[G.R. No. 137841. October 1, 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERTO CHUA alias

DECISION

This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
Region, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 1 in Criminal Case No. 514-M-98 imposing on
accused-appellant Alberto Chua alias "Bert" the penalty of death. : red

In a criminal complaint dated April 13, 1998, Accused-appellant was charged with the
crime of rape as follows:ClubJuris

"The undersigned complainant, assisted by her mother, Esterlita A. Chua, hereby

That on or about the 28th day of March 1998, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, father of the offended party, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, threats and intimidation and with lewd designs,
have carnal knowledge of the said offended party, Chenny A. Chua, a minor, against
her will.

Contrary to law.

I hereby certify that I have conducted proceedings in this case pursuant to the
provisions of Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, considering
that the herein accused, who is under custody of the law without warrant of arrest has
refused to sign a written waiver of his rights under Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
and finding a prima facie against the accused, the undersigned is filing this information
with the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor.clubju ris vi rt ua1 1aw 1i bra ry

(SGD.) RENATO T. SANTIAGO

3rd Asst. Prov’l. Prosecutor

x x x" 2

On April 20, 1998, appellant was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty." 3 At the pretrial
conference on May 8, 1998, however, appellant, through counsel, manifested that he
was withdrawing his plea and changing it to "guilty" as charged. As prayed for by
counsel for appellant, the trial court reset the pretrial to May 13, 1998.

On May 13, 1998, the trial court propounded several questions on appellant inquiring
into the voluntariness of his change of plea and his comprehension of its consequences.
Satisfied with appellant’s response, the court ordered his rearraignment. Appellant, with
the assistance of counsel, withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of
"guilty" as charged. 4 Thereafter, the court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence.clubjuris vi rtua1 1aw 1ib rary

The prosecution presented the testimony of private complainant, Chenny Chua. It also
presented Chenny’s sworn statement before the Malolos police investigators 5 and the
medico-legal report of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory on the girl’s
physical condition. 6 From these evidence, the following facts were established: On
March 28, 1998, at around 2:00 in the afternoon in Canalate, Malolos, Bulacan, Chenny
Chua, thirteen (13) years of age, and her father, herein accused-appellant, were
watching television in the house of her aunt, Salvacion Ardenio Niegas. At about 2:15,
Chenny stood up and went to her family’s rented room adjacent to her aunt’s house.
Chenny entered the room and laid down on the floor to sleep. Beside her slept two of
her younger sisters. Some fifteen (15) minutes later, Chenny woke up and saw her
father, herein appellant, shaking her and calling her name. Then, she saw him remove
her short pants. Chenny stared at him. She knew what her father was going to do but
did not resist him because he had been sexually molesting her since July 1996. She
resisted the very first time it happened, but he forced himself on her and told her not to
say anything about the incident. He said that if her mother would find out, her mother
would surely kill him, and she would be imprisoned and no one would take care of
Chenny and her seven (7) little brothers and sisters. So Chenny bore everything in
silence. And that fateful day, Chenny just closed her eyes as he peeled off her short
pants. Appellant went on top of the girl and parted her thighs. He inserted his penis into
her vagina and made a push and pull movement for some five minutes. After he was
through, appellant told Chenny not to report the incident to her mother. Appellant got
up and suddenly sensed that someone was watching them. He turned around and saw
the gaping hole in the wall divider. The hole was not covered by the wall calendar as it
used to be. clubjuri s virtua1 1aw 1 ib rary

Earlier, when appellant was on top of Chenny, the girl saw someone peeping through
the hole in the divider. It was her aunt, Salvacion Ardenio Niegas, and Chenny heard
her exclaim "Nakita ko! Nakita ko!" Chenny did not cry out for help because she was
afraid. She then saw another person peering through hole. It was her little cousin.
When appellant realized that someone was watching them, he got up and said "O,
Gene!" and pretended to fix something at the door. Softly, appellant again warned
Chenny not to tell her mother about what he did to her.

Five days later, on April 2, 1998, Chenny’s mother, Esterlita, arrived. She had just
come from work in Taytay, Rizal. Chenny’s aunt lost no time in reporting to Esterlita
what she witnessed. Fuming mad, Esterlita roused her daughter from sleep and asked
her about the incident. Chenny denied it. By Esterlita’s persistent questioning, however,
Chenny finally admitted her father’s dastardly act. Forthwith, Esterlita brought her
daughter to the police station where Chenny executed a sworn statement and
submitted herself to a physical and medical examination. clubjuri s virtua1 1aw 1 ib rary

Dr. Manuel C. Aves, the medico-legal officer at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Crime Laboratory Office found the following: ClubJuris

"GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused ALBERTO
CHUA alias Bert GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death and to pay private complainant
Chenny Chua the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. With costs. clubjuris v irt ua1 1aw 1 ibra ry

SO ORDERED." 8

Hence this recourse. Appellant assigns the following errors: ClubJuris

"I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN METING OUT THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY WAS NOT
PROPERLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. THE FACT THAT COMPLAINANT DAUGHTER
WAS DESCRIBED AS A "MINOR" IN THE INFORMATION IS A CONCLUSION OF LAW AND
NOT A STATEMENT OF FACT. clubjuris v irt ua1 1aw 1 ibra ry

"II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING WITH ALACRITY ACCUSED’S PLEA OF
GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE. CHARGED." 9

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, Rule 116, Section 3 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides the following procedure: ClubJuris

"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.

The accused may also present evidence in his behalf." 10

When the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial court must do the
following: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the
accused’s full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution
to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires. 11 This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails
to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion. 12

The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily
and with fill knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear
understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or
information. 13 Thus, when the accused enters a plea of guilt, the trial court must, first
of all, determine the voluntariness of the said plea and accused’s comprehension of its
consequences. In making such determination, the court must conduct a searching
inquiry. The inquiry is not a simple question and answer exercise; it must be searching.
To "search" means "to look into or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find
something." 14 This looking into carefully and thoroughly, in the matter under
consideration, must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of said plea. 15

There is no hard and fast rule as to the number and type of questions the judge may
put to the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct the inquiry.
What is essential is that the judge should, first of all, consider the age, personality,
educational background, socio-economic status and other personal circumstances of the
accused confessing his guilt. 16 The trial judge should determine whether the accused
had been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters, or by mistaken impressions given,
wittingly or unwittingly, by authorities or parties; whether the accused had the
assistance of competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations;
and whether he understood the charges against him. 17 The court should inquire if the
accused knows the crime with which he is charged and explain to him the elements of
the crime and the corresponding penalty therefor. The court may require the accused to
fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or make him reenact
the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to furnish and explain
missing details of significance 18 about his personal circumstances, about the
commission of the crime and events during the custodial and preliminary investigation.
In doing so, all questions posed by the judge to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter. 19 Still, the inquiry need not stop with the
accused. The court may also propound questions to accused’s counsel to determine
whether or not said counsel had conferred with, and completely explained to accused
the meaning of a plea and its consequences. 20 In all cases, the bottom line is that the
judge must fully convince himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so
voluntarily; and (2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis
for a finding of guilt, based on his testimony. 21

In the case at bar, appellant claims that the trial court accepted his plea of guilt without
following the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court. He alleges that the court should
have placed him on the witness stand to find out if he actually understood the effect of
his action and to hear his version of the events. 22

We agree.

COURT: When this case was called for pretrial conference, Accused Alberto Chua,
through counsel, manifested that he is withdrawing his former plea of NOT GUILTY and
he is changing it to one of GUILTY as charged. Rearraigned, the accused, assisted by
Atty. Ma. Cristine Laderas of the Public Attorney’s Office entered a plea of GUILTY as
charged. After conducting searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea, the accused voluntarily manifested to
the Court that he understood all the consequences of his change of plea and that he is
willing to face the verdict of death. Considering the accused’s plea of guilty to a capital
offense, the prosecution was required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability. SO ORDERED. : red

x x x" 23
From the foregoing, it is clear that the court a quo did not probe carefully and
thoroughly into the reasons for appellant’s change of plea and his comprehension of the
consequences of said plea. First of all, there was no determination of appellant’s age,
personality, educational background and socio-economic status. All questions the court
propounded were couched in English and yet there is nothing in the records to show
that appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a nodding acquaintance with the
English language. As to whether the judge translated and explained his questions to
appellant in a language or dialect known and understood by the latter is not likewise
borne by the records. It is not insignificant that appellant revealed to the trial judge
that it was difficult to go against his family. This statement should have led the trial
judge to inquire into the family background and the voluntariness of appellant’s guilty
plea. But no questions were asked. It would have been well for the court to go over
appellant’s relationship with the victim and the other family members, the specific
reason why appellant decided to change his plea, the effect of his guilty plea on his
family, and the fact that despite said plea, if his family knew that he was still to be put
to death.

Further, the trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the crime
with which appellant was charged. Appellant was convicted by the court a quo of
incestuous rape under the first qualifying circumstance of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. The information charged him with "rape
penalized under the provisions of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659." It did not specify under what particular paragraph of Article 335 the charge
was made. Nothing in the record shows that appellant was aware as to what specific
paragraph of the law he was being charged. As regards the penalty, the court may have
repeatedly informed appellant that his penalty was death, notwithstanding his guilty
plea, but it did not disclose the indemnity he was to pay the victim. The decision of the
court ordered appellant to pay Chenny the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. As a result of the court’s failure to fully explain
the basis of appellant’s indictment, appellant was not accorded his fundamental right to
be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, and was therefore
denied due process. 24

The trial court did not only neglect to make the searching inquiry, it also failed to
inquire from appellant whether he desired to present evidence in his behalf. This is the
third requirement under Section 3, Rule 116. The prosecution presented the victim’s
testimony, her sworn statement and medico-legal report as its evidence. But when
cross-examination came, appellant’s counsel declined to do so. The court merely
accepted this and did not inquire into the reason why they waived cross-examination.
Given this disinterest, the court should have, at least, informed appellant that he could
present his own evidence and ask him if he desired to do so. Courts must proceed with
meticulous care wherever the punishment for the crime is in its severest form. The
execution of a death sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent
persons have, at times, pleaded guilty. 25 In capital offenses, the essence of judicial
review is anchored on the principle that while society allows violent retribution for
heinous crimes committed against it, it always must make certain that the blood of the
innocent is not spilled, or that the guilty are not made to suffer more than their just
measure of punishment and retribution. 26 The prudent course to follow is to take
testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Supreme Court in
determining whether the accused understood the significance and consequences of his
plea. 27 This is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court,
or this Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have been some
misunderstanding by the accused of the nature of the charge to which he pleaded
guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime
which justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the
imposition of the prescribed penalties. 28

There is also another element of the crime overlooked by the trial court. Chenny
testified that on that day subject of the complaint-information, when appellant started
peeling off her short pants, she did not resist him. She just stared at her father
knowing what he was going to do to her. She fought back the very first time he
molested her, but he forced himself on her. Since then, she did not resist him; and that
day was like the rest. Appellant was able to satisfy his lust on the girl without exerting
force or intimidation on her.

In incestuous rape cases, the victim’s lack of resistance has been explained as a
product of the moral ascendancy parents exercise over their children, viz: ClubJuris

". . . A rape victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason.
It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a
climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into
silence and submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the
perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim.
Furthermore, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship,
proximity magnifying the sense of helplessness and degree of fear. clubjuris v irt ua1 1aw 1ib rary

x x x

. . . [T]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his
victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over
a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid.
In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of
courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved malefactor to justice.

. . . The perpetrator takes full advantage of his blood relationship, ascendancy and
influence over his victim, both to commit the sexual assault and to intimidate the victim
into silence. Unfortunately for some perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims
manage to break out from the cycle of fear and terror. . . . ." 29

In Philippine society, the father is considered the head of the family, and the children
are taught not to defy the father’s authority even when this is abused. They are taught
to respect the sanctity of manage and to value the family above everything else. Hence,
when the abuse begins, the victim sees no reason or need to question the
righteousness of the father whom she had trusted right from the start. 30 The value of
respect and obedience to parents instilled among Filipino children is transferred into the
very same value that exposes them to risks of exploitation by their own parents. 31 The
sexual relationship could begin so subtly that the child does not realize that it is
abnormal. Physical force then becomes unnecessary. The perpetrator takes full
advantage of this blood relationship. Most daughters cooperate and this is one reason
why they suffer tremendous guilt later on. It is almost impossible for a daughter to
reject her father’s advances, for children seldom question what grown-ups tell them to
do. 32

But incest, no matter how despicable, hateful and revolting it is both to the victim and
society, is not a crime in our statute books. There is no law that specifically defines and
penalizes incest. The case at bar involves rape. Rape, under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman: (1) by
using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 33
In the instant case, the victim was not under twelve years of age or demented when
her father abused her. Neither was she deprived of reason or rendered unconscious. No
force or violence was used on her, she herself testified. As to whether there was
intimidation, this element must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It is addressed to the mind of the
victim and is, therefore, subjective. 34

There is nothing in Chenny’s testimony that shows how appellant intimidated her into
giving him her body. Intimidation breaks down the victim’s moral resistance and makes
her submit to the evil in order to escape what she conceives to be a greater evil. 35
There is no proof of what greater evil Chenny had to escape that made her submit to
her father’s carnal desires. The mere fact that appellant is her father and therefore
exercises moral ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso facto lead this Court to
conclude that there was intimidation. There must be some evidence of the intimidation
employed on the victim as to indubitably show how vitiated the victim’s consent was to
the violation of her womanhood. After all, rape is committed against or without the
consent of the victim. 36 The very first time appellant violated Chenny, he did not use
any weapon to threaten her into submission. Neither did appellant threaten her with
blackmail or words of terror. He warned her not to tell her mother because if she did,
her mother will surely kill him and she will land in jail and no one will take care of
Chenny and her younger brothers and sisters. These words of doom may give the
reason why Chenny did not report the incident or incidents to her mother, her aunt or
other people; but they do not show how they brainwashed her into giving in to
appellant’s lustful desires. The doomsday scenario is not per se sufficient to establish
the psychological terror that made the girl submit to her father. The court cannot rely
on presumptions of moral ascendancy, 37 for in this new century where mores change,
it could well be that in certain cases, the traditional moral ascendancy of a parent over
children is a myth. Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and should not prevail
over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Force or intimidation is an element of
the crime of rape. There must, therefore, be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
victim did not resist her defloration due to the moral ascendancy of the accused.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to
the trial court for rearraignment and thereafter, should the accused appellant enter a
plea of "guilty," for reception of evidence for the prosecution, and should the accused-
appellant so desire, for reception likewise of evidence on his part, all in accord with the
guidelines set forth in this Decision.
clubjuris vi rt ua1 1aw 1i bra ry

SO ORDERED.