Chicago convention.8
In spite of Bennett's last-minute attempt to prevent Horton 's
delegation from sailing by obtaining a restraining order from the
insular attorney general's office,9 the old guard reached Chicago, and
was seated by the committee on credentials of the National Con
vention. All the machinations of Bennett were of no avail, since
Farley10 and Governor Roosevelt11 were in favor of the Horton group.
6. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Democratic National Campaign Com

mittee Correspondence, 1928-1933, United States Possessions, Before Con
vention, A-Z, Item 8, Letter from William J. Barr, March 28, 1932.
7. La Democracia, April 25, 1932. 8. Ibid., May 20, 1932.
9. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Democratic National Campaign Com
mittee Correspondence, 1928-1933, United States Possessions, Unarranged,
Letter from Mrs. Henry Dooley to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jan. 23, 1933.
10. New York Times, May 29, 1932.
11. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Democratic National Campaign Cor-
The motivation of this squabbling was apparently the hope of

future spoils, and the whole episode points up the artificiality of the
national party organization on the island.- Among these same Demo
crats we can find sentiments which were not only being expressed
but being recommended by the Secretary of State to the Secretary
of War as coming from a "very reliable" observer. ]
- When I first came to Puerto Rico in 1915, in President Wilson's

Administration, all the Federal positions except a few of the lower
grades were held by Americans, and in the Insular Government the
Governor, the Attorney General of Porto Rico and his principal
assistants were all Americans and Democrats. Now only a few of the
highest Federal positions are held by Americans and in the Insular
Government there is not now an American in any position of im
portance except those who are appointed by the President and con
firmed by the United States Senate. During the last few years while
the Insular Departments have been under the control of local native
political leaders, the Insular Government has run hopelessly into
debt, and has nothing much in the way of permanent improvements
to show for the enormous bond issues that have been spent.}
/ In view of the above, it is my firm opinion that not only should
Americans (Democrats) be appointed to all Federal positions here,

but that Americans should be appointed also to all Insular Govern
ment positions of importance in order that our new Democratic
Governor may be surrounded with loyal efficient Heads of Depart
ments and assistants who will cooperate with his policies.12 Z
The attitude expressed in this letter was not, as we shall see,

unusual among continentals on the island. The severe judgment
often expressed on the local capacity for home rule seems to have
been inspired by an interest in government positions.
The platforms of the national parties include a plank on Puerto
Rican policy. These planks attempt to define the future political
relationship between the island and the continent. Since, in the
case of the Democrats, the plank was proposed by a small group
of continentals living an isolated existence in a foreign culture, the ex
pression reflects inadequately the actual political tenor of the islander.
respondence, 1928-1933, United States Possessions, Before Elections Puerto

Rico, A-Z, Gov. Roosevelt to Gov. James Beverley, Aug. 29, 1932.
12. BIA, #9093 Appointments, Letter from Cordell Hull to George
Dern, March 28, 1933. Enclosed was a copy of the above quoted letter after
depriving it of any identifying information. . i
The Horton group, which succeeded in being seated, requested

successfully that the Democratic party look toward eventual statehood
for Puerto Rico. The motivation behind such an expression, as ex
plained by Horton in a Beverley, was to gain a
letter to Governor
public recognition of the fact that Puerto Rico was, and would be,
considered by a Democratic administration as "an integral and per
manent part of the United States and [therefore] entitled to the same
benefits and generally speaking, to the same obligations as the main
land.""
Governor Beverley, suggesting a plank of a more realistic and
immediate nature, wished to see the island included in any legislative
or administrative measures enacted for the benefit of the nation.14-
The governor thus wisely refrained from entering into the contro
versial field of political status and directed his attention to the im
mediate problem at hand.
The Bennett group, which was not seated, had planned to offer
a completely different plank. Their statement called to mind that
the Organic Act, which established the civil government of Puerto
Rico and defined the relationship between the United States govern
ment and the island, was last liberalized by a Democratic administra
tion. Now they requested a continuation of this enlightened policy
and proposed further changes in the act. Specifically, they requested
that the governor be elected by local suffrage and, once selected, be
granted the power to appoint, with the consent of the insular senate,
the heads of the various administrative departments of his govern
ment. Not content with this radical departure from colonial pro
cedure, the Bennett group further proposed that immediate steps be
taken to hold a plebiscite which would determine the permanent
political status of the island.15
This plank was based on a philosophy of home rule or local
autonomy and not on a move for separation or independence from
the United States. Francis Dexter, a lawyer from San Juan and a
member of the group, reflected the feeling of his fellow party mem
bers in a letter to Franklin Roosevelt. He stated that in his opinion
"independence would be a great mistake and a calamity on account
of the size and the resources which would make impossible the
13. La Fortaleza, #238/7, Letter of Benjamin Horton to Gov. James

Beverley, June 2, 1932.
14. Ibid., Letter of Gov. James Beverley to Benjamin Horton, June 1,
1932. 15. La Democracia, May 20, 1932.
maintenance of an independent government."16 Dexter went on to

suggest that the growth of sentiment in favor of independence had
been fostered by "the failure of Congress to permanently determine
the political status of the territory and to grant its demands for ...
home rule."
These two groups which contended for the recognition of the
national party leaders as the legitimate local representatives of the
Democratic party clearly reflected these divergent attitudes. One view
was conservative in the sense that it foresaw no immediate change
but rather a continuation of the status quo looking toward a day in
the distant future when statehood might be realized. Prevalent in the
minds of some was the reactionary hope that the degree of local
participation in the government should not be increased but restricted
much further than it was under Republican rule.
The other view looked toward an immediate change that would
permit greater local autonomy. This local autonomy would be bol
stered by a freedom of expression of the islanders themselves through
a plebiscite which would define decisively and permanently the rela
tionship between the United States and Puerto Rico. This, of course,
would open the way toward possible independence, but this group
could not be labeled as in favor of or against independence.
One member of the Dexter group and a strong advocate of great
er autonomy was Walter McK. Jones, the close adviser to Antonio
Barcelo. During the twenties Barcelo and Jones had worked jointly
for greater autonomy. The demands for outright independence had
been minimized. The pressing political circumstances of the 1932
campaign forced a change in this position.
Barcelo, having broken from the Alianza, endeavored to reorgan
ize and resurrect his old party, the Union party, but he was thwart
ed in his efforts because there was a sufficient number of Union
members in the Alliance to continue the entity. This refusal to allow
the breaking up of the Alliance gave course to a legal battle which
was carried up to the Circuit Court of Appeals of Boston without
avail. The Court defined Barcelo and his group as a dissenting fac
tion and refused to recognize their right to re-establish the old Union
party.
[ The Alliance, now no longer composed of the followers of Bar
celo, entered into a working agreement with the minority coalition,
16. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter from Francis

Dexter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 16, 1933.
under the name of the Good Government Group.- In January of

1932, in an act of official amalgamation, the Alliance united with
the pure Republicans in a party which carried the name Union-
Republican party. ?The final touch in the construction of a formid
able political bloc was carried out in the city of Mayaguez where
the newly formed Union-Republican party agreed to combine forces
with the Socialist party in a new coalition. The agreement gave the
Socialist party the right to name the coalition candidate for the
position of resident commissioner for the island in Washington. The
Union-Republican party was to get the position of president of the
insular senate and the party of the coalition which would poll the
highest votes was to get the position of speaker of the house.17
-Thus the election of 1932 was to be fought out between these
two groups. -The one was the newly formed coalition of the Socialist
and the Union-Republican parties.-This latter party was composed
of three factions; the pure Republicans, the old Republican elements
of the Alliance, and the small Unionist faction of the Alliance which
had refused to follow Barcelo.-The other group was that formed by
the followers of Barcelo. J
i The line-up against Barcelo was a formidable one. Recalling that
he had not only lost his party identification, but had given up the
"Union" label to the opposition, one might well consider his long
and successful political career at an end .-Certainly the complicated
realignments carried out almost every four years did not work for a
clear understanding of the political picture.
- With more than 40 f
per cent of the electorate illiterate,18 it would be too much to hope
that an election would be decided on issues rather than by the per
sonalities involved.- This, of course, worked to the advantage of Bar-
celo, since for at least the past twelve years he had been a dominant
political personality on the island. 1
Don Antonio, a veteran politician, bore the battle marks of many
a political campaign, but now without even a party the results looked
doubtful. Not only his backers but those in opposition had sincere
respect for the political ability of the man. He was recognized by the
War Department as "an astute, aggressive politician . . . with a very
17. Resumen Histdrico; Elecciones Generates 1932 (Ponce; Gil de La-

madrid Hermanos, 1932), pp. 7-9; See also BIA, #719-73 to 88, Part 2,
Politics, unsigned and undated memorandum for the files.
18. Clark, op. cit., p. 77.
large following . . . whose early return to control of the local legisla

ture is by no means impossible."19
Vail Spinoza, who considered himself in opposition to Barcelo,
recognized him as a "fiery speaker" who could only be beaten by the
formation of a coalition. 20fThe considered judgment of Governor
James Beverley concerning Don Antonio was that while some of his
party were not his staunch followers, they nevertheless "believe that
it is impossible to win an election without him because of his per
sonal prestige."21 J
* TThe "dissenting faction," gathered around Antonio Barcelo,
promptly set about to organize itself into a political party under the
auspicious name of the Liberal party. -The platform of this new
group was no easy job to hammer out. -To win the election Don
Antonio realized that, regardless of personal desires or past state
ments, he would have to undertake an aggressive campaign.- His own
political beliefs were well hidden behind the tactical maneuvering
which had taken him in and out of a number of political combina
tions according to the dictates of the apparent (sometimes to him
alone, as in 1929) expedients of the moment. I
.. In 1929 Barcelo, speaking of the Puerto Rican people, wrote
/to the War Department: "They are American citizens. -They do not
desire independence.- On the contrary, their ultimate desire is to
remain always in close association with the United States. "zl Coupled
with this statement was a request for local autonomy which included
the right to elect the island's governor.-This position was not marked
ly changed until 1931- On March 13, 1932, the Liberal party
unanimously approved the following plank in its political platform:
The Puertorican
Liberal Party therefore declares:- That its pur-
pose is to demand the immediate recognition of the sovereignty of
'
Puerto Rico and make it effective by the most rapid, most practical
and most direct methods, thus establishing the absolute independence
of Puerto Rico in the brotherhood of nations.".}
19. BIA, #1028, Puerto Rican Elections, Memorandum to Secretary

of War from Gen. Parker, May 17, 1933.
20. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter from Vail
Spinoza to Governor Roosevelt, Nov. 23, 1932.
21. BIA, #26429-203, Letter from Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker,
April 18, 1932.
22. Ibid., #719-73 to 88, Puerto Rican Politics, Letter of Barcel6 to
War Department, May 17, 1932.
23. La Democracia, March 14, 1932.
* LThe platform went on to state that while the island awaited the
carrying out of this act of moral justice, the Liberal party would
cooperate completely with the existing de facto authorities. -Further
more, they agreed to work to secure all the social, economic, and
cultural measures which would benefit the island. j
1 In a letter to the recently elected President Roosevelt, Antonio
Barcel6 briefly stated his party's position.
It maintains as a political solution the independence of Puerto

Rico, on the basis of our moral rights as a people, of our economic
needs, and of the mutual benefits, both moral and material, that our
independence would entail for the United States and Puerto Rico.24:
The War Department did not view either the program of the
Liberal party or Don Antonio's forceful manifestations for moral
justice with great alarm. -In a memorandum for the new Secretary
of War, George Dern, who was about to meet this fiery personality
for the first time, General Parker, director of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, said that Don Antonio "is the special exponent of the old
Spanish elements of the population and has been (when not allowed
to have his own way) a bitter critic of the United States' policies in
Puerto Rico. He has been a highly vocal, but not entirely consistent,
advocate of independence."25!
Governor Beverley wrote to the Bureau just a month after the
approval of the Liberal platform, giving his explanation of the latest
political developments.
-
It
has been my experience that at least 50 per cent and prob
ably as high as 70 per cent of this party are not independentistas but
are autonomistas who favor autonomic independence under the
United States.-The fact that independence was not eliminated from
the platform is due to the personal influence of Barcel6 and some of
his close advisors.-You are probably aware of the political history of
Barcel6 and know that he has changed positions and opinions on the
political future of the island several times in the past.28
Although the estimates seem high, there is no way to prove them
24. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter from Barcelo

to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dec. 21, 1932.
25. BIA, Personal File: Antonio Barcel6, Memorandum from Gen.
Parker to Secretary of War, May 4, 1933.
26. Ibid., #26429-203, Letter of Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker, April
18, 1932.
unreliable. In the third of a series of three long articles in La Dem-

ocracia, which was recognized as the organ of propaganda for the
Liberal party, one of Antonio Barcelo's young Turks dedicated a
great deal of attention to the autonomistas whom he had divided into
eight different groups. The writer admitted that there were perhaps
hundreds of loyal party members in these categories.27
However moderate or numerous the autonomistas might have
been, they were lumped with the radicals of the Liberal partyJThe
independence program was approved unanimously by the party con
vention, and Don Antonio spoke the words of the left wing. (Wheth
er they were sincere or not is of little concern at this point. )[For
the political opposition and the American sympathizers, both Puerto
Rican and continental, there was no question that the Liberal party
had but one ideal: independence. 2
One personality who perhaps goaded Don Antonio into this
category in the political spectrum was the author of the above-men
tioned article concerning the autonomists.CLuis Mufioz Marinjwas
no novice to the island political arena in spite of his youth. As son
of the famous Luis Mufioz Rivera, founder of the Union party, his
name was well known.
At the age of nineteen Luis Muiioz Marin was offered a position
as secretary to the successor of his father in the position of resident
commissioner of Puerto Rico in Washington.! The young man aban

doned a prelaw course at Georgetown to accept this position, which
he held two years.- He then turned to the study of journalism at
Columbia University. "He soon found the literary circles of New
York, and within a short time he had secured a reputation as a
translator and writer - He contributed to The American Mercury of
Henry Mencken; The Nation, then edited by Ernest Gruening; The
New Republic; and Poetry.- He translated into Spanish, The Man
With a Hoe, by Edwin Markham, a poet whom he knew and ad
mired.28.
In 1920 Luis Muiioz Marin entered island politics if not as a
member of the insular Socialist party, then, at least, as a defender
of its principles and a friend of Santiago Iglesias, its founder.
In 1926 he assumed the editorship of the famous paper founded
by his father, La Democracia. However, neither his pro-Socialist

28. Angel M. Torregrosa, Biografta de Luis Munoz Marin (San Juan:
Editorial Esther, 1944), Chapter IX.
campaigning nor his editorship was destined to keep him fully occu
pied, and he soon left to return to the continent. The depression
made it difficult to live adequately in the States, and in the latter
part of August, 1931, he returned to the island again to take up
permanent residence and to cooperate with the Liberal party.
I At the time, the party, led by Antonio Barcelo, declared
same
itself unequivocally for Puerto Rican independence.- Munoz Marin
soon became recognized as the most fluent spokesman for this posi
tion .7 From the editorial position of La Democracia, which he again
assumed on March 7, 1932, he clearly defined the uphill fight of
his party and he outlined the direct steps which should be taken.
Munoz Marin wrote in a private letter just after the election :
You know the general policy of the paper. We are for independ
ence, but we don't bait the United States unless driven to it. We
have a special tenderness for the Democratic party in spite of its
having statehood in its platform . . . that does not mean anything
. . . because of its traditional liberal attitude towards Puerto Rico
and the Philippines. We are opposed to begging money from the
American taxpayers and instead claim the right to have our own
tariff, to get rid of the coastwise shipping laws, and to be empowered
to regulate absentee ownership.29
Thus through the manifestations of Barcelo, characterized by an

editorial in the New York Tribune as merely a method of protest
against his unfortunate position as a political leader without a legal
party, and through the sincere and potent pen of the young editor
of La Democracia, the newly baptized Liberal party was clearly
clothed in the ideal of independence.
The other large political bloc composed of the Socialist and
Union-Republican coalition presented a curious and almost inex
plicable combination to the casual observer. Up to 1932 the Socialist
party had maintained a consistent political program based on eco
nomic measures designed to alleviate the miserable conditions of the
common laborer - From year to year as the control of continental
corporations grew over the economic life of the island, the Socialist
party slowly increased its following and importance. The advent of
the depression promised to swell even more the ranks of the party.]
The Union-Republican party was led by a series of personalities
29. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letter of

Luis Munoz Marin to Ruby Black, Dec. 13, 1932.
all prominent in the business world or in the legal profession of the

island.- Alfonso Valdes, who, in addition to other business enterprises,
was part owner of the light and power company which served the
city of Mayagiiez; Rafael Martinez Nadal, a good criminal lawyer
and a very active leader of the Pure Republican faction; Celestino
Iriarte, a shrewd lawyer and politician; Pedro Juan Serralle"s, owner
of a large sugar central on the south coast of the island; and sugar
lawyer Miguel Angel Garcia Me"ndez were the most prominent fig
ures. -The coalition published a newspaper called El Pais, edited by
Juan B. Huyke, who had been commissioner of education under
Republican administrations. J
The marked contrast between the economic interests which these
two groups represented would have logically suggested two separate
and opposed political entities. - Often politics is far from logical, but
in this case there is a reasonable explanation.-In the case of Santiago *
Iglesias, the undisputed and much-admired leader of the working
masses, there was a conflict of interests which in the final analysis
placed his economic program in a secondary position to his own
political philosophy. j
[In a letter to Dern in March, 1933, Iglesias explained his stand.
The Socialist Party was never greatly concerned with the im
mediate need for raising the statehood-independence issue. - It was
and is more interested in the Island's economic problems.Tt has been
opposed to the continued revival of that issue considering it as purely
a political scheme devised chiefly as a means of fomenting discord,
fostering anti-American propaganda to enable the secessionists to
capture, if they can, the Island's government.!
~
+ The Socialist Party is striving for such a form of government as
will guarantee equality, liberty, and justice for all citizens but its
fundamental goal is permanent association with the people of the
United States. J
Both parties, the Union-Republican and the Socialist parties,
having some common ideals, decided to form a Coalition, whose main
object is the establishment and organization in the Island of a gov
ernment capable of safeguarding the fundamental principles and
ideals of a true American democratic and republican form of govern
ment in the Island and which may be prepared to undertake the
solution of the vital economic problems to bring about the complete
rehabilitation of the Island.30'
30. BIA, #719-73 to 88, Part 2, Puerto Rican Politics, Letter from
Santiago Iglesias to Secretary of War, March 14, 1933.
* LThe cord which bound these strange bedfellows in politics to

gether was a loyalty to the United States and a unified opposition to
the independence movement. -Thus we have the incongruous act of
a leader campaigning for the United States Republican
Socialist
party in the wards populated by Puerto Ricans in the cities of New
York and Chicago. 'There is also the case of a nominal Democrat
who wrote to Franklin D. Roosevelt.
In this coalition it was necessary to accept the Socialist candidate

for commissioner to Washington. . . . Mr. Iglesias is Spanish born
and an American citizen, with International [sic] tendencies. I had
to vote for him as his opponent was a fiery anti-American young
man. ...I personally voted the coalition ticket as I felt my duty
to my nation, America, came first.31
The platform of the coalition did not express complete agreement

r
with the existing relations between Puerto Rico and the United States. ]
In effect it said that the people of Puerto Rico did not wish to live
under a colonial government, but that the island aspired to govern
itself. It offered two solutions: the acceptance of Puerto Rico as a
state in the Union, or "the full internal and external sovereignty in
harmony and brotherhood with the United States."32 As the first step
toward either of these solutions, the coalition argued for the right to
elect the governor of the island.
The final political entity which participated in the election of
1932 was the Nationalist party. On May 11, 1930, Pedro Albizu
Campos, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was elected president
of the Nationalist party. -From this date on the party turned to a
more active and sensational political agitation. Previously the political
group had shunned formal organization, but as the elections of 1932
approached the party took steps to draw public attention. Two ex
amples of this activity might be mentioned.
Late in 1930, during the depths of the depression, the National
ists launched on the Wall Street market a sale of bonds to raise
money to establish the Republic of Puerto Rico. These bonds were
issued in five denominations, the largest being $100. 33 The first
31. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter from Vail

Spinosa to Franklin Roosevelt, Nov. 23, 1932. Vail Spinosa was chairman
of the Horton delegation in Chicago.
32. BIA, #719-73 to 88, Part 1, Memorandum of Puerto Rican Poli
tics for files, no signature, no date.
33. Ibid., #26429-B2, Puerto Rican Independence Bond Issue, Letter
from Gov. Roosevelt to Gen. Parker, April 23, 1931.
public sale was one of $200,000 announced in April, 1931, in San

Juan.34 The hope was that if the first sale met with success the issue
would grow to $5 million. Apparently the first public sale of the
bonds on the continent was attempted in the summer of 1932. 33
When Washington inquired about the bonds, Governor Theo
dore Roosevelt pointed out that the purpose was just to raise funds
for political activity, and he wisely advised the War Department
to ignore them.36 A year later when the issue moved to New York's
Wall Street, General Parker requested legal opinion from Judge
Advocate General Blanton Winship. The advice came back:
There is no legal objection to any individual or associations

of individuals, or political party, advocating independence for Puerto
Rico if they desire to do so, or to their raising money for propaganda
for that purpose, provided that they confine their efforts wholly to
peaceful and legitimate means of influencing public opinion.37
The opinion went on to state that since the bonds were issued
by a nonexistent republic, they were fraudulent and legal action
could be instigated. However, no action was ever taken.
The second incident which netted the Nationalists timely pub
licity evolved around a private letter written by one Dr. Cornelius
Rhoads,38 who had been working under the auspices of the Rocke
feller Foundation in one of the leading hospitals of the island. This
letter, which fell, under suspicious circumstances, into the hands
of the Nationalists, as described by Governor James Beverley,
/ "amounts to a confession of murder," and was "libel on the Puerto

Rican people."39 - The Nationalists, who gave the document full
publicity, quickly generalized from Dr. Rhoads to all American
doctors on the island, and from them to all Americans. - The accusa
tion was that all Americans were in a secret, but organized, cam
f paign to exterminate the Puerto Rican people.

f If one were to accept the document at its face value, it would
be difficult to conclude otherwise. - Rhoads had written :
34. New York Times, April 10, 1931. 35. Ibid., June 29, 1932.
36. BIA, #26429-B2, Letter from Gov. Roosevelt to Gen. Parker,
April 23, 1931.
37. Ibid., Letter from Judge Advocate General Winship to Gen. Parker,
Aug. 31, 1932.
38. El Mundo, Jan. 27, 1932. The late Dr. Rhoads was director of
the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Research Center.
39. La Fortaleza, #172/orig., Letter from Gov. James Beverley to
Col. F. F. Russell of the Rockefeller Foundation, Jan. 30, 1932.
They are beyond doubt the dirtiest, laziest, most degenerate race
of men ever inhabiting this sphere.- It makes you sick to inhabit
the same island with them ...
a tidal wave or something to totally
exterminate the population is necessary. . .- . I have done my best
to further the process of extermination by killing off eight and trans
planting cancer into several more.40]
Dr. Rhoads wired Governor Beverley that his letter was a "fan
tastic and playful composition written entirely for my own diversion
and intended as a parody on supposed attitudes of some American
minds in Porto Rico."41- He added that he was willing to return to
the island to face any legal charges that might arise. ]
[ Governor Beverley ordered a thorough investigation looking
toward prosecution of libel and even murder. -The libel charge could
not be prosecuted because the doctor did not purposely make public
his libelous statements. -No deaths of patients could be traced to
negligence or malpractice on the part of the doctor,42 and no formal
charges were ever brought. ]
Certainly the incident was an unfortunate one as far as United
States-Puerto Rican relations were concerned. -It served to start off
the Nationalist party's campaign year in a very successful fashion.]
The party convention, held shortly after the publicity over the letter,
came out for immediate and outright independence for Puerto Rico.j
Contrary to previous party policy, which had not stressed active and
formal political organization, the convention declared itself in favor
of accepting elective offices in the colonial government with the view
in mind of working for the destruction of this same government.
Pedro Albizu Campos was selected as the party candidate for a posi
tion as senator at large, the only office which the small party evi-
dently felt strong enough to capture.43
The obvious question which arises concerns the relationship
between the Nationalist party and the Liberal party, both of which
pretended to speak for independence. The Liberal party, by far
the larger group, could afford to take, and did take for a while, a
magnanimous attitude toward the Nationalist group. The fullest ex
pression of this attitude was found during the Liberal convention in
March, 1932. While Don Antonio Barcel6 was delivering the prin
cipal address to his followers from all over the island, Pedro Albizu
40. El Mundo, Jan. 27, 1932.

41. La Fortaleza, #172/orig., Wire from Dr. Rhoads to Gov. Beverley,
Jan. 30, 1932. 42. La Democracia, Feb. 3, 1932. 43. Ibid.
Campos with a small group of the faithful entered noisely into the
assembly and proceeded to the lectern. In a great gesture, Barcelo
cut his speech short and turned the floor over to Albizu Campos, who
harangued the gathering for over two hours on independence. A
fraternal Latin embrace sealed the pact of cooperation between the
two groups.44 The Liberals would have gained nothing by rejecting,
and thus antagonizing, the Nationalists, and much might have been
realized by a cooperative campaign against the coalition of pro-Amer
ican parties. This honeymoon was destined to last but a few short
months.
As has been pointed out, the group led by Antonio Barcelo lost
a long legal battle, which was carried up to the Circuit Court of
Boston, to maintain the name and organization of the Union party.
The electoral law under which the 1932 elections were to be held
had been approved by the senate controlled by Antonio Barcelo. This
law had been drawn up in such a way as to deposit the electoral
machinery in the hands of the powerful and already existing political
parties,45 of which at that time the Barcelo group was the dominant
one. Under this law, new parties were required to present petitions
for recognition with signatures of at least 10 per cent of the total
votes tabulated in the previous election. The Liberal party, a new
political entity, was forced to circulate petitions in order to receive a
place on the ballot.
The Nationalist party, which had polled a mere 329 votes in
1928, was confronted with the same requirement. Unaided, it is
doubtful if the Nationalists could have met the requirements the
law set down. In the opinion of Governor Beverley, later borne out
by the election returns, the Nationalist party was directly aided by
the Union-Republican party in securing over 30,000 signatures on
petitions to be recognized as a legal political party, and included on
the ballot.46 This effort was undertaken only after a bold-faced at
tempt on the part of the legislature to put the Nationalist party on
the ballot by law. This move was blocked by Santiago Iglesias and
Antonio Barcelo.47
With a position on the ballot, the Liberal party's battle had only
44. Ibid., July 9, 1932.

45. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Puerto Rico,
Appointments Box 46, Letter from Secretary of War George Dern to Franklin
D. Roosevelt, in which there is cited a letter from Gov. Beverley, May 12,
1933. 46. Ibid. 47. La Democracia, July 11, 1932.
started because the election law, which had been carefully devised
by those who had no idea that it would boomerang, left the super
visory election committees in the local wards in the hands of the
existing parties and accorded no representation to the newly organ
ized groups. In Puerto Rico, as will be indicated later, control of
committees was essential to controlling the votes of the ward.
these
No one was more aware of this than Antonio Barcelo, who had
helped devise this fraud-permitting legislation.
The Liberal party started a campaign to change the law. Since
they could expect little cooperation from the island legislature, they
decided to take their case to the federal Congress. Congress could
set up a new election machinery for the island by acting on its con
stitutional prerogative of legislating on all matters pertaining to the
territories. However, rather than go this far, the plan of the Liberal
delegation to Washington was to request that Congress grant the
War Department emergency powers to cover the immediate situation
and thus insure fair elections in 193 2. 48
The Liberal delegation consisted of Luis Mufioz Marin, who was

joined in New York on his way to Washington by Martin Travieso,
lawyer and one-time member of the Union party, of whom more will
be said later. Mufioz was fortified with a letter of introduction from
an old acquaintance of his former days in New York City, Roger
Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union.49 Muiioz succeeded
in planting the problem before the proper authorities, but he found
that the administration was following a different tactic.
This Washington trip was the first of many which were to be
made by Mufioz in the interest of the Liberal party. Future ones
would end in a more successful fashion, principally for Mufioz. Gen
eral Parker correctly suggested: "There is doubtless another pur
pose in the activities of Mr. Mufioz and his colleagues — namely, the
publicity and political capital which they hope to gain by claiming
48. BIA, #1028-100 to 132, Part 2, Puerto Rican Elections, Mem

orandum for the Secretary of War from Gen. Parker, June 9, 1932.
49. ACLU, Vol. 524, Letter of introduction of Mufioz Marin from Roger
Baldwin, May 3, 1932. The ACLU, in their publication CiviZ Liberties in
the American Colonies, March, 1933, suggested that the problems the Barcel6
group was having were due to the fact that the group had taken such a
forthright stand on independence, and that the United States government
was blocking its political development (p. 18). This hasty conclusion is not
supported by subsequent government action favorable to the Barcelo group's
inclusion on the ballot.
credit for an action that Congress or the War Department might

be persuaded to take."50
In this battle the Liberal party found a strong ally in the gov
ernor, James Beverley. He agreed with Barcelo that the election law
had to be changed and invoked a special session of the island legis
lature to amend the law. However, the legislature was dominated
by a bloc, ironically called the Good Government Group, which was
strongly opposed to Barcelo and to any change in the election law.
Nevertheless, the governor was determined that this problem would
be solved on the island and wrote to the War Department that no
action was necessary at that time.51 The hopes of the governor were
placed on an agreement between Jose' L. Pesquera, resident com
missioner, and Santiago Iglesias, upon an amendment to the electoral
law which he had devised.
The governor's hopes for a solution might have been thwarted
had it not been for the action of the Liberal delegation in Washing
ton. Munoz Marin had succeeded in getting Senator Cutting and
Bepresentative Cross to sponsor a bill which would remedy the
situation. An urgent wire from the resident commissioner to his
friends in the insular legislature outlined the pending action :
Unable to prevent immediate action by Congress on Cutting

and Cross bills if Puerto Rican Legislature fails to adopt, before
expiration of tenth day of special session, amendments to election
law as agreed between majority leaders, governor, and myself.52
On the day the wire arrived, the insular senate unanimously passed
the agreed-upon amendments.
The emphasis on this incident would be hard to justify if it were
not for the irony involved. This is concisely illustrated by the first
page of La Democracia for May 12, 1932. In one article Luis Mufioz
Marin is quoted as saying that the remedy for the situation should
come from the federal Congress.
Congress should amend the Organic Act so that the right to

vote of all citizens is safeguarded forever from the action of any
majority.53
50. BIA, #1028-100 to 132, Part 2, Memo., Gen. Parker, June 9, 1932.
51. Ibid., #1028-133 Part 3, Letter of Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker,
May 25, 1932.
52. Ibid., Wire from Jose Pesquera, June 30, 1932.
Near the above is an article referring to the unofficial observers of the

Liberal party who planned to attend the National Convention of the
Republican and Democratic parties. The lead of this article reads:
The demand for independence considered as the only solution

to our political status.
[It
must have been sobering thought to those few Liberals who re
a
flected upon that their demands for electoral justice were met only
it
because of the threat of federal action, that same influence which they
were so solidly pledged to remove.
was during this special session that the Union-Republican
It
legislative group threatened to include the Nationalist party on the

ballot and in the vital election committee. This move was loudly
protested by the Liberal party, which had gone through the costly
process of fulfilling the legal prerequisites, on the grounds that this
was unwarranted favoritism and thinly disguised move against
a
the Liberal party, which stood to profit by the proindependence votes
of the unorganized Nationalist group. Of course, the astute leaders of
the coalition realized that either way the matter was resolved the
Liberal party would find itself in difficulties. By opposing this gen
erous offer to include the Nationalist party by legislation, Antonio
Barcelo incurred the vituperative wrath of Albizu Campos.54
When this move was frustrated in the House, after having been
approved in the Senate, the coalition leaders urged and, as has been
implied, aided the Nationalist party to secure the necessary signa
tures to be included on the ballot with the other recognized parties.
With the Nationalists now in the race, the political campaign took
on greater vigor.
Two examples of the political activity of the Nationalist party
might be referred to. On the night of July the Nationalist party
9
held public meeting in the Plaza Baldorioty de Castro in San Juan,

a
in which several speakers took the opportunity to criticize the legis

lators, particularly Barcelo and Santiago Iglesias, who would not
concede to the plans of the Republicans to place the party on the
ballot. Pedro Albizu Campos, the principal speaker of the evening,
was introduced at about nine o'clock and spoke for two and half
a
hours. While not limiting his attack to Barcelo and Iglesias, he sin
gled them out with others, like Chief Justice of the Puerto Rican
Supreme Court Emilio del Toro, as traitors to their country. The gov-
54. La Democracia and El Mundo, July

9,
1932.
ernor was accused of issuing orders to the police to take every oppor
tunity to do physical violence to the Nationalists. The orator pledged
on his honor that if any Nationalist lost his life at the hands of the
police, the chief of police would forfeit his own life. The meeting
ended quietly and the few remaining faithful accompanied the
speaker to his home.55
The following evening in Ponce on the south side of the island
— Puerto Rico's second largest city — a Nationalist meeting was held
in the Central Plaza which did not end so peacefully. In port was a
United States Navy ship and ashore were members of the crew.
Their presence was noted by several of the orators and they were
singled out as a group of "bandits" who were permitting the destruc
/ tion of Puerto Rico. Jose" Enamorado Cuesta, vice-president of the

Nationalist party, referred to the United States flag as a symbol in
Puerto Rico of robberyujape^-and piracy. The orators were taken
into custody, and, although there was some interference, they were
escorted to the city jail.58
two evenings serve to indicate the tone and vigor with
These
which this party was carrying on its activity. Since the Nationalists
realized there was little profit in combating the coalition of the pro-
United States parties, the Nationalists' attacks were directed at the
Liberals. Their hope for electoral in convincing the anti-
success lay
American electorate that they, not the Liberals, stood for immediate
independence. The Liberals were accused of being the "eternal de
tractors of Puerto Rican dignity and the ones who were to blame for
the fact that their political problem had not been solved,"57 while the
Nationalists, who had previously argued for noncooperation with
and nonrecognition of the American regime, tried to accuse the
Liberals of being colonial servants. The Nationalists found that the
charge came back with double fervor, since they had eagerly accepted
the favors extended by the pro- American coalition parties.
C The fact that both parties were openly in favor of independence
is indisputable, but there was a difference
between the two as to
how that independence should be realized. For the Nationalists, in-
' dependence came immediately when their party secured a majority
in the legislature. For the Liberals this abrupt change would have
55. La Fortaleza, #79-57, Report to the chief of police by detective

Juan Miranda, July 10, 1932.
56. Ibid., Telephone message to central offices of insular police, July 11,
1932. 57. La Democratic, July 13, 1932.
disastrous social, political, and economic repercussions which could

be mitigated only by a period of transition through which the island
would be firmly guided by the leaders of the Liberal party.58 J
To say that the primary election issue was the relations with the
United States would be an understatement. More accurate would it
be to state that every election issue was discussed in the light of the
particular party's stand on this primary matter.
In a series of three long articles, later adopted by the Liberal con
vention as an official expression of their ideas, the young editor of La
Democracia discussed the matters which were before his party on the
eve of the election campaign.59 Using as a point of departure his
party's plank for independence, Munoz Marin looked into the eco
nomic implications of this political program specifically as it would
affect the production of sugar. He initiated his discussion of the
sugar economy by pointing out that since the occupation of the island
by the Americans, Puerto Rico had been under the protection of the
tariff laws of the United States. This resulted in an artificial and
unnatural development of certain phases of agriculture, specifically
creating an abnormal growth of the sugar industry, and a marked
neglect of other phases of the agricultural economy, like the coffee
industry. Independence, he maintained, would allow the agricul
tural production of the island to return to its natural and normal
state, since it would remove the island from the abnormal stimulus
of the American tariff.
This abrupt change could not be brought about over an election
night. Sugar was the main support of the Puerto Rican economy,
but it was high-cost sugar, thriving under the hothouse protection
of the tariff. Mufioz Marin wrote :
There is not one central in Puerto Rico which can produce sugar
for less than $1.75, and there is not one that ADMITS that it can
produce it for less than $2.75. Today, the price of sugar in the free
market is $0.85. . . . The sugar industry has the little life it has
on account of the North American tariff.60
Therefore, any independence program would have to take a transi

tional period into account, which would, through gradual tariff revi
sion, permit a slow conversion of agricultural production from sugar
to other marketable products which could compete on the world
58. Ibid., Sept. 9, 1932. 59. Ibid., March 5, 1932.

60. Ibid., March 10, 1932.
market. The author made no concrete suggestions concerning these

products other than a passing reference to the badly battered coffee
industry.
As a model for this tariff reduction program, Mufioz cited the
case of the Philippine Islands and the proposed program outlined
in the bill offered by Senator Hawes. This program would eventually
produce not only political but economic independence for the archi
pelago. However, in the case of Puerto Rico, there would be "just
one irrevocable difference; that the transition period has to be under
the sovereignty of Puerto Rico."61
Several months later Mufioz Marin had another opportunity to
develop his ideas on the political and economic future of the island.
On this occasion Munoz Marin spoke for more than three hours
before a large gathering at the University of Puerto Rico. He called
attention to the fact that the impending Democratic victory in the
United States could have an undesirable economic effect on the
island. He recalled that it had been the Democrats under the Wilson
administration who had passed the Underwood Tariff of 1 9 1 3, which
was prevented from ruining the sugar industry only by the advent of
the World War. Faced with a Democratic victory and the lower
tariff which this would bring, Munoz Marin argued that only the
blind could not see that independence was imperative.62
In the course of his long lecture, the editor of La Democracia
made the "sensational declaration" that the law which limited land
tenure to five hundred acres was unrealistic within the existing eco
nomic framework. He pronounced himself against any move to en
force this law which up to then had been considered a dead letter.
Contrary to previous public pronouncements in which he had
urged the enforcement of this law, Munoz Marin now explained
that the economy of the island was thoroughly oriented toward op
erating within the tariff walls of the United States, and thus the
large-scale production of sugar was economically advisable. Already
the cost of sugar production in Puerto Rico was high in comparison
with other sugar-producing areas. He argued, therefore, that it would
be a mistake to bring additional costs to this process by breaking up
the large land units which kept the island sugar factories functioning
at an efficient rate. However, almost as an afterthought, he added
that someone had suggested that the centrales be operated as a quasi-
61. Ibid., March 11, 1932. 62. Ibid., July 12, 1932.
public utility under a plan which would guarantee adequate measure

of maximum operations, thus allowing efficient production during the
transitional period which would establish economic independence.
This pronouncement may have been the price of a united party
stand on independence. The Liberal party, formed out of the body
of the Union party, represented, as has been indicated, the old tra
ditional social and economic groups of the island.- Don Antonio
Barcelo's stronghold was around Fajardo on the eastern end of the
island where one of the largest sugar corporations, Eastern Sugar
Associates, was located.- His brother-in-law was the vice-president
and general manager on the Fajardo Sugar Company. -These implica
tions cannot be substantiated. 1 Perhaps the explanation is found in
the obvious. ^The Socialist party had long been the strong defender
of the 5 00-Acre Law.-Munoz took this opportunity to point out to
his former cohorts some of the thought behind his change of party
interest. After all, the Brookings study had come to a similar con
clusion. ]
As has been noted, the issue of status was ever-present in the

political utterances of the campaign. -To this observation Mufioz
Marin was no exception, but in his case there is something more
basic which does not come forth in the speeches of the other poli
ticians.- For example, toward the close of the public lecture at the
university, he contended that just as the Liberal party would work
for a rapid return to a normal and balanced agricultural economy
unhampered by foreign tariff controls, so would the party endeavor
to bring to the island the opportunity to exercise the expression of
its own political desires in an environment free from any colonial
coercion.
Perhaps the best expression of this subtle emphasis on freedom
is found in an article which answers one by the Socialist leader,
Rivera Zayas. In the article, Rivera Zayas had gone to great lengths
to extol the benefits which the island received by being under the
jurisdiction of the United States Constitution. Munoz Marin made it
clear that he did not wish to discuss the merits or demerits of the
United States Constitution, since these were beside the point. He
wrote :
But the real objection is that the Constitution is not ours, it is

not subject to our pressures, nor can we wait until it is adapted to our
needs; it is an instrument foreign to our life and our will. Of little
importance is it that it may be dynamic ...
the dynamic quality in
which I believe is based on our own suffering. To the dynamic quality

of the American Constitution let the Americans relate themselves.
The people of Puerto Rico can only be related with dignity and in
telligence to the dynamic quality of the Puerto Ricans.88
Here is something more profound than agitation for a change in

political status. Or to put it another way, here is the philosophical
basis for independence. It may be claimed that the distinction is of
httle merit, but the historical development within Puerto Rico and
the minds of its leaders would prove otherwise.
* * »
TOn the continent the November election of 1932 was a decisive

and clear-cut victory of one party over another. -This was not so
obvious in Puerto Rico. -There was not a victorious party. - A change
in positions had been carried out. -Antonio Barcelo, who had ruled
the insular political scene for most of the decade of the twenties,
was no longer in a dominant position. ]
The coalition had paid off with a total of 208,232 votes made
up of the 110,794 of the Union-Republican party, and the 97,438
votes of the Socialist party.64 - Santiago Iglesias went to Washington
as resident commissioner of Puerto Rico. -The humble worker and
labor organizer had living proof that the democracy of the United
States functioned." One could rise from lowly beginnings to the top.j
'The total vote of the Liberal party was greater than either of the
two divisions of the coalition: 166,235 votes. Barcelo had carried
the bulk of the Union party votes into his newly formed Liberal
party, but the shrewd politician had been outmaneuvered by the
combination which would keep patronage from his followers.)
f There were those65 who maintained
that Santiago Iglesias too
had been outmaneuvered when he was placed in Washington out
side the local political scene.-The Socialists did have control of the
position of the speaker of the house of representatives in the person
of Alonso Torres, but his political experiences were to be unfor
tunate
(If
Iglesias was convinced that democracy was a reality, Pedro
Albizu Campos was just as convinced that it was a thoroughgoing
farce.- Campos was aware that his party would not sweep the elec-
63. Ibid., Sept. 1, 1932. 64. El Mundo, Nov. 11, 1932.

65. Florete, Ano III, No. 106, Nov. 5, 1932.
tions, but he had strong hopes of securing enough popular support

to place himself in the senate.) Once there he might be fortunate
enough to command a key position which would control the balance
between the coalition and the Liberal groups XAlbizu Campos polled
11,634 votes, but his party received less than half that number.^
tThe embarrassment of the party must have been shared by the Union-
Republican party when the total vote was compared with the 30,000
signatures which had been secured to place the party on the ballot.)
CThis was the last election in which the Nationalist party participated
with any enthusiasm and official recognition.)
* * *
As has been seen, (the impending Democratic victory in the

United States was faced with some concern, since the threat of a
lower sugar tariff meant an uncertain future for those of this in
dustry^ On the other hand, it was recalled that (the last Democratic
administration had liberalized the United States-Puerto Rican rela
tions.) For the most part there was almost an indifferent and even
fatalistic reaction to the election of Roosevelt from the active poli
ticians. Certainly none expressed the jubilation with which some met
the change in the States. The coalition leaders were of course more
favorable to the Republicans,but they expressed their willingness to
cooperate with Washington's new administration if there was no
threat of withdrawal of sugar support.67
A casual perusal of the numerous letters from Puerto Rico writ
ten in Spanish and broken English to governor of New York
the
both before and after his election as President would indicate that
even in the distant Caribbean the forgotten man's candidate had a
great deal of unsolicited support. Some, like Vail Spinosa, were pro
fessionally interested in securing a sinecure. However, such a con
clusion is not warranted in the case of Jose Virella of Ponce who
wrote the following letter to the governor dated October 24, 1932:
... on the night of the 21st of the month, I gave a Spiritualist Ses
sion in my home and convoked the spirit of the dead magician,
Houdini . . . and after a series of mystic prayers he was able to come
and take possession of a mind and I made my corresponding ques
tions for which he was called. ...
He told me that the Democratic
66. El Mundo, Nov. 11, 1932. 67. La Democracia, Jan. 9, 1933.

elections will be won in favor of Franklin D. Roosevelt by a great

majority of votes from the state and all the other cities of the United
States would offer their decided aid in favor of the Democratic can
didate and on ruling the destinies of the country he will be a loyal
administrator of public matters and will have the most progressive
administration the United States has had since its founding.68
Virella went on to predict that the new President would carry

out "great financial works of Reconstruction" and would be elected
for a second term with even a greater electoral vote than his first
one. A third term would be urged upon him, but he would decline
the honor and turn to travel. It was predicted that he would visit
Puerto Rico in 1935. Republicans notwithstanding, he would live to
the age of ninety, overcoming all dangers which might threaten his
activity.
After the election the letters and communications from Puerto
Rico increased manyfold. Unsolicited suggestions on all topics — from
the immorality of the islanders to a plan to bring the governor, who
was vacationing in Florida, to Puerto Rico — were sent to the newly
elected President. For the most part, the serious or relevant letters
contained suggestions of factors to be considered in naming a new
governor for the island.
In regard to the appointment of the island's chief executive, the
first decision, according to most of the writers, was whether the
candidate was to be a continental or an islander. If a continental,
then it would be advisable to select someone who had Jiad^ experience
on the island, but who was free from the local politics. If this was
not possible, then an American who understood Latin people and
their customs, particularly one who spoke Spanish, would be a wise
selection. If still unable to find a person with these qualifications,
then, as Vail Spinosa, who was most ready to offer advice, suggested,
a nationally known figure of absolute integrity, "friendly towards
Puerto Rico and with enough influence in Washington to obtain aid
when needed," would be acceptable.69
Opposition to a Puerto Rican governor was based on widely
divergent lines of thought. From retirement in Kansas, E. Mont
Reily, unanimously considered the worst governor the island had
68. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter to Gov. Roose

velt from Jose Virella, Oct. 24, 1932.
69. Ibid., Letter to Gov. Roosevelt from Vail Spinosa, Nov. 23, 1932.
ever had under the United States flag, categorically stated that no
native should be ajipomted, nor should anyone living on the islancT
EFnamedTto that position.70 In a letter to James Farley, one R. South-
aTd~spdk"e with similar mind: "It would be disastrous to appoint a
native governor. . . . The people of Puerto Rico are not ready for a
native governor as the better thinking classes realize it, but amor
patriae causes them to fall in line with this native son propaganda."71
From the competent and conservative incumbent James Beverley
came the following observations:
* In my judgment, any Puerto Rican appointee to the office of the

governor wouTcTencouTUer~a_humber of difficulties and pressures due
to theTact that most of the good families here are interconnected
elffier In business or "by marriage, and to tEe Fact that on the average
mucF more attention is paid to friendship and kinship than in- the
StatesT1-
The attitude of a War Department official, General Lejeune

Parker, who for many years had been in charge of the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, was expressed in a confidential letter to Governor
Beverley. He wrote:
I believe that in general a suitable American can discharge im

partially the dual mission (that of local chief executive and local
representative of the Federal Government) of the office with less
difficulty than a Puerto Rican who has been sufficiently prominent
locally to make his appointment as governor probable and generally
accepted on the island.73
Letters with opposite points of view show equal fervor and even
sagacity. Mr. and Mrs. James Bourne, who were former neighbors
and good friends of the newly elected President and his wife, were
temporarily living in Puerto Rico. They kept the President advised
of conditions and problems in the island possession. Dorothy Bourne,
who had been brought down to organize a new department of the
university which would train social workers, was primarily inter-
70. BIA, #858-64 Governor of Puerto Rico, Letter from E. Mont Reily
to War Department, April 10, 1933.
71. Ibid., Letter to James Farley from R. Southard, Copy sent to Secre
tary George Dern, April 3, 1933.
72. Ibid., Letter from James Beverley to Gen. Cox, March 3, 1933.
73. Ibid., Confidential B., Letter from Gen. Parker to Gov. Beverley,
April 6, 1933.
ested in the pending changes which might occur in the field of edu
cation as a result of the election of a Democratic administration.
Mrs. Bourne ventured to comment on the pending appointment of
a new governor. "There is no doubt," she wrote, "that a Puerto Rican
rather than an American would be persona grata to the majority of

the Puerto Ricans if the right person could be found."74
Francis H. Dexter, the enlightened attorney from San Juan,
wrote in a similar way to the President.
The first duty of the Democratic Administration is to appoint

the governor and other officers now appointed under the law by the
1/ President from the American citizens of Puerto Rico of native birth,
of whom there are many amply qualified for the trust and the re
sponsibility. There are some citizens born in the mainland who have
resided here for many years ancT who are also qualified for these
offices T3ut fairness and justice demand that they should step aside
It this critical time in deference to and in recognition of the rights
oT the native sons.75
From a Puerto Rican came the following uncompromising asser

tion:
Our country has its own traditions, our country has its own
language, our country has its own religion and those three things
are and ever will be in conflict with whatever you have to offer along
fines in the United States. We do not understand each other,
i//those
and never will. I do not admit that an American citizen however
talented and well intentioned, can render as valuable a service from
the Governorship of this island as an honest and talented and highly
^cultured native son of Puerto Rico. . . . We don't want the American
people to interfere in the affairs of Puerto Rico any more.76
From the two points of view, spoken with varying shades of

passion and objectivity, several basic points seem to be evident. Ac
cording to the War Department's definition of the dual role of the
governor of the territory, the appointee would be more responsible
to the Washington administration than to the local political groups.
74. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, After Elections, Letter from Dorothy

Bourne to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 12, 1932.
75. Ibid., Letter from Francis H. Dexter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb.
16, 1933.
76. BIA, #858-64, Letter from J. Benitez Rexach to Franklin D. Roose
velt, April 21, 1933.
His function on the local scene would be to carry out his executive
duties with impartiality and equanimity. Competent continentals or
Puerto Rican administrators were available. However, according to
the observation of James Beverley, the one fact which made it hard
to find a qualified Puerto Rican was not that there were few in num
ber, but rather that politics was such an intense business on the
island, and that few prominent men in public life were free from
direct or indirect political influence of some sort. So long as the
governor was a federal appointee, there would be strong opposition
to a candidate with local political interests. In 1932 the problem
was further complicated by the fact that the coalition which con
trolledthe local government had openly backed the Republican
party in the United States.
Shortly after the inauguration of the President, the War Depart
ment wrote to Governor Beverley requesting information on, and a
personal evaluation of, the ability of several people who had been
suggested as candidates for the office of governor.77 The first name
on the list was Martin Travieso, who had been a judge in the island
courts, and who was an active member of the Liberal party. Beverley
suggested that, aside from his political liabilities as a member of a
party out of power, his heavy losses on the stock market would make
him a questionable risk.78 That he was considered persona non grata
to the coalitionis beyond question. When word was circulated
through the press that Travieso was being considered as a candidate,
the newly elected resident commissioner wrote to Secretary of War
George Dern, transmitting the names of the candidates of the coali
tion for the position to be filled. One would gather that Santiago
Iglesias was not in accord with the appropriateness of the candidates,
since he submitted the list as "an unavoidable duty" on his part.79
Martin Travieso, in addition to his legal career, had a long
record of political and administrative experience. He had strong con
nections on the continent in the persons of Colonel House and Sen
ator King of Utah.80 Travieso was considered the leader of the mod-
77. Ibid., Confidential File B., Letter to James Beverley, March 18, 1933.
78. Ibid., Letter of James Beverley to the War Department, March 30,
1933.
79. Ibid., Letter of Santiago Iglesias to the Secretary of War, March 31,
1933.
80. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Hayes Gore, Letter from F. H. Payne,
April 25, 1933.
erate Liberals and usually identified with hopes for greater autonomy
but not independence.81 In the 1932 campaign he had taken a more
active role in the public meetings, provoking, as a result, the open
wrath of coalition leaders.82 The Socialists looked upon him as a
corporation lawyer.83 Travieso's acceptability as far as the unusually
sensitive Bureau of Insular Affairs was concerned can be judged from
the fact that six months later no reason could be found for not
recommending him for an important post on the island.84 However,
by May 1, 1933, when Martin Travieso responded to an invitation85
to attend one of Mrs. Roosevelt's informal teas at the White House,
another candidate had gotten the nod.
The incumbent commissioner of education in the local govern
ment, Dr. Jose Padin, had influential backing, but he lacked a local
organization to push him^ This, of course, should have operated in
his favor. As commissioner of education, as will be indicated later,
Dr. Padin had done exceptionally well. He had been brought back
to the island, from an administrative position with Heath and Com
pany, publishers, to take a cabinet post under Governor Theodore
Roosevelt, Jr., who had succeeded in building up a group of public
servants relatively free from political influence.
Dr. Padin had the support of Dorothy Bourne, who hoped that
the President would overlook the fact that the commissioner, though
apolitical, had served under a Republican administration.86 Governor
Beverley, obviously disappointed at the list of candidates upon which
heTiacTTreen asked to comment by the War Department, suggested
that there were other more highly qualified Puerto Ricans than those
mentioned. To prove his point, he recommended Dr. Jose Padin as
a person of unimpeachable integrity, nonpolitical, and possessing
the strength of character necessary for such a position. The Depart
ment of Education was proof of his executive ability, in the opinion
of the governor.87 The press gave little attention to the candidacy of

82. BIA, #858, Confidential File B., March 30, 1933.
83. Ibid., Personal File: Jean Whittemore, Letter from Pablo Sosa,
March 24, 1933.
84. Ibid., #28813-72, Confidential File B., Puerto Rican Correspond
ence, Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Nov. 4, 1933.
85. The channels through which this invitation was secured will be
studied later. Ruby Black Collection, Robert H. Gore File, April 28, 1933.
86. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Dorothy Bourne to Gov.
Franklin Roosevelt, Nov. 12, 1933.
87. BIA, #858, Confidential File B., March 3, 1933.
Dr. Padin, and it was apparent that without the necessary local or
federal political backing, he had little chance of being selected.
Shortly after inauguration, Governor Beverley wrote to the Presi
dent and placed himself unconditionally at his disposition. Whether
this meant serving a new governor or carrying out the policies of the
new administration, Governor Beverley was willing "to work for
the best interests of the United States and the island."88 James Bev
erley had served as attorney general in the cabinet of Governor
Roosevelt. When the latter was transferred to the governorship of
the Philippines — a post a little further away from the office he de
sired in Albany, New York — James Beverley's excellent work was
rewarded with a promotion. There is little question that Governor
Beverley had successfully served out a term which had been marked
with difficult economic problems. He had organized the emergency
relief program to handle the disruption of agricultural production
caused by the hurricane of September, 1932. He was also proud of
the comparatively honest elections which had been held in 1932
under his newly enacted law.89 And finally in keeping with the trend
of thought of the moment, he"had succeeded in reducing the ex
penditures and budgets of the insular government.90
President J. W. Harris of the Polytechnic Institute, a private
liberal arts college in the southwest corner of the island, wrote to
President Roosevelt as follows:
Governor Beverley is prepared as no other governor has been

for the administration and leadership of Puerto Rico. He not only
knows Spanish but he knows the people of Puerto Rico and they
in turn understand him. His many years as Attorney General intro
duced him to the political government of the island, where Spanish
law must be understood. Governor Beverley is intellectually a super
ior man with the added grace of common sense. ...
He occupies
the governor's chair in Puerto Rico today not as a political but as a
service appointee.91
Mrs. Henry Dooley, widow of the former Democratic committee-
88. Ibid., Personal File: James Beverley, Letter from Beverley to Frank
lin Roosevelt, Copy to War Department, March 13, 1933.
89. Ibid., #858, Letter of Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker, April 21, 1933.
90. Ibid., #1028 Elections, Letter of Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker,
April 21, 1933.
91. Ibid., Personal File: James Beverley, Letter of J. W. Harris to Frank
lin D. Roosevelt, April 18, 1933.
1932: A YEAR OF POLITICAL CHANGE SI
man from Puerto Rico, wrote in a similar vein;92 so was his candidacy
urged by A. Rivera Chaves, president of the League of Civic, Eco
nomic, and Social Affairs.93 Both of the Bournes thought him a wor
thy representative of the newly elected Democratic administration.94
There is little doubt that the officials of the Bureau of Insular Affairs
of the War Department were partial to the incumbent.95
Decisive proof of the governor's ability is given in a letter written
by a severe critic of the United States administration in the island.
Several months after the choice had been made, Barcelo wrote:
We do not urge this in Mr. Beverley's behalf, but rather do we

claim it as a right of Puerto Rico — the right to be guaranteed against
well meaning and absolutely unavoidable mistakes on the part of an
executive entirely unfamiliar with local values. ...
It is a question of
that intimate sense of reality, of familiarity with the operations of
the local administrative machinery and with the forces that bring
pressure to bear on it, which only a man of long residence and close
contact with the political and governmental affairs here can expect
to have.
We had at times occasion to criticize decisions of Mr. Beverley
in the past; we shall certainly criticize him in the future, whenever,
in our opinion, such criticism shall be warranted; but we have had
no occasion to question the sincerity of his conclusions nor the
honesty of his intentions, nor the general worth of his ability.96
Before the end of March, Governor James Beverley received Jl
cordial but formal reply, drawn up by the Bureau of Insular Affairs
and signed by the President, thanking him for his offer of coopera
tion and requesting that he remain in his post at least until the end
of the present session of the insular legislature.97
Before attention can be directed to the unknown appointed by
the President, a further individual must be mentioned. This was a
92. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Mrs. Henry Dooley to

Franklin Roosevelt, Jan. 23, 1933.
93. BIA, #858-64, Letter to the War Department from A. Rivera
Chaves, Feb. 28, 1933.
94. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Dorothy Bourne to Frank
lin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 12, 1932; Letter from James Bourne to Gov. Roosevelt,
Nov. 27, 1932.
95. BIA, #858, Confidential File B., Gen. Parker to Gov. Beverley,
April 6, 1933; Personal File: James Beverley, Letter from Gen. Parker to Gov.
Beverley, April 28, 1933.
96. Ibid., Personal File: James Beverley, Letter from Antonio Barcelo
to Secretary Dern, June 29, 1933.
97. Ibid., Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Beverley, March 29, 1933.
woman named Jean Whittemore who had formed part of the dele
gation which was recognized as representing the island at the Demo
cratic National Convention. In Chicago she had made contact with
the organizing forces behind Franklin Roosevelt by working unceas
ingly in the tedious tasks of routine office and record work. Although
professionally employed as a teacher of English, she had hopes of some
political appointment. While it is doubtful as to whether or not she
had seriously considered herself as a strong candidate for governor of
the island, there is little doubt that she was a candidate and would
have accepted the position.98 The reaction to this possible appoint
ment was unanimously negative. Both Puerto Ricans and continen
tal advisers were adamant in their assertion that a woman would be
a most unwise selection. For the most part, however, Jean Whitte
more merited words of personal approval from those who knew her.
But Mrs. Dooley wrote:
No woman is qualified unless fitted by very peculiar training

for such a position. the standing of a woman in Latin
Moreover
countries is such that it would result in misery and humiliation, if
appointed to the governorship and discredit to our country."
On April 21, 1933, time ran out for the insular legislature. The
Organic Act stipulated a limited period for the duration of each
legislature session. Governor Beverley looked at the balance sheet
of work accomplished and matters left unattended. Effort to establish
a program of workingmen's compensation had failed. The Socialists
were already being made aware of their uncomfortably close rela
tionship with the Union-Republican party.100 Solid support behind
an acceptable plan which would offer the laboring classes adequate
security in case of accidents or illness was not forthcoming, much to
the chagrin of the Socialist commissioner of labor in Beverley's cabi
net.101 The budget was kept down to about $9.2 million and officials,
whose salaries were stipulated by the Organic Act, accepted a volun
tary reduction to ease the financial burden of a hard-pressed govern-
98. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files No. 200, Puerto Rico,
1933, Letter from Mrs. Henry Dooley to Louis McHenry Howe.
99. Ibid., Democratic National Campaign Committee Correspondence,
Unassorted, Mrs. Henry Dooley to Franklin Roosevelt, Jan. 23, 1933.
100. BIA, #21237-55, Letter from James Beverley to Commissioner
Rivera Martinez, April 8, 1933. The party presented opposition to the state-
operated insurance fund.
101. Ibid., Personal File: Santiago Iglesias, Wire from Rivera Martinez
to Santiago Iglesias, April 4, 1933.
ment. Most of the time had been spent drawing up amendments to

the recently approved and tried election law. These measures were
vetoed by the governor on April 14, but were passed over his veto.
The fight on this matter would be later transferred to Washington,
where, in spite of the support of the resident commissioner,102 the
governor's veto would be backed by the President. In the governor's
opinion, the legislature had amused itself in a favorite diversion,
politics, while the people of the island went on facing impossible
difficulties.103
At least one member of the legislature, whose hands were tied
because he belonged to the minority, agreed with the governor.
Luis Mufioz Marin, now senator by virtue of a vote given him that
was greater than that of the leader of his party, observed even before
the legislature got fully underway:
Over and this or that way of electing our functionaries,

above
over and above these or those petitions to be presented to Congress,
over and above how the question of statehood is to be presented by
the Republican party, over and above where is to be found the birth
place of the new governor; over and above all of these things is the
fact that our people are dying of hunger . . Tand in the face of this
reality We are playing politics."*
One week after the legislature closed, the Secretary of War

phoned the Bureau of Insular Affairs and said that steps were about
to be taken for the appointment of Robert Hayes Gore of Florida
to the office of governor of Puerto Rico.105 On April 27, the nomina
tion was taken to the White House for the President's signature.
The way was cleared for this nomination by a letter from the Demo
cratic national committeeman from Puerto Rico, Benjamin Horton.
There is little doubt that the nominee was not known to the writer,
since the letter was of a perfunctory nature and only indicated no
opposition from the local members of the party to the candidate.106
The only other but very significant endorsement for the nominee
came from one Donald Draughon of the United Porto Rico Sugar
102. Congressional Record of the 73d Congress, Appendix, p. 6021.

103. BIA, #1028, Letter from Gov. Beverley to the War Department,
April 21, 1933. 104. El Mundo, Feb. 12, 1933.
105. BIA, Personal File: James Beverley, Letter to James Beverley,
marked personal from Gen. Parker, April 28, 1933.
106. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Hayes Gore, Letter from Benjamin
Horton, April 22, 1933.
Company. His letter, dated April 27, could have had negligible
effect on the selection, but it indicated some of the top-level prepara
tion which had been carried out to clear the way for Robert Gore.
The letter read in part:
he [Gore] would have, and this statement is based on direct con

versation with Island political leaders, the full cooperation of the
majority party in the Insular Legislature. Likewise many organiza
tions, individuals, and Puerto Rican Democrats are most friendly
disposed towards Mr. Gore.107
Donald Draughon notwithstanding, the nomination of Robert H.

Gore by the White House arrived on the unsuspecting Puerto Rican
scene like the announcement of a visit of a Tibetan Lama. Not
only had the islander never heard of the individual before, but in
formation concerning him was quite scarce because his fellow con
tinental was just as ignorant of the character, personality, and
history of Robert Hayes Gore.
Perhaps the reporter who felt most unprepared was the Wash
ington correspondent of La Democracia. Since the first of the year,
La Democracia had employed the services of Ruby A. Black, a noted
woman reporter in the nation's capital. Ruby Black published a syn
dicated column on the continent, and she was recognized by Robert
S. Allen, coauthor of the Washington Merry-go-Round, as one of the
best reporters in that city. Ernest Gruening, former editor of The
Nation, classed her as one of the top ten of the country.108
The appearance of Miss Black's material in La Democracia had
more behind it than a mere business arrangement. The wife of the
editor was Muna Lee, a very active and dynamic personality in her
own right. When in the States Muna Lee was a leader in women's
movements, as had been Miss Black. Through common interests,
the two soon became friends.
Mrs. Roosevelt's decision to hold press conferences assured Miss
Black's acceptance in the closed field of accredited newspapermen.
International News Service succeeded in contracting Miss Black's
107. Ibid., Letter from Donald Draughon of Cane Orient Corporation,

a subsidiary of United Porto Rico Sugar Corporation, to Secretary of War
George Dern, April 27, 1933. For this trouble Mr. Draughon was eventually
appointed U.S. Marshal. See: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File
No. 200, Puerto Rico, Atty. Gen. Cummings to Franklin Roosevelt, Nov. 10,
1933. 108. La Democracia, Jan. 4, 1933.
services for these interviews; this guaranteed her acceptance.109 The

cordial relations110 between the First Lady and the reporter enabled
the latter to secure valuable orientation
toward newsworthy material.
As has already once been implied and as will be demonstrated later
on, this friendship was ably used from time to time to other ends
than those strictly within the journalistic realm.111
When Robert Gore appeared on the scene unannounced, Miss
Black, who had previously predicted that Martin Travieso was 90 per
cent assured of the nomination,112 was roundly scooped. It might
have been consoling to know that she had company, since all inter
ested informers of the public were sent scurrying to the archives
to seek material on this unknown arrival. One of the most complete
stories on Gore came from the pen of Milton S. Mayer.
According to Mayer,113 Gore was a man about whom almost no
one had any information. He appeared to have made an impressive
amount of money in the insurance business, but since his youth,
he had been interested in the newspaper trade. He had worked
as a reporter and editor in several small papers. After a time as
editor of the Scripps' paper in Terre Haute, Indiana, the Terre
Haute Post, Gore resigned to turn his full time to a fast-developing
insurance business which he had started. In the next ten years he
made over $2 million. Robert Gore then decided to retire for reasons
of health to Florida. There he bought a large farm near Fort Lauder
dale, built a town house in Oak Park, and turning back to journal
ism, bought three small newspapers in the surrounding area. Most of
these purchases were made after a hurricane had ripped through
Florida, lowering the price of real estate.
Ruby Black interviewed Robert Gore shortly after he entered
the public eye.114 Gore's jovial personality seems to have made con
versation easy, and Miss Black learned that he was a self-made man
109. Interview with Miss Black in Washington, April, 1954.

110. See Ruby Black, Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1940). Also La Democracia, April 8, 1933.
111. Ruby Black wrote to Luis Mufioz Marin that if she had known
how easy it was to get Travieso into the White House, she would have had
him there a long time ago. Ruby Black Collection, Robert H. Gore File, Let
ter of May 1, 1933.
112. La Democracia, April 3, 1933.
113. £2 Diluvio reprinted and translated the article of Mayer in the
November, 1933, issue.
114. La Democracia, May 3, 1933, with a Washington dateline of
April 29, 1933.
who had difficult youth behind him. His manners lacked the
a
polish one would have expected needed for the new position, and
he still acted like a night reporter or an insurance salesman.
Ruby Black described Robert Gore in a personal letter to Munoz.
He chews gum. He is short, baldish, plump with a dimple.

The boys who know him tell me to warn you to nail down the furni
ture. He seems simple and honest, but if he is, how did he make
millions?115
Robert Gore was the father of a large family and a devout Roman
Catholic. Although he did not know where Puerto Rico was,116 and
had hoped for a better position, his intentions were irreproachable,
and he said that if he were selected to carry the New Deal to the
island, he would assume the position with earnestness and a sin
cerity of purpose.
But the question still remains as to why this man was selected
for such a position. It is true he was a successful businessman, one
of the requirements singled out by Vail Spinosa. He was a Roman
Catholic with a large family, and the vast majority of islanders were,
at least nominally, Roman Catholic. He lived in Florida, which
might have indicated climatic compatibility. He neither knew Span
ish nor was he familiar with Spanish culture or the Spanish per
sonality, but how many qualified Democrats were prepared along
those lines? He was generous, as his party contributions would indi
cate. But all these characteristics could be found in many men,
islanders or mainlanders, men with public administrative experi
ence. Why was he chosen?
In 1920 Robert Gore wrote an editorial for the Terre Haute Post
commenting on the recent visit of the vice-presidential candidate of
the Democratic party. He wrote: "The Democrats have their candi
dates reversed. Roosevelt should lead the ticket and Cox should
follow. ... He may not become Vice-President, but some day he
will be President."117 The Roosevelt was Franklin Delano, and the
year was 1920. Gore, being a good Christian, did not invoke the
spirit of the great Houdini, but he certainly did exercise a keen per-
115. Ruby Black Collection, Robert H. Gore File, Letter of Ruby Black
to Luis Munoz Marin, April 29, 1933.
116. Hubert Herring, "Rebellion in Puerto Rico," The Nation,
CXXXVII (Nov. 29, 1933), 618-19.
117. El Diluvio, November, 1933.
ceptiveness of the abilities and the personality of Franklin D. Roose

velt, and thus establish for himself a place in the front row on the
band wagon. He did not let Jim Farley forget his preferential posi
tion.
On the Hill, where a breathless Congress was faithfully follow
ing the lead of the new administration, only perfunctory attention
was paid to the minor and noncontroversial matters of state. In the
Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, led by Senator Millard Ty-
dings of Maryland, the hearing on the appointment of Robert Gore
was brief, and while there was some opposition to the wishes of the
President — or, rather, his Postmaster General — the appointment
was carried out.
The opposition came from Puerto Ricans living in New York.
A letter from a Mr. Ortega was read that criticized the nominee on
the basis of his interview with Miss Black. It was evident to Ortega
that Gore was without tact as well as without government experi
ence. Gore had referred to the Puerto Ricans as "those poor devils
who live there."118
Aside from comparatively insignificant objections, there
these
was little organized protest on the part of the islanders themselves.
Antonio Barcel6 was present at the hearing, but he made no public
statement. There was obviously little to be gained by antagonizing
a new governor before he had given some indication of his program
and his plans. The Tydings^ommittee favorably recommended the

candidate and the Senate approved Robert Hayes Gore for governor
oTPuerto Rico on May 15, 193 3. 119
"He hoped for something better."120 So it was said. According,
to Jim Farley's standards, he may have deserved something better,
but he was sent to Puerto Rico. What he did to it, or rather, what
it did to him, will make exciting, but disturbing, reading.
118. BIA, Personal File: Robert Hayes Gore, Memorandum for the
records on Senate hearing, May 8, 1933.
119. Congressional Record of the 73d Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 77, Part
4, p. 3422.
120. The Nation, unsigned editorial comment, July 5, 1933.
GORE'S HELL
7 he governor-designate
to arrive
had originally planned
in Puerto Rico on the twelfth of June,
about a month after his confirmation. However, he took the oppor
tunity to delay his trip month longer by accepting an offer to
a
speak in Chicago, where the Century of Progress Fair was being

held. The Puerto Rican delegation to this world's fair sponsored the
dinner at which the governor-designate spoke. In his speech, Gov
ernor Gore identified himself as a staunch New Dealer and prom
ised to do in four years for Puerto Rico what Franklin Roosevelt
had done for the country during his first hundred days in the
White House. There is no doubt that Gore was a businessman and
a dynamic one at that. He spoke of plans for rejuvenating the island's
business and agriculture. Particularly, he was interested in directing
more trade toward Florida, where he had developed many business
contacts.1 The fact that both were tropical lands and competed in
the production of many citrus fruits did not pose any problem for
the governor, at least he was not aware of any.
The speech included some favorable comments concerning
Puerto Rico's hopes for statehood. Since statehood was an approved
plank in the Democratic platform, the governor-designate did not
do more than assert what he thought to be his party's policy.2 This
assertion that Puerto Rico was rapidly approaching statehood serjt
the officials of the Bureau of Insular Affairs into a dither. A mem
orandum was promptly prepared by General Parker, urging the
1. ha Democracia, June 10, 1933. 2. El Mundo, June 10, 1933.
58
"GORE'S HELL" 59
Secretary of War to speak with Governor Gore on this subject. Two

main points were then developed in this memorandum. The firsjt
was that Puerto Rico was not readj, and would not be ready for
many long years, to assume the responsibilities that rested on other
states of the IJniqn. Parker wrote: "Puerto Rico is not believed
even approximately prepared for statehood."3 The second point was
that since Congressional action would be necessary to make Puerto
Rico a state, it would be prudent to leave such statements of policy
in the hands of the President or the Secretary of War.
Secretary Dern agreed to speak to Gore about the matter, but
over a week passed and no opportunity presented itself. General
Parker then took it upon himself to telephone Governor Gore, just
before he left for the island, and inform him about this important
matter of policy. Gore assured Parker that there "was no occasion
for uneasiness on the question," since Parker "was aware of his
[Gore's] views on the matter of statehood."4
Apparently the governor had made a public gesture designed to
encourage the coalition's aspirations for statehood. Proof that he
took up the suggestion of General Parker is found in a letter to the
President several days later, accompanying a copy of his inaugural
address. Gore wrote:
You will note that my reference to statehood is an if and when

proposition. I have tried to make plain that statehood in Puerto
Rico can be had by meeting all conditions and requirements that
have been met by other states of the Union. It will be a long time
before Puerto Rico can qualify.5
When he wrote the above, Gore had just arrived in Puerto Rico.
His expressed opinion may or may not have been correct. The point
seems clear, however, that it was not his opinion but one spelled
out by the War DepartmenJ. It would appear also that his cryptic
comment to General Parker indicated a predetermined opposition
toward the aspirations of the coalition which was not in accord with
Eis public statements.
Although Governor Gore did not come to the island until about
3. BLA, #26429-228, Independence or Statehood, Memorandum for the

Secretary of War from General Parker, June 20, 1933.
4. Ibid., #750-17, Memorandum for the record by Gen. Parker, June
30, 1933.
5. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Puerto Rico; Ap
pointments, Box 46, Letter from Gov. Gore to the President, July 3, 1933.
the first of July, he was introduced to the political blocs before he

left the States. As has been indicated, the island legislature in its
previous session had united its efforts to pass amendments to the
electoral law over the veto of Governor Beverley. The fight was
carried to Washington. Again a Liberal delegation was selected to go
toWashington just as a year previous on a similar mission Munoz
Marin had been sent to the nation's capital. This time Antonio
Barcelo accompanied the young senator. The trip was successful,
since President Roosevelt sustained the veto of Governor Beverley.
The coalition, through Santiago Iglesias, declared that the pro
posed changes would be favorable to the pro-American groups on the
island. The attitude of the governor was expressed in a letter from
Secretary of War George Dern to the President:
The excuse of pro-Americanism cannot be used to cover an

Election Law which in my judgment is both unnecessary and un
fair. . . . The attitude must be one of scrupulous fairness and im
partiality.6
This small political skirmish, the final maneuvers of which were

carried out in Washington, gave Antonio Barcelo an opportunity to
introduce himself to the new governor. As has been indicated, he
attended the Senate hearings on Gore's appointment. The political
opposition soon realized it was being caught napping. Alfonso Valdes
and Martinez Nadal, after Gore's confirmation, sailed to the States.
When Governor Beverley was queried by the War Department as to
why the migration, he answered in part: "I inferred he [Martinez
Nadal] thought it convenient because of fact other local political
leaders were reported to have conferred with Governor Gore and
with other high federal officials."7
Governor Beverley caught the fever also and suggested in a let
ter to Gore that a conference in Washington at the earliest possible
moment between the two would be wise, so that some continuity of
government policy might be guaranteed.8 General Parker, when in
formed of Beverley's plans, wired back confidentially urging him not
to come to Washington, since it "might be regarded as an effort to
6. Ibid., Letter from Secretary of War to the President, no date, but it

is judged to be between May 12, 1933, and June 15, 1933.
7. BIA, Personal File: Martinez Nadal, Letter from Gov. Beverley to
Gen. Cox, May 17, 1933.
8. Ibid., #17128-A, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Letter from
Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker, May 18, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 61
influence the new governor and commit him to some special line of
policy prior to his arrival on the island."9 Certainly it should have
been evident that the officials of the Bureau of Insular Affairs were
capable 6F orienting the new governor before he left the continent.
Governor Gore arrived on the island with the good wishes of
almost all sectors of the political field, excepting of course the Na
tionalists.His inaugural ceremony was simple, in keeping with the
austerity of the times, and his address indicated his admiration for
the New Deal and his hopes to carry out in a small way recovery
measures for the island similar to those being set up by President
Roosevelt on the continent.10 La Democracia ran an editorial on
June 30, 1933, which was translated and published in English
several days later, expressing satisfaction at the obvious demonstra
tion of accord and confidence between the President and his ap
pointee. However, a word of conservative caution was included by
suggesting that the exhausted economic condition of the island could
not allow excessive expenditures and increased indebtedness such
as the large ones carried out in Washington for the continent.
The which should supply the financial arms to com

same classes
bat povertyof the people, are themselves in need of someone to help
them, in need of the government fighting shoulder to shoulder with
them, so as to place them in a position in which they might fulfill
their great social duty to finance, as taxpayers, the large enterprises
of rehabilitation of the working class in general.11
The welcoming editorial of La Democracia motivated a short note

of appreciation from Governor Gore, which was acknowledged in
similar friendly terms by Antonio Barcelo.12 But the honeymoon was
to be a short one. Even before Governor Gore left the continent there.
were ominous signs which would with time spell trouble.
With a June 30 Washington date line, Ruby Black quoted Jim
Farley as having suggested that the appointment of Jean Whitte-
rhoreto an important post in the insular government would be a
wise move.13 Also Mrs. Dooley was rumored to be in line for the
9. Ibid., Personal File: James Beverley, Confidential Wire from Gen.

Parker to Gov. Beverley, May 25, 1933.
10. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Gov. Gore to President,
July 3, 1933. 11. La Democracia, June 30, 1933.
12. Letter dated July 3, 1933, from Gov. Gore, and Antonio Barcelo's
reply dated July 6, 1933. Both published in La Democracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
13. La Democracia, July 3, 1933.
position of commissioner of immigration. A week went by and then

a second dispatch of Miss Black on the same subject prompted an
editorial reaction from La Democracia. In part this dispatch read:
Mrs. Jean Whittemore, as well as Mrs. Dooley, wants to be the

Commissioner of Immigration in Puerto Rico; they both probably will
secure "good jobs" in the government of the island; Postmaster Gen
eral Farley would prefer "that these ladies reach an agreement be
tween themselves so that our task would be easier." There are
indications that Mrs. Dooley will secure the Immigration post while
Mrs. Whittemore will be named as Commissioner of Education,
which Mr. Farley considers the better of the two jobs.14
This caused a stir in the island's political and academic circles.15

Governor Gore had been moving slowly and cautiously on any gov
ernment changes. His letter to President Roosevelt on July 61G men
tioned briefly the qualifications necessary to fill the posts of attorney
general and auditor of Puerto Rico, two positions which had to be
filled with federal consent. On the same day that he wrote Roosevelt,
he called in the legislative leaders, both coalition and Liberal, to
discuss pending appointments and request their cooperation in sug
gesting candidates to fill these insular positions.17
The following week end Antonio Barcelo submitted his list as
was suggested. Then the above-cited dispatch arrived.
The editorial reaction of La Democracia read in part as follows :
That high officials of the United States government should con
sider the education of our children, our culture, and our spiritual
enrichment as a means of paying off political debts, which could be
left to the decision of two ladies, is highly offensive to the people
of Puerto Rico.18
The idea that the position of commissioner of education was

above the spoils systemfound favorable response in the War Depart-

15. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Press Conference, July 14, 1933. It
also caught the President unprepared because, as he confidentially confessed
to the reporters at his White House press conference, he had not realized
that he had the power to appoint the commissioner.
16. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Gov. Gore to the Presi
dent, July 6, 1933.
17. Letter from Antonio Barcel6 to Gov. Gore, dated July 10, 1933,
found in La Democracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 63
ment. In a memorandum Parker to the Secretary of

from General
War the editorial of La Democracia is quoted and approved, with
the addition, however, that the position of attorney general has also
been considered above party politics.19
The memorandum was prompted by the following radiogram
which was to be delivered to Jim Farley: "Numerous telegrams and
letters received by me from Puerto Ricans urge appointment of Jean
Whittemore as Commissioner of Education. I can approve of her
appointment."20
The Secretary of War, following the lead of his subordinate,
sent a wire to the governor advising him that his message to Farley
was being held up pending a letter from the Secretary which would
shortly be in the governor's hands.21 On Monday the letter was sent
to Governor Gore.
The letter took the governor gently to task for not working
through the correct administrative channels and indicated that the
government of Puerto Rico was the Secretary's responsibility and not
Jim Farley's. He promised to bring the governor's suggestion of the
Whittemore appointment to the President's attention. However, he
added the following paragraph which implied that the candidate
would not receive the Secretary's approval or endorsement.
I
have been advised that the appointment of the present Com
missioner of Education was apparently based upon considerations
that had no connection with affiliations with any particular party in
the United States; that the Commissioner was not ...
an aspirant
for the appointment the acceptance of which is understood to have
involved some financial sacrifice on his part.22
Furthermore, the Secretary claimed that for the past twelve years a
Puerto Rican had held that post and that Padin's work was very
highly thought of.
19. BIA, #20324 Commissioner of Education, Part #2, Memorandum

from Gen. Parker to Secretary of War, July 13, 1933.
20. Ibid., Personal File: Jean Whittemore, Wire from Gov. Gore for
Jim Farley, July 13, 1933. There are in this file numerous form-like wires
approving the appointment of Jean Whittemore. See a wire from Pablo Sosa
to the Secretary, March 24, 1933. For opposition see a letter from James
Bourne to the President, May 3, 1933. Bourne's candidate was the incumbent,
Dr. Jose Padin.
21. BIA, #20324, Wire from the Secretary to Gov. Gore, July 15, 1933.
22. Ibid., Letter, marked confidential, from the Sec. for the governor,
July 17, 1933.
The Whittemore appointment, long before the public storm

broke, had hit a snag in the War Department. There is little doubt
that the Bureau of Insular Affairs thought highly of the public serv
ants in the cabinet of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and continued in
office by Governor Beverley. If there was need of an island reaction,
the editorial of La Democracia, quoted by General Parker, supplied
the backing.23
Governor Gore's reaction to the Secretary's letter was concilia
tory in tone, but not wholly in accord with the ideas expressed by
the writer. He agreed that it would perhaps be wiser to reward Mrs.
Whittemore with some other office than that of commissioner of
education. However,he was adamant in his opinion that an Ameri
can should be in the position of commissioner. He backed up his
assertion by claiming, after three weeks on the island, that the
"schools in Puerto Rico are not pro- American. They are teaching
English with a left-handed gesture and instilling in the minds of the
students the ideas of ultimate independence for Puerto Rico."24
James Farley, unaware not only of the War Department's oppo
sition to Mrs. Whittemore, but also uninformed of Gore's change
of opinion, wired Dern:
After conference with the President, I desire to recommend

Mrs. Jean Whittemore of San Juan, Porto Rico, for the position of
Commissioner of Education of the Territory of Porto Rico. Mrs.
Whittemore is well and favorably known throughout the Island and
has been recommended by the entire Porto Rico organization. Hon.
R. H. Gore concurs in this recommendation.25
23. On the same day that the letter was sent to the governor, Gen.
Parker received a letter from Judge Cordova Davila in which there was the
following paragraph:
Dr. Padin is a man who came to Puerto Rico at the cost of an important
position which he held in New York. He acceded to the requests of the gov
ernor of Puerto Rico and returned to the island with the intention of fulfilling
an obligation. He has carried out his responsibilities with efficiency, capability,
and honesty. He is a man who has won the support and confidence of the
people of Puerto Rico because of his high moral character, his admirable
personal qualities, and his intelligence. It does not seem just that he be sub
stituted by any other candidate, particularly when the substitute does not have
the attributes of Dr. Padin.
See BIA, #9093, Letter dated July 12, 1933.
24. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter to Dern, July 23, 1933.
25. Ibid., Personal File: Jean Whittemore, Wire from James Farley to
Secretary Dern, July 27, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 65
It is clear from this wire, if there would have been any doubt,
just what was foremost in Farley's recommendation. No word about
qualifications for the position to be filled was mentioned. She was
backed by the local political organization; no other criteria need be
mentioned. The responsibility was Secretary Dern's and he accepted
it even when it meant going against a man as close to the throne
as Farley was. The Postmaster General's wire was unkind enough to
point this out subtly to the Secretary. Nevertheless, Secretary Dern,
out of Washington at this time, wired Jim Farley:
Believe proposed appointments Puerto Rico would not be up to
the standard of former administration and I cannot conscientiously
recommend them. In view of my responsibility, I hope you will con
sent to delay until I return.26
At this point the appointment of Mrs. Whittemore was blocked.

Letters favorable to Jose" Padin from highly respected educators and
administrators of the^ island and the continent continued to come
in." It was unfortunate that Governor Gore was not informed of
the very favorable impression the work of Dr. Padin had caused.
There is little doubt that the governor could have been, at least at
this point, convinced of the ability of the incumbent commissioner.
Soon his attack was to continue along a different approach.
As has been shown, the governor was trying to move slowly and
with caution in his relations with the local political groups. He
Had asked for their suggestions concerning candidates for govern
ment positions. However, once these were in his hands he wisely
held off any move which would antagonize either group. He could
not hold off much longer. He was being pressed particularly by the
Republicans and Socialists. These groups, controlling the insular
legislature, could withhold necessary legislation until he acted. The
one outburst from the Liberal party's paper was directed carefully
at Farley and not at the governor. In view of what was unleashed
26. Ibid., #9093, Wire from Secretary Dern to Mr. Martin, July 27,
1933.
27. Educators like Dr. Hugh Auchincloss, of the School of Tropical Med
icine in San Juan, and Dr. Thomas Benner, dean of the University of Illinois
and former chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, spoke highly of
Padin's educational work. Former Governor Beverley also wrote urging sup
port of the commissioner. See BIA, #20324 for the letters of Dr. Auchin
closs and Beverley, dated July 25 and 24, 1933, respectively. The letter of
Dr. Benner is in the Whittemore Personal File, dated August 7, 1933.
later, one could see that Governor. Gore, with positions to fill and
nominations in his power, was keeping a very temporary peace.
The governor would have preferred with any of
to avoid deals
the parties. As he saw it the Liberals were anti-American and for
independence, and to deal with them was out of the question. Nei
ther the Socialist nor Republican parties, independently, controlled
the legislature; together they did. Governor Gore wished to promote
a local Democratic party and spoon-feed it with the spoils system
mtoTHomfnant position.
Judge C6rdova Davila, who had written in defense of Dr. Padin,
had observed that there was on the island a notable increase in the
political activity of continentals with the evident purpose in mind
of forming a more active local Democratic party. The judge wrote:
"These persons flaunt their influence and seem to be determined to
control the federal appointments."'8
General Parker, having had success with one memorandum to
the new secretary, decided to add another to the letter of the judge.
The one activity which has been notably over-developed in

Puerto Rico in the last thirty years is partisan politics. ...
It is not
apparent that the best interests of either Puerto Rico or the United
States would be promoted by the artificial stimulation of national
political organizations in the island.29
Following up this suggestion, the Secretary sent a noncommittal

letter to Governor Gore on the subject, requesting his personal re
action or opinion as to the wisdom of initiating an active Democratic
organization.30 The governor's answer was not prompt in coming
and it certainly did not sound like that of a nonprofessional politician
such as he maintained he was. He claimed: "The time is opportune
for the formation of a Democratic party in Puerto Rico, and the
formation of such a party at this time would greatly simplify the work
of the governor."31 This move, which time and circumstances, both
in Washington and on the island, did not allow the governor to
follow up, would have solved the dilemma of being forced to choose
28. Letter of Judge Cordova to Gen. Parker, July 12, 1933.

29. BIA, #9093, Memorandum from Gen. Parker to Secretary of War,
July 17, 1933.
30. Ibid., #719-73 to 88, Puerto Rican Politics, Secretary Dern to
Gov. Gore, July 17, 1933.
31. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to Secre
tary Dern, July 31, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 67
between an an ti- American party and a Republican-Socialist combina

tion. However, Gore was forced to work with what he had. He felt
the urgency of moving quickly. The honeymoon was about over,
and he seemed to sense it. He wrote Parker: "I am momentarily
to
expecting to encounter difficulties because of the practices that have
grown up with the politicians surrounding me."32
At this point, Governor Gore had made only one appointment
to his cabinet. Men^ndez Ramos, recommended by the Department
of Agriculture, accepted the post of commissioner of agriculture
and commerce in Gore's government. Concerning the other positions,
Gore explained: "For the purpose of leverage on the coalition other
appointments have been withheld."33
* This technique of using appointments positions
to government
as reward Tor party cooperation with the executive branch was the
practice which Gore anticipated would bring him difficulties. He
did not feel himself strong enough to withstand it, or perhaps he
thought it to be the only way to govern. The fact that Theodore
Roosevelt, Jr., and Beverley before him had resisted this practice
to a great extent did not offer him an example of an alternative
procedure.
On the first of August Governor Gore opened a special session
of the legislature to which he sent a list of nominations. This action,
as he anticipated, did receive the criticism of the Liberal party
through its spokesman, Antonio Barcel6. Barcel6 had submitted can
didates for minor positions such as local magistrates in precincts
and districts where the Liberal party had racked up a plurality over
each of the other two parties independently. He had also submitted
candidates for positions where his party hadpulled down more
votes than the combination of the other two parties. However, pro
tested Barcel6, "among the appointments you just sent to the Senate
. . . figures a large number who have been recommended by the
Coalition . . . [for areas] in which the Liberal Party had a decided

majority over the two parties combined."34
In a friendly tone the governor offered his reply to the charge.
His letter explained that the coalition controlled the legislature and
expected "the same preferences you would expect if your party were
32. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen.
Parker, Aug. 2, 1933. 33. Ibid.
34. Letter from Antonio Barcel6 to Gov. Gore, Aug. 3, 1933, found in
La Democracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
in the majority in the Legislature." Governor Gore went further.

When equally qualified candidates are presented to him, "I will
favor, of course, anyone who belongs to the Coalition because Coali
tionists have had fewer employments and have a right to patron
age." However, as an afterthought, he added, "it_is not my wish to
permit any party to push the executive branch of the government
from one side to the other."35
At this point, the battle broke out into the open and, for the
remainder of 1933, no quarter was given by Barcelo and his fol
lowers. Governor Gore had been on the island a little more than a
month. His initial reception had been a noncommittal wait-and-see
policy on" the part of the Liberals. The coalition received him with
open arms, convinced he was one of them. Once Senator Barcel6
saw that he could get little or no attention at the hands of the new
executive, no stone was left unturned to remove him. That Gore,
alone, might have been able to survive the battle is very doubtful,
but certain events in Washington made his situation even more
difficult.
To understand these events and the misunderstanding they
caused, attention must be turned to Washington and the struggle
between Dern and Farley. It will be recalled that when Farley's
note mentioning the presidential approval of a change in the posi
tion of commissioner of education arrived, Secretary Dern was out
of Washington. General Parker, and probably efficient
a long-term
bureaucrat, saw the need to clear the way for the changes which
the wire from Farley implied were forthcoming. He drew up a wire
requesting "that unless resignations of Attorney General Winter,
Commissioner of Education Padin, and Auditor are already in your
hands you suggest to them confidentially immediate submission of
same to be effective if and when the President may elect to accept
them."36 After a conference with Dern's secretary, Mr. Martin, who
was informed about the pending test of strength between his super
ior and James Farley, this wire was not sent. Rather, the following
day a confidential letter was air-mailed.
This letter suggested the pending changes and urged Gore to
submit his recommendations. However, in an attempt to soften the
35. Letter from Gov. Gore to Antonio Barcel6, Aug. 10, 1933, found in
La Democracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
36. BIA, #9093, Proposed confidential wire from Gen. Parker to Gov.
Gore, drawn up, but not sent, July 28, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 69
request and couch it in terms of accepted and long

a generally
standing procedure, the letter contained two unfortunate paragraphs.
These are quoted at length because of their importance.
It would appear to be desirable that, in general, when there is

contemplated an appointment to a presidential office [sic] in Puerto
Rico wherein no advance vacancy exists, the incumbent should
have some information regarding the possible change in prospect
and thus be given an opportunity to submit his resignation in advance
of the new appointment, in case he so desires; the resignation to be
effective at the pleasure of the President, for acceptance if and when
the President may elect to do so.
This Bureau will endeavor to communicate to you appropriate
advance notice of pending changes affecting such appointees. Cir
cumstances may not, however, make this practicable. If the three
officials in question understood this, they might prefer to anticipate
the possible appointment of successors and submit their resignations
in the contingent form outlined above.37
The governor continued to make suggestions concerning pend

ing appointments. He urgedthe retention of the Auditor MacLeod^
who had been appointed upon the recommendation of the United
Fruit Company, but who had kept free of political entanglements/'8
this was approved by General Parker.39
While persistent in his demands for a continental commissioner
of education, he demonstrated his willingness to be pliable by sug
gesting Dr. Carlos Chardon, chancellor of the university. Chardon
was acceptable to Gore because "he is decidedly pro-American and
proved it when he compelled some high school students to apologize_
for an offense to the United States flag/'40 This Parker pointed out
was a highly dubious move, since Dr. Chardon had left the position
of commissioner for the chancellor's office."
Besides these continued suggestions concerning possible appoint
ments, the governor clumsily proceeded to carry out the suggestions
included in General Parker's letter in a way which brought about the
unrelenting opposition which would spell complete disorder. In a
37. Ibid., #9093, Letter from Gen. Parker to Gov. Gore, Confidential,
July 29, 1933.
Parker, Aug. 2, 1933.
39. Ibid., Letter from Gen. Parker to Gov. Gore, Aug. 16, 1933.
40. Ibid., Gov. Gore to Gen. Parker, Aug. 2, 1933.
41. Ibid., Gen. Parker to Gov. Gore, Aug. 16, 1933.
press conference in the afternoon of Friday, August 1 1 , at the gov

ernor's office, the chief executive of the island was said to have as
serted that
in any appointment which he might make in the future to the head

of a department he will require an undated resignation in advance
from the person who might be named in order to be able to control
this position at any moment that he might believe it convenient.
The executive is of the opinion that the governor should hay.e
the sameTfreedom with respect to the heads of departments that the
President of the United States has with respect to the appointment
of "the governor, that is : to be able to change them freely whenever
he deems it necessary/2
The reaction to this explosive announcement was, of course, at

first incredulity, then defense, and finally, attack. Immediately a
wire went off to Ruby Black in Washington to verify Gore's asser
tion concerning the President's policy. The answer which was wired
back read as follows:
The President denied having asked for undated resignations

from'persons whom he appointed. He suggested that I should find
out if the report was really true. He added that it sounded to him
like a "fairy-tale."43
Meanwhile, during the five days it took to receive this answer,

Antonio Barcel6, in defense, informed the governor that he was
withdrawing the list of Liberal party members which he had sub
mitted for positions in the government. Barcel6 explained: "We take
this action because we feel that no Puerto Rican of stature and
prestige could accept a position under such conditions."44
Governor Gore, feigning concern, replied that he hoped that
the unappointed Liberals would understand why they were being
passed over. He added "that the participation which the Liberal
party would have had in the government, will be offered to the
Democratic party."45
In this battle of words Antonio Barcelo spoke plainly and with
the vigor which he felt the situation required. He wrote "that a
42. La Democracia, Aug. 12, 1933. 43. Ibid., Aug. 17, 1933.
44. Letter from Antonio Barcel6 to Gov. Gore, Aug. 13, 1933, La Demo
cracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
45. Letter from Gov. Gore to Antonio Barcel6, Aug. 14, 1933, ibid.
"GORE'S HELL" 71
protest of dignity and respect owed to decent people was utilized by

you as a pretext to further the crude and degrading policy of pa
tronage."46 Within a few days the political feeling of approval and
cooperation between the governor and the Liberal party had degen
erated rapidly into an unpleasant atmosphere of recrimination and
reproach.
Once assured of the attitude in Washington, Barcelo decided to
launch his attack on Governor Gore. To President Roosevelt, before
whom he had just three weeks previously held up Gore as a model
public administrator, Barcelo wired : "Governor Gore has so far utter
ly failed to live up to his early declaration of efficiency and non-
politics and has frequently during his short seven weeks grated on
the sensibility of our people by uncalled-for grossness of statement
culminating in his announcement that he would exact blank resig
nations from his cabinet."47
Thus an unnecessary suggestion from Washington, ineptly taken
up and clumsily expressed in an effort to carry it out, netted for
the new governor tenacious opposition of the Liberal party.43
The governor felt he was securing cooperation from the coalition,
the other political group.49 By holding up on appointments he re
ceived from the coalition almost complete approval of the legislative
program which he had outlined to the special session of the island
legislature. The governor was highly pleased at the laudatory tele
grams sent to the President by the insular house and senate,50 which
referred to the "intimate accord" and "mutual cooperation" between
the two branches of the insular government.
The two measures which the governor found essential enough
to include in his message to the special session deserve separate at
tention. The first requires no comment except to say that one should
read the complete speech to appreciate fully the context within which
46. Letter from Antonio Barcel6 to Gov. Gore, Aug. 14, 1933, La Demo-
cracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
47. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Wire from Antonio Barcel6 to
President Roosevelt, Aug. 19, 1933.
48. While to this day the responsibility for the undated resignations
has rested on Gore's shoulders, it is probably true that the Washington
bureaucracy should shoulder a part of it.
49. BIA Personal File: Antonio Barcel6, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen.
Appointments Box 46, Wire from Garcia Mendez to President Roosevelt, Aug.
4, 1933.
the suggestion was made. The questionable taste is manifest. The

governor suggested to the legislature that about $7,000 should be
appropriated to carry out certain minor constructions within La
Fortaleza, the executive mansion of the governor, in order that Presi
dent Roosevelt, when visiting the island, might be wheeled through
the suites in comfort.51
To the special session, the governor also suggested that the re
vival of cockfights might attract the American tourist, although a
law would be required to legalize the sport, which, since the arrival
of the Americans, had been banned.52 Martinez Nadal was known
to be a leading enthusiast of this sport! When continental publicity
was given to the governor's request, several letters found their way
to the White House protesting re-establishing this "barbarous pas
time."53 The War Department suggested that this was not "a desir
able type~oF sport to stimulate."54
One final measure which reveals the nature of the cooperation
between the two parties needs detailed attention. This was the
program of working-men's insurance on which concentrated efforts
of James Beverley had failed to produce agreement during the last
regular legislative session. The issue by its nature threatened the
newly founded coalition. The Socialists could not ignore the meas
ure, since it had been one of their primary planks. However, the
interests represented by the Union Republican party could not ap
prove of such a state insurance fund, which promised to be costly
and inefficient. Furthermore, such a plan was counter to the prin
ciples of free enterprise, which were stoutly defended by the so-
called Socialists. In this, the influence of Samuel Gompers, Iglesias'
mentor, and the Republican allies could be seen. Conservative James
Beverley," with admirable forthrightness, set up the issue before the
Socialists and pointed out to them their obligation. He wrote:
To me the principal question is not the fact that the operation

of the state fund is more expensive upon the employers than any
other system but the damaging and terrible thing is that in spite
51. Government of Puerto Rico, Message of Robert H. Gore, Gov. of

Puerto Rico, to the 13th Legislature, first special session, delivered Aug. 1,
1933, pp. 7-8. 52. Ibid., p. 7.
53. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box #46, Letter from Byron Harlan
to President Roosevelt, Sept. 15, 1933.
54. BIA, #19101-167 to 9, Part 4, Legislature, Letter from Gen. Parker
to Gov. Gore, Aug. 14, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 73
of the heavy expenses the laborers who were injured received no

benefits. I conceive the object of all working-men's compensation
laws to be to protect the working man and not to protect the political
job holders or lawyers or doctors. Whatever system protects the
laborer is the proper system regardless of theory.55
The governor's efforts, as we have seen, were in vain. The legis

lature recessed without agreement on this most important issue. Dur
ing the recessand prior to the arrival of the new governor, the
Socialists and Republicans put their heads together and came up
witha plan which would be acceptable to all except the eagle-eyed
members of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department.
During the first months, Governor Gore emphasized time and again
the factor of economy and the need to cut and, if possible, to do
away with the deficit. The projected legislation, pushed by the
speaker of the house, Socialist Rafael Alonso Torres, was designed
apparently to meet this requirement. However, it was actually a
cleverly disguised work which would permit the setting up of an
insurance organization (to be controlled by the commissioner of
labor, a Socialist), which enticed the support of big business because
of invitingly lower rates.
Victor Braegger, one of the largest insurance representatives on
the island, wrote to the home office of Maryland Casualty Company.
The interesting fact about the acceptance of this law by the

leading industries is that they have allowed themselves to become the
dupes of a plan that would relieve the big sugar mills and corpora
tions employing labor in industries or processing of agricultural prod
ucts such as tobacco, etc., to pass on the big burden of the premium
cost and deficits to the small property owner, i.e., the middle classes
who would have to share the bulk of the cost of this service.58
It is to be expected, of course, that Braegger would be prejudiced

against any state insurance organization and his letter does make
some questionable reference to the political pork barrel which was
to be set up under this bill. His criticism, however, is specific and
he cites an example to back up his objection. He offers the case of
55. Ibid., #21737-55-90, Puerto Rican Employers' Liability, Working-

men's Compensations, Letter from Gov. Beverley to Commissioner Rivera
Martinez, April 8, 1933.
56. Ibid., #21737-55-90 Part #2, Letter from Victor Braegger to Mc-
Gillet, Copy to Gen. Parker, Aug. 17, 1933.
f 74) PUERTO RICAN POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL
the Serraltes Corporation, a sugar company located near Ponce on

the south coast of the island and owned by a prominent member of
the Republican party, to prove his point:
Assuming that the assessed value of this mill was three million
— under the new law Serraltes will only pay 31/100 of 1% or
$9,000 a year. Our loss records show that for the fiscal year to June
30, 1932 this risk cost us more than $25,000. Therefore, the in
nocent tax payer will have to pay $16,000 on behalf of the rich
corporation.57
This legislative matter shows not only to what extent the Social
ists and Republicans were working together for mutual benefit, but it
is also an example of the specialized interests which they protected
and worked for. The Socialists, with the hopes of oiling a political
organization under the guise of a state insurance fund, secured
support of the capitalist half of the coalition by offering the obvious
benefit of reduced rates.
Fortunately the governor, who was in Washington at the time,
was able to escape the open rebuff of his legislators by pocket veto
ing this and other special interest legislation.58 The coalition was
markedly disappointed, but the Liberals, who had fought most of
those measures, expressed satisfaction at this turn of events. Gore
in Washington was not the Gore in San Juan. However, meanwhile,
the poor laborer suffered.
A minor skirmish was developing behind these scenes, which,
if it had gotten out of hand, would have been of serious enough
nature to have precipitated the immediate removal of the governor.
While Robert Gore was awaiting Senate approval of his appoint
ment governor, he was visited at the Mayflower Hotel by a
as
newspaper man who had written a series of articles on Puerto Rico
for the Baltimore Sun in 192 5. 59 John Boylan, the reporter, was not
known to Gore, but since he did demonstrate an impressive grasp
of the island's political picture, the governor evidently tolerated
his presence while in the States and may have even hinted at finding
him some kind of governmental sinecure once on the island. Boylan
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Wire from Robert Gore to Acting
Gov. Winter, Sept. 13, 1933.
59. Ibid., Personal File: John F. Boylan, Letter from Gov. Gore to Sec
retary Dern, Aug. 24, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 75
attached himself to the governor's party in Miami, Florida, and con

vinced the Pan American Airways ticket agents that he was part
of the official entourage. Later the governor, out of his own private
funds, had to reimburse the company for Boylan's trip to the island.60
Under no stretchy .of the imagination were Boylan's articles in
the Baltimore Sun a compliment to the islanders in general and to
Antonio Barcelo in particular, who was at that time the president
of the insular senate. The legislature declared the writer persona
non grata to the people of Puerto Rico. Of course, it was a shock
to see the man back on the island, apparently as a protege" of the
new governor. As the attitude of Governor Gore toward the Liberal
party became clearer, Barcelo took an opportunity to strike out at
Boylan and the governor. He charged the governor with intending
to put this unacceptable person on the government payroll as pub
licity director within the department of agriculture and commerce.
This, Barcelo declared, "would constitute a gratuitous offense to the
Puerto Rican people."61
It is probable that Barcelo was correctly informed of the inten
tions of the governor, since Boylan had already been entrusted with
a task which would fall under the responsibility of such an office
once it were set up. Gore had sent him to Florida to make the ar
rangements for a "trade trip" of Puerto Rican manufacturers.62
Upon his return, Gore claimed that he notified Boylan that he would
not support him for any government position because of his reputa
tion as a "periodical drunkard"!63
Once the doubt had been raised by Barcelo as to the charac
ter of Boylan, the governor wrote to William Moore of the Baltimore
Sun, requesting information on Boylan's character and a more com
plete story on the Puerto Rican articles. Moore replied authenticat
ing the truth of the articles, saying that Barcelo had been unable to
prove a single misstatement of fact. However, concerning Boylan's
character, he added: "I haven't any great confidence in him."64
60. La Fortaleza, Official Files, John Boylan, Letter of Gov. Gore.

61. Letter from Antonio Barcel6 to the governor, Aug. 12, 1933, found
in La Democracia, Aug. 24, 1933.
62. Gore hoped to broaden the island's commercial relations with the
mainland; he was particularly interested in breaking the monopoly of the
northeast ports.
63. BIA, Personal File: John Boylan, Letter from Gov. Gore to Secretary
Dern, Aug. 24, 1933.
64. Ibid., Letter of William Moore to Gov. Gore, Aug. 21, 1933.
Once removed from his source of income, Boylan was in a

predicament; since he did not have sufficient funds to come to the
island, he certainly did not have enough to pay for his passage off
of it. The situation was even worse than the time he had had to
leave Baltimore hurriedly. On that occasion, he had found gullible
friends to lend him money.65 Lacking these, Boylan plied an even
more questionable ruse.
There was a bill, sponsored by Senator Muiioz Marin, pending
the signature of the governor, which would outlaw the possession
and operation of slot machines on the island. On a Sunday, John
Boylan went to Attorney General Charles Winter and urged
see
him to advise the governor that the bill was unconstitutional. Either
that same day or early the next the governor was informed that
Boylan had "in his possession a check for $250 made out to cash
and signed by the president and secretary of the slot machine op
erating company."66 Governor Gore signed the bill on Monday and
ordered an investigation of Boylan's activities. Since the latter was
not in a government position he could not be charged with bribery.
With the necessary check, he booked passage for the States on the
last day of August.67
The Liberal party, through La Democracia, kept this Boylan
affair alive for at least a week after he left. The paper charged that
the break between the governor and Boylan came when the latter
accepted the check from the interested party. Although the dif
ference in accounts exists, it is not important, since even La Demo
cracia admitted the honesty of the governor, but it also indicated
that, in view of this affair, he had proved his incompetency and
incapacity.68
The Liberal party then kept up a steady attack not only on the
Boylan affair but also on the undated Gore began to
resignations.
show concern, and he wrote to the War Department explaining his
points of view: "You probably know by this time that Barcel6 is
fighting me. He wanted me to permit him the right to veto appoint
ments to the cabinet. I refused to even tell him who I intended to
65. One of these was Governor Ritchie of Maryland, who never was
repaid. See Ruby Black's story of July 20, 1933, Ruby Black Collection, File
on R. H. Gore.
66. BIA, Personal File: J. F. Boylan, Letter from Gov. Gore to Secre
tary Dern, Aug. 24, 1933.
67. La Correspondence, Sept. 1, 1933.
68. La Democracia, Sept. 7, 1933.
'GORE'S HELL" 77
appoint and this incensed him. He is conducting a lying campaign

to which I am not even replying."69
These lies are not cited or referred to by Governor Gore, but
there seems to be little proof that the attack of La Democracia
contained any premeditated distortion of the facts. Undoubtedly,
things may have been misinterpreted and blown up out of pro
portion to their importance. For example, Governor Gore candidly
suggested that "too much importance had been given to his declara
tion that he would exact undated resignations from public officers
appointed by him."70
However, there is no question that the attacks of La Democracia
became more and more disrespectful of the first executive. The sit
uation was a desperate one for the Liberal party. They had burned
their bridges by publicly stating that no Liberal would, or morally
could, participate in a government directed by a person who re
quired undated resignations. The titles of the editorials of La Demo
cracia indicated the tone of the continued attacks. On Monday,
August 21, 1933, the editorial was entitled La Dignidad y el Torino.
On Friday, the editorial, which was later picked up by Drew Pearson
in his column "Washington Merry-Go-Round," ridiculed Governor
Gore's vacillating public utterances by quoting the refrain of the
popular Cuban rumba: Mendalo, Menealo, De aqui pa'alld, de alia
pa'ca. The fact that the governor was built physically on the corpu
lent side did not help matters at all. Finally, an article, not written
by Mufioz Marin, attacked the governor under the caption of the
word ImbeciV. It was provoked by telegram sent to Governor Gore
a
by Jose Acosta Velarde and published in La Democracia. In part, it

read:
Even if Mr. Barcelo had tried to boss you the fact remains that
you denounce him only after he flayed you for your attempt to corral
insular government employees when you announced you would re
quire undated resignations. . . . This is the biggest act of imbecility
ever exhibited by any governor that we have endured not including
Mont. Reily of the Ohio Gang.71
Worse was to come. Governor Gore, once in trouble, kept silent

and even refused to see the press. Once, on the mainland, however,
69. BIA, Personal File: Antonio Barcel6, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen.
70. El Mundo, Aug. 15, 1933. 71. La Democracia, Aug. 25, 1933.
where he had gone with a group of businessmen to open up markets

in Florida for Puerto Rican products, he decided to talk to a more
sympathetic press.
The Washington Daily News, with a Miami date line of August
21, 1933, published a cablegram from Governor Gore denying that
he had required undated resignations from his appointees and ac
cused Barcelo, the leader of a defeated party, of refusing to coop
erate with the administration. It was essentially the same as he
had written to the Bureau of Insular Affairs. He referred to Barcelo
as an "old man who has about lost his power and is crying in the
wilderness."72
If true, then the old man was making a lot of noise which was
bound to reach the ears of someone. On the eleventh of September,
Governor Gore, now in Washington, was personally handed an
editorial from La Democracia73 entitled: "Governor Gore you are a
Damn Liar." The editorial was given to him by Brigadier General
Creed Fulton Cox, who was shortly to replace General Parker as
director of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.74
While the attacks in the Liberal paper were progressively becom
ing more vitriolic, Governor Gore had only been growing more over
confident. In Washington, while surrounded by a group of "the boys"
(newspaper men who spoke his language), he had accused Barcejo
of inventing the story of the undated resignations.75
The editorial put the facts before the public, although, since
it was written in English, it was a limited public. The writer pre
ferred to quote El Mundo rather than his own paper for the source
for the governor's public statements dealing with the undated resig
nations. The writer's case rested on the direct contradiction of the
evidence presented. The final paragraph read:
Governor Gore this is a damn lie. You who uttered it are a

damn liar. . . . We make it deliberately so that you may sue us for
libel, and obtain a verdict if you have not lied. It is in your hands
to demonstrate your veracity.76
There is no evidence as to the reaction of Governor Gore when
72. BIA, Letter of Aug. 20, 1933, from Gov. Gore.

74. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Memorandum attached to the edi
torial clipped from La Democracia.
75. El Mundo, Sept. 5, 1933. 76. La Democracia, Sept. 6, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 79
he was confronted with this interesting example of political journal

ism. The fact remains that the evidence was overwhelming against
him. He did not press the matter, and there rested the case of the
undatecT resignations.
The undated resignations were only symptomatic of the desire
of the governor to rid himself of Republican hang-overs. A new
administration meant new job-holders. The coalition itself was ready
to help the new governor in accomplishing this, once they were as
sured that they were the ones to benefit from the change.
As we have seen, the case of the commissioner of education had
run into difficulties. A new approach was required, since the de
partment of education under Dr. Padin had been comparatively
free of political influence, when it theoretically offered fertile terri
tory for political maneuvering.
Governor Gore had informed the War Department, shortly after
his arrival on the island, of his impression that the educational sys
tem was not preparing good American citizens.77 Two weeks later
the governor returned to his growing obsession with the need for
a change in the educational division of the government. He now
asserted that such a change was necessary because of the lack of
a definite program of Americanization. He wrote:
I have heretofore written you about the lack of any definite

American educational tendencies on the island and I want to reit
erate with this proof which I am sending you herewith the state
ment that the Americanization of the island is now at the lowest
ebb. We must definitely form a policy if we desire to achieve sym
pathy" and understanding between the United States and Puerto
Rico. ... I would appreciate it if you will show this article and
the translations to the President because I
intend to talk to him
about this phase of Puerto Rico when I next see him. I am going to
insist that we definitely form some permanent educational policy.78
Donald Draughon, who had helped to clear the way for Gov
ernor Gore on the island, was of a similar mind, and he may have
been the guide to Gore's thoughts on the subject. Although the press
had indicated that Mrs. Whittemore's appointment was unlikely,
Draughon wrote to the Secretary of War urging that Mrs. Whitte-
77. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to Secretary
Dern, July 23, 1933.
78. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to Secretary Dern, Aug. 12, 1933.
more be given full consideration, since she "will do much to foster

the development of Americanism which has been so sadly lacking
in the past."79
Two days after sending this letter to Dern he wrote to Gore:
I
have obtained several articles, somewhat similar to the leaflet
I gave you, signed by Mr. Barcelo . . . and written in the same trend
of an ti- Americanism. In view of the agitation which they have caused
and fostered, I thought perhaps they might prove useful to you.
... I trust that you will successfully accomplish your mission.80
Governor Gore's "mission" to Washington was designed to drop^

Dr. Fadin from his position as commissioner of education. In order
to carry out this task, he was collecting proof of the anti-American
ism prevalent on the island and he was pointing to the school system
as the root of the trouble. He was prepared to take his case not
only Secretary Dern, who, unknown to him, had stopped the
to
Whittemore appointment, but to the White House itself. His pur
pose would in definite terms an educational policy
be to establish
for the island and thus reverse the anti-Americanism which he felt
was growing on the island.
Warned by the governor's letter as to the purpose of his visit,
the Secretary of War sent off several confidential and personal let
ters to outstanding educators of the country. Dr Nicholas Murray
Butler, Dr. Thomas Gates, and Dr. Leland Jenks were consulted
concerning the quality of the present educational situation under
Dr. Padin as well as to possible successors.
The first pleaded ignorance and requested that someone more
qualified be consulted.81 Dr. Gates, who had previously defended the
work of Padin, recommended, if a change had to be made, about
a dozen continental educators.82
A letter of Dr. Jenks, professor of Social Institutions of Welles-
ley College, cut through to the heart of the problem.
79. Ibid., Personal File: Jean Whittemore, Letter from Donald Draughon
to Secretary Dern, Aug. 28, 1933.
80. Ibid., Letter from Donald Draughon to Governor Gore, Aug. 30,
1933.
81. Ibid., #20324, Confidential B., Letter from Dr. Butler to Secretary
Dern, Aug. 25, 1933.
82. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gates to Secretary Dern, Sept. 23, 1933; an
swering letter from Dern, Aug. 23, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 81
• I must say frankly that in my judgment a policy of further

ing Americanization in Puerto Rico by political authority would
be almost the most unfortunate development which could take place
for the two countries. There is no reason to bewail Americanization
insofar as it takes place naturally, that is to say, through the exten
sion of economic and social contacts. This is certain to come if tKe
inhabitants of the island can be brought to some standard of living
similar to that of the mainland. Should that time come the educa
tional policy can and will conform. But it is hopeless folly now to
talk of Americanizing the jibaro.
The most immediate consequence of the suggested policy would
be an inflamed public opinion in Puerto Rico, passionately anti-
American, anti-Gore, with outcries that would be eloquent and
would have repercussions in other American countries. . . .
IF there is one thing that our colonial experience should have
taught us it is that there is nothing to which our neighbors are so
attached as to their culture. Political issues stir the ambitious; the
economic issues perturb larger groups; but culture stirs unreasoning^
emotional responses which defy all political and economic calcula
tions'.
Concerning Dr. Padin himself, Jenks wrote:
I have the highest respect for his abilities. He has assimilated

the best that the United States has to offer in the way of modern
educational policies. ...
It is ridiculous to refer to his policies as
anti-American unless the New Deal, Teachers' College or John
Dewey's educational philosophy are to be so termed. . . . No other
policy (bi-lingualisrh) is feasible for the insular schools without
ruining the system that has gradually developed or/and flooding the
island with carpet-bag teachers from the mainland. . . .
"
T do hot believe that it is possible to make the islanders good
Americans by education, except as they can be made good Puerto
Ricans.83
As can be understood, Governor Gore's reception in the official

circles of Washington was not one marked by easy acquiescence.
On the contrary, for the Americanization of the island
his plan
was coolly received not only in the War Department but also in the
White House, from which he had expected to receive most of his
support.
83. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Leland Jenks to Secretary Dern, Aug. 23,
1933.
Ruby Black, the informed first lady of the Washington press

colony, sent out a story built around the following assertion: "The
administration of public education in Puerto Rico will be continued
under the leadership of the present commissioner, Dr. Jose" Padin,
or another Puerto Rican."84 Although Miss Black could not speak
for the government, her sources of information, while not beyond
question,certainly demanded respect. If this were a true reflection
of the administration's position, and there is nothing to indicate
that it was not, Governor Gore had been completely countermanded.
Some question of Gore's own status and qualifications for con
tinued service as governor must have been raised at this time by
the White House itself. The inquiry, unknown to Governor Gore,
was sent to the Secretary of War. Dern answered in part as follows:
'T had two long conferences with Governor Gore during the past
week and feel that he is getting good grasp on Puerto Rican prob
a
lems."85 Even though Ruby Black could pick up no indication of his

removal, an editorial in La Democracia claimed that his policy in
Puerto Rico was in direct conflict with the Good Neighbor policy
which was about to be unveiled at the Pan American meeting in
Montevideo.88
Although Governor Gore returned to the island in apparent re-
treat,~there seem to have been resources left to him. Soon after his
appointment as governor, he had received a letter from a young
professor of Spanish at Charleston College in South Carolina request
ing consideration for the appointment as commissioner of education.
The letter itself is interesting in that great attention is given to the
political activity of the writer in the local Democratic organization,
but little or nothing is said in regard to his academic or educational
qualifications for such an important administrative position.87
Jose" Gallardo, the writer of the letter, was a "well appearing
man, above medium height and of Puerto Rican descent."88 In his
letter to the governor, Gallardo did admit "that the appointee should
be selected entirely on a basis of fitness. ...
If the present incum-

85. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Appointments,
Box 46, Letter from Secretary Dern to President Roosevelt, Sept. 2, 1933.
87. BIA, #20324, Letter from Jos6 Gallardo to Robert H. Gore, June
19, 1933.
88. Ibid., Confidential B., Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary
Dern, Sept. 26, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 83
bent has done the work efficiently he should be retained even though
he is a Hoover appointee. However, if . . . there should be a
change. ..." Gallardo thus let it be understood that he would be
available.89
The young professor's letter was accompanied by a recommen
dation from a good politician rather than from an educator. The
mayor of Charleston, Burnet R. Maybank, restricted his praise of
Gallardo to the "splendid" work in political organizations among the
students and townspeople during the past two election years.90
Governor Gore wrote to the Secretary of War recommending
the appointment of "Jose Gallarda" [sic].91 Governor Gore stressed
the fact that Gallardo had been a Democrat before 1928 and a
Roosevelt supporter before the convention. He was obviously a man
who spoke the governor's language, and it is strange that he was
overlooked for such a long time. The War Department followed
up the recommendation with a letter to the president of Charleston
College requesting an appraisal of the young man's administrative
and executive abilities. A report from the Federal Bureau of In
vestigation was also requested.
Dr. Harrison Randolph, president of Charleston College, re
vealed the character of the man in question: "He adapts himself
easily to any situation. He is one of the best informed men in Amer
ican politics that I have ever known, and his enthusiasm in this
field he seems to be able to pass on to others."92 From the FBI report,
which is highly favorable, we learn that Gallardo had the hacking
oF the Chamber of Commerce and that he had never requested
credit in Charleston.55
Jose"Gallardo was unknown to the island's politicians, and cer
tainly unknown to Santiago Iglesias, when Creed Cox informed him
of the governor's recommendation.94
On October 12, 1933, the official paper appointing Jose M.
Gallardo as commissioner of education went to the White House.95
89. Ibid., Letter of Gallardo, June 6, 1933.

90. Ibid., Letter from Maybank to Gov. Gore, June 28, 1933.
91. Ibid., Personal File: Gov. Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to Secretary
of War, Sept. 20, 1933.
92. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Dr. Randolph to Gen. Cox, Oct. 5, 1933.
93. Ibid., FBI Report dated Oct. 3, 1933.
94. Ibid., Note on copy of a report from Santiago Iglesias to Secretary of
War, Sept. 25, 1933.
95. Ibid., Secretary Dern to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Oct. 11, 1933.
To understand what happened to this document, attention must

again be directed to the island.
When Governor Gore had returned to Puerto Rico, he found
that the island wags, active in his absence, had written a satirical
farce on the island's political situation entitled "Gore's Hell."96 The
main characters in the drama were Don Antonio de la Mancha (Bar-
celo), Rafael del Gallo (Martinez Nadal), Gorito Dantes (Governor
Gore), and Jack Boil Land (J. Boylan). Other symbolical actors
were Tio Samuel, La Vieja Gloria, Reverendo Tirado, Maria del
Mar, and Benjamin.
The plot of the farce was built around the romance between
Maria del Mar (Puerto Rico) and her beau Benjamin (the ideal of
independence). Reverendo Tirado is the minister of the Pentecostal
Church to which Gorito Dantes belongs. Gorito Dantes, central
figure of the drama, considers himself sent from heaven on a special
good-will mission by el Gran Delanitp, the Celestial Father. This
mission is to win Maria del Mar from Benjamin. However, in this
mission he fails because Maria del Mar rejects his pretentions when
he requires her to sign undated divorce papers. Gorito is supposed to
be helped in his effort by Jack Boil Land, but the latter succeeds in
causing more trouble for his protector.
If we are to believe the notices of La Democracia, this play was
an enormous success in San Juan." Its popular appeal was sufficient
enough to make the coalition take steps to prevent its being shown
in Mayagiiez, the third largest city on the island. In Mayagiiez,
Alfonso Valde"s, who held a mortgage on the town's principal the
ater, refused permission to present the play on the grounds that it
would disturb the peace.98 The authors of the play, Eusebio Prats,
who considered himself a Republican, and G. Jime"nez Sicardo, who
considered himself a Liberal, went to court to secure permission to
show the play in one of the smaller theaters of the town."
However ludicrous the situation might have seemed at this point,
events were soon to occur which could not be laughed off. Munoz
Marin began a weekly column in which he dealt with the daily
errors, from the Liberal party view, committed by Governor Gore. On
occasion, some concern was aroused as to whether the governor
96. La Democracia, Sept. 21, 1933. 97. Ibid., Sept. 23, 1933.
98. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Muna Lee to Ruby Black, Oct.
9, 1933. 99. La Democracia, Oct. 10, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 85
would commit his error for the day, but for the most part, Governor
Gore obliged the young editor.
On September 22, Governor Gore named a Socialist leader,
Rafael Alonso Torres, a member of the house of representatives, to
the board of directors of the University of Puerto Rico.100 This ap
pointment could not have been better calculated to cause a storm
of protest. The position was to be filled by a person who was "of
recognized ability in the sciences, letters, or arts."101 The Bureau
of Insular Affairs admitted to itself that Alonso, who had studied up
to the age of fourteen — an above-average education for a working-
man — did not meet the requirements.102 Even the coalition recog
nized triat the politician could not Tiave been a professor of the
university. The vigorous outburst which this appointment caused
would be a week or two in coming. In the meantime, the depart
ment of education began to ward off the attacks of the governor.
The commissioner of education, Dr. Padin, formally requested
that Governor Gore send Dorothy Bourne, who was in charge of
the Social Service work of the department, to Washington to attend
the Child Health Convention called by the Secretary of Labor,
Frances Perkins.103 Governor Gore was astute enough to see through
this thinly disguised ruse, and anticipated that Mrs. Bourne, as a
personal friend of Mrs. Roosevelt, would defend the commissioner
of education before Washington officials, asking for his reappoint
ment. Governor Gore, however, did not feel strong enough to deny
permission for the trip.
Mrs. Bourne went to Washington to defend Dr. Padin. She went
with a letter of introduction from the commissioner to General Creed
Cox, whom she visited upon her arrival. She also secured an appoint
ment with the Secretary of War. In her conference with the Secre
tary, she limited her defense of Padin to a refutation of the charge
that he was not a patriotic American and to a warning that a pro
gram of Americanization would cause a great deal of harm.104

101. BIA, #20324, Commissioner of Education, Part 1, Confidential B.,
Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Oct. 26, 1933.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., Personal File: Governor Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen.
Cox, Sept. 25, 1933.
104. Ibid., #20324, Commissioner of Education, Confidential B., Mem
orandum of Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Oct. 4, 1933; Attached B, a pen
ciled note of G. H. Dern dated Oct. 9, 1933, on Mrs. Bourne's visit.
However, it was not in this department of the executive branch
that Mrs. Bourne was expected to have the most success. The day
after she made her appointment with Secretary Dern, Mrs. Bourne
attended one of the famous White House afternoon teas at Mrs.
Roosevelt's invitation. The talk naturally turned to Puerto Rico with
out any obvious effort on the part of the guest. The President, who
was not present, had been discussing the Puerto Rican situation
with his wife just a few days previously. He had expressed the de
sire to find out all the truth about the island.105 Mrs. Roosevelt hoped
to get some reliable information from her friend, Mrs. Bourne. One
question which was asked was whether or not, in the opinion of
Mrs.TJourne, Governor Gore would eventually work out in Puerto
Rico. "The answer she got was a discouraging one," Ruby Black
wrote to her friend, Muna Lee de Munoz Marin. Miss Black had
been present in a nonprofessional capacity.
But the tea was not an appropriate time and place to talk over
the full situation in Puerto Rico, and Mrs. Bourne received an invi
tation to return to dine at the White House with the President and
his wife. Unfortunately, what was discussed at that dinner is un
known.
Commissioner Padin defended himself in a personal letter to
General Creed Cox. Questioning the value of a program of Ameri
canization, he requested an opportunity to defend his point of view
before the proper authorities in Washington. Padin went to the
heart of the matter with an accusation : "I feel that short-sighted and
selfish politicians have retarded the growth and understanding and
affection between the people of the island and their continental
brothers by their maneuvers to secure larger shares of spoils under
the cloak of 100% Americanism."106
General Cox reprimanded Dr. Padin for going over the gover
nor's head to write to the bureau. Dr. Padin was informed that even
though he did not agree with the governor, the governor was en
titled to a frank statement of his views as a cabinet member.107
This letter and Mrs. Bourne's visit were both looked upon by
the War Department as proof of Governor Gore's charge that he
105. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Ruby Black

to Muna Lee, Oct. 5, 1933.
106. BIA, #26954, Anti-American feeling, Letter from Jose Padin to
Gen. Cox, Sept. 27, 1933.
107. Ibid., Gen. Cox to Jos6 Padin, Oct. 4, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 87
"could not count upon Commissioner Padin for his cooperation in

the government."108 General Cox advised the Secretary of War that
the commissioner was "not only not in accord with the views of the
governor but is apparently hostile to him."109
General Cox drew up a letter for the Secretary in an effort to
call the governor's attention two possible causes of ill will. It
to
was pointed out that no one cause of discontent could be found
in any similar circumstances, whether in the federal, state, or local
government. However, changes in administration often produced
uneasiness in the minds of appointed officials whose terms of service
would be concluded. This unrest, the Department pointed out,
would not be serious as long as good candidates were selected to re
place the outgoing officials.
Another cause of discontent was still more serious and it
stemmed, according to the writer of the letter, from the "rather
frequent use of the term Americanization in its application to Puerto
Rico as distinguished from the rest of the United States."110 The
Puerto Ricans, with a rich historical tradition of Spanish customs
and language, had for many years been a part of the United States
and since 1917 were declared citizens of the United States. There
fore, it was maintained, any suggestion of doubt concerning the
loyalty of the Puerto Rican was offensive to the islander and would
retard rather than advance the feeling of national unity between
the two people. The War Department's advice to Governor Gore
was the same that had been given to Governor Reily ten years before :
"In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, Puerto Ricans must
be presumed to be loyal citizens and only by accepting them on this
basis may we be expected to receive" their loyalty.111
The governor refused to accept this good advice in the manner
in which it was offered. He denied that he had said anything "that
might be construed as offensive to the culture, language, habits or
appearance of the people of Puerto Rico."112 He did not mention
having questioned the loyalty of the islanders.
Cox, Sept. 25, 1933.
109. Ibid., #26954, Confidential Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Sec
retary Dern, Oct. 4, 1933.
110. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Dern to Gov. Gore, Oct. 9, 1933.
111. Ibid., Letter from Secretary of War to Gov. Reily, June 27, 1921.
112. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to Secretary Dern, October 18, 1933.
With the island events pointing toward a serious outbreak, the

governor would have done well to have considered the wise advice.
Perhaps, however, it was already too late.
The political appointment of Alonso Torres became a rallying
point for attack upon the governor. Since there was little in the
past history of the appointee which would have warranted his being
selected for such a position, there is little doubt that it was a polit
ical appointment. He was a political leader of recognized ability.
Since 1917 he had been continually elected to the house of repre
sentatives by more votes than any other member of that legislative
body. As a member of the house, his most recent valued contribu
tion had been a three-volume analysis, drawn up by a commission
of which he was a member, of the economic conditions of the work
ers and the unemployed of the island.113
The opposition to this appointment was cultivated for political
purposes by the Liberal party. La Democracia openly suggested that
the spirit, if not the letter, of the law was being violated by the
governor.114 The Bureau of Insular Affairs claimed this would be
hard to prove, since the governor could argue that his discretion
allowed him to be the judge of his candidate's qualifications.
Alonso's intellectual standing on the island was not improved
by the publishing in El Mundo of one of his literary efforts entitled
The Mission of the Dog in Human Destines."115 The Liberal party
paper immediately ridiculed the author, suggesting that this was
Alonso's doctoral dissertation. In the article Alonso committed sev
eral obvious errors, including that of reference to dogs as felines.
This prompted a satirical reply published by several students in
El Mundo entitled "Feline Dogs and Canine Cats."116
The university students demonstrated against the appointment
with placards and parades. With the statues on the university grounds
draped in black, the students decided to parade up to the governor's
house in old San Juan. A commission of twenty was selected to see
the governor, but the governor stated that the matter was closed,
and refused to see them. Later, yielding slightly, he suggested that
he could see three students. But the damage was done, and accord-
113. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Santiago Iglesias to the Bureau, Oct.
23, 1933.
115. El Mundo, Oct. 1, 1933.
116. Ibid., Oct. 3, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 89
ing to Governor Gore, some two thousand students paraded, carry

ing an empty casket, shouting threats, and urging the governor to
return home.117
This reaction against Alonso was not all politically motivated.
He had, upon occasion, perhaps with some degree of accuracy, criti-
- cized the university as a center of aristocracy and social exclusive-
1/ ness which he, as a Socialist, was interested in combating. In a
speech given in the house of representatives in November, Repre
sentative Alonso suggested that there were certain cultural institu
tions which deserved "to be blown to bits" once the hour of revolution
for "collective growth" arrives.118
Governor Gore, now evidently alarmed at the proportions to
which the reaction to the Alonso appointment had grown, wrote to
the President. In his defense of his selection, he admitted that Alon
so had no advanced education, but he stressed that Alonso was a
self-made man, decidedly pro-American, with a high sense of moral
responsibility and a desire for economy. Gore said: "I appointed
him as a representative of the 96 per cent of the people of this
l/ island who have never been to a university, but who have an interest
in the education of their children."119 Under other circumstances
with another governor, a similar appointment might have been ac
cepted. Certainly Dr. Padin was a self-made man who had come
from humble beginnings. On the other hand, he was well prepared
for his position. However, one was acceptable and the other not,
because one was pro-American and the other, according to Governor
Gore, an ti- American. Governor Gore repeated his request for a
cabinet which is in thorough accord with the government, and "not
one that is acting to destroy the government."120
The governor, who felt that Washington officials doubted his
word, requested that the FBI be called in next to investigate the
school system.121 When the War Department refused his request,122
he repeated it, adding: "It will be necessary to change the commis
sioner of education or to remove the governor. The two are so in-
117. BIA, #20324, Gov. Gore to BIA, Oct. 2, 1933.

118. El Mundo, Nov. 20, 1933.
Box #46, Gov. Gore to President Roosevelt, Oct. 2, 1933.
120. BIA, #20324, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox, Oct. 2, 1933.
121. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox, Oct. 4, 1933.
122. Ibid., Wire from BIA to Gov. Gore, Oct. 5, 1933.
compatible and so far apart in their conception of the educational

standards for the island that there is no hope of accord."123
The answer to this ultimatum was the information that the
pertinent papers concerning the Gallardo appointment had been
finally organized and transmitted to the White House. The Secre
tary hoped that action would be taken on the appointment in the
near future.124 In the same letter, however, he expanded on his re
fusal to request a survey of the educational system by the Depart
ment of Justice. In his opinion, such a survey would not "serve any
useful purpose and it might create an undesirable situation in Puerto
Rico."
The appointment of Jose Gallardo received the approval of the
War Department when it was evident that the governor and the
commissioner of education were not compatible. Far from being
unsatisfactory, Dr. Padin's administration was described in an official,
confidential memorandum to the Secretary from the Bureau of In
sular Affairs as "a distinguished one."125 Nevertheless, in view of the
impending change, his resignation was requested by wire, to be ef
fective at the discretion of the President.126
At the same time a change was contemplated in the office of
attorney general. Charles Winters was to be replaced by Benjamin
Horton, who was the leader of the Puerto Rican delegation to the
Chicago convention. This office had consistently been held by a
continental, and while local politics had filtered into the lower
levels of the department of justice to a marked degree,127 no great
political battle was waged over this position. At a later date Horton
was to be the victim of a political shake-up, but there was no indica
tion of this at the present.
Early Saturday morning, on October 14, the War Department
was informed that the President had approved the appointment of
Benjamin Horton as attorney general, but concerning the appoint
ment of Jose" Gallardo, "he [the President] has not approved as he
123. Ibid., Personal File: Governor Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to
Gen. Cox, Oct. 7, 1933.
124. Ibid., #20324, Secretary Dern to Gov. Gore, Oct. 11, 1933.
125. Ibid., #9093, Appointments, Confidential B., Memorandum from
Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Oct. 11, 1933.
126. Ibid., Confidential B., Oct. 12, 1933, Wire to Gov. Gore.
127. La Fortaleza, Letter from Dr. Nicolas Quifiones Jimenez to Mrs.
Jean Whittemore, June 5, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 91
personally felt that it would be better to leave the present incunv

bent in."128
This notice exploded like a bombshell in the Bureau of Insular
Affairs. General Cox gathered together all pertinent material on the
Padin-Gore-Gallardo affair and suggested that it be brought to the
attention of the President. Of particular importance was the gover
nor's letter in which he set up the case as either Gore or Padin, but
not both.129 Other documents which were carried by the Secretary
to the White House on Monday morning included letters on the
student demonstration, threats of a student strike, charges by the
governor to the effect that the school system was being infiltrated
with ideas of anti-Americanism due to the alleged political sym
pathies of the commissioner, and finally a letter in which the gov
ernor charged that all of this "is part of a plot,"130 to get rid of him
and bring independence to the island.
The President, who, as we have shown, had his own sources
of information, refused to yield much ground and the Monday morn
ing conference ended in a compromise. At the suggestion of the
President, the Secretary of War would accede to the governor's re
quest for a careful study of the educational system by a competent
person. It goes without saying that the FBI would not be called in
to make this survey and it is to the credit of General Cox of the
Bureau of Insular Affairs that this agency was specifically not recom
mended but that the Brookings Institution was.131 In the meantime
Dr. Jose Padin would remain as commissioner of education.
Unfortunately for the administration's plans, the wire requesting
the resignation of Dr. Padin became public knowledge through a
hews story in El Mundo.132 Governor Gore denied the responsibility
for the leak and, in an indirect way, he accused Ruby Black in Wash
ington of getting the information.133 General Cox refuted the charge
and indicated that the wire service claimed that the information

Letter from M. H. Mclntyre, Assistant Secretary to the President, to the
Secretary of War, Oct. 13, 1933.
129. BIA, #20324, Memorandum, Oct. 14, 1933.
130. Ibid. Personal File: Governor Gore, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen.
Cox, Oct. 9, 1933.
131. Ibid., #20324, Confidential Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Sec
retary Dern, Oct. 18, 1933. 132. El Mundo, Oct. 14, 1933.
133. BIA, -Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter of Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox,
Oct. 18, 1933.
had come from San Juan.134 Governor Gore then moved to close up
the possible leaks in his office by rearranging his staff, so that the
two persons rather than the earlier six would alone have reason to
know what was being communicated between La Fortaleza and the
Bureau of Insular Affairs.135
But the damage had been done, and Dr. Padin requested that
his resignation be accepted immediately. Up to this point, he had
been able to maintain the public appearance of not battling for his
position. However, now that it was public knowledge that his resig
nation had been requested, he felt that his administration had been
repudiated, particularly since he had only three months remaining
to fill out his normal term of four years. He wrote to the Secretary
of War: "I feel that I have served the island and the nation loyally
and faithfully and that I am entitled to a little more consideration
than I have received."138
The governor, having received a copy of this letter, urged that
his resignation be accepted immediately and a successor be ap
pointed.137 The War Department, not yet prepared to reveal the
complete truth to the governor, wired back that Dr. Padin would
stay in office pending the action of the President.138
In the midst of this, the coalition gave Governor Gore and the
Washington administration an opportunity to rally all dissident
factions together in a pro-New Deal demonstration. The coalition
had originally planned this as a public manifestation of solidarity
behind the governor and as a direct refutation to the disturbances
of the university students and the campaign of the Liberal party.
Governor Gore wisely suggested that the parade be in honor of the
New Deal and the President. Thus the Liberal party could not
oppose the demonstration openly and it even had to agree to par
ticipate in it, although it did so with little enthusiasm. This also
gave the President, called upon to send a message to the people of
the island, an opportunity to boost the rapidly declining prestige
of his appointee, Governor Gore.139 This demonstration had almost
134. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Gen. Cox to Gov. Gore, Oct. 21, 1933.
135. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter of Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox,
Oct. 20, 1933.
136. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Dr. Padin to Dern, Oct. 17, 1933.
137. Ibid., Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Oct. 19,
1933. 138. Ibid.
139. Ibid., #20324, Memorandum from Cox to Dern, Oct. 16, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 93
no carry-over effect, since the rebellion at the university continued

to grow more serious daily.
The Alonso appointment was the first step in a politically moti-
vatecT economy drive. Governor Gore's original plan was to move
directly into the educational department. He claimed that "while
Padin was in office, he built up a political machine in the school
system by establishing many unnecessary positions, and filling them
with Liberals."140 Frustrated in his attempt to remove Padin, he
decided to exercise his powers to appoint a member of the board
of trustees of the university, Alonso Torres. At least in this place
he was determined to begin to clean out the Liberals.
On the university board, Alonso was to begin immediately with
an economy drive which would abolish five positions which were
filled by Liberals, thus saving $11,000. One of these positions was
that of publicity director, held by the wife of Senator Luis Munoz
Marin, who was professionally known by her maiden name, Muna
Lee. Governor Gore said: "The university has no more use for a
publicity director than I do for a poodle dog." According to him,
Muna Lee's "principal work at this time is following through the
political strategy of her husband. Most of the teachers of the uni
versity are Liberals having been put in through long years of Liberal
control of Puerto Rico." Governor Gore hoped to eliminate some
$52,000 from the budget of the commissioner of education. He
intended to do it by "eliminating the sinecures of the Barcelo re
gime." The appointment of Alonso was made to realize this in part.141
If the new board had met, there is little doubt that an effort
would have been made to carry out the wishes of the governor. How
ever, in this quarter as well, the governor was again frustrated by
an outbreak of student demonstrations and a strike motivated by
the Alonso appointment and the requested resignation of Dr. Padin.
In view of these uncontrolled outbursts, and probably aware of the
student violence in Havana, Cuba, and Mexico, Alonso Torres, who
planned to attend the trustees meeting at the university on Thurs
day, wrote to the chancellor
requesting police protection from the
students. He warned that any violence would be met with vio
lence.142 After speaking to the students, Dr. Chardon assured the
Cox, Oct. 18, 1933. 141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Carlos Chard6n to Dr. Warburton of
Socialist representative that he would be perfectly safe on the

campus.143
However, Dr. Padin cancelled the meeting because of the
explosive nature of the situation.144 Completely frustrated in his
attempt to attack the Liberals, the governor accused the commis
sioner of education of playing politics.145 Anticipating an early re
moval from his position, Dr. Padin decided to avoid an unpleasant
situation in the last days of his administration, leaving it to his
successor.
Almost a week after the President had notified the War Depart
ment of his refusal to remove Padin, a wire was sent to the governor
informing him of the unexpected turn of events and the pending
analysis of the educational system.146 Upon receipt of this message,
Governor Gore concluded that he had no alternative but to request
by wire that he "be relieved of responsibility of office at earliest
possible moment consistent with President's convenience. November
first if possible."147
Two days later, in a long letter to the President, Governor Gore
carefully went over the whole series of events from the day he
appeared before the Senate committee prior to his appointment, up
to the moment of being blocked in his attempt to remove Dr. Padin.
He saw the whole opposition — from the unsuccessful candidacy of
Martin Travieso, the flags flying at half mast the day he arrived,
Antonio Barcelo's vigorous and vociferous campaign, Muiioz Marin's
caustic and insulting editorials, the student demonstrations and
strikes, and finally Dr. Padin's obstinate refusal to move — all as an
anti-American plot to force his resignation and the appointment of
a Puerto Rican as governor in his place. Governor Gore wrote :
Mr. President, I have been here four months under the most
distressing circumstances. I have been exposed to the most damnable
political intrigue ever devised. You have left Dr. Padin in my cabinet
and it is indeed an embarrassing position for a governor. ...
I
the Department of Agriculture, passed on from Warburton to Rexford G. Tug-

well to the Secretary of War, Oct. 18, 1933.
143. Ibid., Letter from Alonso Torres to Gov. Gore, Oct. 17, 1933.
144. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Padin to Gov. Gore, Oct. 18, 1933.
Cox, Oct. 18, 1933.
146. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Confidential B., Wire from
Secretary Dern to Gov. Gore, Oct. 20, 1933.
147. Ibid., Wire from Gov. Gore to Secretary Dern, Oct. 21, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 95
hardly think you would tolerate a personal enemy in your cabinet.

I ask you for your confidence until it has been proven to you that I
am unfit, dishonest, unfair, or incapable. . . . When I can be of
no service to you and cannot have your confidence I want to leave.
. . . Please let me know, at the earliest possible moment your
decision, as I cannot remain with Padin in my cabinet and without
your confidence.148
The President's only recorded reaction to this letter was a request

sent to the Secretary of War to be kept closely informed of develop
ments in Puerto Rico.149 On October 28, 1933, he held a conference
with the Secretary on the Puerto Rican problem.150
Before the final act, it would be well to pause and to study the
situation which promoted the impasse between the public servant
of four months' experience and a large segment of his people. There
was no question that the Liberal party did not receive the new
governor with the same warmth that the coalition demonstrated. The
Liberals as well as others had urged the appointment of a native
son For governor. However, they did not openly defy the governor;
on the contrary, they expressed a willingness to cooperate as long
as such cooperation did not compromise their political program or
principles. Undoubtedly Antonio Barcel6 hoped that he might
secure some favorable appointments in the government for his fol
lowers even though the coalition outvoted the plurality of the Liberal
legislators. When it became apparent that Governor Gore was not
willing to take cognizance of the Liberal party, Antonio Barcel6 took
his fight to the public. He had previously privately informed the
governor that Jack Boylan, member of his official family, was un
welcome in Puerto Rico.
Up to this point, the governor had tried to keep free from the
control of the coalition, but he did not know how to exert pressure
over the coalition majority of the legislature to secure his own wishes.
He catered to the obvious majority and ignored the minority when
it came to making appointments. There is no doubt that his personal
inclination was much more favorable toward the coalition. After all,
148. Ibid., #20324, Confidential B., Letter from Gov. Gore to President
Roosevelt, Oct. 23, 1933.
Box 46, Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Secretary Dern, Oct. 26,
1933.
150. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Press Conferences, Oct. 28, 1933.
they were considered pro-American by him while the Liberals were

openly in favor of independence^.
Once the Liberal party's attack on the governor became public,
the governor was driven into the arms of the coalition. From this
point on, he was willing listener to all anti-American charges
a
against the Liberals, and he believed anyone was anti-American who

could not be controlled by the coalition. Dr. Padin, for example,
was not connected with any party. The department of education,
which controlled one-third of the insular budget, was the only
branch of the government that defied the coalition through the
apolitical attitude of the commissioner who took his educational
responsibility seriously. He was, therefore, subjected to the insinua
tion of being anti-American. This suggestion found a favorable
reception in the mind of the governor, and he soon was convinced
that the proindependence sentiment was being fostered by the edu
cational philosophy of Dr. Padin himself. Dr. Padin had to be
removed while the loyalty of the Puerto Rican was actively culti
vated through a thorough revision of the educational system.
Careful examination of the letter of Governor Gore fails to
reveal any specific charge against Dr. Padin other than the one that
he had used his position to build up a political machine in favor
of the Liberal party. The bureau defended the works of Padin and
only recommended his removal under pressure of the governor's
request. While Governor Gore did not specifically charge that Dr.
Padin was an anti-American in policy, he implied as much when
he condemned the educational system for fostering proindependence
sentiments, for permitting the continuance and flourishing of Span
ish language and culture, and, finally, for allowing the students to
demonstrate and to strike. To Governor Gore this seemed proof
enough of Dr. Padin's anti-Americanism.
The former Governor Beverley had written to the Secretary of
War:
The charge of anti-Americanism against Dr. Padin would be
laughable if it were not outrageous. It is a terrible charge to make
/ —tantamount to treason. Dr. Padin is not pro-American; he is an
American in the finest sense of the word.151
151. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, Division of Ter

ritories and Island Possessions, 9-8-104, Personal File: Jos£ Padin, Letter
from James Beverley to George Dern, Oct. 25, 1933. Hereafter this collection
will be referred to as DTIP.
GORE'S HELL" 97
Dr. Padin wrote a forceful refutation of the governor's charge:
The charge of anti-Americanism is stupid, to say the least, unless

I stand accused of not grading up of one hundred
to the standard
per cent Americanism. I must confess that I am entirely free from
that form of American vulgarity. If I rate one hundred per cent in
V anything I hope it is integrity and sincerity, two human qualities
free from national bias.152
The governor's loose charge of anti-Americanism obscured the

division within the Liberal party itself. Within that party there
v existed a division between lndependentistas and those who wished
for greater autonomy within the protective walls of the United
States.
After four months of Governor Gore's administration, however,
Guillermo Esteves Volcker, a conservative member of the Liberal
party, wrote to the radical Walter McK. Jones: "Well, Walter, the
sojourn of Mr. Gore here is greatly benefitting the Liberal party.
There are no longer two wings in the party but only one . . .
170,000 praying for independence of Puerto Rico."153
The Coalition party had not only secured control of the legisla
tive branch, but it had captured the executive branch also. The
governor had definitely committed himself to the coalition. As Luis
Mufioz Marin pointed out in an editorial in La Democracia, this
was most vividly demonstrated the Sunday of the New Deal demon
stration. For the first time in the long history of the island, the
executive mansion was used as a political tribunal. From the balcony
of La Fortaleza, the members of one political group, with the blessing
and protection of the governor, "threw partisan epithets which gave
vent to arguments of political color."154
The incident was of little importance in itself. The political
advantage was minor and the Liberal party passively participating
in the program of the day lost little. What was important, as the
editorial writer pointed out, was that it symbolized the coalition's
complete control of the governor.
The coalition made no effort to deny or even to hide the fact
152. BIA, #20324, Memorandum from Dr. Padin, dated Oct. 23,
1933.
153. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter from Walter McK. Jones
to Secretary Dern, Oct. 7, 1933.
154. La Democracia, Oct. 18, 1933.
that the governor belonged to thern. In an editorial of El Pats, the

direct and public assertion of the capture of the governor was de-
fiantly published. As translated, the editorial follows in part:
It is not Governor Gore who must be responsible for the appoint

ment of Sr. Alonso Torres nor for all and each of his political and
administrative acts in the governor's palace; it is we who back him
that are responsible. All such acts of his are taken up, discussed,
and agreed upon between the governor and the leaders of the coali
tion; and when Governor Gore speaks and when he acts the leaders
of our parties speak and act.
Let the whole country know it, both friend and adversary. Be
hind the governor are we, behind us is the immense majority of the
electorate.155
The appointments made by Governor Gore show that the coali

tion's "control was no idle boast. The first political appointment was
thai of Dr. Garrido Morales as commissioner of health to replace
Dr. Fernos Isern. The governor was warned156 that this. move would
probably stir up trouble since Dr. Garrido Morales was recognized
by the Liberals as an astute politician. However, he was at the same
time adequately prepared for the position to which he was named.
Other changes were of the same order. Antonio Lucchetti, a non-
politician, was removed to make way for the Socialist Manuel Dome-
nech in the treasury department. Sr. Hilera was removed as head of
the civil service commission in order to put Rivera Santiago in, whose
political sympathies with the coalition were no secret.157
The position of a colonial governor has little precedent in the
A American system. By definition the governor of Puerto Rico was
supposed to be an impartial federal administrator. While responsible
to the federal government, he was expected to execute impartially
the will of the people as expressed through their legislative repre
sentatives. In case of conflict the federal orders would take pre
cedence over the local wishes. Always the governor was expected
to keep himself above the level of local conflicts. Of course, no
man could be completely free of political bias. This is one of the
reasons why islanders were rarely considered for the position. Con-
155. El Pais, Oct. 27, 1933.

156. BIA, #20324, Memorandum drawn up by Gen. Cox after being
visited by former Attorney General Charles Winters, Oct. 31, 1933.
157. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter of Walter McK. Jones to
Secretary Dern, Oct. 7, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 99
tinentals were chosen in part because they were not involved in

the local political issues. Most of the governors did in fact keep
themselves above island politics. A few like E. Mont Reily failed
in this respect and had to be removed.
That this role of executive in the Puerto Rican government was
understood in Puerto Rico itself is in part indicated by a profound
editorial in La Democracia written by Munoz Marin. Just as Mufioz
could write caustically when he felt the circumstances required it,
so at other moments he was capable of impartial judicial pronounce
ment. This editorial, written and published in English, is here
extensively reproduced.
As regards those principles the security of which is regarded

as paramount for the welfare of Puerto Rico, the Liberal Party
holds as follows : It is essential that the governor do not at any time
depart in word or~3eed, publicly or privately, from the conception
of his office as a non-partisan moderating power. It is essential that
political education of the country shall not be lowered or endangered,
or annulled by destroying civil service guarantees and thus throwing
political action upon [sic] to a life and death struggle for petty joBs.
It is essential, unrTer the present status, that every last citizen of
Puerto Rico shall consider the governor his high servant and not his
petty enemy. It is essential for the future status of Puerto Rico, be
that independence or statehood, that the political and administrative
life of the country shall be maintained at the highest possible IeveJ,
that its training in democracy shall be a training in the communal
problems and not in the delicacies and intricacies of patronage. It
is essential that, within an intelligent and reasonable policy, con
ducted as far as possible in accordance with the will of the legislative
majority, a reasonable degree of political peace shall be established
in thfs country to the end that the terrific problems of hunger,
economic maladjustment, and social justice may be faced with
serenity and strength by the whole people. And we may add, it is
essential in the prestige of the United States, in the eyes of t£e
Latin American peoples, that no slightest shadow of suspicion shall
be cast that the United States is consciously playing politics with
the will of the Puerto Rican people, with their struggle to define
their own future themselves, with their pride in their race, their
language, their personality and their civilization, and that the Wash
ington government be so represented in Puerto Rico that its dignity
shall not be open to question.158
158. La Democracia, Oct. 24, 1933.

This editorial was called to the attention of the Secretary of

War, and the reaction was one of hearty approval. Dern said: "This
editorial reflects my views as the proper attitude of the governor. I
may have occasion to say so some time. Keep it on file."159
There was no doubt that the Liberal party wanted to remove
the governor as soon as possible. However,
Governor Gore had the
support of the coalition parties which comprised the majority of tne
legislature and had elected the insular representative to Washington.
While they lacked direct access to the White House for their spokes
men, the coalition did undertake to defend the governor through
their press and through direct presentation in Washington of a legis
lative delegation led by Senator Valde"s.
This commission from the island, joined by the resident com
missioner, Santiago Iglesias, was received in the War Department
by General Cox, and eventually met with the Secretary of War.180
There is little point in reviewing their defense here inasmuch as it
coincides with the expressions of the governor himself.161 One ex
ample sufficiently illustrates it.
On the school demonstrations and the need to change the pres
ent commissioner, the delegation presented their opinion to the effect
that the demonstration "was against true Americanism and should
not be permitted by the commissioner of education." They wanted
as commissioner of education "a man with a mental structure that
favored the developmentof the island and true Americanism.""2
Santiago Iglesias said to Secretary Dern: "We are going to have and
we demand a change."163 This, in the opinion of General Cox, was
the sum and substance of the delegation's petition.
The commission of the coalition professed to be puzzled at the
delay in removing Dr. Padin. The only satisfaction the War Depart
ment could give them on this point was to inform them that the
matter rested in the hands of the President. Santiago Iglesias suc
ceeded in getting his cohorts into the White House, but the inter
view with the President lasted only two minutes, and was limited
159. BIA, #719-73 to 80, Note signed by Secretary Dern dated Nov.
8, 1933.
160. Ibid., #20324, Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary of War,
Oct. 26, 1933. 161. Ibid.
162. Ibid., Memorandum for Secretary of War from Gen. Cox on visit
of Legislative Commission, Oct. 26, 1933.
163. Ibid., Further Memorandum dated Oct. 27, 1933.
GORE'S HELL" 101
to a formal presentation of their complaints. Martinez Nadal, who

did not accompany the group to Washington, directed a telegram
to the President informing him that the coalition majority found
itself "obliged to deny cooperation to Dr. Padin,"164 while the answer
to this threat pointed out to the member of the island legislature
that Dr. Padin was appointed by the President and therefore inde
pendent of local politics.165
Both the White House and the Bureau of Insular Affairs were
daily receiving mail concerning Governor Gore. According to Gen
eral Cox of the War Department, the letters in favor just about
balanced those which were against the appointee.166 Most of these
expressions were politically inspired and did not represent reasoned
judgment on either side.
A letter which passed through the White House about the end
of October might be cited, since it was written by a Puerto Rican
woman, not to government officials, but rather to a private individual
who saw fit to forward it to the President. It reads in part as follows :
y They hate this new Governor Gore, who seems to be a sap. He

r irinks like a Lord, and wants the people to have cock fights, and
in selecting his cabinet asked every member to write their resigna
tions, leaving the date in blank, so that he can kick them out, if
not suitable, at his convenience. I am telling you that these Porto-
ricans are seeing red and are ready to have him kicked out. This
.man is a Catholic, the first one that they ever had here, and is all
^for the priests and nuns, and the Knights of Columbus and this
country although seemingly Catholic, does not like anything like
/ that. It savors too much of old Spain to suit them. Well, whether
Roosevelt recalls this man or not, remains to be seen, but there is
trouble ahead.167

Wire from Martinez Nadal to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Oct. 25, 1933.
165. Ibid., Secretary to the President to Martinez Nadal, Oct. 25, 1933.
166. BIA, #20324, Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern,
Oct. 23, 1933, but never sent.
167. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore. The above letter from "America
to her mother," dated Aug. 23, 1933, was enclosed in a letter from Mrs. R.
G. Hoffman to the President, no date. It was rumored that Monsenor Byrne,
Bishop of Ponce, had written to his ecclesiastical superiors on the continent
to protest the continuation in office of Gore. His presence was apparently
considered harmful to the reputation of the Roman Catholic Church. Ruby
Black Collection, Gore File, Letter from Muna Lee to Ruby Black, Oct. 5,
1933.
From amore cultured and less passionate source, a person whom

Governor Gore considered as a friend, the chancellor of the uni
versity, Dr. Carlos Chardon, came the following unofficial judg
ment in a private letter to Dr. Warburton of the Department of
Agriculture.
I do not want to lose time in advising you that the immediate

removal of the present executive is necessary if not imperative. . . .
I have no personal prejudice against the new executive. He has been
nice to me personally, although my advice has meant little to him.
But he has had no administrative experience, he does not know the
language. Furthermore he has daily intestinal troubles and this
makes him very irritable. It was a great mistake to send him down
here.168
A few days later Chardon wrote again:
In the face of this situation, I do not see any solution other

than the removal of the present governor. . . . If I were the Presi
dent, I would recall the present governor on vacation leave . . .
and finally appoint a native son for governor. This will immediately
restore confidence and peace in the island and the President would
be doing justice to us down here. You know we are honest and loyal
citizens. In fact this whole protest is not against American institu
tions. It is a legitimate right which we have against a man, honest
in mind and principle, but unfitted through lack of experience and
knowledge of Latin backgrounds to govern a community like ours.169
W. R. Bennet wrote to the Secretary of War:
Our present Governor Gore is unequipped in character, educa

tion, experience, and common sense. A successful administration by
him of his present office is impossible and his appointment will
sooner or later become a national disgrace.170
Two other visitors to the War Department might be mentioned

as sources of information concerning the situation on the island.
Former Attorney General Winters and former Police Commissioner
Lutz dropped in to see General Cox. Winters was favorable toward
168. BIA, #20324, Letter from Carlos Chard6n to Dr. Warburton,

personal, Oct. 18, 1933.
169. Ibid., Oct. 26, 1933, Sent on by Tugwell, Nov. 6, 1933.
170. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter from W. R. Bennet to
Secretary Dern, Sept., 25, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 103
Gore, but he admitted that his blunt and outspoken manners

offended the proud and sensitive Puerto Rican.171 Lutz also stressed
the offensive personal characteristics of the governor but added that
he had allowed himself to be maneuvered into the hands of "the
most unscrupulous group of politicians on the island,"172 and he
furthermore charged that the governor showed a marked ignorance
of government affairs.
Back on the island, the situation was growing more serious. The
unrest had brought political division to all types of peaceful, apoliti-
cal, and cultural entities. The^ Association of the Alumni of the
University of Puerto Rico, the Teachers' Association, the Medical
Association, and others were splitting apart on political issues and
losing their own identity as cultural associations. James Bourne wrote
to Harry Hopkins: "There is a tension quite noticeable among all
the people from the lowest people all the way through to the top
that is most distressing. Anti-American feeling is growing rapidjy
among all classes. "173 People were walking around armed. It was
claimed, with quite some exaggeration, that if a man were picked
as a subject for assassination, the people would protect the man
doing the killing. The people were in a semirevolutionary state of
mind.174
A bomb exploded in the governor's country estate, ]djome. For
tunately no one of the official family was at the estate. Four sticks
of dynamite were planted inside the garden of the executive mansion
in San Juan. Only a defective fuse and the alertness of the new
chief, E. Francis Riggs, who was temporarily living at La
^police
Fortaleza, prevented serious damage.175 The effect of these occur
rences on the governor and his family was demoralizing. There
is no question that this was not part of the Liberal party's campaign
to remove Governor Gore. Apparently, although sufficient proof was
171. Ibid., #20324, Memorandum by Gen. Cox on visit of Winters to

the office, Oct. 31, 1933.
172. Ibid., Memorandum for the files of the visit of Col. R. R. Lutz,
Oct. 30, 1933.
173. National Archives, Record Group 69, Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (hereafter referred to as FERA), Puerto Rico, #400, Box
259, Letter from James Bourne to Harry Hopkins, Oct. 30, 1933.
174. BIA, #20324, Memorandum for the files on the visit of Munoz
Marin to BIA, Nov. 6, 1933.
Cox, Oct. 25, 1933.
not turned up the Nationalist J>arty had choserjLjhe

to prosecute,
student disturbances as an opportunity to make the negative reaction
to the governor more forceful.
~
At this point, when Governor Gore's morale must have been at
a very low ebb, he received an answer to his letter in which he
had charged the Washington administration with lack of confidence
in him. The letter, which was probably planned and discussed
between the Secretary and the President, had been carefully drawn
up to bolster the sagging spirits of the governor. Instructions from
Mr. Martin, the administrative assistant to the Secretary of War,
to GeneraTCox, who was to draw up the first draft, read : "Call the
governor 'Dear Bob' and make the letter very personal."178
The~Tetter explained that since Dr.^Padin hadonly three more
months to serve out his term and since public and private recogni
tion of "his efficient administration had been noted by leading United
Slates educators, the President, to avoid the possible accusation of
using the department of education as "a mere political football,"1"
had decidecT to allow T3r.
Padin to complete his term. Both" the
governor and Dr. Padin should seek out a common ground for
cooperation to end the chaotic situation which had developed on
the island.
This diplomatic effort waters evidently
to smooth out troubled
had some effect. Governor Gore was flattered by the personal tone
of the letter178 ancT decided to call in Dr. Padin for a conference.
The two had aiP'amiable conference," and, according to Governor
Gore, Dr. Padin "graciously accepted the. economy program" which
he had jproposed. The governor was able to claim that no bad
feelings existed between them.170
From another direction efforts were also being made to pacify
the potentially explosive crisis. Luis Munoz Marin had journeyed
to the War Department, and, from there, he reached the White
House itself.
On Tuesday, November 7, the young senator attended one of
the White House teas with Ruby Black.180 They were received by
176. Ibid., #20324, Inter-office Memorandum from Mr. Mardn to Gen.

Cox, Oct. 28, 1933.
177. Ibid., Letter from the Secretary of War to Gov. Gore, Oct. 30,
1933.
178. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to the Secretary of War, Nov. 3, 1933.
179. Ibid., Wire from Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox, Nov. 4, 1933.
180. La Democracia, Nov. 9, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 105
Mrs. Roosevelt, who was interested in listening to what the visitor

had to say about the island. The President soon entered the room
and talked briefly with Mufioz Marin. He and his wife were expect
ing an important diplomatic visitor, and the conversation concerning
Puerto Rico had to be interrupted. Maxim Litvinoff, first ambassador
from Communist Russia to the United States, was expected to pre
sent his credentials in an official ceremony that afternoon. After this
important event, Mrs. Roosevelt returned to discuss the Puerto Rican
situation for another half hour with Muiioz Marin.
From the news article written by Ruby Black concerning the
tea, it is evident that the discussion was not solely about the political
problems of the island. Mrs. Roosevelt was more interested in the
social and economic matters: unemployment, child welfare, and the
general relief program. Ruby Black wrote: "To her more than any
other person should be attributed the increase in relief funds for
the country even though she remains in the background, shying
publicity, and giving full credit to the federal administrators."181
Mrs. Roosevelt, however, had her own opinion about Governor
Gore. She did not agree with Colonel Louis Howe, who felt that
the" governor should break the strangle hold which politics had on
everything in the island. Robert Gore did not have the abilityjto
carry out this difficult task, in her opinion. She wrote Colonel Howe:
"I feel very strongly that Gore has neither the personality, back
ground, or education or tact to deal with the different groups in
Puerto Rico and someone who does know Latin American people
would do much better."182
Mufioz Marin came away from the White House convinced
that steps would eventually be taken to remedy the unfortunate cir
cumstances which had created the insular disturbances. To this
effect he wired Antonio Barcelo183 and urged his followers "to reduce
dfcle."184 Adherence to this advice was not easily obtained. Repre

sentative Ramos Antonini, one of the more radical members of the

182. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Puerto Rico
Miscellaneous, 1930-1940, no date, Letter from Mrs. Roosevelt to Louis
Howe.
184. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Memorandum from Mufioz Marin
for the Secretary of War and President, no date.
Liberal party, published a letter in El Mundo1*5 warning that there

would be war until Gore left the island. This was sent by the
governor to the President as proof that cooperation could not be
expected from the Liberals.180
While Mufloz was visiting the Secretary of War and promising
to do everything in his power to reduce the attack on Gore so that
he could be replaced by a responsible governor,18' the striking stu
dents of the university returned to the institution, which had been
closed for ten days. Alonso Torres then resigned from his position
as trustee of university. Governor Gore followed through with
the
plans to leave the island on Saturday, November ll.188 Apparently
the unrest which was quite alarming at times was easing away.
Secretary Dern waited patiently for the arrival of Governor
Robert Gore in Washington. The governor had gone to Florida and
then made his way north to the capital where he arrived and met
Dern on the twenty-first. In the meantime, the Secretary had
broached the possibility of making a survey of the educational system
with Dr. Ernest Hopkins, president of Dartmouth College.189 Dr.
Hopkins had been recommended by Louis Brownlow, director of
the Public Administration Clearing House.190 The fact that Dern
had had a son studying at Dartmouth, until necessary economy
measures had dictated his transfer to George Washington University,
may have had some influence in the selection. The Secretary waited
until after the visit of Governor Gore before specifically assigning
the task to Dr. Hopkins.191 He, however, could not leave for the
island until the second week in December.
In the interim, the island was host to another important and
more widely publicized visitor. Senator Millard Tydings, chairman
of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, dropped in upon the
island rather unexpectedly.
A few days after his arrival, Senator Tydings spoke to the
185. ElMundo, Nov. 8, 1933.

186. BIA, #20324, Letter from Gov. Gore to President Roosevelt, Nov.
8, 1933.
187. Ibid., Office Memorandum on visit of Mufioz Marin, Nov. 6, 1933.
Cox, Nov. 6, 1933.
189. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Dern to Hopkins, Oct. 28, 1933.
190. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Dern to Dr. Brownlow, Oct. 28, 1933.
191. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Dern to Dr. Hopkins, Nov. 27, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 107
Rotary Club of San Juan on the relations between the island and
the federal government. He did not limit himself to the purely
political field, but touched upon the economic and social aspects of
the relationship. He ridiculed of Americaniza
a so-called program
tion and freely discussed possible changes in the Organic Act which
would more clearly delineate the responsibility for the economic and
social plight of the island. Concerning independence, he said: "If
you really want it, I am willing to help you get it."192 He criticized
parties which played politics with the independence issue,
l~ihose
parties that were now in favor, now against, depending upon their
political fortunes of the moment. However, he wrote to President
Roosevelt as follows:
/ I am sorry to report there is no real independence sentiment

here. . . . This [referring to his willingness to introduce an inde
pendence measure], I trust, was at least indirect notice that the
leaders here had better address themselves to the island's problems
and not operate behind smoke screens. It would certainly be better
for us if we were out of this place, and, conversely, much worse for
Puerto Rico.193
His advice on Governor Gore was follows : "Under no circum

as
stances should Governor Gore

resign or be removed now; in my
opinion this hurts too much our prestige here and makes it difficult
for his successor." This had been the opinion of the Secretary of
War194 and the President's assistant secretary, Colonel Howe, but
there was still Dr. Hopkins to be heard from.
Dr. Hopkins' assignment was to inform the President and the
* Secretary of War
as to whether or not education in Puerto Rico is being conducted
/ along lines that are in fact anti-American in principle, thus develop-

ing a separation or nationalistic tendency in Puerto Rico as against
the development of sentiments calculated to permanently weld the
people of Puerto Rico into the American system.195
192. El Mundo, Dec. 6, 1933.

193. BIA, #20324, Letter from Sen. Tydings to President Roosevelt,
Dec. 6, 1933.
194. Ibid., Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Dec. 22,
1933.
195. Ibid., Memorandum drawn up by Gen. Cox on the present situa
tion for background knowledge of Dr. Hopkins, Dec. 4, 1933.
Dr. Hopkins spent a very busy week on the island, and if his
first day's reaction was any indication of what was to follow, it must
have been an educational experience for the college president him
self. He wired Dern:
I
arrived this morning and found myself immersed in the ques-
There is more politics to the square
at issue almost immediately.
rytion
rod down here than to the square mile at home, even in northern
New England, where they take their politics pretty hard.196
At the end of his week and prior to his departure for Washington,
Dr. Hopkins wired again to the War Department:
No for slightest question in regard to Commissioner

basis exists
Padin's Americanism or very unusual ability. His administration
school affairs intelligent, progressive and efficient. Such antagonism
here to United States as did exist markedly increased by Governor's
ix- influence producing sense of humiliation in being placed under jl3-
ministration of such defect of temperament and quality. . . . Situ
ation over island delicate and may become serious if the Governor
returns even temporarily.197
Once back in Washington, Dr. Hopkins gave an oral report to

the Secretary of War in which he was more specific in his findings.
Just before he left the island, El Mundo, a nonpartisan but con
servative daily in San Juan, published an article exposing the coali
tion's plan to divide the cultural, social, and professional groups of
the island into political entities whose support would be counted
upon.198 This made an adverse impression on Dr. Hopkins, who
pointed out to the Secretary that the group which was backing
Governor Gore was "attempting to organize everything politically
including the school teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, and even
to the extent of the nurses in the hospitals, with the idea of forcing
them out of employment if they did not subscribe to their political
group."199
Dr. Hopkins defended the honest and good intentions of Bob
Gore Tiimself , but he said : "He is probably the worst blunderer that
ever came along. ...
He has a genius for doing things wrong and
196. Ibid., Wire from Dr. Hopkins to Secretary Dern, Dec. 11, 1933.
197. Ibid., Dec. 19, 1933. 198. El Mundo, Dec. 18, 1933.
199. BIA, #20324, Memorandum on conclusions presented verbally by
Dr. Hopkins to Secretary Dern, Dec. 21, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 109
has a feeling of hostility or suspicion toward anybody not connected
with the political group with which he is working."200

By the first of the year, Dr. Hopkins submitted a rather long
but concisely written detailed report which was a telling blow to
the interest of Governor Gore and the coalition. Dr. Hopkins wrote:
In regard to the political situation, I

feel very strongly that,
without adopting any attitude of prejudice against the Coalitionists,
Washington ought not to allow itself to become too closely identified
with them. Admitting certain outstanding exceptions to the state
ment, I should still generalize very definitely that the irresponsible
elements, the ignorant and the lawless factions, and the sordidly'
^/acquisitive groups are too conspicuously dominant in the Coalition
Party For the United States Government to wish to subsidize it at
all in influence and/or prestige.201
This was the same group that could write to the President, saying:
Ours, Mr^President, is not a policy merely to control all public

offices and sinecures. In truT matter of education in Puerto Rico we
Tjy
are inspired only the highest, purest, and most generous political
ideals. . . And since this means that the Liberal Party which
.
aspires to the independence and separation of Puerto Rico from the

United States^ shall be ousted from all government positions, hence
alT this political upheaval to create scandal for the only purpose of
202
causing uneasiness or worry to the national administration.
Governor Gore saw the handwriting on the wall. The newspaper

articles which he received from time to time informed him how.JJr.
Padin had taken Dr. Hopkins into his confidence as soon as Dr.
Hopkins had arrived on the island. He wrote to the War Department
and charged that Dr. Padin was making every effort to influence
Dr. Hopkins in his decisions,.203 Just how one would study the de
partment of education without contact with the commissioner of
education question which Gore did not propose to answej;.
is
a
Dr. ]os6 Padin was professionally and personally vindicated in
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid., Report from Dr. Hopkins to Secretary Dern, Personal, Jan.
9,
1933.
202. Ibid., Letter from Martinez Nadal to President Roosevelt, Nov. 21,
1933.
Cox, Dec. 19, 1933.
a most positive expression of approval. In 1900 Dr. Padin was one

of sixty young Puerto Rican students selected by the United States
government to be educated in the continental schools. He studied
at Haverford College, where he may have picked up his quiet per
sonal manner and his dislike for flag-waving Americanism. Return
ing to the island to integrate himself into the school system, he rose
rapidly from teacher to supervisor to assistant commissioner of edu
cation. He returned to academic studies in the States and received
a doctor's degree from Columbia University. When called back to
the island, he left a well-paying administrative position with Heath
and Company to accept a position as commissioner of education in
the brain trust cabinet of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. In 1930 he was
subjected to attack by the same crowd of politicians because he was
so ultra-American that he was disregarding the Spanish heritage of
the island. The only charge which could stick against Dr. Padin was
that he was an educator and above politics. As Dr. Hopkins expressed
it: "Gradually the fact seemed to me to emerge clearly from the
mass of data and the number of conferences that the commissioner's
one offense was in refusing to allow politics to enter into his depart
ment in any degree."204
One final word about the charge of anti-Americanism. Dr.
Hopkins saw through this immediately and labeled it for what it
really was when he called it "a political racket."205 It was a special
ized technique of that "favorite indoor sport" of the Puerto Ricans
indiscriminately used by any party which thought that it would be
to its advantage. But more than this, the cloak of pro-Americanism
was drawn self-righteously about the blatantly selfish designs of
some of the most hypocritical politicians on the insular scene. As
former Governor James Beverley had written, the sincere and con
scientious Puerto Rican found no need of, and was indeed offended
by" the flag-waving 200 per cent pro- Americans who hoped to capi
talize politically on their public demonstrations.206
Dr. Padin had written:
In my twenty-five years of cooperation in shaping the relations
of the island with the United States ...
has been in accord with ... my line of conduct . . .
the reaffirmation of the bicultural
policy with Americanization interpreted as the induction of Puerto
204. Ibid., #20324, Report of Dr. Hopkins, Jan. 9, 1934.

205. Ibid.
206. DTIP, Letter from Beverley to Secretary Dern, Oct. 25, 1933.
"GORE'S HELL" 111
-Rico into the civic ideals, technical standards and general philosophy
of the good American life.207
Dr. Padin could be singled out as an outstanding example of

those Puerto Ricanswho felt no need to make any pro-American
manifestation since they felt themselves inherently American, in the
largest sense of the term, and not outsiders who had to manifest
their sympathies for a strange nation. And finally, to paraphrase
Dr. Jenks, the way to make a good American was first to make
him a good Puerto Rican. In this task the consensus was that Dr.
Padin was doing an admirable job.
Shortly after Christmas, December 27, 1933, Governor Gore
visited the President and learned of the adverse report rendered by
D7rilopkins.208 On the eighth of January the Bureau of Insular
Affairs received the following wire from Governor Gore:
Have forwarded letter for President to Secretary of War enclosed

in letter to Secretary. Have given no information to the press and
will not. President should do that. Will respond to the wishes of
the President and Secretary. They may withold my letter if they
deem it wise.208
The letter of resignation directed to the President requested

relief from his obligations due to his and his family's bad health.
He wished the President success in his administration, reminded
him of his early political support, and suggested that if anything
were open in Florida he would be honored to continue to work for
the national administration.210 In his letter to Dern, Governor Gore
was more candid. He admitted:
I have made the mistake there of being too outspoken in my

conversations and too frank in my dealings. Someone who has lived
there twenty-five years, might begin to assimilate the moods and
mysteries of the people, and I think the only governor who can be
successful is one who knows them intimately and has had a long
association with them.211
207. BIA, #26954, Letter from Dr. Padin to General Cox, Sept. 27,
1933.
208. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Press Conferences, Dec. 27, 1933.
209. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Wire from Gore to BIA, Jan. 8,
1934.
210. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to President Roosevelt, Jan. 8, 1934.
211. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to Secretary Dern, Jan. 8, 1934.
The situation in Puerto Rico was fast developing into another
periodof crisis. For the most jjart the Liberal party guarded silence
and did not proclaim. victory — yet. However, as the absence of the
governor continued without any apparent explanation, the coalition
realized slowly that they were not going to come out on top in this
battle between the governor and the commissioner. To the politician
and the public it looked as though the university strikes which had
forced Alonso Torres to resign had been powerful enough to remove
the governor. The numerically potent and well-organized Socialist
party was not to be outdone.
# Strikes^ were organized [by the coalition among the longshoremen
designed to tie up most of the maritime traffic and, while ostensibly
for the benefit of the workers, the prime reason was a counter-
demonstration oF power by government parties.212 At the turn
th"e
oTthejear imminent anarchy moved the propertied citizens into

making plans for a Citizens Committee of 1,000 for the Preservation
of Pej^jmd jOrderTThis group cabledjhe President that^"a state
oTactual anarchy exists. Towns in a state of siege. Citizens unable
toTeave homes. Police impotent. Businessjaralyzed."213
Former Governor Beverley felt the conditions were serious
enough to write the Bureau of Insular Affairs urging immediate
action to bring order to the island. There was danger of widespread
riots and a condition of anarchy was ; .prevalent. A firm hand at the
executive position was badly needed. The governor wrote: "If Gov
ernor Gore has resigned or been removed it is important that his
successor be appointed at once. ...
I strongly favor an ex-army
officer for the next governor . . . one who has sufficient experience
to know how to size up and handle delicate situations and who has
the courage to do his duty whether it is popular or not. Is not Gen-
eral Winship available for a position of this kind?"214
~
JorgeTfird Arias, general manager and vice-president of the Fa-
jardo Sugar Company, whose advice was highly regarded by the
officials in the Bureau, wired Secretary Dern to assert that "existing
conditions, both economic and political, demand ...
an excep-
212. Ibid., #20324, Letter from Sen. Tydings to President Roosevelt,

Dec. 6, 1933; see also Office Memo. on Dr. Hopkins' visit to War Depart
ment, Dec. 21, 1933.
213. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Box #46,
Wire from Beverley to President Roosevelt, Dec. 29, 1933.
214. BIA, Personal File: James Beverley, Letter from Beverley to Gen.
Cox, Jan. 1, 1934.
"GORE'S HELL" 113
tionally good, WQU&> and capable man."215 (The italics added.)

In this opinion the War Department concurred.
Finally on January 12 the President signed a short letter to
Robert Gore accepting his resignation and extending him his best
wishes for a quick recovery of his health.21" Maria del Mar had
been relieved of an unwanted suitor by EI Gran Dehnitg.
Robert H. Gore's errors and weaknesses as governor should be
abundantly evident at this point and need not be singled out for
further emphasis. James Farley thought that he had found the right
position for this faithful Roosevelt Democrat. He was a successful
businessman. While others were in economic difficulties, this man
continued to thrive economically. He was honest and ethical in his
public and private dealings. In spite of the Boylan affair the Liberal
party failed to turn up any corrupt practices in his administration.
Furthermore, Bob Gore was a Roman Catholic and it seemed logical
to conclude that he and the predominantly Roman Catholic island
would find mutual sympathies. But these assets were not enough
to compensate for the lack of administrative ability and experience,
the lack of tact and discretion, and absence of the dignity and per
sonality of an executive.
The Adjutant General of the War Department, Blanton Wig-
ship, was available. In a move to counteract possible loss of prestige,
to establish inlTclearly chaotic situation some degree of order and.
decorum, and to bring in a strong hand of a proved administrator,
the President appointecTGeneral Wlnsjjip as governor of Puerto Ricp.
According to Ruby Black, Senator Luis Mufioz Marin was com
ing down in an elevator of the War Department building with some
Washington newsmen just after all had been summoned to receive
the announcement of the appointment of the new governor. The
newsmen, anxious to secure a reaction from the man who had done
the most lobbying to remove Gore, asked the young senator what his
opinion of the new man was. Munoz Marin, equally prepared for
banter in Spanish as in English, responded: "Well, at least this
bird has a few more feathejs!"2"
As a postscript it need only be mentioned that Dr. Josi Padhj
215. Ibid., Personal File: Jorge Bird Arias, Wire from Jorge Bird Arias
to Secretary Dern, Jan. 11, 1934.
216. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Personal Private Files, Box 740,
Letter from President Roosevelt to Robert Gore, Jan. 12, 1934.
217. Related to the writer by Ruby Black in an interview in April, 1954.
was reappointed as commissioner of education by the President much

to the satisfaction of all save the coalition.218 Dr. Hopkins was par
ticularly pleased that the President and the Secretary had seen fit
to follow his advice.219 The incoming governor, after studying the
report ofJ)r. Jlqpkins^ also urged the reappointment.220 When pub
licity was given to the action, the statement to the press stressed that
Dr. Padin had been retained in an explicit move "to_ completely
divorce the department of education from local politics."221
The threatened legislative opposition to Dr. Padin did not
develop. The appropriations for the department were slightly greater
than in the previous years. The Socialist party vainly tried to con
trol the university through a legislative committee^ but this w§s
vetoecTby the governor.222
The reception accorded to Luis Mufioz Marin upon his arrival
on the island was similar to that displayed at the victorious return
6F"a conquering hero. People from all over the island came to greet
him. The influential and nonpartisan El Mundo ran a large photo
graph of the young politician and his family on the front page.223
The Liberal party openly implied that Gore's^ removal had been due
to Ihe~ work of Mufioz. After all, he had seen and talked to the
President in greater confidence an3 more extensively than had the
coalition Teadere.
But more than the recognition of his successful fight against
Gore there was the acclaim of a new leader, "a symbol of the younger
generation nobly ambitious, cultured . . . and nurtured in the
highest ideals,"224 who would replace the tired, worn, and spent
This dissident tone was not repeated in the official party
politicians.
organ nor was it extensively commented on elsewhere. However,
the seed had been planted and, in the tropics, things grow rapidly.
Mufioz Marin did not rest on his laurels. Already the general
plan oT the next-steps was forming in his mind. One would hay.e
218. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Puerto Rico

Miscellaneous, 1933-1940, Wire from Sr. Cosme to President, Jan. 24, 1934.
219. BIA, #20329-141, Part 2, University of Puerto Rico, Letter
from Dr. Hopkins to Secretary Dern, Feb. 7, 1935.
220. DTIP, 9-8-104, Jose Padin, Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Sec
retary Dern, Jan. 31, 1934.
221. Ibid., Secretary Dern to President Roosevelt, Feb., 1, 1934: also
BIA, #20324, Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Feb. 9, 1934.
222. BIA, #719-73 to 88, Memorandum re: Socialist Activities in
Puerto Rican Education from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, May 2, 1934.
223. El Mundo, Jan. 22, 1934. 224. El Diluvio, Jan. 27, 1934.
"GORE'S HELL" 115
had to be completely insensitive to have spent almost three months

in Washington and not catch the fever of social reform. As has
been shown, Munoz was far from being blind to the socioeconomic
problems facing the islanders. The predominant political motif of
his thoughts was also evident through his conviction that the solution
to these problems hinged primarily on the island's relation to the
States. This motif was while he was in Washington. The
to change
drive for independence would not disappear but take a secondary
place to the drive for social and economic rehabilitation of the
island
Some might claim that a deal was made; for removal of Gore
the Liberal party would soften the agitation for independence and
get behind the administration's economic program as it would affect
Puerto Rico. There is no evidence of such a bargain. What does
seem evident is that the young man sensed a sincere and new atti
tude on the part of the federal government to concern itself with
the basic problems of poverty and misery of the nation, including
♦ naturally Puerto Kico. Since no previous administration had probed *
deeply into the social problems confronting the people of the island,
and since previously no basic economic reform had been considered,
independence had seemed to be the first essential step to correct
existing conditions. Now that steps could be taken in these other
areas, independence could shift to a secondary position in relatiop
to the more pressing problems.
Before leaving Washington, Munoz Marin penned the following
to the President:
I hope that mere politics can now be adjourned among Puerto

Ricans, and I shall certainly bend all my efforts to that end, in order
that the economic implications of the New Deal shall have as full
an opportunity for beneficial application to Puerto Rico as possible.225
Not completely free from the issue of status, Munoz Marin

suggested the need to define United States policy concerning Puerto
Rico, since, as he said: "the lack of such a definition in the past
has made it practically impossible to attack our fundamental eco
nomic problems in an intelligent way."226 To define this relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico, Munoz Marin suggested
225. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File #400, Puerto Rico,

Appointments, Box 46, Letter from Munoz Marin to President Roosevelt,
Jan. 17, 1934. 226. Ibid.
a round-table conference with island economic and political leaders

exchanging ideas with Washington administrators.
The formal reply, drafted by the War Department, aroused the
doubts of the President's secretary, Mclntyre, but the letter was
signed and sent. It expressed satisfaction at Mufioz' "intentions of
future cooperation,"227 but no satisfaction was given on his sugges
tion for a conference. (The italics are added.) He was urged to
take up the matter with the proper insular authorities.
Once on the island, Mufioz Marin left no doubt as to the sin
cerity of his promise. He urged the political leaders notjojvaste
their time in pointless "deprecating partisan politicsT^but to dedi
cate Their energy "to the problems of life or death which confront
Puerto Rico."228 These problems, apart from the definition of status,
Mufioz Marin maintained, were of an economic nature; rehabili
tation of agriculture, stimulation of the coffee industry, stabilization
of sugar prices, protection of the local industries to insure employ
ment, diversification of agriculture through varied fruit production,
increased production of food for local consumption were all men
tioned. Furthermore, he proposed "to cut the freight rates, guarantee
economy and justice for large and small public transportation, and
recognize the rights of fair participation in all the improvements of
the New Deal for the mass of laborers."229
Apparently after almost a jear the New Deal was to be extended
to theTslancT. However, up to this point attention has been drawn
to the short but ; "disastrous political career of Governor Gore. The
work" of the Roosevelt administration during its first year should not
be judged on the basis of one unfortunate appointment. Quietly,
with or without the cooperation of Governor Gore, the New Deal
was taking definite steps to alleviate the economic plight of the_
islander. To these emergency steps we now turn our attention.
227. Ibid. President Roosevelt to Muiioz Marin, Feb. 3, 1934.

228. La Democracia, Jan. 24, 1934.
229. Ibid.
EMERGENCY RELIEF MEASURES
7 he government of Puerto Rico, faced with

unemployment, poverty, and destruction to which
reference has been previously made, attacked the problem in a super
the
ficial manner in two ways. Governor Beverley urged that an ad

ditional loan be contracted through the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. In his message to the island legislature the governor
urged efficiency, economy, and common sense as the best methods
of confronting the existing economic difficulties which plagued the
government and private business.1 He emphasized that there was no
magic formula or theoretical plan that would haul the island auto
matically out of its sad plight.
Actually the governor was only echoing the advice of the Bureau
of Insular Affairs, which in turn was repeating the suggestions which
came out of the Brookings Institution study. Specifically, such econ
omy measures would involve the elimination of unnecessary public
activities, the discharge of superfluous public employees, and the
simplification and consolidation of the separate municipal govern
ments.2
As a positive measure, the governor suggested that the insular
government, although seriously limited in its resources, undertake
to expand the program of road construction of the local department
of interior. To secure the necessary funds for this program, the gov
ernor urged that the tax-collecting machinery be reorganized so that
1. La Democracia, Feb. 13, 1933.

2. BIA, #3377-600 Civil Government of Puerto Rico, Memorandum
from Gen. Parker to Secretary Dern, April 10, 1933.
117
it would be more realistic in its purpose and more efficient in its

operations. This he maintained would produce an additional revenue
of $125,000,000 [sic] yearly."
The tone of the message implied that the island had to seek the
solution to its economic problems within itself. Realism was urged
and the magic formula of independence expounded by the Liberal
party was termed illusory. Nor could the island hope to return to
the dole of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., hoping that the rich uncle might
suddenly become benevolent. The rich uncle was occupied with his
own financial problems.
The legislative body terminated its sessions with little positive
accomplished. The limit of action taken was a voluntary reduction
in salaries by officers whose incomes were fixed by the Organic Act.4
The insular government had refused to face the problem of economic
disaster, so the authorities were forced to turn to the federal govern
ment.
Shortly after his arrival in Washington, Santiago Iglesias dis
cussed the island situation with the President. As a result of this
conference, the President sent a note to the Secretary of War ex
pressing his interest in the island's unemployment problem and
suggesting a "work" plan financed by RFC relief money but carried
out with machinery like that of the "conservation bill."5
This plan for the relief of the unemployed was worked out in
further detail by Iglesias and discussed with the Secretary of War.
Some 25,000 men were to be employed in soil conservation, in the
enlargement and protection of forest reserves, and in plant and
pest control. Iglesias urged that the recruiting machinery be placed
under the insular commissioner of labor, who, it will be recalled,
was a Socialist appointee. To justify his request, he pointed out
that such was the procedure in the various states as outlined by the
conservation bill.8
This plan was in accord with the basic philosophy of the resident
commissioner. It was his purpose to extend to Puerto Rico "every
Congressional Federal [sic] measure intended to relieve or rehabili
tate" the people of the United States. This same attitude was simi-
3.La Democracia, Feb. 13, 1933.

4.BIA, #1028, Gov. Beverley to the War Department, April 21, 1933.
5. Ibid., #28659 Unemployment, Note from President Roosevelt to
Secretary of War, no date.
6. Ibid., Letter from Resident Commissioner Iglesias to Secretary Dern,
April 10, 1933.
EMERGENCY RELIEF MEASURES 119
larly expressed to the President.7 Puerto Rico was a part of the

United States, even though an unincorporated territory and free
from any tax obligation, and therefore entitled to attention.
This concept of Iglesias as to what the United States-Puerto
Rican relations should be, ran into conflict with the opinion of
General Parker of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. The latter sus
tained that because of the fundamental discrepancy between conti
nental and island resources, production, and private and public
incomes there was no reason to expect that the islanders should
enjoy the same standard of living as the inhabitants of the conti
nental United States. The federal government, because of trying
circumstances brought about by the tropical hurricanes, had been
far too generous according to Parker. Since 1928 some $4.1 million
had been granted in direct relief to the island. Furthermore, some
$6 million had been extended in the form of loans to agriculturists.
Most of this had not as yet been repaid and the general doubted
that it ever would be. To Parker the obvious conclusion was that
"Puerto Rico is receiving and has received treatment much more
liberal,at the hands of the federal government, than the average
state or incorporated territory."8 Parker estimated that direct and
indirect federal aid, and favors in the form of tax rebates and
exemptions came to at least 50 per cent of the total annual insular
budget.9 Nevertheless, almost as an afterthought, the director of the
Bureau relented and agreed to limited federal relief at this time if
the insular government revised its governmental organization and
practiced strict economy.
Although Governor Beverley was not informed of these plans,
he read about them in the local press and urged the Bureau of
Insular Affairs to add his approval of them when taken up with the
Secretary of War. He pointed out that the urgency of the situation
on the island was acute. The cane cutting season was shortly to end
and unless something was done he said many people would starve.10
The plan, when it did come through, set up work for 1,200
men — not 25,000 envisaged by Iglesias. The administration and
7.Congressional Record, House, March 29, 1933, 73d Congress, Special

Session,1st Session, Vol. 77, Part I, pp. 1004-5.
8. BIA, #3377-600, Memorandum from Gen. Parker to Secretary of
War, April 10, 1933.
9. Ibid., Memorandum on federal aid to Puerto Rico, May 10, 1933.
10. Ibid., #28659, Letter from Gov. Beverley to Gen. Parker, April 21,
1933.
supervision of the work to be undertaken was to be handled by the

representative in Puerto Rico of the United States Forest Service
with an officer of the army as fiscal agent. The local commissioner
of labor was by-passed. The forest supervisor was William Barbour,
who drew up the general outline of the projects. He had some
$197,610 to work with. Of the 1,200 men, some 800 were to be
employed intermittently in the forests. Contrary to the continental
programs, few camps were established, since towns were plentiful
and men did not have far to travel to the projects.11
This plan, which was approved by the President and the De
partment of Agriculture, was financed under "an act for the relief
of unemployment through the performance of useful public works."13
Even in spite of this small measure of relief, Governor Beverley
could see no solutionto the starvation facing the island after the
closing of the cane cutting season on or about July 15. As it was,
the relief was only grudgingly approved by the Bureau of Insular
Affairs. Even with a good coffee crop in October, something not to
be counted upon because of the recent hurricane, a further loan
from the RFC would be necessary. The governor gently needled the
Bureau of Insular Affairs by pointing out that the economies in
the insular government budget also worked to aggravate the misery.13
Beverley could speak with a little more independence at this
point, since his successor had been selected. He pointed out, never
theless, that things should not remain at a standstill until the new
governor arrived. Some continuity and anticipating of forthcoming
problems was needed. The apparent unconcern or even antipathy
of the new governor did not help matters. Gore postponed his trip
to Puerto Rico for three weeks. In the meanwhile General Parker
suggested that Governor Beverley had better request additional aid
if things were really as bad as reports seemed to indicate.14
The governor also spoke in plain terms to the Puerto Rican
people. In Ponce he criticized the politicians of all parties for their
11. La Fortaleza, #536121, Radiogram from BIA to Gov. Beverley,

April 26, 1933.
12. National Archives, Record Group #126, General Correspondence
of the Civilian Conservation Corps (hereafter CCC) relating to Puerto Rico,
Letter from Fechner to Iglesias, May 6, 1933.
13. BIA, #17128-A Reconstruction Finance Corp., Letter from Gov.
Beverley to Gen. Parker, May 18, 1933.
14. Ibid., Confidential Letter from Gen. Parker to Gov. Beverley, May
12, 1933.
ignorance of and insensitivity toward the pressing problem of sur

vival faced by the poor people of the island. Rather than confront
these difficulties realistically, he accused the politicians of wasting
their time and the taxpayers' money in idle talk, fanciful theories,
and impractical projects. The coalition reacted as if their honor and
their dignity had been offended. The Liberal party shrugged its
shoulders and refused to recognize that the criticism was directed
against all the politicians.15
During this transitionary period, the RFC offered much needed
economic assistance. As of May 15, 1933, it had lent in total over
$1 million to Puerto Rico. This money was to be used in self-
liquidating projects, such as irrigation and water systems for farm
and urban areas, proportioning some iy2 million hours of work to
the unemployed.16
The new administration in Washington was moving slowly into
a more active program with unemployment. The Federal
to deal
Emergency Relief Act of 1933 — Public Law 15 — was approved
on May 12, 1933. Governor Beverley soon received, as did all the
state governors, from Harry Hopkins, a notice that he would enter
tain requests for grants from the federal government for relief of
unemployment. From $250 million the federal government would
supply one dollar for every three put up by the local government.17
With the intention of putting this program into immediate
effect, Harry Hopkins called a conference in Washington to outline
the general philosophy of the program and the fundamental details
for the carrying out of its purposes. Again the appointed Governor
Gore, still on the mainland, shirked his duty and sent instead his
young and inexperienced secretary, W. L. Butte, to the meeting.
Governor Beverley was not able to leave the island, but the Bureau
sent an officer to cover the orientationprogram.
From thesetwo sources, which submitted full reports to their
respective superiors, it can be gathered that the emphasis, both of
Hopkins and the President, who spoke briefly, was on the importance
of selecting capable leaders from the local community where the
projects were to be carried out to direct the relief units. Also
stressed was the need to keep at a minimum overhead expenses
15. La Democracia, May 25, 1933. 16. Ibid., June 10, 1933.
17. La Fortaleza, Letter from Harry Hopkins to Gov. Beverley, May 24,
1933.
so that most of the money might go directly to those who needed

it — the unemployed.18
It was several months before this program could be extended to
Puerto Rico, primarily because the insular government, overextended
in loans, could not put up the money required to bring in the federal
aid. It would seem reasonable to expect that an energetic governor
would have found a way to take advantage of this offer.
Before analyzing the extension of the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration to the island, attention is to be directed to the prob
lems involved around the extension of another New Deal act to the
island. There was some doubt as to whether the National Recovery
Act of June 16, 1933, was applicable to the island. There was no
doubt, however, that the businessmen of the island were opposed
to its extension to Puerto Rico. Lupercio Colberg, president of the
Manufacturers' Association of Puerto Rico, wrote to Governor Gore
to urge him to intervene so that Puerto Rico might escape this threat
of interference from the federal government. He suggested that if
it were impossible to avoid the measure, the local manufacturers
should be allowed to submit their own codes.19
The board of directors of the association met in July and drew
up a formal protest. They argued that different living standards,
working conditions, and the weak nature of the local industries
dictated different treatment for the island.20 The governor took up
the petition and made it his own. He was soon informed that there
would be little chance to exclude Puerto Rico from the National
Industrial Relief Administration. However, in each case opportunity
would be given to the local manufacturers to argue for a differential
if the situation in Puerto Rico was markedly different from that on
the continent.21
Like California and other states, Puerto Rico had a fair trade
act which ran in conflict to the National Industrial Relief Adminis
tration. At the urging of the judge advocate, General Winship, the
Bureau of Insular Affairs suggested to the governor that this law be
repealed so that there would not be a conflict between federal and
18. BIA, #28659, Report of Wm. C. Short, dated June 15, 1933; also
Report of W. L. Butte, dated June 19, 1933.
19. Ibid., #28813, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letter from Lupercio
Colberg to Gov. Gore, June 20, 1933. • •

21. BIA, #28813, Letter from W. L. Butte to Gov. Gore, July 19, 1933.
insular legislation.22 While the application of the codes was pending,

a measure designed to eliminate the conflict was introduced into the
special session of the legislature.23
Secretary of War Dern tried to intervene to secure postponement
of the determination of the codes for Puerto Rican products until
the insular government could study the cases and present, in a docu
mented way, the arguments for special treatment for the island
industries.This attempt failed and the governor was urged to send
an individual connected with the trades and industries to Washing
ton to testify.24
As elsewhere, in Puerto Rico the situation was explosive. Opera
tors, managers, and owners were rushing workers in order to get
production done under the wire before the cost of labor rose. The
workers on the other hand were calling strikes to better their own
position while the threat of the pending codes gave them a lever to
bargain with.25 These strikes were most serious in the needlework
industry centered around the western end of the island. Toward the
end of August the situation grew violent and Mayagiiez was the
scene of several riots. Store fronts were stoned and police were
wounded as well as the workers.
Opinion on the island seemed to be unanimous in its insistence
of special treatment on a differential scale which would establish
higher wages but not so high as to drive out the industries. The
island legislature felt that they should have the power to establish
the wages and hours in the industries. The coalition composed of the
Socialists and businessmen felt that they could reach an agreement.28
If this had been allowed, the result would have been difficult to
foresee. The Socialists were active in the strikes, although they
denied being the organizers and initiators of the strike.27 The other
half of the coalition could best be personified by the Union-Repub
lican representative to the legislature from Mayagiiez, Maria Luisa
22. Ibid., #28813-27 Part 1, Letter from Short to Gov. Gore, July
22, 1933.
23. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to BIA, Aug. 4, 1933.
24. Ibid., Letter from Gen. Parker to Gov. Gore, Confidential, Aug. 11,
1933; also from Gov. Gore to Gen. Parker, Aug. 12, 1933; and Gen. Parker
to Gov. Gore, Aug. 14, 1933.
25. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Letter from
Garcia Meridez to the President, Aug. 18, 1933.
26. BIA, #28813, Gov. Gore to Gen. Parker, Aug. 15, 1933.
27. La Democracia, Aug. 30, 1933; Sept. 1, 1933.
Arcelay, one of the largest operators within the needlework industry.

It was her factory which was stoned in one of the riots.
Some evidence of this potential split in the coalition, which for
obvious reasons was kept carefully hidden, is found when a group of
merchants in company with Resident Commissioner Iglesias visited
the Secretary of War to convince him that Puerto Rico should be
exempted from the national codes. A report on this conference by
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which kept an account of all official
interviews,reads in part: "The conversation revealed a difference
of opinion between his [referring to Jose Andreu, president of the
Merchants' Association of Puerto Rico] group and Senator [sic]
Iglesias."28
Prudencio Rivera Martinez, commissioner of labor and Socialist
leader, approved the application of the NIRA codes to the island,
but he argued that
it is necessary to differentiate establishing [sic] scales which will

compensate employers in Puerto Rico for the differences in cost in
bringing the raw materials here and exporting them in manufactured
form. However, we must not lose sight of the fact, if conditions on
the Island are to be improved, substantial increases in all wages
must be made.29
Inexplicably, there was no effort made on the part of the Liberal

party to exploit the situation. At this point, it will be recalled, the
Liberal party was in full swing with its attack on Governor Gore,
not for his lack of leadership in this moment of economic crisis, or
his apparent lack of interest in bringing the New Deal measures to
the island, or his obvious preference for the wealthy wing of the
coalition, but rather for the purely political matters which have been
discussed. The potential split in the coalition was probably not
known by the Liberal leaders; or, if known, they saw little that
they could do to foster it. A Liberal attack would possibly have
healed the breach. Furthermore, Puerto Rico was no exception to
the country as a whole when it came to trying to understand what
was occurring in Washington. Each section, and Puerto Rico was
a section in itself, wanted to know how this revolutionary program
28. BIA, #28527, Part 2, Memorandum on Conference with Jos6 An

dreu, Sept. 2, 1933.
29. Ibid., #28813, Letter from Rivera Martinez to Gov. Gore, Aug. 25.
1933.
would affect it before jumping on the New Deal bandwagon. The

Liberal party followed the reports of Ruby Black in Washington
with interest, but it adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
One exception to this attitude, and in contrast to the fairly favor
able articles on the new administration in Washington, was one
article which appeared in La Democracia at about this point. The
author did not limit himself to political attacks on the governor but
launched out in a general criticism of the new administration. He
cited the fact that for a loaf of bread the poor now had to pay ten
cents whereas it had been four; a quart of milk sold for fourteen cents
when it had been five; "and all the necessities of life triple in
value."30 The writer closed by suggesting that "the New Deal" be
changed to "the Old Raw Deal."
The national administration remained firm. The codes would
be applied as drawn up by the Washington offices and not by the
local legislature. The representative of the Garment Workers' Union,
Sidney Hillman, could see no objection to some kind of differential
which would allow the island industries to survive but at the same
time correct the sweat shop conditions which in the tropics were
incredible. It was recognized that the problem required special atten
tion, since wage rates were about one-third or one-fourth of what
they were in similar industries in the States. To raise them to the
continental minimum would close the factories and throw people
out of work. Wages were to be raised and the question of just how
much was to be studied. A coordinator of the NIRA was sent to
the island to draw up recommendations.
Morris E. Storyk, the coordinator, met with the representatives
of the needlework industries and was able to bring about agreement
for "substantial increases" in most phases of the industry. However,
the handkerchief group could reach no solution. Storyk felt that this
group should be forced to improve its labor prices without delay.31
For the most part, however, the national administration seemed to
follow a policy of adopting codes which were suggested and agreed
upon by the employers and employees of the island.32
The intention of General Johnson, who was setting up the
30. La Democracia, Aug. 20, 1933.

31. BIA, Personal File: Gov. Gore, Letter from Acting Gov. Winter to
Gov. Gore, Aug. 28, 1933.
32. Ibid., #28813, Letter from Rivera Martinez to Secretary Dern, Oct.
5, 1933.
NIRA, was to draw up the codes for the continental industries first
and then send a deputy administrator to Puerto Rico who would
consult the local representatives of the industries concerned as to
the necessary modifications in wages, hours, and other conditions to
make the code in some degree applicable to Puerto Rico. In indus
tries not competing with the United States, General Johnson foresaw
no codes. It would appear to the casual observer, as it did to the
Puerto Rican, that the NIRA was interested only in protecting conti
nental producers from the competition offered by the insular cigar,
cigarette, dress, sugar refining, and hat and embroidery industries.
This was of course denied, and it was asserted that an attempt was
being made to raise the standard of living.33 There was doubt, how
ever, as to whether local codes could legally be set up for the island
industriesnot exporting to the continent.34
When General Johnson became ill, the appointment of a co
ordinator for Puerto Rico was left pending. A report from Donald
Richberg to General Johnson concerning this appointment fell into
the hands of Governor Gore. The explosion was immediate. Rich
berg, urged on by Ruby Black,35 put forth the name of Martin
Travieso for the position. He did this knowing that the governor
and Travieso were in open conflict.36
Governor Gore immediately sent letters to Dern, Cox, and
Linton Collins, personnel director of the NIRA, stating that Tra-
vieso's appointment would be highly embarrassing to him since he
was Barcelo's henchman, would be embarrassing to labor since he
was a corporation lawyer, and would be an affront to the President,
since, "He has been saying and doing many things against the
President and against me."37 Governor Gore's ire may be judged by
the extreme to which he went in implying that charges were soon
to be brought against Travieso in connection with a bank scandal
under investigation by the Justice Division.38 The Bureau of Insular
"
Affairs, however, could find no confirmation of this implication.
33. Ibid., #28813-28 to 64, Part 2, Memorandum on conference

with Miss Boyd, assistant to Gen. Johnson, Oct. 5, 1933.
34. Ibid., Oct. 12, 1933.
35. Ruby Black Collection, Governor Gore, Letter from Ruby Black to
Martin Travieso, Sept. 18, 1933.
36. BIA, #28813-72, Memorandum from Richberg to Johnson, Con
fidential, Oct. 20, 1933.
37. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to Linton Collins, Oct. 30, 1933; Let
ter from Gov. Gore to Secretary Dern, Nov. 3, 1933.
As far asit was concerned, Travieso was a good candidate for

the position, but in deference to the governor, no recommendation
was made.39 Thus, as Ruby Black pointed out, politics apparently
blocked the naming of a coordinator and the setting up of codes for
the island." Finally, late in November, Boaz Long, an experienced
diplomat who had held posts in the State Department and in Latin
America, was appointed coordinator.41 Not only this appointment,
but the two members to serve with him, Herman L. Cochran, a
banker recommended by the Brookings Institution, and Coronel
Behr, a director of the Federal Hurricane Relief Administration,
indicated that every effort was being made to keep the NIRA out
of local politics.
In August, since Puerto Rico had not taken any steps to take
an advantage of the Federal Relief Administration's offer of aid,
Harry Hopkins sent one Alan Johnstone to study the extension of
the relief program to the Caribbean possessions. Johnstone recom
mended one relief administrator for Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands for reasons of economy. Hopkins turned this advice down
and selected James Bourne to direct the Puerto Rican Emergency
Relief Administration.42
James Bourne was a graduate of Yale and for the past three years
had been plant superintendent for the canneries of Hill Brothers,
Inc., in Puerto Rico. Previously he had been manager of a large
farm in Dutchess County, New York, in which Hyde Park is located.
As has been mentioned, the Bournes were close friends of the
President and his wife. It would be reasonable to assume that this
fact influenced the selection of Mr. Bourne as representative of the
FERA."
The setting up of the FERA was marked with confusion. Gov
ernor Gore never understood his relation to it, nor was he sure for
whom Bourne worked. He assumed that since Johnstone apparently
appointed Bourne, Harry Hopkins was his boss.44 Governor Gore
was not an easy man to deal with, however, and Bourne never took
the trouble to make the situation clear to him.45
39. Ibid., Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Nov. 4, 1933.
40. La Democracia, Nov. 20, 1933. 41. Ibid., Nov. 23, 1933.
42. BIA, P. File, Alan Johnstone, Letter Johnstone to Hopkins, Aug. 16,
1937, Hopkins to Johnstone, Aug. 17, 1937.
43. DTLP, 9-8-63, Federal Aid, PRERA, James Bourne, Letter from
Gov. Gore to Secretary Dern, Aug. 20, 1933.
44. Ibid. 45. Personal interview with James Bourne, April, 1954.
While the organization of the program confused him, the gover

nor also became entangled in the financial arrangement for Puerto
Rico. After his September visit to Washington, during which he had
been under severe fire from the Liberal party, the governor was
determined not to return empty-handed to the island. On his arrival
he announced that he had secured $4.4 million in relief for Puerto
Rico.48 With Ruby Black's help, La Democracia set about to prove
the claim false.47
The governor thought that his total assignment was $900,000
to which he was to add some $450,000. In addition to this, some
where he had picked up the number of $200,000 and concluded
that this was in addition to the $900,000. All of this was wrong.
Puerto Rico was to have received $600,000 from the FERA before
the end of the year. The island was originally required to add
$300,000 to this, making a total of $900,000, but in view of the
dire economic straits of Puerto Rico, the requirement was waived.
The $200,000 was the first installment of the $600,000 grant.48
All this confusion added to the problems of James Bourne, who
was busily occupied with the setting up of the PRERA. Two small
offices of Bourne and his emergency staff were unwisely located in
the capital building. The economy realized was to be applauded
in theory, but the location was too accessible to the politicians. Mrs.
Bourne was able to direct trained graduates and students of her
courses in social work at the university into the PRERA where they
could put their learning to work. In all, a concentrated effort was
undertaken to move the funds from Washington out to the people
as soon as possible by means of direct relief and work projects.
The Bournes were rightly proud of the rapidity, efficiency, and
human outlook with which the PRERA dispatched relief. Further
more, the work projects organized by the PRERA, while not marked
by large scale operations, were practical and necessary.40 However,
not all the people of Puerto Rico were satisfied with the work of
the PRERA.
46. La Democracia, Sept. 14, 1933. 47. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1933.
48. BIA, #28659, Letter from Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox, Sept. 20, 1933;
Memorandum from K. F. B. [?] to Secretary Dern, Sept. 26, 1933; Note
from Brookman to Gov. Gore, Sept. 26, 1933; Letter from Gov. Gore to
Johnstone, Oct. 2, 1933.
49. First Annual Report of the Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Admin
istration (San Juan; Bureau of Supplies, Printing and Transportation, 1935),
PP. 7-10.
The federal funds controlled by James Bourne were significant

enough to justify political attention. The line of attack was obvious
and similar to that which had been adopted with Dr. Padin. Gov
ernor Gore, who saw red when anyone mentioned the Liberal party,
was told that the PRERA was hiring Liberals who were active
politicians. The implication that the program would be using federal
relief funds to build up the Liberal party seemed clear to him.
James Bourne denied this charge in a long letter to Harry
Hopkins.
I know that this is not true and I pride myself on the fact that
our employees are not only working hard and unselfishly but abso-
solutely impartially. . . . But the governor is so bitter against the
Liberals that he believes anything the Republicans tell him and has
threatened to ask you to cut off our funds.50
Specifically, in the person of Martinez Nadal, "a

the coalition,
cheap politician,"51 according to Bourne, wanted the removal of the
assistant administrator, the chief of the bureau of investigations, and
the chief of personnel — the three key positions in the organization.
Politicians in these three positions in the organization, whether Lib
eral or coalition, would have converted the PRERA into a political
pork barrel. Finally, Governor Gore had the temerity to suggest that
Bourne hire a coalition spy to keep check on the activity in the
central office of the PRERA.52 At first, Bourne refused to consider
such an affront to his integrity, but as the coalition attack on him
and his organization grew worse, he bowed to the compromising
request.53
Even before the coalition man had been hired, Bourne had
sufficient reason to believe that his office was already accessible to
the coalition. Someone had stolen his payroll lists, giving them to
Martinez Nadal, who, in turn, showed them to the governor after
he had labeled each name with the correct party affiliation of the
individual.54 In a meeting with the governor and Martinez Nadal,
Bourne was then told to eliminate the Liberals from the employment
lists.55
50. FERA, Puerto Rico, #400, Box 259, Letter from Bourne to Hopkins,
Oct. 16, 1933. 51. Ibid., Oct. 18, 1933. 52. Ibid.
53. Personal interview with Bourne, April, 1954.
54. FERA, Box 259, Oct. 18, 1933.
55. Ruby Black Collection, Correspondence, Letter from Martin Travieso
to Col. Ed. House (copy to R. Black), Oct. 25, 1933.
While operating under this political pressure, Bourne wrote ex

tended reports to Harry Hopkins. The visit of his wife to Washing
ton, as we have seen, not only served to defend Dr. Padin, but also
to clarify the position of her husband before the proper authorities
in the White House. Bourne's letters served to keep the residents of
the White House informed about the development of events on the
island, if they had time to read them.
Bourne was also told that the coalition legislative commission
bound for Washington to defend Governor Gore would present
charges against the PRERA for dealing out relief with political
bias.58 Since he had kept Hopkins fully informed as to the troubles
he was having with the local politicians, he had little to worry about.
However, weekly meetings were held by the coalition in which
Bourne and the PRERA were roundly condemned. The amount of
aid which the island received was minimal and did little more than
scratch the surface of the dire needs of the poor. Naturally, under
these conditions political demagoguery could stir up potent popular
reactions. Finally, on the last day of November, the municipalities
of the island under the control of the coalition declared that James
Bourne was persona non grata to the people of Puerto Rico.87
By this time, Bourne was immune to the savage political attacks,
and he did not react with great concern.58 Within a short time, the
Socialists had come to apologize and Bourne expected that eventually
even the better Republicans would refuse to persist in the machina
tions of Martinez Nadal, Alfonso Vald&, and Celestino Iriarte.59
In the four months of operations in 1933, the PRERA disbursed
$339,145 in work relief projects. In September only some 5,000
cases of direct relief had been handled. In the months that followed,
the average number of cases aided directly was over 50,000; 93
per cent of these were families in which there were, on the average,
five people. Still, the aid was insignificant when only 3 5 per cent of
the working population, some 176,331, were gainfully employed.90
The PRERA distributed some 120,000 pounds of surplus pork
throughout the island, cooperated in road building and extension
56. FERA, Letter from Boume to Hopkins, Oct. 23, 1933.

57. El Mundo, Dec. 1, 1933.
58. FERA, Old Subject File, Misc. File B, Letter from Bourne to O'Don-
nell, Dec. 23, 1933.
59. Ibid.
60. First Annual Report of the PRERA, pp. 7-10.
programs with the department of interior of the insular government,

cooperated with the department of health in malaria control, and set
up needlework centers throughout the island where work was done
for the Red Cross." In all, the total $770,000 which the FERA
was able to send to Bourne in 1933 was well spent in spite of the
charges and countercharges of politics and prejudice.62 Nevertheless,
it was recognized by all that this insignificant amount could not be
considered as more than temporary relief.
* * *
Puerto Rico's economy was based on agricultural production, for

the most part sugar. It would be in this area of sugar production
where the New Deal would have its major problems. Even before
Roosevelt took office, there had been scheduled for February, 1933,
a meeting of the Tariff Commission tariff on sugar. It
to study the
will be recalled tariff act
that the protectionist of 1930, called the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff, drove the duty on sugar up to its highest point
in history. Cuban sugar, upon which a commission in July 26, 1924,
had recommended a half-cent reduction only to be denied by Presi
dent Coolidge, looked for more lenient treatment from the new
administration.63 When President Roosevelt appointed Daniel C.
Roper as his Secretary of Commerce — a man who had been an
attorney for the Cuban sugar interests for many years — some ob
servers saw that a favorable change for Cuban sugar would be
forthcoming.64
The Puerto Rican sugar interests were ably represented before
the Tariff Commission by John Bass, who maintained his offices at
99 Wall Street.65 The case which the island had was not helped
along when it became known that the American Sugar Company,
connected with the Fajardo Sugar Company in Puerto Rico, in
creased by threefold the 1932 profits over the previous year. Some
26,000 more tons of sugar had been produced and the dividend per
share for each of the 64,778 stockholders was $9.26 as against the
$3.42 of the previous year.86 This corporation was one of only seven
61. La Democracia, Dec. 1, 1933.

62. Ibid., Dec. 15, 1933, carries a Liberal party charge of favoritism to
the coalition. 63. Ibid., Jan. 28, 1933.
64. La Fortaleza, Letter from Hector Lazo to Gov. Beverley, April 24,
1933. 65. American Business World, March, 1933.
66. La Democracia, July 20, 1932, taken from New York Investment
News, June 30, 1932.
in the United States to declare a comfortable profit during the ebb

year of 1932 when sugar was selling on the world market at a half-
cent per pound.
The report of the Tariff Commission, prepared under the guid
ance of its chairman, Robert O'Brien, was made public at the end
of May. It rejected the tariff as an adequate means of protecting the
sugar industry. The commission also denied the necessity of a high
duty on Cuban sugar because of cost differences. The recommenda
tion made by the commission urged a reduction in the Cuban duty
and urged a reduction in the production of the local market in order
to raise the price of the sugar.67
The Agricultural Adjustment Act, approved in April, 1933, did
not retain the original suggestion of including sugar as one of the
basic commodities and thus subject to the control of the Department
of Agriculture. Therefore, the sugar industry decided to limit pro
duction, since the law did empower the Secretary to enter into an
agreement for production control68 with any association of producers
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce. The representa
tives of the sugar producers met through the long hot months of the
summer of 1933. In these meetings Puerto Rico was represented
again by John Bass. The case of the Puerto Rican producer was not
an easy one to defend, although it was not impossible. In 1922-1926
Puerto Rico had sent an average of 418,000 short tons of sugar to
the United States market, supplying thus 7.2 per cent of the total
sugar consumed. In 1932 it had shipped 851,000 tons, or 14.6
per cent of the total amount consumed. The continental producers
over the same period had increased their production only from 19.5
per cent to 23.7 per cent of the total market. The loss of decline in
production had been suffered by Cuba which in 1922-1926 had
produced 58.2 per cent, but by 1932 was contributing only 28.2
per cent.69
Puerto Rico argued that this increase in production, while due
in part to expanding of areas under cultivation, was primarily due to
an increase in efficiency and modernization in the methods of the
production. The price of sugar on the protected United States market
67. John Dalton, Sugar: A Case Study of Government Control (New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), Chapters V and VI.
68. General Correspondence of CCC, Letter from Henry Wallace to
Rivera Martinez, Dec. 22, 1933.
was under three cents per pound, too low to allow expansion of the
continental producers, but high enough to encourage increased pro
duction, and thus increase the profit, in Puerto Rico.70 Nevertheless,
the figures in the hands of the government indicated that each year
new sugar land was being cultivated. In 1930 only 254,259 acres
were under cultivation. After the act in 1931, with lower world
prices, land sown in sugar totaled to 279,165 acres. In 1932 it
went up again to 293,953 acres and in 1933 there were 300,071
acres in sugar cane.71 Just whether this expansion of sugar land was
at the cost of other types of cultivation such as foodstuffs, as the
Diffies had maintained,72 or the putting to work of idle or pasture
land as the Brookings study73 maintained, is hard to determine.
The sugar producers in the United States were not in a com
fortable position with the change of government. It would have been
to their advantage to have presented a solid front against a low-tariff
and pro-Cuban Democratic administration. This they could not do.
The group had hoped to limit production to about six million tons;
but each sector, Hawaii, the sugar-beet states, Florida-Louisiana, and
Puerto Rico, wanted to retain a sizable guaranteed production for
itself. Puerto Rico requested a minimum quota of 800,000 tons with
provision for proportional increases if consumption rose.74
The final agreement of the domestic sugar group set the total
production at 6,725,000 tons, which would have depressed even
further the price of sugar, since it was almost a half-million tons
over the previous yearly consumption.75 Puerto Rico, under this
agreement, was assigned a quota of 875,000 tons, which seemed
acceptable to all. In fact, the sugar producers of the island joined
the mainland interests in the campaign to secure the approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture of the agreement.
As Jorge Bird Arias, general manager of Fajardo Sugar Company,
told General Cox, the quota was a limitation and certainly the 1933
sugar production was much larger than 875,000, but since the
op. cit.; also Lippert S. Ellis, The Tariff on Sugar (Free-

70. Dalton,
port, The Rawleigh Foundation, no date, but possibly 1933), p. 60.
111.:
71. BIA, #422-233, Puerto Rican Sugar, Letter from Gen. Cox to
Joshua Bernhardt of the Sugar Section of AAA, Nov. 1, 1933.
72. Dime, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 73. Clark, op. cit., pp. 624-26.
74. La Democracia, May 29, 1933; also BIA, 33-77-599, Part 10, Civil
Government in Puerto Rico, Wire from E. D. Colon to Gov Beverley May
7, 1933.
75. Dalton, op. cit., p. 81.
island's production fluctuated from year to year, any excess could

be held in reserve for the short-crop years which were sure to come.78
On one point, however, the sugar producers of Puerto Rico were
apparently unanimous in their dissatisfaction. Within the original
agreement there was included a provision limiting the island's sugar
refining to 100,000 tons.77 This, is was argued, was unjust in view
of the fact that the island was already producing about 115,000
tons of refined sugar. Furthermore, Senator Pedro Juan Serralle"s of
Ponce, a coalitionist and a wealthy sugar producer, had plans to
increase his output of refined sugar before the agreement was formu
lated. The protests had some effect, since the sugar producers agreed
to allow SerraLtes to proceed with his plans in light of the fact that
his capital outlay had been made before the agreement was made.78
Attention should be called to the fact that when the Puerto
Rican producers found provisions in the sugar agreement not exactly
to their liking they turned to the governor, the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, the President, or other federal officials for defense. This was
an agreement between sugar producers and, until accepted by the
Secretary of Agriculture, there was no binding force connected with
the proposal. Indeed, even if the Secretary were to accept the agree
ment, there was little binding power which could be brought to bear
on the producers to adhere to their original plan.
Henry Wallace refused to accept the agreement. He rejected it
on the basis that it would favor some 42,000 sugar farmers to the
detriment of 60,000,000 consumers.79 The domestic production was
in no way curtailed and the burden of the program would fall on
the buyer. Heavy pressure was put on Wallace by the beet sugar
interests to approve the plan. The governors of Utah and Montana
personally called upon the Secretary to make the plan his.
76. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Confidential B, Memorandum for

the Records, re visit of Jorge Bird Arias, Nov. 28, 1933.
77. Ibid., #422-233, Memorandum on Pending Sugar Agreement, Gen.
Cox to Secretary Dern, Sept. 29, 1933. This memorandum was drawn up
after the bureau had received a deluge of wires from Bull Insular Line, Inc.;
Baltimore Insular Line, Inc.; Banco de Ponce; Ponce Chamber of Commerce;
Sen. Mario Mercado; Jos6 Andreu Blanco, president of the Federación de
Comerciantes; Felipe de Hostos, president of San Juan Chamber of Com
merce; the American Railroad Company of Puerto Rico; and others. Jean
Whittemore and Benjamin Horton cabled a protest to the President, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files, #400, undated.
78. BIA, #422-233, Letter from David Buckley to the Secretary of
War, Oct. 7, 1933.
79. Ibid., Letter from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern, Sept. 29, 1933.
One factor which entered into the rejection by the administra

tion was the highly volatile state of the Cuban political scene.
Machado fell on August 12, 1933; in the first week of September
the C&pedes provisional government was pushed over by a sergeant
named Batista. Grau San Martin was set up, but in four months
taken down because Washington refused to recognize his govern
ment. Exports from the United States to Cuba had fallen from 1925
high of $192,513,000 to a low in 1932 of $28,396,000. If Cuba
could sell more sugar to the United States, she might be able to
increase her imports of American products. The sugar agreement
envisaged a slight curtailment of Cuban sugar entering the United
States.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was given some early signs of
success with the controlled production of cotton, wheat, corn, hogs,
rice, tobacco, and milk. With an announced policy looking toward
a reduction of agricultural production on marginal lands,80 the Secre
tary could hardly accept a program which allowed for an increase
in the actual production. Finally, the sugar producers were not
united in an ironbound agreement. With inadequate means to en
force the agreement, the Secretary would have opened himself up
to serious criticism for accepting responsibility over a matter in
which he had httle or no control. He set his sugar experts to work
in October to draw up an administration plan for sugar. About
six months later the President presented the administration's sugar
control program to Congress.
In the meanwhile, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was making
itself felt on the continent and on the island. As with the NIRA,
the island's commercial interests sought ways to avoid, if possible,
or at least soften the effect of the recovery and adjustment legis
lation on the island. These interests were even less successful with
the AAA than they were with the industrial codes. At least under
the latter program they had a local coordinating board which was
to consider local conditions.
Shortly after his visit to Washington in September, Governor
Gore wrote to the President requesting that the AAA not be applied
to Puerto Rico, since it would work more hardship than good. He
argued that the crops of the island's tobacco and cotton producers
80. Ruby Black Collection, Sugar, Press Release of the AAA, Oct. 9,
1933.
were so small that sufficient compensation could not be expected

to balance the cost of the program to the island consumers.81 The
President referred the governor to the Attorney General.
After studying the legality of the problem presented, the Attor
ney General could offer little hope for Puerto Rico. The processing
taxes would apply, unless Congress took action to exclude the
markets of the island from the specific law of the land.82
The governor talked with the Secretary of Agriculture at length
in an effort to convince him that the AAA did not apply to the
island. Failing in this, he argued that the Secretary should help him
secure Congressional approval for the exclusion of Puerto Rico from
this measure. Wallace, after consulting his legal division, sustained
the applicability of the AAA in question to Puerto Rico and sug
gested, as did Homer Cummings, that Congress be petitioned. How
ever, he did not offer his aid in this matter.83
The legal division of the War Department only partly coincided
in opinion with the previous two divisions. The Judge Advocate
General suggested that the third section on financing did not apply
to Puerto Rico.84
The problem was (and, in part, still is) that for governmental
and official purposes, Puerto Rico was considered part of the Ameri
can market. It was within the tariff walls even though the Revenue
Act of 1932 had classified Puerto Rico as an export market. On the
other hand, for private and commercial reasons the Puerto Rican
market was treated like any foreign market. Shipments of a company
were consigned to one agent or dealer, usually in San Juan, whose
job it would be to distribute the product throughout the island. It
would be with difficulty, if not impossible, to secure a certain pro
duct except through this island representative. Obviously, this type
of distribution not only added costs to the final price of the product,
but it gave a virtual monopoly to the representative.85 Because of
these exceptional conditions, Gore's case had some validity.

Gov. Gore to President, no date.
82. Ibid., Letter from Attorney General to President, Sept. 29, 1933.
83. General Correspondence of CCC, Letter from Secretary Wallace to
Secretary Dern, Sept. 12, 1933.
84. BIA, #28813-28, Letter from Gen. Cox to Secretary of War, Aug.
31, 1933.
85. General Correspondence of CCC, Letter from Francis Cole of the
American Manufacturers' Export Association to Secretary Dern, Sept. 8, 1933.
One of the industries to be benefited by the AAA, the tobacco

industry, was in serious difficulties. In 1932 a campaign against
planting was carried out because there were on hand some 170,000
quintales, almost half of a year's production, from previous har
vests.86 This campaign evidently had some effect, since the produc
tion in 1933 came only 170,000 quintales.*1 Tobacco acreage
to
dropped from 81,900 acres to 10,079 in 1932. 88 However, already
the greater part of the tobacco land was in receivership. For the
most part, the tobacco producer was a small independent farmer
not well organized enough to make himself and his interests heard.
It is hard to believe that these producers would not have welcomed
federal assistance.
As the AAA program moved forward, a waveof protest swept
through the commercial and business interests on the island. There
is no denying the justice of the protest. Efforts to exempt the goods
consumed on the island from the processing tax had failed. Without
the administration support no Congressional approval for Puerto
Rico's exemption could be secured. The administration had other
plans. The fact remained, nevertheless, that as matters stood the
prices on a number of the most necessary farm commodities, in
cluding pork, dairy products, wheat products, and — most important
of all — rice, were definitely on their way up.
The price of fancy rice per hundred pounds in Puerto Rico in
December, 1932, had been $2.40, and a year later in 1933 it was
$4.10. California red beans, the next important item in the Puerto
Rican diet, had been $3.00 per hundred pounds, and as of Decem
ber 1, the price was $5.25. Codfish, another basic item, increased
from $19.00 to $28.00 per hundred pounds. Similar increases for
other products could be cited; hams increased from $20.00 to
$25.00, flour from $3.50 to $6.15, lard from $14.50 to $18. 00.89
All told, the Chamber of Commerce estimated that the cost of living
had gone up on the island during the past year by about one-third.no
One estimate of the total additional tax burden on goods purchased
86. La Democracia, Dec. 7, 1932.

87. Ibid., June 14, 1933.
88. BIA, #422-233, Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern,
Feb. 12, 1934.
89. Ibid., Letter from Jorge Bird Arias to Oliver Grimes (Copy to BIA),
Nov. 29, 1933.
90. Ibid., Wire from Felipe L. de Hostos to Secretary of War, Dec. 15,
1933.
in the American market amounted to about $15 million.91 Francis

Cole, of the American Manufacturers' Export Association, frankly
suggested that the island did not have enough ready cash in its
banks to support this additional burden.
The Secretary of War urged the Secretary of Agriculture that
consideration be given to the island's plight. The Secretary of War,
following Governor Gore's line, requested that approval of the sugar
agreement either be extended or Puerto Rico be declared exempt
from the AAA. Henry Wallace replied with a request for patience,
since his staff was working on a plan to take care of the domestic
sugar producers. He wrote:
It
is possible that this plan may give materially increased income
to the Puerto Rican sugar producers. In view of these facts, they
would be likely to lose more on the side of sugar than they would
gain on the side of the products they have to buy. . . . Would it
not be wiser for the Governor of Puerto Rico to wait until we see
how this program works out before pressing for their request for
exemption from the Act?92
So Puerto Rico waited.

The economic and social conditions, not to mention the critical
stateof political affairs, were quite serious. Pending the arrival of
Boaz Long, the NIRA codes were as yet not drawn up fixing wages
and prices. We have referred to the series of strikes which came
about while producers rushed through orders before governmental
control might drive wages up.
The AAA was forcing prices of commodities up, but as yet
Puerto Rico, because of the sugar producers' inability to control and
reduce production satisfactorily, was receiving only the brunt of the
program and not the benefits. The island was caught in the squeeze
of high prices and no favored crop.
The cane cutting season begins with the start of the new year
and extends into June or July. The negotiations for the labor con
tracts which cover this period added to the unrest of the community.
With the rising cost of living facing the workingman and the pros-
91. General Correspondence of CCC, Letter from Francis Cole to Secre

tary Dern, Sept. 8, 1933.
92. BIA, #28527, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Letter from Henry
Wallace to Secretary Dern, Nov. 3, 1933.
pect of government-controlled and even reduced production facing

the sugar grower, the elements of a labor battle existed.03
A strike was declared by the workers of the South Porto Rico
Sugar Company, which owned the Guanica Central in the south
western corner of the island. This company was managed by Ameri
cans. The town of Ensenada, in which the factory is located, looked
very much like a southern company Company houses for
town.
administrators were adequately spaced with front lawns along a
beautifully shaded street. The houses were of wood, with screened
front porches, marking them as inhabited by continentals. The
houses of the workers were found at the other end of the town,
the factory marking the central point between the extremes. These
houses, while they could not be condemned as being of the same
level as the shacks of the slum, El Fanguito, were of one or two
small rooms hoisted upon short stilts. No adequate means of sani
tation were provided for, electricity was not used, and the dusty
roads or paths were filled with dogs, a few pigs, some chickens,
and children. The town reflected the two worlds linked together
with the factory for mutual survival.
The division was not merely physical or economic, but social
and psychological as well. Acting Governor Benjamin Horton wrote :
The Guanica people are to some extent responsible not so much

on the question of wages but because they regard the laborers as
if they were some sort of lower animals. Mr. M [name
deleted by author] said he would be in San Juan tomorrow and if
he will be reasonably polite to the laborers I hope that we can con
tact the laboring people and make some kind of agreement.94
Horton was far from being classed as a liberal himself. He tried to

get Jim Bourne to withdraw federal relief from the strikers. Bourne
refused,95 but wired Washington for clarification and was backed
up by the administration in his refusal.96
It was at this time that the former governor, James Beverley,
had wired the White House declaring that a state of anarchy existed
93. Industrial costs were also rising. The jute bags in which sugar was
shipped went from $.10 to $.15; fuel oil from $.90 to $1.40 a barrel; BIA,
#422-233, Letter from Bird to Grimes, Nov. 29, 1933.
94. BIA, #20324, Letter from Acting Gov. Horton to Gov. Gore, Jan.
1, 1934.
95. FERA, Wire from Jim Bourne to Harry Hopkins, Jan. 9, 1934.
96. Ibid., Wire from J. Baker to Jim Bourne, Jan. 10, 1934.
on the island. The sugar strikes were spreading. The dock workers
threatened to go out on strike. The workers in the public utilities,
such as light and power, which were privately owned, threatened
to strike. It looked like a general strike. Santiago Iglesias was
appealed to by Acting Governor Horton to use his influence to
prevent a general outbreak of anarchy.97
Benjamin Horton toured the island on the fourth of January,

and he succeeded in gaining concessions and a more conciliatory
attitude on the part of the workers.98 The situation generally quieted,
sugar was slowly being cut, work was available to some, and the
impressive appointment of a dignified general to replace Robert Gore
allowed the new year to move peacefully along after an explosive
start.
In his economic program for the island, Governor Robert Gore
had taken his lead from the Bureau of Insular Affairs, specifically
General Parker. He had worked to reduce the governmental expen
ditures, not along the solid lines recommended by the Brookings
study,99 nor along those suggested by the Bureau of Insular Affairs.
Feeling himself bound to work with the coalition and moved by
events to work against the Liberal party, the governor lashed out
at departments or agencies which were, as it turned out, beyond the
control of the coalition, such as the department of education and
the University of Puerto Rico, or embarrassing to the coalition in
terests, such as the bureau for classification of property for tax pur
poses or the tax reassessment bureau.
In this latter matter, Governor Beverley, following the sugges
tion of the Brookings group and the Bureau of Insular Affairs, had
called for a radical revision of the tax procedure. Since much of the
sugar land was underevaluated, a re-evaluation program would pay
dividends to the insular government. On the other hand, Governor
Gore, who probably had never read the Brookings study, had urged
that the treasurer eliminate the bureau for classification of property
for tax purposes, thus saving $43,500. Gore considered the elimi
nation of the bureau an example of good economy.100 Not content
97. BIA, Personal File: Robert Gore, Jan. 4, 1934, Letter from Acting
Gov. Horton to Gov. Gore.
98. Ibid., Letter from Albin Dearing to Gov. Gore, Jan. 5, 1934.
99. Clark, op. cit., pp. xvii-xxxv.
100. BIA, #247-264, Puerto Rican Budget, Letter from Gov. Gore to
the Treasurer, Oct. 9, 1933.
with this, he later suggested that the tax reassessment bureau be

eliminated.101
The economies he sought at the university and in other divisions
of the department of education have already been referred to. Gov
ernor Gore succeeded in securing the cancelation of $1,632 from
the overtime payroll of the legislature, much against the wishes of
the coalition.102 In all, the governor and his auditor sliced slightly
over $1 million from the expenditures of the insular government.103
A good percentage of these cuts came in projects of the department
of interior which, of course, was counterbalanced in part by the
expenditures of the FERA in work relief projects.
Governor Gore's meddling in the PRERA, although primarily
politically motivated, demonstrated a lack of cooperation with the
work carried out by James Bourne. In the PRERA, as in the projects
under Behr, the governor again represented the conservative point
of view by recommending wages at 18 cents an hour rather than
the proposed 22y2 cents, which he protested would throw the
economy of the island into chaos and strikes.104
The efforts of the governor to block the extension of the AAA
and the NIRA to the island have been noted. As an appointee of
the President, Governor Gore showed a marked lack of sympathy
for the New Deal programs.
Governor Gore's contribution to the island's economic health
was found in the "trade trips" which he stimulated, planned, and
led to Florida. Gore, who lived in Florida before coming to Puerto
Rico, felt that the island should not be oriented only to the ports
of the northeastern seaboard. For him Florida was the Caribbean's
natural port of entry. He concluded that only the lack of knowledge
of Puerto Rican industrial products and the opportunities in Florida
prevented the natural development of commercial interest between
Florida and Puerto Rico. To bring these two areas closer together,
Governor Gore organized a trip to Florida for a group of insular
businessmen. The expedition took place in December; and it turned
out to be Gore's last trip to the continent from the island.
102. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Gore to Martinez Nadal, and to Gen. Cox,
both Oct. 19, 1933.
104. Ibid., #28811-6, Wire from Gov. Gore to Gen. Cox, Confidential,
Sept. 25 and 28, 1933.
It is difficult of this type of economic

to evaluate the success
stimulus. First of all, the economic interests of Florida and Puerto
Rico would appear to be competitive rather than complementary,
since both economies are based on a semitropical or tropical agricul
tural production. Second, any reorientation of trade channels should
first try to break the monopoly on shipping which the northeastern
seaboard enjoyed in Puerto Rico. Finally, it would appear that
Florida would receive more benefits than the island producers. How
ever, this is conjecture.
Governor Gore's personal opinion of the island's economic future
was expressed in a letter to the Secretary of War in answer to an
inquiry about the establishment of the Home Loan Bank on the
island. He wrote: "If it were [my] money would not put in
[I]
it
an institution of this sort . there not sufficient
is
. . [since]
. .
.
stability of industry or agriculture here to warrant anything but the
most meager sort of [support]."105 Fortunately, the island of
.
.
.
Puerto Rico did not have to depend upon the good will of Governor
Gore.106
105. Ibid., Personal File: Robert Gore, Letter from Gore to Secretary
Dern, Nov. 1933.
6,
106. single defense of Governor Gore was published in the Feb.
3,
A
1934, Literary Digest. The article, "Puerto Rico and the New Deal," was
written by Albin Dearing, who was on the personal payroll of the governor.
The strongest condemnation of Governor Gore was found in The Nation,
Nov. 29, 1933. The article, "Rebellion in Puerto Rico," was written by
Hubert Herring.
0faflte* 5
RELIEF OR RECONSTRUCTION
preparation for its sugar plan, the Department

of Agriculture had the experience of wheat, cotton,
and tobacco control to guide it, nor was it under the same urgency
connected with the first measures of the New Deal. In October the
Department of Agriculture gathered information pertinent to sugar
production in Puerto Rico. Men like Joshua Bernhardt, John Frank
lin Carter, Rexford Guy Tugwell, Frederick P. Bartlett, James A.
Dickey, and J. A. S. Weaver were associated with the over-all plan.
John F. Carter, one of these experts, wrote of the New Deal adminis
tration as an "unofficial observer" for the public. Concerning his
colleague Rex Tugwell, and his ideas for an agricultural program,
Carter wrote that Tugwell, contrary to Hoover, who argued for re
duced production through starvation of the farmer, wanted social
control of production designed to eliminate low-grade farm land
from active use.1 Tugwell also argued for the elimination of the
tariff protection extended to artificial or uneconomical industries.
Both of these ideas were the underlying purposes behind the sugar
program.
In February the President presented the general outline of the
sugar plan to Congress. The purpose of the bill, as expressed by the
President, was to stabilize the production of sugar, which, in certain
areas, had been expanding under the protection of the tariff, much
to the detriment of Cuba and the United States exporters to the
Republic. The remedy suggested would involve the arrangement of
1. Jay Franklin, The New Dealers (New York: Literary Guild, 1934),
p. 89.
143
quotas for the domestic sugar producers. In general, the plan fol
lowed the outline of the stabilization agreement rejected by the
Secretary of Agriculture the previous fall. However, it specifically
favored Cuba by increasing its quota and hinting at a new trade
treaty which would lower even further the tariff on Cuban sugar.
All domestic and offshore sugar producers were curtailed slightly
to allow for the increase. The hardest hit were the domestic beet
producers, whose quota was reduced some 300,000 tons less than
the voluntary agreement. Puerto Rico's quota was cut from 875,000
to 821,000.
The vote-powerful beet states, as should have been expected,
did not accept this recommendation. Congress itself, rather than
delegate to the Secretary of Agriculture the power to fix the quotas,
established the quota for the beet states by adding 100,000 to the
original suggestion. This amount was then to be reduced from the
quotas of the other areas at the discretion of the Secretary. The
quotas of these areas were to be determined on the basis of the
average production of any three years between 1925 and 1933 to
be selected by the Secretary.
Puerto Rico's production from 1925 to 1933 (in thousands of
tons) was as follows:
1925 665 1928 752 1931 778

1926 606 1929 587 1932 992
1927 630 1930 872 1933 834
The lean years of 1929 and 1933 were due to the destructive hurri
canes of 1928 and 1932. The production of 1934 promised to be
the largest in Puerto Rico's history, over a million tons. There was
immediate opposition to the President's program. Indeed, even the
day before the President went to Congress, John Bass, representing
the Puerto Rican Sugar Producers Association, wrote to the Secretary
of War protesting against the rumored purpose of the program. He
argued that any effort to take out of production any "so-called sub-
marginal lands . . . would harm the insular producers by raising
the costs of production." He added that "all acreage at the present
time under cultivation is economically fit for the production of
sugar cane."2 The price of sugar was so low that any production
2. BIA, #422-233, Letter from John Bass to Secretary of War Dern,

Feb. 7, 1934.
RELIEF OR RECONSTRUCTION 145
which was not economical would be automatically eliminated. Bass

was equating the term marginal with the term economical, which
is not possible.
Large scale production had required, or at least made possible,
the expansion of sugar lands. This expansion added, as has been
mentioned previously, some 50,000 acres between 1929 and 1933. 3
By limiting Puerto Rican sugar production to 803,000 tons (the
final figure after further reduction required by the Congressional
action which added 100,000 tons to the sugar beet industry), it
was hoped not only that the expansion of sugar cultivation would
be stopped but also that, being faced with a fixed and reduced quota,
some lands would be retired from sugar cultivation. Those lands
so retired would certainly be the least productive of sugar.
General Winship, the new governor, went even further in his
protest than did Bass. Winship wanted a quota of 900,000 tons and
thus rejected the quota of the stabilization agreement of the previous
year.4
The arguments used by those defending the island's case were
based on the injustice of using either 1932-1933 or 1928-1929
sugar production years as a basis for setting up a quota. The average
of the three immediately previous years, 1931-1933, including even
the off-year of 1932-1933, was 926,577 tons, but this included
the bumper crop of 193 2. 5
The admitted policy of the Department of Agriculture was to
reduce the production in order to raise the price. In reducing the
production, it was hoped that even though fewer people would
benefit, only the best acreage would be used, thus assuring more
yield per acre and freeing land for other products. In Puerto Rico
this prospect was particularly attractive, since the sugar lands were,
for the most part, in the hands of the large corporations.
In Puerto Rico about 13.3 per cent of the entire area of the
island was devoted to sugar production. This area contained about
400,000, or about 25 per cent, of the population. Or expressed in
more specific terms, about 50 per cent of the cultivated land was
in sugar and 35 per cent of the total agricultural population was
3. Ibid., Letter from Gen. Cox to Joshua Bernhardt, Nov. 1, 1933.

4. Ibid., Wire from Gen. Winship to BIA, Feb. 10, 1934.
5. Ibid., Notes prepared in BIA in connection with a study of bills
H.R. 7907 and S. 2732, March 1, 1934. See also the Washington Herald
Supplement, Feb. 18, 1934, for Puerto Rico's case against the bill.
dependent upon sugar production. These figures compare unfavor

ably with other sugar-producing areas, such as the Philippine Islands
or Hawaii. The conclusion, offered by the men of the Bureau of
Insular Affairs who drew up the analysis, was that, while sustaining
the people at a higher wage level than any other agricultural product
of the island, sugar production "falls short of sustaining its due
proportion of the population of the island. This analysis," the re
port went on to say, "would seem to indicate the desirability of
forcing a considerable proportion of the sugar land in Puerto Rico
out of sugar cultivation or else have it assume a greater burden as
regards the sustenance of the population of the island."8 The figures
suggested in this report were subject to variation depending upon
the individual who drew up the data. The island lacked a recent
agriculture census and any estimate of the number of sugar cane
workers had to be vague. Governor Winship suggested that 500,000
were supported by sugar production.7
The sugar control bill, known as the Jones-Costigan Bill, passed
in spite of the strong protests of the offshore areas, like Hawaii and
Puerto Rico. General Winship fought the measure but received little
official support from the Bureau of Insular Affairs. The chief of the
Bureau felt that he could not oppose an administration measure.
The messages of the governor were transmitted to the proper authori
ties, but they went without the backing of the officials in the War
Department.8 To aid in the battle the island government sent up
Jose" Pesquera, former resident commissioner, to testify before Con
gressional committees and to talk to government officials.
In addition to the above-mentioned opposition, two other private
interests fought the measure. Pedro Juan Serralle"s, who had recently
started a refining plant, feared restriction and saw that expansion
of a good enterprise would be curtailed. With his low labor costs,
it was estimated that he was realizing from 50 to 75 per cent return
on his investment. The other was an unidentified promoter who
wished to build a refinery in Puerto Rico, but he did not have the
ready money to undertake his enterprise immediately.9
One indication that the sugar industry was causing a disturb-
6. BIA, #422-233, Notes.

Ibid., Letter from Gen. Winship to BIA, March
7. 2, 1934.
8. Ibid., Feb. 10, 1934.
9. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #241, Sugar, Letter
from Ben Gray to Mclntyre, April 25, 1934.
ance over a minor matter was the fact that sugar stock on the Wall
Street market was selling strong. The prices were from two and a
half to five times the price of the previous One of the gov
year.10
ernor's assistants, whom he had brought down with him from the
War Department, painted the bill in dark tones. Colonel Rigby
declared that this was a revocation of the fundamental principle
which distinguished American treatment of her offshore areas in
contrast with the mercantilistic policies of Spain and England during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which, in part, caused the
revolt of Spanish America and the American Revolution.11 Certainly,
the favored treatment of the beet states and the limitation on refining
was apparently a policy of discrimination for the benefit of mainland
producers.
The principle of the matter aroused most of the opposition. It
was General Cox who suggested that this discriminatory legislation
would create "a feeling of uneasiness and uncertainty and even
doubt as to whether they can rely on the United States government
for fair and impartial consideration of their fundamental rights."12
Jorge Bird Arias, of Fajardo Sugar, wrote to the Secretary of War
suggesting that the President should not sign a bill "which rates
loyal American citizens of Puerto Rico as second-class Americans."13
Nevertheless, the industry, which had voluntarily undertaken to
limit its own production the previous year (thus accepting in prin
ciple the sugar acts), looked to the possible benefits which might
come out of this measure. It is most strange that no objection was
expressed over the vagueness of the benefits accruing from the proc
essing tax. Section 8 of the act gave the Secretary of Agriculture
wide discretionary powers over the processing tax funds arising from
the sugar produced in the various insular sugar areas. These funds
could be used to make payments to cane planters for curtailing
production or for the general benefit of agriculture under such plans
as the Secretary might provide, or a combination of both measures.
In other words, there was no legal guarantee whatsoever that the
cane producer would be paid for his restriction of production. And
10. Ibid.
11. BIA, #422-233, Informal notes of Col. Rigby to Gen. Cox, April
6, 1934.
12. Ibid., Gen. Cox's Memorandum on Sugar, April 12, 1934.
13. Ibid., Letter from Jorge Bird Arias to Secretary of War, April 21,
1934.
yet, no objection was raised and no request for clarification made.

No one demanded a clear definition of the government's responsi
bility.
This silence was even more remarkable in view of certain events
which were occurring on the island. It is easy to look back and to
put the two pieces together, but at the time there was little indica
tion as to what was going to happen. One Puerto Rican, who had
been in Washington while the Agriculture Department was working
on the sugar plan, knew in great part what to expect. Although he
did not keep his information completely to himself, the scope of his
understanding spread to only a very few.
As has been indicated, Munoz Marin returned to the island with
enthusiasm for the New Deal when he urged the island to put aside
any trivial politics and cooperate with the federal government in
solving the pressing economic problems confronting the nation and
the island. He had urged, in a letter to the President and in press
interviews, a round-table discussion on Puerto Rico so that a general
policy might be formulated. This suggestion gained sympathy among
all factions on the island. The Chamber of Commerce passed a reso
lution requesting a conference to consider the economic problems
of Puerto Rico.14 This request was directed to the President and to
the Secretary of War.
Munoz* enthusiasm was not hard to understand. His original
bent, as we have seen, was toward social reform and his cooperation
with Santiago Iglesias in the twenties began with a strike of cane
laborers.15 Both the conflict with Governor Gore and his entrance
into the Liberal party, where political activity was not of the highest
calibre, deterred the young radical from his original drives. But
perhaps more than any other Liberal in the party, he always thought
of economic changes along with his ideas on independence for the
island.
The association with the planners and the economic intellectuals
of the New Deal was a heady experience for Munoz. With President
Roosevelt, Hopkins, Wallace, and Dern, he had been able to discuss
the work of the New Deal in relation to the problems of Puerto Rico.

Box 46, Letter from Felipe L. de Hostos to President Roosevelt, Jan. 27,
1934.
15. Angel Torregrosa, Biografia de Luis Munoz Marin CSan Juan: Edi
torial Esther, 1944), p. 77.
Puerto Rico had its peculiar twists, such as a one-crop economy, with
a rapidly growing population, hurricanes, and cultural blocks be
tween the island and the mainland, but the problems were only a
more serious and more permanent complex of the continental ones.
Puerto Rico lived under starvation, unemployment, discouragement,
poverty, and constant business failure. The New Deal was aiming
at the solution of these blights on the nation's existence; and, since
Puerto Rico was a small and fairly isolated area, one might wonder
if a single over-all reconstruction plan might not be drawn up for
the island as a whole.
There is evidence that this thought was prevalent in the minds
of high administration leaders as early as October, 1933. Dorothy
Bourne returned from her trip to Washington with a sense of this
/
trend of thought concerning Puerto Rico. Her husband called a
group together. Professor Rafael Cordero, economist, Professor Jose"
C. Rosario, educator and sociologist, and Frederick Krug, president
of Puerto Rican Railway, Light and Power Company, were to work
out a single plan of economic adjustment for the island. The report
was drawn up in general terms. It acknowledged that property, over
population, and scarce natural resources required a more equal dis
tribution of wealth, which, at the same time, would not sacrifice
efficient production. Bourne and his group mentioned the expected:
higher wages, better working conditions, compensation for illness
and injury, but he added the suggestion that the island "should make
better use of marginal and submarginal lands."16 Submarginal lands
then used for major crops or marginal lands lying idle could be used
to produce food crops to augment the diet of the people working the
land. The suggestion was obviously a modification for the land-scarce
and sugar-dominated Puerto Rico of the vegetable garden plots
fomented in the States. A word of caution was added : "To substitute
a less efficient system of land utilization for a more efficient one in
an island which needs badly its yield for the support of an excessive
population is economic nonsense." Clearly there was nothing radical
or revolutionary in this report.
James Bourne followed this a month later with another "Con
structive Plan for Puerto Rico," this time sent up to the President,
Senator Tydings, and the Secretary of War. This second plan was
16. BIA, #20324, Letter of James Bourne to Harry Hopkins, copy to

Dern, Nov. 8, 1933.
more extensive, including in addition to the garden plot and indus

trial program (which, incidentally, was not to be built on the false
bases of low wages and tax relief) a strictly enforced tax program
and a civil service reform. The President forwarded his copy to
Secretary Dern with the comment: "I think this memorandum from
James Bourne has much of real merit."17
Yet Bourne had supplied little that was new. His garden-plot
scheme had been tried, with very questionable success, by Governor
Roosevelt on a small scale on land given by the Roig Sugar Com
pany. Agripino Roig, whose opinion may not be free from prejudice,
judged the program in the following words:
The net results were that some of the men ate the seeds, others
worked the soil and obtained some products, but in substance the
plan was given up as a failure, because the people refused to work.
. . . The mind of our jibaro is made up so that he considers food grow
ing not as a means of livelihood for himself and his family but as
a means of income in cash, therefore, if he can grow something
that will pay him handsomely in cash, he prefers to devote his time
to cane fields and let his land go to waste.18
The body of the work under Bourne's plan was to be carried

out under the PRERA. It was an expanded public works program
which would little change the basic economic pattern of the island.
An effort would be made to eliminate the slums, improve health
through public health extension services, and keep the workers busy
during the months the sugar cane was growing. The federal govern
ment would convert itself into a caretaker to keep the house in order
and the servants well groomed so that efficiency might increase and
the owners of the estate might make greater profits. Of course,
Bourne did urge that the taxes be increased and collected.
There may have been "real merit" to Bourne's plan, but for
tunately Puerto Rico did not have to depend upon such short vision.
Before Luis Mufioz Marin left Washington he sent a hopeful
letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, referring in a general way to his plans
for the island. He wrote in part:
17. Ibid., #28659, Unemployment Work Relief, Letter from James
Bourne to President Roosevelt, Dec. 6, 1933; Note from the President to Sec
retary Dern, Dec. 19, 1933.
18. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, Puerto Rican File
1934, Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, Letter from Agripino Roig to
Gov. Winship, March 6, 1934. Copies were sent by John Bass to Secretary
Dern and Under Secretary Tugwell.
There is in Puerto Rico a generation that is coming to power

in all political parties . . . that has been educated in the United
States. It is familiar and deeply sympathetic with the best American
life . . . not 100% Americanism, of course. ...
It wants to fight
hunger, not with doles but with social justice, operating within an
economy that shall be as far as possible planned and autonomous.
It wants to break the strangle-hold of land monopoly and restore
the soil to the people who work it. It wants to diversify crops, plant
food, emancipate the people from the constant fatal threat of Con
gressional action on sugar. It wants to foster industrial development
to help support our relatively enormous population. It wants to give
dignity and purpose to political action.18
These are stirring words about ideals Munoz hoped to see realized
with the New Deal Program.
Upon his arrival on the island, he spoke of the New Deal in
the following terms:
The New Deal is a mobilization of great economic forces di

rected towards a permanent reconstruction upon the basis of indi
vidual resources, to attain a higher level of living and culture in
the communities affected by it.20
With the cooperation of all political factions and the help of the
New Deal, a basic economic reorganization might be realized on the
island.
He suggested that the application of this reorganization should
be through the formulation of a general economic plan for the island,
which, in the senator's opinion, should include the following four
points: (1) diversification of agricultural production, (2) industrial
ization, (3) the creation of a stable group of small farmers, and (4)
the achievement of a reasonable balance between production and
the acquisitive power of the Puerto Rican people.21
On the third point he was more specific. He estimated that there
were in Puerto Rico between 30,000 and 50,000 families which
"might be placed in conditions relatively certain of life and dignity"22
if they were given land. These farms would not be transferable and
would be of sufficient size to produce food and fruits for consump-
19.Ruby Black Collection, Luis Munoz Marin, Letter from Munoz

Marin Mrs. Roosevelt, Dec. 8, 1933; copy to Ruby Black.
to
20. El Mundo, Jan. 23, 1934.
21. La Democracia, Jan. 24, 1934. 22. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1934.
tion and possible sale if market conditions could be improved. The

government, he felt, could set up certain requirements which would
insure a diversified use of the land. Munoz went on to point to the
Department of Agriculture of the federal government, which was
carrying out a similar program by setting up subsistence farms in
the United States.
Of course, it would be misleading imply that this was new
to
and revolutionary to the island scene. Almost twenty years previ
ously, the insular government had set up in 1915a Homestead Com
mission which planned to raise half a million dollars by selling bonds
in order to set up a small farm program. Some 15,000 acres were
bought in the interior of the island (the coastal sugar land being
too expensive) and divided into holdings of 4, 16, and 20 acres,
depending upon the fertility of the soil. In one project, El Duque,
800 families were settled on land which cost $30,000. 23
Munoz Marin himself had called upon Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.,
to undertake a legal action against the holdings in excess of 500
acres and set up an agency which would distribute the land acquired
into the hands of the small farmer.24
With the increased interest in economic reform Muiioz, how
ever, did not allow his independence hopes to be forgotten.
In order to know in what specific form the economic legislation

is to be drawn up in Puerto Rico, it is necessary to know first if we
are headed towards Statehood, Autonomy or Independence. ...
Of
course, there is no necessary economic difference between autonomy
and independence. . . . The issue . . . lies between statehood on the
one hand, and independence or autonomy on the other. This is the
issue which the United States is called upon to resolve in harmony
with the people of Puerto Rico, as soon as possible.25
Thus Munoz left the back door open just in case he found it neces
sary to oppose a program in which he and his party could not par
ticipate.
Toward the end of 1933 it had become public knowledge that
the lands of the United Porto Rico Sugar Company, one of the big
four of the island, were about to be put on the market for sale. This
was taken up immediately as an excellent opportunity for the plac-
23. The Geographical Review, April, 1934.

24. The Nation, CXXIX (Nov. 20, 1929), 608.
25. EI Mundo, Jan. 24, 1934.
ing of land in the hands of competent families which would en

deavor to till the soil for their own sustenance. The outspoken Pedro
Biaggi, a member of the Puerto Rico Fruit Defense Committee and
author of The Puerto Rico Tragedy,26 wrote to Secretary Dern urg
ing that small farms of not less than ten and not more than twenty-
five acres be set up by the government for the landless families.27
The Liberal party repeated the request in La Democracia, urging
that the case presented a magnificent opportunity to try out the
homestead subsistence plan of Senator Munoz Marin.28 When J. A.
S. Weaver learned of the pending action on the property of the
United Porto Rico Sugar Company, he put a man on the matter
to study the details of the case.29
The Chamber of Commerce drew up a plan for rehabilitation
and submitted it to the governor.30 It was predicated on the realiza
tion and acceptance of greater government regulation of the capitalist
system. The members of the Chamber of Commerce felt that the
stimulation by government of business activity and the raising of
individual incomes were welcome. In keeping with this, all federal
recovery legislation should be extended to the island. The homestead
measures, found in Munoz' proposal, were approved. A public mo
nopoly for the marketing of Puerto Rican coffee was urged. Of note
was the request that the President, using his discretionary powers,
direct some of the funds received by the NIRA tax to the island for
a program of construction, repair, and improvement of public high
ways and for subsistence homesteads. This program of public works
was outlined in great detail, mentioning the highways and repair
work to be carried out in a resolution passed by the annual assembly
of the Chamber of Commerce.31
The unanimity of opinion expressed by all the various groups
was remarkable. Even more notable was the agreement that a co
ordinated plan of economic recovery was necessary. This was pre
cisely what the administration had in mind. Immediately after the
President introduced the sugar plan to Congress, Ruby Black wired
26. Pedro Jose' Biaggi, The Puerto Rico Tragedy (New York: Editorial
Cronistas Ibero-Americanos, no date, but possibly 1933).
27. BIA, #1175, Puerto Rico Reports, Letter from Pedro Biaggi to
Secretary Dern, Dec. 24, 1933. 28. La Democracia, Feb. 1, 1934.
29. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letter from
Ruby Black to Munoz Marin, Feb. 14, 1934.
30. La Tortaleza, Letter from Felipe de Hostos to Gov. Winship, Feb.
10, 1934. 31. La Democracia, Jan. 28, 1934.
an exclusive story to La Democracia,

declaring that "a completely
planned economy for Puerto Rico is expected from the sugar stabili
zation plan."32 She went even further to explain that the President
had discussed this plan fully with Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
Sumner Welles, Secretary Dern, Secretary Wallace, and others like
Tugwell, General Cox, Weaver, and Jerome Frank of the AAA.
Luis Mufioz Marin had initiated the public thought along these
lines, and although he was not following orders from Washington,
he did make the work of the federal government much easier. How
ever, the plan would leave mere garden plots or subsistence farms far
behind, and would not limit itself to coordinating relief measures
or directing public works. Steps toward the formulation of this over
all economic plan were accompanied with the visit of prestige-bearing
personalities.
In February the governor received a confidential letter from the
President, and a second one from Mrs. Roosevelt, who announced
her intentions of visiting the island about the first of March. The
President was concerned about the reception his wife might receive
on the island. He wanted to know if her visit might be seized upon
as an opportunity for a "demonstration which would be inconvenient
to all concerned,"33 and he stated that his wife was deeply interested
in the welfare of the island. The President said he had no objection
to the trip, however, if it would do good. Winship had no "fear of
any trouble," and he expressed his delight at the plan.34
Mrs. Roosevelt was accompanied by Lorena Hickok, an assistant
to Harry Hopkins, and a few women reporters including Ruby
Black. The latter, of course strictly off the record, informed her
friends on the island of the impending visit. Several years later
Ruby Black wrote her impressions of the trip.
To the great distress of the American colony in San Juan who

wanted to make Puerto Rico a rich man's playground, Mrs. Roose
velt took reporters and photographers across rickety catwalks over
a dank swamp to little houses built out of debris of the 1932 hurri
cane, took them into the muddy alleys in sight of the beautiful
32. Ruby Black Collection, Chard6n Plan, Story, Feb. 5, 1934.

33. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Private and Personal Files #1263,
Letter from President Roosevelt to Gov. Winship, Personal and Confidential,
Feb. 15, 1934.
34. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Winship to President Roosevelt, Private and
Confidential, Feb. 23, 1934.
Spanish palaces of the Governor and the Commandant of the 65 th

Infantry, stepped over pigs and game cocks into the six by nine foot
shacks in which the poor and jobless lived and died of tuberculosis
and malnutrition, took them up in the hills to see httle girls, at
the lunch hour, working exquisite initials upon fine linen handker
chiefs, that sold for a dollar each in New York and for which the
little girls got less than 25 cents a dozen. She noted a woman toiling
up a steep hillside with a five gallon gasoline can of water on her
shoulder, and then found the woman scrubbing the floor of her
tiny hut with the laboriously brought water. She found cleanliness
of the people that astounded her because of the enormous difficulties
with which it was maintained. She found a self-reliance and a
dignidad — a sense of self-respect and worth of the individual —
among the most poverty-stricken in Puerto Rico. . . . She found
overwhelming unemployment, far too many people on so small an
island, and an absentee ownership which took the island's wealth to
the American continent, to Spain, to Canada.35
While in Puerto Rico, Mrs. Roosevelt was guided by her friend

Mrs. Dorothy Bourne, who well knew the interests of the President's
wife, as she also knew the suffering of the islanders.
On the airplane with Mrs. Roosevelt came another public person
ality who would have commanded the center of attention in his own
right. This was Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford Guy Tug-
well, one of the bright young professors of the New Deal. He was
accompanied by Ferdinand Silcox, chief forester, John F. Carter,
and Frederick P. Bartlett. It is hard to believe that this was a mere
coincidence, but this is attested to by Ruby Black36 and by Rexford
Tugwell.37 The fact that Rexford Tugwell would probably have
liked to monopolize public attention lends credence to his denial of
previous knowledge of the First Lady's plans. Since he too came to
see and be shown, he followed Mrs. Roosevelt through the incredible
slums of Little Mud (El Fanguito) and The Pearl (La Perla).38
The rest of the time was spent in formal and informal meet
ings. These were numerous and through them the islanders had
ample opportunity to inform the distinguished visitors. Not all the
discussions followed the same pattern, but the general tone of the
35. Ruby Black, Eleanor Roosevelt, pp. 296-97. 36. Ibid., p. 296.
37. Rexford Guy Tugwell, The Stricken Land (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1947), p. 27.
38. See the island press: El Mundo and El Imparcial, March 8, 9, 10,
11, 1934.
conferences can be grasped from an example. A "Round Table Con

ference on Possible Permanent Plans Relating to Relief and Civil
Works Administration"39 was held in La Fortaleza on Saturday after
noon, March 10, 1934. In addition to the visitors, the Governor of
Puerto Rico, Attorney General Horton, Commissioner of Labor Ri
vera Martinez, Commissioner of Education Padin, Commissioner of
Agriculture Menendez Ramos, James Bourne, Boaz Long, President
of the Chamber of Commerce Felipe de Hostos, Jorge Bird Arias,
Chancellor Carlos Chardon, Bishop Byrne, and others attended —
in all some twenty-eight people.
James Bourne opened the discussion by suggesting that the pre
liminary report of an economic and agricultural survey prepared by
his office serve as a starting point for the discussion. Each person
had been given a copy of this preliminary survey. There was gen
eral agreement that such a survey was necessary and should be ex
tended as a function of the insular government.
Dr. Carlos Chardon launched the suggestion that Puerto Rico
should begin to produce some of the foodstuffs which were being
imported at high cost to the islanders. He specifically mentioned
rice, imports reaching 5 million pounds a yearly delivery, and he
suggested that idle land, such as the 4,000 acres of Carlo Tiburones,
be drained by the government and turned over to rice cultivation.
Mrs. Roosevelt questioned the economy of this measure, since
at most only one-quarter of the rice consumption could be island-
produced, leaving the price of rice consumption still determined by
nonisland producers. However, Chardon was not so much concerned
about economy as he was about giving people work and putting the
dollar to do service on the island before it was drawn back to the
mainland. Professor Tugwell pointed out that rice could be produced
much cheaper elsewhere. Puerto Rican rice would then require
protection from the imported, low-priced rice. It would be better
to look for a more economical product which would require little
mechanization, no protection, and would bring an immediate return
to the small farmer.
Commissioner Mene"ndez Ramos suggested vegetables, such as
tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers, lima beans, and others, which would
serve both the local markets and theNew York market. He cited the
experience of the growers in the northwestern corner of the island
39. La Fortaleza, Official Files, Filed under "Mrs. Roosevelt."

where the insular government had constructed an irrigation project.

A farmers' cooperative had been established, but only in the case of
cucumbers, which produced a profit of 87 cents per box, were they
able to meet the prevalent New York price during the last three years.
Under normal market conditions of 1925-1930, the prices would
have produced a tidy profit. The risk of a fluctuating price for such
a small-scale production was too great. One measure which would
have been helpful was the establishment of a government sales agency
to eliminate the middleman and bring more profit to the grower.
The fruit industry was mentioned briefly and then the discus
sion turned to the plight of the coffee producers. Low wages, bank
ruptcy, repeated hurricanes, lack of loan facilities, and disappearing
markets were among the problems faced by this important island
product. Men^ndez Ramos pointed out that the slums of the cities
were being produced by the migrants who were being driven out
of their natural habitat in the mountains. Agricultural rejuvena
tion, he maintained, should start with this dying industry.
Finally, Carlos Chardon came out with the core of a radical
proposal which set some of the attending members of the round
table scurrying for cover. Chard6n said : "I propose that the Govern
ment buy the whole property of the United South [sic] Porto Rico
Sugar Company,"40 and that a nonprofit public corporation be or
ganized with five shareholders. The enterprise would be run on a
business basis by the governor of Puerto Rico, the Secretary of Agri
culture, and the Secretary of the Interior of the federal government,
with two members of the Puerto Rican cabinet. The sugar land of
the corporation would be divided up into fifty-acre plots in charge
of some three hundred colonos who were to be selected from colonos
producing sugar on marginal lands. These colonos were to be offered,
in accord with an arranged ratio, the more appropriate and more
fertile acreage in exchange for their previous holdings. This mar
ginal sugar land, once in the hands of the government, plus that
marginal acreage owned by the United Porto Rico Sugar Company
would be placed in the hands of a Homestead Commission which
would select some 2,000 to 3,000 landless families which, with
technical guidance, might show promise of rehabilitation. Chardon
closed by saying: "The running of five mills [those owned and con
trolled by the United Porto Rico Sugar Company] for the benefit
40. Ibid.
of 300 colonos, thus creating 2,000 or 3,000 small farmers, would

be a good thing."41
The reaction was almost immediate. Jorge Bird Arias protested:
"A sugar mill . . . giving sugar at cost to the colono, would put them
in a position of competing with the rest of the industry, I believe
that should [sic] be a very poor policy of the Government who [sic]
should try to support these industries rather than disorganizing them
and establishing competition."42 Commissioner Mene"ndez Ramos
admitted that the proposal had its attractive features, but he felt
that something should be done to help the lot of the small farmers
whose land (some 300,000 acres) was in the hands of receivers.
Here the notes of the meeting end. The suggestion had been
launched by the island's leading intellectual, Carlos Chardon, chan
cellor of the University of Puerto Rico. The attractiveness of the
proposal, as Menendez Ramos recognized, could not be denied. An
absentee would become a nonprofit government cor
corporation
poration, and the efficiency of large-scale production would not be
lost. The private corporations would be faced with stiff competition
to the benefit of the colono. The Homestead scheme was included.
Marginal land would be retired from sugar production. Small farm
ing families would be relocated again on land which they could
almost call their own. If successful, the same pattern could be re
peated with other holdings.
To deny that Tugwell and his fellow workers, like Dickey,
Carter, or Weaver, were behind this proposal would be to deny the
obvious. Within Secretary would be directing
a year the Assistant
the Resettlement Administration which, with appropriate modifica
tions for Puerto Rico taken into account, was basically the same
program Dr. Chard6n had outlined. Even before she left Washing
ton Ruby Black wrote to Mufioz: "The facts are that Tugwell and
some of the other boys want to use considerably more than $40 mil
lion of the sugar processing tax for Puerto Rico ...
for the complete
economic plan outlined."43 While on the island, Tugwell had wired
Ickes of his intentions to use federal government funds to set up
some kind of program of subsistence farming.44
41. Ibid. 42. Ibid.

Ruby Black to Luis Mufioz Marin, Feb. 14, 1934.
44. BIA, #1238-108, Puerto Rican Agriculture, Tugwell to Secretary
Ickes, March 9, 1934.
Tugwell, who was to return some ten years later as Puerto Rico's
last continental governor, paid extensive visits to various corners
of the territory. His impressions are left in three very revealing letters,
two to Henry Wallace, and one to Harold Ickes.
The first impression which hit Tugwell concerning this "most
precarious bit of civilization" was the "emergency need for five
thousand houses."45 He suggested that a government housing cor
poration be established to build houses at a cost of three to five
thousand dollars. This would help alleviate the plight of some "hun
dreds of thousands of families squatting in huts in marshes without
any sanitary provisions whatever."46 Tugwell could not understand
why the slums that were located in the middle of cities and villages
had not produced devastating plagues.
The precariousness of all this seems to be realized by nature,

and she compensates by an enormous fecundity. There are a dozen
children behind every bush, many of them very indifferently nour
ished. But nature aided by our doctors has only added to the pre
vailing difficulty by such a growth of population that it outruns any
possibility of furnishing opportunity in our terms.
There will be something like a crisis here soon . . . with the
pressures that are accumulating. There must be either an increase
in our charity or a mass movement outward of population. ...I
rather dislike to think that our falling fertility must be supplemented
by these people. But that will probably happen. Our control of the
tropics seems to me certain to increase immigration from here and
the next wave of the lowly . . . succeeding the Irish, Italians, and
Slavs . . . will be these mulatto, Indian, Spanish people from the
south of us. They make poor material for social organization but
you are going to have to reckon with them.47
Previously he had said : "I can't see anything to do but to try, in

spite of the priests, to control the increase."48
Lorena Hickok saw the obvious and told Harry Hopkins that this
was not his job. Puerto Rico was a case of overpopulation without
the means of support.
There's no emergency about it. It's a situation which has been
45. Ibid.
46. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, Puerto Rican Folder,
1934, Secretary of Agriculture, Letter from Tugwell to Secretary of Agricul
ture Henry Wallace, March 9, 1934.
47. Ibid., March 16, 1934. 48. Ibid., March 9, 1934.
developing for years. The so-called depression has very little to do

with it ... if anything. . . . What is needed in Puerto Rico is re
habilitation, not relief, and it's too big a job financially for this de
partment (FERA) to undertake.49
Tugwell thought first of industries, which might be protected

from the unfair competition of mainland corporations,50 but even
this, with a few exceptions, was not promising, as he later admitted.51
He was impressed with the anomaly of the situation; an agricultural
island so dominated by the tariff-protected sugar industry that it
had to import all its foodstuffs. The problem was challenging. Tug-
well stayed on the island a little more than a week before moving
on to the Virgin Islands. In this short time he set the wheels moving
when he appointed James A. Dickey as permanent AAA represen
tative for the island.52
James A. Dickey, who had helped to draw up the Brookings
study, drew a small group of island leaders around him, of which
Dr. Chardon, Professor Rafael Fernandez Garcia, and Commissioner
Menendez Ramos formed the solid core.
Dickey'sprincipal task was the formulation of 4 plan for the
sugar adjustment program, but he was not a person afflicted with any
narrow vision. He agreed with Lorena Hickok that the economic
plight of the island was not in an emergency state of shock but
rather that the island was suffering from a chronic maladjustment
of its economy. He agreed there was time to plan for the future
to set up a well-rounded program.53
Two general trends in the thinking of those concerned with the
plans for Puerto Rico can be seen. The first was the recognition that
all the various local offices of the federal government should be tied
together and put under one coordinating agency. Thus duplication,
conflicting programs, and wasted money and energy would be cut to
a minimum. Second, there was a general agreement that what Puerto
Rico needed was not relief to remedy a serious but temporary eco
nomic collapse, but rather a complete rehabilitation program which
49. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Lorena Hickok to Harry Hopkins,
March 20, 1934.
50. Puerto Rican Folder, Tugwell to Wallace, March 9, 1934.
51. Ibid., March 16, 1934.
52. BIA, #28527 — Part 2, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letter from
Tugwell to Secretary Wallace, March 8, 1934.
53. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from James A. Dickey to Rexford Tug
well, March 23, 1934.
would attack lang-standing economic ills which were sapping the

vital strength of the islanders. In this second point even the conserva
tive legislators of the Union-Republican wing of the coalition
agreed.54
Relief could not be abruptly withdrawn and the emergency hous
ing program urged by Tugwell was needed, but as Chardon claimed:
"I firmly believe that nothing substantial can be accomplished here
unless we face the ever-absorbing sugar interests. The question of
providing housing facilities for our poor is important, but it does not
go deep into the causes of our economic unrest."55
Dickey and his group worked on four plans for the agricultural
rehabilitation of the sugar industry. The first, which he showed to
and discussed with the governor securing his ready approval,56 was
a simple horizontal reduction of acreage and production. Less sugar
would be produced and more foodstuffs for island consumption.
Some attention in this plan was given to the means by which the
colono and the laborer were to participate in the benefits of the proc
essing tax.57
The other- three plans,which were not shown to the doubtful
governor, were much more radical. The second called for a reduc
tion of marginal lands, thus cutting down on high-cost production.
The benefits from the tax in this case also would be shared by the
laborers. The third plan called for the purchase of sugar lands and
sugar centrales to be operated by public corporations for the benefit
of the people of the island. In this way marginal land would be
retired from production and further expansion of sugar cultivation
would be prohibited. United Porto Rico Sugar Company would be
the first to fall under this plan.58
The destiny of United Porto Rico Sugar Company seemed to be
in other hands. At the end of March the federal court on the island
approved the sale of this corporation to the National City Bank of
New York. United Porto Rico was organized in 1926 and had a
54. FERA, Official Civil Works Administration, Wire from Martinez

Nadal to Secretary Dern, March 26, 1934.
55. Puerto Rican Folder, Carlos Chardon to Tugwell, March 29, 1934.
56. Dickey wrote to Bartlett that the governor "simply fell over himself
to swallow the plan." Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from James A. Dickey
to Fred Bartlett, April 2, 1934.
57. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, Fred Bartlett's File,
Outline of Plans Being Developed for Sugar Adjustment Program, initialed
J. A. D. [Dickey], March 21, 1934. 58. Ibid.
5. The possibility of actively promoting fishing, forestry, and

crops, such as cotton, quinine, rubber.62
The reaction of the President to these proposals can be gauged

only by subsequent events. Certainly he had his own source of in
formation. His wife had brought back with her, or was promised,
several reports, including one important one by Dr. George Bach-
man, director of the School of Tropical Medicine, on health pro
jects.63
The procedure which was to be adhered to was as follows:
There was to be established a Puerto Rican Commission composed
of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Commissioner Mene"ndez Ramos, and
Chancellor Chard6n. At one time there was a move to include Jorge
Bird Arias in this group,64 but whether the plan was changed in view
of Bird's opposition to the sugar programs, which was noted above, or
whether he declined the invitation is not known. There is also some
indication that a representative from each political party would be
invited, but this also was dropped. Mufioz Marin tried to get an
official invitation to join the commission, but he was not invited,
since to do so would have unduly embarrassed the administration.
He was told, however, that he would be more than welcome unoffi
cially at all the conferences.65
This commission was to determine how the proceeds of the
processing tax on sugar was to be used. It could decide to give direct
benefits or gifts to producers as was being done on the mainland,
or it could take advantage of the clause in the sugar act which al
lowed the Secretary of Agriculture to use this money for the general
benefit of agriculture. If
the latter choice were selected, then the
commission would proceed to formulate a plan something like those
suggested by Dickey or that drawn up for Dr. Tugwell.
Once the over-all plan had been drawn up, public hearings would
be held in order to give all interests an opportunity to be heard.
These hearings were to be conducted in such a manner as to make
62. Fred Bartlett's File, Memorandum for Dr. Tugwell on Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Island tour of inspection, April 2, 1934. Also see: Report on
American Tropical Policy, submitted to the President by Rexford Tugwell,
found in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
63. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files, Box 46, Letter from
Dr. George Bachman to Mrs. Roosevelt, May 3, 1934.
64. Fred Bartlett's File, Memorandum for Dr. Tugwell, April 2, 1934.
65. Ruby Black Collection, Chard6n Plan, April 27, 1934, Letter from
Ruby Black to Mufioz Marin.
"all interests feel that they had contributed to the development of

the plan and that even though the plan was not entirely satisfactory
to any one interest, it was, after all, the best plan possible. Other
wise, continuous trouble in administrating the program will re
sult."66
If this procedure had been followed to the letter, the continu
ous which resulted might have been minimized if not
opposition
prevented. The plans, however, were not followed. The first difficul
ty centered around the position of the governor in the whole pro
gram. It was originally suggested by Dr. Tugwell67 that the admin
istration of the benefit program be carried out under the governor
of Puerto Rico. This procedure met with the approval of the Sec
retary of War and the Secretary of Agriculture, but there remained
some doubt as to the legality of it; that is, could the Secretary of
Agriculture delegate authority to the governor to administer the
program?68
This was not the only reason for hesitance. No one was absolutely
sure where the governor stood. James Dickey, now back in Wash
ington, had, as we have seen, doubted the expediency of being com
pletely candid with him. The shadow of doubt was beginning to
spread. John F. Carter urged General Cox to inform the governor
that the appointments to the Puerto Rican Commission be made
on a temporary or provisional basis. "This is because, since we are
necessarily feeling our way in the whole matter, it would be un
desirable to commit ourselves to function through specific individ
uals who might prove to be unsympathetic or inefficient or otherwise
obstructive to what we are trying to do."69
Carlos Chard6n, Professor Fernandez Garcia, and Commissioner
Mene"ndez Ramos spent the months of May and June in Washing
ton drawing up the report of the Puerto Rican Policy Commission,
popularly known as the Chardon Plan. As little publicity as possible
66. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, John F. Carter's

File, Suggestion of Immediate Steps to be Taken in Applying the Sugar Act,
no date.
67. La Fortaleza, Official Files, #96-5A, Wire from Cox to Gov. Win-
ship, April 21, 1934.
68. BIA, #422-233, Memorandum from Gen. Cox to Secretary Dern,
April 23, 1934; Wire from Gen. Cox to Gov. Winship, Confidential, April
24, 1934.
69. John F. Carter's File, Letter from Carter to Cox, May 7, 1934; also
BIA, Confidential Wire from Gen. Cox to Gov. Winship, May 7, 1934.
was given to their work; indeed, one of the reasons for the transfer
of their activity to Washington was to remove them from the pres
sures of island factions and interests. Nevertheless, the politically
alert on the island were restless to know what was going on and
to play a partin the creative task.
The solid conservative interests, concerned of any
at the lack
attention paid by the federal administration to the laboring, political,
and business groups of the island in the selection of the island
members of the brain trust, decided to journey to Washington and
present their case. It should also be kept in mind that the Liberal
Senator Munoz Marin, accepting the unofficial invitation extended to
him, was also in Washington on an unofficial basis. Two of the
conservative group tried to make the trip at government expense..
Senator Celestino Iriarte and Representative Alonso Torres requested
from the legislature and Acting Governor Benjamin Horton an ex
pense fund of $2,400 for a proposed trip to Washington to discuss
the economic problems of Puerto Rico.70 Of course, this was not
approved, but several legislative members of the coalition went to
Washington, anyway. Washington was warned of their pending
arrival. Dickey, who was on the island, wired to Carter: "Garda
[Me"ndez] coming by plane watch out for him."71
These groups of businessmen, bankers, and laboring interests
were at a marked disadvantage on the island. They did not know
what was going on in Washington. They could not react either for
or against something which was still in the embryonic stage. The
sugar people were wary about buying a pig in a poke. Wallace had
written to Garcia Me"ndez and publicly expressed to Rafael Carri6n,
acting chairman of the Puerto Rican delegation, his assurance that
the efforts of rehabilitation connected with the sugar program would
accrue to the benefit of Puerto Rico.72 This was not enough, and
long impressive-looking memoranda were presented to and accepted
by proper officials with the assurance that they would be carefully
consulted and turned over to the Puerto Rican Policy Commission
for appropriate action.
70. La Fortaleza, #96-5A, Letter from Horton to Gen. Cox, April 30,
1934.
71. John F. Carter's File, Letter from James Dickey to John F. Carter,
April 30, 1934.
72. New York Herald Tribune, April 30, 1934; New York Times, Mav
13, 1934.
The memoranda were in general terms; although not
expressed
counter to the general proposals of land diversification, retirement
of marginal land from sugar, and others, they expressed a vagueness
which, upon reading, makes one wonder what the tone of the spokes
men would be once the planning got down to specific measures and
action.73
In the latter part of May the Department of Agriculture be
latedly announced the sugar quotas for the various areas under the
control of the Secretary. Already the cane cutting season, starting
the first of the year and ending in July, was three-quarters finished.
The sugar crop was plentiful and well over the agreed 875,000
tons suggested in the stabilization agreement. Realization of the ex
panded sugar production of Puerto Rico may have explained some
of the opposition the Department of Agriculture was facing. As
was pointed out before, the main opposition was coming from the
large sugar companies, while the colono was either favorable or
noncommittal.74 The setting of the quota at 803,000 increased
the opposition to the administration.
Governor Winship was disturbed. He had been called to Wash
ington to give his approval to the final draft of the plan drawn up
by the Puerto Rican Policy Commission. He made the most of his
presence in Washington to press his opposition to what he consid
ered unjust treatment of restrictive quotas accorded to the producers
of island sugar. On May 1 he pressed his case on the President.75
The opposition, which Governor Winship felt under obligation
to represent, came from the large producers. The criticism was di
rected specifically against the low quota, but there was a feeling of
not being accorded equal treatment in the determining of quotas.
Jorge Bird Arias did not mention Munoz by name, but he left no
doubt concerning the implication, when he saw in the sugar plan
73. BIA, #422-233, Memoranda of Frudencio Rivera Martinez and

Rafael Alonso Torres to Secretary Dern, May 11, 1934; and of Rafael Car-
ri6n to Secretary Dern, May 11, 1934.
74. General Correspondence of the AAA, See wires received during April,
May, and June; the following sums up the situation: "Puerto Rico bona fide
cane growers repudiated Costigan-Jones Bill at a meeting by the sugar mag
nates ignoring its advantages but upon recent genuine information consider
same a blessing for the economic survival of the farmers." Wire from Rafael
Calderon, Pinero Hnos., Roberto Calderon, Jos6 Pagan Mundo, Luis Calder6n,
Cane Growers to President Roosevelt, May 6, 1934.
75. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Press Conference Notes, Vol. Ill,
p. 312.
a move toward independence. He wrote to Winship: "If the Wash

ington administration is going to discriminate against us in such a
way and listen to and follow the advice of men who are openly
for independence, the only right and proper way to think is that
they are encouraging the idea of independence."78
Governor Winship saw that he could not affect the quota and
began to change his approach. He outlined the economic loss to the
Puerto Rican government as a result of the sugar law. This he and
his aides estimated at about $1.5 million.77 He then followed through
with a strong demand for a liberal share in the allocation of public
funds by the federal government.78 One measure of help which he
succeeded in securing was a local tariff designed to protect the local
coffee production from dumping by Brazilian producers.79
In the meanwhile, the delegation of the business, political, and
laboring interests returned to the island and sought an outlet to their
frustrations. Not at all satisfied with the words of assurance offered
by the Washington officials, they turned to the offensive, following
the maxim that when in doubt one should attack. The legislature,
with the coalition in control, set up a commission, with Alonso Tor
res as chairman, to draw up their own plan for rehabilitation. This
plan was a more detailed expansion of the memoranda submitted
by the group to the officials while in Washington. By the third week
in June the plan had been drawn up and was submitted to Wash
ington as a substitute for the report of the Puerto Rican Policy Com
mission.
This lack of confidence in which had gone to
the commission,
Washington with the approval of the legislature, would be difficult
to understand if one were unfamiliar with the island's political com
position. The only man on the commission who could be considered
as having coalition leanings was Commissioner Men^ndez Ramos,
one of the few good appointees of Governor Gore and approved
by the coalition legislature. In the Gore-Padin battle, Carlos Char-
don had been scrupulously correct in all his public activity, although
we have seen that he was convinced that Gore was not qualified
76. BIA, #422-233, Letter from Bird to Gov. Winship, June 2, 1934.
77. Ibid., #247-264, Puerto Rican Budget, Wire from Horton to Gen.
Cox for Gov. Winship, June 25, 1934.
78. Ibid., #422-233, Memorandum of Gen. Cox, June 20, 1934.
79. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Box 46, Letter
from Gov. Winship to Secretary Dern, June 15, 1934.
for the position he held. Those who attended the Fortaleza meeting
with Tugwell and Mrs. Roosevelt heard him expound on a radical
plan which boded no good for the sugar interests. Furthermore, La
Democracia insisted that the final product of the Policy Commis
sion should be called the Chardon Plan.80 The third member of the
group was also an enigma. Rafael Fernandez Garcia was apolitical
in his public and professional life. His brother had been the can
didate for resident commissioner of the Liberal party. However,
Benigno Fernandez Garcia's political history had not been predict
able, and there was no way of knowing whether his brother fol
lowed his chameleonic political career.
There were too many unknowns in this to satisfy the coalition.
The die-hards, remembering that Munoz was in Washington with
the commission, that the odds were against them,
were convinced
and there was sound reason for their fears. Munoz Marin was en
thusiastic with the progress of the work of the commission. In a
private letter he wrote:
While the value of sugar which is no longer produced, will be

more than $9 million, investment in reconstruction will not be less
than $50 million. The benefits for our people would be great and
apparent. . . . This will be due to the liberal efforts of our people,
and especially to Rafael and Chardon.81
Therefore, in order to be prepared for the worst, the coalition drew

up their own plan. The reaction of the Policy Commission was im
mediate and defensive. Chardon and Men^ndez Ramos wired several
of the members of the Socialist hierarchy who could be counted
on to take a reasonable attitude. Prudencio Rivera Martinez, the
commissioner of labor, was assured that the interests and welfare
of the laboring classes of the island were being taken care of.82
A similar telegram was sent to Rivera Chaves, who was then
acting commissioner of agriculture while Menendez Ramos was in
Washington.
Have read in press that legislation plans repudiation of our
80. La Democracia, May 28, 1934, and throughout the month of June
in news stories and editorials.
81. Private File of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Letter of Luis Mufioz
Marin to Maria Fernandez Garcia, June 9, 1934.
82. BIA, Personal File: Carlos Chardon, Wire from Chardon and Me
nendez Ramos to Acting Gov. Horton, for Rivera Martinez, June 25, 1934.
plans and presentation of new one prepared by Alonso and others

please seeDon Rafael and advise nothing should be done to hinder
developments until plan can be made known. We have not been
authorized to make known details of our recommendation and that
is the only reason why the whole scheme has not been made public
yet. Iglesias has been continually informed of developments and
understands the situation. I believe that plan as a whole embodies
a veritable new deal for people of island and no party could afford
oppose same without previous thoughtful consideration. Plan has
been approved and has sympathy and endorsement of administra
tion so I cannot see how true representatives of Puerto Rican people
can repudiate it especially before knowing its details.83
On the same afternoon the above wire was sent John Carter
called on Santiago Iglesias. They held "a long and friendly discus
sion of the whole problem," and he said he was in sympathy with
the general trend of the proposals so far as he knew them.84 He was
given a copy of the report and, in turn, he promised to cable a gen
eral endorsement of it to the island if he found it acceptable. He
assured Carter that he could bring the support of the Socialist party
behind the plan. On the basis of this conference Carter concluded
that if the matter were handled tactfully the commissioner would
cooperate.85
The commissioner's cable assured the island's political forces
that he had been guaranteed that no party or individual could claim
or obtain personal advantage, whether political or otherwise, from
the rehabilitation The fear was primarily in having the
program.86
reconstruction program controlled by the Liberal party, as was the
PRERA, according to the coalition Iglesias' statement had
group.
the desired effect in the opinion of Chardon, who was now back
on the island. He predicted that the coalition would join forces
with him in backing the reconstruction program.87
Opposition was forming from another sector. This source of
criticism could not have been immediately anticipated, but should
83. Ibid., Personal File: Menendez Ramos, Wire from Menendez Ramos
to Acting Gov. Horton for Rivera, June 25, 1934.
84. General Correspondence of the AAA, Memorandum from John Carter
to Oscar Chapman, June 28, 1934.
85. Ibid., Letter from John Carter to Oscar Chapman, June 28, 1934.
86. El Mundo, June 30, 1934.
87. General Correspondence of the AAA, Letter from Carlos Chardon to
John Carter, July 5, 1934.
have been taken into account. As previously indicated, one of the

basic points of the new program was the change in emphasis from
relief to rehabilitation. Just where was this change of policy to
leave James Bourne? Bourne had been constantly under attack since
the organization of the PRERA. His most recent battle, from which
he was just emerging, was with the island's Chamber of Commerce.
Its spokesman, Felipe de Hostos, had been highly indignant at the
purchases of relief food supplies in the States through the Federal
Surplus Relief Corporation, not from the local island merchants.88
While he was on the island, Professor Tugwell had told James
Bourne that he would be glad to look over any plans the PRERA
might have for an extended relief program in Puerto Rico. Bourne,
in accord with the recent discussions with Tugwell and Mrs. Roose
velt, revised one of the plans he had been sending almost monthly
to Harry Hopkins and sent it on to Professor Tugwell. Aside from
the shift in emphasis, from relief to rehabilitation, he stressed two
major points: (1) the fact that his organization was fairly inde
pendent of local political pressures, and (2) that they were so or
ganized as to work with impartiality and efficiency on an island-wide
basis, since they had almost a year's experience behind them.89
This report and other memoranda presented formally or other
wise, together with that of Dr. George Bachman, forwarded by Mrs.
Roosevelt, were acknowledged and turned over to the Puerto Rican
Policy Commission. Professor Tugwell's form letter thanking
Bourne90 for the efforts hardly satisfied the head of the PRERA.
His dignity offended, he immediately wrote a long letter to Harry
Hopkins outlining the work which had been accomplished while
protesting at least in three different places in the letter that "we are
at the present time better prepared to carry out a rehabiliation pro
gram than any other agency."91
Meanwhile, the PRERA had been hard at work. In addition to
its regular activity, the following projects had been or were in the
process of being carried out: (1) community gardens had been
88. DTTP, 9-8-63, FERA, Letter from de Hostos to James Bourne, April
10, 1934; see also Memorandum submitted by de Hostos on the Free Dis
tribution of Foodstuffs in Puerto Rico, May 9, 1934.
89. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from James Bourne to Rex Tugwell,
May 22, 1934.
90. Ibid., Letter from Rex Tugwell to James Bourne, May 31, 1934.
91. Ibid., James Bourne's letter to Harry Hopkins, June 8, 1934.
established; (2) of the destitute families had been made;

a survey
(3) a list of families eligible and willing to return to small farms
had been drawn up; (4) a housing survey had been carried out,
looking toward the establishment of workingmen's settlements; and
(5) a plan for industrial development was being prepared. Bourne
argued that his work should not be considered as a mere "stop-gap
between starvation and rehabilitation."02
The crux of the matter lies in the following comment: "I feel
very strongly that if a general plan is being made for Puerto Rico,
that I, or some other representative member of this administration
[PRERA] should be there to assist in making those plans."93 Under
a confidential seal, Hopkins forwarded this letter to Tugwell with
the comment: "You will note that he seems to be considerably upset
because of your letter of the 31st of May."94
As has been shown, Bourne was not the only one who thought
he was being left out of a vital planning session. Nor was the fact
that he was a member of the New Deal reason for concern because
of the implied slight. The reaction of Bourne on a lower level was
soon manifested on the top level. If this was to be an over-all plan
for Puerto Rico, then it should not rest solely within the hands of
the Secretary of Agriculture, who had little to do with the island's
administration.
The President himself was not satisfied with the administrative
organization which for many years had kept Puerto Rico under the
War Department. At this time particularly, the incongruity of the
situation was abundantly apparent. The military bureau had very lit
tle to do with the specific points of administration which bound the
island to the federal government.
In 1927 there had been some agitation for the organization of a
separate agency which would administer the outlying possessions of
the United unit. The Willis Bill, introduced in Congress
States as a
in February of that year, would have abolished the Bureau of Insular
Affairs and set up an independent agency free from the War De
partment.95 Elder statesman Josephus Daniels, before a meeting of
the Spanish American War Veterans, of all organizations, argued
92. Ibid. 93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., Letter from Harry Hopkins to Rex Tugwell, Confidential and
personal, June 14, 1934.
95. BIA, #132-68, Transfer of BIA to DTIP, Memorandum dated Feb.
4, 1927.
that continued supremacy of the War Department over island affairs

was contrary to the democratic principles of the nation.96 A month
after Roosevelt's inauguration, Daniels, in a conversation with the
President, suggested that the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and Samoa all be placed under one
Department.97 The President apparently approved of the idea and
requested an opinion from the Director of the Budget.98
The idea germinated below the surface for almost a year. Ruby
Black picked up an indication of the plan in September, 1933, and
explained that the delay was due to the President's inability to choose
among the State, Navy, or Interior departments as to the resting place
for the new agency.99 While visiting the island Senator Tydings had
spoken in favor of the need of one director for all insular affairs.100
Finally in March the President told Secretary of the Interior

Harold Ickes of his intention to transfer Puerto Rico from the War
Department to the Interior.101 This move met the firm opposition of
the Secretary of War,102 as well as of the Director of the Budget,
Mr. Douglas. The latter opposed it on the grounds that such a move
would increase the administrative costs of the government.103 Never
theless, the President wrote: "After the most careful consideration
from all angles, I am more and more certain that Puerto Rico should
be treated in the same way and under the same form of government
as Hawaii, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands."104 Although the actual
transfer was not carried out until July 28,105 the President signed
Executive Order No. 6726, transferring the affairs of Puerto Rico
96. Baltimore Sun, July 13, 1927.

Appointments, Box #46, Office Memorandum, dated April 5, 1933.
98. Ibid.
99. Ruby Black Collection, File of Robert Gore, Letter to Munoz Marin
from Ruby Black, Sept. 22, 1933. 100. El Mundo, Dec. 5, 1933.
101. The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, Vol. I, The First Thousand Days
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), pp. 151 and 157.
George Dern to President Roosevelt, April 25, 1934.
103. Ibid., Letter from Mr. Douglas to President Roosevelt, May 28,
1934.
104. Ibid., Letter from President Roosevelt to George [Dern], May 28,
1934.
105. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Memorandum
of Edward Stockton, Acting Chief of BIA, July 19, 1934.
to the Department of the Interior,106 the day after he divulged his

intentions to Secretary Ickes.
While the plans were being made for this transfer and personnel
were being sought to direct the new Division of Territories and
Insular Possessions, something had to be done to coordinate the vari
ous federal agencies and departments concerned or affected by the
over-all plan for Puerto Rico. This too had been foreseen by the
President. An advisory council had been appointed for the Virgin
Islands in February, 1934, and it was the intention of the Presi
dent to set up a similar council for Puerto Rico.107
This Inter-Departmental Committee for the Economic Rehabil

itation of Puerto Rico was appointed in June to "work out a coordi
nating plan and advise on the general rehabilitation program of
Puerto Rico."108 If it had been organized earlier, James Bourne's
protest would not have been formulated. The committee, at the
President's suggestion, was headed by Oscar Chapman, Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, and was composed of Dr. Tugwell from
Agriculture, Jacob Baker from the Federal Emergency Relief Ad
ministration, and Governor W. I. Meyer, representing the Farm
Credit Administration and the Treasury Department.109
By the time of the formation of this Inter-Departmental Com
mittee the preliminary work of the Puerto Rican Policy Commission
had been finished. The so-called "Chardon Plan" was not a reality,
but it still had a long way to go before the plan could be approved
and carried out.
Although the plan had not been made public, nor had the Sec
retary of Agriculture given his approval to it, some attention should
be directed to the plan. It had a four-fold objective: (1) to reduce
the chronic unemployment; (2) to break up land-monopoly and to
reduce the hardship of absentee ownership; (3) to reduce to a rea
sonable minimum the outflow of money in the form of interest and
dividends to the mainland, thus increasing the purchasing power of
the island and raising the standard of living; and (4) to work for
106. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, com

piled and collected by Samuel Rosenman (New York: Random House, 1938),
II, 227.
107. Secret Diary, I, 151. 108. Ibid.
Oscar Chapman to secretary of the President, June 23, 1934.
the emancipation from the evils of monoculture through a readjust

ment of the sugar industry, looking forward to a more equitable dis
tribution of the material income of the island.110
The means whereby these objectives would in part be realized
was the heart of the "Chardon Plan" and was built around the setting
up of a "semi-public corporation, similar to the Virgin Islands Com
pany."111 This corporation would:
1. Acquire a certain acreage of productive sugar land.

2. Acquire and operate the mills that will be included in these
lands.
3. Exchange productive land acquired for marginal cane lands.
4. Dispose of this marginal land in subsistence homesteads for
food production and small cash crops.
5. Yield a higher return from the cane processed by these mills
on the condition that the increased income of the colono be shared
with the worker.
6. Obtain, through the experience of operation of the semi-
public mills, a "yard-stick" to apply to the whole of the industry.
7.Use profits (fixed at not more than 8 per cent) of the mills
acquired for further rehabilitation work.112
This program, according the analysis of the Puerto Rican

to
Policy Commission, should bring about the following adjustments
in the economy of the island :
1. Permanent reduction of sugar production.

2. Diversification of agriculture and production of more food
crops.
3. Elimination of land monopoly.
4. Creation of permanent source of funds for social improve
ments.
5.Creation of 10,000 subsistence homesteads with adequate
housing, farm animals, tools, and other utilities.
6. Permanent employment of 17,000 men.
7. Increase in milk supply by 12 per cent and pork production
by 30 per cent.113
110. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400, Report from

Chester Davis to Stephen Early, June 8, 1934.
111. Ibid. 112. Ibid.
113. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Puerto Rican Policy Commission,
Report.
The original Chard6n Plan was drawn up in far greater detail

than the above summary. There of an effort to include
is evidence
projects which would satisfy the special interest of almost every fac
tion of the island.114 For Commissioner Menendez Ramos, who was
vitally concerned over the coffee industry, there was included a
provision to buy some 24,000 acres in the coffee section for the
establishment of some 8,000 subsistence plots. Similar plans were
drawn up for fruit and tobacco. Also, there was a plan to reforest
some 100,000 acres over a ten-year period.
Governor Blanton Winship also had his own favorite projects
and he worked hard to get some of them included. He was con
vinced that Puerto Rico had the potential to become a great tourist
mecca. The first step toward this was not to clean up the unsightly
slums, but to buy and to remodel the Hotel Condado. The cost of
this expansion to a more economical size was estimated at a con
servative figure of $300,000.115
The brief outline of the plan cited above was sent to the Presi
dent about week before the June 16th White House Conference
a
on Puerto Rican Affairs. It was at this meeting of top administrators

concerned with Puerto Rico that the President appointed the Inter-
Departmental Committee and endorsed in general the outline and
objectives of the plan, and strategy for further action was mapped
out.118
The first problem to be solved was that of financing the pro

gram. The original scheme was to use the funds earned through
the processing tax of the AAA, which, as has been indicated, were
at the disposal of the Secretary of Agriculture. Now that the plan
had been drawn up, it remained to be seen if the legal departments
of the government would agree that this plan was for the general
benefit of agriculture and whether the Secretary could delegate his
power to a semipublic corporation.
The hope was to have the Puerto Rican legislature charter the
corporation, which would carry out the reconstruction program. To
this corporation would be granted the necessary funds by the De
partment of Agriculture. The legal department of the Department
114. Ibid.
115. BIA, Personal File: Menendez Ramos, Menendez Ramos to Gov.
Winship, May 23, 1934, and May 26, 1934; Gov. Winship to Menendez
Ramos, May 25, 1934.
116. FERA, Box #259, Letter from A. J. S. Weaver to Jacob Baker,
June 28, 1934.
only to find that the visitor also had unladen arms. Weaver urged
that, in order to remedy the situation, Chardon be given permission
to release a general summary of the report with the explanation that
it still had to receive legal approval.120 This request was not granted.
Indeed, subsequent events seemed to indicate that the Chard6n Plan
was in serious danger.
The Inter-Departmental Committee, in accord with the order to
check on the mechanical details of the plan, had appointed a tech
nical committee of three persons to go to Puerto Rico and study
the problems involved in carrying out the plan.121 The three experts
authorized to go for a month to Puerto Rico were: Edna Lonigan,
economist and member of the staff of the Farm Credit Administra
tion, T. R. Snyder, an economist from the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, and Dr. Julius Matz, a plant entomologist from the
Bureau of Plant Industry of the Department of Agriculture. Some
ten years previously, Dr. Matz had worked on the island for a limited
period. No previous publicity was given this committee, nor was any
person, from Chardon to Winship, informed about their trip or about
their assignment.
Just two days after Dr. Matz arrived on the island, he sent a
strange letter to Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace. In the letter

Matz referred to a number of persons "whose standing and reputa
tion I have known for a long time . . . who expressed their amaze
ment at the fantastic and impractical so-called Chardon Plan." With
this revealing start, Matz decided to give the Secretary a "few perti
nent points which are not revealed in the Chardon report."122 His
main point was that the persistent poverty in Puerto Rico, caused
by the low and unstable productivity of its soils and lack of natural
resources, could not be solved by shuffling the land from the large
holder to a smaller one. Far from restricting sugar production or
retiring marginal lands, he urged the government to help the sugar
people put more land into use by building irrigation projects.
The Secretary and the Under Secretary, Dr. Tugwell, were both
out of Washington for most of the month of July. Dr. Matz's letter
was read and answered by Appleby, who admonished the writer by
120. General Correspondence of the AAA, Memorandum from Mr. Ap

pleby to Dr. Tugwell, July 10, 1934.
121. John F. Carter's File, Miscellaneous Notes, July and August, 1934.
122. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from Dr. Matz to Secretary Wallace,
July 18, 1934.
informing him that his letter discussed matters which were not
within the scope of his assignment. He informed Matz that since
the President had approved of the general principle of the plan,
he should be very circumspect about voicing criticism of the meas
ures to anyone other than the Secretary himself. Appleby showed
a little irritation by asking "just what is it you have in mind when
you say that 'the Chardon Plan is fantastic and impractical'?"123
Dr. Matz's letter indicated that his membership on the technical
committee was a mistake. Dr. Julius Matz had come to Puerto Rico
for the first time in 1919 to work at the Insular Agricultural Ex
perimental Station as a technician. He worked with Professor F. S.
Earle, who was on loan from the Department of Agriculture investi
gating a plant disease which was affecting the quality of the sugar
cane. The investigation of this disease, which is called the "mosaic
disease," dated from 1915 when Jose* R. Aponte initiated the work.124
People on the mainland carried the investigation further, and Matz
published several scientific studies on his, and others', research on
this problem.125
In 1922 Carlos Chard6n joined the Experimental Station as its
special pathologist and there developed a certain rivalry, which prob
ably existed before the arrival of Chardon, between the continental
and insular investigators. The struggle had a rapid outcome. In
1924 Carlos Chardon was appointed commissioner of the depart
ment of agriculture, which made him supervisor of the Experimental
Station. Certain technical personnel, including Dr. Matz, fearing a
limited future, either refused to work for the insular department of
agriculture while it was in the hands of Chardon, or were fired by
Chardon.126 Dr. Matz went to work at the Central Aguirre and
eventually wound up in Washington in the Bureau of Plant Industry
of the Department of Agriculture with his friend E. W. Brandes,
who was principal pathologist in charge of sugar plant investiga
tions.
123. Ibid., Letter from Appleby to Dr. Matz, July 20, 1934.
124. Carlos Chard6n, "Mosaic Investigations at Central Cambalache,"
Journal of the Department of Agriculture, VIII (April, 1924), 27.
125. Julius Matz, "Infection and Nature of the Yellow Stripe Disease
of Cane," ibid., Ill (October, 1919). See also his "Recent Developments in
the Study of the Nature of Mosaic Disease of Sugar Cane and Other Plants,"
ibid., VI (July, 1922), and "Ultimos Desarrollos en la Patalogia de la Cana
de Azucar," Varios Trabajos, XXXIII (Diciembre, 1920).
126. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from Chardon to Fred Bartlett, July
20, 1934. The claim is made that Matz was fired by the writer.
E. W. Brandes, who had been on the island also and to whom

we shall refer shortly, selected Dr. Matz for this special trip to Puerto
Rico. He seemed like a good choice. He was a capable sugar plant
technician. He had had experience in Puerto Rico. No one in Wash
ington could have known of the difficulty between Chard6n and
Matz unless the latter or Brandes were to say something. They, of
course, kept silent.
With this background, it is easier to understand why Carlos
Chardon wrote letter after letter to Washington about Dr. Julius
Matz. He asserted that Matz's "presence here will do more harm than
good. Years ago I fired him from the Insular Experimental Station
on account of being mixed up in local politics and expressing him
self against the islanders."127 Shortly after Chardon sent this letter,
Matz and Snyder dropped into his office where they discussed the
work of the Puerto Rican Policy Commission with Fernandez Garcia
and Senator Mufioz Marin, who also happened to be in the office.
Chardon's impression after this meeting was "that they are prejudiced
against our report, especially Mr. Matz."128 However, the letter
which decided the fate of Matz was written to his superior, Knowles
Ryerson, of the Bureau of Plant Industry. Chardon was evidently
more friendly with Ryerson, because in the letter he speaks more
frankly of his distrust of Matz.
"Calamitous" Julius Matz has just dropped from the clear blue
sky on this poor little island as the head of a committee of three,
wbich has come down to study the feasibility of our sugar plan. . . .
He has already expressed himself against our report, and this has
placed us and the administration in a H . . . [sic] of a fix. . . . You
perhaps do not know that I personally fired Matz from the Insular
Experimental Station some time ago for his attitude against Puerto
Ricans. If there is a persona non grata to us, it's him. I do not wish
to cause any trouble or embarrassment, yet I can not remain silent
about this complication. Can't something be done?129
Even though Ryerson was out of Washington, the acting chief

of the bureau, F. D. Richey, after talking to Appleby, Bartlett, and
127. Ibid.
128. John Carter's File, Letter from Dr. Chardon to John Carter, July
23, 1934.
129. National Archives, Record Group #126, General Correspondence
of Bureau of Plant Industry, Letter of Dr. Chard6n to Knowles Ryerson,
July 23, 1934.
Carter, telephoned John E. Dalton of the Sugar Section of the AAA

to order Dr. Matz's immediate return.130 Chardon was not informed
of his success. To the contrary, a him
letter from Richey informed
that although Dr. Matz worked in the Bureau of Plant Industry,
he was on loan to the Sugar Section of the AAA, and, therefore,
out of Richey's or Ryerson's control.131
Back on the island, Dr. Julius Matz and his two friends had
meanwhile taken up residence at Central Aguirre. From the twenty-
second to the twenty-seventh of July when Dr. Matz received his
orders to return, the trio was carefully protected from the realities
of Puerto Rican social and economic life by the pleasant environ
ment of the sugar estates. On the twenty-sixth, Matz and Miss Loni-
gan took an all-day trip (Snyder stayed at Aguirre resting) to Central
Guanica of the South Porto Rico Sugar Company. This information
was sent to Carter with the additional charge that persons had heard
Dr. Matz criticize the Chardon report on the boat before his arrival
on the island.132 Carter concluded that "Matz made a tour of the
island exclusively under the auspices of the Central owners."133 He
was thoroughly aroused and urged Tugwell to get to the bottom
of the Matz mess. He wanted to know under whose authority Matz
had gone to Puerto Rico.134
What apparently had happened was that during the hot sum
mer months most of the members of the Inter-Departmental Com
mittee were out of Washington for long periods of time, thus making
any steady and coordinated work impossible. Oscar Chapman, who
was in charge of the committee, hit upon the bright idea of setting
up this technical team to look into the practical aspect of the Chardon
Plan and report back in September when the committee would be
ready to move ahead. Thus, while those responsible for Puerto Rican
progress were away, at least something would be done.135
The Technical Committee, however, had been a mismanaged
affair. The aura which surrounded Matz spread to the rest who were
130. Ibid., Memorandum for the files by F. D. Richey, July 25, 1934.
131. John F. Carter's File, Letter from F. D. Richey to Chardon, July
26, 1934.
132. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter and affadavits from Chardon to Carter,
July 30, 1934.
133. Ibid., Note from Carter to Tugwell, Aug. 1, 1934.
134. John F. Carter's File, Memorandum for Tugwell, July 30, 1934.
135. Ruby Black Files, Rehabilitation Plan, Confidential Memorandum,
Aug. 10, 1934.
apparently open-minded and unprejudiced about the island's prob

lems. James Bourne refused to cooperate with them because "they
were obviously biased against the Chardon Report and against the
New Deal."136 This charge drew a hot reply from Jacob Baker, who
resented the accusation that T. R. Snyder was against the New
Deal. He said: "I should like you that when I send any
to assure
body to you that has worked for us here, it is with the feeling of
assurance that you can talk to him with the feeling of confidence as
to integrity and understanding. We may make mistakes here, of
course, but they are not intentional."137
It was Dr. Matz back to Puerto Rico. Dr. E.
a mistake to send
W. Brandes, who had spent many years in the tropics and had
worked at the Federal Experimental Station in Mayagiiez, was re
sponsible for Dr. Matz being selected. Dr. Brandes liked to con
sider himself "as a friend and advocate of Puerto Rico"138 but his
confidential commentaries made him a questionable friend. Several
years before the Matz incident, Brandes had written:
It is noteworthy that the men who have promoted these proj

ects have not placed reliance on the scientific efforts of natives of
the tropical American countries. After nearly twenty years of experi
ence in the tropics with many opportunities for observation of agri
cultural research institutions conducted by Latin Americans I can
endorse the well-considered view of these men that American leader
ship and for the most part American sweat is the price of any really
fruitful outcome of scientific enterprise in the tropical countries we
are interested in. This situation will improve when Latin Americans
are driven to realize that post-graduate study is essential to the proper
conduct of modern research, but it is partly a matter of race char
acteristics. Many of them are highly intelligent and some are good
administrators but a careful view of their scientific contributions in
dicates that they are unimaginative in natural sciences. Astute poli
ticians, convincing talkers, and writers, hospitable and generous as
they are, it is nevertheless necessary to give them a low rating at
the present time with present training as scientists. We have in the
Department scientists who take a gloomier view than mine.139
136. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Bourne to Baker, Oct. 17, 1934.
137. Ibid., Letter from Jacob Baker to Bourne, Oct. 31, 1934.
138. General Correspondence of Bureau of Plant Industry, Memorandum
from E. W. Brandes to Dr. Taylor, March 30, 1932.
139. Ibid.; Matz was not mentioned in the letter, but he must have been
one of the individuals Brandes had in mind. For further proof of this an-
Dr. Matz's quarrel should not be interpreted as merely profes

sional jealousy.140 If
this were all, it would not explain the attention
given to this interlude.The manifestations of Brandes and, by im
plication, of Matz of racial prejudice are not the main point here,
although this enters in. The one pertinent fact which does stand
out is that Matz and the old school scientists, stored away in the
Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Plant Industry's Sugar Cane
Division, were ready and willing to cooperate with the established
sugar interests who saw the need to combat the radical measures of
the Chard6n Plan.
A preliminary report of the Technical Committee was turned in
shortly after the two remaining members returned to Washington.
An indication of the influence that Dr. Matz had over the other
two members of the committee was seen in the complaint of Snyder
that both he and Miss Lonigan "were handicapped quite a bit by
Dr. Matz's sudden recall."141 The final report was turned in about
the first of October and by the end of that month the Inter-Depart
mental Committee had met and discussed the report.142
The report was a criticism of the Chardon Plan, but it was
couched in moderate terms. Without entering into unnecessary
details, it can be indicated that there was no disagreement concern
ing the need "for a unified program for a thorough economic re
habilitation on the island." However, concerning "the central
economic problem," which, according to the committee, was "the
difficulties of farmers and workers in competition with the corpora
tion economy," the Chardon Plan failed, in the opinion of the three,
to take into account the complexity of the matter.143 It was pointed
out that the plan would definitely not add to the income of the
island nor would it benefit the bulk of the population.144
tagonism toward the scientists on the island, see a letter to him from E. D.
Col6n, Dec. 20, 1934, in this same file.
140. Such was the interpretation given by an editorial in El Pais, Dec.
21, 1934.
141. FERA, Inter-Departmental Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs,
Box #262, Letter from T. R. Snyder to Baker, Aug. 6, 1934.
142. Ibid., Minutes on meeting of Inter-Departmental Committee, Oct.
22, 1934.
143. John Carter's File, "A Report to the Inter-Departmental Commit
tee on Puerto Rico," by Julius Matz, T. R. Snyder, and Edna Lonigan.
144. FERA, Box #262, Memorandum from Baker to Fellows, Dec. 21,
1934.
Some errors were caught up by the technicians. A project for

sea-island cotton was discarded. Nevertheless, the reaction of Jacob
Baker, representing the FERA on the Inter-Departmental Committee,
to the report was similar to that of the others.
The report reaches considerably beyond the request which we

made for advice as to suitable policy, as to operation, and priority
of steps to be taken, in that it presents with considerable emphasis
a variety of suggestions as to organization. ...
As a matter of fact
I disagree with most of the suggestions made as to organization and
feel that if they are given publicity they may embarrass the Director
of the Division of Territories and Insular Possessions in carrying
out his responsibility in aiding the organization of agencies for
rehabilitation in Puerto Rico.145
The whole committee was in agreement that no copies of the report

should be released, but exactly one month later an extensive outline
of the report appeared in the Congressional Record submitted by
Santiago Iglesias.146 The full report was also mimeographed the
same year in Washington at the expense of the Puerto Rican legis
lature.147
In any event, the committee's island sojourn did not ease the
minds of the authors of the Chardon Plan. Even President Roose
velt's words of assurance failed to still the doubts, and the summer
months of waiting made Chardon impatient. On July 27 a general
explanation of the plan was given to the press,148 but this only in
creased the anxiety, since now the sugar trusts began to work openly
on public opinion. The crucial test was over the Socialist party. The
coalition could not afford to split, and if Santiago Iglesias continued
to back the plan, the Union-Republican party had no choice but
to go along. Iglesias' statement of approval came out in El Mundo
on July 2 7. 149
The enthusiasm prevalent at this time lasted barely
two weeks.
Yet in this two-week period nothing happened, and it was very
hard to understand. As Chardon argued : "You have complete island
political backing, the plan was approved in principle by the Chief
145. DTIP, 9-8-15 General, Letter from Jacob Baker to Oscar Chapman,
May 29, 1934.
146. Ibid., Letter from Oscar Chapman to Edna Lonigan, May 29, 1934.
147. Puerto Rico Legislature, Report of the Technical Committee of the
Inter-Departmental Committee on Puerto Rico (Washington: 1934).
148. El Mundo, July 27, 1934. 149. Ibid., July 27, 1934.
Executive, and funds should be available by this time. We have

contributed fully with our share, and now it is up to the adminis
tration to support us with immediate and effective action."150
About two weeks later Chardon turned again to lobbying for
his plan. This time he sent a concrete program of action to the
Secretary of Agriculture. He urged: (1) immediate organization
of the United Puerto Rico Corporation; (2) the purchase of some
mills and lands; (3) that the noncontroversial projects concerned
with coffee, tobacco, and fruit be put in operation, and (4) that
James A. Dickey be assigned as AAA representative for the island.151
Ten days later Commissioner Men^ndez Ramos repeated the third
measure outlined by Chardon in a letter to Tugwell. He. felt that
this would "calm the feelings disturbed by sugar problems and re
assure confidence in general rehabilitation plans of the adminis
tration."152
The fact was that the colonos were being ignored by the sugar
centrales. Faced with a reduced quota, the sugar centrales made
plans to grind their own cane and ignored the helpless colono who
lacked the facilities to process his product.153 The colonos met in the
city of Mayagiiez to form an Asociacion de Colonos in order to pro
tect their own interests.154 Their president expressed their concern
in a wire to President Roosevelt. Jesus T. Pinero said: "It is the
uncertainty as to what is to be done that is bringing our financial
and moral collapse."155
This concern was not limited to the sugar grower alone. The
Puerto Rican Chamber of Commerce through Felipe de Hostos, its
president, called a general assembly of business organizations to
discuss the economic situation in which the island found itself. The
assembly unanimously approved the following condemnation of the
national administration:
The belated, unconnected, and vacillating manner in which

the National Administration has been acting with regard to the
150. John F. Carter's File, Letter from Dr. Chardon to Carter, July 26,
1934.
151. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from Chardon to Secretary Wallace,
Aug. 6, 1934.
152. Ibid., Letter from Menendez Ramos to Tugwell, Aug. 16, 1934.
153. John F. Carter's Folder, Letter from Chard6n to Carter, Aug. 9,
1934. 154. La Democracia, Aug. 7, 1934.
155. Puerto Rican Folder, Wire from Pinero to President Roosevelt, Aug.
8, 1934.
economic problem of Puerto Rico plainly establishes the fact of the

great confusion which obtains in Washington concerning the sub
ject. This evident confusion has created here a state of uncertainty,
bewilderment, and doubt which has adversely affected all business
activities in the Island.158
This was followed by a detailed statement of the grievances of the

islanders and a request for immediate action on the sugar program.
The final statement was sent to the governor and then on to the
Secretary of Agriculture.
None of these petitions, letters, or wires had any success in
comparison to a short wire sent by Luis Munoz Marin to the Presi
dent at the White House. Although the message was forceful and
to the point, was due more to the on-the-spot work of
its success
Ruby Black, who was able to bring it directly to the attention of
the President.157 Its importance demands that it be cited in full.
Costigan Act applied as to restrictions but unapplied as to com

pensations. Credit paralyzed. Cane dried up. Mills decapitating
farmers. 98% cane workers unemployed, starving. Misadministra-
tion from Washington of policy intended to do opposite has ac
celerated tremendously process of last thirty years. Chardon Plan,
which has enormous popular support of all economic associations,
except sugar mills, and of Socialist and Liberal parties, independ
ent press and church, being unwarrantedly delayed while big mills
fight underhand.
I try hard to keep confidence while criticizing petty Washington
officials for criminal negligence. Situation growing rapidly unman
ageable. People being as good as they can about it but there is a
distinct sense of intolerable betrayal from Washington throughout
population.158
This stirring wire got prompt results. The President sent a copy
of the message with a "very confidential" memorandum to Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture Tugwell, asking: "Can anything be done
156. Puerto Rico Camara de Comercio, Our Recovery Problem, Com

pilation of correspondence with the President and other officials CSan Juan:
1937), no pagination. Memorandum on the Present Situation in Puerto Rico,
Aug. 11, 1934.
Dot to Luis, Aug. 16, 1934.
158. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, President's Secretary's File Folder,
Puerto Rico 1933-1935, Box #12, Wire from Luis Munoz Marin to Presi
dent Roosevelt, Aug. 14, 1934.
about it?"159 Tugwell went to the White House to discuss the mat
ter, but what could be said?
J. F. Carter, commenting on the telegram, wrote: "I concur
with Mr. Mufioz Marin in laying the blame for delay, confusion,
and suffering on this government. ...
He naturally tends to paint
the picture in rather strong colors."160 For Carter the answer to the
lack of action was due in the first place to the fact that Puerto Ricun
affairs had been transferred from the Bureau of Insular Affairs to
the Interior Department. Second, Tugwell's advice, that there was
a need to concentrate responsibility as much in San Juan as in Wash
ington, was not only not being followed through, but an "ineffective"
interdepartmental committee was set up to coordinate Puerto Rican
matters. Finally, the direction of the program lacked continuity.
Tugwell had begun matters only to leave them to the Interior's Chap
man, who left Washington for the summer. Then Bartlett and
Carter were replaced by Wilson and Dickey by Weaver. In summa
tion, Carter felt that Mufioz and the Chamber of Commerce were
justified in their protests.161
Carter fully understood the seriousness of the situation and also
felt a responsibility to see the Puerto Rican reform through to the
end. He warned that "unless the Administration takes a vigorous
lead in dealing with the Puerto Rican situation, we may find blood
on our hands, and not only political blood either. Riots and similar
social and economic disturbances are quite probable in the near fu
ture unless the Government acts."162
Finally, forward was taken that does clearly indi

a positive step
cate the administration's of dealing directly with a pro
intentions
gram of complete economic reconstruction. The step also satisfied
the criticism of administrative bungling which Carter had voiced.
After several months of unnecessary delay, Secretary Ickes finally
decided to appoint a director of the newly formed Division of Ter
ritories and Island Possessions. The candidate selected was Dr. Ernest
Henry Gruening, of Maine.163 His name had been mentioned for
159. Puerto Rican Folder, Confidential Memorandum from President

Roosevelt to Tugwell, Aug. 14, 1934.
160. Ibid., Memorandum from Carter to Tugwell, Confidential,
Aug. 15,
1934. 161. Ibid.
162. John F. Carter's Folder, Memorandum from John Carter to Paul
Appleby, Aug. 18, 1934.
163. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files of the President, 6-S,
Secretary Ickes to President Roosevelt, Aug. 15, 1934.
the position as early as June.164 While there is little doubt that the
choice was entirely the Secretary's, there is some indication that the
available and most acceptable candidate was placed under Ickes'
nose.165
Ernest Gruening was prepared in Harvard's School of Medicine,

but soon after graduation, he turned to journalism in Boston and
later in New York City. After the World War he was occupied as the
president of La Prensa Publishing Corporation, which published
the only Spanish language journal in the United States. In 1920
he became the managing editor of The Nation and in 1924, the
national director of publicity, part of the LaFollette presidential
campaign in 1924. He then went to Mexico and wrote Mexico and
Its Heritage (1928). In 1931 he lectured in a seminar on the
Caribbean organized by the Committee on Cultural Relations with
South America. In 1933 he was sent as an advisor to the United
States delegation to the Inter-American Conference in Montevideo.166
Versed in Latin American affairs and a recognized liberal, Dr. Gruen
ing was not uninformed about Puerto Rican affairs. In The Nation
he wrote a fairly favorable analysis of the work carried out by Gov
ernor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., on the island.167 Furthermore from his
days as editor of La Prensa and hisyears with The Nation, Dr.
Gruening knew a struggling young poet and writer, Luis Munoz
Marin, and he published some of his work.168
Among the liberals, Oswald Garrison Villard's reaction was prob
ably typical. Villard wrote in The Nation: "Not in all the years
that I have been writing for the press can I recall an appointment
which has given me more satisfaction than that of Dr. Gruening."160
On the island the reaction among the informed liberals was similar.
164. Ruby Black's Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letter from

Ruby Black to Luis Munoz Marin, June 29, 1934.
165. Ibid., Letter from Dot to Luis, Aug. 10, 1934.
166. Who's Who in America, 1932-1933.
167. "Hope for Porto Rico," The Nation, CXXXIII (Sept. 30, 1931),
332-34.
168. Ernest Gruening (ed.), These United States: A Symposium (New
York: Boni and Liveright, 1923).
169. The Nation, CXXXIX (Aug. 29, 1934), 232.
Muna Lee de Mufioz Marin wrote: "I don't know whether you
realize how profoundly happy Gruening's appointment made us."170
As if the appointment had taken direct effect, the Department
of Agriculture took steps to relieve the pressure from the colono.
About the same day that the press broke the story of Gruening, A. J.
S. Weaver sailed for Puerto Rico with sugar quotas and contracts
for 1935. He found that no one had exaggerated the seriousness of
the island's plight.171 The solution he was empowered to offer was
to set up two types of allotment, one for administration or mill cane,
and the other for the colono cane processed by the central. "Under
this plan the mills would not obtain any benefit at expense of the
colono. 2
The immediate problem was solved and subsequent action
would be entirely up to Dr. Gruening. As Weaver expressed
it,
"My subsequent plans will depend upon development of general
plans and Departmental development in Interior."173

Muna Lee to Ruby Black, Sept. 1934.
3,
171. John Carter's File, Letter from Weaver to the Secretary of Agricul
ture, Aug. 20, 1934.
172. Miscellaneous Data and Correspondence relative to Puerto Rico,
National Archives Accession #1074, Letter from Mr. Gilchrist to Weaver,
Aug. 24, 1934.
173. General Correspondence of AAA, Letter from Weaver to Gov. Win-
ship, Aug. 10, 1934.
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL
*/n September various pressure groups from the

* island descended Washington. Now that the
on
economic reconstruction plan had been made public in a general
fashion and a recognized liberal selected to put the plan to work,
the struggle no longer turned about the nature of the plan but,
rather, over the administration of the reconstruction work itself.
One of these groups represented the sugar central interests.
It was composed of Agripino Roig, who ostensibly went north to
accompany his daughter back to school; Ramon Aboy Benitez, presi
dent of the Sugar Producers' Association of Puerto Rico, who was
traveling for the same reason to accompany a granddaughter: R. A.
Veve, son-in-law of Jorge. Bird Arias of Fajardo; and Manuel A.
del Valle of the Central Constancia.1 These four were expected
to rely upon the services of their Washington representative, John
Bass.
The action2 of this group was limited, however, to quiet lobbying
of a kind which could have been more efficiently carried on by
Bass himself in their absence. One desperate gesture was carried out
after their return to the island, perhaps an indication of their frus
tration. At the end of November Antonio Roig sent a "personal and
strictly confidential" offer to Rexford Guy Tugwell to appoint him as
a permanent representative of the sugar producers of Puerto Rico.
1. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from Carlos Chardon to J. Franklin Car

ter, Sept. 13, 1934.
2. John F. Carter's File, Letter from Ram6n Aboy Benitez to Ernest
Gruening, Oct. 17, 1934.
189
Roig wrote: "Puerto Rico's very existence is dependent on agricul

ture, and, due to your preparation and ability, I feel you are par
ticularly fitted to serve us best."3
The note was referred to J. Franklin Carter for comment. He
classified it as "a clumsy bribe" and suggested two possible ways to
answer the offer. One would be to give full publicity to the note
and turn it over to the office of the Attorney General for possible
legal action. This, Carter maintained, would antagonize the sugar
industry but clearly place the administration on the side of jus
tice; that is, defending the small colono. The alternative would be
to answer by suggesting that the offer was an admirable, if tardy,
gesture of cooperation, since it obviously meant that the sugar pro
ducers were willing to place their special interests in the hands
of the Under Secretary of Agriculture.4 But Tugwell let the matter
rest.
A second group, representing the coalition, was composed of
Resident CommissionerIglesias and the insular Senator Alfonso
Valde"s. The latter was part owner, with his brothers, of a light and
power company which enjoyed a monopoly in Mayagiiez. The rates
of this company, 13 cents per kilowatt hour for domestic lighting,
were the highest on the island.5 In 1909 the company was founded
on a capitalization of $75,000, which had grown, after twenty-four
years of operation, to $900,000. Currently the corporation was
under indictment by the insular government for having loaned
money to a questionable sugar corporation in order to avoid paying
taxes.6 One Mayagiiez lawyer, when informed that Don Alfonso
was reducing his industrial electric rates, commented "that the rate
has been so high from the start that no matter how many reductions
he makes the result will always be the highest on the island."7
Iglesias and Valdes presented their ill-disguised plan for control
3. National Archives, Record Group #126, Files of the Secretary of

Agriculture, Letter from Antonio Roig to Rexford Guy Tugwell, Nov. 30,
1934.
4. John F. Carter's File, Memorandum from J. Franklin to Rex Tugwell,
Dec. 7, 1934.
5. BIA, Personal File: Alfonso Valdes, Letter from Jose" Acosta Velarde
to President Roosevelt, Oct. 25, 1934.
6. ElDiluvio, XIV (Marzo 17, 1934) 566.
7. La Democracia, Sept. 19, 1933. Incidentally, Alfonso Valdes' picture
appeared in the New York Evening Journal, July 9, 1934, receiving the Presi
dent when he landed in Mayagiiez in July, under the caption: "President
Roosevelt meets Puerto Rico's main New Dealer."
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 191
of the reconstruction program. They had received information that

a Puerto Rico Corporation would be formed to direct and coordinate
the work of social and economic rehabilitation on the island. The
following is taken from their petition.
... it being always our desireto lend our whole-hearted coopera

tion to the Federal Authorities, and wishing that their efforts . . .
will meet with the full approval and support of the people of Puerto
Rico and also that the proposed corporation prosecutes its task as
smoothly, efficiently and economically as is possible, we respect
fully recommend that said Board of Directors be made up as follows :
Governor of Puerto Rico, chairman, with the Insular Commissioners
of Agriculture, of Labor, of Interior, a member of the Economic
Commission of the Legislature, and two outstanding residents of
the Island of recognized business ability and general experience.
(We suggest that one be a member of the Farmers' Association and
the other be a member of the Chamber of Commerce.) We feel
assured that a Board of Directors so composed would be able to
induce cooperation, confront and resolve wisely, without conflict,
all matters that may be brought before it.8
There is little doubt that a board, "so composed," would pre

sent little friction. Every post excepting the chairman's would be
filled by members of the coalition with the Union-Republican wing
holding the balance over the Socialists. This petition could also be
considered a threat. For if the board were not so composed, as sug
gested, would it mean that the reconstruction program would not
receive the full approval and support of the representatives of the
people of Puerto Rico?
Previously, Santiago Iglesias had turned a plan for the develop
ment of the needlework industry in Puerto Rico into the central
office of the FERA.9 This had been drawn up for the commissioner
by Mrs. Brown-Clark, who was commercial agent for New York
needlework firms. T. R. Snyder, who studied the plan, called it
"another sweat shop idea."10
The third group was composed of Governor Winship and Com
missioner Men^ndez Ramos. Just where these two gentlemen stood
in regard to the New Deal for Puerto Rico was still in doubt. Carlos
8. DTIP, 9-8-98 Puerto Rico Corporation, Letter from Alfonso ValcMs and
Santiago Iglesias to Ernest Gruening, Oct. 11, 1934.
9. FERA, State Files 450-453, 2, Box 262, Memorandum from Chloe
Owings to Jacob Baker, Oct. 1, 1934. 10. Ibid.
192 PUERTO R1CAN POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL
Chardon, who had worked with Men^ndez Ramos, was optimistic

and had hopes "that they would come out O.K."11
Governor Winship had prepared a long and detailed memoran
dum which he took to the President on the last day of October.12
Much of this outline, drawn up previously, had been coldly received
by the War Department. This time Winship, who explained the
plan to the President himself, had high hopes. He would not be
confronted with the Bureau of Insular Affairs, whose argument had
been that Puerto Rico, since it did not pay federal taxes, could not
expect treatment equal to that extended to the States.13
Concerning sugar, Winship protested that some $2.5 million
had been lost to the insular government by the Jones-Costigan Act,
which cut sugar production and prevented the importation of sugar
from Santo Domingo. He calculated that due to the quotas, unem
ployment figures had risen almost 20 per cent. Furthermore, there
was no sign that the federal government was going to take care of
the 250,000 tons of surplus sugar caused by the tardy determining of
the quotas.
The President recognized the responsibility of the federal gov
ernment in this case and he ordered Wallace to get together with
Hopkins to figure out a solution to the surplus problem.14 One solu
tion was to buy up 30,000 tons for local consumption and distri
bution.15 This the President rejected as inadequate, insisting that
in some way the excess be taken care of fully.16 The following plan
was devised.
The problem in which the Department of Agriculture found
itself involved was the financing of the program of sugar reduction
without using the funds from the processing tax (estimated at $8
million yearly) which were to be used in the general program of
rehabilitation. The department set aside $4 million in order to
reduce the 1934-1935 crop to quota level, and $2 million for the
11. John F. Carter's File, Letter from Carlos Chardon to J. F. Carter,

Sept. 13, 1934.
12. FranklinD. Roosevelt Library, Diaries and Itineraries, 1933-1936,
Wednesday, Oct. 31, 1934.
13. BIA, #3377 Civil Government, Letter from Gen. Cox to Gen. Win
ship, June 25, 1934.
14. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box #46, Memorandum of the Presi
dent to the Secretary of Agriculture, Nov. 5, 1934.
15. Ibid., Memorandum from Weaver to Wallace, Nov. 12, 1934; also
Memorandum from Wallace to the President. Nov. 14, 1934.
16. Ibid., Memorandum from the President to Wallace, Nov. 19, 1934.
purchase of accumulated surplus sugar. These funds were all from

processing taxes on sugar produced in areas other than Puerto Rico,
but even this was not enough to reduce totally the surplus. It was,
therefore, recommended that the surplus be divided into three lots:
30,000 tons, 70,000 tons, and 100,000 tons. The first could be
purchased by the $2 million. The second was to be bought in the
form of growing cane to be destroyed or converted into feed at a
cost of $2% million to come from the $8 million. The remaining
100,000 tons would be held over until 1936 and then be integrated
into the sugar production quotas of that year.
This memorandum closed by explaining: "The justification for
deferring action on half of the surplus is found in the fact that all
surplus except possibly 5,000 tons is held by mills rather than farm
ers. Mills are much better able to carry 100,000 tons of sugar (10
per cent of the total production) for one year than the farmer."17
Governor Winship then turned to the meager relief which was
reaching Puerto Rico. He claimed it was out of proportion to the
population. The island had received $2,296,722 when it should
have received the sum of $32,232,894." The President responded
by asking Hopkins if he could "squeeze a bit more money for Puerto
Rico."19 Hopkins did manage to squeeze a paltry $250,000, which
was half of a regular monthly assignment.20
The pet project of Governor Winship was also brought up. The
hotel scheme needed a little less than $1 million. The problem was
referred to Jesse Jones,21 who agreed to loan the necessary money to
a mortgage company to be organized by the Puerto Rican govern
ment. The amount committed to Winship was $600,000, which

was evidently all he was prepared to use at this time, although his
original request was for $950, 000. 22
Among other things brought up was the possibility of a free port
for San Juan. This the President received with enthusiasm, but
Secretary of Commerce Roper pointed out that this would divert
some re-export trade from certain Atlantic and Gulf ports.23 How-
17. Miscellaneous Data and Correspondence, Memorandum undated and

unsigned.
18. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 46, Memorandum of Gov. Win
ship to President Roosevelt, Nov. 5, 1934.
19. Ibid., Note from the President to Harry Hopkins, Nov. 5, 1934.
20. Ibid., Note from Harry Hopkins to the President, Nov. 7, 1934.
21. Ibid., Note from the President to Jesse Jones, Nov. 5, 1934.
22. Ibid., Note from Jesse Jones to President Roosevelt, Nov. 12, 1934.
23. Ibid., Note from Secretary Roper to the President, Nov. 6, 1934.
ever, did request that the naval floating dock at New

the President
Orleans be transferred to San Juan.24 Winship asked for, but did
not get, money for an additional 10,000 acres of forest reserves. As
a final measure the President instructed Secretary of State Sumner
Welles to check with Dr. Gruening before negotiating further re
ciprocal trade agreements.25
In all, the governor had had a fairly profitable session at the
White House. He had gotten action on practically every specific
request. In some cases, like the free port or the forest reserve, the
President was interested but unable to help.
Before looking into the activity of the fourth group that de
scended on Washington, there is a revealing letter of Chardon which
should be mentioned. Chardon, who had cooperated wholeheartedly
with the New Dealers in drawing up a program of economic recon
struction for the island, had become very closely tied personally to
the success of the report of the Puerto Rican Policy Commission,
which popularly carried his name. He felt that his own professional
standing could become weakened if his work on the commission were
repudiated. He recognized that all political parties had put them
selves on the side of the President in approving the general principle
of the plan. However, at the same time, no matter how complete
and well-meaning the plan was, if placed in unsympathetic hands,
it would come to nothing or would be diverted from its original
purpose. He wrote Carter, who had been his confidential sympa
thizer in Washington, of the necessity of placing "the operation of
the sugar project in the hands of able Puerto Ricans with experi
ence in the sugar industry and in sympathy with the idea."26
Carter's reaction was not what Chard6n would have expected.
He was not against using as many Puerto Ricans as was technically
possible, but he said: "I'm really afraid of this program being used
as a pie-counter for the Liberals . . . not that I'm opposed to pie,
but that I'm afraid they'd build up such an overhead of pleasant
jobs that little could trickle down to the people we are trying to
help."27 Carter forwarded part of Chardon's letter to Dr. Gruening
24. Ibid., Note from the President to the Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 21,
1934.
25. Ibid., Official Files #6-S, Note from the President to Welles, Nov.
5, 1934.
26. Puerto Rican Folder, Letter from Chardon to Carter, Oct. 3, 1934.
27. John F. Carter's File, Letter from Carter to Weaver, Oct. 8, 1934.
with his warning that "there will be a strong attempt to convert the
rehabilitation program into a big patronage fund for the benefit
of the Liberal Party."28 He admitted that Chardon was a most dis
interested public servant, but he feared that the program would
fall into the hands of island politicians, specifically, the Liberals
who had made a rich contribution in ideas and in energy.
The sound advice came late. Dr. Gruening had already made
up his mind a month previously that Chardon was to be the admin
istrator of the organism to carry out the reconstruction work.29
In his answer to Carter, Gruening showed little concern and suf
ficient confidence that the "political pitfalls" would be avoided.30
If the experience of James Bourne in the PRERA was any indi
cation of what was to follow, Dr. Gruening might have shown more
concern. The coalition was working over Bourne again. The accu
sations of favoritism to the Liberals were being carried to Governor
Winship just as they had been carried so successfully to Governor
Gore a year previously.31 Hopkins, to whom Bourne had written ad
vising him of the new trouble, turned to Jacob Baker, who had been
to Puerto Rico, for comment. Baker admitted "that there is some
validity in the claim that important people in the PRERA are all
Liberals."32 He went on to suggest that Bourne could "take the heat
off this recurrent charge ...
if he could give a job to . . . one mem
ber of the Union-Republic-Socialist Party."33 This suggestion is only
one step removed from the Gore proposal of the previous year. Even
if Gruening had been aware of the problems of the PRERA, it was
probably already too late to shore up defenses even if he had been
so inclined.
Finally, the fourth group which went to Washington in the
fall of 1934 was composed of two very good friends of the Chardon
Plan and the New Deal. One was Senator Luis Mufioz Marin and the
other Jesus Pifiero, president of the island's independent sugar grow
ers, the many colonos who stood to benefit from the reconstruction
28. Ibid., Letter from Franklin Carter to Gruening, Oct. 8, 1934.

Ruby Black to Muna Lee, Sept. 26, 1934.
30. John F. Carter's File, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Carter, Oct. 10,
1934.
31. FERA, Box #259, Letter from James Bourne to Harry Hopkins,
Sept. 13, 1934.
32. Ibid., Memorandum from Baker to Hopkins, Sept. 18, 1934.
33. Ibid.
program. These two gentlemen succeeded in getting very close to

Dr. Gruening, which should not be surprising knowing the previous
friendly relations between the doctor and the senator. Indeed, it was
to Munoz that Dr. Gruening turned for political orientation if the
long memorandum on the Democratic party in Puerto Rico is any
indication.34 Luis Munoz Marin's mission to Washington was to
produce spectacular success, but before this is touched upon, an
other look at the status of the Chardon Plan is required.
John Franklin Carter had placed the blame for the blocking of
the plan upon the bungling bureaucrats with divided authority. Now
that Dr. Gruening was solely responsible for seeing that action was
taken, the plan should have moved into life. It did not. Gruening
was making no more progress than the Inter-Departmental Committee
had made. This committee still continued to meet, but its initiative
had passed into the hands of Gruening.
The reason for the delay was part legal and part financial. To
understand this, a slight review may be necessary. The Chardon
Plan aimed to make a fundamental change in the economy of the
island by redistributing the land held in large quantities and by
controlling the forces which created this concentration of the pro
ductive soil. Central to the realization of the plan was the setting
up of a government-owned and -controlled corporation through
which the reconstruction program would be carried out. The work
of this corporation was to be realized through the use of funds pro
cured from the processing tax on the sale of sugar. The Jones-Costi-
gan Act placed the use of this money in the hands of the Secretary
of Agriculture for the benefit of agriculture. The Secretary was to
delegate the use of this money to the government corporation to
carry out the program of economic reconstruction.
It was at first thought that the government corporation could
be created by a special act of the Puerto Rican legislature under the
laws of incorporation of the island. This was rejected because the
insular legislature was not scheduled to meet until February, 1935,
and the calling of a special session for this purpose was filled with
real dangers since the parties in control manifested questionable
sympathy with the basic principles of the Chardon Plan. Further
more, under the laws of incorporation, the directors were required
to be residents of the island.
34. DTIP, 9-8-82, Politics, Political Parties, Memorandum from Luis

Munoz Marin on Democratic party of Puerto Rico, Nov. 26, 1934.
Therefore, it was decided to incorporate under the laws of

Delaware. The articles of incorporation were drawn up and sub
mitted to the Attorney General for his opinion. The reaction was on
the whole favorable, but it was the opinion of the office consulted
that the Secretary of Agriculture could not delegate to the corpora
tion any powers involving the exercise of discretion. Nor could the
government borrow money on the anticipation of taxes.35
The whole problem was to be sent on to the General Accounting
Office where the Comptroller General and his assistants exercised
an all-powerful control over the creative work of the federal gov
ernment. If a green light could be secured from this office, the ad
ministration could move ahead. Months passed, however, before
the key figures in the Department of Agriculture could agree on the
wording of the questions to be submitted to the Comptroller General.
Finally the following six questions were drawn up:
1. Can the Secretary of Agriculture formulate a plan for the

benefit of Puerto Rican agriculture?
2. Using tax-processing money, can land be bought to redistri
bute?
3. Could the corporation use tax monies to pay back loans used
for the purchasing of land?
4. Can profits of said corporation be used for further opera
tions or as operating capital?
5. Can such profits be used for other purposes than those out
lined?
6. Need receipts be submitted?36
The opinion of Rudolph Golze of the Comptroller General's

office was quite adverse to the whole project. He felt that the tax
money could not be used to purchase land, which was, of course,
the key part of the structure. Nor was approval granted for the
raising of loans on future tax money.37 Secretary Ickes was furious,
but he could do nothing about it.38 The Washington Post (November
35. General Correspondence of the AAA, Memorandum for the Files by

Prew Savoy, July 19, 1934.
36. Puerto Rican Folder, Memorandum from Mr. Wilson to Oscar Chap
man, Oct. 15, 1934.
37. DTIP, 9-8-15, Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration (here
after the PRRA) General, Notes on a meeting with Dr. E. Gruening, Col.
Rigby, and Mr. Wiener, Assistant Solicitor, held on Nov. 16, 1934.
38. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Comptroller General, Dec. 12,
1934. The legal obstacles were found in Section #3736 of Revised Statutes
24, 1934) ran an article pointing to J. R. McCarl, the Comptroller

General, as the man who was throwing a monkey wrench into the
whole New Deal machinery. But no amount of fury would change
the hostility.The creation of an instrumentality, such as a corpora
tion, to carry out the Chardon Plan was discarded.
Two alternatives were left open. A corporation, modeled after
the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Inland Waterways Corpora
tion, with all necessary powers and sufficient means to instrument
the purposes of the plan, could be created by an act of Congress.
This would mean that the President would have to take a personal
hand in pushing the legislation. If delay was threatened, or the bill
was opposed or passed in a modified form, a second alternative
would be required.
This alternative was the creation of an agency by executive
order, such as that which created the Farm Credit Administration.
The agency's powers and funds would be limited in respect to the
purchase of land, but further legislation could amplify its power
later. Through this agency the federal activity on the island would
be centralized and reorganized in a more orderly fashion.
Dr. Gruening, who outlined these alternatives to Secretary
Ickes, suggested that the first be tried and if opposition were to
develop it would come within ten days to two weeks of the Con
gressional session and then recourse would be had to the second
alternative. In either case the agency should be in operation by the
end of March, 193 5. 89
Carlos Chardon, who was not aware of these legal difficulties,

took up correspondence directly with Dr. Gruening. He had gone
ahead to organize on paper his United Puerto Rico Company com
pletely on his own. He suggested to Dr. Gruening six administrative
divisions: treasurer, auditor, legal, publicity, personnel, and ap
praisal. There would be seven operational sections: hydro-electric,
industrial, coffee, sugar, homesteads, public works, and tourist.
Finally, a number of advisory committees were to be established to
insure an over-all "mass attack" on the economic problems of the
which prohibited the buying of land with tax money and the Deficiency Act
of 1934 which prohibited government corporations and agencies from borrow
ing money. The Comptroller General was a Republican appointee over whom
the President had no control.
39. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box #46, Memorandum for the Sec
retary of the Interior by Dr. Gruening, Nov. 30, 1934.
island.40 working through the board of trustees of

The chancellor,
the university and unhampered by legal or financial restrictions,
moved quickly ahead. Even before writing to Gruening concerning
his plans, he had set up an Agricultural Coordinating Committee
composed of Dr. Parkinson, dean of the College of Agriculture, Dr.
Atherton Lee, director of the Federal Experimental Station, F. A.
L6pez Dominguez, director of the Insular Experimental Station,
Dr. M. F. Barrus, director, Agricultural Extension Work, Commis
sioner Men^ndez Ramos, commissioner of agriculture and com
merce, Antonio Texidor, director of Vocational Work in agriculture,
and Bienvenido Matienzo, director of the Agricultural Division of
the PRERA.
At the first meeting of this group, held at the College of Agri
culture in Mayagiiez, November 16 and 17, twelve technical sub
committees were set up to formulate programs for the various agri
cultural problems of the island. The details of this are not important
here, except in one revealing point. Carlos Chardon, whose specialty
was mycology, was left in charge of coffee while Dr. Atherton Lee
was to take charge of sugar.41
Dr. Lee convened his subcommittee on sugar problems and
drew up a formal report, the details of which need not be studied.
This printed report was sent to F. D. Richey of the Bureau of Plant
Industry in Washington with the following note attached:
You will see that we tie all of our sugar cane work here in with
the sugar cane work of your Bureau. Although the insular agricul
tural entities legally would not need to follow suggestions or modi
fications from myself or Dr. Brandes, still the set-up and the senti
ment is such that you can influence the sugar cane work along any
channels which you might wish.42
It looked as though Chardon was being checked in his own field.

On October 10 OscarChapman spoke over a national radio
network about the administration's plans for Puerto Rico. In this
address, without naming the Chard6n Plan, he stated:
It
is the administration's desire to shift the Puerto Ricans from
the ravages of seasonal and meagerly paid employment in the cane
40. DTIP, 9-8-98, Puerto Rican Corporation, Letter from Chard6n to

Gruening, Nov. 21, 1934.
41. Ibid., Letter from Carlos Chard6n to Dr. Gruening, Dec. 3, 1934.
42. Bureau of Plant Industry, Correspondence Box #608, Letter from
Atherton Lee to F. D. Richey, Dec. 12, 1934.
fields to all year around employment through diversification of crops

and the introduction of industry. It is the purpose to transform them
if possible, from hopeless sharecroppers whose share has been grow
ing steadily less into individual land and home owners.43
Dr. Gruening was featured in a prominent article in the New

York Times at about the same time. His plans for the Division of
Territories and Island Possessions were amply explained. None of
these publicity moves meant as much to the Puerto Rican people
as the following political and publicity master stroke.
Senator Luis Munoz Marin was finding his way around in the
Interior Department much more easily than in the stiff and unsym
pathetic War Department. Of course, his friendship with Dr. Gruen
ing helped, but he found that Assistant Secretary of the Interior
Oscar Chapman was also ready to do favors for him. One of these
favors was a letter of introduction to the President's Assistant Sec
retary Mclntyre recommending that the President find time to see
the "leader of the Liberal Party . . . who . . . has been most active
in support of the New Deal policies."44 This letter may not have
opened any doors, but two days later after Chapman had accom
panied Winship to the White House, Senator Munoz Marin spoke
with the President for about half an hour.45 This prompted Antonio
Barcelo to fly to Washington and request a similar interview, which
was granted for a brief moment.46
With the cooperation of Chapman and Gruening, Munoz secured
a Christmas message for the Puerto Rican people from the President.
Such attention was justified by Dr. Gruening in view of the long
wait for initial action on the Chardon Plan. The fall and winter
months, just before the opening of the cane-cutting season, are
marked by high unemployment figures. The Christmas season holds
little hope for the sugar worker. Washington knew, even though
the island as yet did not, that it would be several months yet before
the steps could be taken toward reconstruction. The files of the
President were being filled with cables, wires, letters, and petitions
from the island, requesting solutions to sundry social and economic
43. Washington Star, Oct. 11, 1934.

44. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box #46, Letter undated from Chap
man to M. H. Mclntyre, Oct. 26, 1934.
45. Ibid., Diaries and Itineraries, November 2, 1934.
46. Ibid., Official Files #300, Democratic National Committee, 1933-
1940, Puerto Rico.
The coffee farmers47 and the needlework industrial lead

difficulties.
ers48 were only a few of the larger entities which directed their pleas
to Washington. Antonio Matos of the Civic Reform League wired:
"Puerto Rico faces disaster unless prompt action is taken. Promises
are no longer of avail. . . . Population reaching point where doubt
is being expressed as to value of our citizenship and sincerity of
purpose of Washington government."49
The President's message was in answer to one sent by Munoz,
which read in part as follows:
Puerto Ricans are more hell than it has

now going through
even been their fate to experience before one million two hun
. . .
dred thousand in need of relief. . . . My appeal to you, Mr. Presi

dent, is for reassurance to my people ...
so that they can tighten
their belts and wait for justice.50
The reply prepared for the President's signature was addressed

through the senator to the Puerto Rican people. This in itself was
a coup d'dtat of major political significance for the young senator.
The Department of Interior secured the services of short-wave sta
tion W2KAF at Schenectady to transmit on the evening of Decem
ber 22 the voice of Mufioz Marin reading a Spanish translation of
the message of the President. The Liberal party on the island was
prepared for the event. A radio was placed on every plaza and cross
road so that an estimated half million people received the message.
As a result, so Munoz Marin informed the President, "public feeling
has turned from despair to exultant Christmas cheer."51
The crowning touch to this episode was the message itself,

which read in part:
Ican and do assure you and your people of my complete good

will and firm determination that permanent reconstruction shall be
47. Ibid., Box #46, Wire from Sanchez Justiniano, Nov. 23, 1934.
48. Ibid., Wire from Chamber of Commerce of Mayagiiez, Nov. 24,
1934.
49. Ibid., Wire from Antonio Matos, Dec. 15, 1934.
50. Ruby Black Collection, Chardon Plan, Letter from Luis Munoz
Marin to President Roosevelt, Dec. 13. 1934.
51. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Luis Munoz Marin to
President Roosevelt, Dec. 24, 1934.
initiated at the very earliest possible moment on the basis of the

Chardon Plan, the principles of which have received my approval.52
This obviously left no doubt that the Chardon Plan would serve as
a basis for the rehabilitation program for the island. The political
significance of the wording as well as the act itself by the Liberal
politician can be gauged by quoting a short paragraph from a long
letter of protest from Senator Alfonso Vaktes to the President.
This letter, broadcasted by a minority Senator, a message from

President Roosevelt to the people of Puerto Rico has made a political
hero of him. Comments are made that all local administration officials
were disregarded and that to the minority Senator was given the
privilege of making an announcement from our PRESIDENT and
that "Chard6n Plan" (not Chardon's Report) would serve as the
basis for the rehabilitation of the island. Needless to say, that the
Liberal Party is making all sorts of political capital with the letter.
I beg to remind you that said Party has stood and stands for the
Independence of Puerto Rico.53
The reply was drawn up in Dr. Gruening's office, and salt was
rubbed into the wound by repeating that the Chardon Plan would
serve as the basis for the island's reconstruction.54
Almost a year to the day after Gore's removal, Mufioz Marin
again triumphantly returned to the island. Even his political ad
versaries recognized that he had outwitted them again. Valdes had
admitted that he was a hero on the island. But more than mere
political achievements, Mufioz returned closely followed by Dr.
Gruening, who was paying his first official visit to the island as
directorof the Division of Territories and Island Possessions. Al
though his stay was brief, the strategy was mapped out for the setting
up of the reconstruction program. At least preliminary planning
would be undertaken while the legal red tape in Washington was
being cleared.
One of the things which Dr. Gruening discussed while on the
island was a suggestion made by James Bourne for the incorporation
of the emergency relief administration under the laws of the island.
52. Ruby Black Collection, Chard6n Plan, Letter from President Roose
velt to Muiioz Marin, Dec. 7, 1934, copy.
53. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box #47, Letter from Senator
Valdes to President Roosevelt, Jan. 11, 1935.
54. Ibid., Letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Vald6s, Jan. 29,
1935.
This move was nothing out of the ordinary, since in the various
states of the Union similar action had been taken by state relief
administrators. In fact, the PRERA was tardy in making the move
suggested by Hopkins in Washington.
Concerned about the future of the organization in view of the
grandiose scheme of the Chardon group, Bourne had sent a flow
of monthly letters55 to Dr. Gruening explaining the thoroughness of
the relief work carried out by his administration and the necessity
of making a place for the PRERA in the reconstruction program.
He suggested that this new "Rural Rehabilitation Corporation" would
have "tremendously broad powers and under it we could do prac
tically everything which is now included in the Chardon Plan, of
course, if money is available."58
Dr. Gruening's mind was not made up on this possibility. Ac
cording to a memorandum on the impressions of his trip, which
he drew up after his return to Washington, he was not entirely
adverse to allowing "some parts of the Chardon Plan to be sheared
off and carried on as part of the general recovery program."57 How
ever, it is not clear whether this would fall to Bourne or to the in
sular government. He also claimed that Chardon was in agreement
with this division of labor. However, Chardon protested that while
"Mr. Bourne's organization is as good as any one in the continent
... it is not prepared to assume the responsibilities of a permanent
reconstruction program."58
Bourne outlined his ideas in more detail in a letter to the Presi
dent.59He envisioned a division of powers with Chard6n with whom
he thought he could work very well. Chardon could work on the
sugar aspect of the program and leave the other parts of reconstruc
tion to Bourne and the PRERA. It must be stated pointedly that
Bourne never did grasp or envision a thorough economic recon
struction program. He soon grasped that relief was no longer an
acceptable basis on which to build an economic recovery, but he
never went beyond an extensive program of public works: roads,
bridges, housing projects, and slum clearance projects. Government-
55. DTIP, 9-8-63, Letters from Bourne to Gruening, Oct. 17, 1934;
Nov. 16, 1934.
56. Ibid., Letter from Bourne to Gruening, Dec. 28, 1934.
57. Ibid., Memorandum on Puerto Rico by Dr. Gruening, Feb. 8, 1935.
58. DTIP, 9-8-98, Letter from Chard6n to Chapman, Feb. 8, 1935.
59. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box #47, Letter from James Bourne
to President Roosevelt, Feb. 21, 1935.
controlled and utility plants, hydroelectric projects,

-constructed
government ownership of sugar mills, the breakup of land monop
oly, "yardsticks," etc., were things which Bourne did not include in
his plans.60
Senator Mufioz expressed his objection to the PRERA and to
Bourne along a different plane. According to his analysis: "The
PRERA just holds a mirror to the existing social system and reflects
its outline faithfully."61 Bourne's own figures lend credence to this
charge. Since July, 1933, $4.8 million had been spent on white-col
lar work and only $3.5 million had been directed to the wage workers.
Dr. Gruening and Harry Hopkins, unwisely, suggested that the
President refrain from answering Bourne's letter for a couple of
weeks "since a new organization may be necessary to handle the
Work Program."62 James Bourne went ahead with his incorporation
plans; though, if he had been told of the limited future which such
corporation plans might have, he might have refrained. Certainly
the political environment was not propitious for the move he was
about to make.
The attacks which had been initiated by that "persistent con
troversialist"63 Felipe de Hostos, president of the Chamber of Com
merce, against Bourne and the PRERA was about to be carried to
wider battlefields. De Hostos evidently followed in the footsteps of
his father, who had kept up a running battle with the Spanish au
thorities in defense of his ideal of independence for about half a
century. His son, Felipe, defended his ideal of free enterprise capital
ism with almost equal tenacity.
As will be recalled, de Hostos had, the previous spring, attacked
Bourne and the PRERA for distributing on the island food which
had been secured by the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation. He
had requested that his procedure be discontinued and the funds be
used to secure supplies for the needy directly from the merchants of
60. DTIP,
9-8-63, Bourne to President Roosevelt, May 1, 1935, and
May 15, 1935.
61. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Copy of Let
ter from Luis Munoz Marin to Gruening, March 27, 1935.
62. DTIP, 9-8-63, Memorandum from Gruening and Hopkins to the
President, March 5, 1935.
63. National Archives, Record Group 126, Office of the Secretary,
9-8-21, Communications, General Memorandum from Gruening to Secretary
Ickes, May 11, 1935.
the island.64 To enforce his point he amply expounded upon the ad

verse effect of the practice on the local trade.
He accused Bourne of not understanding the local customs and
peculiarities of the island people and therefore wasting a great deal
of material. De Hostos was perturbed that the PRERA distributed
food in such large units that the edibles could not be consumed be
fore deterioration set in, because of the tropical climate. The Puerto
Rican family, not equipped with adequate means of storage and re
frigeration, was accustomed to the buying of rice, codfish, beans, or
lard in small quantities, thus paying, through higher prices, the
local grocery to serve as its warehouse.
On one occasion de Hostos was successful in convincing Bourne
to cancel an order for surplus foods, but the scheme backfired when
it developed that local purchases could not be made since the funds
were not transferable from the federal to the local administration.
The Chamber of Commerce was then placed in the indefensible
position of depriving the poor of food, and, at the same time, failing
to benefit the local businessman. Of course, through all of this, it
was argued that: "We are not acting on purely selfish motives . . .
we are going beyond the countenance of our own interest and en
deavoring to protect the interest of the community as a whole."65
In the fall of 1934, de Hostos again opened up on the PRERA's
application for surplus foodstuffs. The arguments were not changed,
although the language was stronger. Hostos wrote to Gruening:
"The merchants of the island now feel, and I concur with them, that
the local and national relief administration made fools of them
selves [sic]. They are not disposed to again be bamboozled by Bourne
or the Relief Administration in Washington."66 Just why de Hostos
thought the conditions had changed since the previous spring is not
clear, since he was expressing his old arguments. Dr. Gruening re
plied67 with a repetition of the same explanation that was offered
to the previous petition. The reaction of the president of the Cham
ber of Commerce was quite intemperate, illogical, and verging on
insult.
64. Collection of Correspondence with government officials, Letter from

de Hostos to Bourne, April 10, 1934.
65. Ibid.
66. DTIP, 9-8-63, Letter from de Hostos to Dr. Gruening, Nov. 26,
1934.
67. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to de Hostos, Dec. 14, 1934.
The reply given to you [Gruening] by the PRERA is typical of

their mentality and cannot fail to impress very disfavorably every
sane and right-thinking member of the community. I sincerely hope
that in transmitting their reply you do not endorse it. To regard as
gifts the belated and insufficient relief allotments granted to the
island is, to my mind, a senseless refusal to consider the whole prob
lem in its true light, and, furthermore, a denial of the true aims and
ideals of the New Deal. To say that allotments from the Federal Sur
plus Relief Corporation are gifts is not only stupid but also fal
lacious.68
The FERA in Washington completely understood the situation.

Their conclusion was that "on the whole the people in Puerto Rico
would rather have the surplus commodities shipped in than they
should not be received at all."69 The polemic sustained by de Hostos
was not all a disinterested defense of the poor merchant of the island.
He had competed, unsuccessfully, for the PRERA gasoline contract.70
To what degree this influenced his attitude to Bourne and his group
is open to debate.
Frustrated in the attempts to change the orders from Washington
by which Bourne was running the PRERA, de Hostos took a new
tack. Felipe de Hostos had come to the conclusion that Washington
and Bourne seemed to be determined to administer relief against the
best interests of the Puerto Rican community; that is, the Chamber
of Commerce. The next move was to try and convince Washington
that relief should be administered through the local insular govern
ment. A request was to be directed to Harry Hopkins that relief
funds be channeled through the island government on the basis that
it would foment local responsibility and that such funds were justly
due the island. It was argued that "money assigned to Puerto Rico
can not be considered as emergency relief since they are justly due
considering the losses brought about by the Federal Recovery Legis
lation, which has drained over twenty-four million dollars from
Puerto Rico in the last year."71 This request was perfunctorily re-
68. Collection of Correspondence, Letter from de Hostos to Dr. Gruen

ing, Jan. 15, 1935.
69. DTIP, 9-8-63, Letter from Jacob Baker to Dr. Gruening, March 1,
1935.
70. Ibid., Letter from Percy Fellows to Dr. Gruening, March 27, 1935.
71. FERA, #450, Special Material from Colonel Harrington's Office,
Letter from de Hostos to Hopkins, Feb. 15, 1935.
fused,72 thus provoking an extensive document accusing the local

administration of relief of misadministration, inexperience, and ig
norance of local conditions.73
With matters in this state, Bourne took steps to set up his new
"Rural Rehabilitation Corporation." This move was accompanied by
a great deal of confusion and turmoil. At first it was not clear wheth
er the new entity had anything to do with the whole economic recon
struction program. Some thought that this organization might be
given the task of carrying out the Chardon Plan.74 As has been
shown, Bourne harbored this hope, although his action was strictly
in accord with orders from Hopkins and with similar moves taken
in other states and Hawaii.75 Felipe furious and saw
de Hostos was
that a "concentration of such wide powers in the hands of a cor
poration not responsible to the community would be tantamount to
forcing on the island a trading company of most approved colonial
type."76
As Harry Hopkins pointed out, in answer to an inquiry by San
tiago Iglesias, "in any state which objects to being a beneficiary of
the rural rehabilitation program or objects to the use of the Corpora
tions, they are not set up."77 The opposition could not be content with
a mere denial to Bourne's plan. A frontal attack was opened on the
relief director.
The insular house of representatives formally requested the
President to direct proper officials to investigate the activities of the
PRERA. The charges justifying the need of this investigation were
twofold : ( 1 ) too much direct relief which "tends to destroy love for
work and self-reliance," and (2) the PRERA operated independently
of the local government.78 The Washington administrators consid-
72. Ibid., Letter from Fellows to Berrios, secretary of Chamber of Com

merce, Feb. 20, 1935.
73. FERA, #400, Box 259, Letter from de Hostos to Fellows, March
11, 1935.
74. DTIP, 9-8-63, FERA, Letter from de Hostos to President Roosevelt,
March 13, 1935.
75. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from Harry Hopkins to
Santiago Iglesias, March 15, 1935.
76. DTIP, 9-8-63, FERA, Letter from de Hostos to President Roosevelt,
March 13, 1935.
77. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Hopkins to Iglesias,
March 15, 1935.
78. Ibid., Letter from Miguel Angel Garcia Mendez to President Roose
velt, March 14, 1935.
ered these two charges too vague to justify an investigation and re

quested more specific information. The charge of direct relief was
in no way damaging, since limited funds often made other types of
aid impossible.79
James Bourne was ignoring all and moving rapidly ahead. He
registered his corporation, securing approval from the island's attor
ney general, and held his first meeting of the board of directors in
the morning of the nineteenth of March.80 He let it be known through
the local press that relief funds would be available to the island only
through this corporation. This was a direct challenge to the insular
legislature which was in the process of approving a bill to establish
their own relief corporation and to declare Bourne's organization
illegal.81
The coalition did not stop there. Since Bourne had already reg
istered his corporation, another move was required. On the twenty-
first a joint telegram was sent to the President by Representative
Garcia Mendez, Senator Martinez Nadal, Senator Vald^s, and Repre
sentative Pagan (son-in-law of Santiago Iglesias), accusing Bourne
of, among other things, "handing over the PRERA to the political
domination of the Liberal party."82 The following day the insular
legislature declared that James Bourne was persona non grata to the
Puerto Rican people.
The charge of politics in the PRERA was not new, as has been
shown. Specifically, one accusation stated that there were money
boxes in the relief centers to pick up donations for the Liberal par
ty.83 These charges cannot be discounted.
The clean sweep of the coalition in the elections of 1932 must
have left some capable Liberal-sympathizers out of government posi
tions. Few were protected by the limited civil service on the island.
In Puerto Rico the independent voter was practically unknown. It
could therefore be expected that a new organization would find
among the employable, members of the party out of power.
When the charge of politics first came up against James Bourne
and the PRERA, an investigation was carried out by a man who
79. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Jacob Baker to Dr. Gruening, March
15, 1935.
80. Ibid., Letter from James Bourne to Mr. Hitchman, March 14, 1935.
81. Ibid.
82. DTIP, 9-8-63, Wire from Garcia Mendez, Valdds, Martinez Nadal,
and Pagan to President Roosevelt, March 21, 1935.
83. FERA, Letter from Pobcarpio Suarez to Harry Hopkins, May 5, 1935.
came very close to being apolitical. He had been the commissioner of

the interior in Governor Roosevelt, Jr.'s, good government cabinet.
Guillermo Esteves found that 27 per cent of the employees of the
PRERA were Liberals, 32 per cent Republican, 9 per cent Social
ists, and the remaining 32 per cent continentals or without political
affiliations. He also found that of the PRERA relief administrators in
the 76 municipalities of the island, only 12 were Liberals and the
rest were coalitionists.84
Telegrams rained on the Washington offices and the White
House. In the battle of the wires, Bourne came out on top, but this
had little effect and worse was to come. The island newspapers were
daily publishing charges and countercharges. Finally Aubrey Wil
liams in Washington authorized Northrop, who was on an inspec
tion tour in the Caribbean possessions, to make any investigation
necessary.85
Bourne was not without defenders. The minority of the legis
lature had turned in a factual statement on the cooperation between
the PRERA and the insular departments of health, the interior, and
education, and other agencies.86 Obviously, the Liberal party could
not be outspoken in its defense of the PRERA because this would
lend credence to the charges of the coalition.
The opinion which Washington received from official observers
of the FERA on the island was against a full-fledged investigation of
the PRERA and James Bourne at this time, because the publicity
accompanying the investigation of a personal friend of the President
would be unfortunate. Second, an official investigation would have
a "demoralizing effect" on the organization and "tend to create the
inefficiency" of which it was charged. Finally, "personal charges
against Bourne are groundless; charge that work is being carried on
without consulting legislature is equally groundless."87
Bourne himself was worried. He asked Dr. Gruening to give
Hopkins a ring and explain "what you know about the group which
is now in control of the legislature."88 After great effort he finally
got the governor, who had before refused to be involved in the con-
84. DTIP, 9-8-63, Letter from Martin Travieso to Dr. Gruening, March
19, 1935.
85. FERA, Letter from Williams to Northrop, March 28, 1935.
86. La Rehabilitation, March 30, 1935.
87. FERA, Letter from Hitchman to Fellows, April 1, 1935.
88. DTIP, 8-8-63, Letter from Bourne to Ernest, March 28, 1935.
troversy,89 to defend him in a letter to Harry Hopkins.90 Dr. Gruen-

ing spoke to Fellows, Baker, and Johnstone of the FERA, stressing
the political aspect of Bourne's opposition, and urging a wire sup
porting him. Hopkins sent two wires to back him.91 Gruening wired
him not to get alarmed.92
However, at this point Bourne had reason for concern. One of
his administrators, Jose" Soto Rivera, had been disbarred several years
previously from law practice for allegedly having pocketed $500
from a client rather than depositing it.93 Bourne was asked to explain
why this man should have such a high administrative position. In a
discussion in his office, he defended the man as an able administrator
and indicated that in his opinion the charges were unfounded. As
the discussion grew stronger, Bourne was supposed to have claimed
that there were more criminals in the insular legislature than there
were in the PRERA. He was promptly charged with slander.94
False witnesses and a Republican judge, up for reappointment,
soon made "the situation serious."95 Bourne was able to secure the
services of an excellent lawyer in the person of former Governor
James Beverley. Beverley was convinced that there would be no trou
ble keeping the matter out of the papers and even out of the courts
on the island.96 However, he was concerned about the continental
press which was quite uninformed about local matters. His concern
was not necessary and his confidence in resolving the matter satis
factorily was well founded. Within a month, through the Attorney
General in Washington, Benjamin Horton agreed to dismiss the
charges if the matter could be kept confidential.97 Here the battle
between the PRERA and the coalition will have to be left momentar
ily, since other developments must be noted.
89. FERA, Letter from Bourne to Fellows, March 29, 1935.

90. Ibid., Gov. Winship to Harry Hopkins, March 29, 1935.
91. Ibid., Wires from Hopkins to Bourne, March 29, 1935; and April
11, 1935.
92. DTIP, 9-8-63, Wire from Gruening to Jim, April 3, 1935.
93. FERA, Letter from Lino Padr6n Rivera, chairman of the Special
Committee of the House to Investigate the Public Works constructed by
PRERA, to the FERA, April 12, 1935.
94. Ibid., Letter from Bourne to Hopkins, April 6, 1935.
95. Ibid., Letter from Al Baruch to Jacob Baker, April 12, 1935; and
Letter from Bourne to Baker, April 10, 1935.
96. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rico Correspondence, Letter from
James Beverley to Ruby Black, April 8, 1935.
97. FERA, Letter from Joseph S. Keenan, Assistant Attorney General,
to Harry Hopkins, May 9, 1935.
The island legislature, it will had drawn up a bill

be recalled,
to establish a rehabilitation corporation to the exclusion of any other
corporation which might be organized for a similar purpose in the
future. Apparently this had been aimed at Bourne, but Senator
Mufioz was not convinced that it did not endanger the setting up of
the Chard6n Plan.98 He informed Dr. Gruening of his concern. The
director of the Division of Territories wired immediately to the gov
ernor instructing him to veto the bill, since it was contrary to the
ideas of the President concerning the administration of the recon
struction program."
Contrary to instructions, the governor took a direct interest in
the bill by holding a conference with the legislators prior to its ap
proval. At this meeting the party leaders were fully informed regard
ing the requisites for the setting up of a rehabilitation corporation.100
This action, according to Munoz, seemed to indicate that the measure
would be signed.101
The measure passed and was sent to the governor. It provided
for a board of directors of three PRERA members — administrator,
the assistant administrator, and a member to be selected by the gov
ernor — three coalition cabinet members, and the chairman in the
person of the governor.102 Hitchman, who was still on the island,
doubted that the FERA in Washington would approve such a meas
ure as a substitute for the corporation formed by Bourne.103 The gov
ernor sent a copy of the bill to Ernest Gruening for his perusal and
approval.104 Dr. Gruening was still unmoved and repeated his order
for a veto.105 In all he sent six telegrams to the same effect.
GovernorWinship still thought that something might be done
about the wishes of the legislature, or rather, the coalition. On April
10 he held another conference with the coalition leaders and this
time he included Bourne and his aides. The hope was to iron out the
differences between the two groups. The bill had been carefully
98. Ruby Black Collection, Chard6n Plan, Letter from Luis to Ruby
Black, March 5, 1935.
99. DTIP, 9-8-79 Legislation, Wire from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Win-
ship, March 20, 1935.
101. DTIP, 9-8-79, Letter from Mufioz to Gruening, March 30, 1935.
103. Ibid.
104. DTIP, 9-8-98, Wire from Gruening to Winship, April 1, 1935.
105. Ibid. Gruening to Winship, April 3, 1935.
drawn up on the basis of the best information that Iglesias was able
to obtain from the FERA in Washington.106 Nevertheless, Bourne
refused to budge and complained that the Republicans wanted to
control everything.107 The governor was optimistic and thought that
some progress had been made in establishing harmony between the
two groups. He wired Gruening to urge him to contact the FERA
and together calmly study the measure "in order to determine if
possible the advisability of substituting legislative corporation for
that of the PRERA."108
When this wire was received, Dr. Gruening happened to be
out of Washington for the day. However, there was in Washington
an employee of the PRERA, named Navas. He received a cable
from a friend in the San Juan PRERA office, Jose" Soto Rivera,
stressing the absolute necessity of a veto.109 Navas went directly to
Gruening's office and explained the seriousness of the situation.110
The result was a wire from Chapman to Winship ordering a veto of
the bill.111 Chapman later denied that Navas had anything to do
with his sending the order to Winship112 but the wheels must have
been put in motion by Navas' visit, since the governor's cable to
Gruening was called to Chapman's attention shortly after the visit.
Navas was not satisfied. He then went to the FERA offices to
repeat his tale. Baker checked with Chapman by phone and sent a
similar telegram to the governor.113 The urgency of the matter was
understood, since the time for a veto was running out. Navas was
proud of his afternoon's work and wired his friend: "Chapman,
Baker cabled Winship final definite instructions veto corporation
bill."114 This information was published in El Impartial (April 13,
1935), thus producing a delicate, embarrassing political situation.
106. FERA, Wire from Garcia Mendez to Iglesias, March 25, 1935;
Letter from Baker to Iglesias, March 26, 1935.
107. Ibid., Bourne to Hopkins, April 11, 1935.
108. La Fortaleza, 288/26, Wire from Winship to Gruening, April 11,
1935.
109. FERA, Special Material from Colonel Harrington's office, Wire
from Soto to Navas, undated, but must be April 11 or 12.
110. Ibid., Wire from Navas to Torres Mazorrana, April 14, 1935.
111. DTIP, 9-8-79, Wire from Chapman to Winship, April 12, 1935.
112. Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, File 1-270, Ad
ministrative General, FERA, Chapman to Ickes, May 4, 1935.
113. FERA, Wire from Baker to Winship, April 12, 1935.
114. Ibid., #450, Wire from Navas to Torres Mazorrana, April 13,
1935.
The morning after the press story the aroused legislature decided
to recess, which in effect meant adjournment, since the end of the
limited session was at hand. The governor twice called the politicians
and calmed them down somewhat. However, the following morning,
after meeting with the governor until 1:30 a.m., the legislature
closed its books.115 Four days later Governor Winship sailed for
Washington.
This bill which Governor Winship had been told to veto held
several pitfalls. The composition of the board of directors was po
litically stacked against the Washington administration. Apparently
the governor was the central figure in the organization. However,
past events had indicated that a legislative majority could make things
unpleasant for a recalcitrant governor. Furthermore, on this matter
as on others that will be mentioned below, the governor "had shown
. . . failure to comply . . . with orders."116 Second, although the
money for the corporation would come from Washington, there was
no federal representative besides the governor on the board. Bourne
had included Hitchman on his board of directors for the Rural Re
habilitation Corporation. Third, if
any of the bill happened to be
declared unconstitutional, the remaining sections would stand. This
provision could be potentially dangerous, since the bill appeared to
contradict the Organic Act which prevented the local legislature
from setting up additional executive departments. However, the
chief reason for veto was that this bill made it impossible to establish
any future corporation which might undertake to carry out the
Chardon Plan, thus insuring the control of the legislature over the
federal recovery program.
Winship never pretended to understand this aspect of the prob
lem. He conceived the matter as local issue between the coalition
a
and Bourne which he thought he could harmonize. If this had been

all that was involved in the matter, Winship might have been justi
fied in his action, and he might have achieved his purpose. Bourne117
was known to fight hard before giving an inch, but he later often
compromised away more than half of what he had been fighting
115. La Fortaleza, 288/26 Winship to Gruening, April 14, 1935.

116. DTIP, 9-8-79, Memorandum on History of the Corporation Bill
by Dr. Gruening, April 15, 1935.
117. This was the opinion of Luis Mufioz Marin, who expressed it to
Northrop. FERA, #406, Field Reports, Northrop to Harry Hopkins, April
23, 1935, p. 9.
for. Winship had until Saturday to veto the bill, and he hoped
that the Washington conference he had suggested would give him the
green light to go ahead with his harmonizing. He obviously had not
heard of the recent expression of the President concerning the ad
ministration of the reconstruction program to which Dr. Gruening
had referred. His legal adviser, Colonel Trent, had suggested that
the best procedure would be to have the corporation formed on the
island under the chairmanship of the governor.118 Therefore he saw
no conflict between the steps he was taking and the plans of the
federal authorities. The flat order to veto was hard to understand.
Furthermore, when it leaked to the press and caused the legislature
to close its doors thirty-six hours before its time had run out and
before important tax legislation had been approved, there was dire
need for a top-level conference.
Governor Winship sailed with a legal brief under his arm, charg
ing Ernest Gruening and the Division of Territories with "attempt
ing, whether intentionally or not, to reduce the only constituted
Government of Puerto Rico to a mere sub-division of that . . ."
Division of the Department of the Interior.119
Since the first of the year, the relations between the governor
and the Department of the Interior had been steadily growing worse;
the Chapman telegram and the subsequent leak to the press were
just the final straws in a long series of events.
Dr. Gruening had not been willing to sit idly by waiting for an
executive order or an act of Congress to establish his agency, author
ity, or corporation so that the much delayed Chardon Plan could be
put into reality. Much was to be done in Washington and on the
island to prepare the way for action. As will be recalled, the United
Porto Rico Sugar Company was in the process of being reorganized
into a new corporation under the guidance and financing of the
National City Bank. This new corporation, called the Eastern Sugar
Associates, ran into difficulties in the minor matter of registering
property in the Guayama area.
The time seemed propitious to take steps to enforce the dead-
letter Joint Resolution of Congress, May 1, 1900, which "restricted
[every corporation engaged in agriculture] to the ownership and con
trol of not to exceed 500 acres of land." Dr. Gruening wrote: "Prob-
118. La Fortaleza, 521, Memorandum from Col. Trent to Gov. Winship,

undated.
119. Ibid., #288/26, Draft drawn up by Col. Trent, May 6, 1935.
ably no single step will indicate quite so clearly to the people of

Puerto Rico that a new deal has arrived than the enforcement of the
long-dormant joint resolution of Congress."120
The plan was "quo warranto proceedings against the
to initiate
Eastern Sugar Associates in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico . . .
in the moment the decision in the appeal from the registrar is an
nounced."121 Dr. Gruening suggested as the legal mind
Colonel Trent
best prepared to guide the Attorney General and his staff in the mat
ter. Trent had retired from his position with the Judge Advocate
General in the War Department where he had had charge of the
division which handled the legal matters of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs.
On this issue of latifundia, the Secretary of the Interior and
the members of his department, like Gruening and Chapman, were
firmly on the record as in opposition. During 1935 Ickes and his
subordinates had had several opportunities to express publicly their
unequivocal position. Ickes wrote in a letter to Senator Duncan N.
Fletcher:
Puerto Rico . . . has been the victim of the laissez faire economy
which has developed the rapid growth of great absentee owned sugar
corporations, which have absorbed much land formerly belonging
to small independent growers and who in consequence have been
reduced to virtual economic serfdom. While the inclusion of Puerto
Rico within our tariff walls has been highly beneficial to the stock
holders of these corporations, the benefits have not been passed down
to the mass of Puerto Ricans. These on the contrary have seen the
lands on which they formerly raised subsistence crops, given over to
sugar production while they have been gradually driven to import
all their food staples, paying for them the high prices brought about
by the tariff. There is today more widespread misery and destitution
and far more unemployment in Puerto Rico than at any previous
time in its history.122
This attitude on the part of the Washington administration was

not finding an echo in the island administration. The reaction to the
memorandum prepared by Gruening and approved by the Secretary
120. Office of the Secretary, 9-8-13, Puerto Rico Lands, 500 Acres,
Memorandum from Gruening to Ickes and after approval sent on to Win-
ship, Jan. 2, 1935. 121. Ibid.
122. DTIP, 9-8-68, Government-Status, Letter from Secretary Ickes to
Sen. Fletcher, Jan. 15, 1935.
was outright opposition.From Benjamin Horton's office came the

following questions about the enforcement of the 500-Acre Law:
(1) What was a corporation? (2) What did the word "control"
mean? (3) Who was to enforce the law? (4) Finally, a general
questioning of the advisability of the law. The memorandum re
peated the conclusions expressed in the Brookings study by raising
the issue of efficiency and suggested that reasonableness dictated that
at least 60 per cent of the land necessary to operate a sugar central
should be controlled or owned by the corporation. Thus the Attor
ney General suggested that the law be changed from 500 acres to
6, 000. 123 Horton even ordered a subordinate to contact the sugar cor
poration lawyers to secure arguments to combat the 500-Acre Law.
At this point steps were quietly being taken to remove Horton
from his office.124 Cabinet approval had been sought and granted for
this move, and it was only a question of time. Dr. Gruening was
already in communication with Senator Luis Muiioz Marin concern
ing a possible substitute for Horton. Mufioz suggested three names:
Martin Travieso, Miguel Guerra-Mondragon, and Benigno Fernandez
Garcia. His preference was for the second and his weak choice the
first.125
While on the island, Dr. Gruening and Oscar Chapman learned
that Winship had not taken any steps to carry out the request of the
Division, as approved by the secretary, to proceed to prepare quo
warranto proceedings against Eastern Sugar Associates.128 In the
insular senate, Luis Mufioz Marin presented a resolution requesting
the Attorney General to enforce the 500-Acre Law. The resolution
received the senate's unanimous backing when a coalition ammend-
ment was accepted by the senator, instructing the government not
to limit its action to the Eastern Sugar Associates. A copy of the
resolution was sent to Ickes, who, in reply, cited his request of Jan
uary 4 to the governor.127
123. La Fortaleza, 305/2, Memorandum regarding Limits of Ownership

and Control in Puerto Rico, Jan. 14, 1935.
Ruby Black to Luis Mufioz, Jan. 24, 1935. 125. Ibid.
126. Office of the Secretary, 9-8-13, 500-Acre Law, Letter from Oscar
Chapman to Ickes, Feb. 18, 1935; also Letter from Gruening to Ickes, Feb.
28, 1935.
127. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Iglesias (copy to Winship),
Feb. 20, 1935.
In aSan Juan press interview, however, Horton denied that

he had been ordered to draw up quo warranto proceedings,128 and
the governor was then forced to move publicly or expose his lack of
sympathy with the planned procedure. Two months after the original
request was made, Horton was finally told to proceed. Dr. Gruening,
now no longer able to trust either Winship or Colonel Trent,129 and
convinced that Horton was incapable of the task, suggested that a
special counsel be called in order to aid the Attorney General.130
The man suggested for the job was Miguel Guerra-Mondrag6n.
Miguel Guerra-Mondragon had had "a long record of trying
cases in American courts.""1 He also had excellent backing. At Mu-
noz' request,132 Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union
wrote to his friend Dr. Gruening highly recommending Miguel Gue-
rra, the ACLU representative on the island, as a "brilliant lawyer."133
Governor Winship, who first accepted the candidacy of Miguel
Guerra-Mondragon as a "good" suggestion, played cat and mouse with
Gruening for over two weeks. He repeatedly mentioned the names of
other lawyers and refused to make a definite commitment about the
division's suggestion. Finally, he confirmed the appointment of Gue
rra-Mondragon as a special assistant to the Attorney General.134
Therefore, when the governor sailed for Washington, it was clear
to those in the Department of Interior from Ickes down to Gruening's
secretary that not only were things not running smoothly, but that
there would be trouble ahead. General Winship had been governor
for a little more than a year. Through his work in the War Depart
ment he had developed certain ideas about the governing of the off-
lying territories; these ideas did not include the forfeiting of local
sovereignty to the whims of a Washington administrator. Further-
128. El Imparcial, Feb. 25, 1935.

129. Gov. Winship's personal attitude toward some of the provisions in
the Chardon Plan can be judged from the following incident. He called to
the attention of Miguel Angel Garcia Mendcz the failure of public sugar
centrales in Cuba and in the Philippines. Angel M. Torregrosa, Biografia
de Miguel Angel de Garcia Mhidez (San Juan: Imprenta Puerto Rico, 1939),
p. 129.
130. Office of the Secretary, Memorandum from Dr. Gruening to Sec
retary Ickes, Feb. 28, 1935. 131. Ibid.
132. ACLU, Vol. 953, Correspondence, Letter from Munoz Marin to
Roger Baldwin, Jan. 23, 1935.
133. Ibid., Letter from Roger Baldwin to Ernest, Jan. 23, 1935.
134. La Fortaleza, 288/26, Correspondence between Gov. Winship and
Dr. Gruening, March 6, 13, 15, 25, 27, 29, 1935; some of this can also be
found in the Office of the Secretary, 9-8-13.
more, General Winship was not one to take orders but rather to give
them. Puerto Rico would have profited inestimably if the governor
had been asked to step aside at this point for one who was more
sympathetic to the plans of the division. Indeed, Governor Winship's
appointment was a strange one in view of the subsequent change of
the island's affairs from War to Interior.
Dr. Gruening's case against the governor was fortified by, if not
rooted in, the almost daily letters of Senator Luis Mufioz Marin.
Through his letters, Gruening was kept abreast of the governor's
duplicity. Muiioz only asked that he be kept informed of what the
governor had been requested to do. He then followed through with
the complete information on what Winship had or had not carried
out. He advised Dr. Gruening as to what bills should be vetoed by
the governor, and exposed the governor's lack of sympathy toward
Guerra-Mondragon."5
It was Senator Mufioz' plan to force a resignation of Governor
Winship. This plan was "for the Department of Interior to issue
orders to the governor on every petty detail of government,"136 and
Dr. Gruening cooperated without being aware of the plan at first.
When he did realize what was happening, he accused Senator Mufioz
of trying to drive a wedge between him and the governor.137 How
ever, instead of resigning, Governor Winship fought back.
As a corollary to this strategy or as a disguise if it should fail,
Mufioz Marin had a plan for the splitting of the coalition. The Social
ist wing of the coalition had little desire to fight the 500-Acre legis
lation which Muiioz Marin had been pushing. To do so would have
denied one of the key planks in the party's platform since its founda
tion. Mufioz Marin cultivated this cooperation by astutely accepting
the amendment to his bill offered by Bolivar Pagan of the Socialists.
The conservative Republican wing of the coalition did not dare fight
the measure. However, the speaker of the house, Miguel Angel Gar
cia M^ndez, refused to turn the bill over to a Socialist-dominated
house committee, the judicial commission headed by Socialist Rivera
135. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letters from

Mufioz Marin to Ernest (copies to Ruby), March 22, 25, 27; April 2, 8,
1935.
136. Ibid., Gov. Winship, Letter from Mufioz Marin to Morris Ernst,
March 8, 1935.
137. Ibid., Puerto Rico Correspondence, Ruby Black to Mufioz Marin,
Feb. 8, 1935.
Zayas, hoping to have it bottled up elsewhere. Munoz' hope, and to

this end he had entered into a discussion with Bolivar Pagan and
Rivera Zayas, was to carry out a realignment of the political groups.
The New Deal elements in the Liberal party and the Socialist forces
with New Deal tendencies in the coalition would join together under
his leadership. To carry this out, he needed Gruening's help in secur
ing the nomination of a Socialist as treasurer and the presentation of
an administration-backed bill to give Puerto Rico two resident com
missioners in Congress. The reasoning behind the second resident
commissioner is that it was the only way the Liberals could justify
a vote for Santiago Iglesias. Munoz Marin confessed that he was
"sorry that it should take such conspiracy methods but the end is
good." One of the many advantages he saw was the setting up of
"one great party under the effective leadership of your humble serv
ant."138 The plan simmered for awhile, but it never came to a boil.
Munoz' position as the only unofficial advisor to the director of ter
ritories had led him to believe that he could make the world to his
own liking.
Following Winship, but not so as a part of his official group,
went "utility crown prince Vald^s . . . joined by sugar coated PiJuan
and Guanica Michael Angelo."139 Pedro Juan SerralMs was the
wealthy sugar magnate of the Ponce area and coalition member of the
legislature. Miguel Angel Garda Me"ndez, as well as owning vast
sugar lands, was a lawyer for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company.
Before leaving the island, he and Luis Munoz Marin had a fa
mous debate in the quaint and tradition-steeped town of San German.
The issue to be publicly debated was whether or not the Jones-Costi-
gan Sugar Act was beneficial to the island. In his presentation, Gar
cia M^ndez outlined the already familiar charges of discrimination
against Puerto Rican sugar in favor of the beet producers, the rising
costs of imported staples with, as yet, no corresponding benefits to
local agricultural producers, and the threat of economic reconstruc
tion through a supergovernment federal agency.140
Senator Munoz Marin's defense centered around Section 1 5 (f )
of the Jones-Costigan Act which he maintained "is in the law for
the benefit of Puerto Rico in order to prevent a large percentage of
138. Ibid., Letter from Munoz Marin to Ruby, Feb. 16, 1935, and
Munoz Marin to E. Gruening, March 29, 1935.
139. FERA, #450, Wire from Jos6 Soto to Navas, undated.
140. Biografia de Miguel Angel de Garcia Mdndez, pp. 92-144.
the payments from falling into the hands of large corporations."141

He then entered into a full explanation of the Chardon Plan which
was drawn up to carry out Section 15 (f). Munoz said:
The Chardon Plan practically destroys the restrictive effects of

the Costigan law, leaving in full vigor all the beneficial and compen
sating effects of the mentioned law; utilizing them in part for the
fundamental and permanent reconstruction of Puerto Rico, for the
reclaiming of land, for the distribution of small farms and homes,
for the workers of the sugar industry, for the final liquidation of
absenteeism which carries off millions of dollars yearly from Puerto
Rico.142
¥ * *
The coalition was journeying to Washington not so much to

defend the governor as to press the charges against James Bourne.
A very weighty, literally speaking, document was drawn up and
presented to the FERA officials. It had little effect, since Hopkins
was "convinced that most or all of them are not true. In the main
they boil down to politics. ...
On the other hand, I think that we
probably should make a formal investigation."143
Bourne's whole operation was given a close check. Aubrey Wil
liams, Jacob Baker, and Percy Fellows went over not only the charges,
but also the official reports of the PRERA. Northrop was on the
spot in Puerto Rico and was asked for a report on the political aspects
of the charges against Bourne. In his report there were a few notes
on an interview with Senator Munoz in which he had admitted that
there were little "black boxes" in the hands of the PRERA employees
which were used to solicit funds for the Liberal party at the time
the workmen were being paid.144 The senator himself was willing to
recognize privately that the influence of the Liberal party in the
PRERA was of some importance.145
As for the rest of the charges made, in the opinion of Baker and
141. Biografta de Luis Munoz Marin, p. 104. 142. Ibid., pp. 104-5.
143. FERA, Letter from Hopkins to President Roosevelt, April 26, 1935.
Hopkins had been quoted in La Prensa, March 13, 1935, as saying that
Bourne had been recommended by the White House, and that was enough
for him. About this same time, he was also having trouble with the governor
of Ohio and the relief program in that state.
144. FERA, #406, Field Reports, Northrop to Hopkins, April 23, 1935.
145. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Munoz Marin
to Ruby Black, April 10, 1935.
Fellows, they were "not at all convincing on close examination be

cause of the fact that
the items are fragmentary, often irrelevant and
immaterial, and do not indicate administrative policy and so ob
viously colored by political prejudice that they invite discount."146
While Bourne was down he was attacked from another side. The
material aid program of the social work division had been constantly
under fire from the Roman Catholic Church. The dense population
of the small Caribbean island could not be overlooked by the social
workers and the planners. Officially care was taken, however, to
make absolutely certain that nothing which would offend the Cath
olic Church could be laid at the door of public officers.1" On the oth
er hand, unofficially those in influential positions took opportunities
to attack the population problem from all sides.148
One of Bourne's social workers in the material health program,
Ana Alfonso de Colon, who was discharged "because of her unethical
and unfair practices,"149 was sent to Washington by the coalition to
present charges before the Roman Catholic authorities concerning
the birth-control program of the PRERA. As a result, John J. Burke
of the National Catholic Welfare Confederation wrote to the Presi
dent requesting that James Bourne and his wife be removed from
the federal payroll since they were "violating the Penal Code of the
United States in Puerto Rico." The specific charges were the manu
facturing of "preventatives that are used to prevent conception" and
the training of workers "who are advising women of Puerto Rico
in the practice of birth control."150 This letter reveals that the Presi
dent had previously assured the Catholic churchman that the PRERA
program would not include anything which would violate Roman
Catholic beliefs concerning birth control.
These charges were categorically denied by workers in the ma
ternal health department. They insisted that the method of birth
146. FERA, #450, Box 262, Fellows to Baker and Baker to Hopkins,
May 4, 1935.
147. Puerto Rican Folder 1934, Letter from Wallace to Weaver, July
14, 1934.
148. FERA, #435, 2 Puerto Rico, Box 262, Letter from Baker to Hop
kins, March 21, 1934; also Letter from Hopkins to John Kingsbury of the
Milbank Memorial Fund, April 3, 1934.
149. Ibid., #400, Box 259, Letter from Bourne to Fellows, March 29.
1935.
150. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from J. J. Burke
to President Roosevelt, April 1, 1935.
control recommended was the rhythm one officially accepted by the

Roman Catholic Church.151
James Bourne was concerned about the whole unpleasant mess,
but there was little cause for worry as Dr. Gruening had suggested.
Hopkins was satisfied that the matter was a political squabble in
which, while the PRERA was not completely apolitical (witness the
little black boxes and the more unfortunate Chapman telegram
leak), Bourne was doing his best to keep his administration free
from political control. In an island, where, as Northrop had written
"the greatest industry is politics,"152 Bourne was to be congratulated
on his success thus far.
As a result, the members of the coalition
in Washington were
given the bureaucratic run-around. Hopkins was too busy to see them
and they were told on several occasions that he had the case still
under study.153 Hopkins tried to shuffle the hot issue, which by this
time had considerably cooled, first to Dr. Gruening, and then to Gov
ernor Winship.154 Finally the delegation was frankly told
that the charges presented against Mr. Bourne did not seem to be
of such nature as to justify an investigation by us [FERA]; that they
involved matters of purely local administration; that our national
policies were not involved; nor were there allegations or appearances
of misuse of Federal funds.155
But if
James Bourne and his PRERA were not destined to fall
under the coalition attack, their demise was to be directed from more
friendly sources.
The outline of events leading to the creation of the agency which
would carry out the Chardon Plan is most confusing. Dr. Gruening
had suggested that March would be the latest date for the setting
up of this entity. The plan, it will be recalled, was for a Congres
sional bill to set up the agency or an executive order if this measure
were to fail. In addition to the legislative problem there was the
growing doubt that the processing tax could be used in the planned
151. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Dolores Santana and Carlos Rivera
Lugo to Josephine Brown, April 9, 1935.
152. Ibid., #406, Field Reports, Northrop to Hopkins, April 23, 1935.
153. Ibid., #400, Memorandum from Baker to Hopkins, May 14, 1935.
154. Ibid., Hopkins to Baker, May 6, 1935; also Baker to Iglesias, May
22, 1935.
155. DTIP, 9-8-63, Baker to Dr. Gruening, May 23, 1935.
fashion and in sufficient quantity to carry out completely the recon

struction plan because, in part, of the opposition of the legal branch
of the government. The administration had decided to unite all po
litical forces behind one gigantic relief measure. This was commonly
known as the $4 billion work relief bill. Out of this emergency relief
bill it was hoped that funds could be used for the Chard6n Plan. In
passing through Congress, however, certain restrictive measures were
tacked on which "would make it virtually impossible to carry out
Puerto Rican reconstruction program."156 Based on an economy drive
and a desire to limit relief spending to a definite period, these changes
necessitated either amendments to make a special exception of Puerto
Rico, or another measure.
While the funds were still in doubt, Dr. Gruening, Secretary
Ickes, and the President were having difficulty with Acting Director
of the Budget Bell. The bill which was to set up the Puerto Rican
Authority could not get Bell's approval, since he had been instructed
by the President not to approve any more authority bills.157 Secretary
Ickes argued that this blanket order did not apply to the Puerto Rican
case because the President himself had taken not only direct interest
in the matter but had gone to the extent of diagraming the relations
between the to-be-established authority and the existing insular gov
ernment.158
The President had envisaged a government council composed of
two insular legislators and two commissioners from the governor's
cabinet and four members of the Puerto Rican Authority. The chair
man of this council was to be the governor of Puerto Rico. As can be
seen, the council, coordinating federal and local economic and social
reconstruction work, could be easily dominated by the governor.159
This coordinating council under the guidance of Dr. Gruening,
not the governor, actually met several times in the fall of 1935 to
settle minor adjustment problems such as the wage scales to be used
on the coffee projects. However, when Gruening returned to Wash
ington, almost half of the following year passed before there was
another meeting. Winship never quite understood that he was sup-
156. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Presi

dent Roosevelt, March 11, 1935.
157. DTIP, 9-8-98, Letter from Secretary Ickes to President Roosevelt,
April 2, 1935.
158. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Bell, April 26, 1935.
159. Ibid., Contains photostatic copy of the President's diagram.
posed to be chairman of this council or if he did understand it, he

allowed the council to be dominated by either Dr. Gruening or Dr.
Chardon.160 Gruening insisted that this council had no power to dic
tate to either the insular government or the Authority.
The council presents another example of government by com
mittee which just did not turn out as planned. There is no doubt
that coordination between insular and federal authority was neces
sary, particularly when the Authority gave signs of moving into so
many areas, such as vocational education, rural health, and electric
power, in which theoretically, at least, the insular government was
also concerned.101
The creation of the Authority was not to be trusted to the doubt
ful action of Congress. Influential Senators had expressed their op
position to the Chardon Plan. Senator Vandenberg and Senator
Tydings, chairman of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, had
both indicated their opposition.162 The sugar interests had had time to
build up the opposition to the radical readjustment of the sugar pro
duction, which was inherent in the Chardon Plan. It was therefore
decided that an executive order would be necessary to establish the
entity to carry out the program.
The executive order originally would have established a recon
struction board of seven men headed by the Secretary of the Interior.
Because of the objection of the Bureau of the Budget, the order had
to be redrawn by its original author, William Hastie, assistant to the
solicitor.
In a conference at which Dr. Gruening, Carlos Chardon, Sen
ator Luis Munoz Marin, and Lee Pressman were present, Hastie was
asked to draw up another executive order in which an administrator
would replace the board. This procedure followed a suggestion of
Lee Pressman, legal adviser to the Department of Agriculture, based
on his experience with the legal problems which had arisen out of
the creation of the Resettlement Administration and the Rural Elec
trification Administration.163
But there was more to this than met the eye, as was to be later
160. La Fortaleza, 293/26, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship,

April 10, 1936.
161. Congressional Record, Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 79,
p. 12067.
162. Department of the Interior, 9-8-15, General, Letter from Wm.
Hastie to Secretary Ickes, Nov. 25, 1936. 163. Ibid.
admitted. The presence of Lee Pressman immediately aroused the

suspicions of the ever-vigilant Burlew, who jumped to the conclusion
that Dr. Gruening was using outside legal aid to pull a sneak attack
on Secretary Ickes. While Gruening insisted that Pressman's sug
gestions were of value, he did not deny later that he had mixed up
his motives in using them.164 However, he did maintain that he was
more interested in avoiding the conservative hand of Burlew than
the influence of the Secretary himself.
The executive order went to the White House for the President's
signature with the name of the administrator in blank. Secretary
Ickes attached a note suggesting that he would be more than willing
to supply the missing name if the President so desired.165 When Ex
ecutive Order No. 7057 was signed on May 28166 with the name of
Ernest Gruening as administrator inserted without Ickes' consultation,
the Secretary was convinced that he had been outfoxed. There is
little doubt that he would have selected anyone other than Gruening
but the technicality was important, because, as will be later seen, he
felt that Dr. Gruening should not be independent of the Secretary
of the Interior in his dealings as administrator of the Puerto Rican
Reconstruction Administration. Dr. Gruening pleaded innocence to
intrigue, insisting that he had learned of his appointment from the
press.167
The whole insular political situation, including the creation of
the PRRA, and even Winship's role in island affairs, was probably
discussed when Senator Munoz and Dr. Gruening met with the
President shortly after noon on Tuesday, May 7. 168 The meeting had
been requested by the senator, but it was the President's idea to invite
Dr. Gruening.
Shortly after this meeting, Dr. Gruening urgently called the
FERA to make sure that Hopkins "did not make any decision or com
mitments that put anything in the hands of the governor."169 General
164. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Secretary Ickes, Nov. 25, 1936.
165. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400 (b), Note from
Secretary Ickes to President Roosevelt, May 21, 1935.
166. Public Papers and Addresses, III, 193.
167. Department of Interior, 9-8-15, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Sec
retary Ickes, Nov. 25, 1936.
President Roosevelt, May 3, 1935; Memorandum for Mac from F. D. R., May
15, 1935.
169. FERA, #450, Memorandum from Baker to Hopkins, May 15,
1935.
ered these two charges too vague to justify an investigation and re

quested more specific information. The charge of direct relief was
in no way damaging, since limited funds often made other types of
aid impossible.79
James Bourne was ignoring all and moving rapidly ahead. He
registered his corporation, securing approval from the island's attor
ney general, and held his first meeting of the board of directors in
the morning of the nineteenth of March.80 He let it be known through
the local press that relief funds would be available to the island only
through this corporation. This was a direct challenge to the insular
legislature which was in the process of approving a bill to establish
their own relief corporation and to declare Bourne's organization
illegal.81
The coalition did not stop there. Since Bourne had already reg
istered his corporation, another move was required. On the twenty-
first a joint telegram was sent to the President by Representative
Garcia Mendez, Senator Martinez Nadal, Senator Vald^s, and Repre
sentative Pagan (son-in-law of Santiago Iglesias), accusing Bourne
of, among other things, "handing over the PRERA to the political
domination of the Liberal party."82 The following day the insular
legislature declared that James Bourne was persona non grata to the
Puerto Rican people.
The charge of politics in the PRERA was not new, as has been
shown. Specifically, one accusation stated that there were money
boxes in the relief centers to pick up donations for the Liberal par
ty.83 These charges cannot be discounted.
The clean sweep of the coalition in the elections of 1932 must
have left some capable Liberal-sympathizers out of government posi
tions. Few were protected by the limited civil service on the island.
In Puerto Rico the independent voter was practically unknown. It
could therefore be expected that a new organization would find
among the employable, members of the party out of power.
When the charge of politics first came up against James Bourne
and the PRERA, an investigation was carried out by a man who
79. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Jacob Baker to Dr. Gruening, March
15, 1935.
80. Ibid., Letter from James Bourne to Mr. Hitchman, March 14, 1935.
81. Ibid.
82. DTIP, 9-8-63, Wire from Garcia Mendez, Valdds, Martinez Nadal,
and Pagan to President Roosevelt, March 21, 1935.
83. FERA, Letter from Pobcarpio Suarez to Harry Hopkins, May 5, 1935.
came very close to being apolitical. He had been the commissioner of

the interior in Governor Roosevelt, Jr.'s, good government cabinet.
Guillermo Esteves found that 27 per cent of the employees of the
PRERA were Liberals, 32 per cent Republican, 9 per cent Social
ists, and the remaining 32 per cent continentals or without political
affiliations. He also found that of the PRERA relief administrators in
the 76 municipalities of the island, only 12 were Liberals and the
rest were coalitionists.84
Telegrams rained on the Washington offices and the White
House. In the battle of the wires, Bourne came out on top, but this
had little effect and worse was to come. The island newspapers were
daily publishing charges and countercharges. Finally Aubrey Wil
liams in Washington authorized Northrop, who was on an inspec
tion tour in the Caribbean possessions, to make any investigation
necessary.85
Bourne was not without defenders. The minority of the legis
lature had turned in a factual statement on the cooperation between
the PRERA and the insular departments of health, the interior, and
education, and other agencies.86 Obviously, the Liberal party could
not be outspoken in its defense of the PRERA because this would
lend credence to the charges of the coalition.
The opinion which Washington received from official observers
of the FERA on the island was against a full-fledged investigation of
the PRERA and James Bourne at this time, because the publicity
accompanying the investigation of a personal friend of the President
would be unfortunate. Second, an official investigation would have
a "demoralizing effect" on the organization and "tend to create the
inefficiency" of which it was charged. Finally, "personal charges
against Bourne are groundless; charge that work is being carried on
without consulting legislature is equally groundless."87
Bourne himself was worried. He asked Dr. Gruening to give
Hopkins a ring and explain "what you know about the group which
is now in control of the legislature."88 After great effort he finally
got the governor, who had before refused to be involved in the con-
84. DTIP, 9-8-63, Letter from Martin Travieso to Dr. Gruening, March
19, 1935.
85. FERA, Letter from Williams to Northrop, March 28, 1935.
86. La Rehabilitation, March 30, 1935.
88. DTIP, 8-8-63, Letter from Bourne to Ernest, March 28, 1935.
troversy,89 to defend him in a letter to Harry Hopkins.90 Dr. Gruen-

ing spoke to Fellows, Baker, and Johnstone of the FERA, stressing
the political aspect of Bourne's opposition, and urging a wire sup
porting him. Hopkins sent two wires to back him.91 Gruening wired
him not to get alarmed.92
However, at this point Bourne had reason for concern. One of
his administrators, Jose" Soto Rivera, had been disbarred several years
previously from law practice for allegedly having pocketed $500
from a client rather than depositing it.93 Bourne was asked to explain
why this man should have such a high administrative position. In a
discussion in his office, he defended the man as an able administrator
and indicated that in his opinion the charges were unfounded. As
the discussion grew stronger, Bourne was supposed to have claimed
that there were more criminals in the insular legislature than there
were in the PRERA. He was promptly charged with slander.94
False witnesses and a Republican judge, up for reappointment,
soon made "the situation serious."95 Bourne was able to secure the
services of an excellent lawyer in the person of former Governor
James Beverley. Beverley was convinced that there would be no trou
ble keeping the matter out of the papers and even out of the courts
on the island.96 However, he was concerned about the continental
press which was quite uninformed about local matters. His concern
was not necessary and his confidence in resolving the matter satis
factorily was well founded. Within a month, through the Attorney
General in Washington, Benjamin Horton agreed to dismiss the
charges if the matter could be kept confidential.97 Here the battle
between the PRERA and the coalition will have to be left momentar
ily, since other developments must be noted.
89. FERA, Letter from Bourne to Fellows, March 29, 1935.

90. Ibid., Gov. Winship to Harry Hopkins, March 29, 1935.
91. Ibid., Wires from Hopkins to Bourne, March 29, 1935; and April
11, 1935.
92. DTIP, 9-8-63, Wire from Gruening to Jim, April 3, 1935.
93. FERA, Letter from Lino Padr6n Rivera, chairman of the Special
Committee of the House to Investigate the Public Works constructed by
PRERA, to the FERA, April 12, 1935.
94. Ibid., Letter from Bourne to Hopkins, April 6, 1935.
95. Ibid., Letter from Al Baruch to Jacob Baker, April 12, 1935; and
Letter from Bourne to Baker, April 10, 1935.
96. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rico Correspondence, Letter from
James Beverley to Ruby Black, April 8, 1935.
97. FERA, Letter from Joseph S. Keenan, Assistant Attorney General,
to Harry Hopkins, May 9, 1935.
The island legislature, it will had drawn up a bill

be recalled,
to establish a rehabilitation corporation to the exclusion of any other
corporation which might be organized for a similar purpose in the
future. Apparently this had been aimed at Bourne, but Senator
Mufioz was not convinced that it did not endanger the setting up of
the Chard6n Plan.98 He informed Dr. Gruening of his concern. The
director of the Division of Territories wired immediately to the gov
ernor instructing him to veto the bill, since it was contrary to the
ideas of the President concerning the administration of the recon
struction program."
Contrary to instructions, the governor took a direct interest in
the bill by holding a conference with the legislators prior to its ap
proval. At this meeting the party leaders were fully informed regard
ing the requisites for the setting up of a rehabilitation corporation.100
This action, according to Munoz, seemed to indicate that the measure
would be signed.101
The measure passed and was sent to the governor. It provided
for a board of directors of three PRERA members — administrator,
the assistant administrator, and a member to be selected by the gov
ernor — three coalition cabinet members, and the chairman in the
person of the governor.102 Hitchman, who was still on the island,
doubted that the FERA in Washington would approve such a meas
ure as a substitute for the corporation formed by Bourne.103 The gov
ernor sent a copy of the bill to Ernest Gruening for his perusal and
approval.104 Dr. Gruening was still unmoved and repeated his order
for a veto.105 In all he sent six telegrams to the same effect.
GovernorWinship still thought that something might be done
about the wishes of the legislature, or rather, the coalition. On April
10 he held another conference with the coalition leaders and this
time he included Bourne and his aides. The hope was to iron out the
differences between the two groups. The bill had been carefully
98. Ruby Black Collection, Chard6n Plan, Letter from Luis to Ruby
Black, March 5, 1935.
99. DTIP, 9-8-79 Legislation, Wire from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Win-
ship, March 20, 1935.
101. DTIP, 9-8-79, Letter from Mufioz to Gruening, March 30, 1935.
103. Ibid.
104. DTIP, 9-8-98, Wire from Gruening to Winship, April 1, 1935.
105. Ibid. Gruening to Winship, April 3, 1935.
drawn up on the basis of the best information that Iglesias was able
to obtain from the FERA in Washington.106 Nevertheless, Bourne
refused to budge and complained that the Republicans wanted to
control everything.107 The governor was optimistic and thought that
some progress had been made in establishing harmony between the
two groups. He wired Gruening to urge him to contact the FERA
and together calmly study the measure "in order to determine if
possible the advisability of substituting legislative corporation for
that of the PRERA."108
When this wire was received, Dr. Gruening happened to be
out of Washington for the day. However, there was in Washington
an employee of the PRERA, named Navas. He received a cable
from a friend in the San Juan PRERA office, Jose" Soto Rivera,
stressing the absolute necessity of a veto.109 Navas went directly to
Gruening's office and explained the seriousness of the situation.110
The result was a wire from Chapman to Winship ordering a veto of
the bill.111 Chapman later denied that Navas had anything to do
with his sending the order to Winship112 but the wheels must have
been put in motion by Navas' visit, since the governor's cable to
Gruening was called to Chapman's attention shortly after the visit.
Navas was not satisfied. He then went to the FERA offices to
repeat his tale. Baker checked with Chapman by phone and sent a
similar telegram to the governor.113 The urgency of the matter was
understood, since the time for a veto was running out. Navas was
proud of his afternoon's work and wired his friend: "Chapman,
Baker cabled Winship final definite instructions veto corporation
bill."114 This information was published in El Impartial (April 13,
1935), thus producing a delicate, embarrassing political situation.
106. FERA, Wire from Garcia Mendez to Iglesias, March 25, 1935;
Letter from Baker to Iglesias, March 26, 1935.
107. Ibid., Bourne to Hopkins, April 11, 1935.
108. La Fortaleza, 288/26, Wire from Winship to Gruening, April 11,
1935.
109. FERA, Special Material from Colonel Harrington's office, Wire
from Soto to Navas, undated, but must be April 11 or 12.
110. Ibid., Wire from Navas to Torres Mazorrana, April 14, 1935.
111. DTIP, 9-8-79, Wire from Chapman to Winship, April 12, 1935.
112. Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, File 1-270, Ad
ministrative General, FERA, Chapman to Ickes, May 4, 1935.
113. FERA, Wire from Baker to Winship, April 12, 1935.
114. Ibid., #450, Wire from Navas to Torres Mazorrana, April 13,
1935.
The morning after the press story the aroused legislature decided
to recess, which in effect meant adjournment, since the end of the
limited session was at hand. The governor twice called the politicians
and calmed them down somewhat. However, the following morning,
after meeting with the governor until 1:30 a.m., the legislature
closed its books.115 Four days later Governor Winship sailed for
Washington.
This bill which Governor Winship had been told to veto held
several pitfalls. The composition of the board of directors was po
litically stacked against the Washington administration. Apparently
the governor was the central figure in the organization. However,
past events had indicated that a legislative majority could make things
unpleasant for a recalcitrant governor. Furthermore, on this matter
as on others that will be mentioned below, the governor "had shown
. . . failure to comply . . . with orders."116 Second, although the
money for the corporation would come from Washington, there was
no federal representative besides the governor on the board. Bourne
had included Hitchman on his board of directors for the Rural Re
habilitation Corporation. Third, if
any of the bill happened to be
declared unconstitutional, the remaining sections would stand. This
provision could be potentially dangerous, since the bill appeared to
contradict the Organic Act which prevented the local legislature
from setting up additional executive departments. However, the
chief reason for veto was that this bill made it impossible to establish
any future corporation which might undertake to carry out the
Chardon Plan, thus insuring the control of the legislature over the
federal recovery program.
Winship never pretended to understand this aspect of the prob
lem. He conceived the matter as local issue between the coalition
a
and Bourne which he thought he could harmonize. If this had been

all that was involved in the matter, Winship might have been justi
fied in his action, and he might have achieved his purpose. Bourne117
was known to fight hard before giving an inch, but he later often
compromised away more than half of what he had been fighting
115. La Fortaleza, 288/26 Winship to Gruening, April 14, 1935.

116. DTIP, 9-8-79, Memorandum on History of the Corporation Bill
by Dr. Gruening, April 15, 1935.
117. This was the opinion of Luis Mufioz Marin, who expressed it to
Northrop. FERA, #406, Field Reports, Northrop to Harry Hopkins, April
23, 1935, p. 9.
for. Winship had until Saturday to veto the bill, and he hoped
that the Washington conference he had suggested would give him the
green light to go ahead with his harmonizing. He obviously had not
heard of the recent expression of the President concerning the ad
ministration of the reconstruction program to which Dr. Gruening
had referred. His legal adviser, Colonel Trent, had suggested that
the best procedure would be to have the corporation formed on the
island under the chairmanship of the governor.118 Therefore he saw
no conflict between the steps he was taking and the plans of the
federal authorities. The flat order to veto was hard to understand.
Furthermore, when it leaked to the press and caused the legislature
to close its doors thirty-six hours before its time had run out and
before important tax legislation had been approved, there was dire
need for a top-level conference.
Governor Winship sailed with a legal brief under his arm, charg
ing Ernest Gruening and the Division of Territories with "attempt
ing, whether intentionally or not, to reduce the only constituted
Government of Puerto Rico to a mere sub-division of that . . ."
Division of the Department of the Interior.119
Since the first of the year, the relations between the governor
and the Department of the Interior had been steadily growing worse;
the Chapman telegram and the subsequent leak to the press were
just the final straws in a long series of events.
Dr. Gruening had not been willing to sit idly by waiting for an
executive order or an act of Congress to establish his agency, author
ity, or corporation so that the much delayed Chardon Plan could be
put into reality. Much was to be done in Washington and on the
island to prepare the way for action. As will be recalled, the United
Porto Rico Sugar Company was in the process of being reorganized
into a new corporation under the guidance and financing of the
National City Bank. This new corporation, called the Eastern Sugar
Associates, ran into difficulties in the minor matter of registering
property in the Guayama area.
The time seemed propitious to take steps to enforce the dead-
letter Joint Resolution of Congress, May 1, 1900, which "restricted
[every corporation engaged in agriculture] to the ownership and con
trol of not to exceed 500 acres of land." Dr. Gruening wrote: "Prob-
118. La Fortaleza, 521, Memorandum from Col. Trent to Gov. Winship,

undated.
119. Ibid., #288/26, Draft drawn up by Col. Trent, May 6, 1935.
ably no single step will indicate quite so clearly to the people of

Puerto Rico that a new deal has arrived than the enforcement of the
long-dormant joint resolution of Congress."120
The plan was "quo warranto proceedings against the
to initiate
Eastern Sugar Associates in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico . . .
in the moment the decision in the appeal from the registrar is an
nounced."121 Dr. Gruening suggested as the legal mind
Colonel Trent
best prepared to guide the Attorney General and his staff in the mat
ter. Trent had retired from his position with the Judge Advocate
General in the War Department where he had had charge of the
division which handled the legal matters of the Bureau of Insular
Affairs.
On this issue of latifundia, the Secretary of the Interior and
the members of his department, like Gruening and Chapman, were
firmly on the record as in opposition. During 1935 Ickes and his
subordinates had had several opportunities to express publicly their
unequivocal position. Ickes wrote in a letter to Senator Duncan N.
Fletcher:
Puerto Rico . . . has been the victim of the laissez faire economy
which has developed the rapid growth of great absentee owned sugar
corporations, which have absorbed much land formerly belonging
to small independent growers and who in consequence have been
reduced to virtual economic serfdom. While the inclusion of Puerto
Rico within our tariff walls has been highly beneficial to the stock
holders of these corporations, the benefits have not been passed down
to the mass of Puerto Ricans. These on the contrary have seen the
lands on which they formerly raised subsistence crops, given over to
sugar production while they have been gradually driven to import
all their food staples, paying for them the high prices brought about
by the tariff. There is today more widespread misery and destitution
and far more unemployment in Puerto Rico than at any previous
time in its history.122
This attitude on the part of the Washington administration was

not finding an echo in the island administration. The reaction to the
memorandum prepared by Gruening and approved by the Secretary
120. Office of the Secretary, 9-8-13, Puerto Rico Lands, 500 Acres,
Memorandum from Gruening to Ickes and after approval sent on to Win-
ship, Jan. 2, 1935. 121. Ibid.
122. DTIP, 9-8-68, Government-Status, Letter from Secretary Ickes to
Sen. Fletcher, Jan. 15, 1935.
was outright opposition.From Benjamin Horton's office came the

following questions about the enforcement of the 500-Acre Law:
(1) What was a corporation? (2) What did the word "control"
mean? (3) Who was to enforce the law? (4) Finally, a general
questioning of the advisability of the law. The memorandum re
peated the conclusions expressed in the Brookings study by raising
the issue of efficiency and suggested that reasonableness dictated that
at least 60 per cent of the land necessary to operate a sugar central
should be controlled or owned by the corporation. Thus the Attor
ney General suggested that the law be changed from 500 acres to
6, 000. 123 Horton even ordered a subordinate to contact the sugar cor
poration lawyers to secure arguments to combat the 500-Acre Law.
At this point steps were quietly being taken to remove Horton
from his office.124 Cabinet approval had been sought and granted for
this move, and it was only a question of time. Dr. Gruening was
already in communication with Senator Luis Muiioz Marin concern
ing a possible substitute for Horton. Mufioz suggested three names:
Martin Travieso, Miguel Guerra-Mondragon, and Benigno Fernandez
Garcia. His preference was for the second and his weak choice the
first.125
While on the island, Dr. Gruening and Oscar Chapman learned
that Winship had not taken any steps to carry out the request of the
Division, as approved by the secretary, to proceed to prepare quo
warranto proceedings against Eastern Sugar Associates.128 In the
insular senate, Luis Mufioz Marin presented a resolution requesting
the Attorney General to enforce the 500-Acre Law. The resolution
received the senate's unanimous backing when a coalition ammend-
ment was accepted by the senator, instructing the government not
to limit its action to the Eastern Sugar Associates. A copy of the
resolution was sent to Ickes, who, in reply, cited his request of Jan
uary 4 to the governor.127
123. La Fortaleza, 305/2, Memorandum regarding Limits of Ownership

and Control in Puerto Rico, Jan. 14, 1935.
Ruby Black to Luis Mufioz, Jan. 24, 1935. 125. Ibid.
126. Office of the Secretary, 9-8-13, 500-Acre Law, Letter from Oscar
Chapman to Ickes, Feb. 18, 1935; also Letter from Gruening to Ickes, Feb.
28, 1935.
127. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Iglesias (copy to Winship),
Feb. 20, 1935.
In aSan Juan press interview, however, Horton denied that

he had been ordered to draw up quo warranto proceedings,128 and
the governor was then forced to move publicly or expose his lack of
sympathy with the planned procedure. Two months after the original
request was made, Horton was finally told to proceed. Dr. Gruening,
now no longer able to trust either Winship or Colonel Trent,129 and
convinced that Horton was incapable of the task, suggested that a
special counsel be called in order to aid the Attorney General.130
The man suggested for the job was Miguel Guerra-Mondrag6n.
Miguel Guerra-Mondragon had had "a long record of trying
cases in American courts.""1 He also had excellent backing. At Mu-
noz' request,132 Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union
wrote to his friend Dr. Gruening highly recommending Miguel Gue-
rra, the ACLU representative on the island, as a "brilliant lawyer."133
Governor Winship, who first accepted the candidacy of Miguel
Guerra-Mondragon as a "good" suggestion, played cat and mouse with
Gruening for over two weeks. He repeatedly mentioned the names of
other lawyers and refused to make a definite commitment about the
division's suggestion. Finally, he confirmed the appointment of Gue
rra-Mondragon as a special assistant to the Attorney General.134
Therefore, when the governor sailed for Washington, it was clear
to those in the Department of Interior from Ickes down to Gruening's
secretary that not only were things not running smoothly, but that
there would be trouble ahead. General Winship had been governor
for a little more than a year. Through his work in the War Depart
ment he had developed certain ideas about the governing of the off-
lying territories; these ideas did not include the forfeiting of local
sovereignty to the whims of a Washington administrator. Further-

129. Gov. Winship's personal attitude toward some of the provisions in
the Chardon Plan can be judged from the following incident. He called to
the attention of Miguel Angel Garcia Mendcz the failure of public sugar
centrales in Cuba and in the Philippines. Angel M. Torregrosa, Biografia
de Miguel Angel de Garcia Mhidez (San Juan: Imprenta Puerto Rico, 1939),
p. 129.
130. Office of the Secretary, Memorandum from Dr. Gruening to Sec
retary Ickes, Feb. 28, 1935. 131. Ibid.
132. ACLU, Vol. 953, Correspondence, Letter from Munoz Marin to
Roger Baldwin, Jan. 23, 1935.
133. Ibid., Letter from Roger Baldwin to Ernest, Jan. 23, 1935.
134. La Fortaleza, 288/26, Correspondence between Gov. Winship and
Dr. Gruening, March 6, 13, 15, 25, 27, 29, 1935; some of this can also be
found in the Office of the Secretary, 9-8-13.
more, General Winship was not one to take orders but rather to give
them. Puerto Rico would have profited inestimably if the governor
had been asked to step aside at this point for one who was more
sympathetic to the plans of the division. Indeed, Governor Winship's
appointment was a strange one in view of the subsequent change of
the island's affairs from War to Interior.
Dr. Gruening's case against the governor was fortified by, if not
rooted in, the almost daily letters of Senator Luis Mufioz Marin.
Through his letters, Gruening was kept abreast of the governor's
duplicity. Muiioz only asked that he be kept informed of what the
governor had been requested to do. He then followed through with
the complete information on what Winship had or had not carried
out. He advised Dr. Gruening as to what bills should be vetoed by
the governor, and exposed the governor's lack of sympathy toward
Guerra-Mondragon."5
It was Senator Mufioz' plan to force a resignation of Governor
Winship. This plan was "for the Department of Interior to issue
orders to the governor on every petty detail of government,"136 and
Dr. Gruening cooperated without being aware of the plan at first.
When he did realize what was happening, he accused Senator Mufioz
of trying to drive a wedge between him and the governor.137 How
ever, instead of resigning, Governor Winship fought back.
As a corollary to this strategy or as a disguise if it should fail,
Mufioz Marin had a plan for the splitting of the coalition. The Social
ist wing of the coalition had little desire to fight the 500-Acre legis
lation which Muiioz Marin had been pushing. To do so would have
denied one of the key planks in the party's platform since its founda
tion. Mufioz Marin cultivated this cooperation by astutely accepting
the amendment to his bill offered by Bolivar Pagan of the Socialists.
The conservative Republican wing of the coalition did not dare fight
the measure. However, the speaker of the house, Miguel Angel Gar
cia M^ndez, refused to turn the bill over to a Socialist-dominated
house committee, the judicial commission headed by Socialist Rivera
135. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letters from

Mufioz Marin to Ernest (copies to Ruby), March 22, 25, 27; April 2, 8,
1935.
136. Ibid., Gov. Winship, Letter from Mufioz Marin to Morris Ernst,
March 8, 1935.
137. Ibid., Puerto Rico Correspondence, Ruby Black to Mufioz Marin,
Feb. 8, 1935.
Zayas, hoping to have it bottled up elsewhere. Munoz' hope, and to

this end he had entered into a discussion with Bolivar Pagan and
Rivera Zayas, was to carry out a realignment of the political groups.
The New Deal elements in the Liberal party and the Socialist forces
with New Deal tendencies in the coalition would join together under
his leadership. To carry this out, he needed Gruening's help in secur
ing the nomination of a Socialist as treasurer and the presentation of
an administration-backed bill to give Puerto Rico two resident com
missioners in Congress. The reasoning behind the second resident
commissioner is that it was the only way the Liberals could justify
a vote for Santiago Iglesias. Munoz Marin confessed that he was
"sorry that it should take such conspiracy methods but the end is
good." One of the many advantages he saw was the setting up of
"one great party under the effective leadership of your humble serv
ant."138 The plan simmered for awhile, but it never came to a boil.
Munoz' position as the only unofficial advisor to the director of ter
ritories had led him to believe that he could make the world to his
own liking.
Following Winship, but not so as a part of his official group,
went "utility crown prince Vald^s . . . joined by sugar coated PiJuan
and Guanica Michael Angelo."139 Pedro Juan SerralMs was the
wealthy sugar magnate of the Ponce area and coalition member of the
legislature. Miguel Angel Garda Me"ndez, as well as owning vast
sugar lands, was a lawyer for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company.
Before leaving the island, he and Luis Munoz Marin had a fa
mous debate in the quaint and tradition-steeped town of San German.
The issue to be publicly debated was whether or not the Jones-Costi-
gan Sugar Act was beneficial to the island. In his presentation, Gar
cia M^ndez outlined the already familiar charges of discrimination
against Puerto Rican sugar in favor of the beet producers, the rising
costs of imported staples with, as yet, no corresponding benefits to
local agricultural producers, and the threat of economic reconstruc
tion through a supergovernment federal agency.140
Senator Munoz Marin's defense centered around Section 1 5 (f )
of the Jones-Costigan Act which he maintained "is in the law for
the benefit of Puerto Rico in order to prevent a large percentage of
138. Ibid., Letter from Munoz Marin to Ruby, Feb. 16, 1935, and
Munoz Marin to E. Gruening, March 29, 1935.
139. FERA, #450, Wire from Jos6 Soto to Navas, undated.
140. Biografia de Miguel Angel de Garcia Mdndez, pp. 92-144.
the payments from falling into the hands of large corporations."141

He then entered into a full explanation of the Chardon Plan which
was drawn up to carry out Section 15 (f). Munoz said:
The Chardon Plan practically destroys the restrictive effects of

the Costigan law, leaving in full vigor all the beneficial and compen
sating effects of the mentioned law; utilizing them in part for the
fundamental and permanent reconstruction of Puerto Rico, for the
reclaiming of land, for the distribution of small farms and homes,
for the workers of the sugar industry, for the final liquidation of
absenteeism which carries off millions of dollars yearly from Puerto
Rico.142
¥ * *
The coalition was journeying to Washington not so much to

defend the governor as to press the charges against James Bourne.
A very weighty, literally speaking, document was drawn up and
presented to the FERA officials. It had little effect, since Hopkins
was "convinced that most or all of them are not true. In the main
they boil down to politics. ...
On the other hand, I think that we
probably should make a formal investigation."143
Bourne's whole operation was given a close check. Aubrey Wil
liams, Jacob Baker, and Percy Fellows went over not only the charges,
but also the official reports of the PRERA. Northrop was on the
spot in Puerto Rico and was asked for a report on the political aspects
of the charges against Bourne. In his report there were a few notes
on an interview with Senator Munoz in which he had admitted that
there were little "black boxes" in the hands of the PRERA employees
which were used to solicit funds for the Liberal party at the time
the workmen were being paid.144 The senator himself was willing to
recognize privately that the influence of the Liberal party in the
PRERA was of some importance.145
As for the rest of the charges made, in the opinion of Baker and
141. Biografta de Luis Munoz Marin, p. 104. 142. Ibid., pp. 104-5.
143. FERA, Letter from Hopkins to President Roosevelt, April 26, 1935.
Hopkins had been quoted in La Prensa, March 13, 1935, as saying that
Bourne had been recommended by the White House, and that was enough
for him. About this same time, he was also having trouble with the governor
of Ohio and the relief program in that state.
144. FERA, #406, Field Reports, Northrop to Hopkins, April 23, 1935.
145. Ruby Black Collection, Puerto Rican Correspondence, Munoz Marin
to Ruby Black, April 10, 1935.
Fellows, they were "not at all convincing on close examination be

cause of the fact that
the items are fragmentary, often irrelevant and
immaterial, and do not indicate administrative policy and so ob
viously colored by political prejudice that they invite discount."146
While Bourne was down he was attacked from another side. The
material aid program of the social work division had been constantly
under fire from the Roman Catholic Church. The dense population
of the small Caribbean island could not be overlooked by the social
workers and the planners. Officially care was taken, however, to
make absolutely certain that nothing which would offend the Cath
olic Church could be laid at the door of public officers.1" On the oth
er hand, unofficially those in influential positions took opportunities
to attack the population problem from all sides.148
One of Bourne's social workers in the material health program,
Ana Alfonso de Colon, who was discharged "because of her unethical
and unfair practices,"149 was sent to Washington by the coalition to
present charges before the Roman Catholic authorities concerning
the birth-control program of the PRERA. As a result, John J. Burke
of the National Catholic Welfare Confederation wrote to the Presi
dent requesting that James Bourne and his wife be removed from
the federal payroll since they were "violating the Penal Code of the
United States in Puerto Rico." The specific charges were the manu
facturing of "preventatives that are used to prevent conception" and
the training of workers "who are advising women of Puerto Rico
in the practice of birth control."150 This letter reveals that the Presi
dent had previously assured the Catholic churchman that the PRERA
program would not include anything which would violate Roman
Catholic beliefs concerning birth control.
These charges were categorically denied by workers in the ma
ternal health department. They insisted that the method of birth
146. FERA, #450, Box 262, Fellows to Baker and Baker to Hopkins,
May 4, 1935.
147. Puerto Rican Folder 1934, Letter from Wallace to Weaver, July
14, 1934.
148. FERA, #435, 2 Puerto Rico, Box 262, Letter from Baker to Hop
kins, March 21, 1934; also Letter from Hopkins to John Kingsbury of the
Milbank Memorial Fund, April 3, 1934.
149. Ibid., #400, Box 259, Letter from Bourne to Fellows, March 29.
1935.
150. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from J. J. Burke
to President Roosevelt, April 1, 1935.
control recommended was the rhythm one officially accepted by the

Roman Catholic Church.151
James Bourne was concerned about the whole unpleasant mess,
but there was little cause for worry as Dr. Gruening had suggested.
Hopkins was satisfied that the matter was a political squabble in
which, while the PRERA was not completely apolitical (witness the
little black boxes and the more unfortunate Chapman telegram
leak), Bourne was doing his best to keep his administration free
from political control. In an island, where, as Northrop had written
"the greatest industry is politics,"152 Bourne was to be congratulated
on his success thus far.
As a result, the members of the coalition
in Washington were
given the bureaucratic run-around. Hopkins was too busy to see them
and they were told on several occasions that he had the case still
under study.153 Hopkins tried to shuffle the hot issue, which by this
time had considerably cooled, first to Dr. Gruening, and then to Gov
ernor Winship.154 Finally the delegation was frankly told
that the charges presented against Mr. Bourne did not seem to be
of such nature as to justify an investigation by us [FERA]; that they
involved matters of purely local administration; that our national
policies were not involved; nor were there allegations or appearances
of misuse of Federal funds.155
But if
James Bourne and his PRERA were not destined to fall
under the coalition attack, their demise was to be directed from more
friendly sources.
The outline of events leading to the creation of the agency which
would carry out the Chardon Plan is most confusing. Dr. Gruening
had suggested that March would be the latest date for the setting
up of this entity. The plan, it will be recalled, was for a Congres
sional bill to set up the agency or an executive order if this measure
were to fail. In addition to the legislative problem there was the
growing doubt that the processing tax could be used in the planned
151. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Dolores Santana and Carlos Rivera
Lugo to Josephine Brown, April 9, 1935.
152. Ibid., #406, Field Reports, Northrop to Hopkins, April 23, 1935.
153. Ibid., #400, Memorandum from Baker to Hopkins, May 14, 1935.
154. Ibid., Hopkins to Baker, May 6, 1935; also Baker to Iglesias, May
22, 1935.
155. DTIP, 9-8-63, Baker to Dr. Gruening, May 23, 1935.
fashion and in sufficient quantity to carry out completely the recon

struction plan because, in part, of the opposition of the legal branch
of the government. The administration had decided to unite all po
litical forces behind one gigantic relief measure. This was commonly
known as the $4 billion work relief bill. Out of this emergency relief
bill it was hoped that funds could be used for the Chard6n Plan. In
passing through Congress, however, certain restrictive measures were
tacked on which "would make it virtually impossible to carry out
Puerto Rican reconstruction program."156 Based on an economy drive
and a desire to limit relief spending to a definite period, these changes
necessitated either amendments to make a special exception of Puerto
Rico, or another measure.
While the funds were still in doubt, Dr. Gruening, Secretary
Ickes, and the President were having difficulty with Acting Director
of the Budget Bell. The bill which was to set up the Puerto Rican
Authority could not get Bell's approval, since he had been instructed
by the President not to approve any more authority bills.157 Secretary
Ickes argued that this blanket order did not apply to the Puerto Rican
case because the President himself had taken not only direct interest
in the matter but had gone to the extent of diagraming the relations
between the to-be-established authority and the existing insular gov
ernment.158
The President had envisaged a government council composed of
two insular legislators and two commissioners from the governor's
cabinet and four members of the Puerto Rican Authority. The chair
man of this council was to be the governor of Puerto Rico. As can be
seen, the council, coordinating federal and local economic and social
reconstruction work, could be easily dominated by the governor.159
This coordinating council under the guidance of Dr. Gruening,
not the governor, actually met several times in the fall of 1935 to
settle minor adjustment problems such as the wage scales to be used
on the coffee projects. However, when Gruening returned to Wash
ington, almost half of the following year passed before there was
another meeting. Winship never quite understood that he was sup-

dent Roosevelt, March 11, 1935.
157. DTIP, 9-8-98, Letter from Secretary Ickes to President Roosevelt,
April 2, 1935.
158. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Bell, April 26, 1935.
159. Ibid., Contains photostatic copy of the President's diagram.
posed to be chairman of this council or if he did understand it, he

allowed the council to be dominated by either Dr. Gruening or Dr.
Chardon.160 Gruening insisted that this council had no power to dic
tate to either the insular government or the Authority.
The council presents another example of government by com
mittee which just did not turn out as planned. There is no doubt
that coordination between insular and federal authority was neces
sary, particularly when the Authority gave signs of moving into so
many areas, such as vocational education, rural health, and electric
power, in which theoretically, at least, the insular government was
also concerned.101
The creation of the Authority was not to be trusted to the doubt
ful action of Congress. Influential Senators had expressed their op
position to the Chardon Plan. Senator Vandenberg and Senator
Tydings, chairman of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs, had
both indicated their opposition.162 The sugar interests had had time to
build up the opposition to the radical readjustment of the sugar pro
duction, which was inherent in the Chardon Plan. It was therefore
decided that an executive order would be necessary to establish the
entity to carry out the program.
The executive order originally would have established a recon
struction board of seven men headed by the Secretary of the Interior.
Because of the objection of the Bureau of the Budget, the order had
to be redrawn by its original author, William Hastie, assistant to the
solicitor.
In a conference at which Dr. Gruening, Carlos Chardon, Sen
ator Luis Munoz Marin, and Lee Pressman were present, Hastie was
asked to draw up another executive order in which an administrator
would replace the board. This procedure followed a suggestion of
Lee Pressman, legal adviser to the Department of Agriculture, based
on his experience with the legal problems which had arisen out of
the creation of the Resettlement Administration and the Rural Elec
trification Administration.163
But there was more to this than met the eye, as was to be later
160. La Fortaleza, 293/26, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship,

April 10, 1936.
161. Congressional Record, Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 79,
p. 12067.
162. Department of the Interior, 9-8-15, General, Letter from Wm.
Hastie to Secretary Ickes, Nov. 25, 1936. 163. Ibid.
admitted. The presence of Lee Pressman immediately aroused the

suspicions of the ever-vigilant Burlew, who jumped to the conclusion
that Dr. Gruening was using outside legal aid to pull a sneak attack
on Secretary Ickes. While Gruening insisted that Pressman's sug
gestions were of value, he did not deny later that he had mixed up
his motives in using them.164 However, he did maintain that he was
more interested in avoiding the conservative hand of Burlew than
the influence of the Secretary himself.
The executive order went to the White House for the President's
signature with the name of the administrator in blank. Secretary
Ickes attached a note suggesting that he would be more than willing
to supply the missing name if the President so desired.165 When Ex
ecutive Order No. 7057 was signed on May 28166 with the name of
Ernest Gruening as administrator inserted without Ickes' consultation,
the Secretary was convinced that he had been outfoxed. There is
little doubt that he would have selected anyone other than Gruening
but the technicality was important, because, as will be later seen, he
felt that Dr. Gruening should not be independent of the Secretary
of the Interior in his dealings as administrator of the Puerto Rican
Reconstruction Administration. Dr. Gruening pleaded innocence to
intrigue, insisting that he had learned of his appointment from the
press.167
The whole insular political situation, including the creation of
the PRRA, and even Winship's role in island affairs, was probably
discussed when Senator Munoz and Dr. Gruening met with the
President shortly after noon on Tuesday, May 7. 168 The meeting had
been requested by the senator, but it was the President's idea to invite
Dr. Gruening.
Shortly after this meeting, Dr. Gruening urgently called the
FERA to make sure that Hopkins "did not make any decision or com
mitments that put anything in the hands of the governor."169 General
164. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Secretary Ickes, Nov. 25, 1936.
165. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400 (b), Note from
Secretary Ickes to President Roosevelt, May 21, 1935.
166. Public Papers and Addresses, III, 193.
167. Department of Interior, 9-8-15, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Sec
retary Ickes, Nov. 25, 1936.
President Roosevelt, May 3, 1935; Memorandum for Mac from F. D. R., May
15, 1935.
169. FERA, #450, Memorandum from Baker to Hopkins, May 15,
1935.
Winship was still governor and there was no indication that he would
voluntarily step down from his exalted position on the tropical island.
Dr. Gruening wrote to Governor Winship suggesting a meeting
with the island legislators, since "they are all in Washington" to plan
a special session of the island legislature. This session was necessitated
by the premature suspension of the last session and by the need for
certain measures which would facilitate the work of the PRRA. Dr.
Gruening thought by discussing the necessary legislation in the capi
tal any difficulties could be ironed out and he added: "We shall
know in advance if any objections or obstructions are likely to be en
countered."170
One important political leader was absent. Antonio Barcelo's
advanced age and poor English prevented his making frequent trips
to the continent. Now Senator Muiioz Marin cabled him to come up
immediately.171
Most of the new legislation was relative to the enforcement of
the 500-Acre Law. There were five measures, three of which were of
prime importance:
1. A bill giving the insular supreme court original jurisdiction

in quo warranto proceedings.
2. A bill which authorized the treasurer of Puerto Rico to im
pose a fine from $25 to $5,000 a day for each day in which a cor
poration violated the 500-Acre Law.
3. The bill which declared public utilities' all projects of the
federal or insular government or any corporation of either.172
The program for the special session secured the "enthusiastic sup
port ... of the leaders of all parties"173 and its passage was pledged.
While this program was being worked on in the special session of
the legislature, the Washington administrator saw a need for a bill
to permit the funds to be assigned to Puerto Rico to be spent in a
different way than that stipulated in the $4 billion work relief bill.
Dr. Gruening jokingly suggested that the bill be titled: "A Bill to
170. DTIP, 9-8-79, Legislation, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Win
ship, May 28, 1935.
171. La Democracia, June 1, 1936.
172. DTIP, 9-0-79, Letter from Gruening to Gov. Winship, May 28,
1935.
173. Ibid., 9-8-98, Letter from Gruening to Gov. Winship, June 29,
1935.
Permit Us Not to Squander Federal Funds in Puerto Rico, but to

Expend them Efficiently, Wisely, and with Lasting Results."174
In the United States, relief money spent rapidly and within the
two-year limit as required by the $4 billion bill, served to revive in
dustry. The contrary was true in Puerto Rico, plagued with a colonial
economy. The economic problem of Puerto Rico could only be solved
by a complete readjustment of a permanent nature of economic rela
tionships. It was estimated that sixty cents out of every dollar spent
in Puerto Rico returned to the United States on the first turnover.
To remedy this would take much longer than two years. Also, the
reconstruction program envisaged a long-range program of reforesta
tion, land resettlement, electrification, and other projects, and the
President was called upon to use his influence on Congress where,
without it, any Congressional approval seemed doubtful.175
Although the President was willing to apply pressure, the finan
cial aspect had to be cleared first. This was an unpleasant task. The
man who had control over the expenditure of the funds of the work
relief bill was Harry Hopkins. It is true that there was an allotment
committee, but unless Hopkins approved and forwarded the request
to the committee, the chance of success was small.
Dr. Gruening wrote to President Roosevelt requesting $75
million of the $4 billion. He admitted that the amount looked large,
but in view of "the 350,000 unemployed and the magnitude of the
task, it is not excessive. Moreover, we are doing both relief and recon
struction with it."176 The memorandum was sent on to Hopkins, who
found it too large. He suggested that requests for money for Puerto
Rico should be handled as they came up.177 Dr. Gruening was
advised by the President to get together with Hopkins to work some
thing out. He agreed with Hopkins that the request was too large,
but he felt that a definite sum should be agreed upon.178 Further
more, both Gruening and Hopkins were to reach an agreement over
the division of labor and administration of the relief funds.
174. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Letter from Dr.
Gruening to President Roosevelt,
June 21, 1935.
175. Ibid., Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Charles West,
June 21, 1935.
176. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to President Roosevelt, June 20,
1935.
177. Ibid., Memorandum from Hopkins to the President, June 24, 1935.
178. Ibid., Memorandum from the President to Dr. Gruening, June 26,
1935.
There is no evidence that Hopkins allowed Bourne to know his

feelings about the development of the economic reconstruction pro
gram on the island and the future of the PRERA. However, Hopkins
and Bourne were not very far apart in their opinion of the recent
and future developments of the federal program in Puerto Rico. The
prevalent opinion in the top office of the FERA was expressed in a
memorandum drawn up by Jacob Baker: "I do not think that we
would want to turn relief money over to a new organization."179 The
new organization was the PRRA and the request was now made for
a big chunk of relief funds. Hopkins was not going to give in easily.
The President estimated that Dr. Gruening would need between
$50 and $60 million to do an adequate job in Puerto Rico. However,
Hopkins pointed out that such a bite in the funds would leave the
states short during the winter and coming election year. In view of
this argument, Dr. Gruening put the administration first and Puerto
Rico second and accepted the offering of $35 million, less than half
of what he had originally requested.180 Of course, he had the promise
of the President that this original amount would be anted up to
$100 million in the next two or three years.181
Dr. Gruening soon realized that he had been taken in by Hop
kins, but more of that later.
With this matter temporarily settied, the President wrote a

letter to Dr. Gruening outlining the general purpose of the PRRA,
stressing the point that this was a program for "permanent recon
struction" and "not merely immediate relief ," and he added :
It is my intention further
to urge upon Congress that the PRRA
be continued beyond the period for which these funds have been
made available and that the work of rehabilitation in Puerto Rico
be carried on over the more extended period necessary to a well
considered and full accomplishment of these purposes.182
Copies of this letter were sent to Representative Kocialkowski and
179. FERA, Inter-Departmental Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs,

Box 262, Memorandum from Jacob Baker to Edna Lonigan, Nov. 3, 1934.
180. DTIP, 9-8-63, Memorandum from Dr. Gruening to Hopkins, Aug.
25, 1935.
181. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Memorandum from Presi
dent Roosevelt to Dr. Gruening, Aug. 1, 1935.
182. Ibid., Official Files #400 (b), Letter from President Roosevelt to
Dr. Gruening, July 15, 1935.
to Senator Tydings along with a previous letter to Dr. Gruening

along the same line.183
The bills to put this into effect were duly prepared (H.R. 8621
and S. 3140). In the Senate on July 30, unanimous consent was
requested to pass the measure. Senator Wallace H. White, a Repub
lican from Maine, objected to the bill even though, as he admitted,
he had not heard of it until that morning.184 Dr. Gruening was in
formed of the block and contacted Senator White, with whom he
was on friendly terms from the time he had been editor in Portland.
The senator was speedily convinced of his error and confessed that
two individuals, one a Luis Oberg, who claimed to represent the
resident commissioner, and the other Martinez Nadal, who claimed
to be the president of the insular senate and the leader of the local
party in power on the island, had come to him and pleaded for his
cooperation to help stop this measure which was opposed by the
people of Puerto Rico.185
In a partially vacant House of Representatives and on one of the
last days of a long session, on August 24, bill H.R. 8621 ran into
difficulty. Representative Dempsey of New Mexico, who, because of
the absence of Mr. Kocialkowski, was pushing the bill through, was
not particularly adept in his defense of the measure. Santiago Igles-
ias, who had shown up earlier in the day to insert a memorandum
in the Congressional Record prepared by Alonso Torres against the
PRRA,186 was fortunately not present. He had spoken against the
bill in committee and appeared on the floor of the House in time to
see it voted down.187 One of the strong forces which worked against
the measure was the insurance lobby. The badly needed government
insurance program to protect the farmer against hurricanes was at
stake in the provision. A government insurance program was too
much of a threat to the private companies.
In addition to the elimination of the insurance fund, the PRRA
also was prevented from setting up a rotating fund which would have
allowed self-sustaining program to be carried out. For example,
a
monthly payment on resettlement houses would now revert to the

federal government rather than to the PRRA to be used in further
183. Ibid., Copies to Rep. Kocialkowski and to Sen. Tydings, Aug. 3,

1935. 184. Congressional Record, Senate, p. 12067.
185. El Mundo, Oct. 23, 1935.
186. Congressional Record, House, p. 14562-3.
reconstruction work. This setback meant that the pressure would be

on the PRRA to set up its program as quickly as possible. With long
court cases in the offing there was questionable possibility of accom
plishing the minimum objectives within a two-year limit.
On the island the newly created PRRA was running into more
serious trouble. The special session started on June 25 and within
a short time the politicians showed signs of a very short memory. The
promises made in Washington were apparently invalid in the Carib
bean. Dr. Gruening wired Winship to send a statement to the press
so that public pressure might be brought on the recalcitrant legis
lators.188 This, of course, was not the way Winship worked, nor was
public opinion in Puerto Rico capable of the same political force as
continental public opinion. However, something had to be done.
La Democracia did its bit by running a story on Secretary Ickes'
public attack on the large landholders.189 The legislation still went
through in an emasculated form. In protest and against the orders of
Munoz,190 the Liberal party legislators walked out of the legislature.
In the opinion of Dr. Gruening, the key man who failed was again
the governor. As he said: "The exercise of a modicum of ability,
desire, and determination on the part of the governor might have
prevented this."191
Dr. Gruening felt that the governor should be called to order
directly by the President. A cablegram was drawn up for the Presi
dent to sign. At the President's request, Senator Munoz was con
sulted and he approved the final wire.192 In part it read :
I do not understand why the land policy bills were not passed
in satisfactory and workable form. ...
It appears to me that an ade
quate solution of this problem and of the whole reconstruction in
P.R. will require the exercise of great ability and determination on
the part of the governor and the closest cooperation between him and
the Department of Interior which is entrusted with the development
of this policy.193
188. DTIP, 9-8-98, Wire from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship, June
29, 1935. 189. La Democracia, July 13, 1935.
190. Ruby Black Collection, Luis Muiioz Marin, Wire from Munoz,
July 12, 1935.
191. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Memorandum from Dr.
Gruening to Secretary Ickes, July 17, 1935.
192. Ibid., Memorandum from Secretary Ickes to the President, July
19, 1935.
193. Ibid., Franklin D. Roosevelt to Gov. Winship, July 19, 1935.
With matters in this the Secretary of the Interior deemed

state,
it advisable to dip into the private fund, which he had at his disposal
for times such as these, to send to the island a special investigator
who would make a personal report directly to Ickes. After several
turned away from the task, one Antoine Volkoff was sent to the
island under the guise of an inquiring tourist. The report Ickes
received in no way changed the general impression of the situation
which the Secretary must have gotten through the regular channels.
While the report was very critical of the coalition, it did not offer
any information which would have enabled the Secretary to urge the
President to remove his governor. Volkoff did recommend a change
in the Organic Act which would allow the island to elect its own
governor. However, it also revealed that Winship was under fire from
all sides. Under these conditions, President Roosevelt, having already
admitted one error in the person of Gore, would have had to have
grave charges against Winship to justify his removal.
Dr. Gruening was furious with the governor and bluntly ex
pressed his dissatisfaction with Winship to the Secretary. He was
completely convinced that General Winship, as governor of Puerto
Rico, was unfit to continue as a member of the New Deal adminis
tration. Governor Winship used the old dodge, which should have
been familiar to the Washington officials by now. He pleaded inno
cence and ignorance, choosing to believe that the reprimand he re
ceived from the President referred to some insignificant legislation.
However, he gave notice that he was leaving for Washington to con
fer with the President.194 The visit to Washington was brief, and,
while there is no indication of what transpired in his conferences
with Gruening, Ickes, or the President, Winship returned to Puerto
Rico and followed subsequent orders. The President may have de
fended the old man, but at the same time he must have made it
clear that Dr. Gruening was carrying out his wishes with the recon
struction program.
When Governor Winship returned to the island he was received
with a blast of protest from the front page of La Democracia (August
2, 1935). Mufioz had warned Secretary Ickes of the reception that
was being planned for Winship, but the Secretary confessed that he
was powerless to act. Barcel6, who was leading the attack in the
absence of Munoz who was still in Washington, asserted that Win-
194. DTIP, 9-8-98, Letter from Gov. Winship to President Roosevelt,

July 20, 1935.
ship's return was an insult to the Puerto Rican people. However,

realizing that the tactic would not produce the desired results, Mu-
fioz Marin wisely called it off.105
Munoz' move cut off a potentially embarrassing political battle
which had all the characteristics of the Gore affair. There is no doubt
that Governor Winship should have been eased out. The unfortunate
events to follow might have been avoided if this had been done.
However, Mufioz Marin, who was convinced that Winship had to go,
saw that he could not use the same technique he had used on Gore.
Furthermore, the President was still solidly behind his appointment.
If Gruening could keep the governor under control, for a year at
least, a victory at the polls would limit the danger of the governor.
Upon his return, Governor Winship vetoed the dangerous land
bill, which would have approved temporarily the owning of land in
excess of 500 acres. Dr. Gruening demanded a statement from the
governor explaining that the reason for the veto was to assure the
public of the "administration's determination to carry through the
500-Acre Land policy."198 This statement was finally made by the
governor and published in the island press.197
As the PRRA got slowly under way, the "handwriting on the
wall" became clearer to James Bourne. He struggled right up to the
last in refusing to accept the inevitable. When the House of Repre
sentatives in Washington voted down the rotating fund bill, Bourne
wrote Harry Hopkins again urging that the PRERA be recognized
as the only organization which could carry out the reconstruction
work efficiently, rapidly, and without the influence of politics.198
Hopkins finally told Bourne what he should have made clear
from the beginning.
It is planned that the PRRA shall succeed the PRERA and shall
assume whatever responsibilities for relief seem to be necessary. Since
it is expected that the funds of the Reconstruction Administration
will be available in September first for Puerto Rico, and after Sep
tember 30th no further grants will be made by the FERA.199
195. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Memorandum from Dr.

Gruening to President Roosevelt, Aug. 7, 1935.
196. DTIP, 9-8-79, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship, Aug.
6, 1935; Wire from Gruening to Winship, Aug. 12, 1935.
197. El Mundo, Aug. 12, 1935.
198. FERA, Box 259, Letter from Bourne to Hopkins, Aug. 26, 1935.
199. Ibid., Letter from Hopkins to Bourne, Confidential, Aug. 27, 1935.
However jolting the first part of the message was for Bourne, the
second part was a real shock for Dr. Gruening.
Dr. Gruening had by now sensed that Hopkins had shortchanged
him in the drop from $75 to $35 million. Although he had little
basis for his argument since, as we have seen, he had admitted that
the PRRA was and relief work program
to take over reconstruction
for a longer period until the PRRA might get its program under way.
Otherwise the meager funds would be rapidly eaten up.
Dr. Gruening used every tool at his command. Governor Win-
ship wrote to Hopkins pleading that "one hundred thousand families
will be deprived of means of subsistence until other means of liveli
hood is provided. This will undoubtedly take some months and I do
not see where it will be possible to withdraw any of the funds allo
cated to the Reconstruction Administration without breaking down
the purpose of the organization."200 The governor also wired the
President urging him to give consideration to the letter he had
written to Hopkins.
The situation was critical. It was the fall of the year, and it
was a long time until the cane-cutting season in January. Dr. Gruen
ing pulled out his aces. Dorothy and Jim Bourne were sent flying
up to Hyde Park to plead the case of the PRRA.201 Even this failed
to budge Hopkins, since all the Bournes got was a reallocation of
money and not any new grants. Finally Dr. Gruening joined Bourne
in Washington and together they visited both Hopkins and the Presi
dent on one of the closing days of September.202 They succeeded in
getting an extension of the PRERA until June, 1936, and a reallo
cation, not a new grant, of $9 million.203 Hopkins named Ernest
Gruening as director of the PRERA to replace Bourne.204 Bourne
would still continue to direct the organization, but he would now
be under orders from Dr. Gruening. This was in keeping with the
plan to integrate the federal agencies of the island under one body.
200. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from Gov. Winship
to Hopkins, Sept. 9, 1935.
201. Ibid., Official Files #400 (b), Letter from Dr. Gruening to Presi
dent Roosevelt, Sept. 9, 1935.
202. Ibid., Official Files #400, Box 47, Note from Mclntyre to Gruen
ing, Sept. 16, 1935; Letter from Bourne to Mclntyre, Sept. 7, 1935.
203. El Dta, Oct. 1, 1935.
204. FERA, #610, Letter from Hopkins to Bourne, Sept. 26, 1935;
also #400, Box 259, Letter from Hopkins to Gov. Winship, Sept. 27, 1935,
and Letter from Hopkins to Gruening, Sept. 27, 1935.
The PRERA as a subdivision of the PRRA could keep the necessary

relief program operating with decreasing momentum as the PRRA
program expanded and took hold on the island.
The difficult period of transition might have been carried out
smoothly if Ernest Gruening and James Bourne had been able to
work with each other. In almost two years Bourne had built up a
large organization and carried on a program of which he was justly
proud. He could not understand the need of being replaced by a
new organization.
Dr. Gruening had risen high and fast in the administrative
circles of Washington. Not only was he director of the DTIP, but
now he was in charge of a multimillion dollar authority which had
before it a tremendous renovating task. He was responsible directly
to the President and had direct access to him. All of this must have
been a heady experience.
The two personalities of Bourne and Gruening clashed. The best
thing that the Bournes could have done would have been to resign.
At least this was the considered opinion of Harry Hopkins.205 They
felt, however, too closely tied to Puerto Rico, to the people they
served, and to their relief agency. James Bourne accepted a position
as chief of the Division of Relief and Relief Work within the PRRA.
He was placed on the six-man Executive Committee of the PRRA.
Mrs. Bourne directed the Social Work Division.206
The working relations were anything but pleasant. As Mrs.
Bourne, writing to Eleanor Roosevelt, indicated : "I am sure that Dr.
Gruening would like both Jim and me to resign and apparently, to
bring it about, is using the same tactics — personal humiliation — he
is using with the governor."207 Mrs. Roosevelt turned to her husband
and then to Harry Hopkins for a possible answer to Mrs. Bourne.
There was none. The only solution to the clashing personalities was
resignation. This the Bournes would not accept.
The first appointment Dr. Ernest Gruening made in the PRRA
was that of naming Carlos Chard6n as regional administrator. He
was fully aware that this selection would not be well received by the
coalition leaders.208 The points in favor of Char don, who had led the
205. FERA, #610, Hopkins to Eleanor Roosevelt, Nov. 25, 1935.

206. El Impartial, Sept. 10, 1935.
207. FERA, Mrs. Bourne to Eleanor Roosevelt, Oct. 7, 1935.
208. DTIP, Personal File, Carlos Chard6n, Letter from Dr. Gruening to
Dr. Benner, June 25, 1935.
nonpolitical aspect of the reconstruction struggle on the island and

in Washington for the past year, far outweighed the adverse charges
and the ire of the politicians. If Chard6n had a political label, it
certainly was not his doing. As Dr. Padin, who had been consulted,
wrote: "He was born Unionista just as he was born Roman Catholic
and ponceiio. He could not help it."209
Shortly after Carlos Chardon graduated from college, he was
chosen by Governor Towner to be commissioner of agriculture and
labor. From this position he was appointed chancellor of the Uni
versity of Puerto Rico on the nomination of the previous man, Chan
cellor Dr. Thomas Benner. Neither Towner nor Dr. Benner regretted
their choice, and they continued to speak highly of the brilliant
scientist.210 In recognition of his career as a public servant and in
tellectual leader, Dr. Hopkins of Dartmouth College extended to him
the invitation to accept an honorary doctorate degree, which was
bestowed in June, 1935.
With such a record in public administration, Dr. Chardon had
little opportunity to develop into a political leader. And yet, his sym
pathies were decidedly with the New Deal. Again quoting Padin,
we find the opinion expressed: "Chardon should be appointed, if
for no other reason, to serve notice on the Tories and on the doubt
ing Thomases that the New Deal is going."211
As it became more apparent that Chardon was to be appointed,
the coalition telegrams and messages rained on Washington, charging
him with immorality, plagiarism, politics, etc.212 Most of these mes
sages came from coalition mayors of small towns in the interior.
Luis Munoz Marin, who was in Washington during this period,
was confident of the appointment of Dr. Chardon, but he neverthe
less wired his Liberal henchmen, Ramos Antonini, Gutie"rrez Fran-
qui, and others, to get busy on endorsements of Chardon. There was
"no danger," he said, "but record should show great non-partisan
[sic] endorsement."213 As telegrams poured into Washington,
the
Munoz received every one and properly identified their political color
209. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Padin to Dr. Gruening, June 12, 1935.
210. Ibid., Letter from Horace Towner to Dr. Gruening, June 13, 1935;
Letter from Dr. Benner to Dr. Gruening, June 22, 1935.
211. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Padin, June 12, 1935.
212. See the Personal Files of Dr. Carlos Chard6n, ibid.
213. Ruby Black Collection, Luis Mufioz Marin, Letter from Munoz
Marin to La Democracia, May, 1935.
for Dr. Gruening. Upon reading the stack over, one comes to the
conclusion that the Liberal group showed more originality and sin
cerity, but they were not so numerous as the coalition form-like
messages.
Another appointment which Dr. Gruening brought about much
more quietly by pulling wires behind the public stage was the re
placement of Benjamin Horton, as attorney general, by Benigno
Fernandez Garcia. As noted above, this move was in the offing in
the spring of the year, but it had to be postponed because the news
leaked to Drew Pearson and Bob Allen and was published in their
column. Also, the feelings between Ickes and Cummings, the Attor
ney General, were not the most cordial at that time.214
Dr. Gruening had submitted two names to President Roosevelt
for the position. Besides Fernandez Garcia, the name of Miguel
Guerra-Mondragon, who was preparing the brief on the 500-Acre
cases, was suggested. The President indicated his preference for
Fernandez Garcia and sent the word on to the Acting Attorney
General.215 Quickly and quietly, the change was made, and another
Farley appointment was removed from the island scene. Horton did
not leave the island, but he accepted a sinecure in the PRRA.
Fernandez Garcia immediately began to clean house when he
fired the assistant attorney general, who had gone at the request of
Horton to one of the representatives of Eastern Sugar Associates to
ask him for help in diverting the quo warranto proceedings.216 The
reaction of the coalition to the appointment and to the activity of
the appointee was immediate. Fernandez Garcia, it will be recalled,
was the candidate defeated by Santiago Iglesias for the position of
resident commissioner in the previous elections. Martinez Nadal of
the coalition protested that any continental with similar qualifications
would have been better than his fellow islander.217
The appointment, in spite of the political objections, was a good
one. It was the first time a Puerto Rican had held this important
214. Ibid., Puerto Rican Correspondence, Letters from Ruby Black to

Luis, Feb. 22, 1935, and March 1, 1935.
215. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Note from the
President to Acting Attorney General, Aug. 1, 1935.
216. DTIP, 9-8-104, Personal File: B. Fernandez Garcia, Letter from
Fernandez to Manuel Rodriguez Serra, Nov. 6, 1935.
217. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Martinez Nadal to Presi
dent Roosevelt, Sept. 2, 1935.
position in the cabinet. Shortly after his temporary installation (still

waiting approvement by the Senate in Washington), Fernandez
Garcia was elected chairman of the board of governors of the Bar
Association of Puerto Rico.218
Another selection made about this time which had no immediate
political significance was the securing of the services of Earl Parker
Hanson as planning consultant for the PRRA.219 Hanson was to pre
pare a report on the status of planning in the insular government220
and to draw up a general planning report for the island.221 The sec
ond report was similar to reports submitted by other state planning
consultants.
Once on the island to set up his organization, Dr. Gruening was
paid a friendly visit by a delegation of the coalition leaders, headed
by Garcia Mendez and accompanied by Bolivar Pagan, Padron Rivera
(Socialists), and Alfonso Vald^s. The reception extended to them
was anything but cordial. Dr. Gruening, probably recalling the treat
ment extended to James Bourne by some of these same politicians,
called in his secretary and told her to serve as witness as well as to
take everything down that was said in case that it needed to be re
called or printed. According to Jose" A. Ferre, who was not present,
his attitude was cold and hostile and he acted toward the visitors as
if he were a "mean old school teacher."222
Dr. Gruening assured the coalition leaders that he would not
turn over the PRRA to any one political party, but at the same time
he insisted that those who became part of the administrative branch
of the Authority be in sympathy with the purpose of the PRRA.223
It was pointed out by the doctor that sympathy could be gauged by
legislating in favor of the plan and backing those measures necessary
to the strengthening of the work of the PRRA.
218. Ibid., Official Files #400, Box 259, Letter from the Board to
Sen. Tydings, Sept. 13, 1935; sent on to the President.
219. National Archives, Record Group No. 187, Records of the National
Resources Board, Personal File: Hanson, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Secre
tary Ickes, Aug. 27, 1935.
220. Ibid., Earl P. Hanson, "Planning Problems and Organization in
Puerto Rico," Nov. 23, 1935.
221. Department of Interior, 9-8-15, Letter from Ickes to Dr. Gruening,
Sept. 26, 1935.
222. DTIP, 9-8-2, Puerto Rican Administration General, Letter from
Jose Ferre' to Marvin Mclntyre and Stephen Early, Sept. 14, 1935.
223. EI Pais, Sept. 4, 1935.
As soon as the trustees of the university met and gave their

approval to the leaves requested by Dr. Chardon and Professor Rafael
Fernandez Garcia, the complete list of the administrative officers of
the executive board of the PRRA was published. Once this list was
public, the worst fears of the coalition were confirmed. According
to the coalition, the list read as follows:224
Liberals Continentals Neutral

Carlos Chardon Mr. Hadley Rafael Gonzalez
Guillermo Esteves Col. Behr Luis R. Esteves
Rafael Fernandez Garcia Benjamin Horton
Miguel Guerra-Mondragon James Bourne
Anti-Coalition Socialist
Manuel Egozcue Rivera Zayas
Antonio Luchetti
About one of these individuals a little more information might

be given. Manuel Egozcue was an engineer of long standing in the
insular department of the interior. He had risen to be an assistant
to Commissioner Francisco Pons when in August, 1934, the latter
resigned. The coalition recommended that Egozcue be promoted to
the top position since he was a member of their party. This action
was taken by the governor, but since the legislature was not in
session, the appointment was an interim one.
Before this appointment could be made final, there developed a
situation in the bureau of insular telegraph, a subdivision of the
department of the interior, which demanded an official investigation.
The charge was made that "the secrecy of the telegraph service was
being constantly violated and no message which might have some
political significance was transmitted to the addressee until it was
examined by the political bosses."225 The investigation produced suf-
ficent evidence to dismiss the chief of the bureau and two of his
subordinates.
When Egozcue's nomination was sent to the insular senate for
approval by the governor, he was denied the backing of his party.
According to the source of this information : "The governor admitted
that no specific charges had been presented against Egozcue, and in
224. El Mundo, Oct. 28, 1935.

225. La Fortaleza, 288/26, Letter from Martin Travieso to Gov. Win-
ship, July 29, 1935.
the most candid way told me that he had been assured by the oppo
nents of Egozcue that their opposition was not inspired by any desire
to punish him."226 As Dr. Gruening pointed out to the governor,
Egozcue's only crime was that "he was a faithful public servant and
did his duty."227
When Dr. Gruening was confronted with the public accusation
by the coalitionist of political favoritism, he made the most of the
Egozcue case. He singled him out as a Republican; but, he said,
"apparently he is not the type of Republican who satisfies Senator
Martinez Nadal. But he is the type of man with whom I am proud
to associate myself in the setting up of a program to better the exist
ing conditions in Puerto Rico."228
The battle of accusations between Dr. Gruening and the coali
tion which was carried on in the press of the island did little to
further the reconstruction of Puerto Rico, but it certainly did clear
the air and firmly establish the positions of the various groups. The
coalition declared that Gruening's phrase,
"sympathy with the plan" . . . has converted itself into the amulet
and phantom, in the password and in Cancerbus, the watchman, in
the shield and spear; and is also being converted into a synonym of
liberal. It is not necessary to be in sympathy with the plan; one only
has to be affiliated with the political party of Mr. Munoz Marin,
which Mr. Gruening serves as if it were his own party.220
The manifesto of the coalitionists attacking Gruening, like that

drawn up attacking Bourne, was so obviously a politically inspired
document that the sound criticism which they might have offered
was immediately lost. They protested their loyalty to the President,
to the New Deal, to the land program, and to the purposes of the
PRRA. They recounted the history of the long fight of Santiago
Iglesias to enforce the 500-Acre Law. Repeatedly they charged
Gruening of being "tied to Munoz Marin by old bands of friendship
born in the bohemian literary circles."230
This implication that he and Munoz Marin had been friends in
the student days of the latter was denied by Gruening. This denial
was perhaps strictly speaking correct, but Dr. Gruening would have
226. Ibid.
227. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship, Aug. 2, 1935.
228. El Mundo, Oct. 28, 1935. 229. Ibid. 230. Ibid.
difficulty convincing not only the coalition but others politically

less
prejudiced that he was not markedly influenced by the opinions of
his friend, Mufioz. The development of events set forth in this chap
ter should now leave no doubt about this. In the opinion of a con
temporary, James Bourne, who was apolitical but no friend of Dr.
Gruening, the doctor was "perfectly willing to have it [PRRA] . . .
be a Liberal Party program and it has so turned out."231
Far more serious was the charge leveled by astute Mrs. Bourne
in a letter to Mrs. Roosevelt.
The question of political affiliation of PRRA with the Liberals

is also debatable wisdom in a reconstruction program because of its
inevitable exclusion of different political elements. . . . Gruening and
those close to him are sincerely convinced that their plan is a really
perfect plan for Puerto Rico. This, I feel, has convinced them of the
necessity of imposing it and necessitates in their eyes an "end justi
fies the means" philosophy.232
Dr. Gruening's refusal to utilize more of the coalition candidates

was not hard to understand. The coalition had fought the imple
mentation of the Chardon Plan from the beginning. Alfonso Valde"s,
the self-styled New Dealer, in his letter to the President in January,
1935, had protested that he could not support a plan which pro
posed that the government buy and operate as "yardsticks" small,
inefficient, bankrupt sugar mills.233 Or how could one utilize the
services of one Jose" Ferre\ who asked : "If Dr. Gruening wants to be
a Communist, why doesn't he go before the American Congress with
a proposition to share individual wealth? I
cannot see why he should
kick around the legitimate representatives of our people and frighten
them into passing laws that he did not dare present before the Ameri
can Congress."234 Finally, one need only recall the damaging work
done in the federal Senate cloakroom by the island senator, Martinez
Nadal, and Sr. Oberg, representing Santiago Iglesias. One would
have to conclude that the coalition politician was not in sympathy
with the purpose of the PRRA.
231. FERA, Box 260, Memorandum from James Bourne to President

Roosevelt, April 21, 1936.
232. Ibid., #610, Letter from Mrs. Bourne to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 7,
1935.
233. Franldin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Alfonso Valdes to
President Roosevelt, Jan. 11, 1935.
234. DTIP, 9-8-2, Letter from Jose Ferri, Sept. 14, 1935.
The PRRA had its difficulties, and not all were political or un
avoidable. Several months after the program got under way, Frank
Shea, who was general counsel of the PRRA, contracted more than
a dozen young continental lawyers, many of whom were just out of
law schools, and whose salaries under the PRRA plus living expenses
at $6 a day ranged from close to $5,000 to about $10,000. The
Puerto Rican lawyers, graded as junior attorneys, received $1,800,
while the continental equivalent was paid $2,300 plus expenses.235
This wage discrimination did not rest well with the islanders. The
result opposition had another reason to attack the
was that the
PRRA. Dr. Gruening needed good legal advice. Some of the 500-
Acre cases would go to the federal Supreme Court. However, the
bringing in of legal aid at the lower levels was a questionable move
which Dr. Gruening never was able to defend.
The PRRA was running into other problems which in the long
run would weaken its forces. The PRERA had taken some $9 mil
lion. The construction of a housing project, which was about to be
initiated, fell into the hands of the PRRA and took three-fourths of
a million.236 Gruening tried to escape financing it by offering to loan
the necessary funds if they could be paid back at a later date.
In his visits to Ponce and to Mayagiiez in October and in Novem
ber Dr. Gruening learned that he could buy private electric com
panies in those two cities. These two units, plus the San Juan plant,
could be bound together into one whole with the rural electrification
program of the PRRA. Enthusiastic about an island-wide public
utility corporation to be set up by the PRRA, Dr. Gruening wired
a request for an interview with the President. He had trouble getting
permission, since the President was at Warm Springs and any visit
would attract unwarranted press attention.237 However, Gruening
persisted and got the appointment, secured the President's approval,
and had a conference with Frank R. McNinch and Morris L. Cooke
of the Federal Power Commission on the details of the project.
At the same time he brought before the President the pending
vacancy on the insular supreme court bench. The names of Clemente
Ruiz Nazario, Miguel Guerra-Mondragon, Martin Travieso, Roberto
235. El Mundo, Dec. 11, 1935.

236. Department of Interior, File 1-276, Letter from Dr. Gruening to
President Roosevelt, Sept. 30, 1935.
237. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Wire from Mclntyre to Gruening,
Nov. 19, 1935; Nov. 20, 1935.
Todd, Jr., and Rafael Rivera Zayas were suggested.238 Travieso got
the nod and his name was sent to the Senate in the spring.
Because General Winship had seen the President shortly before
Dr. Gruening's emergency trip, the island's papers were filled with
the speculation the future of the governor on the island.
concerning
But apparently the relations between the governor and Dr. Gruen-
ing were very amiable. Winship, in a letter to the President, wrote :
"I am heartily in accord with the principle and plans of the PRRA
for the rehabilitation of the Island."239 For his part Gruening had
asserted that the governor and his cabinet were cooperating splen
didly.240 At this point the administrator had his hands full and little
time for petty sniping away at one who might be useful in the battle
for funds.
The main theme of the governor's conversation with the Presi
dent was the scarcity of funds in the PRRA. He insisted that the
whole rehabilitation work could not be permanently set up with such
a small financial grant. One project he was pushing hard was the
creation of a cement plant.2" The hope was to build hurricane-proof
dwellings for the resettlement farmers. Winship came away from
the conference with "the impression that there was a very strong
pressure on him [F.D.R.] for allotments and we would have to put
up a strong fight to resist the inroads on the allotments already made
by him to Puerto Rico."242
The situation appeared so desperate that the island administra
tors began casting around likely agency where there might
at any
be unused funds available. He turned to Tugwell and the Resettle-
ment Administration requesting that he extend his program to the
island.243 Dr. Tugwell was willing to consider setting up an office
of his administration if so requested, but he could not grant funds.
He also did point out that it was the job of the PRRA to coordinate
238. Ibid., Official Files 6-S, President Roosevelt to the Attorney Gen
eral, Nov. 26, 1935.
239. Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary, File 1-264, Nov.
16, 1935, Eleven-page letter from Gov. Winship to President Roosevelt.
dent Roosevelt, Oct. 28, 1935.
241. DTIP, 9-8-63, Letter from Gov. Winship to Dr. Gruening, Nov.
21, 1935.
242. Ibid., Letter from Gov. Winship to Dr. Gruening.
243. La Fortaleza, 288/8, Letter from Winship to Tugwell, Jan. 27,
1936.
all federal activity and to set up another agency would be out of

place.244
With the New Year Dr. Gruening got more bad news. The
Supreme Court handed down its adverse decision on the use of the
funds procured from the processing taxes of the AAA.245 Back in
August the President had asked Chester Davis to transfer the accu
mulated tax money (some $5 million) to Puerto Rico.246 Efforts were
made to make this and any further transfers, but since the dispens
ing of the funds had run into legal problems no money was ad
vanced.247 The President then decided to advance the $5 million out
of the $4 billion relief money. When the Court declared that tax
funds could not be utilized as projected, Dr. Gruening and the
PRRA were asked not only to forget about the processing tax funds
but to refund the advanced $5 million.248
In spite of the political and financial problems, the PRRA moved
slowly forward. Extensive coffee and tobacco programs were put into
operation. The outlook for the hydroelectric projects was good. Al
ready by the close of the year Puerto Rico was having an extensive
census taken under PRRA auspices.
With the first of the year Harold Ickes paid an unexpected visit
(planned to have been in November) to Puerto Rico. Like Rexford
Tugwell and Mrs. Roosevelt, who had visited the island almost two
years previously, Ickes was appalled by the slum areas which he
inspected. "They are the worst that I have ever seen," he noted in
his diary, and added:
They are thoroughly disreputable and disagreeable. Open sewage

runs through the streets and around the buildings and there are no
sanitary facilities at all. The children play in the sewage, which in
many cases is covered with a thick green scum. The houses appear
to be dirty and unkept. The cooking is done on little charcoal stoves,
and the furniture is of the simplest and scantiest. Notwithstanding
these terrible conditions, generally speaking, the people in the slums,
244. Ibid., Letter from Tugwell to Gov. Winship, Feb. 3, 1936.

245. U.S. v. Butler et al, Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp., 297 U.S. 1.
246. General Correspondence of AAA, Dr. Gruening to President Roose
velt, Aug. 5, 1935.
247. Ibid., Letter from Wallace to Ickes, Oct. 10, 1935; Letter from
Wallace to Secretary of the Treasury, Nov. 29, 1935.
248. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Memorandum from D. W.
Bell to the President, Feb. 13, 1936.
and especially the younger women had the appearance of being neat
and clean. 249
the Secretary concluded, were a serious indict

These conditions,
ment of not only the Puerto Rican government which permitted them
to grow up but also the federal authorities who allowed them to con
tinue. Unlike the previous visitors, the Secretary minced no words
and lashed out at the conservative forces which allowed such misery
to exist. He accused the local legislature of being elected and con
trolled by the absentee sugar interests. When questioned by Senator
Martinez Nadal and Representative Bolivar Pagan,250 he replied that
the previous inaction of the legislature on two previous occasions,
when requested to pass necessary legislation to enable the govern
ment to enforce the 500-Acre Law, had allowed him no other con
Ickes reminded the legislators that they would have ample
clusion.251
opportunity in the coming session to demonstrate their independence
by backing the government's reconstruction program.
The Secretary took the opportunity to reiterate his attitude to
ward the latifundia which gripped the agricultural economy of the
island. A year previous in answer to a letter of Senator Tydings,
motivated by an inquiry of the president of Eastern Sugar Associates,
Secretary Ickes outlined his policy briefly stating that he was in favor
of "the simple, direct, and honorable method of enforcing the law.252
In a conversation with A. Ferre\ Ickes maintained, as had
Jose"
Tugwell before him, that the concentration of land in the hands of
large sugar corporations had forced the rural population off of the
land and into the slums and the life of an urban pauper. He believed
that the process had to be reversed. The people had to be brought
back to the rural areas and given land on which to produce their
means of subsistence.253
A group of liberal professors at the university took issue with one
aspect of this statement by the Secretary. They felt that it would
be a serious error to substitute a subsistence agricultural program of
lesser efficiency for the present commercialized crops which rendered
249. Secret Diary, I, 504.

250. Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 9-8-14, Letter from Mar
tinez Nadal and Bolivar Pagan to the Secretary, Jan. 14, 1936.
251. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Martinez Nadal and Bolivar
Pagan, Jan. 16, 1936.
252. Ibid., Secretary Ickes to Sen. Tydings, March 14, 1935.
253. El Mundo, Jan. 15, 1936.
the highest possible return per acre. With the program of the PRRA
they were in complete sympathy because it increased the food pro
duction by putting marginal land in the hands of idle agricultural
workers.254
Basically, Ickes was in agreement, but he used the opportunity
to strike out again against an absentee economy which benefited a
few who clipped coupons rather than the landless islanders. He sug
gested that a wider distribution of income in local hands could be
realized through cooperatives. As he pointed out: "No sound econ
omy can be built up in an agricultural country when 95 per cent
or more of the agricultural workers are landless."255
Ickes' plain talk aroused the concern of the more conservative
elements. Jose" Ferre, that prolific defender of free enterprise from
Ponce, suggested that if Puerto Rico was "to be used as an experi
ment for drastic reforms of our present capitalistic system . . . then
the Secretary could expect . . . that 1,700,000 American citizens
are sure to make a big roar if
we are to be used as guinea pigs."256
While Ickes was on the island the registration for the coming
elections took place. There was an abnormal amount of activity due
to the fact that the women were being registered for voting for the
first time in the history of the island. After observing the process,
the Secretary concluded that the Puerto Rican was an "inveterate
politician."257 Cars and wagons displaying the banners of the various
parties were seen on the roads hauling people to the centers of regis
tration. The usual statements of confidence in victory were issued
by all parties. The Liberals, who had polled 46 per cent of the vote
in 1932, had reason to expect an easy victory.
When the Secretary left the island he was closely followed by
the governor, Dr. Gruening, the resident commissioner, and Senator
Luis Munoz Marin, all bound for Washington and the coming legis
lative battle. The second session of the 74th Congress was open and
important legislation for Puerto Rico was to come up. The rotating
fund was to be presented again and two important nominations were
to be up for approval.
254. DTIP, 9-8-59, Letter signed by Rafael de J. Cordero, Sol Des

cartes,Jorge Bermudez, and Rafael Pico to Secretary Ickes, dated Jan. 24,
1936.
255. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Cordero, et al., Feb. 13, 1936.
256. Ibid., 9-8-120, Personal File: Jose Ferr6, Letter to Ickes, Jan. 12,
1936. 257. Secret Diary, I, 505.
One of these that of Fernandez Garcia, was to

appointments,
be blocked Cummings.258 Secretary Ickes, who
by Attorney General
was pressing the nomination, asked for any reasonable objections.
Cummings then admitted that he could only express the complaints
presented by the governor.259 This was not enough for Ickes, who
insisted that Fernandez was a thorough New Dealer and a supporter
of the administration's policies in Puerto Rico.260 The Attorney Gen
eral's recommendation was sent to the White House where it was
promptly approved and sent to the Senate.
Beforethe Senate committee holding hearings on the appoint
ments of Fernandez Garcia and Martin Travieso coalition representa
tives came in force to oppose the former. Travieso, for whom it will
lost no love, was looked upon as a harmless
be recalled the coalition
member of the opposite party who did not offer the danger a re
former like Fernandez261 promised. The hearings could have been
much worse for the administration than they were. Senator King,
who had been bombarded with the charges of politics in the PRRA,
aided by a letter from Secretary Ickes, brushed over them lightly.
Furthermore, no one was sure what the unpredictable General Win-
ship would say to the committee.
Benigno Fernandez Garcia was approved by the Senate on the
twentieth of June and the biggest problem was solved. The rest
would be comparatively easy. With the approval of the governor and
at the urging of the Department of Justice and the island justices,
the supreme court of Puerto Rico was enlarged from five to seven
members.262
One measure which lacked the backing of the Washington ad
ministration was presented by the resident commissioner and backed
by the coalition. This proposal was designed to amend the Organic
Act of the island government to allow the organization of a depart-
258. Ibid., p. 503.

259. DTIP, 9-8-104, Personal Files Fernandez Garcia, Letter from At
torney General Cummings to Secretary Ickes, Nov. 21, 1936.
260. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Attorney General Cummings,
Jan. 24, 1936.
261. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Garcia Mendez to Presi
dent Roosevelt, Feb. 10, 1936; also Official Files 6-S, Letter Dr. Bias He-
rrero to President Roosevelt, Jan. 20, 1936. See also DTIP, 9-8-59, Memo
randum of A. B. Hawes, Assistant General Counsel on the Senate hearings.
262. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Memorandum
from the Acting Executive Director of the National Emergency Council to the
President, Feb. 5, 1936.
ment of public welfare. United behind this last ditch effort to outdo
the PRRA, were Mr. and Mrs. Bourne and the coalition!263 Com
menting on this very strange combination, the humor magazine Flo-
rete ran a cartoon which showed a Don Juan (the coalition) trying
to attract attention of a young sefiorita (the PRERA). Srta. PRERA
asks: "Why do you court me now since up to recently I only received
insults and abuses from you?" The answer offered by Don Juan is
short and to the point: "The fact is that the other young lady [the
PRRA] won't even look at me."2"
Less than a year previously the coalition had been hot on the
heels of Bourne with a law suit. Indeed, just four months after this,
Jose* Ferre", the coalition spokesman for the south side of the island,
had confessed that "perhaps the biggest error of judgment of this
[Union-Republican-Socialist] Party was the attack on Mr. and Mrs.
Bourne."285 Certainly the coalition had made a grave error. The
PRERA in the hands of the Bournes was not as markedly Liberal
as the PRRA had become in the hands of Gruening. Furthermore,
the PRERA had no radical plans for public enterprises. Its program
was a moderate relief and work palliative — a fill-in — until things
could return back to normal. It was too late, but the coalition did
come to see the error.
Certainly the insular government needed a public welfare depart
ment even though it probably could have been included under the
department of health. The opposition was too stiff. Now the Roman
Catholic Church raised its voice in opposition268 with the prospect
that Mrs. Bourne would head the new division. It was no longer the
administration alone that turned a deaf ear. In passing, it is worth
note that in one of the letters prepared for the President in answer
to the Church's protest, Dr. Gruening warmly defended the work of
the Bournes.287
The Bournes, particularly Dorothy Bourne, were well liked in
Puerto Rico. They had convinced the Puerto Rican of their complete
263. Ibid., Letter from Mrs. Dorothy Bourne to Mrs. Roosevelt, Jan. 31,
1936; also DTIP, 9-8-63, Letter from Martinez Nadal and Bolivar Pagan to
President Roosevelt, Feb. 3, 1936.
264. Florete, Oct. 5, 1935.
265. DTIP, 9-8-2, Letter from Jos6 Ferr6 to Marvin Mclntyre and
Stephen Early, Sept. 14. 1935.
266. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from John J. Burke
to President Roosevelt, Feb. 5, 1936.
267. Ibid., Letter from President Roosevelt to John Burke, Feb. 10, 1936.
lack of self-interest and dedication to the cooperative working out of

the serious social evils facing the mass of the population. It is true
that James Bourne was a little lofty and blustery in his manner, but
he always repented and usually went out of his way to make amends
to the offended. Mrs. Bourne, who trained the first group of local
social workers on the island, firmly planted the seed of service in the
heart of new professional group.268
a
At the end of June, 1936, when the relief work division within
the PRRA closed its books, James Bourne took a minor administra
tive position in the WPA but he soon found that was not to his
liking, and in the spring of 1937 he left government service.269
268. The Bournes are proud of the fact that today one of the housing
units of a slum clearance program in Arecibo bears the name of Mrs. Doro
thy Bourne.
269. National Archives, Works Progress Administration, Personal File
# 140 on James Bourne, Letter from James Bourne to Hopkins, May 20,
1936; Letter from President Roosevelt to James Bourne, April 10, 1937.
SEEDS OF MISTRUST
+
'i n February, 1936, the future of the PRRA and,
therefore, the hope for improving economic conditions
in Puerto Rico looked fairly bright. After long delays the Authority
was beginning to function. The quo warranto proceedings had been
initiated in January before the insular supreme court. The bill estab
lishing the rotating fund for the PRRA had been signed by the
President. The pen he had used was given to Senator Luis Munoz
Marin.1 The elections were not far off and if the Liberal party did
not sweep them, then the Puerto Ricans could not find the bacalao
in his arroz, and the PRRA had better close down and go home.
A series of events occurred, however, which turned this pleasant
order to things into chaos, and, in the process, the bacalao was lost.
On the morning of February 23, 1936, Colonel E. Francis
Riggs, chief of the insular police, was assassinated while coming
from mass by two young members of the Nationalist party. Hiram
Rosado and Elias Beauchamp were captured by the police and con
ducted to headquarters where, in the words of the governor, "both
. . . were killed by police."2
Trouble had been on its way for quite some time. In Utuado a
month previously, two police were wounded while trying to disarm
a Nationalist. In October, 1935, Pedro Albizu Campos had directed
a particularly virulent attack on the students of the university in a

2. DTIP, 9-8-104, Personal File: Colonel Riggs, Wire from Gov. Win-
ship to Gruening, Feb. 23, 1936.
249
SEEDS OF MISTRUST 251
violence which had been swelling up from the poverty and misery
of the overpopulated island.
The insular government was jolted into action. Donald Draugh-
on, United States Marshal, requested authority to add temporary
members to his staff. While this was granted, he was not given the
riot guns, ammunition, or authority to deputize additional men,
which he had also requested.6 Governor Winship took a personal
hand by planning the search for arms and for compromising evidence
against the Nationalist leaders. These raids were carried out at day
light on March 7, 1936, and "military arms and equipment, a bomb,
and very important documentary evidence"7 were turned up.
The great body of evidence, according to government sources,
was relevant to events previous to the assassination of Colonel Riggs.
This evidence, combined with material collected by the FBI at the
request of the United States Attorney General, was sufficient enough
to order that arrests be made.8 In addition to Pedro Albizu Campos,
seven people were taken into custody and accused of conspiring to
overthrow the federal government in Puerto Rico.
There is no question that the death of Colonel Riggs motivated
the raids which.-iinally produced the arrests of the Nationalists.
As Liberal Representative Ramos Antonini said on the floor of the
house: "The regime wishes to guarantee vengeance for the death of
the American."9 Yet the charges directed against the prisoners were
not incitement to murder or an accusation of being accomplices to
murder, or even incitement to violence, but rather the purely politi
cal charge of sedition and conspiring to overthrow the federal gov
ernment.
On the day the arrests were made, Roger Baldwin of the ACLU
wrote to his friend Ernest Gruening asking that any legal action on
the part of the government be confined to attempts to punish "acts
of violence or direct incitements to them."10 Several days later he
wrote to Miguel Guerra-Mondrag<5n, the ACLU lawyer on the island,
to question whether the indictments were of a political character
6. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from Attorney Gen

eral Cummings to Draughon, Feb. 25, 1936.
7. DTIP, 9-8-104, Personal File: Luis Raul Esteves, Letter from Gen.
Winship to Gruening, March 7, 1936.
8. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Letter from At
torney General Cummings to President Roosevelt, March 2, 1936.
9. El Mundo, March 6, 1936.
10. ACLU, Letter from Roger Baldwin to Ernest, March 7, 1936.
which would interest the Union. He expressed his surprise "that the
government should prosecute for conspiring to overthrow it when
a~charge of being an accessory to murder would be more proper."11
A similar inquiry was addressed to Attorney General Homer Cum-
mings.12
According to Ernest Gruening, there were three reasons why
this type of indictment was returned : ( 1 ) A charge of murder, ac
complice to murder, or incitement of violence would have taken the
case out of the federal hands and into the insular courts with local
prosecutors;(2) an insular jury, so it was claimed, was much more
I subject tointimidation than a jury in a federal case; and (3) the
nature of the evidence dictated this type of indictment since there
was almost no evidence to substantiate murder charge or incitement
a
to murder. An incitement to violence might have been sustained, but
the conviction on this charge would have produced a light sentence,
and the notorious publicity would have been all out of proportion
to thebenefit of the punishment. Dr. Gruening was said to be in
agreement that a sedition charge was most undesirable and was
quoted as saying that such was a "paradox" in Puerto Rico.13
This confession, while made in private conversation, was not far
different from a statement made on the floor of the insular house of
representatives by the outspoken Ramos Antonini. He suggested that
Albizu Campos, rather than be singled out as~a traitor, should be
recognized as "a patriot" because he was attempting to "liberate his
country from a sovereignty imposed by a foreign power."14 This
speech was translated and sent to the President by the speaker of
the house, Garcia Me"ndez, who carefully pointed out that this man
was a leading member of the party favored by Dr. Gruening.15
Dr. Gruening was shocked by the news of Riggs' death,16 as was
^
everyone who knew the young man. He was a very popular fellow
around the San Juan area. Perhaps he was too popular, since more
11. Ibid., Letter from Roger Baldwin to Miguel Guerra-Mondragon,

March 13, 1936.
12. Ibid., Letter from Baldwin to Cummings, March 13, 1936.
13. Ibid., Letter from Frederick A. Ballard to Baldwin, July 14, 1936.
14. El Mundo, March 6, 1936.
15. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Box 47, Letter from Garcia Mendez
to President Roosevelt, March 11, 1936.
16. DTIP, PRRA, Personnel, Employees, Letter from E. G. Royster
to Joseph A. Short, Feb. 24, 1936.
than one governor complained about his active night life.17 Colonel
Riggs, so it was claimed, was also on speaking terms with Albizu
Campos, whose friendship he had tried to cultivate.
Colonel Riggs had been nominated to his position by the influ
ential Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland. The loss of his friend
was a hard blow for the Senator. When on the island, it will be
recalled, Senator Tydings had offered to submit a bill for independ
ence whenever the people of the island requested it. However, he
went away with the feeling that the people lacked any real sentiment
for independence. With the death of Colonel Riggs he changed his
mind.
The Senator requested Dr. Ernest Gruening to draw up a bill
to give the people an opportunity to register their views on the com
ing election day for or against independence.18 Both Dr. Gruening
and Senator Tydings agreed that : "If the people of Puerto Rico, after
being fully appraised of the consequences of independence, still
desire to vote for it, they should be allowed to have it."19 If they
voted against it, the issue would be a closed one for at least a
generation.
Dr. Gruening, who, with some justification, considered himself
an expert in Latin American affairs, predicted that with independ
ence, the island would swing back and forth from periods of anarchy
to periods of dictatorship. He wrote : "I am convinced that independ
ence for Puerto Rico would be folly and the island could not sustain
itself either politically or economically."20 Gruening argued that the
move to offer independence to Puerto Rico would be the "height of
statesmanship" since it would be in keeping with Roosevelt's efforts
to reverse the thirty years of imperialism. While it would be in keep
ing with the American tradition of self-government, it would also
relieve America of a heavy financial burden.
This suggestion of Senator Tydings was discussed at a cabinet
meeting held by President Roosevelt on Wednesday, March 18,
1936. Secretary Ickes, when asked for his opinion, followed more
or less the same arguments offered by Dr. Gruening cited above.
17. BIA, #20324, Letter from Acting Gov. Horton to Gov. Gore, Jan.
1, 1934.
18. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Unsigned mem
orandum to the Secretary of the Interior, March 13, 1936.
19. Ibid.
20. DTIP, 9-8-68, Government Status, Tydings Bill, Memorandum from
E. Gruening for the Secretary, March 13, 1936.
There was some discussion as to whether it should be introduced

at this late date of the legislative session. Secretary Ickes "strongly
urged its immediate introduction, although it might not pass at this
session of Congress, because of the quieting effect that he anticipated
it might have on Puerto Rico public opinion."21 This bill, drawn up
in the Division of Territories and Island Possessions for Senator
Tydings, was not to be connected in any way with the Roosevelt
administration.22
The drawing up of this bill received Dr. Gruening's personal
attention. The project giving independence to the Philippine Islands
was used as a basis for the drawing up of the Puerto Rican meas
ure.23 Colonel Rigby was consulted along with the legal division of
the Interior Department. Dr. Gruening wanted to be sure that the
bill was generous, "so as not to becloud the basic issue of the refer
endum with recriminations or objections that the question as pre
sented did not offer a fair alternative in view of the conditions
attached to the grant of independence."24
The economic provisions of the bill were far from generous.
Puerto Rican products imported into the United States were to be
subject to a 25 per cent yearly increase in tariff. In contrast, the
bill for the Philippine Islands, an area far more capable of economic
independence, provided for 5 per cent yearly tariff increases, thus
allowing the necessary economic readjustment to be spread over a
twenty-year period.25
Senator Luis Munoz Marin was in Washington at the time of
the assassination. As shocked as he was over the news of the incident,
he was also offended by the action of the law-enforcing agents who
^ had held a cracker-box trial for the two Nationalists. Later, making
an ugly matter worse, a weak excuse was officially given to the effect
that the boys had dived for loose guns lying around the police station,
and were therefore shot.26 The police involved were called before a
San Juan grand jury which unanimously voted to indict them.27
21. Secret Diary, I, 547-48.

22. DTIP, 9-8-68, Memorandum from Secretary Ickes for Dr. Gruen
ing, March 19, 1936. 23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Sen. Tydings, March 27, 1936.
25. For a slightly different interpretation of this matter see Frank Otto
Gatell, "Independence Rejected: Puerto Rico and the Tydings bill of 1936,"
The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVIII (February, 1958)
25-44.
26. La Prensa, March 5, 1936.
27. La Fortaleza, #521/12, Memo for the Gov., June 12, 1936.
Four were acquitted and there was a mistrial in the case of another.28
Governor Winship, a year later, requested a promotion for one of the
men, and when the request was denied, he had him transferred to
an easy position on the Fortaleza guard.
Senator Munoz was asked, by Dr. Gruening, to send a statement
to the island press condemning the murder of Riggs. This the senator
refused to do unless at the same time he condemned in the same
terms the irresponsible police officials.29 However, he did send a
letter to the editor of the Washington Post. He expressed "unquali
fied condemnation of the crime committed on the person of Colonel
y Riggs who was a fine gentleman, an able officer, probably the best
police chief that Puerto Rico has had."30 This, however, did not
satisfy Dr. Gruening.
At the time, Ruby Black was confined to a Washington hospital
where both Dr. Gruening and Munoz came to visit at different inter
vals. Both were no little piqued with each other. Dr. Gruening,
during his visits, paced the floor, repeating: "But, Ruby, he is con
doning murder!"31 During his visits Munoz pointed out to Ruby that
to follow through with Gruening's request would be equivalent to
committing political suicide. Ruby Black maintained that if she had
been well and on her feet, she might have prevented them from
going off the deep end. Earl Parker Hanson, who also knew them
both fairly well, expressed the belief that if it had not been this
issue, something else would have driven a wedge between the two
men.32
While he later recognized the seed of division, Munoz saw noth
ing wrong for almost two months. Dr. Gruening still worked fairly
closely with him on Puerto Rican matters.33 Then the independence
bill hit the press.34 As the leading spokesman for independence,
</ Senator Munoz had written the independence plank which had been
adopted unanimously by the Liberal party prior to the last election.
28. Congressional Record, Vol. 81, Part 5, p. 5276.

29. ACLU, Vol. 953, Letter from Luis Munoz Marin to Ruby Black
(copy to Roger Baldwin), Sept. 25, 1936.
30. Washington Post, March 1, 1936.
31. Interview with Ruby Black in Washington, April, 1954.
32. Interview with Earl Parker Hanson. In passing, it might be noted
that in the present opinion of Munoz Marin, he feels that he should have
written the condemnation which Dr. Gruening had requested.
33. ACLU, Vol. 953, Letter from Luis Munoz Marin to Ruby Black,
Sept. 25, 1936.
34. New York Times, April 24, 1936.
In his first interview with the President, he of his hopes for

spoke
the independence of his island. Munoz himself admitted in a private
letter to one of his close admirers that during the past year, while
never rejecting the idea of independence, he had placed a priority
on the work of economic reconstruction which he felt was necessary
to correct the almost forty years of unchecked colonial exploitation.35
And yet he, who had been in Washington to work closely with the
administration on Puerto Rican affairs, had not been consulted on
this important measure. As late as March, 1936, he reiterated his
party's purpose of bringing the plea for independence before the
federal authorities.36
When Senator Tydings introduced his bill, contrary to orders,
he claimed the administration backed it as well as having discussed
and approved it in a cabinet meeting.37 Governor Winship, whose
aide, Colonel Rigby, had been consulted, falsely pleaded his inno
cence. In a letter to Dr. ]os6 Padin he wrote: "I was as much sur
prised at the independence bill as you were. ... It might be well
to give this out for publication."38
The administration's duplicity was immediately sensed by, at
least, the island senator in Washington. Munoz had his own ways
of finding out how sincere the administration's offer was. Through
Dr. Gruening's private secretary, the senator was kept well informed.
However, he was almost alone in his denunciation of the Tydings
bill. Throughout Latin America, on the eve of the Inter-American
Conference at Buenos Aires, the press reaction was very favorable.39
In the United States, those who were financially concerned about
Puerto Rico protested loudly at first. Dr. Gruening calmed them with
a semiform letter which was sent to the many inquiries of this
nature. He pointed out that the bill could hardly pass this session
or any session of Congress without long and extensive hearings and
debates. Furthermore, he explained that the Tydings bill did not
grant independence itself, but rather merely paved the way and pro
vided for a vote from the island on independence. At any rate, what-
35. Ruby Black Collection, Senator Munoz Marin, Letter from Luis
Munoz Marin to Gutierrez Franqui, May, 1935.
37. El Mundo, April 25,1936.
38. DTIP, 9-8-68, Letter from Gov. Winship to Dr. Padin, April 28,
1936.
39. Ibid., Alexander Weddell to the Secretary of State, April 29, 1936.
ever the outcome, he explained, the United States investors would

probably be fully protected.40
While Senator Mufioz had not rejected the idea of independence,
he strongly objected to the bill because it was "not only bad but
impossible of execution." He said, in an interview for the Washing
ton Post : "I am for independence and the Liberal Party that I repre
sent is for independence but we want to get it quickly and we want
to get it right."41
His objections were over two closely related central points : ( 1 )
the measure decreed economic ruin for Puerto Rico, and (2) in tone
and in words the bill reversed the administration's previous attitude
as manifested by the PRERA and the PRRA, that federal expendi
ture in Puerto Rico was warranted as a fair discharge of responsibili
ties accumulated by the United States government during its control
of the island.42 To correct these defects the Liberal senator requested
that the bill be changed (1) to guarantee the United States manu
facturers preferential positions in the island markets in all products
not produced by the island; (2) to guarantee quotas in the United
States markets for the island's cash crops; (3) to secure from the
United States government a substantial loan with which to termi
nate the economic reorganization initiated by the New Deal.43
On the other hand, Antonio Barcelo, the other spokesman for
independence, was fairly well satisfied with the proposal. He did
ask for a transitional period which would help the island make the
change from a colony to a nation, but he was for independence "even
though we may die from hunger."44
Mufioz evidently thought the bill had a good chance of clearing
the Congress. He also was convinced that as it stood, the island
would roundly reject the offer. He was convinced that the United
States government was entirely sincere in offering to give Puerto
Rico its freedom if and when the Puerto Rican people gave a clear-
cut mandate to that effect. However, the Tydings bill did not, in his
opinion, give the islanders the opportunity to express that mandate.
As he pointed out to Ickes : "The bill gives Puerto Ricans a very clear
impression of being designed to obtain the mandate from the Puerto
40. Ibid., E. Gruening to Wm. H. Ridgeway, Letter, April 28, 1936.

41. Washington Post, April 28, 1936.
42. DTIP, 9-8-2 Administration-Legislation, Letter from Luis Mufioz
Marin to Dr. Gruening, April 27, 1936. 43. Ibid.
44. La Democracia, April 25, 1936.
Rican people under threat of literal starvation for a continuance of

the present colonial status."45
What was the reaction of the island? Secretary Ickes and Dr.
Gruening thought that the bill would have a quieting effect. They
could hardly have been more mistaken. The crafty and unprincipled
politician, Senator Martinez Nadal, sensed the current of opinion
in an instinctive way and made a 180° turn. From statehood, he
jumped with little trouble to an open demand for immediate inde
pendence.46 Pedro Albizu Campos, whose Harvard law training had
been perverted through years of bitter resentment of a second-class
colonialcitizenship, calmly stated that since the President and the
cabinet had agreed to independence, there was no need to allow
legal formalities to delay the calling of a constitutional convention.47
The radical element of the Liberal party was almost impossible to
control, and in spite of Munoz' words of warning from Washington,
they voted to accept the Tydings bill, honorable conditions or other
wise, since their long-delayed ideal was independence.48 Indeed,
Munoz claimed it was only through his influence that the Liberal
party was restrained from approving a resolution in favor of joining
the Nationalists and immediately holding a constitutional conven
tion.49
The reaction of the moderate element within the Liberal party
can be judged by the reaction of Carlos Chardon who fell in with
Earl P. Hanson's scheme to draw up a long analysis of the disastrous
effects of the Tydings bill on the island economy.50 The report
pointed out, in the most objective language possible, that the terms
of the bill "would double and treble the island's prevailing starvation
and could result in nothing short of chaos."51 This was exactly what
Munoz was claiming in Washington. Dr. Gruening's unexpected
answer came back to the PRRA economists to burn and destroy
every printed copy of the document. The editor of the bill could
45. DTIP, 9-8-2, Memorandum from Munoz Marin to Secretary Ickes,

May 11, 1936.
46. El Impartial, April
25, 1936. 47. Ibid., April 27, 1936.
49. Ibid.; DTIP, Memorandum from Munoz Marin to Secretary Ickes,
May 11, 1936.
50. DTIP,
9-8-68, Separate File, Puerto Rico and the Tydings Bill for
Independence, Preliminary Report, May 2, 1936, Planning Division PRRA.
51. Earl P. Hanson, Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. 159-60.
hardly afford to have his own economists submit proof of his insin
cerity in drawing up the measure.
The bill placed Munoz Marin in a serious position. Since his
entrance into the Liberal party he had been able to dominate its
radical wing by speaking for it and formulating its program through
his control of La Democracia. At the same time he had diligently
cultivated the support of the conservative faction led by Don Antonio
Barcelo, although this had been more difficult, since his rising star
had from time to time dimmed the fading brilliance of the elder
politician. His command of English, his obvious ability to open the
doors to high Washington offices, and his influential friends, in the
administration and out, had indicated to Barcelo that the young man
was indispensable. He had managed to bring the diverse elements
of the Liberal party together, and, as its spokesman, he had converted
the party into the political defender of the New Deal and social
justice in Puerto Rico. The Tydings bill split this hard-wrought
unity, however.
Munoz could not fight the bill without losing the leadership of
the radical wing, since he would be called a tool of the federal gov
ernment by so doing. He and Resident Commissioner Santiago Igles-
ias, who could not believe the United States was turning its back on
loyal American citizens,52 would be thrown together as puppets of
the colonial regime. And yet for Munoz to come out for the Tydings
bill would be to invite a split in his party, thus running the risk of
almost certain defeat at the polls. Such a defeat would be interpreted
as a rejection of the ideal of independence, thus almost assuring a
colonial status for a generation.
This split in the Liberal party was already manifesting itself.
In May Barcelo made a hurried trip to Washington to discuss the
Liberal party's attitude toward the Tydings bill. Even though these
discussions were held far from the shores of Puerto Rico, indication
leaked to the press that these two leaders were in violent disagree
ment as to the position to be taken by their pary.53 Barcelo was
in favor of minimizing the independence issue and concentrating on
winning the election. Munoz was so convinced that the election
could not at this point be won that he felt that concentrated work
on an honorable independence was the only solution.54 The first
52. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Santiago Iglesias to

President Roosevelt, May 8, 1936.
53. El Impartial, May 28, 1936. 54. Ibid., June 1, 1936.
public admission of a difference of opinion between the Liberals —

previously there had been denial55 — came after a meeting of the
Central Committee of the party at the end of June.58
Independence, even with dignity, that is, with the changes sug
gested by Munoz, as the senator urged, would be hard to realize
against the almost united opposition of the sugar and commercial
interests. The people were not economically free enough to make this
decision, in the opinion of Munoz. To attempt to make it at this
moment even under the most inviting terms would be to court the
rejection of independence.
In an effort to secure the best possible conditions for the refer
endum, Munoz suggested that it be held in June, 1937, ostensibly
because it would be before the dangerous hurricane season.57 How
ever, it would be more accurate to attribute this request for a change
to an effort to lessen the control of the monied interests over the
electorate. Coming in November as the elections did, the tiempo
muerto, during which there was widespread unemployment, was in
full swing. The poor could hardly feed their children a vague right
to vote. On the other hand, in June la zafra would be coming to a
close and there would be relatively more economic independence.
As in the case of the island politician, so in the case of the
people of the island, the over-all reaction was far from what Dr.
Gruening and Secretary Ickes had expected. As in most Latin Ameri
can countries, a center of agitation was found among the youth. The
university students had played a part in the removal of Governor
Gore. Only the firm control of Dr. Padin and Carlos Chard6n pre
vented a complete disruption of the educational program at that
time. In March, 1936, firm action by Dr. Padin again prevented a
scheduled strike in the high schools. He called in the parents and
made it plain that he would "go to the limit to defend the schools
against vicious, unprovoked, and unprofitable aggression."58 The
strike threat was broken. One Nationalist youth slit his wrists in a
face-saving Latin version of hari-kari.59 Dr. Padin was under no
illusion that the battle was over. The next time he was not sure that
he could count on the cooperation of those who had helped him in
55. La Democracia, May 29, 1936; June 17, 1936.

56. Ibid., June 27, 1936.
57. DTIP, 9-8-2, Letter from Munoz Marin to Dr. Gruening, April 27,
1936.
58. Ibid., 9-8-65, Letter from Dr. Padin to Dr. Gruening, March 20,
1936. 59. El Mundo, March 19, 1936.
this crisis. As he expressed it: "A lot of people on this island seem
to have lost their nerve."60
Then came the Tydings bill, and the school disturbances, far
from ceasing, increased markedly. In several towns the United States
flag was lowered and the single-star banner of the Republic of Puerto
Rico was run up. In Ponce, Mariano Villaronga, principal of the
high school, refused to follow the orders of the police to lower the
flag.61 Four students were arrested while on guard at the flag pole
of the Central High School of Santurce.62 A parade and demonstra
tion of the university students was held, and Albizu Campos ad
dressed the students for the first time since he had ridiculed them.63
A wave of disorder and alarm swept the island, and in more
than one place the authorities were clashing with school children.
While violence and strikes by students were common occurrences,
passions were running high. Dr. Padin, the acting governor in Win-
ship's absence, publicly guaranteed that he would use all the forces
at his command to secure respect for the United States, its institu
tions, and its flag.64 Far from quieting the people, the Tydings bill
had stirred up more emotion and agitation, particularly among the
youth, than had been seen in many years. Dr. Gruening and Secre
tary Ickes had failed to recall that in questions of ideals or causes,
reason is secondary to passion.
Barcelo condemned the action of the irresponsible students,
whom he accused of being tools of colonial forces trying to prove
that Puerto Ricans could not govern themselves. On the other hand,
Munoz accused the insular government of being responsible for the
deplorable situation and he insisted that no Puerto Rican should fire
on any other Puerto Rican no matter what the circumstances.65
The Nationalist party was making the most of this unrest and
with great effort it was trying to draw Barcelo into the United Front
for Independence. At one point, the middle of May, it was claimed
that Barcelo and Albizu had reached an agreement.66 This was
strongly denied several days later by Barcelo, who in turn accused
Albizu of conspiring with the coalition and other colonial forces to
avoid holding any elections in November, thus depriving the Liberal
60. DTIP, 9-8-65, Letter from Dr. Padin to Dr. Gruening, March 20,
1936.
61. El Impartial, May 2, 1936. 62. Ibid., May 1, 1936.
63. ElMundo, April 30, 1936. 64. Ibid., May 2, 1936.
65. El Impartial, May 15, 1936. 66. Ibid., May 12, 1936.
party of its inevitable victory.67 Barcelo argued that, with the victory
of the Liberal party, independence would also be victorious and the
constitution of the Republic could be then drawn by the legislature.68
Mufioz Marin, who was convinced that the Liberal party could not
possibly win the elections, admonished Barcelo for playing into the
hands of the conservative forces by allowing it to be understood that
the elections would be a type of referendum. Thus badgered by
Mufioz, Barcelo was driven into confusion, and by the middle of
June he had reversed himself to agree to a united front and to the
suspension of the elections.69
With the formation of the United Front, the drive for the im
mediate convocation of the Constitutional Assembly was now the
rallying cause for all factions from the Nationalists, Liberals, and
those strange Republicans who followed the meanderings of Martinez
Nadal. The latter was in the process of being straightened out by
the coalition leaders and would soon be back among the 200 per
cent United States sympathizers. The leaders of this convention drive
frankly admitted that the plebiscite was rejected because it would
lead to trouble, possibly civil war. They were confident that "over
ninety per cent of the whole nation would vote for independence."70
But they did not want to put it to a test, since the sugar interests
would use every means at their disposal to thwart the desires of the
people. In spite of this agitation all parties, except the Nationalists,
were drawing up plans for the coming campaign.
Introduced with the Tydings bill was an effort at electoral re
form. A similar measure had been introduced into the local legisla
ture by Senator Alfonso Valdes. All of the principal parties had
publicly expressed their agreement of the need for electoral reform.71
While the governor was in Washington, a meeting was held with
Dr. Gruening, Senator Mufioz Marin, and Santiago Iglesias to dis
cuss the pending electoral reform. It was agreed to push for this
legislation in a special session of the insular legislature, but, if the
final results failed to live up to expectations, the measure would be
pushed for in Congress.
The crying need for electoral reform was dramatically presented
67. Ibid., May 15, 1936. 68. Ibid.

70. DTIP, 9-8-68, Letter from Marta Lomar to President Roosevelt,
July 2, 1936.
71. See statements in El Mundo, Feb. 13, 1936; El Pais, Feb. 8, 1936;
and La Democracia, Feb. 3, 1936.
on the floor of the Senate by Senator Tydings when he quoted from

a report drawn up in the office of Dr. Gruening.72 The PRRA had
just finished conducting a census which produced some rather re

vealing figures. And according to the report based on this census,
"out of 852,832 persons over twenty-one years of age in the island,
852,904 [sic] of them are registered voters. In other words, there
are about 100 more people registered in Puerto Rico and qualified
to vote than there are people of both sexes over 21 years of age
in the island." The most obvious fraud was found in the municipality
of Coamo where the census found 9,775 inhabitants over 21 years
of age. The registered voters in this municipality totaled a mere
14,144, or in terms of percentages, 144 per cent of the inhabitants
were registered voters in Coamo.
Senator Munoz proposed four changes which should be incor
porated into the electoral law: (1) an effort should be made to
eliminate the fraudulent names from the padded list of eligible
voters; (2) the parties of a coalition should not be allowed double
representation on the electoral boards, as would be the case if each
were represented; (3) the right to form a coalition should be per
mitted to all parties and not restricted to just the large or established
parties; and (4) the federal employees should be allowed to serve
as election supervisors.73
The bill as drawn up and presented to the island legislature
provided for assemblying not more than 150 voters in closed
buildings or restricted areas at a given time from which they would
not be released until after voting. No voter could enter after the
indicated hour for the voting to begin. The recommendations of
Senator Munoz were also incorporated into the bill. It will remain
to be seen what effect these efforts had on election procedure.
About a month after Colonel Riggs' death, while the Tydings
bill was being drawn up in the Division of Territories and Insular
Possessions, Dr. Gruening sent off a series of letters to influential
Americans on the island requesting confidential information concern
ing any anti-American activity on the island in general and specific
ally within the National Guard and the university.74 One of these
72. Congressional Record, Senate, Vol. 80, Part 6, pp. 5923-5927.

73. DTIP, 9-8-82, Letter from Gov. Winship to Dr. Gruening, June 10,
1936.
74. Ibid., 9-8-107, PRRA General, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Dr.
Lee, March 20, 1936.
letters went to Atherton Lee, director of the Federal Experimental

Station in Mayagiiez, whom we have previously mentioned.
Dr. Lee's answer came back affirming the charges suggested by
Dr. Gruening in offering "a few papers which may document this
conception."75 The "documentation" offered by Lee would have put
to shame a layman and was sufficient proof to put in doubt the com
petence of the scientist. His "evidence" was a number of quotations
from private citizens indicating that in their opinion the university
was anti-American. The closest he came to documenting his claim
was two Nationalist leaflets which were "said to have been found
on the desk of a professor of the university."
At Dr. Gruening's request two special agents from the Division
of Investigations of the Interior Department were sent to the island.
They were given a twofold task of checking on politics in the PRRA
and on the estimates of the value of property to be bought by the
PRRA. The charges of politics in the PRRA had been repeatedly
made and each time the administration had denied it and pledged
its efforts to keep the PRRA neutral, particularly in this election
year. Nothing was ever done and the coalition had come to the con
clusion that further protests were futile.
If further proof is needed of the infiltration of Liberals into the
PRRA, the case of the Needlework Cooperative organized by the
Authority might be cited. According to Earl P. Hanson, in a letter
to Carlos Chardon, one Felisa Rincon seemed "to be on the warpath
because the seven directors of the cooperative . . . belong to this
wrong party."76 Hanson was not overly concerned about the charge,
since in any cooperative where there was marked political activity,
there would be automatic trouble and defeat. He was concerned that
a Liberal, Miss Felisa Rincon, was injecting politics into a potentially
dangerous situation. Hanson claimed: "There is enough dynamite in
the situation as it stands."77 Even though this occurred before Dr.
Gruening turned against the Liberal party, Miss Rincon was eased
out of her position. Hanson explained that her campaign had been
too vigorous and would have provoked the charge of politics if she
had been allowed to continue.78
75. Ibid., 9-8-59, Conditions General, Letter from Dr. Lee to Dr. Gruen
ing, April 8, 1936.
76. FERA, Self Help Cooperatives, Puerto Rican Grants, Needlework
Cooperative Industry, Letter from Earl P. Hanson to Carlos Chard6n, Feb.
19, 1936. 77. Ibid.
78. La Fortaleza, #521, Statement by Earl P. Hanson, Sept. 21, 1936.
The investigators from the Interior Department looked into the

charges of kickbacks and political collections and found that from
the lowest laborer up to the whitest collar of the PRRA, the Liberal
party expected to receive on pay day from 1 0 per cent to 1 5 per cent
of their wages or salaries.79 The agents claimed to have substantiated
the charge that any person who failed to contribute was summarily
discharged from his work. The coalition had previously pressed these
same accusations unsuccessfully. Unaware of the internal investiga
tion being carried out, the coalition took steps to form its own in
vestigatory committee sponsored by the legislature.
Governor Winship, who had formerly transmitted the coalition's
protests to Washington with the indicated results, now allowed the
coalition to go ahead with their plans. This threw Ickes into a white
heat when he found out about it. He dressed the general down in
the following fashion:
It is highly improper for the insular legislature to make an inves

tigation of a federal agency. In the present circumstances such a
move by the legislature would be an obviously unfriendly act moti
vated by political considerations and merely provocative of more
unrest.80
The governor's reply was a strong defense of his action which

would, once and for all, "either show that there is no such practice
as has been charged or that the practice will be stamped out and any
guilty parties vigorously prosecuted."81 The capstone was added by
informing the Secretary of the Interior that the investigators would
be selected by the head of the Division of Territories and Island
Possessions. It would appear that the governor and Dr. Gruening
were now working in very close cooperation.
Secretary Ickes was aware that things were not moving along
smoothly in Puerto Rico and he was highly concerned. In May he
had ordered an investigation of the PRRA legal setup. In June only
his personal interference prevented a committee from the House of
Congress from going to Puerto Rico and carrying out a general in
vestigation.
79. DTTP, PRRA, Political Activity, Memorandum from special inves

tigators S. S. Simpson and Harry Barger to A. D. Bailey, May 9, 1936.
80. Department of Interior, 9-8-15, Letter from Secretary Ickes to Gov.
Winship, June 15, 1936.
81. DTIP, 9-8-82, Letter from Gov. Winship to Secretary Ickes, June
17, 1936.
Secretary Ickes took his concern to the President. He pointed out

that as administrator for the PRRA, Dr. Gruening was his own boss,
and responsible only to the President who was too busy to keep a
check on him. He suggested "that there might be a first class blow
out one of these days in Puerto Rico for which he [the President]
and I [Ickes] would be held responsible."82 Through the summer the
Secretary kept hitting away at this point with gathering success.83
Finally in November the President ordered the PRRA to be placed
under the Secretary of the Interior.84
The short session of Congress ended and the Congressmen
turned to the summer political campaign. The session had seen one
very salutary action for Puerto Rico in the approval of Benigno
Fernandez Garcia as attorney general. Senator Luis Mufioz Marin,
the unofficial representative of Puerto Rico in Washington, made
preparations to return, not too enthusiastically, to his island. He
wrote the Secretary of the Interior on the eve of his sailing: "I shall
do everything in my power towards public tranquility while working
without sunt for independence."85
On the island the senator found several political matters which
had to be dealt with in addition to the internal problems of the
Liberal party. The trial of the Nationalist leaders, which was sched
uled for July 14, was one of these matters. Every effort was made to
get the charges of sedition and conspiracy against the United States
government dismissed. The line of argument which was used by the
defense was that since the administration had offered in Congress a
measure to grant independence to Puerto Rico, if it was so desired,
the charges of sedition lacked both legal and logical foundation.
The prosecution was being pushed by the Department of Justice,
but the Attorney General stated to Roger Baldwin that he was willing
to "do whatever the Interior Department, which is in charge of policy
in Puerto Rico, requested."86 MacMahon of the Justice Department
admitted to Baldwin that his personal views on the case were very
82. Secret Diary, I, 594.

83. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Memorandum from President Roose
velt to Director of the Budget, Aug. 13, 1936.
84. Public Papers and Addresses, II, 228.
85. DTIP, 9-8-68, Letter from Luis Mufioz Marin to Secretary Ickes,
June 17, 1936.
86. ACLU, Vol. 953, Letter from Luis Mufioz Marin to Roger Baldwin,
June 29, 1936.
similar of the ACLU.87 Senator Muiioz urged his friend

to those
Roger Baldwin to press the case further with either Gruening or
Ickes so that the charges might be dropped."8
Baldwin, being tied down in New York, was forced to send the
ACLU lawyer in Washington to see Gruening. Baldwin then tackled
Ickes by letter, endeavoring to convince him not to drop the prosecu
tion, but to switch the charges so that the political aspects of the
prosecution might be eliminated. He wrote:
It seemed who examined the facts that if these

to our lawyers
men were proper subjects for indictment it should be as accessories
to the crime of murder, not sedition. A political prosecution will only
fan the flames of resistance anyhow.89
Secretary Ickes was not of a much different opinion. He agreed

with Baldwin "that it would have been much better if the charge
of being accessory to murder could have been brought."90 He did
add, however, that the prosecutions should be supported because of
the serious situation which existed on the island. "The lives, not
merely of government officials, but of peaceable citizens are at ...
stake. If assassinations cannot be stopped by ordinary legal processes,
there will be no alternative but the highly undesirable one of declar
ing martial law."
The defender of civil liberties was not convinced that the gov
ernment was on sound footing. Baldwin had no brief for Albizu
Campos. "Anyone," he said, "who commits murder or incites to their
commitments should be punished. If Albizu Campos is doing what
Dr. Gruening and others charge there ought to be no difficulty in
trying to convict him."91 He charged the government with very ques
tionable procedure because "they think they could control the ma
chinery of the Federal court better than the Insular court." In a
letter to Ickes, the secretary of the ACLU wrote : "Switching charges
in order to select a favorable forum does not seem to the Board
proper."92 The correct procedure would have been to risk an acquit
tal rather than initiate a series of political trials.
87. Ibid., Letter from Roger Baldwin to Ernest, July 13, 1936.
88. Ibid., Letter from Luis Mufioz Marin to Roger Baldwin, June 29,
1936.
89. ACLU, Letter from Baldwin to Secretary Ickes, July 6, 1936.
90. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Roger Baldwin, July 22, 1936.
91. Ibid., Letter from Baldwin to Ballard, July 15, 1936.
92. Ibid., Letter from L. B. Milner to Secretary Ickes, July 30, 1936.
The government sent two federal prosecutors down to bolster the

efforts of Cecil Snyder, who had been on the case from the begin
ning. Even with this extra help and the desired federal court, as
well as a staunch conservative judge, Judge Cooper, the able Harvard
graduate, Albizu Campos, through his young lawyers, so carefully
selected his jury that the accused failed to be convicted. However,
they were not acquitted either. The trial terminated with a hung
jury.
The local prosecutors were ordered to proceed at once with a
new trial before a new jury. If a sworn affidavit of the famous artist
and left-winger Rockwell Kent is to be given credence, the state this
time was taking no chances. Kent, on a visit to Puerto Rico, was
taken by a continental resident of the island to a reception on July
20, at La Fortaleza. One of the guests he was introduced to was
Cecil Snyder. In a conversation with Kent's friend, Snyder, handing
him a lot of names, said, "Tell me what you think of these men for
my next jury."93 The friend concluded that all were pro-American
and the prosecuting attorney knowingly agreed. This jury, consisting
of ten resident continentals and only two Puerto Ricans, speedily
brought in a verdict of guilty.94 The Nationalists were sentenced to
Atlanta for a period of from two to ten years.
When confronted with the Rockwell Kent accusation, Cecil Sny
der offered the following denial:
How could I possibly know what men on the entire jury panel,
drawn July 20, 1936, and consisting of forty men, would be chal
lenged by Albizu Campos for cause, and how could I possibly know
what ten names Albizu Campos would, as he was permitted to do
by law, strike from that panel of forty names without giving any
reason for his actions?95
If this was not sufficient Snyder went on to point out

refutation,
that three of the men on the jury were on a list of fifteen additional
men selected for jury duty, drawn on July 24, 1936, because some
of the forty originally selected could not be found.
93. Ibid., Sworn affidavit of Rockwell Kent, undated.

94. For the inside view on the deliberations and prejudices of this
strangely composed jury, see the letter of one of the jurors, Elmer Ellsworth,
to President Roosevelt, found in ACLU, Vol. 2053, Copy of letter from Elmer
Ellsworth to President Roosevelt, Oct. 17, 1938.
95. DTIP, 9-8-84, Publicity, Letter from Cecil Snyder to Brian McMahon,
Assistant Attorney General, Dec. 17, 1938.
This does not void the possibility

that the fifty-five men selected
for possible jury service were pro-American. A jury panel of ten
Americans and only two Puerto Ricans from an island where there
were almost two million Puerto Ricans and only about five thousand
American residents must be open to criticism. If this had been even
New England, where they also took their politics seriously, it might
have been possible to select an unbiased group of twelve. But this
was Puerto Rico where the main industry was politics.
When he heard of the results, Dr. Gruening wired congratula
tions to Governor Winship and exclaimed that these "satisfactory
results . . . ought to go far to restore order and tranquility."96
The American Civil Liberties Union received reports on the trials
from Guerra-Mondragon, who expressed his opinion that both trials
"were thick with political bias."97 He stated quite frankly that he
thought that the "defendants were very inefficiently defended." On
this point another observer who could hardly be classed as a friend
of Campos, or, for that matter, of Puerto Ricans in general, wrote
to the effect that Albizu had conducted a brilliant defense, at least
in the first trial, which, because it was based on legal technicalities
and not on bombastic outbursts against colonial despots, disappointed
many of his faithful followers.98 In the first trial his strategy paid off,
but in the second, the card-stacking strategy of the state paid off.
Guerra-Mondragon thought that the ACLU might be able to
secure a new trial or might at least help with an appeal of the case.
He called to the ACLU's attention the fact that Judge Cooper in his
instructions to the jury had denounced Albizu Campos as a mur
derer. Baldwin thought that the ACLU might be able to help, but
he was halted in his plans by a wire from Vito Marcantonio, who
had been on the island observing the trial.99
After many years of experience in cases of this nature, Roger
Baldwin was fully aware of the unfortunate consequences of the
prosecution of political figures. As he cogently expressed himself to
Secretary Ickes: "We could think of no means better calculated to
96. Ibid., 9-8-59, Wire from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship, July 31,
1936.
97. ACLU, Letter from Guerra to Baldwin, July 31, 1936.
98. Wenzel Brown, Dynamite on Our Doorstep (New York: Greenberg,
1945), pp. 83-84.
99. ACLU, Letter from Baldwin to Munoz Marin, Aug. 6, 1936; Letter
from Marcantonio to Joseph Brodsky, Aug. 6, 1936.
defeat the very ends you have in view than these political charges."100
Ickes, unconvinced, answered: "It is my belief that the convictions
will have a salutary effect and be of definite value in helping to sta
bilize conditions."101
The which accompanied the eight Nationalists as
applause102
they strode off to the island prison, La Princesa, could hardly be
what Ickes had hoped for, since it sounded much more like the atten
tion given to martyrs. It was less than a year previously that Campos,
after insulting the students of the university, could hardly have com
manded the attention of more islanders than his small circle of
devotees. But then a lot of changes had occurred in a year; indeed,
in six months. As Mufioz Marin predicted, the Tydings bill had
"widened and deepened ...
the power of Sr. Albizu Campos."103
This political prosecution had hoisted him up on a pedestal from
which he has never descended.
* * »
The other matter which dominated the political attention of the

island during the summer months, aside from the political campaign,
was the inquisition which was being carried out in the PRRA. Hav
ing closed his eyes to the marriage between the Washington admin
istration and the Liberal party, which culminated in the PRRA, Dr.
Gruening set about to deny the parenthood and endeavored to scrub
the child's features so that he did not look so much like his father.
In the process the child was all but killed and certainly maimed.
Colonel Luis Raul Esteves, head of the personnel office of the
PRRA, was selected to head the committee to investigate the politi
cal activity within the PRRA. Esteves had excellent credentials. He
had been selected by the governor to fill the post of the unfortunate
Riggs, but Senator Martinez Nadal had blocked his appointment for
purely personal reasons, even though the rest of the coalition was
ready to go along with it. He certainly would have been a better
choice than the man who was finally selected, as events will indi
cate. Colonel Esteves was generally recognized by all parties as be
longing to that rare species of bird that was quite scarce on the
island. He was apolitical.
100. Ibid., Letter from Baldwin to Secretary Ickes, Aug. 15, 1936.
101. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Roger Baldwin, Aug. 18, 1936.
102. New York Times, Aug. 1, 1936.
103. DTIP, 9-8-2, Letter from Mufioz Marin to Ickes, May 11, 1936.
The committee met for the first time on June 10,104 but most of
its work was done behind closed doors and the press could only keep
account of the people removed and not the details of the investiga
tions. One group of employees was charged with discounting from
pay checks for party contributions.105 An example of the fairness of
the Esteves committee can be seen from the handling of the Self Help
Needle-Work Cooperative, to which reference has been made. In this
division a full investigation was undertaken, but no action was recom
mended in spite of the pressure exercised by the governor and the
Socialist members of the cabinet who were interested in creating
their own protected needlework unit.108
As a parting shot, James Bourne threw timber into the fire when
he publicly charged that the PRRA had been turned over to the
Liberal party.107 As people were removed, the coalitionists, led by
Santiago Iglesias, who had returned from Washington, rained accu
sations against known Liberal party members in the PRRA. No one
was safe from the top to the bottom, and Rafael Fernandez Garcia,
one of the original editors of the Chardon Plan, was removed with
prejudice.108 Although not charged with political bias, Commissioner
Menendez Ramos had already given notice that he was retiring from
the cabinet of the governor to return to private life.109 Only Chard6n
remained, and the rumor was that he would shortly be replaced.110
In September, when Dr. Gruening took personal charge, the
head-hunting became very effective. Hardly a day went by without
some type of action indicativeof a political purge. All candidates
for public offices were removed in keeping with federal regulations.
Prominent Liberals, including Jorge Font Saldana, Pedro A. Vaz
quez, and Juan Martinez Chapel, were forced out of their positions
for having set up a small cell group under the name of Renova
tion.111 The primary purpose of this group was to collect funds for
the Liberal party. One ironic fact, confessed to by Dr. Gruening him
self, was the need of funds to pay the debt on cables owed to
Ruby Black.112 Most of these messages had carried vital information
104. El Mundo, June 11, 1936. 105. Ibid., Aug. 31, 1936.
106. La Fortaleza, #521, Letter from Col. Estevesto Dr. Chardon, Sept.
1, 1936. 107. El Mundo, June 20, 1936.
108. Ibid., Sept. 3, 1936. 109. El Impartial, July 1, 1936.
110. El Mundo, Sept. 2, 1936. 111. El Pais, Sept. 14, 1936.
112. Ruby Black Collection, Dr. Gruening's reaction; Notes of the Sec
retary on the questioning of Font Saldana, Sept. 8, 1936.
for Dr. Gruening in his fight to set up the PRRA. But perhaps the
most unfortunate case was the poor laborer who was fired when he
lent a PRRA launch to Senator Luis Munoz Marin.113
The last straw was dropped when the reliable and important
daily El Mundo ran a story declaring that the "PRRA investigates
the way a person thinks with reference to independence before ex
tending important appointments."114 This story was picked up and
run in the New York Times on September 23, 1936. The witch
hunt had gone too far. Persecution for political beliefs was taking
on an aspect which has recently been familiar in the United States.
The ACLU promptly wired the Department of Interior for confirma
tion of the charge.115 A flat denial of the press statement came back
a week later.116 However, Munoz, who claimed "to have proof of
every assertion that I make," did state:
An independence test is set up for employment in the Recon

struction which I and avowed independence leaders were trusted to
help create. This is vigorously denied, but is nevertheless absolutely
true. Of course, always some petty excuse is found, but the reality
is that the man responsible for an Administration Bill giving the
Puerto Ricans the opportunity to choose independence is having the
belief punished at every turn.117
Dr. Gruening flew back to the island and met with the press.
He gave his assurance that the constitutional rights of all PRRA
employees would be respected. However, he was not very discreet
in his statement. His opinion was thinly veiled, and concerning his
politics in the PRRA, he was quoted as saying that "the PRRA does
not propose to intervene in the beliefs of its employees even though
those beliefs may occasionally appear to be in conflict with a mini
mum of common sense."118
Dr. Gruening was personally involved in the election of 1936.
He had encouraged the idea that this election would be considered
a form of plebiscite. He had placed himself, as PRRA administrator,
and the PRRA in firm opposition to independence. Under these cir-
113. El Mundo, Sept. 16, 1936. 114. Ibid., Sept. 20, 1936.
115. DTIP., 9-8-63, Wire from ACLU to Secretary Ickes, Sept. 23,
1936.
116. Ibid., Letter from Acting Secretary Walters to ACLU, Sept. 28,
1936.
117. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Mufioz Marin to Ruby Black,
Sept. 25, 1936. 118. La Correspondencia, Sept. 30, 1936.
cumstances he could hardly maintain a neutral position even though

he tried to keep up appearances of neutrality by refusing to remain
on the island during the month previous to the election.
Before he returned to the capital, however, he exerted all the
pressure at his command to discourage any proindependence move
ment. He visited various Liberal leaders to ask them to work to
remove the independence plank in their platform. While political
activity was forbidden to the PRRA employees, he undertook to put
himself above this position by trying to discredit independence and
by "attacking the idea with vigor."119
Finally, less than a year after he had been strongly attacked in
the island press by the above cited political manifestos of the coali
tion, Dr. Gruening appeared as guest at a dinner which also served
as a political rally for all the important leaders of the Union-Repub
lican party.120 When asked to explain the open reversal of his past
attitude, coming on the eve of the election, Dr. Gruening denied
that his appearance had any political significance at what he termed
a purely social gathering.121
The humor magazine Florete, commenting on a two-hour visit
of Dr. Gruening at the home of Santiago Iglesias,122 pictured the
Socialist asking his secretary: "Draw me up half a dozen more com
plaints about the PRRA. I am thinking of leaving Chardon en-the
street,"123
After Dr. Gruening had returned to Washington, the staid paper
El Mundo (October 17, 1936) carried the story that Carlos Char
don had sent in his resignation. There was evidently more reason to
put faith in this report than in the previous rumors which had been
published in the less reliable papers. Dr. Gruening, who stoutly re
fused to return to the island, sent three continental members of his
staff flying to the island to try to convince Chardon that he should
withdraw his resignation. Chardon stood his ground, although a year
previous when faced with similar circumstances, he had yielded
to the pleading of Dr. Gruening.124 However, nothing was done until
after the election.
119. Department of the Interior, 9-8-15, Letter to Secretary Ickes signed

by Esteban Bird, Jose Benitez, Tomas Blanco, and seven others, Dec. 5, 1936.
120. El Mundo, Sept. 11, 1936.
121. La Correspondencia, Sept. 12, 1936.
122. El Mundo, Sept. 15, 1936. 123. Florete, Sept. 26, 1936.
124. La Democracia, Nov. 14, 1936; as reference to an explanatory
letter from Dr. Chard6n.
The events which motivated the irretraceable move of the man

who had given his name and complete soul to the economic recon
struction program of the island are not hard to find. It is clear, how
ever, that the purge of the Liberal politicians in the PRRA was not
the prime motive for his decision. Nevertheless, he could have hardly
approved of their being replaced with persons who had previously
indicated their opposition to the program.
The core of the problem was found in the following: Dr. Char-
don, as regional administrator, was second in command of the PRRA
only to Dr. Gruening who had been named by the President. The
responsibilities which Dr. Chardon bore, as a result of his position,
were complete. Particularly when Dr. Gruening was on the island,
Chardon found himself in the uncomfortable position of being coun
termanded by Dr. Gruening to whom every continental had ready
access, irrespective of the established administrative channels.125
The provocation in October, 1936, was the same as in Novem
ber of the previous year: the lack of authority within the legal divi
sion of the PRRA. Chardon had no power over Francis Shea, his
successor Moses Huberman, or the young law graduates in their
division. Yet, he was responsible for their work since it formed a
key part in the over-all work of the PRRA, specifically in the expro
priation of land, the setting up of the government sugar factory, and
aid in the 500-Acre cases. Furthermore, these inexperienced conti
nental lawyers were often preferred over adequately prepared Puerto
Ricans, such as Clemente Ruiz Nazario, who were forced to do the
work at lower pay and often under humiliating circumstances.
The three continentals who had been sent down to talk with
Chardon and convince him to withdraw his resignation found that
he had acted quite correctly under extremely trying circumstances.
He had found incompetence, acted to correct it by putting his own
lawyer in charge, and the result was an appeal to Gruening.126
Chardon presented his resignation as a result of this sequence of
events and as a test of the confidence Gruening placed in him. Either
Gruening accepted his resignation or gave him authority equal to his
responsibility.
This question of personal confidence was necessary because Dr.
Gruening had the unfortunate ability of, perhaps unwittingly, imply
ing that any difference of opinion implied a personal misunderstand-
125. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Earl P. Hanson to Dr. Gruening,
Nov. 30, 1936. 126. La Democracia, Nov. 14, 1936.
ing. Of course, this seed of distrust would grow in Dr. Gruening's

mind until it culminated in a severing of relationships. This is pre
cisely what happened between Bourne and Gruening, Mufioz Marin
and Gruening, and, finally, Dr. CharckSn and Gruening.
Dr. Gruening's insecurity probably came from a lack of confi
dence which a psychologist could explain more easily than a histo
rian. Gruening prided himself on being a crusading liberal, and he
was convinced that he could do no wrong, while those who differed
with him were motivated by selfish or otherwise ulterior motives.
Dorothy Bourne recognized this when she pointed out to the Presi
dent that Gruening's uncompromising attitude led him to ride rough
shod over all independent minds, convinced that, since his goal was
so spotless, his disrespectful and dictatorial attitudes were justified.
What was tragic was that he had the power to make good his un-
pronounced threats of vengeance by imposing his will over those who
differed with him. The one unfortunate exception to this was Gov
ernor Winship, who was backed by the President, and with whom
Dr. Gruening had found it expedient to join forces.
Dr. Chard6n, after Dr. Gruening publicly implied that he was
blameless in producing the regional administrator's resignation, pub
lished in the press a full explanation of his administrative difficulties.
Although the above analysis has drawn heavily from this source, it
is not out of order to quote some of the pertinent points raised by
Chard<Sn in justifying his resignation.
(A) . . . Dr. Gruening meddles in affairs and discussions which

do not correspond to the high dignity of his position.
(B) . . . has fostered division between continentals and Puerto
Ricans through humiliations and mortifications which will leave deep
marks on the future relations between the two countries.
(C) Because by means of an attitude of open mistrust toward
the integrity and native capacity, you have wounded the sentiments
of men of prestige who honor our country . . . you ordered an inves
tigation of a business agreement between the PRRA and Mr. Jorge
Bird Arias, recommended by Mr. Manuel Egozcue, which I approved
and signed.
(D) Because of your ignorance of or your wish to ignore ad
ministrative ethics by communicating directly with subaltern conti
nental employees, by transmitting orders and verbal decrees behind
the backs of superior Puerto Rican employees and the Regional Ad
ministrator of die PRRA. . . .
(G) ... In order to relieve my conscience, I consider myself

incompatible in every aspect with Dr. Gruening, with his actions,
with his sly and insincere conduct. I have the fullest and most inti
mate conviction that the great majority of employees of the PRRA
think as I do.127
Dr. Carlos Chard6n's resignation was taken to the President by

Dr. Gruening and was promptly accepted.128 The following day Mr.
Roosevelt signed the executive order putting the PRRA and its ad
ministrator under the Department of the Interior. However, the
damage had been done and Ickes, who was not at all happy with
Dr. Gruening,129 could not do much to correct it at this point. Char-
don's successor was Miles Fairbanks, who since October had held
the position of Chief of the Rural Rehabilitation Division of the
PRRA. Previous to October he had been the representative for Puerto
Rico of the Production Credit Corporation. Chardon went to Vene
zuela and to Colombia, where, in Colombia, he remained for a while
to combat a disease he was better prepared to understand, the mosaic
rust, which affected the quality of sugar cane.
With Chardon's resignation, and proof of the validity of his
closing assertion in the above quoted letter, over twenty employees
of the administrative divisions of the PRRA resigned. Among them
were Antonio J. Colorado, Esteban Bird, Tomas Blanco, and Earl
P. Hanson. The latter was employed by the National Resources Com
mittee and only on loan to the PRRA. However, since he held four
positions within the PRRA, he formally requested that Dr. Gruen
ing relieve him of any further obligations in Puerto Rico. It was his
hope that he could be relocated elsewhere in the federal government
and to this effect he wrote to his superior on the National Resources
Committee, Charles W. Eliot, II. Since the letter Hanson wrote to
Eliot is most revealing, it is extensively quoted.
This act [his resignation] comes as a result of many months of

apprehension about the course of events down here and of many
weeks of deliberation. Events of the last month . . . have finally con
vinced me that the present policies here, of representatives of the
127. Ibid.
128. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File 6-S, Letter from Dr.
Chardon to President Roosevelt, Nov. 11, 1936; and letter from President
Roosevelt to Dr. Chardon, Nov. 13, 1936.
129. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Ruby Black to Luis, Nov. 9,
1936.
Federal Government can only lead Puerto Rico to rapid and in

evitable chaos with concurrent loss of American prestige not only in
Puerto Rico but throughout the Western Hemisphere. As an indi
vidual, as an American, as a man who feels he has to protect his
own integrity, I can no longer participate in the P.R.R.A. program
and so give tacit consent as well as active support to policies that
have by now created in Puerto Rico one of the most tense and hateful
situations I have ever seen ...
a situation that in my opinion must
"blow up" before too long if present policies are continued.130
On the same day that Hanson write the above he drew up a

long and rambling letter to Ernest Gruening. He left no doubt as
to his opinion of Gruening and his politics while he briefly traced
the history of the PRRA, the hopes with which it was met, and the
despair which it invoked in the minds of these same people now.
Hanson wrote:
In the PRRA, in the University, in the Insular Government

people are afraid to say what they think politically to talk about
Independence, to tell you and, through you, the Federal Govern
ment what their own attitudes are if those differ from yours. Eco
nomic necessity is too powerful. A man is now often faced with
starvation if he speaks his mind or acts according to the dictates of
his honor. That amounts to an almost complete suspension of civil
liberties that your country and mine stands for.131
Hanson was recalled to Washington after Eliot discussed his

strictly confidential
letter with Secretary Ickes' alter ego, Mr. Bur-
lew.132 His removal from Puerto Rico caused another outburst of
protests to flood the Department of the Interior. Each pointed out
that Hanson had been the best exponent of the New Deal that the
island had seen.133 Of course, these protests had little effect, but still
Dr. Gruening did not acknowledge Hanson's request for formal
releasefrom his obligations. With the first of the year, this request
was repeated.134 This time the caustic reply came from the master
130. National Archives, Record Group #187, National Resources Com

mission, Personnel File: Earl Hanson, Letter from Hanson to Charles Eliot,
Nov. 30, 1936.
131. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Earl R. Hanson to Dr. Gruening,
copy to Roger Baldwin, Nov. 30, 1936.
132. National Resources Committee, Note from Mr. Burlew to Secre
tary Ickes, on Dec. 5, 1936.
133. Ibid., Letter from Jose Benitez Castro to Ickes, on Dec. 5, 1936.
134. Ibid., Letter from Earl Hanson to Dr. Gruening, Jan. 20, 1937.
of sharp banter, the old "Curmudgeon" himself. He informed Han

son that he considered "that the method and manner of your at
tempted resignation to Dr. Gruening were both improper and in
bad taste." He went on:
The whole thing to me had the appearance of an intent to inflict

injury while glorifying yourself. . . . May I suggest that if you really
want to resign, you do it to the proper person. I assure you that you
will not complain of any dilatoriness in the reply that you will get.
Since you do not seem to know by whom you are employed, I will
say again your employer is the National Resources Committee of
which I am the chairman.135
Hanson's reply to the blast was a calm reassertion of correctness

of his position.
I wrote you some months ago that I knew my course to be
apparently unethical, that I considered the situation in Puerto Rico
to be serious enough to warrant it, that I asked for no protection,
that I have no regrets for having taken the course I had to take
regardless of consequences.136
This exchange of letters is important only in that it sets out in

clear terms the opinion of one continental concerning the turn of
events in the PRRA. There is no doubt that Hanson stressed his point
of view with a great deal of vigor and warmth while he was caught
up in tensions brought about by the actions of Dr. Gruening. He did
not agree with Dr. Gruening, and he predicted a "blow-up" in which
he did not wish to be involved.137 Hanson's analysis was not far
wrong, since subsequent events speak for themselves.
In anticipation of these events, it might be pointed out that
Ickes, now in control of the PRRA, initiated a formal investigation
of its administration on the first of the year. He sent his trusted
Miss Leona Graham, executive assistant to the Secretary, to the
island to hold court and make a very thorough report on the PRRA
and Dr. Gruening. The results of this study will be touched upon
later.
In the interest of seeing the PRRA purge through to the end,
other events have been neglected which undoubtedly had bearing
135. Ibid., Letter from Secretary Ickes to Earl Hanson, Jan. 29, 1937.
136. Ibid., Letter from Hanson to Secretary Ickes, Feb., 3, 1937.
137. Earl P. Hanson's book, Transformation: The Story of Modern
Puerto Rico, has been criticized for painting too black a picture of this period.
But readers of the present book can judge how much he erred.
on the Puerto Rican political developments. Shortly before the elec

tions, Senator King from Utah, a member of the Senate Committee
on Insular Affairs, decided to go to Puerto Rico. He had been con
tinuously bombarded with protests of the coalition concerning the
prevalence of politics in the PRRA, and other matters, and he
decided to investigate the situation for his own satisfaction.
Senator King's visit in August has been humorously written about
elsewhere.138 The Senator was chiefly concerned with the teaching of
English on the island, where, much to the detriment of the educa
tional system in general, his inquiries threw the department back
into the political arena.
In the spring of 1934, just after Dr. Padin's reappointment
with the President's strong approval, there was organized in the
department of education a round-table seminar on bilingual educa
tion. This group formed a committee which carefully studied the
problem through the summer months and finally turned in a report
in September. The report concluded that English should not be used
as a means of teaching the classroom material itself, such as mathe
matics, science, and art. The teaching of English itself, however,
would be intensified.139
Dr. Padin went to great lengths to explain the reasons behind the
decision to the governor, pointing out that most of the public school
teachers were not prepared to teach mathematics or geography in a
foreign tongue. As a result, the child was not only not learning cor
rect English, but he was also failing to pick up the basic essentials of
an education. He proposed that as large a number of continental
teachers as the budget would permit should be brought in to spear
head the English teaching program.140
The governor was not convinced, but he agreed to suspend judg
ment until the commissioner had an opportunity to allow his experi
ment to be tested over a reasonable length of time.141 Dr. Padin
admitted it was an experiment. He wanted to discover if there was
"a way by which English can be given adequate practice in the ele
mentary schools without the need of using it as the medium of
instruction."142
138. Hanson, op. cit., p. 54. 139. La Democracia, Sept. 8, 1934.

140. DTIP, 9-8-65, Letter from Gov. Winship to Dr. Padin, Sept. 6,
1934. 141. Ibid.
142. Ibid., Personal and Confidential Letter from Dr. Padin to Dr.
Gruening, Sept. 12, 1934.
In a talk chapter of the American Association of

to the local
University Women at La Fortaleza in September, 1934, Dr. Padin
had stressed the fact that this was strictly a pedogogical move taken
at a time of complete political tranquillity in the hope that politics
would of the field of education. Some effort was made
be kept out
to interest Dr. Gruening in taking up the cudgel for the coalition on
this issue, but at that time Dr. Gruening was not interested.143
When in the fall of 1936 Senator King raised his protest, Dr.
Gruening was more inclined to listen. The criticism was coming from
an influential legislator. If it would be unjust to imply that the sub
sequent action of Dr. Gruening was in part a reprisal taken against
the proindependence group, it did come at a time of political tension
when all were grouped together.
During the months of September and October, personally or by
letter, Dr. Gruening made inquiries of a great number of continentals
and a few Puerto Ricans within the insular school system concerning
the teaching of English on the island. The answers which returned
were highly critical. The opinions were based on vague charges that
the English teaching was inefficient and half-hearted, and "that there
seems to be a strong tendency to defeat any measures to popularize
instruction in English."144
The instruction of English was in charge of a committee presided
over by a continental professor. C. Lewis Richardson had several
good workers on his committee, including Pauline Rojas, later to
direct the island's English program. The program of the committee
and the criticism of it is not deemed pertinent here, and will not be
analyzed.
Juan P. Blanco, its chief critic, had been supervisor of English
teaching for the previous six years, and his twenty-one page report,
entitled "An Exposition of the Educational Problem of Puerto Rico,"
was recommended for study to Ickes. Gruening admitted that it had
"a certain ex parte quality," but he asserted that the "information
therein contained is amply confirmed by others, especially teachers
of English."145
143. Ibid., Letter from Jose Miguel Gutierrez to Dr. Gruening, Sept. 5,
1934; Letter from Dr. Gruening to Jose' Miguel Gutierrez, Sept. 21, 1934.
144. Ibid., Report from J. P. Blanco to Dr. Gruening, Oct. 31, 1936.
145. Ibid., 9-8-104, Personal File: Jos6 Padin, Letter from Dr. Padin to
Dr. Gruening, Jan. 4, 1935; Letter from Dr. Gruening to Dr. Padin, Jan.
14, 1936.
Dr. Padin did not have to have the writing on the wall spelled
out for him. He had attempted to resign at the beginning of 1935,
but he had been convinced by Dr. Gruening that he could best serve
the island through staying on and helping with the reconstruction
program.146 However, in November, 1936, with the world falling
apart around him and a quiet investigation going on under him, Dr.
Padin considered it prudent to submit his resignation to the Presi
dent. Again Dr. Gruening was the one who presented it, and secured
the letter of acceptance from the President.
One final and most important development remains to be dis
cussed before going into the pre-election political campaign. As a
background to this development, a short summary of the PRRA's
activity is necessary. The PRRA had been a reality for almost a year
and a half before the elections were held. It is true that the program
had been slow in starting and had to lean heavily on the dying
PRERA for the better part of a year before it could be said to be
standing on its own. The program of the PRRA was manifold, and
to many of its critics it looked like a giant octopus whose tentacles
lacked the central coordination necessary for controlled and purpose
ful operation. Its program included an island-wide hydroelectric
development with dams, reservoirs, transmission lines, power stations,
and other facilities, looking toward a program of rural electrification
and cheap industrial power for the metropolitan areas. A preventive
program to control the centuries-old problem of soil erosion was
pushed. Steep mountains with slopes of 30° or more had been
stripped for agricultural purposes. Tropical vegetation notwithstand
ing, the torrential rains were washing the red soil from the coarse
rocks. A reforestation program had been started by Chief Forester
Barbour before the PRRA was organized, and to this program PRRA
gave new life.
Central to the economic reconstruction program, as far as Com
missioner Menendez Ramos was concerned, was the reorganization of
the coffee and fruit production. The farmers of these products were
organized into producers associations to which the PRRA rendered
marketing aid, educational programs, and financial assistance. With
coffee, a small controlled production plan was drawn up in hopes of
raising the local price of the product. The Producers' Association
undertook to market the excess production in foreign markets. In the
146. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Padin to President Roosevelt, Nov. 9, 1936;
Letter from President Roosevelt to Dr. Padin, Nov. 16, 1936.
following year, 1937, the PRRA would sign the final papers for the
purchase of the Castaner hacienda which would be set up as a model
coffee farm.
The resettlement program was basic to the over-all readjustment
of the social pattern. Approved and prepared families were set up
on small farms of five to ten acres. The size depended upon the soil
and the product suitable to the area. Cement houses with semiper
manent latrines were constructed and turned over to families taken
from urban slums in many cases. The resettlement communities and
demonstration farms were supplied with rural medical centers and
units of public education. There were plans for extensive facilities,
including vocational education units, hospitals, community education
centers, and recreational equipment. Restriction in funds forced
many of the communities to be satisfied with a small clinic and an
elementary one- or two-room cement school house. However, even
this was an improvement over the absolute void which had existed.
Programs for the elimination of parasites were set up. Cattle
baths were built to attack the tick which produced the Texas fever
that had cost the dairymen producers dearly. The
and livestock
coconut industry, for which Puerto Rico should have been famous,
was plagued by the rhinoceros beetle that reaped havoc among the
beautiful and productive coconut palms of the island.
New industries were studied which could put to work the hands
of the thousands idle on the overpopulated island, and technical
reports were written which pointed out the necessary legal and eco
nomic reforms that would establish a climate favorable for industrial
development. It was suggested that the sine qua non requisites would
be greater liberty in the matter of a local tariff (such as the coffee
tariff established in 1934); authority to enter into reciprocity agree
ments with foreign countries; control or at least freight regulation
over the steamship lines serving the island (since the PRRA building
program had been initiated, freight rates on cement and lumber
soared 65 per cent);147 a free port for San Juan; and a form of sub
sidy, possibly from tariff revenues, for new industries.148
In the fifteen months of operation ending November 30, 1936,
the PRRA had spent in the above phases of its program close to $ 1 3
147. Ibid., 9-8-59, Conditions-General, Letter from Dr. Gruening to

Governor Winship, July 31, 1936.
148. Ibid., Thirty-five-page Memorandum from Guerra-Mondragon on
Industrial Development, Dec. 10, 1935.
million ($12,760,459.35), over two-thirds of which ($7,581,-

266.5 1) had been spent on labor. The PRRA payroll included some
52,221 people of which only 3,635 were administrative. The pay
roll was close to $ 1 million a month.
As of the first of October, the balance sheet showed 24 resettle
ment houses completed and 343 under construction. A dozen camps
were completed and 28 under construction.149 In spite of adminis
trative problems the PRRA was apparently moving ahead, and the
Chardon Plan was becoming a reality, or was it?
Sugar was the core of the Chardon Plan as well as the reason for
the PRRA, and Professor Rafael Ferndndez Garcia was made respon
sible for this part of the program. The plan was to buy a sugar
central which would be run by the PRRA as a model for the rest of
the sugar centrales of the island. The sugar land of the central was
to be turned over to colonos for cash or marginal lands (probated at
a three to one ratio) which would be retired from sugar production.
The original plan established this model central150 as a nonprofit
government corporation or a type of public utility. However, the
legislative opposition, in the persons of Senators Tydings and Van-
denberg, to government competition with private enterprise blocked
the original designs of the authors of the Chard6n Plan. The form
in which the multimillion dollar relief bill had been approved defi
nitely necessitated a change of plans.
In the spring of 1935 Miles Fairbanks wrote a letter to Rafael
Fernandez Garcia describing a slight change in the original plan.
This change called for the replacement of the government corpora
tion with a cooperative. The cooperative central would be formed
by the colonos who supplied it with the sugar cane it processed.151
This change was accepted by Fernandez Garcia, Jesus Piiiero, pres
ident of the Asociacion de Colonos, and Carlos Chardon, with the
warning that close supervision should be insisted upon to insure
efficiency and protection of the laborers. Fernandez Garcia wrote:
After reading the four billion dollar bill just as it was signed by
the President, I see that it will be difficult to carry out all of the
Chardon Plan under this law, especially those parts which deal with
149. Revista Economica, Jan. 20, 1937.

150. See La Democracia, April 16, 1936, for the details of the purchase
of Central Lafayette by PRRA.
151. Private files of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Letter from Rafael Fer
nandez to Dr. Chard6n, April, 1935.
the sugar, cement packing plant, etc. industries. Therefore I urge

you to study the possibility of cooperatives, intervening in the first
years for the corporation or public agency in order that as private
associations they need not carry out their business through the comp
troller. Study well what is happening to the Alcohol Corporation
of Virgin Islands.152
Then in the spring of 1936 another change was undertaken in

the sugar plan of the rural rehabilitation division of the PRRA. This
division was directed by Rafael Fernandez Garcia, but the changes
in the plans were drawn up "without my knowledge and without giv
ing me the slightest opportunity to express my views on the same."153
He claimed that even Chardon did not favor the change, but did
not dare fight it, since he saw the odds were against him. This was
not strictly correct, since later Chardon defended the change.
The change in the plans for the sugar central was hatched among
the young continental lawyers led by Francis Shea. The precise moti
vation behind the change is still in doubt, but the explanation given
by Dr. Chardon in his defense was that the original plan was im
possible of execution. It was judged impossible because of the legal
difficulties involved in transferring the property of the colono, which
was nine times out of ten not free of mortgage, under litigation, or
without in exchange for fertile sugar
a clear title, to the government
land.154Shea took his plan, not to Chardon, but to Dr. Gruening in
Washington. Dr. Gruening then called Chardon to Washington and
with Jesus Pinero, who happened to be in the capital, laid the pro
posed change before them in a manner which gave them no alter
native other than to agree.
The new plan was to divide the land of the Central Lafayette
into small tracts of less than 500 acres and then organize the cane
workers on these tracts into cooperatives which would control and
cultivate the land. Aside from the fact that he had not been con
sulted on the change, Fernandez Garcia was in strong disagreement
with the innovation. In his letter of protest to Dr. Gruening, he
raised many serious questions which the director of the Division of
Rural Rehabilitation would have to solve.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid., Letter from Fernandez Garcia to Dr. Gruening, July 18,
1936.
154. La Democracia, Sept. 22, 1936, Letter from Dr. Chardon an
swering the charges of the Asociacion de Colonos.
First, the question of an efficient organization was raised. The

Central Lafayette had over 10,000 acres of land and over 8,000
acres leased out to agregados. This would mean, if the 500-Acre
Law were to be respected, between twenty and thirty distinct co
operatives formed by cane field laborers, some of whom could not
even read or write. This cumbersome organization would be de
feated before it started in the highly competitive sugar industry.
Second, argued Fernandez Garcia, these cooperatives would not
be able to raise one cent for working capital. No agency would loan
them money without a mortgage on the land, which would not be
secured since the land was not theirs. The workers, for the first
year, would be receiving little more than their ordinary wages, since
they would have to turn over their profits to the government or
central cooperative to pay for their land and for the servicing of their
land with fertilizer, irrigation, and other needs. Thus, saddled with
a heavy debt, earning little more than before, and uninstructed in
the ideals of cooperativism, the worker would be easy prey for the
sugar companies, the labor organizers, and the politicians who would
stand to profit by the failure of the PRRA.155
These are serious doubts raised by the man who would have to
see the implementation of the land reform through to its completion.
There was, however, one final revealing point raised by Fernandez
Garcia. Toward the end of his long four-page letter to Gruening,
there was the following paragraph :
The main support of our fight against the sugar corporation was
the colono class. They were even willing to relinquish seven to eight
million dollars in processing taxes due to them, for the benefit of
obtaining yard-stick factories that will insure their dealings with the
corporations. By going into this experiment we are not fulfilling the
promises made to the colonos, in fact, we are working against them.
We are trying to prove there is no need of their services, we are
inciting the workers to rebel and unite against the colono. Is this the
way we should treat those that placed their confidence and trust in
us? Is it good for Puerto Rico that the PRRA should initiate a
struggle of laborers against the middle class?156
The same objections were expressed perhaps more frankly in a

letter from the Asociacion de Colonos to Dr. Chardon. It said: "So-
155. Private Files of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Letter from Fernandez

Garcia to Dr. Gruening, July 18, 1936. 156. Ibid.
called cooperatives are nothing more, in the last analysis, than a

formula with openly Communistic characteristics."157
Dr. Chardon answered these protests by stoutly maintaining that
"the fundamental motives of the original plan of the sugar program
have been carried out, that is, the elimination of absenteeism, the
elimination of the unfairness between the industries on the one hand
and the colonos and workers on the other."158
He argued that 436 colonos were destined to benefit from the
PRRA purchase of Central Lafayette, and he also recognized that
some 1,500 workers would also receive like benefits. After all: "The
workers are just as important as the colonos in the development and
distribution of industrial profits." And to the charge that coopera
tives were Communistic, he replied that "cooperativism is the most
effective means within the capitalistic system of combating Com
munism." But there is one final touch which must be added to bring
the picture into proper perspective.
It will be recalled that Dr. Gruening was deprived of the main
source of financial backing of the PRRA when on January 6, 1936,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision invalidating the AAA
as an improper exercise of the government's taxing powers. The
doubtful legality of the act and other considerations held up the
transfer of funds to the PRRA.
In January, 1935, contracts fixing a quota for sugar production
had been signed with James A. Dickey. Some 8,000 were legalized.
Payments on these contracts were conditioned upon the nonemploy-
ment of children under 14 years of age and the compliance with any
minimum wage or maximum hour agreements. One large corpora
tion, Luce and Company, which controlled Central Aguirre and
22,000 acres of sugar land, refused to sign the AAA contracts and
therefore was neither restricted in cane production nor benefited by
the tax refunds.159
These payments were made in May, 1936. Senator Vanden-
berg requested from the Secretary of Agriculture the information on
the AAA payments. All the names of persons and corporations
receiving over $10,000 in payments were duly compiled and sent to
the Senator, who inserted them in the Appendix of the Congressional

159. General Correspondence, of the AAA, Letter from John E. Dalton
to Winthrop Bancroft, vice-president of Central Aguirre Association.
Record. On the basis of the information submitted, Puerto Rican

producers received $8,728,603. 78,160 but this did not include the
money paid to the small sugar producers. El Mundo (June 28,
1936) quoted an estimate of over $12 million for all the Puerto
Rican producers. The largest payment went to the Fajardo Sugar
Growers Association: $961,064. It is interesting to speculate on
what the PRRA might have done with an additional $36 million
over a three-year period.
The line of thought behind the change in the PRRA policy may
have been as follows. Since the colonos were receiving the benefit
payments, the land readjustment program of the PRRA need no
longer be designed for their benefit and now could be directed for
the benefit of the common laborer. As Don Rafael had maintained,
the colonos "were willing to relinquish seven to eight million dollars
in processing taxes." Now that the colono was no longer being de
prived of this money, the PRRA could look toward the more needy
members of the Puerto Rican community.
The colonos were not willing, however, to carry their altruism
to this extreme. Rafael Fernandez Garcia submitted his resignation
to Ernest Gruening in a letter of August 18, 1936. 161 He was solidly
backed by the Asociacion de Colonos, which announced its disillu
sionment with the turn of events in the PRRA.162 It will be recalled
that the president of the Asociacion was Jesus T. Pifiero, faithful
companion of Mufioz Marin on several of his trips to Washington.
These, then, were the developments which provided the back
drop for the strange political battle of 1936, the violent outbreak of
the Nationalists, the dubious sedition trial, the "surprise" of the
Tydings bill, the break between Mufioz and Gruening, the purge of
the Liberals in the PRRA, the quiet inquiries about anti-American
sentiment, the investigation of the teaching of English in the public
school system, the arrival of large federal checks made out to sugar
producers, colonos, and centrales alike, the revision of the original
land distribution plan of the PRRA, and the subsequent alienation
of the colono class.
160. U. S. 74th Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document 274, pp. 126-32.

161. Private File of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Letter to Dr. Gruening,
Aug. 18, 1936. 162. El Mundo, Sept. 4, 1936.
THE HARVEST
7 he central political figure in the election cam

paign of 1936 was the man who, in one way or an
other, had figured prominently in every major political decision
except one, from the arrival on the island of the first Roosevelt ap
pointee to the November election day. The presentation of the Ty-
dings independence bill was the only decision in which Munoz Marin
had played no part. The fact that Mufioz was not consulted in this
important measure shook his control over the Liberal party. A strug
gle for power ensued between the conservative and liberal elements
within the party. A temporary truce held the two blocs together until
after the close defeat on election day. Then the Liberal party split.
In the mind of Mufioz the issue of independence had to be tied
to the economic conditions which would accompany such a status. If
the economic conditions which would accompany independence were
favorable (in Mufioz' words: independence with economic justice)
then the issue would be fairly put before the people. However, the
Tydings bill offered independence under conditions which could be
accepted only by the extremists.
This was the way Senator Munoz personally viewed the political
scene.
The for the election of 1936. The Liberal forces con

stage is set
trol the Liberal Party completely. And the Liberal Party with many
thousands of Socialist and Republican votes is going to sweep the
elections with independence in its program, because it happens that
we believe in it, but reconstruction is the immediate issue.
288
THE HARVEST 289
But suddenly the Tydings independence bill is presented as an

administration measure. This bill says to Puerto Ricans that inde
pendence can be of their own choosing and it paints a picture of hun
ger, and terror as necessarily connected with independence. Nothing
could have been more accurately designed to split the Liberal Party,
to bring back its small reactionary group into influence and control
than this threat of independence with hunger, ruin and destruction.
Nothing at the same time could have given the really liberal forces
a more dramatic and ghastly sense of total irresponsibility by the
Washington government than the sudden presentation of such a bill.
Result, a new power for the reactionary element in and out of the
Liberal Party.
The moment the Tydings bill is presented, the Liberal Party has
the elections as good as lost and the liberal elements in the Liberal
Party have their power threatened. It so happens that those that be
lieve in independence are, with slight overlapping, those that believe
in the New Deal and economic justice, and that those that are against
independence also with small overlapping, are those that are against
the New Deal and against economic justice through the ownership
and exploitation of selfish economic interests. Therefore, at one
stroke, Gruening (but officially, the administration) has placed con
trol of the elective part of the Puerto Rican Government for many
years to come in the hands of the anti-liberal, anti-economic justice,
and anti-New Deal element and has considerably weakened the lib
eralism of the Liberal Party which was the only remaining engine for
the protection of these helpless masses down here. Thus, Ernest
Gruening, with years of liberalism as his background, is solely re
sponsible through a lunatic quirk of his mind, for having released the
greatest reaction that Puerto Rico has known for years.1
The colono sugar interests in the Liberal party, represented for

the most part by Jesus T. Pinero and the Asociacion de Colonos, were
not for immediate independence, Tydings style, even though they
might have been in favor of greater autonomy. The loss of a pro
tected sugar market would have hit the centrales and corporations
more severely, but it also would have affected the colono interests. A
prolonged transitory period or a quota assignment within the United
States market based on reciprocal trade agreements with the United
States, such as was proposed by Mufioz in his amendments to the
Tydings bill, might have made acceptable the status of independence.
These interests, which were best examplified by the insular leader-
1. ACLU, Letter from Mufioz Marin to Ruby Black, Sept. 25, 1936.
ship and cooperation of Carlos Chard6n and Rafael Fernandez Gar

cia in the formation of the plan of economic reconstruction, were
willing to work for the realization of the New Deal in Puerto Rico
even when it might mean the postponement of certain financial bene
fits for the colono class. The New Deal, particularly as interpreted
by Dr. Rexford G. Tugwell, J. Franklin Carter, and Fred Bartlett,
would mean the recovery of island land from the absentee corpora
tions by the rural middle class, that is, the small farmer or colono.
When this plan was taken out of the hands of the brain trusters in
the Department of Agriculture and eventually changed, due to legal
and administrative reasons more than political, this group withdrew
its support and its cooperation. This withdrawal coincided, unfor
tunately, with the interjection of the question of the political status
of the island raised by the untimely Tydings measure.
There is evidence in the Fernandez Garcia-Chardon correspon
dence of a strong desire to minimize the discussion of status as much
as possible. Fernandez wrote:
By today's cables I see that apparently the status of Puerto Rico

is in discussion and in an unpublished cable of Ruby Black, Col.
Rigby appears to suggest that Puerto Rico is neither a possession nor
a territory. Is this not the sabotaging by the corporations through the
governor and his humble tool Col. Rigby? Is it not the intention to
bring into discussion the status of Puerto Rico so as to forget the
economic part and the centrales will come out on top?2
Dr. Chard6n also gave indication of a similar attitude when he

declared for the press "that the principal and supreme issue for the
coming years should be the reconstruction of the island."3
To these elements can be added the claimed "thousands" of Re
publicans4 and Socialists who were brought into the Liberal fold by
the very obvious success of the cooperation between the New Deal
and Mufioz Marin. Just how large this sector was is impossible to
judge. There are several indications that this was a little more than
just election year propaganda.
All was not well within the Socialist party. In the opinion of
the rank and file, the Socialist party was not getting its share of the
2. Private files of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Letter to Dr. Chardon from

Fernandez, April 18, 1935. 3. El Mundo, June 30, 1936.
4. One important renegade Republican was Vicente Geigel Polanco. See
DTIP, 9-8-67, wire from Geigel Polanco to President Roosevelt, Sept. 7, 1936.
THE HARVEST 291
top positions. One reason was the lack of adequately prepared ad

ministrators. Rafael Alonso Torres, for example, had offered a rather
vulnerable point of attack during the administration of Gore. He was
an example of a worker who had risen through the political ranks to
a high position, but he was not prepared to accept the positions which
his political power had given him. Nevertheless, the Socialists wanted
to dip into the pork barrel with a frequency comparable to their vot
ing power.
In 1934 a group of Socialists in Ponce called for a special party
convention to judge their accusations of neglect and lack of patron
age. These charges were leveled specifically at Rafael Alonso and the
control of the coalition by the Republicans.5 This group took on the
name of Afirmaci6n Socialista and later an effort was made to swing
them into the ranks of the Liberal party.
To balance these groups of pro-United States elements within or
sympathetic to the Liberal party, were those who desired independ
ence at any cost. This group was composed of the urban middle
f class: the lawyers, writers, professors, teachers, shopkeepers, doc

tors, and others. This hard core which sympathized with Albizu
Campos, and may have even egged him on, was not very numerous,
!^.but they were vociferous and outspoken, and managed to keep them
selves in the public eye. They had a strong appeal. Senator Mufioz
Marin was one of the spokesmen of this group. However, he was not
limited to it for his support. He was proud of the fact that he had
broadened the appeal for independence. It will be recalled that he
had written the independence plank for the Libral party which was
unanimously adopted by the convention. He commented:
While independence was at first an issue imposed by intellec-

/fuals because it could not be opposed without showing a lack of col
lective pride by others, it is now an issue believed in all over the
island and sustained by local leadership.6
The extreme colors with which Mufioz painted his statements does
not void the general validity of the assertion to the degree that it
referred to the Liberal party.
But even further, Senator Munoz had succeeded in broadening
the attitude of the rabid independentistas themselves. He was able to
5. Comit6 Insular, Afirmaci6n Socialista, Vrontuario del Libro en Prepa

ration: Opinion y Sentencia (San Juan: La Estrella, 1934).
6. ACLU, Letter from Senator Mufioz to Ruby Black, Sept. 25, 1936.
instill enough optimism and faith in Roosevelt and the New Deal in
the minds of this group to dominate their skepticism and to allow
them to soft-pedal the independence drive, in the hopes of carrying
out a peaceful revolution against the absentee corporations which
gripped the small island in an economic vise. To some of this group,
the New Deal was understood and accepted not in economic terms
but in the nationalistic terms of United States corporations vs. Puerto
Rican landless. The best expression of this drive for economic jus
tice which would free Puerto Rico from foreign control was a radio
speech by Senator Muiioz Marin in December, 1935. Not once dur
ing the speech did he refer to independence.7
In this group of independentistas were intellectuals and profes
sors like Jaime Benitez,8 Tomas Blanco, Sol Descartes, Rafael Cor-
' dero, Antonio J. Colorado, and Acosta Velarde. Of this group those
who were economists, like Cordero or Descartes, followed the general
approach outlined in Dime's book for which they had supplied a great
deal of statistical data. If their specialization was in the arts, like Co
lorado and Benitez, they based their views on cultural arguments.
The political lead was taken by lawyers like Ernesto Ramos Antonini
and Miguel Guerra-Mondrag6n. The one was defender of Albizu
Campos and the other defender of the civil liberties.
The work of the leader of the Liberal party, whether he be the
veteran Antonio Barcelo or the dynamic Muiioz Marin, was to bridge
the two groups and bind them into a united movement. Until the
Tydings bill appeared, the young senator was able to sustain party
unity without sacrificing his ideal of independence. However, with
the independence measure this unity was threatened. Muiioz was
more vulnerable than Don Antonio to the potential danger offered by
the Tydings measure. Don Antonio had a long political history be
hind him which ranged from statehood to autonomy to independence.
Munoz' career was not marred by one moment of vacillation from the
ideal of independence. His recent sotto voce in reference to independ
ence was justified because it would allow an economic reorganization
to be carried out. Once this was realized, then independence could
be easily brought back to the center of attention with less fear, less
opposition, and greater equality of bargaining power between the
island and the continent.
The Tydings bill dictated independence and the island had no
7. El Mundo, Dec. 3, 1936. 8. La Democracia, March 22, 1935.

THE HARVEST 293
basis on which to bargain. The result was the fear and the opposition
of the colono group which threatened to split the Liberal party. If
independence meant loss of a protected market, pride would have
to be swallowed and the Liberal party would have to modify its plat
form. If this were not done, then the coalition would have to carry
the election day even though for the Liberals this would mean an
other long four years away from the political troughs.
On the other hand, the independentistas, not forced to compro
mise by landed interests which demanded a protected market for
agricultural products, rose up to reaffirm their original ideal. Their
defense was loud and demanding because of the implied affront to
the honor of the islander inherent in the conditions of separation
set down in the Tydings measure. Separation would not be asked
for in an orderly or peaceful fashion through a plebiscite. It would
be demanded, the conditions be what they may. To bow down would
be to deny the dignity of being a Puerto Rican.
This was the incipient division within the Liberal party produced
by the dominant issue of the 1936 campaign: the Tydings bill. Upon
Munoz Marin's return to Puerto Rico he saw a divided party and
a lost election.9 In an effort to bring together the diverse elements
and maintain his control over the party, he came up with a question
able tactic. He asserted to the press his unalterable decision to resign
from his seat in the senate,10 and announced that he would refuse
to run for any elective position. This stand was amplified in a mani
festo published in the island press three days after his arrival.11 This
broke upon the public like a bomb, although Barcel6 and the top
leaders of the Liberal party were aware of his thinking. All, Liberals
and the general public, were expecting Munoz to pit his political
strength against Santiago Iglesias for the position of resident com
missioner.
Luis Mufioz Marin had been the unofficial representative not
only of the Liberal party but of the whole island to the New Deal
administration in Washington. He had been amazingly successful.
Few national Senators, not to speak of Representatives, could boast
of as many personal conferences with the Chief Executive over the
problem of their state as Munoz could. Some of these conferences
9. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Mufioz Marin to Ruby Black, June
29, 1936.
10. ElMundo, June 23, 1936.
11. Ibid., June 26, 1936; also La Democracia, June 27, 1936.
the people of Puerto Rico were not even informed about so as not to
alarm unnecessarily the slighted party in power. It was natural that
the Liberal party and Barcelo had become convinced that the young
politician would have no difficulty replacing Santiago Iglesias and
leading the party to victory.
The plan of sending Munoz to Washington would have been at
the same time a way of easing the strain of competition felt by Don
Antonio. Munoz was in his element in Washington. Don Antonio's
element was the island. With both on the island the latter felt obli
gated to be just as active as Munoz. When Mufioz went to Washing
ton and returned he was always received as a conquering hero, and
this cut into the prestige and supposed leadership of the titular
head of the party. Better would it be to keep Munoz in Washington.
The long sessions of Congress could absorb the energy of the young
man and keep him out of harm's way. The local party hacks could
have free reign on the island.
Munoz would have accepted the position in Washington with
little interest. He was aware that some Liberals realized that unless
he were "politically killed before Barcelo die[d], they [would] have
to go back being third-rate leaders."12 He had seen what had hap
pened to Santiago Iglesias when he entered into the coalition and
accepted the Washington assignment. Iglesias had a long political
career behind him and could afford four years away without harm
ing the strength of his personal following, although the party was
weakened. Munoz could hardly boast of such a long career and his
past history looked like that of a professional migrant. Now on the
island, now in New York, back on the island, now living in Wash
ington, he had, indeed, spent one summer living in a car as he trav
eled across the United States. The islanders knew not this son of the
famous Munoz Rivera. He did not have his roots down in Puerto
Rican soil. These past four years were of little value on this score.
The islanders read about his activities on practically every first page
of the island papers, but the tropical sun did not have a chance to
tan his features. No, Munoz could little afford politically the Wash
ington assignment, but this is not why he refused it.
Senator Mufioz refused to run for the position of resident com
missioner or any other position on the Liberal ticket because he was
convinced that if his name appeared on the ticket, the Liberal party
12. ACLU, Letter from Munoz Marin to Ruby Black, Sept. 25, 1936.
THE HARVEST 295
would be torn apart and defeated at the polls.13 Not satisfied with
his own abstention, he tried to push his personal refusal to cooperate
politically onto the Liberal party by declaring that the Liberal party
should boycott the coming elections.14 All through July, in the press
and in the party conventions, this novel doctrine was fought by the
party machine bosses and Barcelo. Mufioz recognized that "to ask a
political party to withdraw from the elections is equivalent to asking
Don Juan to become a monk (which of course, he eventually does,
when it is too late)."15
Antonio Barcelo submitted his resignation to the party and he
refused to carry on unless Mufioz accepted his responsibility and al
lowed his name to enter on the ballot. Ochoteca accused Mufioz of
putting the Liberal party into the noose and pulling the trap door.
He argued that the Liberal party without Mufioz was nothing.16
Mufioz answered that if his program were to be followed to the letter,
independence would be secured on Puerto Rico's terms within at least
three years. If this were so, "What can be achieved, Santo Dios,
by going through one more of the bitter electoral campaigns which
have filled the heart of Puerto Rico with hate, resentment, frustra
tions, and recriminations?"17
Mufioz' interim editor of La Democracia resigned with a blast at
his superior, predicting the dissolution of the party and asserting that
"parties are formed to fight, not to remain paralyzed by fear of the
enemy."18 To counterbalance this opinion, his wife, an ardent ad
mirer, compared el retraimiento to the act of Cortes who burned his
ships on the beach at Vera Cruz.19 Ruby Black, who, more than any
one other person in Washington or on the island, had Worked un
selfishly for the success of the political career of the rising young
senator, positively asserted that this move to boycott the elections
would wipe out the good will built up in Washington during the
past four years. She wrote: "This is not a technique acceptable to
our mores or understandable to our strange minds."20 In her own
opinion, it would result in Mufioz' having difficulty in getting a
thoughtful hearing from any government official in the future.
13. La Democracia, June 27, 1936. 14. Ibid.

1 5. ACLU,Letter to Ruby Black, Sept. 25,1936.
17. Ibid., June 28, 1936. 18. Ibid., July 10, 1936.
19. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Muna Lee to Ruby Black, July
17, 1936.
20. Ibid., Letter from Ruby Black to Muna Lee, July 8, 1936.
Few observers could understand why a man with apparent victory

in his grasp would throw it over. Of course, in part, it was a question
of principle, or of conscience, but there was more to it than this
alone. Mufioz explained his action to Ruby Black in these words :
I come to the conclusion that the only way of protecting the integrity
of the Liberal forces is by withdrawing from the elections, a device
that frees our mass strength from the influence of huge sums of
money to be spent in the purchase of votes if the liberal forces re
main in control of the Liberal Party.21
The retraimiento was a political maneuver designed to strengthen

Mufioz' position within the Liberal party.
Fortunately Mufioz agreed to abide by the decision of the party
convention called for the last of July, in Yauco. At this convention
the proposal of retraimiento lost by a very close vote.22 At three o'clock
in the morning the vote was taken: 101 y2 to 101 And only the
1/2
deciding vote of Barcelo turned down the proposal submitted by
Mufioz Marin. However, Mufioz got the platform plank which he
wanted: demand for independence with economic justice.24 He was
a
unanimously nominated candidate for the position of resident com

missioner, but since the convention was not nominating conven
a
tion, this action remained as gesture of solidarity. Mufioz wrote:
a
now have the authority without having the responsibility. For

I
the first time in three years have no promise outstanding. am
I
I
sitting securely in the shade of the tree, not out on limb. The situa
a
tion personally extremely comfortable. believe that the conven

is
tion defeated Puerto Rico by one vote. certainly did not defeat
It
me.25
The "third-rate leaders" were fighting hard to undo the political

power of Mufioz. One, Lastra Charriez, went to Washington to se
cure evidence that Mufioz and Gruening were at odds and that the
doors to the offices of high officials were closed to him.26 was ru
It
mored that Dr. Gruening had given this man such statement and
a
21. ACLU, Letter from Muiioz Marin to Ruby Black, Sept. 25, 1936.
23. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Muna Lee to Ruby Black, Aug.
1937
1,
[sic].
24. Ibid., Letter from Muna Lee to Ruby Black, Aug. 1936.
3,
25. Ibid., Letter from Mufioz Marin to Ruby Black, Aug. 1936.
6, 5,
26. Ibid., Letter from Ruby Black to Munoz Marin, July 1936.
THE HARVEST 297
this statement was to be read at the Yauco convention.27 However,

no derogatory word was spoken against Munoz although there was
expressed disagreement as to his program of retraimiento.
The next step was the preparation for the nominating conven
tion. Munoz was supremely confident on the eve of this convention,
which was to be held in San Juan, August 16-18, 1936. He wrote:
There seems to be very little question that the candidates will be

proper ones. On that basis I am willing to run, and on no other.
I believe we shall present a good ticket. Retraimiento being
barred, winning the election is the best next thing. If I get a good
ticket I shall work as hard as I know how to win the elections.
23
There is some doubt as to whether Munoz was referring to his

willingness to run personally or to allow the Liberal party to partici
pate in the elections when he said: "I am willing to run." There can
be no doubt that he would have cooperated and worked wholeheart
edly for the Liberals if he could have set up a good ticket. As of
August fifth he seemed to think that there was a good chance of his
getting the candidates he wanted. One of these was Don Antonio
Barcel6 as candidate for the position of resident commissioner. The
other candidates were to be selected on the basis of their loyalty to
the approved party platform of independence with social justice. The
only person Munoz refused to accept was Lastra Charriez.28
Shortly before the convention's nominating session, Lastra visited
Munoz at his temporary office at the Condado Hotel. A deal was
made whereby Barcel6 would accept the resident commissioner's
post and select the at-large candidates for the legislature. Munoz'
name was not to appear on the ballot for any office but he would
cooperate wholeheartedly before and after the election.30 This ap
parently one-sided deal was swallowed immediately by Lastra and
taken to Barcel6. Munoz admitted, privately, that "there was one
factor which did not appear in the proposal but that inevitably would
have taken place; and that was that the Presidency of the Party
would have to be left vacant by Barcel6 and the whole machinery
would be in our hands (and it is very useful machinery)."31
27. Ibid., Letter from Muna Lee to Ruby Black, Aug. 1, 1937 [sic].
28. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Munoz Marin to Ruby Black,
Aug. 5, 1936.
29. Ruby Black Collection, Letter from Mufioz to Ruby Black, Aug. 18,
1936. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid.
298 PUERTO HI CAN POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL
Barcelo did not accept the Washington position and countered

with the name of Walter McK. Jones, whom Mufioz did not oppose.
Mufioz was willing to go along with any reasonable proposal as long
as he could be assured that Lastra was not a candidate for any office,
and as long as he thought he could capture the party machinery.
However, on the convention floor, one of the proposed candidates
who had been nominated by acclamation, Ochoteca, withdrew his
name in favor of Lastra.32 When this occurred it was quite late
(2 a.m.) and Munoz was not sure that he could still muster the
support necessary to defeat Lastra, particularly since at this point
the rules of the convention had been suspended. Mufioz informed
Barcelo that the deal was off and he was retiring from the conven
tion and turning the party over to Antonio Barcelo.33 He concluded:
"The whole situation is a dead loss, excepting in the spiritual forces
released. And this can be organized by control of the party machinery
after the elections."
Even here the young politician was outmaneuvered. Barceld, now
taking advantage of Mufioz' anger and withdrawal, scheduled a meet
ing early the following day to select the members of the central
executive committee of the Liberal party. At this meeting in Barcelo's
private office, according to Munoz, the followers of Barcelo were
selected to retain control over the machinery of the party.34
Confronted with this move, Munoz brought together some 236
ward leaders (cotnisarios de los barrios') at a convention in Coamo.
These leaders, in Mufloz' opinion, mustered over one-half of the
Liberal electorate.35 The members of this assembly unanimously
signed a resolution demanding adequate representation on the ex
ecutive committee of the Liberal party. If they did not get this, they
would boycott the elections.36
With the demand for representation arising out of the Coamo
meeting, the split in the Liberal party was out in the open. Mufioz
called his wing of the party into a mass convention at Caguas. In
this show of strength, over 900 local leaders attended, according to
Mufioz.37 This number was four times the number attending the

33. Ruby Black Collection, Letter fiom Mufioz to Ruby Black, Aug. 18,
1936.
34. ACLU, Letter from Mufioz to Ruby Black, Sept. 25, 1936.
35. Ibid.
37. ACLU, Letter from Mufioz to Ruby Black, Sept. 25, 1936.
THE HARVEST 299
regular convention. The demand was to split the party by forming

a new entity. Of course, it was too late to do this and still hope to
be on the ballot. Furthermore:
About one third of the party is against me because they believe

that I am mistaken in my procedure, but they still believe in me,
they don't hold me in deep hatred. If I split the party, I shall have
these people against me for the next thirty years, if I preserve the
solidarity of the party on my own volition, and even against the
proven wishes of the other group, I shall have all these people with
me forever, or at least 99% of them.
On this basis, I have a resolution proposed protecting the pro
gram of the party not with a handful of new members on the Central
Committee but with the founding of what is to all intents and pur
poses the structure of a new political party, Accion Social Indepen-
dentista, with machinery in every town, in every ward on the island
and with enormous prestige among the masses; and on this basis I
cooperate in the futile elections of 1936.
38
The formation of Accion Social Independentista was the last re

sort of a losing battle. Mufioz, who, it was claimed,39 controlled over
30 per cent of the central committee, failed in every attempt to gain
control of the party machinery.40 A.S.I. (or asV) was not limited to
Liberals, but to anyone who could subscribe to its program of inde
pendence with economic justice. Mufioz promised that as an organi
zation it would not activate itself prior to the election. He and its
leading members agreed to cooperate with the leaders of the Liberal
party in an effort to win the elections. As far as Barcelo and his
followers were concerned, Muiioz had committed a grievous error
in suggesting the retraimiento movement and in refusing to accept
any nomination. Even though Munoz and Barcelo appeared on the
same platform together and urged the people to vote for the Liberal
party, the relations between the two were not cordial.
Barcelo accused Mufioz of forming a new party. This was strong
ly denied, even though, as shown above, Mufioz confidentially ad
mitted that A.S.I. was the nucleus of a new party. He protested that
A.S.I. was not interested in votes for itself but for the Liberal party.
38. Ibid. 39. El Mundo, Aug. 29, 1936.

40. This battle can be followed in the daily press. Both El Mundo and
La Democracia gave full coverage. Luis Munoz Marin scrupulously gave Bar-
cel6 every opportunity to expose his point of view fully in the pages of La
Democracia. See La Democracia for Sept. 8, 1936, and Sept. 10, 1936.
It was not even registered political entity. What it was, of course,

as a
was Mufioz' political backing as opposed to the Barcelo bloc. Divided
as it was, the Liberal party had a hard battle ahead of it during
October.
With the internal troubles of the Liberal party, the coalition
began to take hope. This does not mean that the Socialists and the
Union-Republicans had given up. They still had the prestige and the
patronage of the insular government even if they did seem incapable
of coming into control of the new experiments in government car
ried out by the New Deal. The coalition had fought the NIRA, the
PRERA, the sugar legislation, and the PRRA. The courts took care
of the NIRA
and emasculated the sugar program so badly that it
was no longer dangerous. Indeed, it was no longer politically wise to
fight the AAA. The PRRA had taken care of the PRERA and now
the PRRA, like a planaria, was consuming itself. With Liberals at
tacking Liberals, the statement of Senator Martinez Nadal that the
coalition would sweep the elections was not as ridiculous as it first
appeared.
Santiago Iglesias returned from Washington the middle of July
and immediately directed all his energy to the strengthening of his
party. He too gave forth with public statements of confidence de
signed to bolster up the sagging morale and subdue the doubts of
the wavering. One indication of the disconcerting effect of the
Tydings bill is found in the slight change in the platform of the
Union-Republican party. The party agreed to accept eventual inde
pendence in case that statehood were denied the island. As a transi
tory measure it was suggested that Puerto Rico might enter into a
period of growing autonomy.41
One week before the election, in the third largest city on the
island, the coalition held an important political rally. The main
speaker was the resident commissioner. On the platform with him
were several distinguished, that is, conservative, members of Maya-
giiez political circles, the mayor and his wife, and the only woman
member of the insular house of representatives, who was also a lead
ing figure in the sweatshop needle industry which had its center in
Mayagiiez, the Honorable Maria Luisa Arcelay. While the commis
sioner was speaking, five shots rang out. Two were stopped by the
microphone he was using, otherwise he might have been killed on
41. ElMundo, Aug. 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1936.

THE HARVEST 301
the spot. As it was, he was slightly wounded. Miraculously, the Na

tionalist who fired failed to hit anyone on the platform. Aside from
this notable exception, the campaigning was carried off without in
cident.
Charles H. Terry devised the voting rules and regulations which
Winship and Dr. Gruening presented to the political leaders in Wash
ington. It will be recalled that similar bills were introduced in the
local legislature and in Congress. The federal bill passed the Senate
easily and could have gotten the approval of the House, but, since
it was naturally preferable to have the island set up its own elec
toral laws, Governor Winship, pushed by Dr. Gruening,42 put the
matter up to the local legislature. Under the threat of federal action
the local legislature passed the project.
The new rules and regulations set up a voting system which
sounded foolproof if it could be carried out. Election day was de
clared a holiday and all establishments were closed. No liquor could
be sold even to take out. This was a serious holiday. The children
were kept at home, attended to by the very elderly or the very young.
From early morning, both man and wife would plan their tasks
so that they would be free by at least nine o'clock, or possibly later,
depending upon how distant their house was from the polling places.
If they lived in the rural areas they might have the good fortune of
being hauled to the polling places in open trucks or being jammed
into station wagons or sedans loaned by the party faithful. Partic
ularly catered to would be the doubtful voter. The man and the
wife would have with them a bottle of warm coffee because it would
be a long day.
In the past, the political parties sometimes had, in rural areas,
places which were called corrales where the party faithful were
grouped. Once in, the voter was well taken care of with food and
often with drink. These corrales allowed a great degree of socializing
out of which, sometimes, if the liquor flowed freely enough, unfor
tunate incidents developed. Although near the election places, these
corrales were kept from general knowledge because experience had
shown that more than one corral had been cleaned out by strong-arm
tactics of its potential voters before their "x" could be delivered.
One trick would be to feign a gun fight near a hidden corral, fill
ing those within with such trepidation that they would not ven-
42. DTIP, 9-8-82, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Gov. Winship, June 5,
1936.
ture out. These corrales functioned much better under the old voting
system than under the 1936 conditions. Also the modern means
of transportation for the people in the cities and suburban areas made
the corral unnecessary. However, in 1936 it was still used in the
rural areas and served to solidify the vote and inflate party hopes.
Now that a set hour, usually shortly after noon, started the voting
procedure, the corral lost its usefulness."
Usually well before noon the meek and the lowly and the proud
would be packed into small schoolrooms, or other buildings which
had been designated as polling places. Dr. Chardon had thought it
questionable to allow the use of PRRA buildings for voting places,
but, as was typical, Dr. Gruening overruled him and gave the gover
nor the permission to use them.44 There was a marked scarcity of
adequate polling places. Close to 150 people were assigned to each
building.
Two or three months before the election, the political parties
would distribute small cards among their followers on which would
be indicated the polling place to which the individual voter was
assigned after registration. Also on the card would appear the page
number and line on which the voter's name was written in the
registration book of that particular polling place. The day the voter
registered he was given a form of receipt which declared that he had
duly registered. These slips of paper belonged to the voter, but party
"runners" waited outside the centers of registration to collect these
receipts from the faithful. In this way each party could lay claim
to having a new enrollee. There were cases of these runners snatch
ing receipts from the hands of reluctant or confused registrants. If
you did not turn your receipt into one of these party representatives,
you had to be intelligent enough to know how to find out for your
self the precinct in which you were expected to vote.
There were in 1936 about 4,600 polling centers all over the
island. The insular election board, which was under the local de-
43. In the elections previous to 1936, a good city corral could hold a
widely assorted number of voters, and each could be counted on to vote
about four or five times. A party watcher at the polls would send word to
the Corral to send a fat, fortyish woman to his station, since one answering
that description had not as yet shown up to vote. Thus the fat, fortyish
matron might vote in several precincts in addition to the one she was legally
assigned to.
44. DTIP, 9-8-82, Wire from Winship to Gruening, Sept. 25, 1936,
and wire from Gruening to Winship, Sept. 26, 1936.
THE HARVEST 303
partment of justice, was expected to assign a representative to each

polling place, or colegio. Each party could assign to each colegio
one inspector, one watcher, one secretary, and one challenger.
Promptly at one o'clock (only an American would have selected
the siesta hour to begin the voting), the whistles and sirens would
sound and the doors would be closed to the colegios. Policemen were
posted at the entrances to prevent the arrival of latecomers. Slowly
the voting would get under way. One by one the voters would be
called to receive their ballot, and, if not challenged by any party rep
resentative, they would proceed to the small booths to vote. If chal
lenged, a note was taken with signatures of the challenger and the
challenged and a witness, usually the legal representative, and the
voter was allowed then to proceed, but his ballot was identified as
having been challenged.
It used to be that the ballot box was close by the seats of the party
representatives. The ballots were printed on thin-weight paper
through which, after one folding, the mark of the voter could be
plainly seen. Thus the votes were easily identified and paid off as the
voter left the area. In 1936 the ballots were printed on paper of
heavier weight, and the voter was requested to fold his paper two
times so that the mark would not be easily seen.45
The system seemed foolproof, or at least it was a decided im
provement over previous methods. And yet there were a few loop
holes. One of the most vulnerable points was the tabulation and
sorting of the forms of the newly registered voters. In 1940 two of
the San Juan newspapers, La Correspondencia and El Impartial,
joined together to sponsor a contest. Three cash prizes were offered
for the three best accounts of how the election rules and regulations
were violated by the party faithful who sought to deprive their ad
versary of votes in the 1936 election.48 The misplacing of the regis
tration forms was the method which won second prize in this contest.
Perhaps one of the most ingenious tricks of depriving the oppo
sition party of votes was involved with no fraud whatever. So re
vealing is it of Latin social customs, that it warrants repeating. One
of the contestants of the above-mentioned contest was a newly mar-
45. La Democracia, Oct. 18, 1936, contains the changes in the electoral
law.
46. The responses to this contest were drawn up into a book: Domingo
Targa, El Modus Operandi de las Artes Electorates (San Juan: La Correspon
dencia, 1940).
ried middle-class housewife. According to her account, her loving

husband grew alarmed as the passion of the electoral campaign in
creased through the summer months. He finally decided that he
could not allow his newly won spouse to run the risk of venturing
out of the house on election day. The risk involved was too great,
particularly since she belonged to a different party.
The faithful wife, while pleased with her husband's attentive
concern, was determined that her party would not be deprived of her
vote. On the contrary, she was determined to see to it that her hus
band's own party would lose several dozen votes if possible. She care
fully looked over a list of her married friends and lined them up
politically. She selected those families where the situation was almost
identical to hers, that is, where man and wife belonged to opposite
parties. The only difference was that the female wing had to belong
to the party other than the one she belonged to. She then arranged
to pay a visit with her husband or without to these families in the
weeks just previous to the election. She pointedly praised her atten
tive husband, explaining how considerate he was of her welfare. As
she expected, on election day her female friends were also kept from
the polling place by their "attentive" husbands, thus depriving the
opposition of quite a few votes.
The Nationalist party, having polled an insufficient number of
votes in 1932, would have been forced to circulate petitions again to
be included on the ballot. This tedious task, possible in 1932 only
with the help of the coalition, was avoided by the stand taken by
the party. The elections to form a colonial government had now been
declared unnecessary and the next step was to organize a constitu
tional convention, not so much to draw up a constitution as to de
clare the formation of a Republic. Therefore, the party disdainfully
abstained from participating in the campaign and the electoral proc
ess. It was modestly confessed that: "The Nationalist movement
of Puerto Rico is a movement of the intelligentsia and therefore,
is a movement of minority in numbers.""
With the leadership of the party under indictment for sedition,
there was no movement to secure popular backing or a show of sym
pathy through a political drive which would have elected a prisoner
in the penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, to a seat in the senate. Even
47. DTIP, 9-8-68, Letter from MarU Lomar, leader of the women's
division of the Nationalist party, to President Roosevelt, July 2, 1936.
THE HARVEST 305
with the cultivation of the martyr cult, Albizu Campos could not
command a significant political following.
Another minor political group which was having an even more
difficult time securing public recognition and following was the very
small Communist unit. Prior to 1930, it was claimed by continental
Communists that a Communist party was in formation in Puerto
Rico. It was recognized that the chief task of this party would be
that of combating "the traitorous role of Iglesias and the Socialist
party who . . . help American imperialism not only in Puerto Rico,
but throughout Latin America."48
It was not until May, 1933, that any active political efforts of
the Communist party came to public light. La Correspondence (May
1, 1933) published the platform of a newly organized Communist
party. By 1935 it felt strong enough to petition for legal recognition.
A request for this recognition and the registration of the party was
made of the executive secretary of the insular government. The sec
retary was inclined to deny this petition on the basis that the party
included in its platform tenets, such as the abolition of private prop
erty, which were inimical to the federal Constitution.49
The secretary did not wish to act without the backing of the
attorney general, who was the newly appointed Benigno Fernandez
Garcia. But needless to say, the secretary's opinion was not backed,
and the party was given its due recognition and allowed to register.
Guerra-Mondragon spoke for his friend Benigno when he wrote:
"I am not a Communist, but I think Communists are entitled to go
to the polls like anyone else."50 On July 24, 1936, the Communist
party was registered in two interior towns, Utuado and Jayuya.51
The Puerto Rican Communist party orientation was authentically
a Marxist one. Its publications and platform spoke of the class strug
gle. While condemning the capitalistic parties, in this case the Liberal
and Union-Republican, it directed its most vitriolic blasts at the
Socialists — Santiago Iglesias, Rafael Alonso Torres, Prudencio Rivera
Martinez, and others — who "have betrayed in a cowardly and selfish
48. Harry Gannes, Yankee Colonies (New York: International Pam

phlets, 1930), p. 28.
49. ACLU, Vol. 858, Letter from Guerra-Mondragon to Roger Baldwin,
Sept. 27, 1935. 50. Ibid.
51. Luis Mufioz Morales, "Notas y Referencias para la Historia de los
Partidos Politicos," Revista Jurtdica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, VI, 1
(Septiembre-Octubre, 1936), 77.
manner the interests of the proletariat."52 It was admitted that "when

it started, the Socialist party of Puerto Rico was proud of being
a very red party. But today this party is as yellow in Puerto Rico as
the yellowest Socialist party in the world."53
With the Nationalist party, the Communist party was in accord
on the issue of immediate and definite independence. In fact, the
Nationalists were considered "the only sincere and valiant indepen-
dentistas."" But, "the Nationalist party as the other bourgeois parties,
pretends to ignore the class struggle . . . does not represent the in
terests of any class."55
On one measure all parties from the conservative to the radical
were in agreement : the present state of relations between Puerto Rico
and the United States was not satisfactory and had to be changed.
But just how it was to be changed was subject to a wide variance of
opinion. Although Gruening publicly denied it, the understanding
was widely prevalent that the elections would serve as a barometer
of status.58
The third of November was a fairly peaceful election day. The
largest vote that Puerto Rico ever had was registered on that date.
The Liberals, who had taken 46 per cent of the vote in 1932, now
increased their percentage, but it was not enough. They received
48 per cent of the vote. However, the final struggle for party control
was still to come.
Antonio Barcelo was convinced, and perhaps correctly so, that
he could have taken the elections with Mufioz' cooperation and par
ticipation as an active candidate. Shortly after the elections, in the
house of Benigno Fernandez Garcia, Mufioz met with Don Antonio
to see if a united front could not be organized. Following the advice
of Roger Baldwin,57 Mufioz suggested a plan to go to Washington
with Barcelo and work for independence on a far more favorable
basis than that offered by the Tydings bill. He thought they could
put forth a good case. The Puerto Rican people, threatened by the
Tydings measure, had almost swept the Liberal slate filled with un
known candidates into office. Barcelo refused to have anything to do
with such a project.58
52. Josi A. Lanauze Rol6n, Porque somos Comunistas (Ponce: El Dia,

undated), p. 19.
53. Ibid., p. 19. 54. Ibid., p. 12. 55. Ibid.
56. El Impartial, May 15, 1936.
57. ACLU, Vol. 953, Roger Baldwin to Munoz Marin, Nov. 5, 1936.
58. Biografia de Luis Muiioz Marin, p. 121.
THE HARVEST 307
The day following this meeting the central executive committee

of the Liberal party released to the press a strongly worded state
ment to the affect that Mufioz could no longer speak for the Liberal
party, since he lacked the necessary party confidence.59 With this
announcement, Florete came out with a humorous cartoon entitled :
"Barcelo kicks out the Liberal party." Some 56 out of 72 local munici
pal committees solicited an assembly in order to discuss the serious
split within the party. Evidently Barcelo was losing control of his
party machinery. He refused to convoke the requested assembly and
proceeded formally at a meeting on a farm called Naranjales to expel
Mufioz and his followers from the Liberal party.
The Liberal party was split. Mufioz decided to carry out his plan
to go to Washington. Before he left he wrote in his paper, La Demo-
cracia :
The Liberal party has been destroyed. . . . What occurred in

Naranjales was the criminal action of the weak against the strong.
The weak bent a penknife — the leadership of the party — in assas
sinating the union; the strong was unarmed and was not permitted
to take up his weapon : the overpowering popular will.60
The fact remained that he was a man without a party, and in Wash
ington he was to have great difficulty in getting a hearing. Dr. Gruen-
ing effectively closed all official doors to him from the President on
down.61 Even Ruby Black proved to be of little help.
One friend, Roger Baldwin, was of some help to the rejected
politician. He advised Mufioz to work through the Secretary of the
Interior, Harold Ickes.62 The plan was to draw up an acceptable
independence bill, and, with ACLU backing, get the measure into
the hands of Ickes for approval or at the least favorable comment.63
Since at this point Ickes was in search of a confidential adviser who
could keep him informed as to what was going on in Puerto Rico,
the prospect looked bright.
The investigation by Leona Graham of the PRRA revealed such
59. El Impartial, Nov. 25, 1936.

60. Biografta de Luis Muiioz Marin, p. 123.
61. In the spring of 1936, in conversation with Dr. Padin, President
Roosevelt exploded at the mention of Muiioz' name. Interview with Dr. Padin,
June, 1956.
62. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Roger Baldwin to Mufioz Marin,
Jan. 19, 1937.
63. Ibid., Letter from Mufioz Marin to Roger Baldwin, Jan. 20, 1937.
308 PUERTO R1CAN POLITICS AND THE NEW DEAL
amazing incompetence and extravagance that the Secretary of the

Interior strongly urged Doctor Gruening to resign as PRRA admin
istrator. It was Gruening's plan to travel to the island, make inspec
tion, and resign, with the comment that since the program was well
under way, he could turn the task over to others and dedicate his
time to his position of director of the Division of Territories and
Island Possessions. Ickes urged him to follow through on this im
mediately before any flare-up might make a resignation most em
barrassing.
Now convinced that he could no longer secure reliable informa
tion from Gruening concerning Puerto Rico, Ickes called in Roger
Baldwin to discuss the island problems. Baldwin, not mentioning
Munoz' name, referred to the independence bill which the ACLU
had under study and requested Ickes' personal attention for the mat
ter.64 Evidently a deal was made satisfying Baldwin on this request
in return for some badly needed information on another matter per
taining to Puerto Rico which will be brought up in its place.65 Un
fortunately, Gruening, through rumor, received a garbled version of
this conference and accused the Secretary of going around him by
requesting that the ACLU draw up an independence bill. Ickes was
furious and tore into Baldwin for having violated his trust.66 Baldwin
promptly and unconditionally denied that Ickes had requested such
a measure from the ACLU, but the damage was done. Both Ickes and
Baldwin realized that Munoz directly or indirectly had had something
to do with the leak. Steps were then taken to close any of the re
maining open doors in Washington to Munoz and his friends.
Mufioz managed to get an independence bill introduced into
Congress through the friendly hands of Representative Cartwright.
This measure called for a referendum for either statehood or in
dependence, and would thus have a wide range of appeal on the
island.67 The administration, specifically Dr. Gruening, turned a very
cold shoulder toward this bill, and termed it most untimely. Dr.
Gruening was of the opinion that raising the issue of Puerto Rico's
status at this time merely interfered with the essential task of re-
64. The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, Vol. II, The Inside Struggle (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 47.
65. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Ickes to Baldwin, Feb. 8, 1937.
66. Ibid., Wire from Baldwin to Ickes, Feb. 8, 1937.
67. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Munoz Marin to Roger Baldwin,
Feb. 24, 1937.
THE HARVEST 309
construction.68 This was, of course, the sameDr. Gruening who had

deemed it wise to bring up the question of status during the election
year of 1936.
Incidentally, it might be mentioned that Antonio Barcelo did
go to Washington with his interpreter, Walter McK. Jones, in the
first month of the new year. He went not to fight for independence
but to make his peace with Dr. Gruening. As an indication of this
peace, Antonio Barcelo came forth with a statement to the effect that
independence at this time would prove to be a calamity for the
island.69
While Barcelo and Mufioz were in Washington on their inde
pendent missions, and while Dr. Gruening was still trying to weather
the pressure of the Secretary to resign, the predicted "flare-up" or
"blow-up" occurred. This was the tragic Ponce massacre.
The background of this grim chapter of Puerto Rican-United
States relations is not hard to understand. Some of the events, how
ever, are still clouded in doubt. The action taken against the Na
tionalist leaders by the federal government provoked manifestations
of dissatisfaction by the followers of Albizu Campos. Usually these
manifestations consisted of parades by the Army of Liberation, fiery
oratory, and violent verbal denunciation of the colonial regime. The
secondary leaders were anxious to prove their valor and, if fortunate
enough, to be called to court and shipped off to the Atlanta peni
tentiary where Albizu had been confined.
The administration under General Winship was just as deter
mined that such manifestations and disturbances would not be car
ried out. To allow them to be undertaken periodically would only
keep the people stirred up and resentful. Such a state of affairs, in
the opinion of those in authority, would nullify the good work done
by eliminating from the scene the main cause of the agitation, Pedro
Albizu Campos. Of course this attitude was shared by few outside
the insular government. The ACLU warned that this policy was
designed to cultivate the very unrest it was trying to eliminate.
Governor Winship, backed by Dr. Gruening,70 slowly drew the
68. DTIP, 9-8-68, Letter from Dr. Gruening to Bailey Diffie, Feb. 27,
1937.
69. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files #400 00, Letter from
Oscar Chapman to President Roosevelt, transmitting message from Antonio
Barcelo, March 27, 1937.
70. Secret Diary, II, 5-6. Ickes was greatly disturbed about the situa
tion in Puerto Rico. He wrote: "Gruening far from being a liberal, has
noose tighter and tighter around the Nationalists. On one occasion

in San Juan a request for a parade was denied and machine guns
were set up to back up the denial.71 Of course, the denial was couched
in terms which indicated that the government was interested in pro
tecting public order. The ACLU protested to Gruening about such
excessive restrictions on peaceful demonstrations, but to no avail.72
Two weeks after this protest the inevitable happened. As Mufioz
expressed it: "People will relinquish their civil rights once or several
times, but always a time comes when they become determined to
exercise them and then there is an explosion.73
The explosion occurred in Ponce, the quiet and hot port on the
Caribbean side of the island. The Nationalists had issued a call to
the Cadets of the Republic and to the Daughters of the Republic
to come to Ponce for a parade in the afternoon and a meeting in
the evening of Palm Sunday. They had requested permission for
this parade from the authorities of the municipal government, but
since the mayor, Jose Tormo Diego, was in San Juan, this permission
had been denied. When the mayor returned on Saturday night, the
permission was granted with the understanding that the parade
would have no military character whatsoever.
The island's chief of police had gone to Ponce on Friday to learn
first hand of the plans of the Nationalists for the Palm Sunday pa
rade. He returned to San Juan where he discussed the matter at
great length with the governor. Their conclusion was that the parade,
if carried out as planned, would end in bloodshed, and therefore
should be prohibited. Colonel Orbeta, the chief of police, returned to
Ponce Sunday morning and found that the mayor had granted the
Nationalists permission to hold their parade. He undertook to con
vince the mayor that this permission should be revoked. After much
discussion, Tormo agreed to try to convince the Nationalists not to
apparently decided that the mailed fist is the proper policy in dealing with
these subject peoples. He has gone completely in reverse. He is on the outs
with all his liberal friends in Puerto Rico. Formerly he used to damn Gov
ernor Winship up hill and down dale for his militaristic point of view.
He wanted to oust him as Governor, but now apparently he and Governor
Winship see eye to eye and are in perfect accord on question of policy."
71. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Earl Hanson to Roger Baldwin, Jan.
25, 1937.
72. Ibid., Vol. 1095, Letter from Roger Baldwin to Ernest Gruening,
March 9, 1937.
73. Ibid., Vol. 1062, Letter from Muiioz Marin to Roger Baldwin,
March 24, 1937.
THE HARVEST 311
hold their parade. The mayor, Captain Blanco, Ponce's chief of

police, Colonel Orbeta, and the Nationalists held discussions up until
almost the time for the parade. The conferences came to no agree
ment and the matter stood. The police forbade the parade and the
Nationalists refused to allow the mayor to go back on his word.
Meanwhile the Ponce police force — which had been increased
from 35 to over 150 men well armed with rifles, carbines, and sub
machine guns — was taking its places along the route of the parade.
The young cadets, about eighty, and the young girls, about twelve,
began to fall into place for their march. They wore white dresses, or,
as in the case of the boys, black trousers, white shirts, and small
caps.
When the hour approached, the band began to play "La Borin-
queiia" and then the order of forward march was given. At this
point a member of the police force, Captain Soldevila — neither the
insular police chief nor the local police chief Blanco was present —
held up his hand and ordered the parade to halt.
Up to this point, with very slight variations in the choice of
words, the official account of the insular government submitted to
the Senate at the request of Senator Borah74 and the account pub
lished by the ACLU75 are in very close agreement. The first report,
drawn up and presented by Governor Winship, was said76 to have
been based on the investigation carried out by the Ponce district
attorney, Rafael Pe"rez Marchand." This is a partial truth, since the
report turned in by the district attorney contained four parts:78
(1) testimony taken from police and government officials; (2) testi
mony taken from the Nationalists; (3) sworn statements offered by
disinterested individuals, and (4) reports turned in by seven doc
tors. The governor's report was based solely on the first part of the
complete report turned in by Rafael PeVez Marchand.
The ACLU report was based on the thorough investigation car-
74. Congressional Record, 75th Congress, 1st session, Senate, Vol. 81,
Part 5, pp. 5275-78.
75. ACLU, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Civil Rights in
Puerto Rico (New York, 1937).
76. Congressional Record, p. 5275.
77. El Mundo, April 4, 1936, contains a story on the resignation of
Perez Marchand as district attorney^Jased on disagreement with the govern
ment on the handling of the Ponce matter. He felt that it would only lead
to further bloodshed between Puerto Ricans.
78. La Fortaleza, 312/6, Investigaci6n Practicada por el Honorable
Rafael Perez Marchand, Fiscal del Dtstrito de Ponce.
ried out on the island by the distinguished lawyer Arthur Garfield

Hays. The ACLU had tried to get a lawyer who was not so closely
tied to the Union. Michael F. Doyle had been selected, but was
rejected by the Puerto Ricans because he was too close to Dr. Gruen-
ing.79 Finally after all other possibilities, including Earl P. Hanson
who wisely excluded himself, were exhausted, Arthur Garfield Hays
was sent.
It will probably never be determined who fired the first shot.
The official report places the blame on a Nationalist who was dressed
as an ordinary civilian and mixed with the crowd, observing the
events from the sidewalk. The ACLU report does not attempt to
establish who fired the first shot. Both accounts agree as to the
fact that no one of those in the parade was armed. Both accounts
also agree that the police were heavily armed. Some nineteen people
were killed, including two policemen. Over a hundred were wounded.
The sworn statements of the attending doctors80 and the photographs
of the dead and wounded indicate that the vast majority of the
wounded had been shot from behind.
Two photographers, one from El Mundo and one from El Im
partial, took two very revealing photographs. One was taken just
before the shooting and one after. These photographs leave no doubt
as to why the Ponce affair was termed, and will go down in history
as, a "massacre."Not one civilian can be shown to have a gun. There
is one individual bent down and running away from the scene of
action amid the crowd on the sidewalk. The attention of the ACLU
was called to this figure by Attorney General Benigno Fernandez
Garcia. Further examination was made of the photograph under a
magnifying glass, but no weapon was revealed.81 On the other hand,
the pictures show a number of armed police, weapons in hand, one
of whom is shown to be in the act of firing into the crowds. Of course,
the number of dead and wounded speak in far stronger terms than
even on-the-spot photographs.
Given the benefit of the doubt, which may never completely be
cleared away, that one civilian shot at and killed a policeman, this
under no stretch of the imagination can defend the slaughter which
was carried out in Ponce on Palm Sunday afternoon, 1937.
The ACLU report82 in no way attempted to whitewash the Na-
79. ACLU, Vol. 1062, Letter from Roger Baldwin to E. Gruening, May
15, 1937. 80. Ibid.
81. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p. 19. 82. Ibid., p. 7.
THE HARVEST 313
tionalist movement. The fanaticism of Albizu Campos' followers was

clearly recognized. They were recognized as being intolerant, dog
matic, and of a frame of mind which would produce conformity by
intimidation, and, if necessary, force. Hays himself recognized the
germ of fascism in the Nationalist movement.88
On the other hand, the blame for the massacre was placed square
ly on the shoulders of Governor Winship and therefore, by impli
cation, on the federal government. The ACLU board of directors
declared that representatives of the federal government had been
guilty of "gross violation of civil rights and incredible police bru
tality"84 on the basis of Hays' report.
The Washington administration in the person of Secretary Ickes
became most concerned as the alarming events became more and more
known in the nation's capital. The Secretary secured permission from
the President for an investigation of the matter with the under
standing that Governor Winship would publicly request the investi
gation before any move would be taken.85 Harold Ickes felt that if
Winship was innocent he would welcome an investigation by the
federal government. To secure this cooperation from Winship was
not as easy as Ickes and the President had assumed.
Governor Winship did not think along the same lines as the
Secretary of the Interior. He stalled along and put the Secretary off
and finally came to Washington with Dr. Gruening to defend him
self. If
it had not been for the fact that Secretary Ickes at this time
was suffering from an acute heart condition which eventually put
him in the hospital, the President would have found himself with
a battle royal on his hands between the governor and his newly won
protector Dr. Gruening on the one side and Secretary Ickes on the
other.86 As it was, Dr. Gruening and Governor Winship, aided by a
Nationalist attack on a continentaljudge on the island, were able to
get to the President and convince him that it would not be to the
best interests of the administration to have an investigation of the
island administration and the Ponce massacre. The prestige of the
federal authority was to be maintained at an unquestionable level
no matter what the costs.
Secretary Ickes was, of course, as furious as his ailing heart
83. ACLU, Vol. 1062, Letter from Arthur G. Hays to Miss Masson,
May 23, 1937.
84. Ibid., Vol. 1063, Minutes of the Board of Directors' Meeting.
85. Secret Diary, II, 148. 86. Ibid., II, 149.
would allow him to be. He was not to be thwarted. He dipped into

his private funds and selected Walter F. McCaleb, a special adviser,
to go to Puerto Rico and turn in a report to him personally. The in
formation which Secretary Ickes secured was not much different from
that drawn up by the Hays' group. No conclusive evidence was found
as to who fired the first shot. McCaleb roundly condemned Governor
Winship as a person in authority who lacked judgment and possibly

even was criminally negligent in the execution of the law.
The report was sent on to President Roosevelt who was not im
pressed with it at all. He agreed that for the most part, the conclusions
in the report were correct, but there were some things stated as facts
which, in the opinion of the President, remained to be proved or
were only half facts. He pointed out that responsibility was a mutual
matter and that assassinations could not be ignored. The President
could not perceive that excessive restriction often foments the fanat
icism which he abhorred. Dr. Gruening and Governor Winship had
found secure protection in the White House. A clear picture of the
solid backing of his subordinates by the Chief Executive was grasped
by Hays when he visited the President in June.87
One final comment found in a private letter of Arthur Garfield
Hays, written as he flew back to the States, serves to close this ugly
incident. He wrote:
Now I will tell you something about Ponce, which I didn't even
suggest for our report since perhaps it is my individual view. If I
were a Nationalist and had been notified a few days in advance that
a parade was prohibited, I would have called it off too. Nobody but
people with a martyr complex of a lunatic would lead a crowd to face
machine guns. But if I had arranged a parade and there was an
attempt to stop it at the last minute, my self-respect would make me
see it through. It may be just as crazy, but that is the way we human
beings behave. When the issue is drawn, we refuse to be intimidated.
If I had been the leader, I too would have said, "forward march!"
At least I hope I would.88
Charges were brought against some of the surviving Nationalists.

The ACLU followed the cases closely. Upon the acquittal of the ac-
87. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from A. G. Hays to President

Roosevelt, June 10, 1937; also see interoffice communication to Charles
West, June 17, 1937.
88. ACLU, Vol. 1062, Unsigned copy of a letter to Miss Masson, May
23, 1937.
THE HARVEST 315
cused, Hays wrote to Winship and suggested that action be taken

against the police. "The acquittal at Ponce justifies the findings of
our Commission . . . which concluded that the police were responsible
for the Ponce massacre."89 Concerning Hays' suggestion, the Secre
tary of the Interior thought that this was a reasonable request.90 Gov
ernor Winship, now confident with the President's backing, was in
no mood to go back on his original statement which attributed "great
patience, consideration, and understanding of the situation"91 to the
police officers in charge of the shooting.
Clearly Governor Winship was the wrong person in the wrong
office at the wrong time, as Dr. Gruening had at one time recognized.
However, now more than ever, there would be little chance of Win-
ship's removal. Roosevelt was particularly reluctant to remove a man
under fire, as has been illustrated in the case of Gore. In August of
1938, an attempt was made on Governor Winship's fife by one of
the same Nationalists acquitted, and justly so, in the Ponce trials.
Secretary Ickes was thwarted again. He wrote to Oswald G. Villard:
"It seems to me that we are in a vicious round in Puerto Rico. I was
just getting ready to make certain representations to the President as
strongly as I know how when the attempted assassination made me
realize how futile it would be to suggest anything at the moment."92
The Secretary was successful in retiring Dr. Gruening from the
immediate scene. His resignation as administrator of the PRRA
had been agreed upon in January after the very adverse report of
Mrs. Graham had revealed his incompetence in the handling of the
PRRA affairs. And finally in July, after much pressure, Ickes suc
ceeded in extracting a resignation from Dr. Gruening.93 The great
liberal whose appointment had brought unbounded joy to those who
knew him in Puerto Rico was partially retired in disgrace. Of course,
the administration kept up appearances, and Roosevelt's letter to
Gruening stated that his resignation was accepted only because the
President knew that he could continue to guide the good work initi
ated as director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions.94
89. Ibid., Vol. 2053, Letter from A. G. Hays to Gov. Winship, Feb. 28,
1938.
90. Ibid., Letter from Oswald G. Villard to Roger Baldwin, March 10,
1938. 91. Congressional Record, p. 5278.
92. ACLU, Vol. 2053, Letter from Secretary Ickes to Oswald G. Villard,
Sept. 2, 1938. 93. Secret Diary, 11, 160.
94. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Letter from Presi
dent Roosevelt to Dr. Gruening, July 13, 1937.
To what extent Gruening's continued personal intervention in Puerto

Rican affairs could have been considered "good work" is subject to
grave doubts.
When the resignation of Dr. Padin as commissioner of education
became public knowledge, Dr. Ernest Hopkins, who had so ably
defended Padin in 1933, wrote to Dr. Gruening and predicted that
the educational system would be thrown onto the playing field of
the island's favorite sport, politics.95 Dr. Gruening again, as he had
done in other areas, discounted the sage counsel offered by well-
prepared observers, and imposed his own opinion. He wrote in an
swer to Hopkins:
The reports that the University is at present likely to be thrown

to the political wolves seem to me wholly without foundation but
there are psychological factors and fourth dimensional elements
which appear in the picture that are complex ...
too much that
comes out is rumor and unfounded and the truth can only be found
by looking beneath the surface as I have been able to do in the last
two years.96
Just what Gruening's concept of the truth was at this point is hard
to tell. Some indication of the trend of his thought can be found
in the subsequent developments in connection with the department
of education.
Juan B. Soto, chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, was
interested in jumping up to the position of commissioner of educa
tion. To prepare the way for this move, he wrote a five-page letter to
the President, expounding his political views. He urged that Con
gress take steps immediately to incorporate Puerto Rico as a terri
tory of the United States. This action would bring "peace, tranquility,
and assurance" to the island because it would "imply an irreversible
political status for the Island."97 No one can accuse Soto of being a
dangerous independentista. He was not even spreading dissatisfaction
by agitating for statehood. All he requested was a solidification of
the existing colonial status. He was safe.
The chancellor, however, was not Dr. Gruening's candidate for
95. DTIP, Letter from Ernest Hopkins to Ernest Gruening,

9-8-94,
Jan. 7, 1937; also,
Jan. 21, 1937.
96. Ibid., Letter from Dr. Gruening to Dr. Hopkins, Jan. 25, 1937.
97. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Letter from Juan
B. Soto to President Roosevelt, Confidential, Jan. 20, 1937.
THE HARVEST 317
Pacini's position. Dr. Gruening was pressing upon Secretary Ickes

for the nomination of Juan P. Blanco. Blanco, it will be remembered,
was the member of the department of education who solicited for
Dr. Gruening the confidential criticisms of the English-teaching pro
gram. It was his report which Gruening turned over to Ickes with
the admission of its lack of objectivity.
One reason, perhaps even
more important than his stand on the teaching of English, for Gruen-
ing's preference for Blanco is found in a letter from Dr. Thomas
Benner who had been the chancellor before Chardon. In a letter
to Dr. John Studebaker, the federal Commissioner of Education, Dr.
Benner asserted that Blanco was a weak candidate who was easily
dominated.98
While the future of Blanco was under discussion, Roger Baldwin
paid his visit to the Secretary of the Interior. Ickes was not pleased
by the Blanco candidacy, but lacked sufficient information to make
his veto valid and sound. He asked Baldwin to make inquiries dis
creetly and to turn over the desired information directly to him.
(This was the second half of the rumor which leaked to Dr. Gruen
ing. Contrary to his misinformation on the independence measure,
the director of the Division got this half of the rumor straight.)
Roger Baldwin was able to produce the desired data. Blanco had been
indicted for misuse of government funds." This eliminated the can
didacy of Blanco.
Other persons who had been suggested for the position were
Dr. J. J. Osuna, dean of the College of Education of the University of
Puerto Rico, Jose' Balseiro, professor of Spanish at the University of
Illinois, and Dr. Jose" Gallardo, about whom we have already spoken.
Dr. Osuna had been put forth by Mrs. Dorothy Bourne.100 But
as Roger Baldwin bluntly put it, he was "a man so good that he would
be wholly unacceptable to politicians."101 There was on file at the
Division at this time a report drawn up by Dr. Osuna entitled Teach-
98. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Thomas Benner to John W. Stude
baker, Jan. 12, 1937.
99. Ibid., Letter from Roger Baldwin to Harold Ickes, Jan. 26, 1937.
Baldwin got his information directly from Dr. Padin. The latter had written
to Secretary Ickes previously, informing him about the doubtful character of
Blanco, but for some inexplicable reason, the letter had never arrived. Inter
view with Dr. Padin, June, 1956.
100. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Letter from Mrs.
Bourne to Mrs. Roosevelt, Dec. 9, 1936.
101. ACLU, Vol. 1065, Letter from Roger Baldwin to Harold Ickes,
Jan. 26, 1937.
ing of English in Puerto Rico.102 In this report Dr. Osuna concluded

that Padin's system could not be adequately judged after scarcely two
years of practice. He further proposed that Spanish be the medium
of instruction in the first six years of the elementary school. Clearly
Roger Baldwin was justified in his bluntness.
The politicians with whom Dr Gruening was now working were
united behind Dr. Jose" Gallardo, although their first choice was
Blanco. Dr. Gallardo's name was suggested to the President by Sen
ator Harry S Truman, who offered his name in view of the fact
that the party to which he belonged, "the coalition party . . . won
a sweeping victory in the November elections.103 Besides Senator
Truman, Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias and Senator Mar
tinez Nadal urged the appointment of Gallardo.104
Not only was Gallardo called for the post of commissioner of
education, but the official letter appointing him signed by President
Roosevelt set down the policy which he was expected to follow.105
The precedent-breaking document was drawn up by Dr. Ernest
Gruening106 and left no doubt that a program of Americanization
was to be undertaken in the public school system. Dr. Padin's efforts
in teaching English were deemed inadequate and fair notice was
given that an intensified English program was to be initiated. Dr.
Gallardo did not need to be told twice. Within the month the press
published a story of his intentions to discard the Padin program and
restore the old system of all instruction in English.107 This Roosevelt
was the same man who had so solidly backed Dr. Padin when under
attack by Robert Gore. This incredible reversal of policy can only
be understood by realizing that the President's adviser on Puerto Rico
102. DTIP, 9-8-65, Memorandum from Dr. Osuna, Jan. 22, 1937.
103. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Letter from Sen. Truman to Presi
dent Roosevelt, Dec. 4, 1936.
104. Ibid., Wire from Martinez Nadal to President Roosevelt, March 17,
1937.
105. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 6-S, Letter from
President Roosevelt to Dr. Gallardo, April 9, 1937.
106. Ruby Black Collection, Muna Lee, Letter from Ruby Black to
Muna, June 16, 1937.
107. La Correspondencia, April 26, 1937. Later Dr. Gallardo modified
his plans somewhat to come into accord with the realities of the island's
abilities. A detailed outline of his program was presented to Gov. Winship
on Oct. 7, 1937. See La Fortaleza, 301 /Original, Memorandum on the Teach
ing of English in Puerto Rico, submitted by Commissioner Gallardo, Oct. 7,
1937.
THE HARVEST 319
was that expert on "psychological factors and fourth dimensional

elements," Dr. Gruening.
The message to the new commissioner of education came less
than a month after the Ponce massacre, about six months after the
closely contested election of November, and a little more than a
year after the assassination of Colonel Riggs. It asserted that the
commissioner's task was to make good American citizens out of Puerto
Ricans as directly as possible, and suggested
that the first step to
take would be to revise the English program. Even if the Tydings
bill had not been introduced, even if the island had not gone through
a political campaign in which independence had been the central
issue, even if Governor Gore had never touched the shores of the
tropical island, such a poorly disguised program for Americanization
could hardly have been better designed to split the island into two
bitter groups and continue the unrest already marked by violence.
There were those like Emilio del Toro and Fe"lix Cordova Davila,
supreme court justices, who acclaimed the President's letter "as one
of the most important and timely documents penned in the history
of Puerto Rico under the American flag."108 On the other hand, a
contrary opinion was expressed by a group gathered in the Athenaeum
under the watchful eye and guidance of Munoz Marin. This group
sent a long telegram to the President which in part included the
following: "We protest against the attempt to impose educational
norms on our children, forcing us to adopt new national language
not our own even though ours be incidentally respected."109
Dr. Gallardo pursued his instructions in earnest. He was not
content with a mere reversal in the policy regarding the use of Eng
lish in the public schools. He began slowly to eliminate those teach
ers in the public schools and the university who had been outspoken
in their independentista sentiments or who had been critical of any
program to stress the teaching of English.
In the university, the first to fall was the chairman of the English
program under Dr. Padin, Professor Lewis C. Richardson. Others,
including Frederick Sackett, George Warrek, and Jaime Benitez,
were also soon advised that their contracts would not be renewed
108. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official Files 400, Appointments,

Box 48, Letter from Emilio del Toro and Felix Cordova to President Roosevelt,
April 21, 1937.
109. Ibid., Wire from Mufioz Marin and others to President Roosevelt,
April 19, 1937.
for the coming year.110 In the case of the latter, Chancellor Soto,
when questioned concerning the grounds for the action taken, in
formed the instructor, who had been on the university staff for the
previous six years, that he was too young to continue as a university
professor.111
In the public school system, for example in the Caguas High
School, three teachers were removed from their positions. They were
F. Manrique Cabrera, Irving Feldman, and Samuel Freeman.112 But
the case which received the most attention was the case of Ines
Mendoza de Palacios, teacher of Spanish in the Central High School
of Santurce.
As with some of the other cases, Sra. Mendoza had taken up the
open invitation of the Hays committee to listen to any complaint
which the people might wish to bring before it. Several of the teach
ers took the opportunity to protest against the exaggerated importance
given to the teaching of English in a Spanish-speaking land. Those
who appeared before the committee were the first to feel the effect
of Gallardo's purge.
Both Richardson and Sra. Mendoza protested their dismissal and
appealed to the ACLU. From the island, Dr. Gallardo passed his
responsibility on to Washington, stoutly maintaining that he was
only following out orders which had come to him from the Wash
ington administration.113 On the other hand, when inquiry was made
in Washington of any purge
to the persons responsible, a flat denial
order was issued.114 The fact that Ickes was sick and out of the office
temporarily did not help matters. Roger Baldwin knew that he could
not expect a consistent liberal position from Gruening, but he did
feel that some justice could be expected from the Secretary.
Through the summer, correspondence served to clarify the pic
ture only slightly. It appeared that the presence of these individuals
on the payrolls of the university or the department of education only
110. ACLU, Vol. 1063, Letter to Hays from Lewis Richardson, June 12,
1937.
111. Ibid., Letter from Jaime Benitez to Oswald G. Villard, June 13,
1937.
112. DTIP, 9-8-65, Letter from Charles West to Dr. Gallardo, Sept. 2,
1937.
113. ACLU, Vol. 1063, Letter from Tomas Blanco and Gutierrez Fran-
qui to Dr. Wm. L. Nunn, June 16, 1937.
114. Ibid., Letter from Acting Secretary West to Roger Baldwin, July
3, 1937; also, Dr. Gruening to Professor Richardson, July 10, 1937.
THE HARVEST 321
embarrassed the present administration and presented an obvious

contradiction to the educational philosophy outlined in the Roose
velt letter. The case of Sra. Mendoza was called to the attention of
the President by his wife.115 However, even this failed to secure any
corrective action. Even Ickes, who confessed his agreement with the
basic ideas of the President's letter, but who differed with the ex
treme interpretation placed on it by Commissioner Gallardo, felt that
Sra. Mendoza had been correctly removed from her position.
In a letter to Hays, Ickes pointed out that he would hardly hire
anyone in the Indian Service who operated under the philosophy
that the only good Indian was a dead one. Hays in his reply pointed
out that the comparison was not apt, since the Mendoza case involved
the much more fundamental right of academic freedom.116 The ex
change of letters between the two liberals continued for the rest of
1937. Each failed to convince the other that he was correct con
cerning the Mendoza case. Hays finally closed the matter with the
pious hope that Ickes would soon return to his old self.117
Although the Secretary concurred in the action taken concerning
this case, he expressly refused to spread his protecting wings over
all and stick his neck out for any axe Hays and the ACLU might
choose to exercise on it. He was not willing to express confidence in
the fairness and judgment of Gallardo. As it was recognized later,
"some considerable part of Mr. Gallardo's difficulties have come from
the letter of President and, we might add, from the
Roosevelt,"118
strict interpretation which was put on that letter. The enthusiasm
and vigor with which the new educational program was initiated
looked too much like reprisals taken against undesirable political
ideas. However, despite his earnestness, not only did the teaching
of English not prosper under Commissioner Gallardo's leadership,
but the school system failed to stand up to the periodical examina
tions carried out by visiting educators.119 The New Deal was willing
115. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, undated, Memorandum from E. R.

to President Roosevelt.
116. ACLU, Vol. 1063, Letter from Hays to Ickes, Oct. 20, 1937.
117. Ibid., Nov. 23, 1937.
118. DTIP, 9-8-65, Report to Secretary Ickes from Professor Algernon
Coleman, April 9, 1939.
119. Ibid., 9-8-94, University of Puerto Rico, Report by Frank Bowies
to the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Oct.
1937. See also: J. J. Osuna, A History of Education in Puerto Rico (Rio
Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1949), pp. 377 passim.
to recognize that politics and education did not mix in the case of
Robert Gore, but where Gore failed, Gruening and Gallardo suc
ceeded and the educational system of Puerto Rico suffered.
With Gallardo's arrival on the island scene and the attempt to
carry out a program of Americanization through a quiet purge of
the school system, our story comes to a close. The tragic six months
at the beginning of the New Deal were revived with greater in
tensity and with a promise of a lasting effect. At this point, there
was no organized opposition party which might offer a means of
effective protest. Furthermore, Winship, while not so colorful and
ridiculous as Gore, sought the same ends with cool calculation in
his methodical suppression of any anti-American sentiment.
The bright hopes of an early end to a colonial economy awak
ened during 1934 and kept alive with the appointment of a crusad
ing liberal to carry out a promise of economic justice, were quickly
forgotten with the unexpected revival of the issue of independence.
The insincerity and untimeliness of the measure was manifested by
every move of the same liberal whose task it had been to build up the
confidence between Puerto Rico and the United States, and to right
the economic wrongs of thirty years of colonial control. As Rafael
Fernandez Garcia quite early recognized, the New Deal often
changed directions very suddenly and inexplicably.120
Politically, with the power of the Liberal party broken by the
expulsion of Mufloz Marin, the coalition was able to move along
smoothly. The charge was made that public affairs on the island
were in "the hands of those who previously had been unknown, or if
known had only been known through their police records."121
Within the year, the scandal in the island government was sub
ject to official investigation by the local department of justice. Mem
bers of the legislature, officials and employees, were using every
known ruse to increase their own income. It was even charged that
the government of the island was paying out public funds to support
the mistresses of various of the senators.122 It is not within our study
to evaluate and to study these charges. However, from a more reli-
120. Private files of Rafael Fernandez Garcia, Letter to Carlos Chardon,

April, 1935.
121. ACLU, Vol. 1064, Letter from Walter McK. Jones to Mr. Ward,
Dec. 22, 1937.
122. Ibid., Vol. 2053, Letter from Walter Jones to Roger Baldwin, Oct.
26, 1938.
THE HARVEST 323
able source, it might be pointed out that one of the "third rate"
leaders who took over the Liberal party was not free from the stains
of corruption. The black-shirted Juan Lastra Charriez escaped expo
sure of corruption only because a needed economy move removed
him from political appointment in the PRRA.123
a
As of the middle of 1937, the financial assignments to the PRRA
were drastically cut. The grant for 1938 was much less than that
for previous years. In February, 1938, the administrator, Miles Fair
banks, wrote to Secretary Ickes concerning the liquidation of the
PRRA in the near future. Finally, in 1939, after requesting $13
million, the PRRA received a little more than half of this, or $7
million.124
Obviously with these economic restrictions and cutbacks, the
over-all reconstruction program of the PRRA was no longer able to
expand. In accord with the necessary economy measures and the
high-level recognition of a limited future, some PRRA activity was
shunted off into the local government. The health and sanitation
program was turned over to the insular government. This transfer,
as could be expected with other similar actions, put a strain on the
operating budget of the department of health. Some clinics, as a

result, could not be kept in operation. Hospitals and medical centers
were forced to restrict their services for lack of finances and person
nel. PRRA communities which were originally to be provided with
services of health, education, and even recreation could no longer
expect such facilities.
Through December 31, 1938, the PRRA had been granted a
total of $57,953,189.24. Of this amount about 12 per cent had
been used to purchase material and equipment in the United States.
About 53 per cent was spent in labor or personnel services. Of this
money it was estimated that eighty cents out of every dollar in wages
found its way back into the United States on its third commercial
turnover. Finally, 3 5 per cent of the total PRRA grant was invested
in land or its improvement.125
There is a tendency among the islanders to view the PRRA as a
123. DTIP, PRRA, Personnel Employees, Memorandum for Mr. Burlew

from Leona Graham, Dec. 14, 1937.
124. La Fortaleza, 386/A; a long informative letter from Gov. Winship
to his successor, Admiral Leahy, July 15, 1939.
125. Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, A Report on the Facts
about P. R. R. A. as of December, 1938 (New York: Information Research
Section, 1938), pp. 22, 23.
dead loss. The coalition had never been able to see any good in the
New Deal experiments on the island. The Liberals, after being
removed from the PRRA, were no longer interested in defending it
and took little interest in its activity. In 1940 when the Central
Lafayette announced the failure of its cooperative organization of the
cane workers for essentially the same reasons predicted by Rafael
Fernandez Garcia, there were many who could not resist an "I told
you so."
In July, 1934, before the PRRA was created, there were 126,-
917 relief cases involving some 643,327 persons. In November,
1938, there were 222,606 relief cases involving 1,121,935 persons.
It is true that the population was growing and that the PRRA was
not designed to do away with poverty, but apparently it was not
even making any headway. As of December, 1938, nevertheless,
98.9 per cent of its employees had come from relief rolls. But there
was no relief program in Puerto Rico to take care of those not for
tunate enough to be employed.
Slum clearance programs, hydroelectric projects, rural rehabili
tation communities in the coffee and tobacco areas, along with the
sugar central program were the mainstays of PRRA activity. Almost
all the projects were handled on an experimental level rather than
in accord with the original plan of initiating an economic revolution
designed to carry out a complete reshuffle of the control of the
limited agricultural resources of Puerto Rico. These projects, with
the possible exception of the hydroelectric constructions, probably
never did become an integral part of the Puerto Rican scene, but the
blame cannot be in the plans themselves even though they were
limited in scope and in permanency. Nor was the lack of financial
assistance or administrative bungling primarily to blame, although
both impeded the work of the PRRA.
If the PRRA and the New Deal failed in Puerto Rico, the reason
is to be found in our political study. The administration turned away
from the only group in the Puerto Rican community which under
stood and was willing to cooperate in the tremendous renovating task
that was envisaged by the creative minds which were behind the
Chardon plan. As a result, there was no direct carry-over effect. The
reins on the PRRA had been too closely held by Washington bureau
crats. The Puerto Rican was rarely entrusted with policy-making
positions, and therefore felt little responsibility for the success or
failure of a program over which he had little control. The one pos
THE HARVEST 325
sible exception, noted above, would apparently validate the con

clusion. The hydroelectric program was under the able direction of
the Puerto Rican engineer Antonio Lucchetti.
While we end on a note of despair with the tragic events of the
year of 1937, all had not been lost. In several ways the New Deal
had been quite successful. The laissez-faire attitude of the federal
government toward Puerto Rico and its problems was reversed. The
partial responsibility for the well-being of the almost two million
island citizens was accepted by Washington. Thirty years of relative
neglect and even economic exploitation were to be undone by gov
ernment planning and regulation. However, this new policy had its
drawbacks. Neglect was exchanged for excessive management. The
idea that the Puerto Rican had to be watched, directed, and managed
was apparent. He had to be shown what was to his benefit. When
a discontented few showed signs of rebellion the island as a whole
was threatened by the Tydings measure.

The able island Liberal who had been appointed attorney gen
eral proved to be an excellent choice. For the first time since its
enactment steps were being taken to enforce the 500-Acre Law.
Fernandez Garcia was to labor unto death in the successful court
fight against the large landed corporations. His work prepared the
way for positive government action at a later date.
Finally, and perhaps most important, many of the radical ideas
of economic planning tossed about, in and out of the PRRA in the
thirties, were later put into startling effect with varying degrees of
success and failure by the same group of island leaders, political and
intellectual, that Dr. Gruening had deemed wise to expel from the
PRRA. This story of the return of Mufioz and his followers during
the decade of the forties will have to be told at another time.
MANUSCRIPTS
This study of Puerto Rican politics and the New Deal is based primarily
upon material found in private or governmental archives and classified as
manuscripts. Because of the importance of such unpublished letters and re
ports in the preparation of this book a brief descriptive paragraph has been
written concerning the more important manuscript collections.
American Civil Liberties Union Archives, Manuscript Division,

Princeton University Library. These documents are referred to in the Notes as
ACLU.
The ACLU took an active role in defending the rights of colonial citizens,
particularly those, like the Puerto Rican Nationalists, who found themselves
in constant conflict with the United States government. Ties of personal
friendship between Roger Baldwin and Luis Munoz Marin insured close
cooperation between the Union and the more liberal political elements of the
island. The most important documents in this file are concerned with the in
vestigation by Arthur Garfield Hays of the Ponce massacre.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Important manuscripts pertaining to Puerto Rico can be found in the
papers of former President Franklin D. Roosevelt deposited and available to
historians at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York.
Prior to Roosevelt's assuming office the Puerto Rican material collected came
from sympathizers and friends of the Democratic party. After entering the
White House, Roosevelt continued to receive a great quantity of unsolicited
letters and comments on the United States government's administration of
Puerto Rican affairs. More important than this material are the top level ad
ministrative matters dealing with Puerto Rico which were brought before the
chief executive by members of his cabinet, particularly the Secretaries of War,
the Interior, and Agriculture, who were more concerned with insular affairs.
Other Puerto Rican material found in the Library deals with the President's
visit to the island and items or questions which came up in press conferences.
The following are the more important Presidential files consulted in the prep
aration of this study:
327
328 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Democratic National Campaign Committee

Correspondence, 1928-33, United States Possessions.
. Diaries and Itineraries.
. Official File #200, Puerto Rico.
. Official File #400, Puerto Rico.
. Official File #241, Sugar.
. Press Conferences.
Official Files of the Executive Secretary to the Governor.

These records, which are no longer stored in the governor's mansion —
La Fortaleza — but in the new insular archives building, contain very little
information of importance which cannot be found at a higher administrative
level. Some official information on local political parties, documents relating
to investigations carried out by the insular department of justice, and other
material used by the governor are the most important items found here. These
records are referred to in the Notes as La Fortaleza.
National Archives.
The main source of manuscripts for this study on Puerto Rican politics
was the National Archives. From July 1, 1902, to July 29, 1934, the Bureau
of Insular Affairs of the War Department was responsible for the administra
tion of Puerto Rican affairs. This work was taken over by the Division of
Territories and Insular Possessions on July 29, 1934. The responsible federal
official on the island, the governor, was expected to channel all matters con
cerning the federal government through these agencies. Theoretically the
Bureau of Insular Affairs and its successor, the Division of Territories and
Insular Possessions, should have coordinated the various federal activities on
the island. However, this theory was scarcely realized in practice and each
federal department acted with a great degree of independence in matters with
which it was concerned with Puerto Rico. Therefore, in addition to the above
mentioned two agencies primarily responsible for Puerto Rican affairs, ma
terial concerning the island can be found in the files of other agencies such
as the divisions of the Department of Agriculture like the Agricultural Ad
justment Administration, the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Civilian Conserva
tion Corps., etc., or the Works Progress Administration and the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration. A complete listing of these files follows:
National Archives. Accession No. 1074, Miscellaneous data and correspond
ence relative to Puerto Rico.
. Department of Agriculture. Records of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary and the Under Secretary of Agriculture; Files of Fred Bartlett
and John F. Carter.
. Department of Agriculture. Records of the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture; Puerto Rican File, 1934.
. Department of Agriculture. General correspondence of the Agricul
tural Adjustment Administration relating to Puerto Rico.
. Department of Agriculture. General correspondence of the Bureau
of Plant Industry.
. Department of Agriculture. General correspondence of the Civilian
Conservation Corps relating to Puerto Rico.
. Department of the Interior. Records of the Division of Territories
and Island Possessions, Puerto Rico.
. Department of the Interior. Records of the National Resources
Commission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 329
. Department of the Interior. Records from the Office of the Secretary.

. Federal Emergency Relief Administration. State Files No. 400,
Puerto Rico.
. War Department. Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs relating
to Puerto Rico.
. Works Progress Administration. Personnel File.
Private Files of Rafael Fernandez Garcia.

As a member of the Chardon Policy Commission and an official in the
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, Fernandez Garcia was an impor
tant participant in the events studies.
Ruby Black Collection, Manuscript Division, University of Puerto

Rico Library.
This collection of manuscripts contains perhaps the most extensive non-
official file of correspondence of Luis Mufioz Marin. Miss Black, a newspaper
writer in Washington, was a personal friend of Mufioz and his first wife Muna
Lee, and acted as an unofficial lobbyist for Puerto Rican affairs in Washington.
BOOKS
Alonso Torres, Rafael. Cuarenta Aiios de Lucha Proletaria. San Juan:

Imprenta Baldrich, 1939.
Bernhardt, Joshua. The Sugar Industry and the Federal Government.
Washington: Sugar Statistics Service, 1948.
Black, Ruby. Eleanor Roosevelt. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940.
Brown, Wenzel, Dynamite on Our Doorstep, New York: Greenberg, 1945.
Clark, Victor S., et al. Porto Rico and Its Problems. Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1930.
Dalton, John. Sugar: A Case Study of Government Control. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1937.
Dana, A. G. Porto Rico's Case: Outcome of American Sovereignty. Second
Revision. New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1928.
Diffie, Bailey W. and Justine W. Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge. New
York: The Vanguard Press, 1931.
Ellis, Lippert S. The Tariff on Sugar. Freeport, 111. : The Rawleigh Founda
tion, no date, but possibly 1933.
Franklin, Jay. The New Dealers. New York: Literary Guild, 1934.
Gruening, Ernest (ed.). These United States: A Symposium. New York:
Boni and Liveright, 1923.
Hanson, Earl P. Transformation: The Story of Modern Puerto Rico. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1955.
Kent, Rockwell. This is My Own. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1940.
Lanauze Rolon, Jose A. Porque somos Comunistas. Ponce: El Dia, undated.
Martinez Alvarez, R. Novus Or do. San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1938.
Ortiz, Fernando. Cuban Counterpoint. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947.
Osuna, J. J. A History of Education in Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras: Editorial
de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1949.
Padin, Jose J. Personas Sobre Cosas. San Juan: Biblioteca de Autores Puer-
torriquefios, 1951.
Pagan, Bolivar. Historia de los Partidos Poltticos Puertorriqueiios (1898-
1956) Vol. II. San Juan: Libreria Campos, 1959.
330 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Resumen Histórico: Elecciones Generales 1932. Ponce: Gil de Lamadrid

Hermanos, 1932.
Rosario, José C. The Development of the Puerto Rican Jíbaro and His
Present Attitude Towards Society. San Juan: The University of Puerto
Rico, 1935.
Saltvia, Luis A. Historia de los Temporales de Puerto Rico (1508-1949).
San Juan: Imprenta La Milagrosa, 1950.
Souffront, Luis Muñiz. El Problema del Idioma en Puerto Rico. San Juan:
Biblioteca de Autores Puertorriqueños, 1950.
Targa, Domingo. El Modus Operandi de las Artes Electorales. San Juan:
La Correspondencia, 1940.
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vols. II and IV.
New York: Random House, 1938.
The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes, Vol. I, The First Thousand Days. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1953.
The Secret Diary of Harold lckes, Vol. 11, The Inside Struggle. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1953.
Todd, Robert H. Desfile de Gobernadores de Puerto Rico. San Juan: Im
prenta Baldrich, 1943.
Torregrosa, Angel M. Biografía de Miguel Angel de García Méndez. San
Juan: Imprenta Puerto Rico, 1939.
. Biografía de Luis Muñoz Marín. San Juan: Editorial Esther, 1944.
Tugwell, Rexford Guy. The Stricken Land. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1947.
Vivas, Valdivieso G. Instruyendo al Pueblo. Ponce: El Día, 1937.
. La Protesta se Impone. Ponce: El Día, 1939.
PAMPHLETS
Biaggi, Pedro José. The Puerto Rico Tragedy: In its Historical, Social and
Economic Aspects. New York: Editorial Cronistas Ibero-Americanos, no
date but possibly 1933.
Civil Liberties in the American Colonies. New York: The American Civil
Liberties Union, 1933.
Comité Insular, Afirmación Socialista. Prontuario del Libro en Pre
paración: Opinión y Sentencia. San Juan: La Estrella, 1934.
Degolia, D. Problems Tarifarios de Puerto Rico. Traducido y anotado por
A. J. Colorado. San Juan: Tipografía, 1936.
Del Llano, Joaquín. Puerto Rico hacia la Autonomía. Poncc: Editorial del
Llano, 1936.
Descartes, Sol L. Organization and Earnings on 130 Sugar Cane Farms in
Puerto Rico, 1934-35. San Juan: Bureau of Supplies, Printing and Trans
portation, 1938.
Gannes, Harry. Yankee Colonies. New York: International Pamphlets, 1930.
Harris, Alyce. Porto Rico: Fact and Fable. New York: Golden Galleon
Press, 1932.
Lynskey, Elizabeth M. Porto Rico and the United States. Washington: The
Catholic Association for International Peace, 1931.
Puerto Rico Cámara de Comercio. Our Recovery Problem. Compilation
of correspondence with the President and other officials. San Juan: 1937.
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration. Rehabilitation in Puerto
Rico. San Juan: Imprenta Venezuela, 1939.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 331
Royse, M. W. Puerto Rico, An Account of Existing Conditions. No publisher

or date given.
Smith, Dudley, and Requa, Wm. M. Puerto Rico Sugar Facts. Washington:
Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, 1939.
ARTICLES
"Análisis de Quiebrasen Puerto Rico," Boletín de la Universidad de Puerto

Rico, I
(Septiembre, 1932), 20 pp.
Benítez, J. "Dos Enfermedades de la Universidad," Revista de Puerto Rico,
I (Febrero, 1936), 291-94.
Chardón, Carlos. "Mosaic Investigations at Central Cambalache," ]ournal
of the Department of Agriculture, VIII (April, 1924), 27.
Cordero, Rafael de Jesús. "Problema Contributivo," Revista de Economía,
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Dearing, Albín P. "Puerto Rico and the New Deal," Literary Digest, CXVII
(February 3, 1934), 8, 9, 42.
Descartes, Sol. "Review of Gazer's Book," Journal of Farm Economics,
XXI (August, 1939), 679-82.
"El Engaño de las 500 Cuerdas" (Editorial), Isla, I (Noviembre, 1939), 2.
Gatell, Frank Otto. "Independence Rejected: Puerto Rico and the Ty-
dings Bill of 1936," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVIII
(February, 1958), 25-44.
Gruening, Ernest H. "Hope for Puerto Rico," The Nation, CXXXIII (Sep
tember, 1931), 332-34.
Hall, Francis A. "Social and Economic Conditions in Puerto Rico," Puerto
Rico Health Bulletin, III (July, 1939), 279-87.
Hanson, Earl R. "Informe Preliminar," Revista de Obras Públicas de Puerto
Rico (no vol. no.) (Agosto, 1936), 1381.
Hays, Arthur G. "Defending Justice in Puerto Rico," The Nation, CXLIV
(June, 1937), 647.
Herring, Hubert. "Rebellion in Puerto Rico," The Nation, CXXXVII (No
vember 29, 1933), 618-19.
Holliday, G. "The Sugar Debacle," Revista de Importadores y Exportadores,
II (March, 1934), 28-30.
Hull, Harwood. "Prohibition Violations," New York Times (August 10,
1929).
Jesús de Castro. "El Aspecto Obrero de la Reconstrucción," Puerto Rico
Ilustrado, XXVII (Septiembre, 1936), 16-17.
Lee, Muña. "The Winning of San Juan Hill," Review of Reviews, LXXXIII
(April, 1931), 72-73.
Martinez-Alvarez, R. "Monopolios, Competencia Desleal, y Nuevo Trato,"
Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, III-IV (Marzo-Abril:
Septiembre-Octubre, 1934).
Matz, Julius. "Infection and Nature of the Yellow Stripe Disease of Cane,"
Journal of the Department of Agriculture, III (October, 1919).
. "Recent Developments in the Study of the Nature of Mosaic Dis
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Agriculture, VI (July, 1922).
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Trabajos, XXXIII (Diciembre, 1920).
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Rico Ilustrado, XXI (Febrero, 1930), 15.
332 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Morales, Luis M. "Cuestiones Fundamentales de Política Puertorriqueña,"

Revista de Derecho, Legislación y Jurisprudencia, II (Septiembre-Oc
tubre, 1936).
Morales-Otero, P. "Health and Social-Economic Conditions on a Sugar-
Cane Plantation," Puerto Rico Journal of Public Health and Tropical
Medicine, XII (June, 1937), 405-90.
Muñoz Marín, Luis. "T. R. of P. R.," World's Work, LX (July, 1931),
21-24.
Muñoz Morales, Luis. "Notas y Referencias para la Historia de los Partidos
Políticos," Revista Jurídica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, VI (Sep
tiembre-Octubre, 1936), 55-79.
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Obras Públicas, XII (Julio, 1935), 975-82.
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1930), 7-9.
Paddock, M. "Puerto Rico's Plight," Current History (June, 1936), 91-95.
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Review, XVIII (November-December, 1933), 3, 4, 8.
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la Independencia Económica" (Editorial), Revista de Puerto Rico, I
(Agosto, 1935), 370-71.
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Rico, I (Agosto-Septiembre, 1935), 426-30, 507-8.
Rodríguez, Pastor. "Nuestro Fracasado Sistema de Beneficiencia," Bole
tín de la Asociación Médica de Puerto Rico, XXV (Noviembre, 1933),
581-90.
Roosevelt, Theodore. "Land Problems in Puerto Rico and the Philippine
Islands," The Geographical Review, XXIV (April, 1934), 182-204.
Schroeder, Theodore. "A Different View," The Nation, CXXXIII (Sep
tember 30, 1931), 334-35.
"The Problems of Porto Rico," Foreign Policy Association Information Service,
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CXLIV (April 3, 1937), 371-73.
. "Reconstruction in Puerto Rico," The Nation, CXLIV (April 10,
1937), 408-9.
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Baugh, Vdígil E., comp. Preliminary Inventory of the Central Office Records
of the National Resources Planning Board. No. 50. Washington: The
National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General
Services Administration, 1953.
. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Regional Offices of the
National Resources Planning Board. No. 64. Washington: The National
Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Ad
ministration, 1954.
Bourne, Frances T., comp. Preliminary Checklist of the Central Corres
pondence Files of the Work Projects Administration and its Predeces
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March, 1946.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 333
Monden, Kenneth, comp. Preliminary Checklist of the Classified Files of

the Division. of Territories and Island Possessions. Washington: The
National Archives, June 1943.
Munden, Kenneth, and Greenbaum, Milton, comps. Records of the
Bureau of Insular Affairs Relating to Puerto Rico, 1898-1934: A List
of Selected Files. Washington: The National Archives, March, 1943.
Smith, Lester W. Preliminary List of Published and Unpublished Reports
of the National Resources Planning Board, 1933-1943. Washington:
Division of Interior Department Archives, March, 1946.
U.S. Congress. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. William H. Hack-
ett, The Nationalist Party. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Of
fice, 1951.
NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Porto Rico's Sugar Manuals. Yearly Publications. New Orleans: A. B. Gil-

more, 1930-38.
La Correspondencia. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
La Democracia. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
El Día. Ponce, Puerto Rico.
El Diluvio. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Florete. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
El lmparcial. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
El Mundo. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
El País. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
La Rehabilitación. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Revista Económica. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
OTHERS
American Civil Liberties Union. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on

Civil Rights in Puerto Rico. New York: 1937.
Benítez, Ramon A., and Ramos Casellas, R. An Examination into Some
of the Utopian Political and Economic Ideas now Apparently in Vogue in
Puerto Rico. A Report to the Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto
Rico. San Juan, 1939.
Bird, Esteban A. Report on the Sugar Industry in Relation to the Social and
Economic System of Puerto Rico. A Report to the Fifteenth Legislative
Assembly of the Senate of Puerto Rico. San Juan, 1941.
Bird Pinero, Enrique. "The Politics of Puerto Rico Land Reform: A Study
in the Dynamics of Legislation." Unpublished Master's thesis, Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1950.
Comisión Legislativa. Primer Informe para Investigar el Malestar y Desaso
siego Industrial y Agrícola en que Origina el Desempleo en Puerto Rico.
San Juan: Gobierno de Puerto Rico, 1930.
First Annual Report of the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration
for August 19, 1933, to August 31, 1934. Prepared by the Bureau of
Reports. San Juan: Bureau of Supplies, Printing and Transportation,
1935.
Informe Sobre Corporaciones y Asociaciones Privadas. Preparado por la Com
isión Económica de la Legislatura de Puerto Rico. San Juan: Negociado
de Materiales, Imprenta y Transporte, 1934.
334 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Puerto Rico Legislature. Report of the Technical Committee of the Inter-

Departmental Committee on Puerto Rico. Washington: 1934.
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration. A Report on the Facts
about P.R.R.A. as of December, J 938. New York: Information Research
Section, 1938.
Rosario, José C. Normas de Vida del Obrero Puertorriqueño. Conferencia
dictada por la radioemisora WKAQ, 16 de marzo, 1936.
United States Tariff Commission. A Report on the Summaries of Tariff
Information: Sugar, Molasses and Manufacturers. Washington: United
States Tariff Commission, 1948.
. A Report on the Economy of Puerto Rico with special reference to
the Economic Implications of Independence and other Proposals to
change its Political Status. Washington: United States Tariff Commis
sion, 1946.
Acosta Velarde, Jos6, 77, 292 Tydings, 107; Hopkins investigation,
Agricultural Adjustment Act: sugar, 107-11 passim; labeled a political
135, 286-87; applied to Puerto racket, 110; Gruening inquiries 263-
Rico, 135-36, 138; mentioned, 132 64; Kent accusations, 268; Roose
Agriculture, Department of: recom velt's letter, 318
mends Menendez Ramos, 67; pre Arcelay, Maria Luisa, 123-24, 300
pares sugar plan, 138, 140; subsis Attorney General (insular), 12, 23.
tence farms, 152; Bureau of Plant See also Fernandez Garcia, Benigno;
Industry, 177-79, 181-82, 199; Horton, Benjamin
powers of Secretary, 197; Supreme
Court decision, 243, 286 Baker, Jacob: analysis of technical
Aguirre Sugar Company, 5, 178, 180, committee report, 183; sees politics
286 in PRERA, 195, 220-21; on PRRA,
Albizu Campos, Pedro: president of 228; mentioned, 173, 181, 212
Nationalist Party, 32; candidate for Baldwin, Roger: election law, 36;
insular senate, 34; Liberal Party Guerra-Mondragon, 217; criticizes
convention, 34-35; political activity, Albizu Campos charges, 251-52,
38, 242; threatens police chief, 39, 266-69 passim; advises Munoz
250; election loss, 43-44; University Marin, 306-8; consulted by Ickes,
students, 249-50, 261; arrested, 307-8, 317
251-53 passim; reaction to Tydings Barcel6, Antonio: Union Party leader,
bill, 258; charges against, 267; de 16-17, 20; for autonomy, 25; as a
fense of, 268-70; in Atlanta, 304, political figure, 26-27; on indepen
309; mentioned, 176, 291 dence, 27-28, 257, 309; opinion of
Alianza, 17, 20, 25, 26 War Department concerning, 28;
Alonso Torres, Rafael: speaker of and Nationalists, 34-36, 38; on
house, 43; University Board, 85-86, Beverley, 51; meets Gore, 57; wel
106; rehabilitation plan, 167; mem comes Gore, 61; protests to Gore,
orandum against PRRA, 229; So 67; undated resignations, 70-71;
cialist opposition to, 291; men John Boylan, 75-76; judged anti-
tioned, 73. 93, 98, 112, 165, 305 American, 80; reaction to Tydings
American Civil Liberties Union: Lib bill, 257; disagreement with Munoz
eralizing election law, 36; Guerra- Marin, 259-60, 297-300; political
Mondragon represents, 217; Nation vacillation of, 261-62, 292; possible
alist charges, 266-67; protests PRRA successors to, 294; fights retraimi-
purges, 272; protests restrictions on ento, 296; breaks with Munoz
Nationalists, 310; Ponce massacre, Marin, 306-7; rejects independence,
311-15; hearings, 320-21. See also 309; mentioned, 84, 94, 95, 105,
Baldwin, Roger; Hays, Arthur Gar 200
field Bartlett, Frederick P., 143, 155, 186,
Americanism: use by coalition, 60, 290
100; Beverley on, 60; in schools, Bass, John, 131-32, 144-45, 189
64, 79, 91, 263-64; Chardon, 69; Benitez, Jaime, 292, 319-20
BarceI6, 80; Dorothy Bourne, 85; Bennet, W. Reese, 21-22, 24, 102
Padin comments on, 86, 97; War Beverley, James: on status, 24; on Bar-
Department advice, 87; Alonso Tor cel6, 27-28; on Liberal party, 28;
res, 89; Padin judged, 96, 110-11; Dr. Rhoads' letter, 33-34; on Na
growth of and-, 103; ridiculed by tionalists, 35; electoral law, 37, 53,
335
336 INDEX
60; concerning a Puerto Rican as 140, 216

governor, 45, 50; on Travieso, 48; Budget: cuts in, 53, 73, 113, 118-20
backs Padin, 49, 96, 110; evalua passim; in University, 93, 140
tion of, 50-51; on Americanism, 60; Bureau of Insular Affairs: insular
conference with Gore proposed, 60; Democratic party, 21, 66; on native
workingmen's insurance, 72, 73; governor, 46; on status, 58-60;
suggests Winship for governor, 112; orientation of Gore, 61, 68-69, 87,
urges economy measures, 117, 140; 104; Whittemore appointment, 63-
approves Iglesias' plan, 119; criti 65; opposes cockfights, 72; working-
cizes politicians, 120-21; lawyer for men's insurance, 73; recommends
Bourne, 210 Gallardo, 83, 90; concerning Alonso
Bird Arias, Jorge, 112-13, 133-34, Torres, 85; reprimands Padin, 86;
147, 156, 158, 167, 189 on Americanization, 87; on relief,
Black, Ruby: Washington reporter, 119; analysis of sugar bill, 145-47;
54-55; interviews Gore, 55-57; abolished, 171-73, mentioned, 192
quotes Farley, 61-62; queries Roose
velt on undated resignations, 70; Carter, John Franklin: on Tugwell,
predicts Padin will remain, 82; on 143; to Puerto Rico, 155; convinces
D. Bourne's visit to White House, Iglesias, 169; on Julius Matz, 180;
86; takes Munoz to White House, analysis of Chard6n Plan blocks,
104-5; on Mrs. Roosevelt, 105, 154- 186, 196; calls Roig's offer a bribe,
55; recommends Travieso, 125; pre 190; confident of Chaxd6n, 194-95;
dicts a planned economy for Puerto mentioned, 290
Rico, 153-54; places Munoz Marin's Centrales: history of, 4; production of,
message before President, 185; medi 5, 40; government ownership of, 10,
ator of Munoz-Gruening dispute, 157, 161-62; as public utilities, 41-
255; questions retraimiento, 295; 42, 157, 174; ignore colonos, 184;
mentioned, 91, 271 quotas assigned to, 188; group rep
Blanco, Juan P., 280, 316-17 resenting, 189; sugar surplus, 193;
Bourne, Dorothy: recommendations for opposition to PRRA, 224; Ickes' ac
governor, 46-47, 49, 51; defends cusation, 244; in PRRA program,
Padin, 85-87; guide for Mrs. Roose 283-87; Lafayette, 284-86, 324. See
velt, 155. See also Bourne, James also Aguirre Sugar Compnay; Fa-
Bourne, James: alarmed at civil un jardo Sugar Company; South Porto
rest, 103; directs PRERA, 127; de Rico Sugar Company; Sugar; United
nies politics in PRERA, 129, 195; Porto Rico Sugar Company
declared persona non grata, 130; ex Chamber of Commerce: call for eco
tends relief to strikers, 139; plan nomic conference, 148; submits re
for economic adjustment, 149-50, habilitation plan, 153; attacks
156, 170, 202-3; attacked by Cham Bourne, 170, 204-13 passim; con
ber of Commerce, 170, 204-7 pas demns administration indecision,
sim; feels slighted, 171; reaction to 184-85; mentioned, 156, 186, 191,
Snyder and Matz, 181; incorpora 205
tion of PRERA, 202-4, 207-13; Chapman, Oscar: publicizes Chard6n
libel charge, 210; Roman Catholic plan, 199-200; helps Murioz Marin,
Church, 221-22; end of PRERA, 200; orders veto of corporation bill,
232-33; conflict with Gruening, 212; mentioned, 173, 180, 186
234, 240, 281; backed by coalition, Chardon Plan: prepared by Puerto
247; leaves Puerto Rico, 248 Rico Policy Commission, 165, 168;
Boylan, John, 74-76, 84, 95, 113 support urged for, 168-69; prob
Braegger, Victor, 73-74 lems of financing, 176, 196, 222-
Brandes, Dr. E. W., 179-81, 199 23; studied by technical subcom
Brookings Institution, 9, 42, 117, 133, mittee, 176, 183; proclamation
338 INDEX
200; relations with governor, 214, PRRA sugar program, 283-87; men
216; draws up independence bill, tioned, 179, 322, 324
253. See also Gruening, Ernest Fernos, Isern, Dr., 98
Dooley, Henry, 21 Ferre\ Jose A., 237, 240, 244-45, 247
Dooley, Mrs. Henry, 51, 52, 61-62 500-Acre law: Organic Act, 5; viola
Draughon, Donald, 53-54, 79-80, 251 tion of, 10; effect on sugar produc
tion, 10; some Roman Catholic
Economic conference at Fortaleza, 155- opinion on, 10; and Munoz Marin,
58 41, 216; steps to enforce, 214-16,
Education, commissioner of: Presiden 226, 325; Ickes' statement concern
tial appointee, 12; Puerto Rican or ing, 215, 244; Winship's statement
continental, 23; Whittemore candi on, 232
dacy, 62-65; urged to defend Amer Florida: Gore resident of, 55; Gore's
icanism, 100; investigation of school plans to trade with, 58, 141-42;
system, 106-11 passim; free from John Boylan's trip to, 75; Gore's
politics, 114; teaching of English trip to, 75, 106, 141; sugar pro
policy, 279-81, 317-18. See also duction, 31
Padin, Jose Food: costs, 11; NIRA, 125; AAA,
Egozcue, Manuel, 238, 275 135-37 passim; Puerto Rico to pro
Election: 1932, 43, 208; 1936, 228, duce what it consumes, 156-57; rice
245, 301-6 production, 156; PRERA, 204-5
Electoral law of 1932, 35-36; amend Free port facilities, 193, 194, 282
ments to, 53, 60; reform bill, 262-
63, 301-3; violations of, 303-4 Gallardo, Jose: Gore's candidate for
Ellsworth, Elmer, 268n commissioner of education, 82-83;
Esteves, Guillermo, 97, 208 recommendation sent to Roosevelt,
Esteves, Luis Raul, 270-71 90; again candidate for commis
sioner of education, 317; backed
Fairbanks, Miles, 276, 283, 323 by coalition, 318; named commis
Fajardo Sugar Company, 5, 42, 131- sioner, 318; policy on teaching of
33 passim, 287 English, 318-19; conducts purge of
Farley, James: recommends Horton, education system, 320
22; recommends Gore, 57; recom Garcia Mendez, Miguel Angel, 31,
mends Whittemore, 61-65 passim; 165, 208, 218-20 passim, 237, 252
blocked by Dern, 63-65, 68; men Gompers, Samuel, 15, 72
tioned, 46, 113 Gore, Robert Hayes: appointed gover
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 83, nor, 53, 57; early career, 55-56;
89, 91 personality of, 56, 102; on state
Federal Emergency Relief Administra hood, 58-59; inauguration, 61; re
tion, 121-22, 128, 159-60, 191, quests candidates for insular posi
212. See also Hopkins, Harry; tions, 62; attempts to remove Padin,
PRERA 63-65, 82-83; wants insular Demo
Federal party, 14 cratic party, 66-67; favors coalition,
Fernandez Garcia, Benigno; candidate 68; undated resignations, 69-71,
for attorney general, 216; replaces 77-79; vetoes insurance program,
Horton, 235-36, 246; endeavors to 74; John Boylan affair, 74-76;
reconcile Munoz Marin and Barcel6, honesty of, 76; ridicule of, 77-78,
306; Ponce massacre, 312; men 101; belittles Barcel6, 76-78; sees
tioned, 168, 250, 266, 325 President, 79, 81; possible removal
Fernandez Garcia, Rafael: work on of, 82; recommends Gallardo, 82;
reconstruction plan, 160, 163; po object of satire, 84; appointment of
litical leanings of, 168, 290; in Alonso Torres, 85-89; advised by
PRRA, 238; fired, 271; direction of War Department, 87; demonstra
INDEX 339
tions concerning, 88-89, 92; Mufloz Marin, 255, 296-97; dis

threatens to resign, 89, 91, 94; counts possible approval of inde
accuses Liberals, 93; appeals to pendence bill, 256-57; investigates
President, 94; effect on Liberal anti-Americanism, 263-64; coopera
party, 97; controlled by coalition, tion with Winship, 265; reaction to
97-98; criticized, 102-3, 142n; conviction of Nationalists, 269; di
Dern advises, 104; conference with rects purge of PRRA, 271-72; con
Padin, 104; Mrs. Roosevelt's opin flict with Chardón, 274-76; Hanson
ion of, 105; leaves Puerto Rico, accuses, 277; concern for English,
106; evaluation by E. Hopkins, 280; Padin's resignation, 281; effect
108-9; resignation, 111, 113; op on Liberal party, 289; Ickes urges
poses Travieso, 126; opposes appli to resign from PRRA, 307-8; de
cation of AAA to Puerto Rico, 135; fends actions of Winship, 309, 313-
economy moves of, 140-41; evalua 14; resigns from PRRA, 315; on
tion of economy measures of, 141, education in Puerto Rico, 316-22
142; mentioned, 95, 116, 195, passim; mentioned, 194, 225, 258-
231 59, 301, 302, 322
Government corporation to carry out Guerra-Mondrag6n, Miguel, 216-17,
economic plan, 174-76, 184, 196- 236, 241, 251, 269
98
Governor: powers of appointment, 12; Hanson, Earl Parker: PRRA planning
official position, 13, 47-48, 98; consultant, 237; comment on
proposal to elect, 24, 27, 32, 231; Munoz-Gruening feud, 255; studies
suggestion of candidates for, 45-51 effect of Tydings bill, 258; politics
passim, 112; qualifications, 45; the in PRRA, 264; resigns, 276-78; pre
oretical position of, 98; Luis Mufioz dicts blow-up in Puerto Rico, 277;
Marin's concept of, 99; relation to mentioned, 312
DTIP, 214, 216; in PRRA, 223. Hawaii, 13, 131, 145, 172, 207
See also Gore, Robert; Winship, Hays, Arthur Garfield, 311-15, 320-
Blanton 21
Graham, Leona, 278, 307, 315 Hickok, Lorena, 154, 159-60
Gruening, Ernest: editor of The Na Hopkins, Dr. Emest, 106-9, 114, 235,
tion, 29; evaluation of Ruby Black, 316
54; appointed to direct DTIP, 186- Hopkins, Harry: selects James Bourne
87; reaction to appointment, 187- for PRERA, 127; note to Tugvvell,
88; warned about politics, 195; 171; sugar surplus, 192-93; secures
oriented by Mufioz Marin, 196, 211, more aid for Puerto Rico, 193; re
216, 218, 240; President's mes ceives Chamber of Commerce
sage, 200; Teplies to Valdes, 202; charges, 207, 210; considers in
on future of PRERA, 203-4; reply vestigation of PRERA, 220, 222;
to Chamber of Commerce, 205; PRRA, 227-28; announces end of
backs Bourne, 209-10, 247; contro PRERA, 232-33; mentioned, 121,
versy with Winship, 211-14, 230- 128, 148, 170, 195, 225, 234
31; PRRA, 223-25; funds for Horton, Benjamin, candidate for
PRRA, 226-27, 232-33; takes over Democratic National Committee
PRERA, 233; conflict with Bourne, man, 21; pro-statehood, 24; en
234; personality of, 234, 240, 274- dorses Gore's appointment, 53; ap
75; answers Coalition, 237-41; pointed attorney general, 90; medi
urges rural electrification program, ates Guanica strike, 139-40; stops
241; defends charges against Albizu libel charge, 210; opposes enforce
Campos, 252; reaction to Riggs' ment of 500-Acre Law, 215; steps
assassination, 252; urges offer of to remove, 216, 236; mentioned,
independence, 253-54; differs with 156, 165
340 INDEX
Hostos, Felipe de. See Chamber of Liberal party (1932), 27; (1936),
Commerce 288-89; Luis Mufioz Marin for, 30,
Hurricanes: San Felipe, 2-9, 19, 144; 255-57, 292; coalition opposed to,
San Ciriaco, 7-8; San Cipriano, 19, 32; legality of advocacy, 33; prime
144, 154 issue in 1932 election, 40; eco
nomic implications of, 40-41, 254;
Ickes, Harold: administers Puerto philosophical basis for, 42-43; Gore
Rican affairs, 172-73; appoints claims taught in schools, 64; senti
Gruening to direct DTIP, 186-87; ment furthered by Gore, 97; Ty
and Comptroller General, 198; and dings sees no sentiment for, 107,
plans for PRRA, 198, 223; attacks 253; no answer to poverty, 118;
latifundia, 215, 230; control of encouraged by sugar program, 166;
Gruening, 224-25, 266; investi Tydings bill for, 253-54; conse
gates Winship, 231; visit to Puerto
quences of according to Gruening,
Rico, 243-45, 250; backs B. Fer 253; PRRA purges believers in,
272; criticized by Gruening, 273;
nandez Garcia, 246; urges indepen
dence bill, 254; condemns PRRA Muiioz broadens base of, 291-92;
investigation, 265; predicts blow Munoz' bill for, 306-8; schools
out in Puerto Rico, 266; discusses purged of believers in, 319-21
against Nationalists, 267; Industrialization, 149, 151, 160, 162,
charges
opinion on Nationalist trial, 270; 200, 282
accepts Hanson's resignation, 277- Insular government: indebtedness, 23,
80; seeks advice from Baldwin, 119, 121; appointments in, 23, 61-
307-8; urges Gruening to resign 63, 65, 67-71, 98; legislature, 60,
from PRRA, 307-8; requests official 71, 74, 88, 117, 130, 167, 196,
investigation of Ponce massacre, 208, 214, 226, 244; executive posi
313-14; sends investigator to Puerto tion in, 97, 98, 277. See also Gov
Rico, 313-14; wants Winship to ernor; Judicial system
resign, 315; questions Gallardo's Inter-Departmental Committee for the
policy, 321; mentioned, 261, 280 Economic Rehabilitation of Puerto
Iglesias, Santiago: as labor organizer, Rico: composition of and appoint
15; as a politician, 16; and Luis ment to, 173, 175; purpose, 176;
Mufioz Marin, 29, 148; coalition technical subcommittee, 176-83; re
explained, 31; blocks Nationalists, action to technical committee report,
35; elected resident commissioner, 183; Carter calls ineffective, 186
43; recommends candidates for gov Iriarte, Celestino, 31, 130, 165
ernor, 48; uses pro- American argu
ment, 60; demands Padin resign, Jenks, Dr. Leland, 80-81, 111
100; plan for relief, 118-20; on Jibaro, 8, 11, 81, 150
NIRA, 124; eases labor tension, Jones-Costigan Act: Puerto Rican su
140; approves work of Policy Com gar quota, 144-45, 166; charges of
mission, 169, 183; prints Technical discrimination against Puerto Rico,
Committee report, 184; plan for 147, 167, 219; benefits of, 147,
control of reconstruction, 190-91; 196, 220; basis for economic plan
reaction to Tydings bill, 259; visited for Puerto Rico, 154; Puerto Rican
by Gruening, 273; political strength Policy Commission to decide use of
of, 294; Nationalist shoots at, 300- funds, 163, 219; estimated cost to
1; attacked by Communists, 305; Puerto Rico, 192; Mufioz defends,
mentioned, 72, 83, 208, 219, 229, 219-20; Supreme Court decision,
236, 239, 240, 271, 294, 318 243
Impartial, 212, 303, 312 Jones, Walter McK., 16, 17, 25, 296,
Independence: position of Nationalists, 309
16; position of autonomists, 24-25; Judicial system, 13, 246, 322
INDEX 341
Kent, Rockwell, 268 Mayagiiez, 9, 21, 31, 84, 123, 184,

King, U.S. Senator, 48, 246, 279-80 190, 199, 241, 300
Mayer, Milton S., 55-57
La Democracia. See Democracia, La Mendoza de Palacios, Ines, 320-21
Land distribution: opposition to, 149- Menendez Ramos, Rafael: appointed
50; break up of land monopoly, commissioner of agriculture by Gore,
151-54 passim, 173, 214-15, 249; 67; reaction to government owner
El Duque, 18, 152; United Porto ship of sugar central, 157-58; con
Rico lands, 157-58; plans for, 161- cern for coffee growers, 157, 175;
63, 174, 220, 232; Chard6n plan, to work on reconstruction plan,
174, 196, 200, 203-4; Ickes' posi 160, 163; political leanings of, 167;
tion on, 215, 244-45; PRRA pro urges support for Policy Commis
gram for, 281-82 sion, 168-69, 184; retires, 271;
Lastra Charriez, Juan, 296-98; 323 mentioned, 156, 191-92
Lee, Atherton, 199, 264 Munoz Marin, Luis: early life, 29-30;
Lee, Muna, 54, 93, 188, 295 early political activity, 29-30, 148-
Liberal Party: formation of, 27; stand 49; pro-independence, 30, 40-41,
on status, 27; and Nationalists, 34- 266, 292, 306-8; on tariff, 30; on
35; 38-39; and 1932 election law, absentee ownership, 30; liberalizing
36; support for, 42, 97, 291-92; election law, 36-37, 60; analysis of
results of 1932 election, 43; pro economic aspects of independence,
tests Gore's appointments, 67-68, 40-41; elected senator, 53; editorials
70-77 passim; on Alonso Torres, 88; on Gore, 77-78; weekly columns on
effect of anti-American charge on, Gore's errors, 84-85; concept of the
97; relation to position of governor, role of colonial governor, 99; meets
99; reaction to Gore's resignation, Roosevelt, 104-5, 201, 225; urges
114; threat to economic plan, 194- reduction of attack on Gore, 105-6;
95; President's message, 201-2; comment on Winship, 113, 218;
PRERA, 208-9, 220; PRRA, 239- seen as cause of Gore's removal,
40, 264-65, 270; reaction to Ty- 114; urges socioeconomic reforms,
dings bill, 258-60; pressured by 115-16, 148, 216; association with
Gruening, 273; split, 288, 293, New Dealers, 148; outlines general
307; composition of, 291-93; and plan of economic reconstruction,
retraimiento, 296; conventions, 296- 151-52; defines the New Deal, 151;
98; struggle for control of, 298- clears way for economic planning,
300; Accion Social Independentista, 154; and Puerto Rican Policy Com
299; loses 1936 election, 306; ex mission, 163, 165; reaction to Char-
pels Munoz Marin, 307 d6n plan, 168; Julius Matz, 179;
Lucchetti, Antonio, 98, 325 urges President to proclaim Chardon
plan, 185; possible influence in
McCarl, J. R. See Comptroller General Gruening appointment, 187n; friend
Martinez Nadal, Rafael: leader of of Gruening, 187, 196, 239-40;
pure Republicans, 31; meets Gore, orientation of Gruening, 196, 211,
60; cockfight enthusiast, 72; with 216, 218, 235; President's Christ
holds cooperation from Padin, 101; mas message, 201-2; and PRERA,
Bourne's evaluation of, 208; blocks 204, 220; consulted on appoint
PRRA funds, 229, 240; attacks ap ment of attorney general, 216; plans
pointment of Ferndndez Garcia, to remove Winship, 218, 231-32;
236; Manuel Egozcue, 239; Ickes party realignment plans, 218-19;
accuses, 244; reaction to Tydings debates with Garcia Mendez, 219-
bill, 258; backs Gallardo, 318; 20; urges support for Chardon,
mentioned, 208, 262, 270 235-36; reaction to Riggs' assassi
Matz, Dr. Julius, 177-83 nation, 254-55; differs with Gruen
342 INDEX
ing, 255; reaction to Tydings bill, fixessalaries, 118; mentioned, 213,

255-60, 288-89; position in Liberal 231
party, 259-60, 288; opposes refer Osuna, Dr. J. J., 317-18
endum on basis of Tydings bill,
262; electoral reform, 263; view of Padin, Dr. Jose: candidate for gover
political picture (1936), 288-93; nor, 49; War Department opinion
resigns from senate, 293; proposes of, 63-64; comments concerning,
retraintiento, 295-96; conditions for 64n, 65; praised, 80-81, 90; pre
campaign cooperation, 297-98; hopes dicted to remain as commissioner
to capture Liberal party machinery, of education, 82; sends D. Bourne
297-300; Accion Social Indepen- to Washington, 85-86; defends him
dentista, 299-300; expelled from self, 86, 97; resignation requested,
Liberal party, 306-7; works for in 90, 92; Roosevelt backs, 91; cancels
dependence, 306-8; on civil lib University Board meeting, 94; at
erties, 310; protests education pol tacked by coalition, 100-1; confer
icy, 319; mentioned, 94, 224, 239, ence with Gore, 104; evaluation by
249, 261, 272, 325 E. Hopkins, 108-11; reappointed,
114; on Chardon, 235; school un
Nation, The, 19, 29, 187, 188 rest, 260-61; policy on English,
National Industrial Recovery Admin 279-80; resigns, 281, 316; men
istration, 122-25, 127, 135 tioned, 68, 96, 110
Nationalist party: history of, 16-17; Pagan, Bolivar, 208, 218-19, 237,
active political organization of, 32; 244
bond issue, 32-33; Dr. Rhoads' let Pais, EI, 31, 98
ter, 33-34; Liberal party, 34-35, 39; Pesquera, Josi S., 37, 146
petitions to be included on 1932 Philippine Islands, 18, 30, 41, 50,
ballot, 35; political activity, 38-39; 172, 254
violence of members, 249-50, 300- Pifiero, Jesus, 184, 196, 283-84, 286-
1, 309, 311-12, 315; forms united 87, 289
front, 262; trial of the leaders, Police: clash with Nationalists, 249-
266-70; boycotts 1936 election, 50, 309; treatment of Riggs' mur
304; self-proclaimed movement of derers, 249, 254-55; commissioner
the intelligentsia, 304; Communist of, 102, 270, 310-11; Ponce mas
attitude toward, 306; Palm Sunday sacre, 310-15; punishment of urged,
parade, 310 315
Needlework: wages of, 9, 155; strikes, Political appointments: Americans
123; NIRA codes, 125; PRERA, only, 23, 46, 64; advice to Presi
131; Iglesias' plan for development, dent on, 45-51; Robert Gore, 53-
191; PRRA, 264, 271 57; commissioner of education, 61-
New Deal: need for in Puerto Rico, 65; weapon for governor, 67; of
19; Gore's verbal adherence to, 61; Coalitionists, 68, 70; resignations
demonstration for, 92, 97; Gore's of, 69-71; 77-79; John Boylan, 75-
opposition to measures of, 141; as 76; insular cabinet posts, 98
defined by Munoz Marin, 151; Lib Ponce, 39, 120, 134, 309-15
eral support for, 289, 292; meaning Population, 8, 159, 221
for Puerto Rico, 290; evaluation of President, 18, 62-65, 68-71
effect on Puerto Rico, 322-25 PRERA (Puerto Rican Emergency
Relief Administration): organiza
Organic Act: 500-Acre Law, 5; modi tion of, 128, charges of politics in,
fication of (1917), 12; modifica 129, 195, 208-10, 220, 222; work
tion proposed by Bennet, 24; modi of (1933), 130-31, 204; (1934),
fication proposed by Munoz Marin, 170-71; proposed to administer eco
37; limits legislative session, 52; nomic adjustment plan, 150, 170;
INDEX 343
to be incorporated, 203, 207; Char- Roig, Agripino, 150, 189

don's opinion of, 203; Munoz Roman Catholic Church; and land
Marin's opinion of, 204; attacked reform, 10; Robert Gore, 56, 101,
by Chamber of Commerce, 204, 113; comment of Tugwell on, 159;
213; investigation of, 209, 220-21; attacks the Bournes, 221, 247; men
announced end of, 232-33; men tioned, 235
tioned, 247 Roosevelt, Eleanor: invites Ruby Black
PRRA (Puerto Rico Reconstruction and Travieso to tea, 49; friendship
Administration): administration with Ruby Black, 54; friendship
planned, 198; proposed organization with D. Bourne, 85-86, 234; meets
of, 222-27 passim; created by exec Munoz Marin, 104-5; influence in
utive order, 224-25; funds for, 223, relief measures, 105; visit to Puerto
226-29, 233, 242-43; politics in, Rico, 154-58 passim
237-40, 264-65, 270-74; rural elec Roosevelt, Franklin D.: backs Horton,
trification program, 241; Retiova- 22; reaction to election of, 44-45;
cion, 271; work of, 281-83, 323-25; requests aid of Beverley, 51; ap
sugar program of, 283-87; Gruen- proves governor's veto, 53, 60; Gore
ing resigns from, 315; evaluation of, early supporter of, 56; appoints
323-25; liquidation seen, 323 Gore governor, 57; faced with dif
Puerto Rico: climate of, 2-3; location, ference between Dern and Farley,
2; geography of, 3, 281; agricul 63-65; preparation for possible visit,
tural production in, 3-10; economic 72; presented with anti-American
conditions of (1930), 9; (1934), charges by Gore, 79-81; rejects Ga-
201; civil government of, 12; sugar llardo, 90-91; backs Padin, 91; sug
production in, 132-33, 145-46; un gests study of educational program,
rest predicted in, 103, 112, 186, 91; receives Gore's appeal, 94;
266, 277; Puerto Rico Policy Com receives coalition delegation, 100;
mission, 163-68. See also Chardon meets Munoz Marin, 104-5; re
Plan ceives Gore's resignation, 111; ap
proves Iglesias' plan for relief,
Ramos Antonini, Ernesto, 105, 235, 118; presents sugar bill to Con
251-52, 292 gress, 143; reaction to Bourne's
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, economic adjustment plan, 150;
117, 118, 120, 121 concern over wife's visit to Puerto
Referendum, 24-25, 253-54, 260, Rico, 154; receives information on
272-73 Puerto Rico, 162-63; orders Puerto
Reily, E. Mont, 13, 16, 45-46, 77, 87, Rico transferred to Interior, 171-72;
99 endorses Chard6n Plan, 175, 176;
Republican party, 14, 15, 17, 26. See visit to Puerto Rico, 176-77; con
also Union-Republican party cern over Puerto Rican situation,
Resident commissioner, 12, 37, 43, 185-86; approves Winship's requests,
219 192-94; Christmas message, 200-2;
Revenue, 118, 137-38, 140-41 diagrams PRRA organization, 211,
Rhoads, Dr. Cornelius, 33-34 223; Roman Catholic Church, 221;
Richardson, Lewis, 280, 319-20 pressure necessary for Puerto Rican
Rigby, Colonel, assistant to Governor funds, 226-29; criticizes Winship,
Winship, 147, 254, 256, 290 230-31; visited by Winship, 231-
Riggs, E. Francis, 103, 249-253 32; discusses independence offer,
Rinc6n, Felisa, 264 253-54; orders PRRA into Interior,
Rivera Chaves, A., 51, 168, 169 266,276; defends Winship in Ponce
Rivera Martinez, Prudencio, 124, 156, massacre, 313-15; reverses himself
168, 305 on educational policy, 318-19
Rivera Zayas, Rafael, 42-43, 218, 242 Roosevelt, Jr. Theodore: as governor,
344 INDEX
17-19; attracted charity, 18; on socialize industry, 162; readjust

Nationalist bond issue, 33; quality ment of industry, 174; research
of assistants, 49-50, 64; mentioned, concerning, 178, 181; quotas
13, 67, 110, 118, 152, 208 (1935), 188; surplus, 192-93;
Ickes' comment on, 215; PRRA
Serralles, Pedro Juan, 31, 74, 134, program for, 283-86. See also Cen
146, 219 trales; Colonos; Cuba; Jones-Costi-
Shea, Francis, 241, 274, 284 gan Act; Tariff; Zafra
Snyder, Cecil, 268
Snyder, T. R., 177, 180, 191 Tariff: sugar, 3, 11; tobacco, 6; coffee,
Socialist party: history of, 15-16, 30; 7, 167; effect on food prices, 11,
forms part of the coalition, 26; Luis 136, 215; effect on agriculture, 40-
Mufioz Marin once active in, 29; 41; 136; Underwood, 41; Hawley-
pre- 19 32 attitude on economic mat Smoot, 131
ters, 30; on status, 31; backs the Tobacco, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 136, 137
500-Acre Law, 42, 218; results of Travicso, Martin: liberalizing of elec
1932 election, 43; urges working- tion law, 31; candidate for gover
men's insurance, 52, 72-74; dem nor, 48, 55; political position 48-
onstration of power, 112; stand on 49; proposed as NIRA coordinator,
NIRA, 123-24; approval of Bourne 126-27; mentioned as attorney gen
and the PRERA, 130; stand on eral, 216; appointed to insular
Chard6n plan, 183; PRERA, 209; supreme court, 241-42, 246
possible party realignment, 218-19; Trent, Colonel, legal advisor to Gov
pressure on PRRA, 271; Afirmacion ernor Winship, 214-15, 217
Socialista, 291; attacked by Com Tugwell, Rexford Guy: control of
munist party, 305-6; mentioned, agricultural production, 143; visit
191, 300 to Puerto Rico, 155-60; reports to
Soto, Juan B., 316, 320 President on Puerto Rican visit,
South Porto Rico Sugar Company, 5, 162-63; Roosevelt consults concern
139, 180, 219 ing Chard6n plan, 186; attempt to
Spanish rule, 3, 5, 7, 13, 14, 15 bribe, 189-90; mentioned, 154, 170,
Status: statehood, 14, 58-59; auton 173, 242, 244, 290
omy, 14, 24, 300; position of Demo Tydings, Senator Millard: approves
cratic party, 24-25; position of Lib appointment of Gore, 57; visit to
eral party, 27-28; position of So Puerto Rico, 106; offers indepen
cialist party, 31; position of coali dence, 107, 253-54; on Gore, 107;
tion, 32, 300; position of Bureau urges unification of federal affairs
of Insular Affairs, 58-59; to be in Puerto Rico, 172; opposes PRRA
decided free from pressure, 99; need creation, 224, 283; Ickes' letter to,
to define, 115-16, 152; Tydings 244; reaction to Riggs' assassina
bill, 253-60 passim tion, 253; backs electoral reform,
Sugar beets, 4, 131, 144 262-63
Sugar: history of, 3-5; production of, Tydings independence bill: proposed,
3, 9, 132-33; coffee production 253; economic provisions of, 254,
compared with, 7; profits of, 10, 258, 293; reactions to, 255-61
131; 500-Acre Law effect on, 10; passim; 270; presented as an ad
under tariff protection, 40-42, 131- ministration measure, 256; threat
32; and independence, 40-42; vol ens to split Liberal party, 259-60,
untary production agreements, 133; 288-89, 293
promise of government sugar plan,
138; control production of, 143; Unemployment: in 1926, 10; in 1929,
seen as basic cause of Puerto Rico's 10; investigation of, 11, 88; inter
economic plight, 161; proposal to est of Mrs. Roosevelt in, 105, 155;
INDEX 345
PRERA, 130; reduction of, 173; sugar production limitations, 134-

causes according to Ickes, 215 35; promises relief for Puerto Rico,
Union party, 14, 16, 42, 235. See 138; powers under sugar bill, 147;
also Liberal party sugar surplus, 192-93; mentioned,
Union-Republican party: formation of, 148, 154. See also Agriculture, De
25-26; leading figures of, 30-31; partment of
aids Nationalists, 35, 38, 44; results Washington Merry-Go-Round, 54, 77,
of 1932 election, 43; opposes work- 236
ingmen's compensation, 52, 72-74; Weaver, J. A. S., 143, 153, 154, 176-
mentioned, 191, 300. See also 77, 185, 188
Coalition Whittemore, Jean, 21, 52, 61, 62-65,
United Porto Rico Sugar Company: 79
endorses Gore, 53-54; pending sale Winship, General Blanton: on Na
of, 152-53; Chard6n's proposal tionalist bond issue, 33; legal opin
concerning, 157; bought by Na ions of, 33, 122, 136; proposed
tional City Bank of New York, 161- for governor, 112; appointed gov
62; reorganized into Eastern Sugar ernor, 113; urges higher sugar
Associates, 214, 216, 236 quota, 145, 146, 166-67; reaction
United States Congress: and 500-Acre to Mrs. Roosevelt's proposed visit,
Law, 5; Foraker Act, 12; Senate 154; consulted by Dickey on sugar
confirms Puerto Rican appointments, plans, 161; attitude toward sugar
12; powers over Puerto Rico, 12-13, plans, 161, 164, 191-92; estimates
59; appropriations for Puerto Rico, of cost of quota to Puerto Rico, 167,
18; failure to define status, 25; pe 192; secures coffee tariff, 167; re
titioned to modify electoral law, 37; quests help from President, 192-
receives sugar bill, 143; blocks 194; receives coalition charges of
PRRA funds, 223, 224, 229 politics in PRERA, 195; controversy
University of Puerto Rico: Luis with Gruening, 211-14, 217-18,
Mufioz Marin's lecture at, 41; Dor 234; confers with coalition, 211;
othy Bourne's work in, 46, 128, plans to remove, 217-18; repri
248; Chard6n chancellor of, 69, manded by President, 230; sees
235; Rafael Alonso Torres appoint Roosevelt, 231, 242; opposition to
ed to Board, 85; demonstrations at, B. Fernandez Garcia, 246; and
88-89, 93; Alumni Association of, Riggs' assassination, 249; police,
103; and the Nationalists, 249-50; 255; duplicity of, 256; approves
Soto chancellor of, 316; mentioned, coalition's investigation of PRRA,
112, 263 265; accepts English policy, 279-
80; pursues Nationalists, 309-10;
Valdes, Alfonso: member of Union- submits official account of Ponce
Republican party, 31; meets Gore, massacre, 311-13; accused of crim
60; blocks showing of "Gore's Hell," inal negligence, 313-14; rejects offi
84; defends Gore, 100; light and cial investigation of Ponce massacre,
power company, 190; plan for con 313, 314; attacked by a National
trol of reconstruction, 191, 208; ist, 315; mentioned, 275, 301, 322
opposition to PRRA, 240; electoral Winter, Charles, 68, 76, 90, 102
reform, 262; mentioned, 130, 219, Workingmen's insurance program, 52,
236 72-74
Villaronga, Mariano, 261
Virgin Islands, 160, 172, 174, 284 Zafra, 8, 9, 10, 120, 138-39, 200,
260
Wallace, Henry: rejects voluntary

Puerto Rican Politics and The New Deal

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Puerto Rican Politics and The New Deal

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How did Puerto Rico transform from a backward political and economic area to a leading one?

How did Puerto Rico transform from a backward political and economic area to a leading one?

What role did the United States play in Puerto Rico's development?

What role did the United States play in Puerto Rico's development?

THOMAS MATHEWS

Puenfo ^cccut Politic* and

in finance and administration

ward land. Ignorant people and demagogues are a naturally reacting

fully met. That PuertoRico was still poverty-stricken, still had

which could have been exploited. Independence is a powerful in

to the Governor of Puerto Rico which were stored in the governor's

Mayaguez, 1960 T.M.

II. 1932: A Year of Political Change 20

III. "Gore's Hell" 58

IV. Emergency Relief Measures 117

V. Relief or Reconstruction 143

VI. The Struggle for Control 189

VII. Seeds of Mistrust 249

VIII. The Harvest 288

f^Jn the eleventh of September, 1928, the radio

between the Spanish-American War and the disaster of San Felipe

2.Cuban Counterpoint (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947).

duction by about 200,000 tons in 1928-1929. But the following

5. Bailey W. and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New

the strict administration of the Spanish government. At the end

counted in the millions of dollars. After a destructive hurricane,

forces of nature preventing a steady flow of the coffee bean to the

The common laborer on the coffee farm, known locally as the

the six-months cane harvesting season. If

population density was estimated at 450. Although sugar produc

7. In six months in 1929 mortgages jumped from $11 million to $23

production be impaired. Given the highly competitive industry and

8. Clark, op. cit. p. 630.

wages of the women, particularly those in the needlework industry

12. M. W. Royse, Puerto Rico, An Account of Existing Conditions, p. 8.

legislature.At the same time Congress could be called upon to enact

13. Robert H. Todd, Desfile de Gobernadores de Puerto Rico (San Juan:

while a period of marked restriction occurred much later, around

The Republican party, campaigning on a platform of eventual

persisted. -As more and more sugar ingenios gave way to

' integration was eventually realized through the cooperation of Sam-

14. Rafael Alonso Torres, Cuarenta Anos de Lucha Proletaria (San

it was powerful enough to fill 8 of the 1 9 seats in the senate and 18

of the 39 seats in the house.1

quent trips to Washington, serving as his interpreter. -The War De

Politics were at this stage when a type of human hurricane hit

15. National Archives, Record Group Number 126, Bureau of Insular

American charitable institutions toward the needs of the Puerto

demanded by some frustrated islanders, the birth control preached

1. La Democracia, May 20, 1932.

to those few who met the cultural or racial requirements of the

chief of police under a Republican administration, but who had

The spectacle which of the Democrats offered at Saturday's

6. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Democratic National Campaign Com

The motivation of this squabbling was apparently the hope of

- When I first came to Puerto Rico in 1915, in President Wilson's

Americans (Democrats) be appointed to all Federal positions here,

The attitude expressed in this letter was not, as we shall see,

respondence, 1928-1933, United States Possessions, Before Elections Puerto

The Horton group, which succeeded in being seated, requested

13. La Fortaleza, #238/7, Letter of Benjamin Horton to Gov. James

maintenance of an independent government."16 Dexter went on to