DILEMMAS

OF
THIRD
WORLD
COMMUNISM
The Destruction of the
PKI in Indonesia

..

OLLE TORNQUIST
Dilemmas of Third World
Communism

Olle Tornquist
 All royalties 011 this book have been
donated by the author to TAPOL, the British
Campaign for the Defence of Political
Prisoners and Human Rights in
Indonesia
Dilemmas of Third World
Communism
The Destruction of the PKI
in Indonesia

Olle Tornquist

Zed Books Ltd.

 Dilemmas of Third World Communism was first published by
Zed Books Ltd., 57 Caledonian Road, London NI 9BU in 1984.
It is a revised and expanded version of a book originally published
in Swedish by Symposium Bokforlag, Stockholm

Copyright © Olle Tornquist, 1984

Cover design by Tim Moore

Printed by The Pitman Press, Bath

Brltl•h Ubruy Ca11loa:uing In Publlca1lon 0111

Tornquis1, Ollc
Oilcmma.s of third world communism : 1hc delllruction of 1hc
PKI in lndonellia.
I. Partai komuni• lndonellia - His1ory
2. lndonellia - Poli1ic• and govcrnmcn1 - 19S0-!966
I. Ti1lc II. Marxl$1i5k Barlu1 : varfOr miulyckadell varldcns
1rcdjc stOrsta kommunis1par1i? En1lish
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ISBN 0-86232-278-2
ISBN 0-86232-279.0 Pbk

US Distributor: Biblio Distribution Center,

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The author wishes to express his gratitude to SAREC For its

financial assistance in the preparation of this work.
Contents

Map viii
Preface ix
1. The Problem I
2. The Approach 4
Obj ectives 4
The Concept of Strategy 5
How Does One Examine the Failure of a Communist Party? 6
�mmuy 9
Outline of This Book 9

P A R T l:THECOMMUNIST TR A D I TION II
3. Marxist Theory of Struggle in the Third World: The Communist
Tradition 13
From Progressive to Parasitic Imperialism 13
The Example of Russia 15
Lenin's Thesis o n the Colonies I8
Stalin's Colonial Theses 21
Mao's Silent Revolt 25
New Fronts - Old Lines 27
Old Stalinism and Non-Capitalism 28
Mao's Walking on Two Legs and the Dependency School 31
Reappraisal? 34
From Parasitic to Progressive Imperialism? 36
4. The PKJ, the Communist Tradition and lhe Course of Events
in I ndonesia 45
Colonization 46
Modern Nationalism 47
The Communists Isolate Themselves 49
Communist Hothouse ( 1 952-1960/63) 50
Communist Offensive ( 1 960/63-1965) 53
The New Order 54

P A R T 2: THECO MMUNlST HOTHOUSE 57

5. The PKI in Disarray 59
A New Hard Line - and Setbacks 61
The P!<.I in Disarray 63
 6. A New Strategy 68
S1rong Enemies 68
The Rural Si1uation 71
The PKJ 's Weakness 71
Long-Lerm S1ra1egy 72
Democracy! 73
Anli-imperialism ! 76
Anti-feudalism! 77

7. Modifications of lhe Strategy, up to 1960-63 80

A National Coali1ion Government 80
A New Idea of Democracy 81
The Class Character of lhe Stace 81
8 . Five Strategic P roblems, 1952-60/63 84
9. The National Bourgeoisie and Other Monstrosities 86
Towards A National Economy 86
From a Colonjal Economy to a National Economic Crisis 87
De1erminisric Blinkers 92
The Ethnocentric Bourgeoisie 93
10. The New Lords of AnIi-Imperialism 97
A State-Guided Economy 97
The Army's Role 98
The Boomerang I04
Weak and S1rong Na1ionalis1s 105
The Theoretically Inconceivable Capi1alis1s 106
Whal is Wrong wilh 1he Theory? I 07
1 J. Democratic Cul-de-Sac 112
Na1ionalis1s, CommunisLs and Democracy 112
Guided Democracy Guides 1he PKI J 14
Problems: The Nationalisls Abandon Democracy 118
The Army Enforces 'Guided Democracy' 119
The Guided Democracy of Sukarno and Nasution 120
Democratic Patrons 122
Nationalists AgainsL Democratic Rights and Privileges 123
12. The Mobilized P easant Society 128
The PKI, 1he Na1ionalis1s and 1he Peasams 128
The PKI among Pa1rons and Cliems 131
Problems J 34
Captive of its own Policy 138
13. Workers' Struggle in the Face of Ob tacles 143
The Basis or Class Collaboration 143
The Working Class as a Punch Bag 144
Problems 146
Economic Crisis 146
The Vanguard Which Was Lefl Behind 149
 PAR T 3: COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE: 1960-63 lo 65 153
14. For An Offensive Strategy 155
Locked Positions 155
Class Struggle within the Framework o f Sukarno's Nationalism 156
15. Three Strategic Problems 163
16. Anti-Imperialist Struggles Against the Wrong Form
of Capitalism 165
Disarm the Bureaucratic Capitalists! 165
Anti-imperialism: A Blunted Weapon 167
Problems: Workers Hard Hit, Capitalists Gain 169
The Bureaucratic Capitalists Could Not Be Isolated 170
A Post-Colonial Capitalism Takes Shape 173
Military Bureaucratic State? 176
Post-Colonial Capitalism and the State 178
17. Peasant Struggles Against the Wrong Monopoly of Land 186
Mobilizing the Peasants for a Political Offensive 186
The Land Reform: A Blunted Weapon 191
Problems of Analysis 201
The Centralization of Surplus 204

18. Mass Struggle Bypassed: Elite Conflicts and Massacre 224

Mass Struggle Bypassed 226
Elite Con fliers 230
Massacre 232

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 238

19. Why Did the PKI Fail? 238
Defective Theory and Analysis 238
Ethnocentric Theory on the Rise of Capitalism 238
Nationalists Without Classic Bourgeois Interests -
Post-colonial Capitalism and the State 241
20. What Are the Implications of the PKl's Strategic Problems for
Prevailing Theories on the Struggle in the Third World? 254
The State, Imperialism and Democracy 258
Radical Peasant Struggle 264
How Does the Left React? New Solutions? 266
Concluding Remarks 270

Appendices
Appendix 1 : Glossary and Abbreviations 273
Appendix II: Key to some land tenure agreements in
Javanese agriculture 277
Appendix I I I: The course of events - a short chronology 280
Bibliography 285
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Preface

This book is the rcsull of research and studies spanning about a decade. It
was first published as a doctoral thesis in Swedish in the autumn of 1982. ln
this English edition I have excluded a chapter which describes the material
on which I base this study, and I have also tried to sho1ten, clarify and, I
hope. improve certain passages in the text. Furthermore, most of the
references to works in Scandinavian languages have been left out.
Nevertheless. in all its essentials, the analysis and conclusions can be dated
April 1982.
My research has received financial support from Uppsala University and
the Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation with Developing Countries
(SAREC) which also contributed to the costs of this English edition.
Intellectually, I have been supported and stimulated through con1act
with a vast number of colleagues. comrades and friends in Scandinavia. as
well as in Holland, Australia and Indonesia. Unfortunately, were I to
mention names I would still only be able to thank a few of all those in
Indonesia who have trusted me, and taken considerable risks to help me.
The Indonesian academy of science. UPI (Lembaga I/mu Pengetaliuan
Indonesia), and its patrons certainly showed a considerable degree of
integrity by giving me permission to engage in research there. Jn some way,
therefore, both my work and their contributions received official sanction.
Nevertheless. they still exposed themselves, perhaps those of you who are
former political prisoners most of all, but perhaps others too.
There are also many Indonesians in exile and researchers on Indonesia,
primarily working in Holland and Australia, who have been of assistance. I
shall not name them all; a relatively comprehensive list is to be found al the
back of the book with the references. In many cases, this is not just a matter
of supporting my work, but also. as in Indonesia, a question of generosity
with both Lime and hospitality. which for reserved and harried Swedes is
almost unknown. (Among aU those who are outside Indonesia, I should like
to address a special thank-you to my friends Michael and Carolyn van
Langenberg in Sydney.)
In Sweden I have, since 1975, had the privilege of working with interested
and knowledgeable colleagues. comrades and friends in AKUT, the
Working Group for the Study of Development Strategies. Gunilla Andrae,

ix
Dilemmas of Third World Co1111111111is111

Bjorn Beckman. Inga Brandel!. Berti! Egero, Kenneth Hermele, Mai

Palmberg, Bosco Parra. Lars Rudebeck (colleague. comrade and in­
valuable supervisor) and former members of AKUT, as well as Ernst
Hollander, Staffon Laestadius. Britha Mikkelsen. M.R. Bhagavan. and
many others. Without them this study would bave had a limited interest.
primarily for some specialists on Indonesia, and would scarcely have
become a book. In addition, I thank. among others. "H.A.", Mats Oahlkvist,
Sven Ekberg, Lotte and the late Erich Jacoby.Anu-Mai Koll, ..S.", Thommy
Svensson and John Martinussen. The latter two were. incidentally, the
second and first discussants when l defended my doctoral dissertation.
The majority of my research time has been spent in and around the
AKUT group. But education. views and encouragement have also been
forthcoming th rough the research seminars at the Skytteanean institute of
Political Science in Uppsala. Not least. Sverker Gustavsson and depart­
mental professor Leif Lewin have been interested in my attempts to build
bridges between structures and actors.
Despite nil this support, from a personal point of view it would have been
intolerable writing this book. and Anu-Mai and I would never have
succccc.lcd in working on our theses simullaneously. had Patrik not at
regular intervals, enticed me from my books and papers.
Finally, a big thank-you to Madi Gray for her patience and commitment
during the painstaking Lask of translation.

Olle Tornquist

x
1 . The Problem

A wave of anci-colonialism. anti-imperialism and revolutionary optimism

swept the Third World after the Second World War. By the mid-sixties that
wave broke on a series of significant problems and setbacks. Major but
isolated victories. above all in Vietnam and the former Portuguese colonies.
kept optimism afloat for a few years more. But socialists and communists,
who were under severe pressure. seldom found the time for evaluation and
reappraisal. Instead they vacillated between seeking support and solutions
from Moscow or Peking. and being forced to defend their jobs and perhaps
their standard or living and their basic human rights.
When problems also became apparent in the liberated areas. and a new.
dynamic capitalism was established in several developing countries. while.
at the same time. the old industrialized nations were badly hit by economic
crisis. large parts of the !ell-wing solidarity movement in the imperialist
countries were affected by an acute disillusionment and disappointment.
The labour movement was forced to make the saving or jobs iLS priority.
And as the industrialized countries auempted 10 resolve the crisis by export
promotion measures. partly in order to maintain growth in areas of the
Third World. the opportunities for broad solidarity began to shrink.
Particularly badly affected have been the progressive movements in the
Third World which question the capitalist growth which is so vital to the
exports and investments or the industrialized countries.
Most of the progressives in the industrialized couoLries have. instead.
chosen to emphasize the importance ofan altemalive economic policy. and
to struggle against nuclear energy and the arms race(in a Europe which has
suddenly become the most threatened part of the world). But they have done
so in a way which has consigned exploitation and repression in the Third
World to the background. Consequently. it was only in this Western and
Eastern European context that endeavours to renew Marxism could take
root. Attempts to embark on critical evaluations of problems in the Third
World. in order lo lay the ground for a new and more conscious solidarity
and strategy together with comrades in the developing countries, were
simply drowned in disappointment and in well-intentioned but often
deeply conservative and defensive "friendship associations".
This book is an attempt to swim against the stream. To be better able to
Dilemmas of Third Wor/d.Comm1111is111

understand developments in the Third World we must not only renew

Marxist theories of capitalism's expanding and destructive force, but also
reappraise Marxist and communist theories. which in a number of societies
are being used as economic and political weapons.
One must start somewhere. In this book my point of departure is a
significant example, that of the Indonesian Communist Party. the Panai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Since I introduce the subject with a compre­
hensive review o f the tradition of communist theories of struggle in the
Third World on which the PK! based its own policies. I can also use the
example of the PKI to conclude with a discussion of general problems. and
to open doors to comparative studies which can be undertaken in the
future.
The PKl was at different times one of the most important and innovative
communist parties in the world. I n a country where nepotism and
corruption are the order of the day. this meant, to use the PKI's terminology,
an outright struggle against feudalism and imperialism. The PKI united
millions of oppressed people in their struggle for liberation.
When the social-democratic movement in the Dutch East Indies was
reorganized as a communist party in May 1920. the PKI became the first
communist party in Asia. Two months later the Communist International
(Comintern) decided at its Second Congress to adopt the PKI's strategy for
critical collaboration with what the Comintern termed the revolutionary
bourgeoisie, and to recommend this as the strategy for waging the struggle
in the colonies. The aUiance and front policies drawn up by the PKI became
the guidelines on which the struggles in, for example, Vietnam and China
were fought, and are still fundamental in the Third World.
Impatient left-wingers soon took over the PKI. After a few unsuccessful
attempts at rebellion in the mid-twenties, it lost the initiative to what the
Comintern at that time called the national bourgeoisie, who monopolized
the national liberation struggle.
Only a few years after Indonesia gained independence ( 1949) did the PKI
re-emerge to resume its former greatness. With a regenerated strategy, the
PKI became in just over a decade the world's third largest communist party
and also the largest political party in Indonesia.
During these years, the PKI anticipated some of the Marxist development
strategies which are still dominant today. Furthermore, the PKl tried to
discuss how a communist party should fight to realize them. Ideas on
peaceful struggle for socialism were developed and efforts were made to
apply them; broad aJUances and fronts, as well as ruling coalitions with
other parties being accepted as equal partners, were entered into.
Needless to say, there were also major problems. But in the early sixties
the PKI represented the hopes of a better future for the majority of
Indonesians, irrespective of all the hardships of the present.
In the autumn of J 965 and the spring of J 966. however, the party was
crushed, and with it the entire anti-imperialist popular movement. The
army and bands of anti-communist terrorists murdered about half a

2
 The Problem

million people. The rivers were stained blood-red. Countless PK.I members
and sympathizers were arrested. The way was open for an unrestrained
exploitation of Indonesia's people and resources.
Fourteen and fifteen years later l visited the country, to find luxury side by
side with repression and a constant struggle for survival. I spoke to newly­
released political prisoners who now had lo find jobs to make ends meet
and who searched for their families to find out if they had survived. They
tried to recreate their hwnan dignity, integrity and to draw new strength.
Imperialism bas not disappeared just because the old theories were
imperfect. And people do not give up the struggle for liberation because
many have not been successful and because capitalism is now on the
offensive.
We ought soon to be able to call a halt to our demolition of once-revered
theories - for instance, about capitalism on the periphery being blocked -
and instead maintain that, while capitalism is expanding, the question of
how it is expanding remains to be solved; likewise, how expansion and
destruction combine, and what the social and political consequences will
be. But we can never reach the answers to these questions, and hence be able
to renew om solidarity and political struggle. unless we re-evaluate earlier
theories and strategies. The degree of bitterness of our experience should
not be allowed to play a part. For even if we must go beyond Leninism.
among other things, lt remains true that, as Lenin himself put it, it is more
serious not to succeed in analysing a mlstake than to have committed
one.1

Notes

I. Lenin in Ahhusser (1978). p.26.

3
2. The Approach

Objectives

The more specific objectives of this book are to conlribute to an explanation

of the PK.I's failure and to discuss the consequences of that failure for the
struggle in the Third World. In the Cirst place 1 shaU analyze the period 1952-
65, which is when the policies that ended in catastrophe were drawn up and
applied.
Several studies of the PK.l's failure have already described the party's
organization, programme, strategy and actions. and explained the objective
factors which have determined its political development, or explained
changes by using intentionalist and/or rationalistic perspectives. I have
thus taken it as my task to use these studies critica.lly in order to go further
and concentrate on why the party failed and what other movements can
learn from its defeat.
Earlier research concerning the PKI1 is. unfortunately. often disparate,
generally historical and rarely directed at answering the pregnant question
as to why the PKI failed. Not even Mortimer, who has consciously tried to
tackle the problem. can provide a thorough answer. He has contributed a
fascinating history of the PKI's ideology which contains many helpful
clues. But to his eclectic approach are added problems of systemization,
Jack of clear conclusions and an absence of a general discussion clarifying
the PK.J's significance for the struggle in other Third World countries.
Shortcomings iD earlier research do not. however, mean that I have to
start from scratch. To analysing party strategy, I have built upon the studies
of Mortimer. McVey and Hindley, in particular. This has reduced the need
to examine countless 01iginal sources and has aUowed me, instead. to
concentrate on new interpretations. It has also given me time to study
material dealing with actual social developments and to compare what
actually happened with the PKJ's analyses.

4
 The Approach

The Concept of Strategy

A party's attempt to utilize Marxist theories of social change as a political

instrument is first and foremost an attempt to work out and apply a
strategy.
Within the communist tradition there are many vaguely formulated
concepts of strategy.2 When presenting an historical account of ideological
development (see the next chapter) it is sufficient to investigate and keep
different interpretations separate. But in my own analyses of the PKJ's
strategic problems. unambiguous concepts are required. The concept of
strategy does not originate in Marxist but in military discourse. I have,
however. tried to stay as close as possible to the way in which the term is
commonly used by communists.
By strategy I refer to a plan to mobilize. co-ordinate and organize as many
people as possible. to manoeuvre them into a more favourable position,
thereby facilitating concrete struggles on those occasions when tactical
considerations must be given priority. The strategic objectives are to reach
these more favourable positions. Acquired positions of power can be used
to make social changes of benefit to members and sympathizers. These
objectives I call programmatic.
How does a communist party work out its strategy? The party takes as its
point of departure the knowledge that is available on the structure of
society. the contradictions ber.veen the classes, etc. Then the party uses
Marxist theory and method to make its own interpretation of social
development, where it is operative. In this way the party tries to gain an
understanding of how the objective contradictions in society have
developed and how they are likely to unfold. On the basis of such studies,
the party can formulate its objectives and present them in the party
programme - the programmatic objectives. The party maintains that the
objectives are scientific. since they are based on ao analysis of how society
has objectively developed and how the clash of contradictions sometimes
makes it possible for the party to realize its objectives.
But how should the party struggle to realize these goals? The pre­
conditions for socialism are emerging, but socialism cannot implement
itself. Into the picture in a clearer way than before come the political
theories developed since Marx, and the experiences of Lenin, Stalin, Mao
and others. Political theory guides the way to deeper analyses of one's own
society. in order to discover when and how it will be possible to engage in
political struggle for the objectives of the party.
One of the most important tasks in this connection is to distinguish
between the different stages. During the first stage, the party may have to
direct itself towards strengthening its own position, so that it can take over
the leadership when former allies no longer want to participate and the time
has come for another stage.
Only afterwards does strategy develop. Strategy concerns the formulation
and application of a plan which spells out how the collective resources of

5
Dilemmas of Third World Com11111nism

the party can be mobilized to work together during the current stage of the
struggle, which has been defined by the theory. During tbe first phase the
theory has perhaps held that it is possible to create a united front including
parts or the bourgeoisie and the workers and peasants. Tbe strategy must
include a plan for making this collaboration a reality.
In short, the strategic goals are concerned with reaching certain positions
of power with the help of those social forces, forms and methods which the
political theory regards as possible and necessary and which can be
recommended. One example would be to manoeuvre the party into an
alliance, thereby gaining some innuence. The strategic line is. lastly, the
actual plan for the realization of the strategic objectives.
Also included in the strategy are the concrete activities aimed at realizing
the strategic manoeuvres. The activities of the party on special occasions
and in specilied fronts is included under tactics which encompass the
stmggles which ought to be facilitated by the manoeuvres.
In other words, tactics are concerned with gaining the greatest possible
power for the party under the prevailing circumstances, when the strategy
has enabled the party to manoeuvre itself into a particular position of
power. What is involved here is the taking of separate decisions during
historically temporary and often unique circumstances. Consequently.
tactics are more concerned with decision-making than with planning
political activities.
The objective of this book is not to study the short-term decisions of the
PKI leaders. however. bul the planning they undertook to guide the political
activities of the party. which is why their tactics are relegated to the side­
lines. Besides, to study the tactics adopted would require detailed
knowledge and practical experience which l do not have.

How Does One Examine the Failure of a Communist Party?

First, the strategic problem must be identified. It is usual to start from an

exemplary model which one has elaborated oneself. It may be scientifically
or politically motivated. worked out alone, or borrowed. from Lenin or Mao
for example. and then il is compared to the party's strategy.3 I do not,
however, wish to be politically or scientifically omniscient by trying to
identify the strategic goals and lines which are "correct" but from which the
PKI deviated.
Critical solidarity and scientific integrity instead demand that I start from
a critical reconstruction of the political strategy which the PKl itself
developed and tried to put into practice. Then I examine how far the party
succeeded in practising its strategy, whether it was possible for it to realize
the strategic objectives, etc. l f that was not the case, I will thereby have
identified one strategic problem which, if it had considerable significance
for the party's policies. ought to be investigated more closely.

6
 The Approach

The next task is to e•plain the srraregic problems. Thrnugh a serious

oversimplification, l maintain that, on the one hand. we can talk about
objective causes - factors the party cannot do anything about during the
foreseeable future - which can be explained through a structural
approach: and, on Lhe other band. of subjective causes - the party might.
for instance, have taken certain significant circumstances into account and
even been able to innuence the course of events, but it did not succeed in
doing so. This can be explained by an evaluation of the actors' strategy and
analysis.
An objective cause of a strategic problem might perhaps be that lack of
land was a serious obstacle to the implementation of a strategy of land
reform, in which case not even the best analyses or strategies could have
guaranteed success. (If water is ice-cold, even those who can swim cannot
survive.)
A subjective cause. on the other hand. might be an incorrect analysis of
how the peasants were being exploited. which might mean that the peasants
could not be mobilized by the party, even though they were being exploited,
or that their actions would not succeed. (Those who cannot swim. drown.
even if the water is warm enough to survive in.)
I should add r11at sheer good fortune or. alternatively. bad luck also play a
role. Events can unfold in a way which is neither bound by laws nor
rationally controlled. This development cannot be foreseen by the parry.
nor can it subsequently be explained by current theories; it can only be
analysed descriptively.
When it comes to loose-knit and pragmatic movements, there is. of
course. no need lo closely study strategic problems in order to understand
why they have succeeded or failed. We are instead compelled to carry out
studies of structural factors as well as rational or pragmatic decision­
making. But communist movements. in particular, are disciplined, stick to
their principles and attach great weight to planning their activities.
Essential for success are both favourable objective circumstances and an
effective strategy. If one of these conditions is not met, it follows that a
strategic problem will arise.
There are three reasons for my search for so-called subjective factors,
poor analysis and resultant strategic problems. First, communist parties
emphasize planned actions from the point of view of what Marxists regard
as social changes which conform to social laws. Thus faulty analysis must
be regarded as sufficient cause for explaining a strategic problem. Secondly,
it is usual for one to look fo.r objective causes within the Marxist tradition of
structural theory. From the point of view purely of scientific theory,
objective causes can never be a direct explanation of human behaviour. But
it is, above all, important to use the so-called subjective causes as
complementary, and specifically to utilize Marxism and communism as
political inslrnments for scientific scrutiny. Thirdly. my investigation is
directed towards a case and a counl1y where there existed relatively
favourable objective circumstances for, if not revolution, at lease radical

7
Dilemmas of Third World Com1111111ism

opposition within the framework of long-term strategies. Thus. for that

reason too. it is reasonable to examine the subjective causes of the problem
more closely.
To examine whether faults in the party's analyses of factors determining
developments in society can explain strategic problems. I shall simply
compare the central tenets of these analyses with the final results, namely
those social changes which actually occurred. By means of its analyses the
party tried to predict thefundamentalfeatures of coming events, so that the
leaders could formulate a strategy which would enable the party to gain the
broadest possible popular support and counteract its enemies. Can it, for
instance, be shown that the various classes did have the interests ascribed to
them by the communists. and did the organizations. the military etc. act as
they were expected to?
Actual developments are laid bare by undertaking my own analysis
independenlly and with carefully-defined concepts, but using the same
general Marxist theoretical instruments as did the communists themselves.
To proceed from another theoretical perspective (for instance. the "correct"
Marxist theory or a well-established non-Marxist viewpoint), which
chooses and evaluates facts in a completely different fashion would he to
construct a contradiction in advance between the PK.rs view of develop­
ment and what actually happened. One would be showing the splendid
qualities of one's own tbeoreticaJ perspective and analysis - something
which, unfortunately, occurs quite often in both established science and
policical debate.
Had r found that there were no major faults in the communists' analyses.
or that it was simply not possible to predict developments.I would naturally
have been forced to explain strategic problems with reference to objective
factors or lo describe what happened. But at this stage I can already reveal
that this is not the case. On the contrary. I have found that the problems
originate in insufficient analysis.
Roughly speaking, there are two reasons for a faulty analysis.4 Either it is
simply a poor analysis, and, in other words, the party ought to have been
capable of carrying out a better analysis with the available facts and with its
Marxist and communist theory. Or the theory prevented the party, while
making its analysis, from taking important available data into account,
since these might have contradicted central tenets of the theory. (I must
point out that an analysis cannot be regarded as faulty if the fundamental
features of coming events could not have been predicted from available
data. In that case, the strategic problems must be ascribed simply to
misfortune. and all we can do is to describe bow they occurred.)
In those cases where I do finally conclude that there were certainly
important faults in the party's analyses, but that it would not have been
possible lo have done better with current Marxist and communist theory,
because the theory prevented the party from taking account of certain
essential facts. I can start work on a new theory.5 This I can do by making
use of those factors wbich I have found the communists unable to consider,

8
 The Approach

but which I have identified by comparing the party·s analyses with actual
developments.
My attempts LO contribute lo a regeneration of theory demand an
independent analytical language. but only at those points where the party·s
theory had particularly serious faults. This result means that I do not need
to question the overall methodological principles and concepts of Marxist
theory. O.nly certain theoretical elements. at a considerably lower level of
abstraction. are affected. There is thus no reason to throw out the baby with
the bathwater. for either scientific or political reasons. Whether or not one is
a Marxist. one ought to continue building on those parts of Marxist theory
where no revision is called for.6

Summary

The first main task is to identify the strategic problem by evaluation of how
the strategies have been put into practice. The process of research is not
reported in this book. but the important results become apparent when the
problem is explained.
The next task is to detemune whether the strategic problems can be
explained by poor analysis or not. This is done by investigating whether
there were serious contradictions. and if so what these were, between the
party's analysis on which the strategy was based, and the actual
developments which the analyses were expected in general terms lo
predict.
Thirdly, it is necessary to ascertain whether the slralegic problems caused
by faulty analysis can be explained as resulting from poor analyses. when
better analyses might have been possible from the same theoretical
perspective. Or ought they to be explained as due to theoretical defects. in
which case it is necessary to specify what these defects are and what should
be renewed.

Outline of this Book

The study·s point of departure is a historical presentation of the ideas and

analysis of the Marxist and communist tradition of theory of political
struggle in the Third World. I then present a brief analysis, in outline. or the
course of even ls in J ndoncsia and distinguish between two periods in which
the PKJ adopted different strategies, first from 1952 to 1960-63. and then
from J 960-63 to 1965.
The rest of the book is built round these two periods. Each period is
studied from the point of view of a number of particularly important
strategic problems which have been identified in pilot studies. Each
problem is then separately investigated according to the method which has
been described above. The strategy is ftrst interpreted and reconstructed.

9
Dilemmas of Third World Com1111111ism

together with the analyses and theories on which il is based. Then the
analysis is compared to the actual course of developments, and che
contradictions are laid bare. Finally, I examine whether the party might
have been able ro produce better analyses, and whether the contradictions
resulted from theoretical difficulties, and, if they did. whether particular
theories could be improved and renewed.
In Part II, "Communist Hothouse'', a study is made of the period from
1952 to 1960-63. The period 1960-63 to 1965 is treated in Part rII,
··communist Offensive". In Part IV a summary of my answers to the
question ''why did the PKI fail?" is presented. and then we return to the
Marxist and communist tradition. to discuss what the P.KJ's experiences
mean for the general Marxist and communist theses on the political
struggle in the Third World.
In the Appendix there is a list of abbreviations, a glossary. a key to certain
Javanese agricultural agreements, etc. and a chronology.

Notes

I. Among Lhe worl..

1
"; which direcLlyconcem the PK! during the period I have studied arc Brackman
{!963) and (1969). Cayrac·Blanchard (1973). Dake (1973) supplemenled by the important
criikism by Utrecht (1975b). Hindley (1962b) and (l964a). Leclerc (1969). McVey (1963). (1969a).
(1969b)and(l 979). Mortimer(l969a) .{1969b).(1972). ( 1974a)and(1974b), Palmier(1973). Pauker
{1969), Taioior(l 974). Tichelman (1980) and Kmef(l962b). (1963) and (1965a). This list docs nol
include work concerned with Lhc pre-independence period. nor 1ba1 which is no1 directly
concerned wiLh the PK!.
2. One of the reasons for using the concept Slralegy in so many diITerenl ways is lhal dife
f rent
organizations have had diffcrenL areas of activity. The Com intern. for ins1uncc. acted in the
global arena. For such an organization. s1ra1cgy is concerned with Lhe direction of world
rcvoluLion. while local alliances concern mane rs of tactics. Organizations whose operations are
limited 10 a single country. on the other hand. oricn view local alliances as strategic
questions.
Anod1er reason is that uncomfortable strategies arc often called 1ac1ical, so 1ha1 diseochaoted
members should not feel Lhal the organization has abandoned the struggle for highly prized
objectives.
3. Cf. T6mquis1 (1980).
4. Cf. Laclau (1977) pp. 59·62, in connection with his well-known invesLigation ofMilliband"s as
well as PoulanLzas' methods of analysing poliLical problems.
5. Funnily enough. it is usually common for politicians as welt as researchers Lo rush direcLly
towards that task. Wilhoul having shown why Lhe old theory is faulty. they frankly conclude that
it is problematic. and proceed 10 cons1ruc1 their own brilliant aliemntivcs. (F'or a good example.
sec how Laclau (1977). pp. 59-67, shows thal this concerned Poulantzas.) This approach closely
resemble.� 1wo other unacceptable procedures: 10 compare the party"s mod�I with one's own
ideals in ordcrto show up the fau Its of the party. and 10 prove how superior one's own perspective
is. instead of investigating the actual problems of the party's Lheorclical model.
6. The method described above is my own crcaLioa. When. however. I have tried 10 improve on the
logic of this methodology in recent years, l have mude particular use of Ernesto Laclau·s
important discussion on theoretical problem studies: see especially Laclau (1977). pp. 59-62.

10
Part 1
The Communist Tradition
3. Marxist Theory of
Struggle in the
Third World: The
Communist Tradition

The policies of the PK.I rested on international Marxist tradition. This is

made up of Marxist-inspired theories of how underdeveloped societies
change. and of political theories of how the struggle against"feudaJism and
imperialism'" can be conducted with a view to moving straight to the
socialist phase. without having to suffer from a fully-developed capitalist
phase.
In order for me to analyse the problems of the PKI in applying this
tradition in Indonesia, I must thus start by clarifying, in summarized form,
what these theories are based on. Furthermore, I must establish a Link with
the general theories of struggle in the Third World, in order to situate this
study of the PKT in the context· of struggles in other underdeveloped
countries. Fina Uy, it is necessary for me to review the communist tradition
as such. in order to define all the terms used by the party in its analyses and
strategies.
On the one hand, the terms have theoretical significance. Il is only
possible to understand them within the framework of a specific theoretical
system, in which several alternative ways of combining them are avajJable.
To empirically question these concepts first is not fruitful. On the other
hand, the PKJ did give these concepts an empirical base, which not
uncommonly deviated from that of the theories.

From Progressive to Parasitic Imperialism

Marx never developed a specific theory of imperialism. He counted on

capitalism spreading to countries with pre-capitalist modes of production,
as it did in the United States, for instance. When capitalism had evolved
socialism would come next, even in Russia. Compared to the pre-capitalist
mode of production, colonialism was thus regarded as progressive.1
But Marx was also concerned with such questions as how trade with the
colonies could counteract capitalism·s tendency to undergo periodic crises
and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.2 On the question o f Britain's
exploitation of l reland. he even concluded in I 867 that no revolution was
possible i n England before Ireland had liberated itself.3

13
The Communi
st Tradition

Nevertheless. it was Marx·s positive view of colonialism which. at the

beginning of the 20th century, was handed down to the Second Inter­
national. The majority registered their reservations over certain brutal
methods. but on the whole approved of what they regarded as the
development of backward areas by civilized countries.4
It was. instead, Lenin who formulated modem Marxist theory on the
development of imperialism and anti-imperialism, and who laid the
theoretical foundations of the communist tradition in this area.
Lenin counted on imperialism paving the way for the spread of
capitalism throughout the world. He drew a distinction between monopoly
capitalism and competitive capitalism. According to Lenin. competition
between capitalists led both to a concentration and a centralization of
capital.5 At the turn of the century this resulted in banking and industrial
capitaJ growing together and caused the emergence of a single finance
capital. In their endeavours to control competition and the tendency of the
rate of profit to fall, and hence, to eliminate the crises created by
competition. finance capitalists attempted to monopolize both production
and marketing.
In this way contradictions arose between finance capitalists. on the one
band, and their governmems. on the other. Internationally, this was
expressed as imperialism.
Wliat then, according to Lenin, were the characteristics of the monopoly
form of imperialism?
First, capitalists not only attempted to monopolize known deposits of raw
materials, but also potential resources. In the same way they tried to prevent
their competitors. even capitalists in underdeveloped countries, from
undertaking production which could threaten their monopoly position.
Secondly. according to Lenin. a salient feature of modem imperialism is
the export of capital, and not the export of goods. a view adopted by Rosa
Luxemburg, among others. lfone had a monopoly of both production and
marketing, there would be no great risk of overproduction. Tbe quantity of
goods produced could thus be controlled. but not the amount of capital.
Capitalists had to find a profitable way of depositing their surplus capital.
They could speculate. start wars which caused destruction. and then rebuild
again. But they could also look for enterprises which had not yet been
monopolized and were open to new investments. ln this way, according to
Len� capitalism spread not only to the US. but also Lo underdeveloped
areas.
There would be such fierce conflict over these claims and attractive
investmentS that war would break out not only over one or other colony, but
also on a world scale. 6
On the other hand. Lenin noted in his theory that monopolies usually
inhibit development. and thus imperialism not only spread capitalism but
was also parasitic. This was especially blatant in those underdeveloped
countries where imperialism assumed a more or less colonial form.
Already in a short analysis of Sun Yat-sen's Chinese revolution at the

14
 Marxist Theory of Stniggle in the Third World

beginning of this century, Lenin pointed out lhat, "All the commanders of
Europe. all the European bourgeoisie, arc in alliance wilh all lhe forces of
reaction and medievalism in China."7
Whal Lenin meant, and later developed further,8 was that monopoly
capital prevented tbe development of traditional capitalism in the colonies.
The nation state and tl1e bourgeois revolution which had occurred in
Europe, and which were regarded as being progressive, could not develop in
the colonies because of the effecl of imperialism. J mperiaUsts monopolized
both marketing and production, and also controlled the state apparalus.
Furthermore. they used the pre-capitalist mode of production in order to
acquire the cheapest possible labour. uphold the low rate of technical
development which was so propitious for the rate of profit, and exercised
political control.
Thus the bourgeoisie in the colonies was forced to cum against
imperialism. "Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is
growing, spreading and gaining in strength. The bourgeoisie there is as ye1
siding with the people againsl reaction."9
At the same lime, monopoly capital placed obstacles in the way of
revolutionary work in Europe. This was parlly due to capitalist export of
capital creating fewer jobs than there might have been and lower wages. It
was also due, Lenin said. to part of the proletariaL the "workers'
aristocracy". being bribed with the help of riches from the colonies.10 The
European proletariat was in disarray. Thus the national bourgeois struggle
in the oppressed countries also became a part of the struggle of the world
proletariat.
Finally, wit11 lhe lheory of imperialism propounded by Lenin. one could
also explain why it was possible to carry out a socialist revolution in
oppressed countries before capitalism was fully developed. Contradictions
were clearly illumjnated and the capitalisls were on the retreat. whereas in
Europe one could smooth over contradictions wilh the help of the wealth
from the colonies, at the same time as capitalism continued to gain in
strength.
This confirmed the thesis that it was possible to conduct a socialist
revolution even in backward Russia. And if it was possible in Russia. why
nol in the underdeveloped countries?

The Example of Russia

lnlinitely stereotyped. for instance. is the argument they leamed by rote during the
development of West European Social Democracy. namely. that, as certain "learned..
gemlemcn among them put iL the objective economic premises for social.is m do not
exist in our country. It does not occur to any of them to ask: but what about a people
that found itsclr in a revolutionary situation such os that created during the lirst
imperialist war? Might it not. influenced by the hopelessness ofits situation. fling itself
into a struggle that would oITcr it at least some chance of securing conditions for the
further development of civilization that were somewhat unusual? . . . What if the

15
Tiu.> Communst
i Tradition

complete hopelessness or the situation. by s1imulating the efforts or the workers and
peasants tenfold. ofl'ered us 1he opportuni1y to create the fundamental requisites or
civilization in a different way from thatorthe WestEuropean countries? . . . Ira definite
level of culture is required for the building orsocialism (although nobody can say just
what that definite ..level or culture.. is. for it differs in every West European country).
why cannot we hcgin by first achieving the prercqujsitcs for that definite level of
culture in a n:volutionary way, aml r/ie11. with the aid of 1he workers· and peasant's
government and the Soviet system. proceed to overtake the other nations? 11

The Russian revolution thus became a concrete example of the possibility

of pulling socialism on the agenda. even in so-called backward countries.
(When Regis Debray commented on the above text. he added that Che
Guevara loved to quote it.) 1 2
The Marxists of the Second International claimed that socialism was
possible only when capitalism had ripened and outlived itself. The
Bolsheviks maintained. however. that the Russian bourgeoisie was so
weakened by internal reactionary forces and foreign capital that it did not
have the capacity 10 conduct a bourgeois revolution similar to those in
France or Britain.
Meanwhile the Russian bourgeoisie. together with foreign capital and a
dictatorial if isolated state. had begun intensive industrial development in
certain places. Capitalism also began to spread to the rural areas. creating
violent contradictions in its wake.u Al the same time. the people were
suffering from Russian losses in the First World War.
Consequently. a small but rebellious proletariaL anti-feudal peasants.
dissatisfied landless peasants. an incompetent capitalist class, a dictatorial
but isolated and paralysed stale - all these combined to create a
revolutionary situation.14
In 1 895 Engels announced his belief that the powers of the bourgeois state
had increased lo such an extent lhal the time was past for surprise attacks
like those of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871. "when the revolution
could be conducted by conscious minorities in the vanguard of uncon­
scious masses... Instead. the time had come for the entire structure or social
organization to change. Capitalist society had stabilized. The major victors
thus demanded that the "masses themselves grasp what is happening. what
they com mil themselves to with body and soul". and that they "slowly press
ahead gaining position after position in a hard and lengthy struggle". He
did noL however. exclude the possibility of a final revolutionary
solulion.15
Lenin did not. however. allow himself to be innucnced by Engels' change
of position in regard to the tradition of 1848 and the civil war in France in
1871. On the contrary. he pointed out that the position in Russia closely
resembled that in France in 1848 and 1871. According lo Marx. the
bourgeoisie had then allied itself lo the remnants of reudalism in the
absolucist state, while the young proletariat revolted against the un­
controllable infant diseases of capitalism. What now concerned the
Russian proletariat was to shoulder the task of conducting the bourgeois

16
 Marxisl Theory ofStruggle i11 1/te Third World

revolution and 10 struggle towards socialism at the same time.16

rf Lenin satisfied himself by saying, simply ..That is the way it is i11
Russia". then the communist movement in Europe today should have been
able to engage in more urgent tasks than pinpointing the differences
between Russia in 1 9 1 7 and Europe yesterday and today. r shall return to
this point Here I must emphasize that the importance of the example of
Russia for the struggle in the Third World can hardly be overestimated. ln
the Third World the situation long resembled that of Russia rather than that
pertaining in central Europe.
This was part of the reason why Lenin's analysis of the revolution, and his
view of the state and the party. gained such wide credence in the Third
World.
The state was no more than a tool for the ruling class. l.t was an isolated
bastion which had to be taken and conquered, almost always through an
armed confrontation. the attack coming from outside, when a revolutionary
situation had developed. While waiting for that situation to develop, the
revolutionaries could. on the whole. only propagate their ideas. Whal was
lacking was a s1rategy for long-term operations.
Under the prevailing circumstances. a totalitarian elitist party would
have to lead the way. The state would have to be crushed. The proletariat
would have to establish its dictatorship in place ofthat of the bourgeoisie. In
practice. revolutionary politics became synonymous with a frontal attack
and dual power. Everything else was classified as reformism.'7
Lenin never saw any contradiction between that perspective and Marx's
ideas on government by the people. What he did was to equate class with
party. Only between 1 9 1 8 and 1920 did he come round to favouring 1hc
dictatorship by Lhe parry. weighed down partly by the civil war and by not
having foreseen the difficulties of enforcing class rule directly and without
intermediaries.
Dicta1orship of the party was the most natural refuge. and completely
consistent. As early as 1903 Lenin had declared. '"A revolutionary social
democrat is just like a Jacobin. but one who is indivisibly bound to the
organization of the proletariat and conscious of its class interes1s:·1s. 19
Lenin·s tJ1eory of a social alliance between workers and peasants spread
throughout Lhe world. Fundamental was. ofcourse. the assumption that the
peasants were in conflict with feudalism. which the Tsar and his citizens
were incapable of totally abolishing but which the communists would be
able to do away with. I f. however. the bourg
eoisie were to succeed - a
possibility Lenin did not rule out entirely - the communists would lose a
powerful ally.20 Burgeoning capitalism had. at the same time. created a rural
proletariat. which had substantial grounds for aUying with the workers.
Finally, the proletariat in backward Russia was so weak thaL it simply had to
find allies. and consequently meet the demands of the rebellious peasants.
Thus the revolution had to start as a bourgeois-democratic process and
successively, under communist leadership. move towards socialism.�1
This. like so much else in this section. is a drastic simplification. Lenin's

17
The Co1111111111is1 Tradi1io11

view of the alliance with the peasants changed over the years. and a real
aJliance oever materialized. The capitalist kulaks were not very interested in
a struggle with the feudal lords as long as there was room for both of them.
Even the rural proletariat which worked for the kulaks was excluded from
the feudal economy and was fairly passive and difficult to organize. The
poor farmecs were heavily dependent on their feudal masters. Thus it was
the middle-peasants. the independent small peasants. who fought daily
with feudal oppression and also had to contend with a capitalist
development which threatened to displace the producers of simple
goods.
By 1905 Lenin had come to mistrust the kulaks. (That they became
popular again in the 1920s during the implementation of new economic
policies is quite another matter.) Lenin put his faith instead in the rural
proletariat and the poor farmers. But, in the end, he was forced to conclude
that it was up to the industrial proletariat to inflict a decisive defeat on the
large landowners and the capitalists. before its allies in the rural areas
would dare to join the light.21 A start had been made towards the
enforcement from above of a land reform.

Lenin's Thesis on the Colonies

Some day someone must seriously investigate the following ridiculous absurdity: no
socialist nor communist international has ever. anywhere. succeeded in achieving its
own s1<1ted aim - of promoting the revolution on 1he national level . . . !3

In some way. the Comintern·s theses on the national and the colorual
question are exceptions to the above. They continue to be fundamental to
the political theories which revolutionary movements attempt to apply in
underdeveloped countries.
These ideas took shape at the Comintem·s Second Congress in 1920, when
Lenin, with his newly-established authority. directed special attention to the
struggle far from Europe.14 His view of the struggle in the colonies was
stamped in the first place by his own theories of imperialism. But it should
also be recalled that the European revolution. contrary to assumptions
made at the First Congress in 1919. was losing momentum. When the
German revolution was crushed in 1921. the post-war upsurge had
definitely been cut short.25
It was in this situation that Lenin wrote his ''Left-wing" Communism - an
Infantile Dsorder.
i and recommended forming a united front at party level
(i.e. from above) with the social democrats. and perhaps even co-operation
at government level until a new revolutionary situation arose.26
Furthermore, with his experience of the Russian revolution. Lenin was
rapporteur for the commission for national and colonial questions. The
secretary of the commission was, moreover. Soeevliet (Maring). who had
recently come from the Dutch East Indies, where h e had founded the Social

18
 Marxist Theory of Struggle in 1he Third World

Democratic Party. which in 1920 became the first communist party in Asia,
the PKI. He himself bad successfully practised a united front strategy,
which now in all substance became the front strategy of the Comintem.27
Nor should we forget that at that time it was the strength above all of
British colonialism which threatened the new socialist state.28 And the
entire communist movement the communists believed. was suffering from
the treachery of the "workers· aristocracy", si nee U1e social democrats had
been bribed by colonial riches.
Finally, there were a number of national minorities and areas with in and
on the outskirts of old Russia which became a continuous source of anxiety
for the new Soviet state.29
All this suggested that the Comintern needed to pay considerable
attention to the struggle in the underdeveloped countries - especially since,
as Lenjn bad noted, it was not only workers and peasants but also parts of
ilie bourgeoisie in countries such as China and Indonesia who were tuming
against imperialism. (The struggle had become more intense not only in
Europe but in the colonies during the First World War.) Searching for new
allies, Lenin had managed to identify what be called powerful bourgeois
national movements.
But the communists were not interested in all underdeveloped countries.
Parts of Russia Jay i n Asia, which was where the British enemy had all its
most important colonies.30 And it was in Asia that the new nationalist
movements were on the advance. At that stage no attention was paid to
either Latin America or Africa.31
Lenin emphasized that the revolution in the underdeveloped countries
would, of neccessity, have a bourgeois-democratic basis because of the pre­
capitalist characteristics of these societies. Since imperialism placed
obstacles in the way of a traditional capitalist development and even of the
growth of a nation state. broad bourgeois movements had grown up. The
communists were, however, weak; there was a small proletariat.32
At that stage, U1e proletariat in Europe and in the Soviet state itself was
served by independence movements challenging and weakening imper­
ialism. In addition, it was not necessarily the case that a bourgeois
revolution in the colonies would be anti-socialist as had happened in
Europe. The bourgeoisie was forced to tum against colonialism and
developed capitalism in order to serve its own best interests.33
The bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries was. however, too weak
to complete this task. Thus the commun.ists would be able lo assume
leadership, in the vanguard of an alliance between workers and peasants,
when the bourgeoisie was no longer capable of carrying ilie struggle
forward. Then the communists would carry the struggle for socialism
further. If, at that stage, the commurusts received support from the
proletariat i n the Soviet Union and in the advanced capitalist countries, it
would be feasible to steer clear of a fully-developed capitalist stage on the
road to socialism.34
Communists throughout the world should, therefore. give concrete

19
Tlte Communist Tradition

assistance to the bourgeois-democratic national movements.35

Particular emphasis was placed on the organization of the peasants
against feudalism in general and lhe large landowners in particular. The
concept of the soviets. consisting not only of proletarians but also of all the
working people. especially the peasants. was promoted as a way of forging
an alliance between workers and peasants.
It was. however, Lenin's strategy for the forging of a temporary united
front between communist and bourgeois independence movemenls in the
colonies to which the greatest attention was paid. The intention was tha1. at
aU costs, the communists would retain their own organization and their
political independence - the Leninist party - but that they would at the
same time co-operate with and support the powerful bourgeois-democratic
nationalist movements.36
On this issue the Indian delegate. M.N. Roy. voiced his opposition, both
at that congress and at subsequent ones.J' Roy maintained that Lenin did
not realize how much further capitalism had advanced in the colonies. (At
the Third Congress Roy added that after the world war the imperialists no
longer had any interest in obstructing capitalist development in the
colonies, since they were seeking new markets.)38 Thus it was not at all
certain that the bourgeois nationalists were a progressive force with whom
communists could and should ally themselves. On the contrary. the
Comintern ought only to support the communist movements· own
organizations and struggles against the internal as well as the international
bourgeoisie.
Roy was also sceptical of the importance of Lenin's strategic proposal for
soviets based on the unity of Lhe working people with the peasantry. Roy
said that 80 per cent of the people in India had become proletarian, and Lhat
''these tens of miJlions of people have no interest whatsoever in bourgcois­
nationalist slogans''.39 Without disregarding the land hunger of the
landless. Roy emphasized the role of the proletarial, including the rural
proletariat. in Lbe soviets. Finally. he concluded that the revolution in
Europe would not be able to get under way until Lhe people of the
underdeveloped countries had revolted.40
Lenin and the Comintern rejected Roy's criticism. but agreed lo a
compromise on the political level.41 It was tacitly understood in Lenin's
theses that support for the bourgeois-democratic movements would
continue as long as they fought against imperialism and feudalism, and not
against the workers and peasants. This was clarified in the compromise.
The phrase ''bourgeois-democratic movement" was simply replaced by
"nationalist-revolutionary movement". Lenin explained that it was nec­
essary to distinguish between reformists and revolutionaries, between that
part of�he bourgeoisie which worked harmoniously with imperialism or the
feudal lords. and those that really joined the struggle.

The mcaningofthischangc is that we communists should. and will support bourgeois

liberation movements in the colonial countries only when these movements are really

20
 Mnrxist Theory of S1n1ggle in the Third World

revolutionary. when the representatives of these movements do not hinder us in

training and organizing the peasa nts and the broad masses of the exploited in a
42
revolutionary spirit.

I n this way, assessment of the political situation was given a prominent

place, while basic class analysis and the theory of contradictions between
the feudal and capitalist modes of production were set aside.
At the same time. in a relatively simple way, the bourgeoisie was equated
with either bourgeois-democratic movements or revolutionary bourgeois
movements. By definition, any movement which adopted a revolutionary
nationalist policy was bourgeois: its class base was within the bourgeoisie.
Nationalism became the ideology of the bourgeoisie.
One could maiorain that from a basic analysis of imperialism and of the
role of classes in the colonies, the Comintern rapidly moved to an analysis
of sundry nationalist movements al the Level of political actors. without
clarifying for itself when. where and how it was making this transition.
Presumably this was connected with Lenin's tendency to see political
organizations as an expression of untrammelled class rule.
Should one wish to describe the connict between Lenin and Roy in a
simple fashion. one could start with Lenin's position. He emphasized the
conflict between different modes of production. He was concerned with an
anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggle with room for sections of the
bourgeoisie and all the ..working people". Roy, on the other hand. focused
on the class struggle in individual countries which. according to him. were
capitalist. on the struggle of the proletariat vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. Then
Lenin and Roy agreed to a compromise in which they aUowed the stand of
each of the classes in the struggle and the position adopted by each
.
organization, to determine who was friend and who was foe.
Certain parties voluntarily adopted Comintern·s recommendations.
Others needed lo be ""directed... In 1922 Lenin aod Sneevliet (Maring)
forced the newly-formed Chinese Communist Party to apply Lenin's theses
and Maring·s experiences from Indonesia. With the "block within strategy"
the communists would retain their own political line and simultaneously go
and, without dominating. work actively within the Kuomintang as long as it
was a revolutionary liberation movement. Sneevliet (Maring) became the
Comintern's agent i n China.43

Stalin's Colonfal Theses

Even at the Fifth Comintem Congress in 1924. Lenin"s theses were

endorsed. But Sneevlier (Maring) had already left China in 1923. His once
popular "block within strategy.. was undermined. Comintern·s line, or
rather the policies of the Soviet party. were now more and more directed
towards making the Kuomintang a reliable ally of the Soviet Union. The
Chinese pariy was thus not allowed to accemuate its independence to the

21
The Comm1111is1 Tradition

degree that it interfered with the leadershjp of the Kuomintang, on

questions like the mobilization of peasants, for example.44
Soon lhe "block within strategy·· was replaced by Stalin's idea of a block
with four classes: peasants, workers. the middle classes and the so-called
national bourgeoisie. Michael Brodin, from the Politburo of the Soviet
party. replaced Sneevliet (Maring) as the emissary of the Comintern.
Sneevliet opposed this move. and later broke completely with Stalin.45
Stalin's block of four classes had three particular theoretical bases. First,
Stalin went further than Lenin in his t11esis that imperialism obstructed the
development ofcapitalism in the colonies. Lenin's point was that it was the
traditional type of capitalism (such as the French or Bri6sb) which was
obstructed. His analyses could well be interpreted as meaning that
imperialism in another phase, when it might be less destructive to the
colonies, could well allow for at least some form of capitalist development
since, according Lo Lenin. imperialism generally contributed to the spread
of capitalism.
But Stalin now determined that the contradictions between imperialism
and the general development of capitalism in underdeveloped countries
were permanent and universal. Aside from small colonial enclaves. all
capitalist development was blocked in the colonies.46 If a class analysis
showed that a domestic bourgeoisie existed. it was taken for granted that
under no circumstances could it realize its own genuine interests without
opposing feudalism and imperialism. An alliance with the bourgeoisie
would be self-evident under all conditions. As early as 1924. S1alin coined
the tcnn "national bourgeoisie'"..n
Secondly, in the most drastic way. Stalin came to terms with Lenin's
ideological and political conditions for an alliance with sections of the
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was to be regarded as ··objectively prog­
ressive" in that it tu med against feudalism and imperialism. irrespective of
whether it was directly hostile to communism. More or less feudal
nationalists should also be regarded as revolutionary, even if they did not
bother themselves wilh democratic rights and did not have a revolutionary
programme. The main point was that lhey fough1 imperialism.48
In the third place. S1alin thought schematically in terms of stages. One
had first to break with feudalism and imperialism and develop capitalism.
Only thereafter would socialism's Lime come. This implied a two-stage rev­
olution. a bourgeois-natfonal revolution and later a socialist revolution.49
Lenin had also thought in terms of such s1ages. But his point was thal
communists would successively take over the leadership of the bourgeois­
national revolution from the bourgeoisie. who were incapable of complet­
ing such an enterprise on their own. Furthermore. according to Lenin. one
could go directly from the first revolution 10 the struggle for socialism. ifone
had communists in the leadership who received international support
Capitalism and the bourgeois forces were about to emerge, and one did not
have to wait until capitalism was fu lly developed before engaging in the
socialist revolution.

22
 Marxsr
i Theo1y ofSm1ggle in the Third World

Stalin. on the contrary, said that only in very backward countries. "as in
some parts of Africa. for example", could national uprisings open the way
for socialism without first passing through a proper capitalist phase.50
To summarize the difference between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin concen­
trated on analysing the actual class struggles, while Stalin, a true
determinist. equated a simplified analysis of mode of production and
narrowly-dermed classes on the one hand, and politics and ideology on the
other. Each class had its own interests and was assumed to act according to
them. Lenin also based his analysis on simplifications. but was neither
blinded nor governed by them. The decisive factors were the actions of the
classes and organizations.
Stalin's theories and strategies led to the slaughter of thousands of
Chinese in the streets ru1d squares of Shanghai in 1927. As a result,
something had to be done about the obviously faulty assumption of
unconditionally supporting a national bourgeoisie whose organizations
put communists to death.
Furthermore. Com intern was now of the opinion that the world stood at
the threshold of an economic crisis which might present a threat to the
Soviet Union, but al U1e same time would lead lo a revolutionary upsurge.
Shortly before.an extreme left line, including forced collectivization among
other things. had been introduced in the Soviet Union.51
The Sixth Comintem Congress in 1928 - under Stalin the interval
between congresses increased - certainly adhered to the thesis of the two­
stage revol ution. and maintained that in the colonies the development of
capitalism was blocked, which was why it was in Lhe interest of the national
bourgeoisie to oppose feudalism and imperialism. But it was noted at the
same time that the bourgeoisie generally abandoned their own interests,
sold themselves to imperialism and feudalism and were opposed to
communism.
In consequence, Stalin forced the Congress to abandon all forms of
united-front activity worthy of the name. The national bourgeoisie in
underdeveloped counLries�2 came to be shunned like the plague. as they
abandoned their own class interests. The social democrats in Europe were
likewise hated. In the same way as the Trotskyists, they prevented
communists from taking the vanguard role in the revolutionary situation
which it had been foreseen would arise.
The watchword of the period was "class against class". Communists
should carve their own image in the clearest way possible. devote their
energies to the core of the proletariat and establish ''proletarian fronts" with
individual membership (from below).
As this watchword was an open invitation to communist sectarianism. it
not only aJlowed fascists and Nazis greater room to manoeuvre. but gave
bourgeois nationalists in underdeveloped countries a wide margin too.53
Otherwise. the most startling thing was Stalin's almost colonial attitude.
Socialism would now be built in one country. and the welfare of the Soviet
Un.ion was more important than anything else. Underdeveloped cou mries

23
The Comm1111isr Tradition

were declared to be the rural backwaters of the world. which the urbanized
proletariat, especially that of the Soviet Union, would lead and liberate. The
delegate from South Africa was heard to mutter that even in the colonies
another proletariat was to be found. but on the whole there was no
dissent.54
Only Trotsky, disbarred and in exile, raised serious criticisms. Indis­
putably, he raised cogent arguments concerning the government of Stalin,
the idea of socialism in one country and the stTUggle against fascism, but he
did not raise comparable objections on the question of the underdeveloped
countries. He did, indeed. attack Stalin for his earlier policies on China. and
for his continued affinity for the two-stage theory, which was directly
supportive of the bourgeoisie. according to Trotsky. because of its
recognition of the necessity for a developed capitalist phase. But in concrete
political terms, Trotsky had finally found the uncompromising political
stand he had been looking for vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie. Furthermore,
exactly as Trots.ky demanded. the proletariat was to play the vanguard role
in relation to the peasantry. But this was hardly a road open to the
Communist Party in China, for instance, which was searching for a new
line, and found it, precisely among the peasantry.55
1928 had come and gone. As predicted, there was an international
economic crisis, but not a revolutionary phase. Fascism and Nazism made
triumphant strides forward. while communists were involved in bitter
struggles with social democracy. Sectarianism spread throughout the
communist movement. China was an exception. since it was making its own
way. In the end, the 1928 line became glaringly absurd, even from the point
ofview ofMoscow's own interests. Both Germany and Italy posed threats to
the Soviet state.
I n 1935. at the Seventh Coruintern Congress. the policy of popular fronts
was proclaimed instead. The greatest importance was -attached to the
struggle against Nazism and fascism. Communists would continue to work
independently, if in a less sectarian fashion than before. Work would
continue from below, with fronts of non-members who. nevertheless. were
inOuenced by communist doctrines.56 No longer was the focus on the
"proletarian united fronts" of 1928, but on an anti-fascist popularfront, with
room for "democrats" of all classes. From below, the popular front would
become the base of an anti-fascist coalition between govern ments. In this
way. it would be possible to defend or achieve a democratic stage, and save
the Soviet state, before the struggle for socialism could again be put on the
agenda - and before the struggle for a bourgeois-democratic and national
revolution in the colonies could even be discussed. This meant that
communists in the colonies ought to stop struggling against non-fascist
imperialists, and support them in rhe fight against Italy, Germany and
Japa11.57
In China it was possible lo combine opposition to the Japanese with the
domestic class struggle, to which I shall shortly return. But in countries like
Algeria,58 Argentina59 and Indonesia, the Comintem's policies led to the

24
 Marxist Theor
y ofSm1ggle in the 711ird World

isolation o f communists from the working-class movements and from the

struggle against imperialism.

Mao's Silent Revolt(>()

Because of the defeat of 1927 in Shanghai - a fiasco for which Com intern
was to blame - the Chinese Communist Party began to make its own
way.
II was not difficult to follow the 1928 recommendation that the party
should be isolated from the national bourgeoisie. The communists had
been expelled from the Kuomintang. But subsequently. with Mao as the
driving force. the struggle in the rural areas involving the peasantry became
central. rather than Stalin·s new fixation on the urban areas and the role of
the proletariat61 It was not long before the Chinese communists had
acquired a position of such strength th al they were able to co-operate with
sections of the bourgeoisie. without falling back on a two-stage hypothesis
in which the struggle for socialism was lost. In 1948. in fact, the Chinese
advocated conditional co-operation with parts of the bourgeoisie in
opposition to Stalin. something to which 1 shall later return.
Nor was it difficult to follow the 1935 recommendation for the building of
a broad alliance against fascism and Nazism. seeing that Japan had
invaded China. At the same time important sections of the Chinese
bourgeoisie and landowners joined the opposition. the Kuomintang
became corrupt and Mao took the opportunity to form a broad armed
liberation struggle. The struggle against fascism and Nazism. which.
according lo Comintern. ougbt to unite nations at the expense of the class
struggle. and bridge a gap between colonizers and nationalists. became in
China a nationalism joined to class-based social demands.62
Most characteristic perhaps of what I refer to as Mao's silent revolt
against Stalin and Com intern is thaL on a formal level, Mao used the same
terminology as Moscow. but increasingly seldom the same conceptual and
theoretical context
ll was self-evident that the proletariat would lead the revolution. But, first.
the proletariat was regarded as the equivalent of the party. which i n tum
would lead the peasantry. Locally the peasants would even be able to
conduct the struggle on their own, but with the support of the party. There
was a sharp contrast between Lenin's somewhat resigned view of an
industrial proletariat initiating agrarian reforms from above because the
peasantry would otherwise never start rebelling. and Mao's belief in
agrarian reform i nitiated from below.63
Nevertheless. i n the same way as both Lenin and Stalin. Mao talked of the
rural proletariat and the landless peasantry being the most important allies
of the urban proletariat. Would they be prepared to lake the revolutionary
initiative in China while not doing so in Russia? This was most unlikely.
Mao defined the poor peasantry so generally that the concept included botb

25
The Comm1111i
s1 Tradirion

the landed and the independent small and mjddle peasants. These groups
had suflicient strength and independence Lo be able to start a revolt on their
own if they received some suppo11 from the party.M
Clearly the party ought to be Leninist. But while the Chinese retained
Leninist organizational principles. and the desire for an effective and
enlightened Jeadership with totally centralized control, they also tried to
complement Lhe elitist cadres through good contacts and co-operation with
the masses below. Towards the end of the revolution, it would not be
inaccurate to say that the Chinese party was a mass party with a totalitarian
leadership.65
Mao did indeed speak of the national bourgeoisie. Bue he was referring to
the middle bourgeoisie. the small capitalists who. in comparison to the petty
bourgeoisie, had few employees and tended to work for themselves.
The Maoist concept of a national bourgeoisie was, indeed. quite far from
the Stalinist one, which regarded it as virtually identical with the entire
capitalist class, apart from the direct agents of foreign capitalists. From now
on, it will be to Stalin's concept that I refer when I use the term "national
bourgeoisie"', unless otherwise indicated.
In addition to the middle bourgeoisie, Mao also talked about the big
bourgeoisie, the comprador bourgeoisie. and finally. the bureaucratic
capitalists. The term ··comprador'" was originally used to refer to the traders
who were dependent on imperialists. Later the term was used for rhe
Chinese who were employed by foreign capitalists during the invasion. In
this way the concept generally came to mean "that section ofthe bourgeoisie
which directly served the capitalists of Lhe imperialist countries and was
nurtured by them. Countless ties linked it closely with the domestic feudal
forces'".6<•
The bureaucratic capitalists were defined as the major capitalists in
whom both private monopolies and monopoly over state power were
uruted. They also bad close ties to imperialist and feudal lords.67
Besides making this detailed division of the bourgeoisie, Mao clearly
paid tribute to Stalin's two-stage theory and other expressions of Stalin's
determinism. But it may well have been a question of defending China·s
place within the world revolution. I f one, for instance, began by talking
about an Asian mode of production. China could be taken to occupy a
rather special place in which universal communist truths did not entirely
hold. I f one. moreover, wished to spread the C h inese model. it would be
safer not to emphasize unique Chinese characteristics. which might lead
others LO keep their distance.68 To a much greater ex.tent even than Lenin,
Mao allowed the position of different groups in the class struggle, as well as
political and ideological considerations, to play a crucial part in both class
analysis and political strategy.
One could continue in this vein for some time, enumerating examples of
Mao's silent revolt and at the same time describing the Chinese model.
There was, however. another silent revolt which took place in Vietnam. and
which was not so different. The Vietnamese, for example. say they had very

26
 Marxist Theory of S1111ggfe in the Third World

little trouble with a national bourgeoisie, since there was none to speak of.
One tends to see what one wants to. I n the event. the Vietnamese
communists had the advantage that the bourgeols-nationatist movement
had been broken by the French during the early thirties, after which the
communists were able to monopolize nationalism.69
To summarize, the Chinese used the same terminology as Stalin and
followed the same tendency as Lenin. They allowed analyses of actual
developments and political trends to be decisive; nor were they unfamiliar
with conditional collaboration with bourgeois movements. In addition, the
Chinese started changing their Leninist party into a mass party with a
totalitarian cadre in the leadership; they allowed the peasantry to
participate; and they laid the foundations of a theory of prolonged war of
liberation.

New Fronts - Old Lines

With the end oftbe Second World War, the preconditions for policies based
on a popular front ceased to exist. I n Cnina the communists launched an
offensive against the Kuomintang. In the Philippines and Vietnam, to cite
just two examples. the communists returned to their struggle against the
colonial powers and their internal allies.
Moscow had no very great interest in Third World struggles. Statin bad
participated in the division of the world at the Yalta conference. He was
interested in securing his influence in Eastern Europe. The popular front
policy continued in Western Europe i n order, it was said, to defend
democratic achievements, and advance to true democracy before the
struggle for socialism could seriously be embarked on.
Until the autumn of 1947, an unclear but generally very optimistic view of
the anti-colonial struggle predominated. According to Varga, the major
communist economist of the time, the bourgeoi.sie and the proletariat in the
underdeveloped countries bad come out of the war strengthened. Together
they would now be able to liberate their countries. From a strategic point of
view, there was no grear difference between this and Stalin's policies
towards the Kuomintang in the mid-twenties. But the model was still based
on the 1935 model of a party-less front dominated by communists (from
below).
Towards the end of 1947, Moscow started developing the theory of two
camps. the peace-loving socialist camp and the imperialist camp. Writers
like Zhdanov and Zhukov71 claimed that in most Third World countries the
national bourgeoisie, and parti.cularly the big national bourgeoisie.72 sold
themselves to imperialism and turned against the workers. Soon the
concept of neo-colonialism was coined.73
The 1928 Comintern line was revived and complemented with the new
people's democracies in Eastern Europe.
The Chinese communists were victorious in 1949. Liu-Shao-Chi promptly

27
171e Communist Tradition

put forward the idea Lhat Lhe Chinese revolution was a model which couJd
be suitable for Asia as a whole.74 Suddenly Chinese ideas were counter­
posed to Moscow's. A national, anti-imperialist front, including Mao's
national bourgeoisie (the middle bourgeoisie). stood in contrast to the 1928
Moscow concept of a treacherous national bourgeoisie. Furthermore. after
the Korean war, the Chinese communist-led peasantry who had fought a
war of liberation stood in stark contrast to Russian ideas of a primarily
peaceful struggle with workers in the centre.
Gradually, however. Moscow accepted the idea of co-operating with parts
of the bourgeoisie. while Peking toned down its emphasis on the armed
struggle and continued to pay tribute to the Soviet Union as the undisputed
leader of the socialist camp. For lhe time being. the Gottwald Plan from
Prague7S and Chinese ambition were able to coexist.

Old Stalinism and Non-Capitalism 76

Stal in th us downgraded the need for armed struggle in revolutionary work.

To take just one example. in 1951 the Indian Communist Party gave up the
armed struggle against the national bourgeoisie. Indeed. communists
contined to assert that the bourgeoisie had sold out their countries to
imperialist interests. but the doctrine of the two camps (the peace-loving
and the imperialist) was dissolving to make way for neutral positions.
During the fifties. decolonization got under way. Politically intlependenl
Third World countries claimed lo be independent of both blocks in world
politics.
During the years after the death of Stalin. Moscow and to some extent
also Peking turned back to the almost permanent co-operation with the
national bourgeoisie of the mid-twenties. Khrushchev soon rook a step
further and indicated that the domestic class struggle should give way to a
broad national front against imperialism.
As a resulL during tbe years prior to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1 956,
Moscow started co!Jaborating closely with the Indian government.
previously so despised. And. together with Nehru, China planned the 1955
Bandung conference where the co-operation of the non-aligned states
began, and drew up the five points for peaceful coexistence.
In 1956 in Moscow it was then laid down that it was not only movements
under a proletarian leadership which could conduct a victorious struggle
for national independence. Even the national bourgeoisie could be
accepted as a leading force.n
Once more it was repeated that imperialism was so parasitic that it
blocked every auempt at industrialization and national economic develop­
ment in the Third World. This meant that lhe national bourgeoisie had
greater cause to fight feudalism and imperialism than bad workers and
peasants.
For the same reasons. it was more natural for the national bourgeoisie to

28
 Marxist Theory of Struggle in the Third World

accept assistance from state-led industrialization than simply to rely upon

weak private initiatives. That kind of state capital ism, according to Moscow,
was worthy of support Unlike in Europe. it was not based on private
monopoly capital. On the contrary, the state in the Third World was not
regarded as capitalist, since capitalism was so poorly developed. Prog­
ressive individuals in state organs were regarded as having considerable
independence - what today is called "relative autonomy". Soon we shall
sec how Moscow developed this idea further and started talking of how state
capitalism should pave the way for socialism.78
Khrushchev declared in 1956 that socialism's strength bad grown so much
that he no longer excluded the possibility of reachingsocialism via peaceful
parliamentary methods. The Chinese communists did not demur, but did
express some scepticism.
But already at the party congress in Moscow in 1959, voices more critical
of the national bourgeoisie were heard. Delegates were warned that it was
wavering berween. on the one hand. turning against feudalism and
imperialism. and. on the other. contemplating an attack on workers and
peasants. maybe even going so far as to abandon its genuine class interests
to collaborate with imperialism.
In a similar fashion. the comm':.lnist parties were cautioned against
becoming reformist when they devoted themselves to peaceful struggle.
This cautionary attitude did not lead the Soviet Union to break relations
with such countries as India. Nor did Moscow think that co-operation with
the national bourgeoisie, within the framework of a national front. ought to
come to a halt, unless the national bourgeoisie signed an agreement with US
imperialism. But at the international Communist Party Conference in L 960.
interest shifted towards what was called the struggle for national democra1ic
slates. which would be capable of non-capitalist development - what is
now called socialist-oriented development.
A state could be called an independent national democracy i f it:

. . . consis1cn1ly upholds its political and economic independence. lights against

imperialism and iis military blocs. against military bases on its territory . _ . a stale
which rcjecis dictatorial and despotic methods or government: a state in which the
people are ensured broad democratic rightS and rreedoms . . . the opponunity to work.
the enactment or an agrari11n refonn and other domestic and social changes. and for
panicipation in shaping government policy.79

Whal did this mean. and how would it be possible to achieve a national
democracy? The principles were the following.8(1 Feudalism and imper­
ialism presented obstacles to development. A broad national front, which
included the national bourgeoisie, could counteract these by implementing
state-led industrialization, nationalization of foreign firms and agrarian
and democratic reforms. This would limit imperialism's room to man­
oeuvre. But imperialism would counterattack. The national bourgeoisie
would waver.
In the meantime, state power in most underdeveloped countries,

29
The Communist Tradilion

however, was not directly or chiefly based on a strong capitaUst class. as it

was in most developed countries. (This limited the relevance of the theory to
Latin America, for instance.) Thus there was room for a petty bourgeoisie,
various middle strata and even the military to control the state apparatus
relatively independently, and to work against a compromise with imper­
ialism and feudalism, irrespective of capitaList desires.
(According to Eastern European Marxists, however, in developed
capitalist countries and in countries like those in Latin America. the first
strike must be made against the huge private monopolies. This was a
consequence of their theory of state monopoly capital.)
I n order to implement their policies and establish independent national
democracies, the revolutionary nationalists must intensify state indust­
rialization and a far-reaching agrarian refo1m. To cope with indust­
rialization in a weak economy without exploiting the peasants and risk
losing them as allies. the nationalists needed a good deal of international
development aid from the socialist countries. To get popular domestic
support, the nationalists needed to carry out democratic reforms, so that
workers and peasants could make chemselves beard, and defend prog­
ressive political developments.81
It was not clear what role existing communist parties were expected to
play. In the case of Egypt. the Soviet Union accepted the outlawing of the
parry without raising much objection.82 In the early sixties, when the PKrs
policy was not acceptable, there was discussion ofwhether the Soviet Union
ought to support other parties and persons, among others Adam Malik who
had recently been Indonesia's Vice-President.83
lo the long term, state industrialization allowed for the growth of a
powerful proletariat, which could organize itself in the shelter of
democratic reforms. Socialist development could thus gain momentum
with the proletariat leading the peasantry, without going through a fully­
developed capitalist stage.
Indonesia was one of the countries which in 1961 were regarded as being
national democracies.84 In recent years. the best examples of non-capitalist
development have been Ethiopia. Algeria and Afghanistan. Strong non­
capitalist tendencies are also to be found in Mozambique, Angola and
Guinea-Bissau.
In sum East European scepticism of the revolutionary potential of the
peasantry. and the poor but not strictly speaking proletarian masses.
continues. While there has been a revival of the 1950s honeymoon with the
bourgeoisie of the Third World. this has been complemented by a romantic
attachment to nationalists of an unspecified class who are at the head of a
mighty state apparatus.
Even if the discussion of non-capitalist development does not exclude
armed liberation struggle (Cuba is sometimes referred to as an exampl.e of
the validity of the theory85) it does nevertheless imply that less drastic
methods can suffice. Parallel with this, peaceful co-existence on a global
level can continue.

30
 Marxi
st Theo1y ofStn1ggle ill 1he Third World

Mao's Walking o n Two Legs and the Dependency School

Mao·s previously quiet revolt became public and radical during the late
fifties and early sixties. In the past, differences ofopinion concerned how to
take power. Now different strategies for development came into the picture.
But at least as important, the different lines became increasingly linked to
separate national interests and contradictions in each country.86
The Chinese communists continued to emphasize the decisive role
played by the peasantry in the revolution, the importance of a party which
was deeply rooted among the masses. and the need for armed struggle with
bases in lhe rural areRs. In addition. Moscow was criticized for its
bureaucratic autocracy. as well as its policy ofpeaceful co-existence with the
US. The bureaucracy, in particular. was regarded as opening the way to a
new form of capitalism in the Soviet Union. Peaceful coexistence seemed to
the Chinese to hamper the armed liberation struggle in the Third
World.
From Peking's point of view the Soviet Union was now seen as
imperialist. The Chinese insisted that revolutionary forces should refrain
from co-operating with the Soviet Union, exactly as China was doing. They
should stand on their own two legs and become self-reliant.
The struggle in the rural areas would liberate the cities. The struggle in the
Third World would ignite the spark in the developed counlries.87
Imperialism was a paper tiger. Technology and industry were important,
but took second place lo the mobilization and organization of the masses.
Where there was a will there was a way. H i s quite clear that Mao was al least
as great a beljever in voluntarism as ever Lenin was.
Furthermore. the Chinese refused to accept that the stale in the Third
World was not based on monopoly capitalism. Peking referred to
experiences in the struggle against the Kuomintang. when. according to
Mao. the big bourgeoisie monopolized the most important sectors of the
economy. At the same lime. it was in alliance with imperialist and feudal
forces. Consequently. the big bourgeoisie was almost identical to the
comprador bourgeoisie. On the basis of these positions of strength. Mao
maintained that even slate power was in the hands of the big bourgeoisie,
that they almost coalesced with the state apparatus. used the state as their
base and became a bureaucratic capitalist class.88
The Chinese conclusion was self-evident. When Moscow referred to the
national bourgeoisie it generally included the big bourgeoisie. which.
according to Peking. was simultaneously comprador and bureaucratic­
capitalist. When the Soviet leaders claimed that the state in the Third World
did not have a specitic class base, and wanted 10 promote a policy of state
industrialization. etc.. they contributed lo creating the equivalent of the
state monopoly capitalism of the developed countries.89
On the od1er hand. the Chinese continued 10 insist that a national
bourgeoisie. in the sense ofa middle bourgeoisie. couldjoin in a revolution.
It could even participate in the leadership.90 But hegemony must remain

31
Tire Comm1111is1 Tr{Jdi1io11

with the communists. Peking even maintained that the comprador

bourgeoisie and the feudal leaders could temporarily take sides against
imperialism91 (as the Kuomintang had done during the war againsl the
Japanese). This exception seems to have become the rule, judging from
Chinese foreign policy of recent years, where co-operation with compradors
seems to have become commonplace.
The Chinese communists' theses, their cultural revolution and their
emphasis on the struggle in the Third World played an important role for
liberation movements. especially in Asia but aJso in Africa (and for the New
Left in Europe).
In Latin America. however, it was the Cuban revolution that was
primarily seen as worthy of emulation.92 Here. a small group of intellec­
tuals succeeded in overruling a communist party and showed not only the
relevance of the armed struggle. but also that revolutions in Latin America
were hardly likely to be traditional bourgeois-democratic. The perspective
was anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. rather than national and anti­
feudal. There was a good deal to be questioned in the communist parties·
cautious attempts to co-operate with the national bourgeoisie. or at least
with the anti-monopoly bourgeoisie.
Even ifir had not been so before, it was now apparent that it was necessary
lo make a special analysis of the conditions in the countries of Latin
America. which had been formally independent for so many years and
where capitalism was relatively well developed. The dependency theories.
originally a reaction Lo established development theories.93 offered such an
alternative.
It was maintained that Latin America had been capi1alist for decades.
Every part of the continent, no mailer how backward. was linked to the
global capitalist syste� since its underdevelopmenr was caused by capitalist
penetration. Consequently there was no ground whatsoever for co­
operating with sections of the bourgeoisie in an anti-feudal front.'14
The struggle concerned capitalism in general and imperialism in
particular. IL was imperialism which had distorted and blocked the
capitalist development of Latin America. First foreign capitalist exports had
smashed production i n Latin America; then it became more interested in
raw materials. other production for export and limited manufacture for the
tiny upper class. It was unthinkable to stimulate domestic production for
mass consumption. Impediments had been placed in the way of such
production for a long time. Furthermore. the people were now too poor to
afford to buy most of these products. Consequently, it was not an interesting
proposition for lbe profits on production for export to be invested in other
sectors of the economy. A large proportion of the profits left the
continent.
Latin America was dependent in two senses: imports were needed to
maintain exports. and exports were needed lo keep the economy anoat. One
could maintain tha1 Latin America was the United States' backyard, a satellite.
Similarly Sao Paulo could be regarded as a metropole to the poor areas of

32
 Marxist Theory1 of Struggle i11 1he Third World

north-eastern Brazil.
At the same time as the dependency theory broke with the thesis of an
incomplete capitalist phase with feudal traces. the Stalinist view that
imperialism virtually blocked capitalist development was retained.95
Consequently. that section of the domestic bourgeoisie which never­
theless tried to produce goods for mass consumption ought to have some
interest in struggling against imperialism. But when it came co the crunch
even these capitalists would presumably side with imperialism against the
industrial and rural proletariat, the numerous outcasts and the petty
bourgeoisie who were on the brink of ruin, since their domestic capitalism
was not independent of world capitalism. The only realistic alternative
available to the masses was to break completely with imperialism. to rely on
their own strength and to put socialism on the agenda. which, of course. was
a threat to the domestic bourgeoisie as well.
Oe
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Amin developed and adapted the theory to fit African conditions.911 Other
theorists addressed themselves to the balance of trade. Theories of unequal
exchange97 lent a scientific weight to what many in the Third World were
feeUng - that they were losing money when they were importing and
exporting, not only when capitalists exported profits and maintained a
skewed economy.98
The Latin American Dependency School io general, and Andre Gunder
Frank in particular, were subject to considerable criticism. Most pertinent
was Laclau·s comment that Frank confused capitalist circulation of goods
with capitalist modes of production when he argued that the whole of Latin
America had been penetrated by capital. Indeed, capitalist trade could be
found but not always capitalist modes of production. For that reason. it
.
might still be worth while Lo combat pre-capitalist modes of production.w
But dependency theories nevertheless had considerable cogency.
ln the so-called "foco-lheories"'. the most far-reaching political con­
clusions were drawn from dependency theories. Stimulated by the way in
..
which a small petty-bourgeois.. group had succeeded in stirring up the
Cuban masses and overriding a petrified communist parry, many Latin
American intellectuals who were susceptible LO Lenin's Jacobin qualities
soon created small avant-garde armed groups all over the continent. If this
vanguard were to launch a guerrilla offensive in the countryside, reveaUng
the true nature of the regime, create embryo dual governments, and finally
storm towards the cities, where a general strike would be proclaimed. then a
new workers· and peasants' movement should grow up. and the revolution
should be successful.100
Until the mid-sixties. there was a political basis for all this. A wave of anti­
colonialism and revolutionary optimism swept the world. In Moscow lhcre
was talk ofcommunism coming about within 20 years. and the schism with
China had not yet reached its apex. The old empires were collapsing, and
the US was on the retreat. Jn 1961. in the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, the
CIA was literally forced back into the sea. Subsequently, as has been

33
 The Co1111111111is1 Tradi1io11

mentioned, dependency theories were improved. But at the same time as

theoretical weapons were being prepared, the political preconditions for a
successful struggle were becoming more distant.

ReappraisaL?

Time passed before we realized this. The Cubans rapidly grew more radical,
and the Chinese initiated their cultural revolution. Both needed and were
anticipating a revolutionary uprising throughout the world, just as Stalin
had done during the collectivization period in the late twenties. In Europe
the left became enthusiastic, lagging behind by a few years. But despite the
victories in Portugal's former colonies in Africa. despite Vietnam and, most
recently, the victory in Nicaragua, problems and failures started piling up in
the sixties.
Indonesia is just one of several cases where radical anti-colonialism was
toned down. In 1966 Ghana's non-capitalist development came to a halt,
not long after it had done in Indonesia. In Egypt the turning-point came a
few years later. As early as 1964, Goulart's progressive regime fell in Brazil.
In the springof 1965 the US started bombing North Vietnam, and in Algeria
Ben Bella was overthrown only a few months before the Jakarta coup of
1965. These are only a few examples.
[n Ghana the petty bourgeoisie and nationalists of indistinct class
managed to acquire considerable capital interests.101 In Egypt the state
sector soon became a springboard for capitalist development.
Neither are recent events in Ethiopia and Afghanistan indicative of any
real progress. Particularly in Ethiopia. democratic reforms are noticeable
by their absence. With a wave of the hand, the Eritrean liberation struggle
was declared reactionary when new men took over in Addis Ababa,
and the regime pursued the same policies vis-a-vis Eritrea as the Emperor
Haile Selassie had. And when the revolutionaries in Afghanistan failed to
consolidate their agrarian reforms from above. but found the people
resisting them, an intervention from the Soviet Union became a
··necessity".102
On the one hand, Moscow communists march obstinately on. On the
other, a new generation of Soviet development researchers and technocrats
show remarkable faith in the ability of transnational companies and the
world market to generate development. Not only old dogmas but also large
parts of Marxist theory and methodology arc making way for a purified
empiricism, a belief in "pure facts".103
The Chinese communists have revised their theories in an even more
remarkable way. Maoism is being squeezed out. Self-reliance is being
replaced by something which. as far as I can see, closely resembles the old
growth philosophy of the Soviet Union. Pol Pot's extreme policy in
Kampuchea culminated in an unbelievable tragedy. In other countries,
Maoist groups are languishing. The schism between Moscow a.nd Peking was
I
I 34

l
 Marxist Theory of Struggle in the Third World

followed by a Chinese foreign policy which included approaching both the

US and Japan, and open war with Vietnam.
Not only the Maoist but also the Cuban-inspired guerrilla organizations
have gone from courageous proclamations to catastrophe and defeat. Even
the peaceful attempt in Allende's Chile, which had something in common
with the PKI and Indonesia, was crushed. For lack of a revolutionary
situation, all that remained was a long-term, somewhat reformist, policy.
There was no lack of a revolutionary perspective, but from within the
apparatus of state, it was only possible to attempt to revolutionize society
from above.104
Furthermore, the different strategies encompassed by the united front of
Unidad Popular contradicted one another. The anti-monopoly strategy of
the communists placed priority on the workers in advanced industries and
on farms, but neglected workers in smaller industries, the sizeable poor of
the rural areas, and the partly marginalized of the cities, in an attempt not to
upset the petty bourgeoisie and the smaller capitalists. Other groups within
the front maintained, however, that these poor people, the marginalized
and the workers in small industries should also be mobilized. In this way
the petty bourgeoisie and minor capitalists were nevertheless alarmed, but
there was no policy to deal with the situation. The bourgeoisie united, and
joined foreign capital and the domestic oligarchy. Wage earners and
peasants were split.105
Regis Debray has put forward convincing arguments against the
criticism levelled at Allende for not arming the workers. First, there was a
lack of arms. Secondly, there was no united proletariat to arm. The most
politically conscious industrial workers were iisolated. Finally. any attempt
to distribute anns would probably have liastened the coming of the
coup.106
Today certain hopes are raised by the continuing revolution in E l
Salvador. But the guerrilla movements have difficulty i n mobilizing the
workers in the cities, and the repression is nearly as incomprehensible as
the genocide o f the left in Indonesia. Any compromise which would end the
slaughter would surely win the support of the Salvadorean people, even if it
meant that capitalism survived.
In countries where great victories have been won, development policies
are facing tremendous difficulties. The coup :in Guinea-Bissau is a recent
example of the problems involved in moving from the self-reliant policies of
the liberated areas. based on undeveloped agriculture, to assuming
responsibility for an entire country and its rapid development. There are
ever-present risks of the leaders either coming up against resistance from
the peasantry, or becoming heavily dependent on foreign assistance, which
is corrupting and gives the leaders and the administrators the possibility of
creating their own class base with the help of the state apparatus - and
thus, for this reason too, falling out with the peasants.1m Is a similar
development under way in Mozambique?108
This list could be much longer: students in Thailand; genocide on East

35
The Communist Tradition

Timor: Jamaica. In Iran it was the mullahs who mobilized the masses and
expelled US imperialism. If anyone has threatened the industrialized West
during the past decade. it is not the workers and peasants. whom we once
hoped would take the lead in the Third World and thereby pave the way for
the struggle elsewhere, including Europe, but more or less feudal regimes,
gloating over their oil.
Even though actual developments have shown that the traditional
theories and strategies I have sketched are clearly inadequate, they continue
to survive. There is a conspicuous lack of the regeneration of Marxist-based
alternatives.
Every attempt to relate the Indonesian experience to a continuing
discussion. therefore. becomes primarily a question of referring to the
established doctrines and the problems associated with them.
From a viewpoint which is perhaps an ethnocentric European one,
however, I would like to add that the increasingly self-critical discussions
amongst Marxists in general. and so-called Eurocommunists in particular,
do point in a regenerative direction. (Even if most of them are, at present,
wholly directed towards European problems.)
Marxists are. for example, questioning Lenin's concept of the state -
exclusively the state of the ruling classes - and his strategic conclusions.
This is a frontal assault from without. In particular. Nicos Poulantzas has
argued convincingly. both empirically and theoretically, that the state is by
no means a monopolistic unit, but that the class struggle in society at large is
renected within the state. irrespective of whether the proletariat, for
instance, is formally represented or not.109
Such a perspective (which should by no means be confused with the idea
of taking over the state piece by piece, but rather concerns changing it)110
opens up interesting possibilities for the development of a more soph­
isticated and long·term strategy. This is particularly important when the
struggle concerns state power in countries where the state apparatus is no
longer isolated, and which are fairly weak. despite their autocratic powers.
Both in Europe and in many of the countries in the Third World, the state in
general and state capitalism in particular are expanding.
A long-term perspective also requires us to differentiate between distinct
phases, so that at every phase we can unite as many people as possible. al the
same time as preparations for the next phase are being made. Here,
however, the European discussion has gone no further than that in the
Third World, quite the reverse.

From Parasitic to Progressive Imperialism

The basic thesis in all communist theory on the struggle in the Third World
is that capitalism is certainly spread to the Third World by imperialism, but
at the same time it hampers or even blocks every form of capitalist
development. The imperialists create monopolies and ally themselves with

36
 Marxist Theory ofSiruggle ir1 tire Third World

feudal forces.
The workers in the Third World, and those parts of the bourgeoisie who
favour capitalist development as well as those peasants who are ruined by
imperialism or damaged by feudalism, have reason to come together and
attack both imperialism and feudalism.
Since the bourgeoisie is weak and cannot by itselfcarry such a revolution
to a successful conclusion. according to this thesis, there are opportunities
for the workers to take the lead and encourage movement towards
socialism, with the help of their comrades in the advanced countries.
In the industrialized countries (according to the same viewpoint). it is in
the interests of the workers' movement to support this struggle. since
imperialism lends power to monopoly capital, bribes the "workers'
aristocracy" and makes development in the socialist countries more
difficult.
To a greater or lesser extent. and with different practical consequences.
this characterizes the theories of Lenin. Stalin, Mao. Ho Chi Minh, Castro.
the dependency theorists and many others.
The view of the Second International. however. was more favourable to
imperialism. On the whole. capitalism was spreading to underdeveloped
countries. The most important obstacle to development was not imper­
ialism butthe remnants of feudalism. In addition, capitalism must be fully
developed before it would be realistic to speak of socialism.
The connict between the social-democratic and communist theses
continues. But it would hardly be an exaggeration to point out that the
general perspectives in Lenin's theory on imperialism have become fairly
generally accepted, not least because of the dependency theories.
Even Marxists within the communist tradition, however, have for some
years been questioning the thesis that imperialism hinders or blocks "true"
capitalist development in the Third World. The theory of non-capitalist
development and development theorists' occasionally categorical asser­
tions are especially contentious. Examples are pul forward from indust­
rialization not only in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines,
Singapore. Egypt, Mexico. Argentina, Colombia and Brazil, but even, for
example. from Kenya. the Ivory Coast and several of the oil countries.
IL is not an altogether simple task to sketch the main lines of this
discussion in just a few sentences.111 On the one hand, the tendencies
towards a new international division of labour have been discussed. since a
number of industries are being located in Third World countries where
production costs arc lower. Most of the goods that the industries there
depend on are imported, and most of what is produced is exported. This is
why one can maintain that export industrialization can only contribute Lo
development in certain enclaves. in exactly the same way as the production
of raw materials does. In addition. wages are so low that the domestic
market for mass consumption goods remains too small to support local
industry.
On the other hand. it has been pointed out thal while wages certainly are

37
The Communist Tradition

low, as more and more people become wage earners the market will expand.
Moreover, i ntemational competition necessitates the development of more
efficient tools, machinery, etc., which in turn increases the demand for more
local production and improved services. And, above all, demands for
efficiency prevent foreign capital from retaining an alliance with feudalism
which is all too hostile to development.
Finally, it is usually pointed out that the domestic bourgeoisie and the
state have acquired greater potential for influencing investment and
production. and not only in the oil-rich nations. ln order to invest and be
competitive. foreign capital is often needed to initiate local production.
Even though technological development, marketing, etc. are under the
control of transnational companies. significant foreign domination does
not necessarily exclude dynamic development, at least not if production
and markets are integrated in the world economic system, and not simply
loosely incorporated112 The conclusion is thus that the paralysing colonial
monopolies of production and marketing are being broken up in the Third
World, and a domestic markel both for methods of production and for
mass-consumption goods, is developing.
There are several different lines to be traced among those who argue
against the inevitability of the blocking of capitalist development. Not
everyone maintains, as Warren did, that Lenin was incorrect from the very
beginning. and that on severaJ points the Second International was right.1 1 3
Another dividing line is the foJJowing. O n t h e one side, some try t o prove
that traditional, relatively national capitalistic development is under way.
On the other side. others, of whom 1 am one, claim that traditional
capitalism has had its day, in both developed and underdeveloped
countries. What we are now witnessing is an international capitalist system
of production evolving from the former global unit. which was primarily
based on trade between separate systems of production. This is in line with
advanced technological development. which allows for the international co­
ordination of different units of production aod means that. as local
monopolies have Jost considerable power, so the major companies have
been obliged to engage in international competition. Competitiveness is
dy11amic.114 With perhaps few exceptions. all agree that capitalist develop­
ment is particularly brutal, and that many people are not integrated in
modern production but are compelled to live marginalized lives.
(Capitalism can both be dynamic and condemn people and places to
underdevelopment.) At the same time there is a tendency for differences
between individual underdeveloped countries to continue to increase: some
are integrated in the international production system. while others are left
on the side.
Maybe it is true that imperialism continues to retard a traditional
European-style capitalist development in the underdeveloped nations in
the world. But let us assume that it is no longer true that imperialism
prevents a modern international capitalism from spreading to several
countries in the Third World. In other words. let us assume that imperialism

38
 Marxi.�r Theory ofStn1gg/e in rhe Third World

is no longer necessarily parasitic, but can occasionally be progressive, i.e. by

spreading dynamic capitalism. If we accept thjs, we do not also need to
maintain that the clock has been turned back to that kfod of competitive
capitalism which, as we have seen, was espoused by Marx, Luxemburg, and
perhaps M.N. Roy, as being progressive. In this case, what happens to
communist strategies for the struggle in the Third World. strategies which
the PKT tried to adopt and which continue to be the dominant ones?
To start with, the bourgeoisie becomes a less likely ally. If imperialism no
longer presents an obstacle to capitalist development then ever-larger
sections of the bourgeoisie have the opportunity to satisfy their interests in
collaboration with foreign capital. That this may occur for other reasons,
and that capitalists in an underdeveloped country are still made up of
different often warring. fractions, is quite another matter.
Between a bourgeoisie which favours traditional nationalist capitalist
development and a comprador bourgeoisie. which functions more or less as
the local extension of foreign capital. there is room for the growth of an
increasingly significant domestic bourgeoisie. which collaborates with
imperialism from a domestic base.
The models of state capitalism which are becoming more common are
hardly likely, from this perspective, to lead to a bureaucratic capitalist class
with simply a parasitic politico-administrative power base. The state does
incorporate significant parts of direct production and circulation. in which
politicians. military men and administrators may very well be able to
complement their political base with an economic one.
Furthermore, the peasanrry will probably be split between those that in
some way or other profit from the capitalist system, and those who are
marginalized. 11 is hardly likely that they will engage i n a common anti­
feudal or anti-capitalist struggle. The opportunity for broadly-based
support on anti-feudal grounds. from the peasantry for the communists,
wbo shoulder the bourgeoisie's revolution. is disappearing. (This is what
Lenin dreaded might happen in Russia.)11s
This does not however. necessarily mean that those who suffer under
capitalism make up some kind ofunified proletariat Many corn bine small­
hol.dings with wage work, petty trading and other things. Others are forced
into the towns without having found a job in industry, for instance. Instead
tJ1ey often struggle to make ends meet as waiters. petty traders, and so on.
whicb definitely does not contribute to the growth of a closely united
proletariat. Yet a unified proletariat is the sine qua non of communist
political theory. In the meantime, there is no place for the majority of the
oppressed in production, but only, according to traditional communist
theory, as a lumpen proletariat.
By comparison, the relatively permanently employed workers are
reasonably well off. Obviously their political significance is growing. But a
fom1 of capitalism which can afford to raise wages somewhat, and give
limited social security to those who participate in dynamic production
processes. hardly opens the door to traditional communism; but perhaps

39
The Comm1111isr Tradition

instead to a class alliance of the conservative social-democratic type.

So much for speculative perspectives. This review of the communist
tradition puts many explanations of the PKI's failure in context. Now they
must be formulated and tested in a concrete investigation. But even the view
from the ··research front'· must be taken into account when examining tbc
PKI's problems and when trying to relate them to the international
discussion of today. Did the PKI's failure. forexample, have anything to do
with the tendencies to capitalist development in the Third World, which we
can now see so clearly. but which were already evolving towards the end of
the liflies and in the early sixties?

Notes

I. Cf. e.g. Tomquis1 (1979) pp.l70tr:. Palma (1978) pp.886-889. and Barran-Brown ( 1974) Chap.
J.
2. Ibid. The rntc of profil is nn expression of the level or profit io relationship to the total capi1al
invcstcc.l. If invcstmcnis rise in proportion 1o wagcs. then 1hc mte ofprofil on inves1ed capital has
\ c
u t ·nd ncy to fall. Thus. either invcs1mcnt must be limited. or the degree ofexploitation must rise
if lh<' mlc of profi1 is not to fnll.
3. Carrere d"Encuusse und Schram (1969) p.15.
4. I hid. pp. I SIT. Even Rosn Luxcmbul'!l. who wro1c 1he firs1 mujor Marxist book on imperialism The
ilrc1m111/a1io11 of Capital (1913}. afllued lhat capitalism was pro!lrcssivc. Through 1he over·
produc1ion of rhc advanced countries and subsequent need for new markets. capi111lism would
spr�ad. Her polilical conclusions. hO\\CVer. differed from 1hosc or the Second lnlcrnational
S. The conccn11111ion of copiml means th111 every mdi�idual c:apilal grows. C-$- factories become
larger The ce111mliza1ion ofcopitaI mean� 1hc rcduc:1ion of1hc numbcrofindi\!iduul caphals. a�
1hey nrc fused. or merged in10 corpo1111c en1crpriscs.
6. For 1hc above. very brief. account of Lenin's theories. see. e.g.. TOmqu1s1 ( 197'.I) pp. 171 IT. and
Barran-Brown (1974)Chap. 3. which aL�osummarizes the main bodyofserious criticism. Orwhy
not Lenin. 1960, CW 22 pp.685ff. wriucn in 1916. which is brier and worth reading.
7. Lenin's BackwardE11ropea11dAd•'a11<'edAsia ( 1 913). in Lenin (1969) pp.821T Sec also McMichael
(1977).
8. I will return 10 Lhis in Lhe nextsection.The mosl imponan1soun:esare 10 be found in Lenin ( 1969)
(e.g. TheRigh1afNa1ians10Sdf-de11m1iJ
1 1auon. 1914) and in Carrere d"Encaussc and Schmm (1969)
pp.14-45 and appended documenis.
9. See fn. 1. above.
10. According to Lo:nin, lhe labour aristocracy fonncd the base of social democracy or reformism.
c
and was.i111era/1a. represent� b)• lh S<'Cond 1nternationoI. which did no1 disassociale i1sc l
ffr
om
colonialism nor from the First World War.
11. A tcxl by Lenin from January 1923. wh c
i h argues ag;iins1 Menshevism. Lenin (1960) Our
RM•olurion (CW.33) pp.477-9.
12. Dehm} ( 1975/74) p.219.
13. When Lenin wrote 1he/Jin'r!lopmt.'111a sm111 RUSJia in 1899. he argued polemically wi1h lhc
/Capua/i
Russian populis1s. who talked 11bou1 1hc impossibility or capi1:ilism and wan1cd 10 use prc­
capitalist modes. for ins1ance ''illngc communalism. in the sLruggle. Lenin showed 1ha1 1he
opposilt held. 1ha1 c:apitnli�m was emerging and tha1 Ibis was progressive. aod necessary 10 1hc
l rugsJle for �ialism. There may be cause to rec-.i.11 thal Lenin had no inlenlion or moving from
)
1
prc-c<1pi1alis1 modes dircc ly 10 sociali�m.
14. a
For 1he above. when no 01hcr references arc m de. �r. Curn:re d"Encausse and Schram (1969)
pp.17·20. McMichacl (1977) p.208.

40
 Marxisl Theory ofSm1ggle in the Third World

15. Quoted from Engels in Arvidsson and Bcrntsson (1980} who cite Engels· new foreword to Class
stn1gg/es in Pa11cl'
r (1895).
16. Sec: Marx ( 1 87 1 ) The civil wari11 Fro11CI', as discussed in Marxisti
skstatsteori (1978). and Arvidsson
and Berntsson (1980) pp.IOI. 103- 1 1 2 and Note 14 above.
17. For an intcrcsrioy. discussion of rbe above. cf. PouJantza
s (1978b) pp.81IT. '"Dual power"' i.s
generally taken to mean that revolutionaries establish an alternative state apparnius and state
power.
18. Lenin ar the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democraric Party in 1903. quored in
Deurschcr ( 1 952). "Jacobinism" usually refers to the enlightened minority"s often brutal
centralized leadership.
19. Fonheaboveon the state and the party. where nothing else is indicated.cf. Lenin ( 1 9fil) The State
o11 (CW.29) pp.470ff.. The Stare (CW.29) pp.470IT. and Theses and repor1011 bourgeoi
and Re1·0!111i s
democracy 011d the dictator.;hip of the prole1oriar (CW.28) pp.4571T.
20. Laelau. (1971) p.29.
21. Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969). pp.171T. and the next seciion. 'Lenin"s Tbeses on the
Colonies·.
22. Alavai ( 1 973) pp.296-304. Petras (1978) esp. p.54.
23. Debray (1975n4J p.15.
24. Cf. for example. Lenin's report on the in1erna1ional silua1ion toComintem"sSecond Congn:ss. in
Lenin ( 1969) pp.276-282.
25. Ibid. Also Carrere d"Encausse and Schram ( 1 969) p.26.
26. Ibid. Cf. Poulantzas (l974). The United From SlTategy was adopted in December. 1921.
27. For SncevlieL see Williams ( l980).
28. Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969) p.28. Cf. also Halliday ( 1978) p.21 on Afghaoisian. where
no communisl party was established because the regime was engaged in fighting the British.
29. Carrere d"Encaussc and Schram ( l 969) on tbe Baku Conference er a/., pp31-38. and appended
documents.
30. Some of the firs! seeds of the Stalinist policies. which laier wcte 10 subordinale Comimcrn's
pollcy to rhc inlcrcsts of lhe Soviet siaic, were sown now. Lenin was very clear on thaL It grew all
1he more cvidenl al the Third Congress in 1921, when the s1rugglc in the colonies was tolally
ignored: al thar time 1he British were more or less prepared to leave Moscow in peace. Ibid.
pp.28IT.. 4I.
3 I. A notable exception is lhe Indian M.N. Roy. Lo whom I shall shortly return. who, in 19l9, wnsonc
or the founders of lhc Mexican Communist Party. Lenin did not even wish to compare Latin
America with Asia and Africa. but preferred to draw parallels wirh Easiem. Europe.
32. For this. and the review of Lenin's theses immediately below. see Carrere d"Encausse and
Schram (1969) pp.26-31 and appended documents (inter a/fa extracts from debates in the
commission referred to. thes
es, and 1he plenary deba1e. pp.150-167). Sec also articles and
documents in Lenin (1969) up to 1920.
33. On 1hc question of countries like China, whiclrwere nol wholly colonized. Comintern 1alked
about semi-colonialism. I merely use the terms colonies or underdeveloped countries.
34. Lenin was nostranger lo lhe idea ofdirect interveniion by Comintcrn or the Soviet Union.On the
question of the acrions or the Sovict Union vis-�·-vis former Tsaris1 colonies like Turkcstan.
Lenin. referring to Lhc weak prolelarial and 1hc importance or mobilizing the peasants. said.
"Nevertheless. we have assumed. we must assume. the role ofleaderevea there.� Leoin from lhc
above commission, in Lenin ( I969) pp.284IT. Cf. Halliday ( 1978) and ( 1980) on Afgbanisian. for
example.
35. Nevertheless. Pan-lslamism oughl to be fougb1, since Turkish imperialism was c:ounterposed 10
thaioflhe Wcsl. and large landowners were no1 leas1 amongst those who were to be spared.Aflcr
criiicism from the PKrs delegate. Tan Malaka, Comintern yielded on ihe question of Pan­
lslamrsm in 1922.on condilion that communists would be very vigilant. Carrere d'Encaussc and
Schram (1969) pp.42fT.
36. Wich o number of r�visions (which are described in Carrere d"Encausse and Schram (1969)
pp.152-155). Lenin"s draftwas adopted byComimcm. The full drafl is 10 befound in l.cnin (1969)
pp.268-275.

41
The Commum:st Tradition

37. For Roy's cri1kism. sec Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969) pp.27·3 1 and appended
documen1s.
38 On 1his poinL sec ibid. pp.42ff.
39. Ex1roc1 l'rom Roy"s address 10 the Commission on National and Colonial Questions at
Cornintern's Second Congress. Ibid. p.151.
40. Aside from Roy's view that 1hc revolution in the underdeveloped world was a prercquisile for the
Europcun revolution. his criticism of Lenin sounded similnr to lhUI ofthe extremeleft in Italy al
whom Lenin directed his 'Ll:f/·wl11g' c"01111111111is111 - 011 i11fa111ile disorder (1960 CW 31) pp.17ff.
41. Boch Lenin's und Roy'b theses were ndop1ed. wich certain revisions. and especially Roy's were
aleered. Ironically. lu1cr. over o period ofscvernl years. ii ne,•cnhclcss was Roy's original theses
which were distributed by Cominlcrn. Carrere d'Encausse and Schram ( 1 969) p.29.
42. Ex1ruc1 from Lenin's report from Che relevant commjssion 10 1hc plcnary scssioo of the Second
Comin1crn Co11grcss. Ibid. p.157.
43. Ibid. pp.51 ff.
44. Ibid. pp.44ff.. 53-56 and Williams ( 1980) pp.88fT.
45. Ibid. p.89.
46. This was most clearly pul by Ono Kuusinen in 1928. Sec Palma (1978) p.897. bu1 1hc ideas were
not new: they had been nrsc rue in10 practice around 1924·25.
47. Cf. Gordon (1973) pp.198fl: 11nd McMichael (1977) pp.208fT.
48. The las1-named from a speech a1 1hc University of Svcrdlov in 1924. Carrere d'Encuussc and
Schram (1969) p.186.
49. This was clearly expressed al Comintem·s Sixth Congn:S's in 1 928. see. e.g.. 1he programme in
ibid. pp.2J6fT.
50. Ibid.
51. See Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969) pp.560: and appended documents.
52. In 1928 a certain amounc of auention was paid 10 the countries of Latin America, which "ere
distinguished from "colonial and semi-colonial countries" on the one hand. nnd even more
"backward countries" like some in Africa.on the other. Argcn1ina and Brazil were simply called
"independent countries". (See fn.49.) Fora rompe1en1 analysis of how 1his new interest for l.acin
America fell outside the framework ofComin1em's theoretical perspective.see Debray ( 1975n4)
op.cit pp.38·46. See also Laci au ( 1977) on populism.
53. Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969) pp.561T and documcms. and cf. Poulanizas (1974).
54, Carrere d·Encaussc and Schram (1969) pp.57fTand p.2.33. and other appended documents.
SS. Ibid. p.SS and pp.239-242 (extracts from Trotsky"s criticism of the proposal for a new Comintcm
prog.rnmme). Sec 11lso DcuLSchcr ( 1952).
S6. Cf. Carr�rc d'Encnussc and Schram (1969) pp.59tt. and Poulan1zas (1974).
S7. Ibid. pp.166rf. and Carrere d"Encausse and Schram (1969) pp.59-62.
58. Ibid. pp.6()ff.
59. Debray ( 197Sn4) pp.3Sff and Laclau (1977) on populism.
60. Where no1hins else is indic:u1ed, sec Sudama (1978) and Carrere d'Encaussc and Schram ( 1969)
pp.55-67 and documcnlS.
61. In addition to the above no1c. sec Moo Tse Tung"s class analysis from 1926. Mao (1968).
62. The bCSI documen1n1ion or lhis is still 10 be found in Snow (1963)
63. Cf. pp.SIT above. See also Alavi (1973) pp.304-316.
64. Ibid. Cf. also Petras (1978) who argues instead for the key role of the proletnriut
65. Schurmann (1973) seems co me to have the clearest nnulysis of 1he organizncion of the Chinese
pany.
66. Mao (1968) and the explanatory fn. pp.9fT.
67. Mao (1947) in Mao (1961) pp.1671T.
68. Cf. Carrere d'Encaussc and Schram (1969) pp.96IT.
69. er. Gordon ( 1973) pp.201fT. and Vici Nam Workers· Party (1976)
70. See. firsL Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969) pp.63-69 wi1h appended documcncs.
71. See bolh documcntS in Carrere d'Encausse and Schram (1969) pp.2611T.. 265JT.
72. Ibid. p.263.

42
 sc Theory ofStn1ggle in che Third World
Marxi

73. For Moscow. Indonesia was. however. a remarkable exception. presumably because the
bourgeoisie continued their am1ed struggle against the Dutch despite the fact that they
overruled the left. At the UN the Soviet Union had a good reputation for putting forward the
Indonesian case. and it had no reason to lose race therejust forthc sake ofthe lefl in Indonesia.
McVey ( 1969a).
74. See cxtraciS from the relevant speech i a Carrere d"Encausse and Schram {1969) pp.269·
273.
75. In the first place communists in Prague worked together with the social democrats. but
managed to manoeuvre themselves to a dominating position with tbesupport ofa number of
frontorganizcations. mass demonstrations and the fraternal communist nation. after which the
party was able to consolidate its position of unlimited power.
76. When nothingelse is mentioned for the period up to 1959. sec Carrere d"Encausse and Schram
(1969) pp.67-76 and documents. and ror the following period pp.76-82. 87-92 and
documents.
77. Indonesia was mentioned as an example. See the 1956 article by Zhukov in Ca.rrered"Encausse
and Schram (1969) p.289.
78. Alavi (1972).
79. Extracts from lhe conference in 1960. Carrere d"Encausse and Schram ( 1969) pp.3081T.
80. For 11 competent review and discussion of non-capi talist development. see Palmberg
(1973).
81. CL Amilcar Cabral. who expressed part or the problem thus: the petty bourgeoisie must
commit class suicide and leave aside their class interests: Cabral (1969) pp.46-51. For an
interesting discussion or Latin America's place on that question see Debray ( 1975n4)
pp.46-49.
82. er. Carrere d"Encausse and Schra m (1969) pp.91 ff.
83. See below. Chapter 14.
84. Carrere d"Encaussc and Schram ( 1 969) p.88.
85. Ibid. p.88.
86. For this reason iL is not possible 10 oullioe the main lines in the Sino-Soviet dispute in only a
fewsentences. I have presented the background. and now tum to some oftheChincse theses on
the struggle in the Third World. For a review ofthe Sino-Soviet connict. sec ibid. pp.67-107 and
documents. These arc the very pages which are my main source forthe paragraphs below. until
the start of Ilic discussion on Latin America.
87. Cf. M.N. Roy's ideas from the early twenties. sec above. pp.12ff.
88. Mao {1947) in Mao (1961) p.167. Also Wertheim (1974) pp.301 IT.
89. Cf. ibid. On Moscow and the big bourgeoisie as part of the national bourgeoisie. ee
s
above p.27.
90. Carrere d"Encausse and Schram (1969) p.75.
91. Ibid. p.72.
92. For the Cubnn revolution see lirstlyTutiono ( l968). Karol ( 1970) and Debray ( t975n4). On the
importance of the Cuban revolution ror Latin America as a whole. sec Debray (1975/74) and
( 1 977).
93. Established theories maintained that underdeveloped countries suffered from a lack of
capitalism and that the problem was to remove the obstacles. Dependency theory said the
opposite. The underdeveloped countries were underdeveloped because they had been
swallowed up by capitalism and imperialism. The problem was not how to stimulate more
capitalist development. but how to get rid of capitalism and imperialism.
94. For a classic in this genre sec Frank (1967} and ( 1 969}. er. also (1972).
95. Paul Baran ( 1957)wns a pioneerwho stuck to that perspective. based primarily on Comintern·s
of the late twenties.
96. See Amin ( 1970),
97. For a competent summary and critical discussion. see Andersson (1976).
98. The kind of unequal Cl':Change which is norrnnlly referred to is. to put it very roughly. based on
differences in productivity between industrialized and developing nations being Jess than wage
differentials, which is why underdeveloped countries arc paid less for their work t.han
industrialized countries.

43
The Com111u11s1
i Tradirion

99. Sec Laclau (1971).

100. Still unsurpassed in Debray"s self-critical analysis of this struggle (197Sn4) and ( 1 977). Debray
participa1ed in the spread and applicaiion or the rcx:o-theory.
IOI. Beckman (1976) is brillianL
102. Halliday ( 1 980).
103. Sec Kridl-Volkcnicr ( 1980).
104. Debray ( 1975n4) pp.238 and 282.
105. Cf. de Vyldcr ( 1974) pp.92. 1481T.. 181. 190. 1941T. According to the preliminary results of Bosco
Parru's research. it originates in 1he c:ornmunisls· 1rndi1ionally narrow dcfini1ion of lhe
prolc1ariu1 when undcnaking o class anulysis. The many poor people who did no1 belong to the
core of1he prolcturiut hud neverbeen properly organized. Lecturehy Parra. 8May1981.Uppsala.
Pami (1981).
106. Dcbroy ( 197Sn4J pp.258·269.
I 07. Rudcbcck ( 1982).
108. EgcrO ( 1 982).
109. See especially Poulnntzas ( 1 978a). (1980a) and (1980).
1 1 0. Poulnn1zns ( 1980b) pp.2580:
1 1 1. I hnvc made some previous a11emp1s. See TOmquist (1979) and TOmquist and Brundcll (1979).
For nn extreme viewpoint, see Warren (1980).
112. Thcrbom ( 1979) pp.98-101 woots to distinguish between dependence nnd dominance. and
between incorporarion and in1egration Canada. for e:u1mple. is dominated by the US. but
integrated in the world economy.
113. Warren (1980): parlly lmpliciL bul nevcnheless appallingly clear.
1 14. Cf. Beckman (1980) and TOmquist ( 1979).
115. Cf. p.1 71 . above.

44
4. The PKI: Communist
Tradition and the Course
of Events in Indonesia

Which sections of the communist tradition did the PKI try lo apply in
Indonesia? While trying to answer thaL question. it mighl be appropriaLe to give
a very brief presentation of the way in which events developed in the country
and the historical background.1 In analysing the strategic problems of the
communists, I shall assume Lhat the reader has some background knowledge
of Indonesia. (fhe Chronology in Appendix 3 should help to fill out this
background.)
..What is it like in Indonesia today?" is a question J a m often asked. My reply
.
is, . Ifs like fighting for a train ticket�
The selling of tickets starts an hoUI before the train is due to depart
Considerably earlier, the best tickets have already been booked by those with
thick wallets. th.rough their contacts. About half an hour before the ticket office
opens, public corruption is in evidence in the form of a number of agents who
stand in the front of the queue. Each buys. say. 20 tickets to sell to those who can
afford to avoid being crowded. The others are brutally shoved around as they
try to fight for their places in the queue. If a soldier happens to come by. he
regards it as quite natural to walk round the mob to the front and buy his ticket
first.
That's how most things work in Indonesia.
Indonesia is a large country. Its length is equivalent to thaL between Ireland
and the Urals. its breadth to that between Scotland and Spain. Jndonesia is
made up of 13.000 islands. There are over 150 million people. giving Indonesia
the fifth largest population in the world. Most of them are crowded onto tbe
island of Java. which is the world's most densely populated agricultural
area.
Indonesia is strategically localed on the trade routes between Europe and
east Asia. fl is rich in raw materials (oil. tin. bauxite. coal. timber. rubber, etc.)
but, despite recent expansion, still lacks industries. About 70 per cent of tbe
population are engaged in agriculture. Many of the orhers are bureaucrats,
petty traders and service personnel. Eacb year 1 ,400.000 people come onto the
Javanese labour market, with anotl)er 600.000 on the ourer islands. Within
production, however. there is only place for 600,000 to 700.000 new workers
annually throughouL the country.2
Indonesia is a beautiful tropical country. But the rain forests are being

45
The Communist Tradition

devastated by reckless cutting; plastic goods create liner; poisonous exhaust

fumes and the sweet smell of creteck cigarettes combin� with a stench of
poverty so penetrating that even the air in the rich quarters is spoilt
Indonesia is the largest Islamic country in the world. But Islam is mixed
up with many other faiths including animism. There are also Hindus.
Buddhists and some Christians. The national language is Indonesian,
which is underst0od by most of the 350 ethnic groups. who have 250
languages of their own. Javanese culture is highly sophisticated. although
by now deeply undermined by commercialism.

Colonization

Indonesia was already populated 3.000 years before Western history begins.
The culturally advanced pre-colonial societies in the archipelago were
based on agriculture and considerable trade. During the 14th and 15th
centuries the trade and religion or the Ottoman empire reached the islands.
During the 16th century the Portuguese arrived and. in the following
century, the Dutch East India Company, which monopolized trade.
At the beginning of the 19th century. around the time of the Napoleonic
wars, the British staned a more direct process of colonization. primarily of
Java. Soon the Dutch returned and continued exploiting the country. The
last major Javanese resistance, led by Prince Diponcgoro. was crushed.
Colonial trade was complemented by the cultivation of cash crops.
particularly coffee and sugar.
But Dutch capitalism was too weak for private colonization. Instead the
state took the lead. A comparatively indirect method was chosen: the
regional and local aristocracy was bribed and forced their subjects to
produce both for consumption and for the Dutch. This was known as the
cultivation system. or C11/turstelsel.
It was not until the end of the century that Dutch colonialism began to be
privately managed. Large plantations were established. A few years later.
the islands surrounding Java began Lo be of economic significance for the
production of rubber. various minerals and finally oil. By this time. the
Dutch controlled virtually the entire Indonesian archipelago.
l n the meantime, Java was still the most fertile island from the point or
view of agriculture. Most of the people lived there and the island remained
the economic, political and administrative centre. (This book deals
primarily with Java. where the PKJ was most deeply rooted.)
I n Java. particularly in tl1e western province. there was private
ownership: the Asian type of agriculture with a centralized bureaucracy: as
well as local, almost communalistic. cultivation. Aside from foreign-owned
plantations. the properties were seldom large. Expatriates did not have the
right to buy land belonging to any ofthe villages. The Chinese minority had
considerable innuence within the sectors of trade and petty production.

46
 Tire PK! and tire Course of Evems in Indonesia

Modern Nationalism

At the tum of the century in the rural areas, there arose new opposition to
the Dutch and to the local gentry who acted as their agents. I n particular,
private landowners and religious leaders (often the same people) who did
not ally themselves with the colonial powers had an in1eresr in turning
against feudalism. which was strongesl in the areas dominated by private
landownership and which was maintained by the Dutch. The ideology of
Islam was important in the mobilization of the masses. But it was not
possible to co-ordinate the struggle on a national level.
With the growth of plantations. mines and better communications. a
small proletariat was created. It would not be long before trade-union
organization would begin.
Expansive colonialism demanded administrators. The number of wage
workers from Holland in state and private employment rose. 5ome were
conscious of political and trade-union issues. At the beginning of the 20th
century, the Dutch. moreover, started limited education of local admin­
istrative personnel. both in Holland and in Indonesia. They had very
Ii mired opportunities for advancing in their careers. and some of them were
radicaI ized.
Obstacles were also put in the way of private Indonesian business
activities. Indonesia had been allotted the role of supplier of raw materials.
Nearly all commercial production and significanl trade was monopolized
by the colonial powers.
Now lhere existed the preconditions for a national struggle against pre­
capitalist modes of production and colonialism. Local intelJectuals.
administrators and businessmen reached the private landowners and
religious leaders whose interests were being thwarted and who had mass
support. The movement was founded in 1912 and was called Sarekar ls/am.
Soon it gained unprecedented general support.
Isolated from the mass organization. a small social-democratic party
(ISDV) was founded in 1914. I t was rooted in the trade-union movement
where, amongst others. Sneevliel who is already known to us, was active in
the leadership.3 ISDY started working within Sarekat Islam in order to break
iLs own isolation and to hasten what was referred to as the anti-feudal and
anti-colonial struggle which had been started by the bourgeoisie. This work
of unification was later adopted by Comintern in its thesis on the colonial
question.
Afcer the First World War the Dutch intensified their imperialist
exploitation. Sarekat Islam was threatened. High hopes of rapid results were
dashed. The movement was split and weakened. ISDV. which in 1920
became the PK.I and joined Comintem. could no1 take over the mass
movement. Jt, too, was weakened by splits and disputes about how the
struggle should be carried on at the same time as repression intensified.
The leadership was seized by a wing which advocated a rapid proletarian
intervention before lhe upsurge was finally over. Soon the strategy of the

47
The Communi
st Trndi1io11

PKI deviated not only from Lenin's thesis but even from Stalin's
recommendations. Comintern tried to change the line of the party but did
not succeed. In local revolts in Western Java in 1925 and 1926. as well as in
1927 in Western Sumatra, the isolated party was crushed. Those leaders who
survived were put in concentration camps or went into exile. The PK.J did
not regain any real significance until the late forties.
It was, instead, a handful of young intellectuals who monopolized the
business of providing nationalism with a specific ideological content
While they educated themselves, introduced a common Indonesian
language, discussed, wrote. made speeches, spHt into factions and were
imprisoned, they swept different class interests and contradictions under a
carpet of populist nationalism: Indonesia's pre-colonial greatness would be
regained. The workers and peasants were neither organized nor mobilized.
The intellectuals relied particularly on the ability of the anti-colonial
patrons and religious leaders to gather the masses behind them. And yet the
poor peasant, for instance, got the feeling that the land question would be
solved if only the country gained ics independence. These happy events
were part of the dream of the pre-colonial realm. Thus there were
substantial. if passive. classes supporting the national movement.
In the wake of the depression of the thirties. even more miserable
conditions arose in the colony since exports decreased. But there was no
movement with the strength to mobilize the discontented. l o the middle of
the decade. a few communists were engaged in trying to build a broad anti­
fascist popular front, according to the recommendations of Com intern of
1935. Temporarily the anti-colonial struggle made way for the front. But
neither the Dutch nor the Indonesians showed any interest in the idea.
On the contrary. many Indonesians greeced the Japanese as liberators
when they expelled the Dutch in 1942 and occupied fndonesia. The feeling
of the colonial power's invincibility disappeared. An end had come lo the
paralysing control of the Dutch.
· Soon. however. the Japanese made their real intentions clear. They
introduced slave labour and expropriation of (among other chings)
agricultural produce. But the new repression, together with greater margin
to act for the domestic classes and political groups. formed the base for a
new nationalist resurgence.
Socialist and communist groups worked illegally. A number of anti­
colonial and to some extent anti-feudal movements. cemented together by
Islam. worked partly underground and partly with the consent of the
Japanese. Finally, certain leaders, among them Sukarno, chose to work
openly to some extent with the invaders. These leaders thereby gained
access to a sizeable propaganda machine and were able to reach the masses
throughout the colony.
When Japanese fortunes of war changed. the nationalists were given
greater room to manoeuvre. The Japanese regarded them as a bufferagainst
the Allies. Towards the end even military organization was possible. On 1 7
August 1945 the Republic ofl ndoncsia was proclajmed. Sukarno from Java

48
 The PK! and the Course of Events in Indonesia

and Hatta from Sumatra were the obvious Leaders. But the resistance
movement as a whole was split politically. regionally, and by religion.
Nevertheless, the new leaders succeeded in rapidly creating a government
and tbey gained some control over the abandoned state apparatus in
important parts of the country. They defeated those persons and groups
who openly competed against Sukarno and his men. But be was forced to
give up strong centralized presidential power in favour of parliamentary
democracy.
The PKl, which was being revived, was initially part of the opposition.
But exiled leaders who adopted the popular-front policy, and had Moscow's
positive view of the bourgeoisie, soon took over. A version of the European
coalition and popular-front government was built At the same time, the
Dutch regained control of large areas of the outer islands and moved in on
Java. The government fell in 1948. Nationalists with openly bourgeois ideas.
under the leadership of Vice-President Hatta. built a new government,
continued the struggle against the Dutch, but were open to compromises.
not least with the assistance of Washington.

The Communists Isolate Themselves

During the next few months tbe PK.l tried LO alter its strategy. Musso, an old
leader from the twenties. was brought in. as well as the new bard line from
Moscow against both the national bourgeoisie and the US. The PKl
refused. however. to wor� with those communists who stood outside the
party and who had made common cause with radicaJ nationalists and
opposed the earlier unconditional collaboration between the PKJ and the
conservative nationalists. This earlier aJljance was accused of Trotskyism.
Now it was time for the PKl itself to come into the limelight. Those
communists who had joined other organizations, in the spirit of the popu.la r
front should join forces with the PKl. The party would start militant work
among the masses and control a "front from below" with bourgeois
forces.
But when the communists were threatened at their strongest point, in
Solo (Smakarta). the leadership was llnable to control the membership in
Madiun, only a few miles away. The so-called Madiun revolt was crushed
by government soldiers and PKJ leaders were executed. Then the struggle
against the Dutch continued, with communists at the forefront but in
subordinate positions.
ln Washington it was realized that the colonial era was drawing to a close.
and that in any case the US had no interest in maintainfog the monopoly of
the old colonial powers in developing countries. The US threatened to
curtail its Marshall Aid to Holland unless the country came to terms with
the government in Indonesia. which was now friendly to the West and anti­
communist. The UN also adopted a similar position.
Peace and independence in 1949 meant subscantial guarantees both for

49
T71e Communi
st Tradition

Dutch companies in Indonesia and for new foreign inveslors.

After Madiun. those communists who were hesitant about the new policy
of confrontation continued in 1948 to follow the old popular-front policy.
However. a young group ofleaders. schooled in the militant struggle against
the Japanese and the Dutch. offered resistance and tried to implement the
hard-line policy of 1948. The four cenrral figures were Aid it, Lukman, Njoto
and Sudisman. They saw to it that there were extensive strikes, and in
January 1951 gained control of the central organs of the badly-weakened
party. (They remained in the leadership until the aulumn or 1965.)
Widespread strikes continued. in a bid to shake the government. But in the
autumn of 1951 a new threat against the party arose. The government
started a far-reaching series of raids against the communists. The new
leaders were forced underground.

Communist Hothouse ( 1 952- 1 960/63)

The hard-line policy adopled in 1948 by the PKl. the roots of which lay in
Moscow and Peking, had thus led to considerable diflicuJties i n 1948 and
1951. During the wave ofanti-communism which occurred in 195L the new
leaders reappraised the situation and decided to foUow their own much
more careful strategy with a long-term perspective.
The PKl retained the objective of building a "front from below". keeping
a dominant position in it And in the future the party would also develop its
own organization. rather than encourage communists to work within other
parties. But at the same Lime the party returned to Lenin's 1920s criticism of
the extreme left. The party did not allow itself to be provoked by the
government as it had been in 1948. And when the government fell in 1952.
because it refused to sign a security treaty with the US. the PKI approved of
both its own ·'fronL from below" and a united "front from above" with
groups held to be bourgeois-nationalist. The PKJ could contemplate
government co-operation without demanding a dominant role, and could
even consider lending critical support to a more modestly progressive
government. even if the party itself did not participate in the government.
This the PKI analysed in terms of collaboration with the national
bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, which was regarded as being
primarily represented by the Nationalist Party (PNI). The enemy was the
comprador bourgeoisie, represented by the Islamic Masjumi Party and the
Western-oriented Socialist Party (PSI).
In this way the PKI made use or Stalin's early theses on the national
bourgeoisie as a domestic bourgeoisie in whose own interests it was to act
against imperialism and feudalism. Mao's concept of a comprador
bourgeoisie was added to Stalin's thesis. In other words, the PK.I's concept
of the national bourgeoisie comprised the entire capitalist class with the
exception of the major capitalists who were classed as comprador.
At the same time the PKJ practised Lenin's and Mao's method of first

50
 The PK! and the Course of Events in Indonesia

analyzing actual events. The PNr represented a more radical form of

nationalism than the pro-Western Masjumi Party. It was also less anti­
communist This was more important to the PK.I than that the PNI had
hardly any support from Stalin's national bourgeoisie nor from Mao's
comprador class. whereas the Masjumi Party had a base i n both
groups.
AL the same time. though the PNI was based primarily in the bureaucracy
(a modern prijaji4). it could be correctly classified as a radical nationalist
party according to a Leninist analysis. This was however, used as proof of
the nationalists also being a national bourgeoisie in the Stalinist sense, and
they were thus expected to behave Hke such a class, according to Stalin's
doctrine.
Under the leadership of Aidit, the PKI became inspired by China's
succes!.es in mobilizing the peasants, but did not adopt Peking's ideas on
armed struggle. The PK.I emphasized the importance of gaining sponsors,
of achieving peace so as Lo be able to work and ofconducting the struggle in
peaceful forms. keeping in mind the approaching parliamentary elections.
The Leninist party theory was not sacrosanct either. Side by side with all
the informally dominated fronts for workers. peasants. women. youth and
so on, it was decided, perhaps following the Chinese example. to make the
PK.I both a cadre and a mass party. It would have a totalitarian leadership
with a large number of members supporting it and be well rooted among
the masses.
This drastic change of course was worked out and began to be put into
practice late in 1951. and was adopted at the party congress in 1954. Stalin's
post-war policies had. indeed. begun to wear thin by the time of the party
congress in Moscow in 1952. but the base of Lbe PKrs new policy was
primarily to be found in its own analyses of the situation in Indonesia. Even
internationally, the party was a pioneer. I t was not until 1956 that Moscow
openly adopted the policies which the PK.I had already worked out in detail
and had been practising for several years.
Soon the PKI's new policies began to bear fruit. The party and its various
front organizations grew rapidly. I n just a few years membership increased
from about 10,000 to over half a million. lo 1952 the PKl worked for the
creation of a nationalist-led government which was followed by a more
radical one the following year. Indonesia played a significant role in the
new neutralism and anti-colonialism. The 1955 Bandung conference was a
milestone. Now President Sukarno championed the cause of radical
nationalism.
Tn 1952 a military coup, supported by the socialists. was foiled. Pro­
Western and anti-communist forces began to be isolated. The Masjumi
Party split. One faction, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), orthodox Muslims with
broad support especially among relatively well-olT peasants in eastern Java,
built their own party and moved politically towards the PNI.
Simultaneously, however. the dissatisfaction of the business community.
the military and the Islanlic leaders increased on the outer islands which

51
The Communst
i Tradition

were dominated by Java, where the communists had improved their

position and where importers were favoured at the expense of exporters. In
Jakarta the nationalists wanted to create a domestic bourgeoisie at the
expense of the exporters of raw materials, who were dominated by foreign
interests. As a result of the growing dissatisfaction, smuggling and minor
regional revolts increased. Discontent spread to the central leadership of
the army, which succeeded in bringing down the PNI government in 1955.
Shortly before the first free elections were due, a cabinet of Masjumi and
PSI ministers took over again.
But the elections in 1955 were a defeat for Masjumi and the PSI. and a
success for the PKI, among others. The PKI became the fourth largest party,
preceded only by the PNI, Masjumj and toe NU. These were the parties
which succeeded in exploiting traditional contradictions along religious,
ethnic or regional lines, or based on patron-client relationships. After
lengthy negotiations, a new nationalist government was installed.
The communists. however, did not manage to gel representation in this
government either. And regional uprisings spread al the same time as
economic problems, corruption and paralysis shook the politicians in
Jakarta. In local elections in 1957 the PKI strengthened its position. But,
now that the party had become the largest in Java, co-operation with the
PNl, which had lost votes, began to suffer. Among the masses in Java the
PKI and the PNI often competed for votes from the same broad group, the
ahangan, s which was not closely tied to Islam, either in its modern or
orthodox forms.
President Sukarno started talking of the need for stronger presidential
powers. Vice-President Hatta, who was from Sumatra and represented the
outer islands. resigned. There was an intensification oftbe struggle against
the Dutch to reunite/rian Jaya (Papua Western New Guinea) with the rest of
Indonesia. Most of the Dutch companies were taken over in 1957. The army
marched right into company boardrooms. The economy was badly shaken.
Communications between the islands almost broke down. Regional revolts
spread during 1958. In Sumatra and Sulawesi an independent state was
proclaimed. Masjumi and the PSI were sympathetic to the rebels, and so
was the U.S.
The central leadership of the army, under General Nasution, supported
Sukarno. The price was the declaration o f a state of emergency, and a
tightly-controlled democracy in which Sukarno, supported by the PK.I
among others, shared power with the army.
Sukarno protected the PKI, which in return offered him a strong and
radical popular base in addition to the looser and more conservative
support he received from the PNl and the NU. Within both the
administration and the economy, the military gained ever-increasing
influence with the help of the state of emergency and their control of
companies formerly owned by the Dutch. Ideologically, government policy
was fairly radical. But the conservative nature of the support for the PNI
and the NU meant that it was only feasible to realize a progressive foreign

52
 The PK! and tlze Course of Eve111s in Indonesia

policy. Strikes were illegal. The workers' and peasants' movement led by the
PK.I, was forced to act very carefully.
During these years, the PKl appears to have gradually accepted what
later came [o be called noo-capitaljst development, with a predominant
state sector led by nationalists whose class base was unclear. The PKI's
policies appeared to be intended to put such a development strategy into
practice.
In 1960 the party adopted a more critical stance.6 Strong resistance was
offered by the anny. Even Sukarno reacted, and dissolved parliament, while
new elections were postponed indefinitely. At the same time, however,
Sukarno proclaimed a land reform, banned Masjumi and the PSI. and saw
to it that the army did not destroy 1he PKI.
The parry started to voice doubts about non-capitalist development only
a few years after Moscow had proclaimed it in 1960. The PKI opposed the
characterization of Indonesia as a national democracy7 and started talking
io tenns of Mao's bureaucratic capitalists, who were to be found within the
administration of state in general and in the army in particular.

Communist Offensive ( 1 960/63-1965)

By now the PKl was the third largest communist party in the world. It
decided to try to utilize the radical nationaJists to avoid any future pitfalls.
Sukarno's position as anti-imperialist standard-bearer was indisputable.
This was so in the struggle for frian Joya. which was victorious in 1962.
When the pro-Western regional rebellions were crushed, Sukarno was
acclaimed. and this tradition continued when Indonesia opposed the new
British-influenced state of Malaysia. calling for tough confrontation
policies instead.
The PK.I made sure that all the demands it was agitating for could be
justified by reference lo their necessity in the Sukarno-led s1ruggle against
imperialism. These included nationalization. purges in the state apparatus
and an economic policy based on self-reliance. In this way a contribution
was made to the neulralization of an artempl to liberalize the economy in
1963. an attempt encouraged by the US. the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and others.
In similar fashion. the PK.I tried to motivate an offensive to force through
agrarian reform, and saw the chance of moving forward by relying on its
increasingly strong peasant movement. without the party deviating from
Sukarno's policies.
This meant that the PK.I broke with the non-capitalist and peaceful co­
existence approach of Moscow, moving towards Peking's ideas of
uncompromising anti-imperialism and of self-reliance. Furthermore. the
PKJ's offensive among the peasants meant a confrontation with the
conservative rural base of the PNI and the N U in Java. thereby posing a
threat to Sukarno·s concept of Nasakom (unity between nationalists,

53
The Communist Tradition

Muslims and communists).

The state of emergency had come to an end with the crushing of the
rebellion, and Irian Jaya was incorporated into Indonesia. The PK! was
allowed slightly more freedom of movement. But many of the military
leaders saw the chance of retaining their power, partly by transferring
attention to Malaysia and partly by preventing any economic liberalization
or rationalization of the state enterprises, which might have posed a threat
to the influence and economic base of the military. A form of radical
nationalism was in the interests of the army.
ln addjtion. the communists' peasant offensive was unsuccessful. Major
contradictions arose between different peasant groups. on socio-economic,
religious and political grounds. In the autumn of 1964, the PK! was forced to
fall back.
The party maintained its position in Jakarta. and in 1965 wanted to
intensify the continuing purge of so-called bureaucratic capitalists. With
rumours that Sukarno was in poor health, and that the army was planning a
coup. proposals which would affect the army were also being discussed. The
PK! demanded the Nasakomization of the army - that is. to give
nationalists, Muslims and communists who favoured Sukarno some
influence - and also the setting up of an independent militia with Chinese
arms.
During the night of30 September and 1 October 1965. a number ofjunior
officers led by Untung, the head of Sukarno's bodyguard. tried to arrest
leading generals in order to force them to confess. before Sukarno, to
plotting a coup. The actions of Untung and his men were known to. and
supported by. PK.I leader Aidit, though he had not properly informed the
party or got the go-ahead from it. A small number of PK! members were
also involved in some of the actions taken against the generals.
From the start, these actions were doomed to failure. Several of the
generals were killed. The Defence Minister, General Nasution. escaped.
General Suharto. head of the strategic reserves, was left alone. presumably
because he had led the Untung group to believe he would remain
neutral.
Suharto. the number two in the army. led the a1tack on the younger
officers. Sukarno had offended him by appointing another general as
temporary head of the armed forces. Afterwards. Suhar10 and Nasution
blamed the PKl for the murders and used the opportunity not only to crush
the communists. but also to undermine Sukarno·s position.

The New Order

Whal followed in the autumn of 1965 is incomprehensible. Suharto and

Nasution ordered loyal troops to flush ouL arrest and murder the supporters
of the left. Students. the children of the wealthy whom the PKl had never
succeeded in reaching. were brought oul onto the streets. Muslim gangs

54
 The PK! and the Course of Events in Indonesia

started a holy war, together with conservative nationalists, partly to take

their revenge on the left, which had wanted to redistribute the land, and
pardy to eliminate rival Chinese businessmen. The PK.I, the left-wing
nationalists, the trade-union movement - the entire popular mass
movement was crushed. Berween half a rn illion and a million people were
murdered, particularly in CentraJ and East Java, in Bali and in North
Sumatra.
The PK.I's view was that the actions of Untung and his followers should
be regarded as an internal affair within the army, and that the party
membership should remain passive and rely on Sukarno's ability to deal
with these contradictions. But when the actions of Untung did not succeed
and the party was under threat, the PKI was paralysed. The PK.I leaders
were not assembled in Jakarta and thus were not able to meet. The party had
not been informed of what was afoot.Aidit iled, or was duped into escaping,
to the PK.I's stronghold around Solo and Yogyakarta, where he was soon
arrested and murdered on Suharto's orders. Only Secretary-General
Sudisman. of all the well-known leaders who remained in the country,
managed to stay in hiding for a year.
Sudisman lent his support to a Mao-inspired self-critique which called
for armed guerrilla struggle in the rural areas. An attempt to start such a
struggle at Blitar in Eastern Java, led by Central Committee member
Hutapea, was crushed in 1968.
For as long as possible Sukarno tried to defend both his own and the
Picr's politics. But in the spring of 1966 Suharto Ii nally took over, formed a
government and deposed Sukarno in 1967. Humiliated, Sukarno died in
1970.
The new order meant that the army first led a purge and assumed state
power. Then the doors were opened to technocrats and foreign capital. The
US, Japan, Holland and a number of other Western nations, together with
the IMF, went in with substantial economic support. "Guided democracy··
and the economy which Sukarno had built up continued, but now under the
leadership of the army. Not even the Muslims, who had backed the army
against the communists. were given any significant room to manoeuvre.
It would, however, be incorrect to speak of an insulated military
dictatorship. Keeping pace with lhe gushing oil and the brutal capitalist
development promoted by the sfate, the economy has found its feet and the
regime has gained some freedom of action, both in relation to foreign
capital and domestic criticism. I believe there are some signs which poinr to
the eventual undermining of the regime. But this, as well as so much else in
this background chapter, I shall have reason to return to later in the
book.

55
The Communist Traditio11

Notes

I. For Chapter 4. see Tornquist ( 1 975). Svensson (1977) and ( 1 980). (Cf. also th.: fascinating
contemporary communist analysis by Oinglcy ( 1927) and. e.g,. the following selection from the
standard scholarly literature: Anderson ( 1 972b). Crouch ( 1975). Feith ( 1962). Hindley (1964a).
Kah in ( 1952). May ( 1978). McVey ( 1965). ( 1967). Mortimer ( 1974a). Pluvier ( 1978). Reid ( 1974b).
Robison (1978). Tichelman (1980) and Wcnheim ( 1959). Evidence of developments after 1952
will be presented in detail in later chapters.
2. Research Minister Sumitro in Fnr Easrem Economir Rto·iew ( 1977) p.39.
3. See above p.3: IOff.
4. Prijaji refers to rhe traditional Javanese aristocratic and bureaucratic class. closest to the royal
family. Theprijaji were by no means strictly religious Muslims: on rhe contmry. lslnm was of1en
inrerwoven with Hinduism or animism. for i.nstancc. Pnrallel to the prijaji are the samri.
indicating da<:trinnlly pure Muslims. By comparison to the prijtJjis the samris often had
commercial inleresi.s. rather than political-adminislrative ones. Finally. there arc the abangtm.
who could be described as rhc underlings of the prij"aji and who share the same cultural
norms.
5. Sec fn. 4 above.
6. Cf. Moscow's more critical attitude at the same time. Ch.J. p.29. above.
7. For e�amplc. thc communists were not represented in rhc govemmenL (Later some represent­
utives had to be taken in. but they were given no d.ircct powers.)

56
Part 2

The Communist Hothouse

S. The PKI in Disarray 1

On I 7 August
1 945 the Republic o f lndonesia was proclaimed. The days of
the old aristocracy and collaborationists were numbered unless they could
adapt to the way in which tbe wind was blowing.2 Many of their sons had
revolted both against the position of their parents and against the Dutch.
This young generation of intellectuals and administrators. some with roots
in the aristocracy. now acquired leading positions. The least difficult way to
rise in society was through having education. contacts and the right
opinions. rather than through business or property.3 Attempts to unite all
parts of the colony - with its different ethnic and religious groups, classes
and strata - against the Dutch imperialists, within a nationalist movement
kept them together. Their chief representative was President Sukarno. They
were organized mainly in the Panai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), which was
strongest in Central and Eastern Java and in Bali.
Intellectuals inOuenced by Western ideology and cosmopolitanism were
also able to gain considerable authority in the young republic. They were
comparalive'ly well educated and had administrative experience and
international contacts. They had been uncompromising in their struggle
against the Japanese. They managed to get a parliamentary political system
established. After only a few months, presidential powers were drastically
curtailed. and a socialist, Sutan Sjahrir. was made Prime Minister. The
socialist party was called Partai Socia/is Indonesia (PSI).
But the strongest groups, organizationally, ideologically and militarily.
wern those based on .Islam. They had been the favourites of the Japanese.
who needed moderate allies in their war against the West. The Japanese had
also helped the Muslim bourgeoisie in its attempts to take over the
businesses of the Chinese middlemen.4 There was, however, no Indonesia11
capable of running the large Dutch plantations. Vice-President Hatta
generally represented the interests of the Islamic groups. which by no
means lacked inOuence in Java, but were even stronger in the outer islands.
The different groups co-operated within the Masjumi Party, short for
Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia.
l t may seem, therefore, that Indonesia already had a system o f political
parties in the Western sense. Centrally there was a considerable resem­
blance. But the leaders were those who had held power traditionally,

59
1111! Co1111111111ist Hothouse

irrespective of their anti-colonial or anti-feudal interests. They gai ncd mass

support, or support from other leaders. by playing on personal loyalties. The
leaders were patrons who protected and defended their clients politically,
economically and administratively, but who also took advantage of
them.5
The PIG. however, barely existed. Most of the old leaders who had
survived first the repression of the twenties, and then the Japanese
occupation. had gone into exile. When young communists who remained in
the country tried to rehabilitate the party, they joined the radical
opposition in which Tan Malaka played a decisive role.
Tan Malaka6 had been PKJ leader in the early twenties. Soon he was
forced into exile and became the Comintern's representative in South-East
Asia. When the PIG chose to follow an extreme-left line around the mid­
twenties, partly under the leadership of Musso and Ali min. whom we shall
soon meet, both Mataka and Stalin disapproved. In 1926-27 there was an
attempted revolt which Malaka himself tried to prevent.
Later Malaka left Stalin's Comintern. While Moscow devoted itself to
sectarian politics, Malaka tried to create an independent national
communist party. with little success. When, however, in 1945. Sukarno.
Hatta and the socialists took the lead, following relatively conservative
policies, Malaka was the only well-known charismatic nationalist who was
able to return swiftly from exile and start building an alternative, an
opposition that was partly inOuenced by communism.
Malaka advocated an uncompromising struggle against both the old and
the new forms ofcolonialism and feudalism. Faithful to the Comintem·s ideas
of the twenties, he tried to build a broad front in which there was room for
all so-called anti-feudal and anti-colonial forces. The front objective was to
replace the leaders of the new republic with radical nationalists who more
consistently wanted to develop the revolution.
This, then. was the opposition of which PK.I was a member forjust under
a year. Then the party returned to other old PIG leaders, who brought with
them Moscow's optimistic view of the anti-colonial struggle, which. they
said, ought to be conducted within the framework of a modified popular
front. while paying great attention to the bourgeoisie. The PIG separated
from the opposition anu instead backed the government in power when it
Lried to crush its radical critics.
The communists bu ill an unofficial party alongside the legal PIG. Several
leading communists were members only of the unofficial organization. On
the surface they appeared to act as members of other organizations, such as
the socialist labour party, Parrai Buruh; the trade-union movement. Sentral
Organsasi
i Buruh Se/uruh Indonesia (SOBS!), in which the largest and most
important union was the plantation workers' Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan
Indonesia (Sarbupri); the peasant movement Barisan Tani Indonesia {BTI);
or the semi-military youth movement Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo).
The unofficial PKJ co-ordinated the activities of the communists in
different organizations. and formed a left-wing front. Sajap Kiri. In both

60
 The PKJ in Dsarray
i

parliament and the cabinet the front bad a considerable number of

representatives, so it was able not only to promote left-wing policies, but
also to participate in the elimination oftlie radical opposition and to agree
to compromises with the Dutch. The most important unofficial communist,
Amir Sjarifuddin. became Prime Minister in a popular-front government
which survived from mid-1 947 to January 1948.

A New H a rd Line - and Setbacks

During the period of the popular-front government. the communists

acquired considerable innuence among the armed forces, which were stilJ
mainly made up of different groups in each area without an effective central
leadership. In the meanwhile the Dutch troops advanced. The areas
controlled by the republic shrank. On the outer islands the Dutch created
small states whose leaders were willing to be co-operative. The Renville
Agreement, which the government signed in January 1948. was so
u nfavourable a ceasefire agreement that it led to the fall of the popular-front
govern menI .
Moderate nationalists, socialists and Muslims. led b y Vice-President
Hatta, built a new government. The left was offered minority representation.
which it did not accept.
At the same time. a split occurred in the Socialist Party. Those who
supported Hatta's government formed their own party, Partai Socia/i s
Indonesia (PSI). The left joined the opposition. A new front.Front Demokrasi
Rakjac, was created. Sharp criticism was levelled at Hatta's government. The
front drew closer to the old ideas of Tan Mataka about an uncompromising
struggle against the Dutch.
While the government continued the armed struggle, it also tried to
eliminate all communist influence, especially in the armed forces. The
opposition responded with successful strikes especially amongst plantation
workers.
When the old communist leader Musso returned from exile i n the Soviet
Union in August 1948. the communists with their former policy of making
concessions took firmer shape. Musso was soon made the new leader of the
party.
With him he brought Zhdanov's line and Moscow's new tougher view,
which was partly influenced by the Chinese revolution. He was able to
accept the way local leaders had come to terms with his former policies. A
new strategy was hammered out and referred to in the document Djalan
Banr. "The New Road".7
The PKJ engaged in self-criticism for having left the government in
January and for having accepted earlier concessions to the Dutch. Now
instead. the party said, the bourgeoisie in general and the "big national
bourgeoisie" i n particular had taken over. under the leadership of the PSI.
Masjumi and Hatta. These were prepared to relinquish tbeirown national-

61
The Communst
i Hothouse

bourgeois interests aod sell out the independence of Indonesia to

imperialist forces spearheaded by the US. They were compradors. The
communists were thus forced to sl1oulder the historic task of the bourgeois
nationalists, and carry oul the democratic and national revolution.s
The communists should step forward and unite all truly progressive
forces in and around the party. Those political movements where the
communists held top positions should be dissolved and t11eir members
should join the PK.I. ln turn, the PKI should build and control a national
"front from below". ln the international arena, the party should take its
stand within the only true peace-loving progressive camp, the socialist
camp led by the Soviet Union.
Musso talked openly about his "GottwaId Plan" (Prague, Februa1y 1948).
This included not only a communist-dominated front from bel.ow. initiated
by several organizations but with an individual (personal) membership. but
aJso mass action which would enable the communists to achieve
government power and successive control of the state apparatus.
Presumably it was intended Lo pursue an intensilied military struggle
against the Dutch alongside the mass action. Particularly in the occupied
areas. there were units which sympathized with the communists and which
were as strong as the government's. There the PKJ would be able to seize the
in itiative.9
The communists started to put their strategy into practice. Unofficial
communists came forward. There were strikes and occupations; poor
peasants demanded that the endowments (ranah bengkok) of the village
leaders should be divided up; there were invitations from the PK.I to the PNI
and Masjumi to negotiate about the initiation of a national fronL which. as
everyone knew. the communists intended to dominate. Needless to say. the
PNI and Masjumi rejected the invitations.
Even though the PKI's policies were now closer to Tan Malaka's line than
i.o 1946 and 1947. there was no broad co-operation within the left either.
Malaka was of old a main opponent of the leaders of the revolt i.o the
twenties, Musso andAJimin.1°Furthermore, he refused lo toe the Stalin line,
and so was promptly called a Trotskyist. A somewhat more apt name would
have been Titoist.
The Hatta government used the new PKI strategy as an excuse for an
open counter-attack. The armed forces were to be reorganized. prof­
essionally trained and placed under central command. There was a risk of
communist sympathizers. especially in Pesindo. being disarmed.
Armed conflicts soon broke ouL primarily in Solo (Surakarta) near the
border of East Java. These were manageable for the moment, although the
town had a WiJd West atmosphere. But when similar conOict spread to
Madiuo. more than 100 kilometres to the easL and the young communists
took over the town in September 1948 for defence purposes. the dams
burst.
The tictions of the local communists in Madiun had not in any way been
planned by the leadership of ilie party.11 When, however. the leaders

62
 The PKJ in Disarray

arrived, the relations between the rebels and the government in Yogyakarta
(nearly 200 kilometres to the south-west) were so strained that there was no
way out. The Hatta government and. after pressure from the anny,12 even
President Sukarno accused the communists o f trying to take power in the
whole country. Musso and the PKI maintained that they had the choice
between fighting and total defeat.13
Army units crushed the communists in Madiun. Musso and former
P rime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin were amongst those who were killed. The
rebellious communists were declared outlaws. and anti-communist Muslims
took this as an opportunity to "clean up'' the villages. In the Cinal analysis,
their control of the land was threatened by the poor peasants mobilized by
the PK.I. According to the PKI. about 10.000 people were killed in the
aftermath of the Madiun affair.14 Renewed attacks from the Dutch
prevented an even greater massacre. Once again communists and
government soldiers fought on the same side.

Tht: PKI in Disarray

The Madiun revolt caused the PK.1 to be thrown into disarray. The leader of
the Socialist Party.15 Tan Ling Djie, dissociated himself from the revolt and
did not accept Musso's Djalan Baru.
Tan Ling Djie maintained that the communists ought once again to
become active in other parties and political groups while the PKJ should lie
low. Mass actions which could be stigmatized as communist ought. for the
time being. to be shelved in favour of parliamentary work.
Several young Musso followers did. however, manage to escape from the
area of conflict around Madiun. They continued the struggle against the
Dutch.16 One of the members ofMusso's Politburo, O.N. Aid it, is moreover
credited with having rakeo himself to Vietnam and China.17 Today former
PKJ leaders dispute this and assert that Aidit hid in Sumatra.1K Perhaps
uplifted by his experiences abroad, whether true or false, he started working
openly with the PK1 in July 1950. AidiL Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman bu ill
a team which took upon itself the task of picking up the fallen manHe of
Musso. All were in their mid-thirties and former members of Musso's
Politburo. But they had been schooled more by stalwart struggles against
the Dutch and the Japanese than by the international communist
movement.19
Aidifs fraction worked quickly and dynamically to restore the PKI to the
condition recommended by Musso. They recommenced the publication of
the party's theoretical periodical,Bintang Merah, and soon claimed that they
were distributing 10,000 copies, even rhough at rhat poinr rhe party could not
have had more than half that number of members.!0 They persuaded the
commun ists in rhe Labour Party. Partai Buruh. to join forces with the PKI.
And Pesindo became the PKJ's youth movement, Permuda Rakjac. They
split. and played the older leaders off against one another, with Tan Ling

63
The Communst
i Hothouse

Djie and his Socialist Party at the head.

In the Ai.dit group's eyes, Sukarno's a11d particularly Harta's government
had betrayed the revolution when, at the round-table conference in 1949,
they had negotiated Indonesian independence at the cost of substantial
concessions. Furthermore. the largest party in the government, Masjumi,
had close connections to the fanatical Muslims of West Java who formed
Darul Islam.2 1 This organization refused to recognise the new republic,
fighting instead for an Islamic state. In addition, it was obvious that the
government and the President intended to pursue former colonial
economic policies. even if a domestic bourgeoisie in subordinate positions
would complement them.22
The Aidit fraction and dissatisfied labour and peasant leaders thus
jointly organized militant strikes and occupations, in stark contrast to the
caution displayed by the older leaders. Many trade-union leaders
supported him because they were more impressed by Aidit's determination
to take up the struggle again, and start rebuilding the labour movement.
than by his sophisticated political ideas.23 Late in 1950, for example. about
700,000 plantation workers went on strike for 50 days.24 Peasants and
workers who occupied abandoned plantations refused to budge. Many
peasants refused to lease their rice paddies for the cultivation of sugar. The
colonial economy was shaken to its foundations, and the government could
offer no alternative.:!.'
1he Natsir government, led by Masjumi, succeeded the Hatta cabinet in
September 1950. In February 1951 it declared strikes in all important
companies to be illegal. The government was bolstered by the state of
emergency, which had formally been in operalion since 1939.26 The
outlawing of strikes sharpened contradictions.
In January 195 1 the Aidit group finally managed to take over the reins of
power in the Politburo. Aside from the four-man leadership. there only
remained Alim in. The issue that caused the fall of the old leaders was their
desire to stick to the Lreaty with the Dutch over Irion Jaya (West New
Guinea). The Tan Ling Djie fraction turned against the PNI and Sukarno,
as most communists had consistently done since 1948, and maintained that
the inhabitants of lrian Joya ought to determine their own future.
The Aid it group, on the other hand. argued that the entire former colony
ought to stand united against imperialism. There was, moreover, a
possibility of joining together at the parliamentary level with the PNT
against the government. [ [ the PKJ did not demand the absorption oflrian
Jaya into the Indonesian republic, the communists would insulate
themselves from public opinion and the political dynamism of
nationa1 ism.
The opposition did indeed succeed in toppling the Natsir cabinet in
March L951. The formal pretext was the issue of local self-government, but
in reality strikes and compromises with the Dutch played an equally
important part.
The opposition had formed ajoinl front. the BPP. and the P K l sensed the

64
 The PK/ in Disarray

coming of a new dawn. Perhaps here were to be found the seeds of the
communist-dominated front which Musso had been seeking.27 In lJ1e long
run. perhaps even a popular democratic government would become
possible.
AJI these dreams were shattered by the coming to power of the Sukiman
government in April 1951. Sukarno succeeded in reuniting the PNI and
Masjumi. The government followed tough pro-Western and anti­
communist policies. The PKI was furious and returned to its anti­
government activities.
In August the government ordered extensive raids against its opponents
generally and against communists in particular.
Despite trade-union threats of confrontation. the government dared to
retain a de facto prohibition of strikes. by introducing a regulation
stipulating three weeks' obligatory notice and negotiations before a strike. If
the attempts at mediation were unsuccessful. the government could
prescribe another cooling-down period. The new law was passed as an
emergency ruling, without proper treatment in parliament.28
I o his report to parliament in October, Sukiman himself said that about
15,000 people had been arrested for anti-government activities.29
The PIG was paralysed by the new wave ofrepression. Many of its leaders
were arrested.30 Was the party facing the same problem as in 1948 - that of
accepting defeat or offering violent resistance?
Aidit, Lukman and Njojo managed to go underground. They chose quite
a different line from Musso's in 1948. The communists would not allow
themselves to be provoked, but would continue to work openly. It was the
government and its lackeys who would be forced to display their anti­
democratic policies.31
These defensive tactics bore fruit. The PK.I did not accuse all the
ministers, and were careful to avoid those of the PNI. Io parliament the
government was subjected to sharp criticism even from anti-communists.
And in February 1952 it fell. because of its attempts to negotiate a "mutual
security aid" agreement with the United States.
But the Aidit four-man leadership, which was sitting re-reading Lenin's
"Left-wing" Communism - an Infantile Disorder. planned more than a new
tactic. This became obvious when Aidit, during negotiations with the
government. suddenly agreed to give critical support to a cabinet Jed by the
PNL even though communists would not even be represented. The party
even agreed to limit the number of strikes. And one month later, in May
1952, when Wilopo. a PNI member, formed a government and the PKI
celebrated ilS anniversary, cheers were heard for President Sukarno - the
man whom only a few months earlier had been called semi-fascist and a
communist-hunter. I t was only during the second time around that the
astounded members at the meeting joined in the ovations. By this time
Alimin had been joined by Aidit when he led the cheering.32

65
The Communist Ho1'1011se

Notes

I. In lhis comprehensive outline I have primarily. and where no other reference is spccilied. made
use or 1hc following research: Anderson ( I972b). ( 1976). Feith (1962). Hindley ( 1964a).
Indonesian Political Thinking( 1970). Kahin ( 1952). McVey ( 1969a). Pluvier( l 978). Reid ( 1974a)
and ( 1974b), Wrnhcim {I 959) and Tornquist ( 1975). Since 1he chapter holds liulc tha1 is new from
a research poin1 of view. I have only specified sources in a few cases.
2. According 10 the Indonesian historian Onghokham. u surprising number ofconservatives soon
joined the revolution. These were. among others. the so-callcd pamong praja. the local baililTs or
administrators of the Ou1ch. The most obstinate were to be found among 1he aristocracy on 1he
outer islands. Interview. 18 October 1980 in Jakana.
3. er. Reid ( 1 974h) pp.Jn:
4. Wertheim ( 1959) p.121.
5. Sartono (1980) gives a clear indication of the myriad organizations 1hat grew up round different
leaders and collapsed with them. Sartono 1alks about bapaki.tm (bapak � father. protector.
respected man).
6. The mos1 comprehensive study ofTan Malaka in the period up to 1945 is lo be found in Poeze
11976). Helen Jarvis a1 1he University of Sydney is working on a more analytical book on
Malaka.
7. Djalan Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia (1953).
8. er. also Aidit ( 1953) in Aidil (1961a) pp.74ff.
9. Soerjono ( 1980). especially p.88.
10. The communists on Sumatra were nearer to Malaka. who was himself a Sumatran. Bui national
co-operation between. e.g.. Alim in and Malaka was impossible since. in the words of a veteran
communist. -they had been quarrelling since 1926··. Interview No. 59. Jaknna. 1980.
11. This i s corroborated also by rcseurchers such as J.M. Kroef in periodicals like PrtJb/ems of
Com1111111i.m1. er. Kroef (l958b) p.17. fn.6.
12. Pauker ( 1 969) p.15.
l3. PKrs version of the Madiun affair is rela led inlcr alia in Aidi1 ( 1953) pp.I 03-137: The Madiun
revoh was completely and uucrly provoked by the govemmenL
From Lheside of the local Pesinllo leadership. the claim is made !hat lhecommunisls 1ookovcr
power together with the deputy mayor. after an aucmpt by him to send reports upwards nbou1
anacks on the left. which ought to have been sentby the ordinary mayor. but which he did not do.
were declared illegal. -when Musso and Amir Sjarifuddin and others arrived. Lhey were not
angry with us- but realized we had been provoked:· lmcrview No.59. Jakartn. 1980. Prime
sou ce.
r
According 10 01hcrve1ernn communists. however. Musso was livid. and tried unsuccessfully to
reach Sukarno with an explanatory message sen! by courier. Interviews 61 and 62. Jakarta.
1980.
14. Aidit (1953) in Aidit (1961a) p.77.
15. 11ie former leader of 1he Socialist Party. nol to be confused with the breakaway PSI
members.
16. Even Lhe young leader or the rcvoll. Pcsindos Socmarsono. escaped. He was tim:s1ed near
Semarang by the Dutch. who did nol know who he was. so Lhat he wns later able lo nee to
Sumatra. There he lived a quiet life as a leach er for several years. partly so ns not lo make things
diflicult for lhe PK! leadership. In the sixties he returned to J;ova and joined those who were
critical of purty leaders. oncn from the left. but usually for Lheir autocratic ways. Soemarsono is
regarded and now regards himselfmore as o na1ionnlis1 1han as a communist. lniervi�ws No. 35.
58. 61 and 62. Jakarta. 1980. Primary sources.
17. g .. Hindley (1964a) p.23.
Sec. e.
JS. Interview Nos. 20. 24and 58.Jakarta. 1980. Oneoflhose interviewed talks aboul bow he indirectly
helped Aidit to gel 10 his parents in Sumatra fora few weeks.Thereafler Aid ii remmed to Jakarta
where the person interviewed saw him. The person who helped Aid it directly was then chairman
ofthe harbour workers· union. Sjam of the PSI. La1er Sjam was to play a key role in 1he cvcnts of
September-October 1965. ltought. however. to be pointed out thal 1hcsourcc referred to is roduy a

66
 The PKL in Disarray

severe cri1ic of Aid it, for which reason these details ought preferably to be further checked.
19. For deiails abou1 the four. sec Hindley ( 1964a) pp.23-25. Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.29-42 or Cayrac-
Blanchard ( 1 973) pp.186-194.
20. Hi ndlcy (I 964a) p.24.
21. As regards Dor;d f.rlnm see. e.g
.. Utrecht ( 1 978) and Horikoshi { 1975).
22. During the Natsirgovemmcnt, already in 1950-51 Finance MinislcrSumitro formulated u plan
for the creation of nn lndoncsiao bourgeoisie. See. e.g.. Feith ( 1 962) p.174 and Suucr (1959).
especially pp.772-78.
23. Interview No. 8. Amsterdam_ 1980. nod Nos. 29. 58 and 62. Jakarta. 1980. Primary sources.
24. Tedjasukmana ( 1958) p p . 1 12rT.. Aidil ( 1 953) in Aidil (1961a) pp.SO. 4.
8 According to Tedja­
sukmann (1961). pp.2211T.. in 1950 144 strikes were registered. mainly on the planiaiions.
involving more than 490,000 workers. Jn 1951 thcre were about 319.000 workers involved in 541
strikes. The sources. which I have been able 10 study myself. arc srntistics from the Ministry of
Labour. (Interview No. 55. Jakarta. 1980.) There the number of disputes during 1951 is given as
2.754. Cf. differences in Hawkins ( 1967) p.266
.
25. For an illustrative case study of sugar cultivation. sec Gordon ( 1 979a).
26. Sec e.g, Tedjasukman;1 (1958) p. I l.!.
27. The BPP was. however. nol a front from below with individual membcrsh.ip. but from the top.
between panics. (To acquire leading positions the communists had to rely on u few members to
be particularly knowledgeable. active and well co-ordinated and therefore able to rnke the
iniriativc. in a fronl from below, despite the small size of the party.)
28. See. e.g.. Tcdjasukmaoa ( 1 958) pp.I 13ff. The Minister of Labour at that time was responsible for
the law. Tcdjasukmana himselr. who wos on the right of the Parmi Burah. says:

Suki man wanted lo at"t against the strikes bul could not gei any support. I simply suggested
..
prohibiting them. It was an audacious idea. '"You must become Minister or Labour . they
said._, . Ifone cooling-down period was insufficient. wejust polonged
r iL . . . The communists
were furious. But I knew that their mouths were bigger tliao their muscles. So I was able to
persuade most of them not to strike. and I encouraged their employers tocompromisc. lfthcy
ncvenbelcss went on strike. we sent in police and military units. Sometimes. in certain small
and unimportantcompanies. I allowed the workers toslrike.especially ifthc trade-union was
not communist led. I knew tba1 neither 1hc parties nor 1he trade-union movement were
strong. AU that was needed was a strong man_

(Tedjasukmana now works with trade-union education. among other things. within the
organizations allowed by the regime. with the support of Wes! Gem1any.) lotervicw.Jakitna. 25
October 1980.
29, Feith (1962) p.189.
30. Ajdil (1951) in Aidit (1961a) p.28 11nd Aidit (1954) in Aidi1 (1963) p.260.
31. Aidit (1951) i n Aidit (1961a) pp.5-12.
32. Brackman ( 1963) p.175. Hindlcy( l964a) p.257. Ajdit"s speech can befound in Aidil(l961a) pp.31 -
47.

67
6. A New Strategy

Whal had actually happened? What was the basis of these concessions and
what was the idea behind them?1

Strong Enemies2

According to the PK.I, Indonesia's political independence was limited and

did not mean the country was economically independent. Indonesia had
been forced into a union with the Netherlands under the Dutch royal
family. The Dutch government determined the scope of Indonesia's
economic policies .and foreign relations. Furthermore, Indonesia was
bound to pay considerable reparations to the Netherlands. The foreign
capitalists had regained their former plantations. companies and rights.
Dutch experts had decisive influence in both the civil and the military
administrations. The government in the Netherlands refused to relinquish
lrian Jaya.
Indonesia's own trade and industry were, in other words, very small and
weak. Indonesian Chinese had during the colonial period acquired a
relatively strong position, often as middlemen. They were branded as
foreigners and colonial lackeys, particularly by competing Muslim capital­
ists. But much of the Lrade, industry and handicrafts the Chinese were
engaged in was as a matter of course, part of the national economy,
according to the PKI, even if they ought to produce more and trade less.
Presumably many were interested in such a development, but rival
Indonesians prevented them by various prohibitions and political rest­
rictions. The Chinese required political protection. particularly against the
extreme Muslims. The nationalists were not friends of the Chinese either.
So it was that some Chinese capitalists were not unfavourably disposed to
the only non-racial party, the PKI.3
Muslim businessmen, on the other hand. were not only anti-communist,
but had also, for hundreds of years, fought against state control and
regulation. During the twenties this had been progressive, and they had
even worked together with the communists against the colonial state. And
during the forties they often joined with the nationalists. But now that the

68
 A New Strategy

Dutch had finally been driven from the palace, the Muslim capitalists
wanted not only to take over the profitable business dealings ofthe Chinese,
but also to transfer a good deal of the old and often state-run colonfal
economy into private hands. The Muslims were involved not only in trade.
handicrafts and petty industries au over the country, but also i n the export­
oriented smaU plantations on the outer islands.
When the PK.I talked about the Muslim capitalists, as it did above. the
party usually took Masjumi as its point of departure, since this was the
umbrella organization of several Muslim movements. In government
Masjumi had conducted a bitter anti-communist and remarkably pro­
Western policy. The PK.I said that Masjumi had tried to destroy the
progressive alliance between workers and peasants and rebuild the colonial
economy. Masjumi had intimate contacts with groups which were openly
fighting against the republic and which terrorized the population,
especially Darul Islam on West Java. According to the PKI. Masjumi's
policies favoured the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie.
It can and bas been disputed whether it is reasonable to say that Masjumi
was the organization of the comprador bourgeoisie. The PKI's analysis was
based more on the politics ofMasjumi than on its social base, Rex Mortimer
maintained.4 That is true. but not especially remarkable. Both Lenin and
Mao allowed concrete actions in general and political activities in
particular to weigh heavily when determining who was friend and who was
foe. Lenin found what was most important was whether a movement fought
against imperialism and feudalism or not, as well as whether it was anti­
communist or not.5 No one has maintained anything but that Masjumi's
policies were anti-communist and that the party soug11l to co-operate with
foreign capitalists.
Even when the PK.I hinted lhat an organization which was bent on
pursuing comprador policies, virtually by definition had its class base
amongst the comprador class, this was anchored io Leni_n's tendency to
regard political organizations as expressions of direct class rule.6
The PKJ used a similar analysis when dealing with the PSI. With
education and international contacts the socialists acquired considerable
influence over the state apparatus. They took as their point of departure the
arguments of the Second International about a partially progressive
colonialism and capitalism. Capitalism must first be fully developed; only
later could there be talk of socialism. Foreign capital spread capitalism to
Indonesia and with control from the state this could have positive effects. If
Masjumi stood for private capitalism. then the PSI leant towards state
capitalism in a mixed economy.
In the eyes of the PKI, the PSJ's policies were a gross betrayal. From 1952
the PKJ Launched a bitter attack against the PSI. Aidit said that the socialists
were playing the game of the compradors at the same time as the leaders
were not slow to line their own pockets through their foreign partners. The
socialists also tried to work against the communists by splitting the trade­
union movement.7

69
The Communist Hothouse

This type of analysis was also rooted in Leninism.8 And when leading
socialists tried to conduct a coup d'etat together with senior officers in
October 1952, the PKJ could rightly attack the "democratic socialists" for
being undemocratic.
Where, then. did the PKl find its national bourgeoisie? The party did not
make many precise definitions on questions ofclass structure. On the other
hand, it was pointed out that the PN1 had moved away from Masjumi
during the Natsir government. Later the PNI and Masjumi were reconciled,
but the nationalists repudiated Sukiman's virulent anti-communism. The
PN1 and later also Sukarno wanted to continue the struggle against
imperialism in general and against the Dutch in particular. The PNI
contemplated working together with the PKl and it was Sukarno who, in
October l952. saved the country from the coup instigated b y the socialists
and senior military men. The PNI and Sukarno refused to transfer state
property to private ownership, and preferred to talk about nationalization
and assistance to domestic trade and industry at the expense of the export of
former colonial products. Thereby. said the PKl. the PNJ and Sukarno had
started pursuing policies which were in the interests of the national
bourgeoisie. Finally, the nationalists spoke out against "feudal remnants".9
Naturally, it is correct, as Mortimer among others has pointed out. that
the national bourgeoisie did not exactly Oock to the PNJ.10 On the contrary,
as has already been indicated. the PNI attracted a new generation of young
administrators and intellectuals whose roots were in Java's old aristocracy.
Their career opportunities were to be found in the central and local
administration and not i n the economy. The picture of a middle-strata party
was not altered b y some businessmen, many wealthy peasants and the
sizeable number of urbanized petty bourgeoisie who. nevertheless. were
PNI members. At the same time, all agree that the PNT, before long
supported by Sukarno and later following in his tracks, started pursuing an
anti-imperialist policy, talked of the need for measures agai nst feudalism
and accepted the PKI.
In this case, too, it seems to me that the leadership of the PKl had a
foothold in Leninism when they maintained that the PNT and Sukarno
tried to pursue progressive bourgeois politics. 1 1 Whether the PKJ was right
or wrong is quite another matter.
When the PKI moreover maintained that the PNf's base was in the
national bourgeoisie. it was of course mistaken, but this view was in line
with Lenin's and particularly with Stalin's outlook that parties practised
direct class rule.12 Progressive bourgeoisie or not, the PKl leaders
emphasized the risk that the PNJ and Sukarno would form an alliance with
Masjurni and Hatta instead of seeking co-operation with the left This
happened in 1948, under the Suki man governme11l. At all costs the PKJ had
to prevent this being repeated.13

70
 A New Strategy

The Rural Situation

The revolution had ground to a halt in the villages as well. The sultan in
Solo. to take one example. had certainly lost his ability to exploit the
peasants directly. And many peasants had regained control over land
which collaborating village leaders had helped Dutch sugar companies,
among others, to lease. The PK.I leaders, however, emphasized that most of
what they called feudal institutions and relations had survived and played a
decisive role. Indonesia was, according to the PK!, not only semi-colonial,
but semi-feudal as well.

The situation of the peasants. who comprise some 70 per cent of the Indonesian
population. is no better than it was ia the past. Serious and important remnants of
feudalism arc still extant in Indonesia: these are: the right of the large landlord to
monopolize the ownership of lands which arc worked by the peasants, the majority of
whom cannot possibly own land and arc therefore forced to real land from
landowners under any and all conditions: the payment ofland-rents to the landlords
in the form ofcommodities. which commodities comprise a very great majority of the
yield of the harvest of the peasants resulting in misery for most of the peasants; the
system ofland-rent in the form of work on the lands of the landlords. which places the
majority of the peasants in the position of slaves: and. lastly. the accumulation of
debts. which strangles the majority ofthe peasants and places them i n the position of
slaves 10 the landowners. 14

That the PK! characterized Indonesia as semi-feudal with a feudal past

has been criticized, starting from more or less explicit theories thatJava and
its agrarian societies in particular, in contrast to the commercial Muslim
ones, were characterized by a n Asian mode of production rather than a
feudal one.15 From such points of departure, a good deal of the PKI's
analysis can be called into question, particularly whether they in fact
neglected to analyse politicaJ and ideologicaJ dependency relationships in
the rural areas o f Java. But the fundamental thesis that the power of the
lords is dependent on a concentration of land and must be attacked by
redistTibu tion of the land - continues to survive. And, needless to say, no one
questions whether the PKI's outlook harmonized with communist
tradition.

The PKI's Weakness

On the whole. the situation was dismal. The opposition was powerful. while
the PK.I was badly damaged. At most. the party had 7,000 members.16 In late
1 9 5 1 , thousands were in prison. There was no way of co-ordinating activities
and there were still many internal conOicts to be resolved.
The communists had been routed from the state apparatus a n d disarmed.
Strikes had been forbidden by the government, without the opposition
being able co do very much about it.
The PK.I was. furthermore. not deeply rooted amongst the peasants.17

71
The Communist Hothouse

With the exception of certain plantation areas of Sumatra. it was a Javanese

party.18 Finally. the anti-communism of the Cold War was rampant. There
was war in Korea, and the PKJ was not regarded as being reliable.
Pronounced Muslims caUed the PK.I impious materialists.

Long-term Strategy

The PK.l's about-face in late 1951 and early 1952 was thus based on the
leadership's realization that neo-colonfalism had fndonesia in a tight grip
and th at the PKI was weak and threatened. The revolutionary resurgence of
the second half of the 1940s had ground to a halt. Musso·s objectives were
now too advanced and his strategy unrealistic. The PK.I did not have a hope
of joining any govemmenl and had even less chance of dominating a
national united front from below. Instead the party was once again
isolatedY1
The leaders of the PKJ were now looking for a theoretical perspective
which fitted a neo-colonial situation in which the communists were weak.
There was little new t o be found in Moscow, which had lost interest in tbe
Indonesian revolution. Much could be learned from comrades in China
and Vietnam. but there the communists had long since managed to acquire
a dominant position in the nationalist movement as a whole. According to
the PKT, an armed struggle was not appropriate for Indonesia. where the
communists had no liberated areas nor sanctuaries in neighbouring
countries. First. said Aidit, the party should strive to retain legal possibilities
for struggle. Armed struggle could not be a goal in itself.20
Instead the leaders of the PKJ turned back to Lenin·s views of the twenties
to find a perspective that could be applicable. In particular Lenin's ideas of
how communists ought to act when a revolutionary situation was
conspicuous by its absence (in '"Left-wing" Communism an Infantile
-

Disorder) appealed to the Aidit leadership. The communists should look for
temporary co-operation with other progressive forces, maybe even take part
in broad-based governments.21
The same doctrine of co-operation characterized Lenin's and the
Comjntern's theses on the struggle in the colonies. If communists are weak,
they ought to make common cause with revolutionary-bourgeois move­
ments against imperialism and feudalism. but should take care not to be
swallowed b y them.
In this the PKl rooted its new independent line. The leadership of the
party refused to import and copy viewpoints that were opportune within the
communist movement. Instead it tried to adapt and apply the theoretical
framework of the twenties to the specific situation in Indonesia. The PKJ
belonged to one of the few parties that could not in a simple fashion be
accused of mechanical formalism. economism and other tendencies rooted
in Stalinist dogma. On the contrary, the serious criticism was often
concerned with the leaders of the PKI not sticking sufficiently strongly to

72
 A New Srraregy

their principles.22
When the PKI's opponents joined forces and rolled up their shirt sleeves,
Musso answered in similar fashion. Aid it, however, refused to be provoked
into taking up the fight with U1eir opponents on their terms.23 Instead. it was
necessary first to try to split the enemy. defend the party's opportunities for
working, and build a strong government Then it would be in a position to
go on to the attack.24
This had little in common with rigid thinking in stages. The PKI did
indeed use Stalin's words in talking about Indonesia being semi-colonial
and semi-feudal and about the need for completing a national and
democratic revolution before one could start discussing the struggle for
socialism. But, at the same time, the PKI maintained. with Lenin and Mao,
that the communists could lead the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist
revolution towards socialism without having to endure a fully-developed
capitalist stage.25
The more modest ambition which the Aidit leadership now embraced
was concerned with creating the preconditions for a struggle against
imperialism and feudalism; only later would the time be ripe to talk about
controlling a number of fronts and of completing the revolution of
1945.26

Democracy!

Thus the PKI leadership were concerned, first, to co-operate with those who
defended democratic rights and thereby gave the PK.I the opportunity of
propagating, mobilizing and organizing. Other forces had to be isolated. In
particular, the leaders ofMasjumi and the PSI had shown themselves to be
bitterly anti-communist. The PNI and Sukar:no, on the other hand, were
clearly not averse to working against either the PSI or Masjumi, nor lo
accepting the support of th e PK.I.
TheAidit leadership simply decided to offer its critical support to the PN1
and Sukarno, in exchange for which the PKI would be able to operate
legally and be accepted as a reliable national force.27
In this way. the PKI came to lend its critical support to the PNI-lec
government of Wilopo in early 1952 without the communists even being
represented.
This front from above was expected to give PKJ the possibility or legally
reinforcing its position. The Aidit leadership adhered to Musso's idea that
the PKI ought to create its own profile and that all communists should work
within the party. On the other hand, the leadership now advocated a ·'mass
party ofLeninisl type". Since the PK.I leaders counted on being able to work
in peaceful and democratic ways, at least during the period in which the
party was building up its position, there were no reasons to copy s\avishly
the small and strictly cadre-led illegal parties. Furthermore, the Chinese
party had demonstrated the importance of the party retaining intimate

73
The Com1111111i
s1 Hothouse

contact with the masses. But one should retain Lenin's view of a communist
party. His principles were valid irrespective of whether the party worked
legaUy or underground.
TheAidit group thus retained the organizational principle of democratic
centralism and a totalitarian cadre in central and regional positions,
besides the many members and candidates for membership at lower
levels.28 Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of all members
being schooled and politicaUy conscious. at least familiar with the policies
of the leadership. But they should be schooled while taking part in the
struggle. It was regarded as sectarian to set high requirements for
admission. The general perspective was. however. one of a party which led
the masses rather than one that was controlled by the spontaneous
consciousness of the people.29
Alongside the party. but closely related to it. the communists would also
organize various fronts from below.30 The most important was the trade­
union movement SOBSI. by far the largest confederation of trade unions in
Indonesia: the peasant organization BTI:31 the youth movement Pemuda
Rakjat (formerly Pesindo): the women's organization Gerwani (Gemkan
Wanita lndonesia);31 the veterans· organization Perbepsi (Persaruan Bekas
Pedjuang Seluruh Indonesia); the organization ofcultural workers (Lembaga
Kebudjaan Rakjat): a student teachers' organization. IPPI (lkatan Pemuda
Peladjar Indonesia): later on. in 1956. an organization for students, CGMI
(Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia): and Baperki (Sadan Permus­
jawararan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia). formed in 1954 to organize ethnic
minorities. especiaUy the Chinese.
Through these fronts from below. the communists wanted to build a
social alliance between workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie,
under their own informal leadershjp, l f such an aUiance were to grow in
strength. the PKI would be able to influence the front from above. thanks to
Sukarno and the PNI. in a radical direction.
But, and i t is particularly important to note this. co-operation with the
PNT and Sukarno was a precondition for the alliance being built at all, and
for it to be strongly forged. The party leadership was not unaware of
this.33
Why should the PNl and Sukarno give the PKI the opportunity to work
legally. building fronts from beJow and creating the preconditions for a
communist-dominated people's democratic government? The PKI itself
calculated that the PNI and Sukarno both needed a measure of democracy
to win the support of the masses, especially against Masjumi and the PSL
The latter, the PKI maintained. followed policies which were in the interests
of the imperialists and the feudal lords. The PN1 and Sukarno, on the other
hand, followed policies which served the interests of the national
bourgeoisie.
What guarantees did the PKJ have for believing that the PNI and
Sukarno would continue following such policies and that they would be
successful?

74
 A New Strategy

At this point the PK.I leaders did a theoretical about-tum. Hitherto actual
events and political actors had been analysed. Following Lenin it was said
that different actors had their place in different classes and fractions. But
the important thing for Lenin, as well as for the PK.I, had been what the
actors actually did.
The Ai.dit group now began to regard the PNI and Sukarno not as
political actors but as being almost identical with the national bourgeoisie.
After that, what the PNl and Sukarno actually did was no longer the crucial
factor, but instead the PKI focused on the deterministic schedule that Stalin
developed in the twenties. This determined how the national bourgeoisie
had to act. Obstacles not only hampered capitalist development in
underdeveloped countries. according to this schedule, but blocked it. In
order to realize its objective interests, the national bourgeoisie was,
therefore, obliged to move against imperialism and feudalism.34 Since.
according to the Aidit group, the PNI and Sukarno could be analysed in the
same way as the national bourgeoisie, they would be forced now and in the
future, to turn against feudalism and imperialism, u1lless they wished to
commit suicide or be duped. To succeed they were forced to dissolve the
political power monopoly and mobilize the masses. Therefore, they would
be forced to defend democratic rights.35
By the communists and nationa]jsts revea]jng that Masjumi and the PSI
pursued policies in the interests of the feudal lords and compradors, the
PKJ calculated that the Muslim masses and the socialist workers would
finaUy look for other representatives. The communists were hoping to
absorb a large number in front organizations like SOBSI and BTI. and
believed many would move closer to the PNI.36
It would be possible to persuade the national bourgeoisie to abandon
their own interests since they were too weak to be able to lead the struggle
against imperialism and feudalism to victory. But tbe communists, with
their own alliance between workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie.
oughl to assist the national bourgeoisie, remind them oftbeirclass interests,
and force them onwards, in the end under the leadership of the
communists.37
Both in 1928 and again in 1948, Stalin had repudiated the national
bourgeoisie; in 1948, at least, the "big national bourgeoisie", on the grounds
that il threatened the communists, had not moved against feudalism and
Lrnperia]jsm and thus abandoned its class interests. But the PKJ preferred to
quote Stalill's more moderate views of the midi-twenties, when be criticized
the PKJ. among other reasons, for not co-operating with the national
bourgeoisie.38 Quite recently Mao and the Chinese communists
demonstrated how successful their front politics bad been. Furthermore,
co-operation with Sukarno and the PNI simply meant that the PKI only
needed to build up their own strength. Later, when it was time for serious
discussions on the national and democratic revolution, one had to be
prepared for hesitancy on the part of the national bourgeoisie. But by then
the communists would be strong enough to take matters into their own
hands.
75
Tire Co111111
1 111is1 Hothouse

Anti-imperialism!

On the same basis. the Aidit group decided that the nationalists, wbom tbey
equated with the national bourgeoisie, had objective interests in developing
a national economy of a traditional capitalist type, but that they were
blocked by imperialism and feudalism.
To counteract the imperialists, the nationalists had to protect and
strengthen private domestic trade and industry. They had to try building up
an interconnected and balanced economic structure which would enable
the country to become less dependent on t�e export ofraw materials and the
import of linished products. They had to nationalize foreign companies,
refuse to devalue at the expense of the primarily foreign-owned exporters,
and see to it that domestic producers received the raw materials, machinery
and credits they required, while at the same Lime protecting local industry
from foreign competitors. Finally. trade with the socialist countries ought to
increase, thereby decreasing dependence on the capitalist world market. All
Lbis demanded state ownership of the most important enterprises and state
control of the economy as a whole.39
The PKl had no clearly worked-out theory and analysis of the
Indonesian state and state apparatus. Obviously Lenin's extreme idea ofthe
state, as the instrument of the ruling class which had to be conquered from
without. was rejected. The PKl leadership wrote that state power did indeed
rest on the compradors and feudal lords. But. as we have seen, other classes
and fractions could also make themselves felt. either directly or indirectly,
in parliament. in the government and in the state apparatus.40
This meant that the PKl relinquished the idea of a frontal assault on the
established state and refrained from building up its own dual power.
I nstcad, class struggles were seen to exist within the state and these were
seized upon. I n no way did this necessarily mean that the party abandoned
its revolutionary outlook to the benefit of gradual attempts at taking over.
Awareness of major contradictions, and in particular of drastic changes, still
remained.�1
So as not to disturb but rather to support the work of the national
bourgeoisie for a national economy, the workers' struggle had to be limited
to primarily anti-imperialist actions, against foreign capitalists for example.
Domestic trade and industry had to be protected. Socialism was not on the
agenda. But even a national economy would give the workers morejobs and
a higher standard of living. Imagine what would happen if all the riches that
left Indonesia every day were to remain, the communists and nationalists
argued.42
Another and equally important reason for the workers having to content
themselves with struggling against anti-imperialism was that the peasants
were not interested in socialism. There were few workers but many peasants.
Indonesia's national and democratic revolution must rake as its point of
departure the agrarian problems. Workers must enter an alliance with the
peasants. For the peasants, the struggle concerned getting rid of the

76
 A New Straregy

imperialists and the remnants of feudalism. and winning a bit of land for
themselves. If the workers fought for socialism at that time. then tJ1ey would
isolate themselves from the majority of the people. the peasants, the PKJ
leadership maintained. The alliance with the peasants had, for the time
being, to rest on anti-feudal grounds.43

Anti-feudalism!

The communists were convinced that the peasants had bourgeois interests
in counteracting the remnants of feudalism. Since the weak national
bourgeoisie would not be able to completely solve the peasant's problems
with the feudal lords, there was room for the communists, who could carry
through a consistent bourgeois land reform, and. later. led by the workers'
interest in socialism. prescribe collective solutions.44
In the introductory phase, however. the struggle of the peasants against
the remains of feudalism would be promoted by the national bourgeoisie, in
whose objective interests it was to move against feudalism. A national
economy presupposed the accumulation of capital and expanded markets.
which were being blocked by feudal forces.45
This was the PK.I's guarantee that it would be able to reach out and finally
root the party not only i n the plantations but also in the villages amongst the
peasants. The communists would be able to work together with the PNT and
Sukarno in fundamental anti-feudal matters, and become acceptable into
the bargain.
In the meantime. the PKI emphasized the· need for the communists to
make haste slowly. To begin with, former slogans about the land being
nationalized or belonging to the village were withdrawn. Formerly,
demands such as these had been made when it was realized that the land on
Java was insufficient for all the peasants.46 Now. however. the PKl held that
state or. collective ownership made the peasants suspicious and that such
demands were in the interests of the workers rather than the peasants. First
the land had to be taken from the monopolistic feudal landlords. Then the
peasants would realize that they had to work together. In the meantime the
slogan would have to be: private land to those who till it.47
The communists would have to begin at the beginning, with elementary
schooling, social activities, help for self-help and so on. Careful bread-and­
butter demands ought to be formulated and connected to Indonesia's
traditional culture. The most important aspect of these activities was not
how radical they were, but how many were drawn to them and bow
successful they were. Not only men but women and young people must be
mobilieed. This was the way a non-sectarian mass party must work, said the
Aidit group.48
Nor should the PKJ appear anti-religious. I n 1954 the party subscribed to
the Pancasila. the five principles which Sukarno had adopted when he
proclaimed Indonesia's independence and rejected the concept of a

77
The Communist Hothouse

Muslim state. This meant chat the PK.I, among other things, supported the
principle of ..belief in one God".

Notes

I. In this chup1er I intend 10 rccons1rucl the new strategy which the PK! leadership outlined in 195 II
52. The references I ci1earc ncvcnhclcss in some cases documcn1s rrom the mid-fifties.When this
is the case I have. on the basis ofprevious research - particularly Hindlcy (I964a). KrocC(l965a)
and Monimcr ( 1 974a) - been able to draw the conclusion tha1 the later documents confirm
previous decisions and auempl to apply them. It is also obvious thut the druft versions of many
congress documents from 1954 were drawn up between 1952-53. See. e.g.. Aidit ( 1961 a) pp 66 and
113. as well as Aidit (1957) in Aidit (1963) pp.92ff.
2. Unless other references arc specified. my main references forthis section arc Aid it ( 1952) pp.560:.
( 1953) p.121. and (1 954) p.133 in Aid i i ( 1961a) as well as Aidii ( 1954) pp.2440'. and ( 1957) pp.31-39
in Aidi1 (1963).
3. Interview with the late Siauw Giok Tjhan. former leader of the Indonesian Chinese in Bapcrki.
close to the PK!. in Amsterdam on I and 2 October 1980. Cf. also Aid it ( 1959) pp.318 und 433ff. as
well as Aidit (1960) p.180 in Aidit ( 1 963).
4. Mortimer (1974a) pp.560'.• 63f( and 1560'.
5. Cf. pp.20-7. abo\'C,
6. Cf. pp.21. above.
7. See. e.g.. Aidit (1952) pp.360'and ( 1 953) pp.61 0'. in Aidi1 (1961a).
8. er. pp.13. above.
9. See.c.g..Aidit ( 1952) in Aidit ( 1961a) pp.440'.. 880'. and Aidit(l 954) in Aidit ( 1963) pp.2600'.. 2670:
Cf. Hindley (1964a) pp.480'. and 520'.
10. Monimcr( l974a) p.61. 630: and 1540' made this point most forcefully.er. also Tichelman ( 1980)
pp.207-299. It was. however. not unusual to speak or 1he middle class in the PNI. Cf. Wenheim
(1959) and Krocf ( 1 956).
11. Cf. pp.18-23. above.
12. Cf. pp.21-3, above.
13. Sec rn. 9. above.
14. Aidi1 ( 1 953) in Aidil (1961a) p.82. Cf. also Aidit ( 1 953) in ibid. p.133 passim.
15. This is clearest in Tichelman ( 1980).
16. Cr. Aidit ( 1 954) in Aidit (1963) p.162.
17. Sec. e.g.. Aidit ( 1 953) in Aidi1 (1961a) pp.1160'.
18. Aidi1 (1954) in Aidit ( 1 963) p.263.
19. Foran early document. sccAidil ( 1951) in Aidit ( 1961a)wherc these insights are already hinted al
during 1hc Sukiman govemmcni's wave of arrests.
20. Hindley (1964a) pp.290'.. Moni.mer (1974a) pp.571T. Cf. Aidit (1951) e.g. p.9 in Aidit (1961a).
21. Aidi1 ( 1960) i n Aidi1 ( 1 963) pp.185IT. Cf. Aidi1 (1951) i n Aidit ( 1 961a).
22. Sec. e.g.. Moriimer( 1974a) where problems of PKl's analyses and siratcgics are 1n the first place
explained as being due 10 poor class analys is. pany theory and stale th<..'Ory which lack pnnciplcs.
The same paucrn is repeated in a number ofself-critical documents which have been produced
by surviving PK! leaders. Sec e.g. documents in PK! (1971 ).
23. See. e.g.. Aidit (1951) in Aidit (1961a) pp.9· 12.
24. Hindley (1964a) pp.55-59.
25. .. Aidit (l957) pp.58. 60ff. and Aidil(l960) p.174 in Aidit ( 1%3). Cf. ill�o pp.18-20.22-3 and
See. e.g
25-7. above.
26. Cf. Aidit (1955) in Aidit (1961a) pp.31 lff. and Aidit (1956) in Aidit (196lb) pp.50ff.
27. Cf. Mortimer (1974a) p.59.
28. If there is one thing on which all veteran communists whom I have spoken 10 still agree. it is that
there was a lack of democracy in 1he PK! under Aidit.

78
 A New Strategy

29. .• Aidit ( 1951) and ( 1954)1111eralia pp.182rr. in Aidit ( 1961a) and Aidit(l954) in Aidit( l963)
Sec. e.g
pp.270-277. Cf. Mortimcr( l974a). where he says that the Pl<rs new view ofthe pany did not have
anything to do with traditional Leninism. by referring to WhatIs To BeDone. which must surely
be the most c�trcme book Lenin ever wrote. That Lenin adapted his view of the party to the
current situation is already clear from a comparison with "/..eft·wi11g.. Co111m1111m11 - a11 /11fa111ile
Disorder. As for as I understand it. Lenin had simply a general principled view of the party from
which he then drew different conclusions. depending on the situation at the time. for 1ns1ance
whether peaceful struggle was possible or noL
30. Hindley (1964a) pp.54ff.
31. I n the early lifties the PK! did not control the BTI completely. but soon acquired control. I n 1953
BTI and 1hc peasan1organi�ation RTI. which was also PKI-dominated.j
oined forces and in 1955
1hc communists saw 10 ii that the membership of the peasant organization Sakti also JOincd the
BTI. Hindley ( J964a} pp. I 65ff.
32. Formerly called Gcrwis.
33. Cf. Aidit ( 1 952) in Aidit (1961 a) pp.48-54 and Aidit (1954) in Aidit (1963) p.268.
34. Two unusually clear examples ofthe determinism ofthe PKI (party- classorgan1zation)can be
found in Aid it ( 1952) in Aidit (1961 a) p.34 and in Aidit (1960) in A1di1 (1963) pp. 1621T. Otherwise
see. e.g.. Aidit ( 1 954} pp.248. 268ff.. Aidit (1955) p.94. and. on 1hc qucslion of 1he his1orical
unalysis. Aidi1 (1957) in AiJi1 (1963). Cf. also Mortimer (1974a) p.52.
35. Cf.. e.g.. AldiI ( 1952) p.55{lt1.1slm. ( 1953) p.121 pa�•im. ( 1954) p.130pas.rim and especially pp.1331T.
in Aidil (1961a) and Aidit ( 1954) in Aitli1 ( 1963) p.261!.
36. Cf.. c.1;1.. Aidil ( 1 954) in Aidit (1961u) p.132.
37. Sec. e.g.. Aitlil (1954) in Aid il (1963) pp.268ff.
38. Sec Aiclit ( 1 954) in Aidi1 ( l lJ63) pp.2651T.
39. Sec. e.g.. Aidil ( 1952) pp.40n:. (1953) pp.821T.. 85ff..93 in Aidi1 (1961n) and Aidi1 ( 1954) pp.254
1T..
2681T.. and Aidil ( 1955) p.94 in Aidit ( 1963).
40. .. Aidii ( 1953) in Aidh (196111) p.83.Aidil ( 1955) p.94 and Aidit ( 1957) pp.441Tin Aidi1( 1963)
Sec. e.g
:is well as Mortimer (1974a) pp.61ff.
41. Cf. above pp.15·17 and 36-7. This is yet another example of PKrs unconveniional pioneering
spirit. Cf. ulso Monimcr ( 1 974a) pp.13511 which apparen1ly meant tha1 there were only 1wo
allcmn1ivcs: Lcnin"s. or rclorms 10 make the cnpitalis1 sys1cm more bcarnblc.
42. Sec. e.g.. Aid it ( 1953) in Aidi1 ( 1961 a) p.90pas.sim. Hindley ( 1964a) pp. 1421T.. Aidi1 ( 1956) in Aid11
(1963) pp.2521T.
43. Sec. e.g.. Aidit ( 1953) p 90passim and p. i 1 3 passim in Aidii ( 196la}. as well as Aid ii ( 1954) in Aid it
.
( 1963) pp.2521T.
44. Sec. c.g_ Aitli1 ( 1 952) pp.40n: and (1953) pp.821T. in Aidi 1 (1961a).
45. Sec. e.g.. Ail.Iii ( 1 952) pp.40ff. and (1953) pp.821T. in Aidi1 (1 96 1a).
46. McVcy (1969a) pp.65ff.
47. In 1hc lirst place. sec Aidi1 (1953) p.113 pt1s.sim. bu1 also no1c similor thoughts in Aidi1 (1952)
pp.4101T. in Aidit ( 1 961a).
48. Ibid. and Huizcr ( 1974).

79
7 . Modifications of the
Strategy, to 1960-63

A National Coalition Government

At the time of the election campaign of 1955, the PKJ's Politburo had
already developed its strategy further. Thus far, discussions had concerned
an introductory phase in which conditions for the struggle would be
created. in order to complete the revolution of 1945 and establish a people's
democratic government. The phase was rather indistinct within the
framework of a long-term strategy. Now, in 1955. this phase was formalized
and fairly clearly distinguished from the long-term objectives of the
people's democratic government.1
I n the vanguard of the first stage was to be a national coalition
government in which all revolutionary forces should be represented on the
basis of the already existing democracy.2 This was a broad coalition
government supporting democratic rights and freedoms, national unity
against separatists. an anti-imperialist policy and certain measures to be
taken against the remnants of feudalism. It was a government which
depended on a united front from the top. like the coalition government of
1945-47 and the popular front government of 1947-48:3 a kind of"historic
compromise". as the Italian communists of today would call it (There are,
however, differences between these parties on such questions as long-term
democracy and so on.)
During the period of the national coalition government in the second
phase. the ground should be prepared for the transition to a popular
democratic government which could carry on with the national and
democratic revolution of 1945. The same forces could continue to be
represented but on the basis of a new democracy. a people's democracy. I n
order to arrive a t that point. the government would not only depend on a
united franc from above. but it should also be built on and be dominated by
a front from below. an alliance between workers and peasants in the first
place. which che PKI intended to create and lead.4
One of the purposes for making this change was, of course, to deprive
their opponents in the election campaign of the argument that the
communists intended to dominate other social forces and introduce an
Eastern European or a Chinese model. They had Musso's 1948 policies in

80
 Moiliflca1io11 of 1/ie S1ra1egy. 10 1960·63

mind. The PKJ did, indeed. retain its long-ternn perspective, but the prospect
of a people's democracy receded. Soon many of its high-nown ideas were
hidden by the PKI's adherence to Sukamo·s ideas of a coaUtion: first a
coalition government a gotong royong cabinel and later a Nasakom
government with nationalists, Muslims and communists,5 under the
leadership of Sukarno and later also of the army.

A New Idea of Democracy

The PKI counted on being able to participate in a coaliLion governmenL

thanks to its gains in the general elections. Tben the party would acquire a
dominant position for itself by strengthening the alliance between workers
and peasants. But even the PKI"s view ofdemocracy changed. This occurred
during the years 1956-59, at the same time as the PNI lost its desire to defend
the communists. The power of parliament was reduced. The PNI lost votes
to the PKI. Future elections were called into question, and there was a
drastic increase in the powers of the army.
I n exchange for protection, the communists increasingly adopted the
ideas of Sukarno and his leadership of the national struggle. The army
leaders and Sukarno did, indeed. introduce a state of emergency and a
"guided democracy'' which reduced the PKJ's chances of success in the
general elections. This also meant a reduction in their opportunities of
workjog completely openly and of being sheltered by a liberal democracy.
But. at the same time, there was now a chance that the PKI. with Sukarno's
assistance, would be able to acquire a relatively privileged position under a
guided democracy, while parties like the PSI and Masjumi would be pushed
aside.
The PKI acted as it had in 1952. It promised Sukarno critical support in
exchange for protection from persecution. The PKI accepted reduced
freedom of action and a more active role for the army, while their main
enemies. Masjumi and the PSI, were prevented from campaigniJ1g openly.
and could not lead the PNI astray or persuade sundry generals to attempt a
coup.6

The Class Character of the State

Parallel with all this, the PK.I was forced to tackle the question of the class
nature of the state. I n 1957 the army had taken over the majority of Dutcb­
owned businesses and forced through a guided democracy with the support
of Sukarno. A few individual nationalists acquired more and more power at
'

the expense of the parties and other organizations.

It seems the PKI gradually came to accept that an extensive centalized
state apparatus. led by nationalists of indeterminate class. had a greater role
to play than a national bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie was weak, the

81
The Communist Hothouse

PKI argued in 1959. It was mainly concerned with trading and was
dependent on feudal forces.7
This was in line with the growing discussion on non-capitalist
development. B u t even here the PKI was a pioneer. The view that the state in
countries like Indonesia did not have a distinct class base was also relevant
here. The view that within the state apparatus classes other than feudal
lords and compradors could make themselves felt was already being
maintained b y the PKI. I n addition, they could take possession of the state.
since the state was not as firmly anchored in the bourgeoisie as it was in
developed capitalist countries.
Thus the way was open for a struggle between various more or less class­
based groups within the government and the state apparatus.
FinaJJy. the PKI, inOuenced to some extent by Mao, discussed the role of
the "bureaucratic capitalists" as an important domestic enemy together
with the PSI and Masjumi. Under this label the PKI referred to those
politicians, officers, administrators and others who used their political
positions to make the state an instrument in the hands of imperialist and
feudal interests, enriching themselves in the process.8 With the support of
the masses, the progressive forces wi thin the government and the state
apparatus ought to expose. flush out and replace these bureaucratic
capitalists.
The PKl was not prepared. however, to classify entire groups, such as
army officers, as bureaucratic capitalists. Even within the army the struggle
between good and evil was being waged, between those who were against the
people and those who were for the people. Actions that treated everyone
alike could only lead to repression and would isolate the communists from
the nationalists and other "pro-people" forces within the state apparatus
and the government. What was important was to win as many people as
possible to the cause ofdemocracy, national unity and anti-imperialism. To
this end, the class struggle had to be subordinated to the national
struggle.9

Notes

I. Aidit(1955) in Aidit ( i 961a) pp.305·19. See also the more detailed examination in Aidit ( 1956) i n
Aidit (1961b} pp.19-63. esp. pp.50rr.
2. Using the logic of the PKJ. the workers. peasants. petry bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie
ought all to belong here. One could, however. envisage theexistence ofpatriotic property-owners.
i.e. the NU. In 1956 the PKI was even prepared to incl ude a party like Masjumi if 1he leaders
signed the government programme. Ibid. p.38,
3. In the programme of the PKJ from 1953. adopted at the congress in 1954. it is said that the PKJ
was included in a coalition government of 1945-47 and in the communist-led government or
1947·48. but that the party was not able to make the transition to a people's democratic
government primarily because of the lack of a strong alliance between workers and peasanlS.
(PKI ( 1954} p.7.) In the same year Aid it n:fered to bo1h these governments. not only the one led by
communists. from the period 1945-48 as "Un ited Front GovernmcnL�··. (Aidit ( 1 953) in Aidit

82
 Modifications of rlie Strategy. 10 1960-63

( 1961 a) p.89.) Thai means 1hc idea ofa conli1ion govcrnmcn1 was no1 nhogc1hcr new. cvcn 1hough
n:ccnl �clf·cri1ical communisls like 10say1ha1 ii was. and add 1hat it was around 1955 that things
began 10 go badly wrong. See. e.g.. Monimer ( 1 974a) pp.395-399.
4. Sec Aid1t (1956) in Aidit (1961b) pp.1 IIT.
5. Nasakom - NASionali<.Agama. K0.\111111s; among the poli1ical panics 1he PNI. NU and PKI were
those primarily referred 10.
6. Wi1h regard 10 the PKJ's new views of democracy. see firstly Lhe documen!S from the ccniral
commiucc·s meetings in 1956. 1957 and 1958. Aidit ( 1956) pp.19-62. ( 1957) pp.123-159 and ( 1958)
pp.361-383 in Aidit (1961b). Cf. also Mortimer (1974a) pp.7111:
7. Sec. first. documents from the 1957 and 1958 meetings of the central commiuec in Aid it (1957)
and(l958) inAidit ( l961b) pp.ll3-159and 361-383. the central commiuee meeting of l959 in PKI
( 1959). Aidit's report to the seventh congress in 1959. in Aidit (1963) pp.JI7ff. i.a.. as well as 1he
document of Lhe meeting of the central committee in December 1960. in PKJ ( 1961)
8. For some of1hccarliera11cmpLS at definition by the PKJ.sccAidil (1956) in Aidit ( 1961 b) p.31 and
A1di1 ( 1959) in Aidi1 ( 1%3) p.3 18. The categories become more clearly defined from 1%2. see. e.g..
pp.445.460ff.. 473-476 in Aidit (1963) and Aidit (1974) pp.731T. Cf. Leclerc ( 1972) p.79. Ocy (1971)
pp.76ff. and 328 and Monimer ( 1974a) La. p.258.
9. The 1hesis ofsubordinating the class s1ruggle 10 the national struggle was adopted at 1he meeting
or 1hc central commillcc in December 1960; sec PKI (1961).

83
8. Five Strategic Problems:
1 952-60/63

Around 1960-63 the PKl was one of the largest communist parties in the
world. Clearly the strategy I have outlined bad borne fruit. Nonetheless, it
also embodied basic problems. In preliminary studies I have identified five
important problem areas by trying to see whether the party's strategies
could have been put into practice and its objectives realized.
The first problem - the national bourgeoisie and other monstrosities - is
concerned with the co-operation of the PK! with the PNl and Sukarno, in
order to favour the national bourgeoisie at the expense of the imperialists
and compradors. It did, indeed. lead to the colonial economy beingsha.ken,
but also to economic and political crises.
The second problem the new lords ofanti-imperialism is the history of
- -

how a breeding ground for the party's enemies, especially within the army.
was prepared by nationalization and other forms of state intervention
directed at imperialism and pitted so-called bureaucratic capitalists against
polkies in favour of an independent and non-capitalist economy.
Problem number three the democratic cul-de-sac
- - is concerned with
how the party's efforts to mobilize and organize the people in peaceful ways
and rely on general elections could not be realized. Parliamentary
democracy became more and more limited and did not include the party in
any coalition government. "Guided democracy" enabled the head of the
army and Sukarno to domesticate the party's activities.
A fourth problem the mobilizedpeasant society focuses on the party's
- -

careful mobilization of the peasants while at the same time supporting and
seeking shelter from the nationalists. But the anti-feudalism of the
nationalists faded. Mobilization did not break traditional loyalties and
relationships of dependency. On the contrary, it tended to be based on
them.
The fifth and final problem - inhibited workers· struggle -refers to the
PK.I's idea that the workers should direct their efforts towards Cighting
against imperialism and defending their jobs and standard of living; it
should not disturb the national bourgeoisie, but, on the contrary. support
the struggle for a national economy and create an anti-feudal alliance with
the peasants. But the standard of Jiving fell and many jobs disappeared.
Most strikes continued to be illegal and in the end workers in nationalized

84
 Five Strategic Problems: 1952-60/63

factories could be accused of sabotaging the economy of the country, and, if

that did not suffice, the guns of the army could be called in against the
workers.
Here we have five stimulating and significant points from which we can
learn something. Let me attempt to explain them. one by one, in the
foUowing five chapters.

85
9. The National Bourgeoisie
and Other Monstrosities

Towards a National Economy

In the chapter on the PKfs overall strategy. I showed that the parr which
dealt with the co-operation of the party with Sukarno and the PNI, in order
Lo start building up a national economy. was based on Stalin"s theory that
capitalist development in an underdeveloped country was impeded by
imperialism and feudalism.According to the PIG. the domestic bourgeoisie
consisted of a national fraction and one comprising compradors. Comp­
radors were based on neo-colonial structures. The national bourgeoisie, on
the other hand, tried to build a self-generating national capitalism and
consequently ought t o move against imperialism and the feudal lords. Since
Indonesia was firmJy in the grip of neo-colonialism. the national
bourgeoisie would not be able lo deal with the enemy alone. Either it would
give up and relinquish its own interests to make common cause with the
compradors, or it might win the critical support of the masses led by the
PKI, and. with them. build a national economy.
At the political level. the PKI maintained, as we have seen, that the PNI
and Sukarno primarily represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie
and had their base in that part of the capitalist class. The compradors were
represented primarily by the PSI and Masjumi. whose fundamental base
was neo-colonialism. according to that viewpoint.
Consequently. the PK.I should give critical support to the PNI and
Sukarno in the struggle for a national economy. as it was in the interests of
both the working class and the national bourgeoisie. Masjumi and the PSI
should be isolated.
Among the concrete questions which the PIG maintained communists
and nationalists could agree on. as a srart. in the struggle for a national
economy, included the following in 1953 and 1954: that the union and the
economic agreements with the D�tch should be revoked; that domestic
industry and business ought to be protected from foreign competition: that
foreign plantation owners should be forced not only to increase production
but also to plant rice and cotton on some of their fields for the use of the
people: that the trade boycott against China should be ended: that prices
should come under state control; that farmers· tenancy agreements be

86
 The National Bourgeoisie and Other Monstrosities

improved; that there should be reinforcement of their negotiating position

vis-a-vis the feudal lords, usurers and. for instance, the sugar, tobacco and
tea companies; that the land occupied by peasants and workers should not
be returned to foreign plantation owners.1
In 1956 the party added that the national economy which communists
and nationalists were fighting for would benefit the entire population and
not just a few businessmen. Corruption had to be combated. Large foreign
companies should be taken over by the state and not by private capitalists.
The state should control imports and exports. On the question of the five­
year economic plan which the government had started discussing, the PKI
pointed out that no further burdens could be laid on the masses, but that
costs should be borne by foreign capitalists and other wealthy people.2
At the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow in 1956. the Soviet party
developed an analysis and strategy closely resembling that of the PKI's.
Aidit and bis policies were ac a premium.

From a Colonial Economy to a National Economic Crisis

How successful was the PK.I's strategy for a national economy. and did its
analyses tally with actuaJ developments?

Progress
Some advances are undeniable.3 By supporting the nationalists the PKJ
contributed to the divorce between rust the PN1 and Jater Sukarno from
Masjumi and the PSI. Sukarno had persuaded che PNI to co-operate with
the Masjumi-led Sukiman cabinet, but in 1952 this was replaced by the
PNl-led government of Wilopo.
Wilopo fell when his government did not take a stand forthe workers and
peasants who occupied Dutch plantation land in northern Sumatra. The
next stage was that Masjumi and the PSl were left out of the government
when the PNI"s Ali Sastroamidjojo formed his first government in 1953. The
PKJ was not included in Ali's coalition either. But in the view of the PKI,
compared to previous policies. a considerably more progressive policY. was
now introduced.
The Ali cabinet did, indeed, try to start work on a national economy. It
was primarily its anti-imperialist foreign policy which bore fruit. Attitudes
towards Holland. which refused to release Jrian Jaya, and towards Dutch
capital in Indonesia, were appreciably sharpened. The trade blockade
against China was lifted, connections with the Eastern bloc were made, and
in 1955 the epoch-making Bandung Conference was hosted by Indonesia. It
was there that the Non-Aligned Movement was formed.
Ali's first government fell in 1955, when the military refused to knuckle
under. fn the absence of Sukarno. Vice-President Hatta saw to it that, for
almost a year, Masjumi and the PSI were able to lead the work of
government. The PNl, the NU and the PKJ made considerable gains while

87
The Communis1 Hothouse

they were in opposition. and these were reflected in the results of the first
election in 1955. while Masjumi did not live up to expectations and the PSI
collapsed. On 15 January 1956 the PNL the PKI and a small Muslim party, the
PSII, engaged in a massive joinl demonstration4 against the government's
soft line towards the Dutch. Later that same year Indonesia unilaterally
revoked both the union with the Netherlands and the much-hated round­
table agreement of 1949.
Ln March 1956 Ali Sastroamidjojo was thus able to form his second
government. Once again the PKI was excluded and, what was worse,
Masjumi was given a few ministerial posts. But Masjumi did not succeed in
building a government with the NU, which excluded the PN1 and, ofcourse,
also the PKI.

Problems
Despite the progress made, problems abounded. The PKI certainly
succeeded in promoting an anti-imperialist foreign policy, and the colonial
economy started breaking up. But there was nothing to replace it, least of all
an embryo nati.onal economy.
The plantations in North Sumatra, for instance, had already been
truncated during the liberation struggle. Workers and peasants occupied
the fields, which not infrequently had been abandoned, and rice and other
foodstuffs were cultivated.
In Java the sugar industry was one of the things that collapsed. ln the
1930s Indonesia was second only to Cuba as the world's largest exporter of
sugar. The sugar companies were the largest employers after the state, and
were bigger than all the other foreign companies put together. Profits were
substantial, being based on cheap land and labour costs. With the help of
Indonesian collaborators, politicians, administrators and village leaders,
the companies partly tempted and partly forced the peasants, sometimes
entire villages, to hire out their irrigated rice paddies and cultivate sugar
there.
With the liberation struggle, the peasants were given the chance of
controlling the land and their own labour. After independence the exports
were insignificant, and no profits were made. Farmers often continued
cultivating rice, for example, but for several decades the subsistence system
had heen in bad shape, and could not offer a secure haven now.s
Mackie summarizes the situation and writes that the colonial economy
was marked by extremely low wages and costs. high productivity in the
plantation sector, and major investments in mines, trade and communi­
cations, as well as a stable currency. and a remarkable ability to adapt to
changes on the world market. After 1950 all of this was reversed.6
It is hardly surprising that the foreign capitalists often refrained from
making new investments or expensive mai ntenance.7 An exception was the
production of oil, which expanded somewhat and was profitable. But it was
the foreign companies, not the state of Indonesia. which controlled the
inl1ow of hard currency.8

88
 The National Bourgeoisie and Other Mo11s1rosities

A Bourgeois Fiasco
Masjumi and the PSI had already tried to create a capitalist class in
Indonesia by a programme ofstate credits and protective measures.'1 But the
income from exports did not suffice for these major investments. In order to
save, Masjumi and PSI-led governments limited imports and state
expenditure. To defend and if possible increase exports. the currency was
devalued and attempts were made to control the workers· and peasants'
movement.10
Nationalists and communists found such a restrictive policy unaccept­
able, as it was in the interests of the export companies but not of the people.
I t was said that reduced imports would negatively affect the country's own
attempt<; at industrialization. since these often required foreign raw
materials and machinery. Ifwe run short of money. we must demand more
from the imperialists who are daily making tremendous profits from the
Indonesian people, the nationalists and communists argued.11
When they were in government, the nationaLists consequently did not
give foreign capitalists any support. The government refrained from
devaluing the country's currency at the same pace as its real monetary value
sank, thereby supporting importers at the expense of foreign-dominated
exports.12
There is, ofcourse, a limit to the extent to which foreign companies can be
fleeced, since if there are no further prospects for profitable business deals,
very soon there will also be very little for a government to derive. It thus
became essential for domestic industry to establish itself rapidly and
become independent of subsidies based on uncertain income from exports,
if the nationalists' and communists' line on the building up of new
industries was to succeed. The government started by regulating exports
and seeing to it that domestic businessmen were given credit on favourable
tenns. and nearly all the import licences available.13
But this had the same cfTect as if the tremendously important expansive
funds had been invested in non-productive trade rather than in dynamic
production. When the nationalists started controlling essential imports,
they became involved in short-tenn prolitable projects and did not even
reach the point of implementing an import-substitution policy in which
domestic production would be favoured to replace expensive imports.14
Now a policy of old-school-tie politics broke out. which maybe did not
create15 but certainly encouraged Indonesia's much-discussed corruption.
Licences, credits, orders and so on were often issued on the grounds of
political sympathies and other connections. and were not dependent on
whether someone was a dynamic capitalist who could import what was
required to start production_l6
Many used the credits to raise their own standards of living. by buying a
house, a car, etc. 17 while they often allowed their affairs to be run by slcilful
.

Chinese, who were already established but faced the growing prospect of
losing their chance of engaging in trade and petty production. Herbert
Feith, for instance, said that only half of the import firms in 1955 did any

89
The Communist Hothouse

real work. and that many of these were borderline cases. Within the
merchant navy sector it is maintained that only five out or 65 companies
operated on a sound economic basis.18
At most only about IO or all the monstrosities born during U1e fifties grew
into real capitalists, according to one shrewd critic.19 The PKJ, on the other
hand, sareguarded its co-operation with the PN1 by defending this
corruption against what the party regarded as a far more corrupt anti­
corruption campaign started by Masjumi and the PSI.20

Chinese Capitalists Curbed

ff all this were not enough, the whole project also weakened d1e only
competent capita lists in the whole country. the Indonesian Chinese. These
were regarded as being virtually as wicked as the Dutch; they ought
therefore to be replaced by "rear· Indonesians. l n 1954, for instance, the
PNl-led government declared that 85 per cent of imports ought to be
reserved for "real" Indonesians. Similar restrictions faced Chinese
businessmen in other sectors.21
Indeed. the nationalists usually con-tented themselves with measures
designed to curb and limit the affairs of the Chinese. They often needed the
Chinese as rniddl.e-men or "executive capitalists". But many Muslim
businessmen wanted tougher measures, and talked about the Chinese in the
same way as some Europeans had once talked about Jews. The inflamma�
tory campaign against Chinese businessmen went in waves and of course
the entire Chinese community was affected, not only the businessmen.�2
What was decisive, however. was that the PNl never tried to unite
domestic capitalists who wanted to strengthen their position vis-a-vis
imperialism in general and the Dutch in particular. and the Chinese
businessmen tended to form part of these local capitalists. On the contrary.
anti-Chinese activities were given room to nourish. The PKJ certainly
opposed this. but they were not prepared to do anything which might
threaten their co-operation with the PNI.23

Conflicts with Domestic Exporters

.
The economic policies of the nationalists and communists affected the
foreign-owned export trade, which at the same time was to be milked dry.
But domestic p roducers for export and domestic businessmen also felt the
squeeze. Usually they were Muslims who were primarily based on the outer
islands.
Inflation and the over-valued currency were already badly affecting
export interests. The tendency of the nationalists LO favour "their
businessmen", the fact that the nationalists were predominantly Javanese,
and their co-operation with the communists did not improve matters. Soon
the nationalists and communists were on a collision course with domestic
Muslim businessmen and producers in the export sector. Both they and
their exports were actually needed in the struggle for a national economy.
Smuggling on the outer islands thus continued to increase, while regional

90
 The Na1io11al Bourgeoisil! and Oilier Mo11s1rosi1ies

and local army leaders turned a blind eye. When Ali Sastroamidjojo's
second PNJ government came to power in March 1965. regional rebellions
arose which were difficult to put down. Io addition. Brigadier Zulkif1i Lubis
tried getting rid of both the government and Lhe commander-in-chief,
Nasution. during 1956. I n western Java Dam/Islam was still on the rampage,
demanding a Muslim state. In December Vice-President Hatta. represent­
ing the Muslims and the outer islands, resigned after r.erce connicts with
President Sukarno about how to deal with the political crisis.
In the end even Ali's governmem resigned. i_n March 1957. and a state of
emergency was proclaimed. Jo reality, the initiative now Lay with Sukarno
and the army under the command of General Nasutioo.
Since the army and the trade-union movement then attacked Dutch
companies - among them the Dutch shipping company. KPM. which took
care of nearly all transport between the islands - the rebellion on the outer
islands was fanned. Most of KPM's ships disappeared Lo other waters and
Lhe outer islands were isolated.
In February 1958 the leaders of the rebel movement issued a(l ultimatum
demanding that these regions should be given complete autonomy, that the
PKJ be disbanded. that all ministers with left-wing sympathies should be
sacked and that Hatta should be reinstated as Vice-President. If the rebels'
demands were not met. they threatened to secede from the republic. The
government refused to back down. and shortly afteiwards the PRRJ,
Pemerincah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (the Revolutionary Government
oftbe Republic oflndonesia), was proclaimed. It was founded by the rebel
movements in Sumatra and North Sulawesi. The new government invited
all rebel movements to join it.
The rebels were supported by the CIA and several leaders o[ Masjumi
and the PSI. But the army central command decided to back Sukarno. and
the foreign oil companies in Sumatra continued to rely on the government
in Jakarta. Soon lhe revolt was crushed.
The unsuccessful revolt was a severe defeat for Masjumi and the PSl, as
well as for the Hague and Washington. Sukarno. Lhe PNI, the NU and the
PK.I. and above all the army command, basked in the warmth o[ victory.
The army went so far as to forgo revenge on the rebels. gladly accepting their
support against Sukarno and the PK.I.
But the victory of the nationalists and the army over the rebels, and the
support of the communists for the government, did not i n any way
contribute to the creation of a national economy. Contradictions between
Jakarta and the outer islands. and between the nationalists and the Muslim
businessmen in particular, had not been resolved but lived on.24
I n sum, rather than moving from a colonial economy to a national
economy, Indonesia had moved to a national economic crisis. The
economic policies of the nationalists and communists had torn the colonial
economy co shreds, curbed the dynamic business enterprise of the
Indonesian Chinese. put spokes i_n the wheels of the Muslim capitalists and,
when really trying to be constructive, had created a parasitic group of
corrupt i_mporters.
91
The Communist Hothouse

Production stagnated. Exports declined. and the gap between exports and
imports rose. Prices rocketed. Ever larger sections of the economy were
taken over by the state apparatus. including the army. Private business
deals were still possible. but they were now mostly speculative, not
productive.25

Deterministic Blinkers

Actual developments thus indicated with marked clarity that the PKI's
national bourgeoisie. primarily as represented by the PNI and Sukarno, did
not have the ability lo build a national economy. despite the support of the
communists.
If, consequently, there were faults in the PKJ's analyses. what bad gone
wrong?
The PKJ could, indeed, have come up with a better analysis using the
theories to which the party subscribed.
First, it would have been necessary to decide whether to apply Lenin's or
Stalin's perspective. What was done, as I have shown. was to make use of
parts of both theories. The PKI used Lenin to identify the national
bourgeoisie, but went on to analyse and predict its behaviour. future
positions and capacity on the basis of Stalin's quite different concept of a
national bourgeoisie.
It must not have seemed feasible to apply Stalin consistently. A clear-cut
class analysis on that basis would probably have led to the identifying of the
Muslim capitalists as the national bourgeoisie and Masjumi as their
principal representative in the political arena.26 According to S1alin's
determinism, the national bourgeoisie would then turn against feudalism
and imperiaJism. which had hardly been the case with either the Muslim
capitalists in general or with Masjumi in particular, after the independence
of Indonesia.
If, on the other hand, the PK1 had decided to apply Lenin consistently, it
would first have got rid of Stalinist determinism, which laid down how a
national bourgeoisie perforce must act. Instead of starting from the
conviction that capitalist development was blocked, and that the national
bourgeoisie therefore had to turn against feudalism and imperialism to
safeguard its own interests. it would have been possible to employ Lenin's
less categorical thesis on a shackled capitalism and concentrate on
analysing how the national bourgeoisie and the other groups actually did
behave. without using over-simplified prognoses as blinkers.
If the PKI had applied Lenin consistently, it would. secondly, most likely
sliU have concluded that it was the PNI and Sukarno whose policies were
progressive-bourgeois. They took action against imperialism and spoke
disparagingly about the feudal lords. and they were not markedly anti­
communist. And it was precisely the concrete activities of the actors which
both Lenin and Mao had focused on.
But naturally that does not mean that Lenin offered no class analysis. He

92
 The Narional Bourgeoisie and Other Mo11s1rosi1ies

was, indeed, a volunlarist, but regarded it as important to know not only

whether an organization pursued bourgeois policies, but also whether i t
had any chance o f putting its ideas into practice. Had the P K.I stuck to
Lenin, its analysis of the bourgeoisie would have been considerably more
comprehensive than was the case.
As we know, Lhe leaders of the PKI were satisfied with generalizations of
the following type: the imperialists control almost everything, the Ch inese
businessmen some parts, and the Indonesian capitalists only a little.
perhaps nothing. though this can become considerably more. I can find no
evidence that the P K l examined more closely the composition of the
bourgeoisie in Indonesia. What for instance, was the distribution between
traders, industrialists. plantation owners, export-oriented agricuJturalists,
senior employees in the business sector, owners and administrators in the
transport sector, and so on? And how could one distinguish between the
bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, with regard to the traders and
craftsmen who had only a few employees?
f t has seldom happened that a party as large as the PKI has held a class
fraction, the national bourgeoisie, in such high esteem, placed so many
hopes upon it and accommodated itself to it. while knowing so little about it.
Even the fact that Masjumi had a firm foundation in the national
bourgeoisie seems to have been an issue which the PK.I did not regard as
worthy of analysis.
Towards the end of the 1950s, the PK.I did indeed begin to show more
interest in what was called the vacillating position of the national
bourgeoisie. It was hinted that the national bourgeoisie still had strong ties
to imperialism and lhe feudal lords, and that its interests were primarily
commercial rather than productive. According to the PK.I. this was why the
PNI did not consistently move against imperialism and feudalism.
In the same breath. however, the PK.I issued assurances that the political
signilicance of the PNI was still decisive, and that, if progressive forces
could only lend the national bourgeoisie even more powerful support, it
would choose - and dare - to build a national economy. Since there were
so few national capitalises, there was, furthermore, little risk of conOicts
between them and the workers.27
The only significant correction of the party's course was that the PKI
complemented its support for the national bourgeoisie with a growing
i.nterest in the role of the state. r shall return to this in the following
chapter.

The Ethnocentric Bourgeoisie

The question remains whether a consistent Leninist analysis would have

placed sufficient emphasis on the tendency of the nationalists to turn to the
state apparatus, to patronage and corruption. instead of to productive enter­
prises in order to enrich themselves and safeguard their own interests.

93
The Communi
st Hothouse

Expressed more drastically. the problem is whether even the "best''

traditional Marxism would have been capable of taking into account that
the nationalists neither wanted nor were able lo generate a dynamic
capitalist development policy, bearing in mind that the nationalists
nevertheless turned against feudalism and imperialism and had the
strength lo liberate the country from a good deal ofcolonialism. exactly like
Marxism's ideal ''progressive bourgeoisie". J doubt it.
Within the Marxist tradition it is as obvious that every consistent anti­
feudal and anti-imperialist position is bourgeois-nationalist as it is that the
Indonesian relations of productio� which are not capitalist. are to be called
pre-capitalist. Capitalism succeeds feudalism.
In this connection it does not matter whether we talk about an Asiatic
mode of production instead of about feudalism. since that too is pre­
capitalist. Evc1y consistent opposition. with the exception of the workers·.
against pre-capitalist modes of production and imperialism is of a
bourgeois nature, whether those involved are aware of it or not
Feudal or Asiatic classes can, naturally. also tum against imperialism.
But according Lo both bourgeois as well as Marxist theories. it is
unthinkable that feudal or Asiatic classes would be able to liberate their
country from colonialism to the extent that the Indonesian nationalists did.
without breaking with the pre-capitalist mode of production. This seems
reasonable to me. Certainly it might be exciting. for example, to analyse
Sukarno as some sort of remnant from an Asiatic mode of production, but
at the same time it would be difficult to account for his indisputable
strength.2x
What is wrong with Marxist theory is not. in the first place. a fixation on
feudalism at the expense of the Asiatic mode of production. in my view.
More important is the lack of efficient theoretical tools for analysing how
capitalism coexisted with and dominated pre-colonial modes of production
in such a complex way that. for instance, it is almost impossible to identify
anything as being wholly capitalist or feudal. Consequently. it does not
suffice to simply throw together or "articulate" a number of theories about
distinctly disparate modes of production.:!9
Let me exemplify what I mean by returning to a t:oncrete analysis of the
Indonesian nationalists. They were hardly a traditional bourgeoisie, large
or small - neither were they feudal lords, nor probably remnants of the
Asiatic mode, since they were suddenly able to force the colonial forces to
their knees.
What drives someone to become a capi alist
t is the necessity ofinvesting a
substantial portion of profit in new production in order to make new profit.
But for most of the nationalists the chance of enrich ing themselves tluough
productive investments was smaller than if. for instance, they made use of
innuential posts in the state apparatus. In production and trade, the
imperialists had unassailable advantages. Those who dared to beard the
lion in its den were primarily the Indonesian Chinese. since they were
forced to do it. They were excluded from agriculture. administration and

94
 The National Bourgeoisie and Other Monstrosities

politics. The nationalists were in the opposite position. They had long­
established contacts within the administrative apparatus and political life.
The Muslims had an intermediate position, with a base in politics and in
the economy.30
It was thus obvious to many nationalists that they could make the Largest,
safest and speediest profits by interesting themselves in the state. The
colonial economy was built on the exploitation of cheap labour, raw
materials and exports, as well as the import of finished products. It was very
difficult for the nationalists to get into production or trade, but the state had
overaU control of exports and imports, licences and concessions. In other
words, it was simpler for them to take over the state, and enrich themselves
by developing different systems for services and favours. than to try to
compete against imperialist companies.
The nationalists found it simpler to satisfy their "bourgeois" interests by
taking over the state in the struggle against the feudal lords (or whatever
they should be called) and against imperialism. Then the nationalists
needed to be able to live off a colonial economy which they themselves had
helped to break down. Furthermore they had to defend themselves against
dynamic Muslim and Chinese capitalists who put private interests before
public ones.
In Europe the bourgeoisie advanced where feudalism was weakest
withi_n the economy. In most of the underdeveloped countries. however. the
growth of the bourgeoisie was stopped. since the imperialists, the capitalists
of Europe. were economicaUy stronger. Many Indonesians who otherwise
might have become private capitalists now took to administration an.d
politics. the areas where imperialism was relatively weak.

Notes

I. PKI ( 1954) pp.IOIT.

2. AiJi1 ( 1 956) in Aidi1 (1961b) pp.36-54.
3. For a more detailed 1rcatmcn1 or the progress made. sec. e.g.. Hindley (1964a) Chap. XXI.
4. Ibid. p.253.
5. Gordon ( 1979a) i.a. pp.252 and 260ff.
6. Mackie ( 1 9 7 1 ) pp.16IT.
7. Mawkins ( 1 967) pp.231ff
8. Paauw (1967) pp.184.
9, See. e.g .. Fei1h ( 1962) p.174 and Suncr ( 1959) pp.772-8.
10. Sec. e.g.. Suner ( 1 959) pp.1 126-83. Mackie (1971) i.a. pp.53-69. Glassbumer (1962) i.a. pp.122ff.
and Sievers ( 1 974) pp.2 12rr.
11. See. e.g. . Rocamora ( 1 974) PJ>.173·93. Suucr (1959) pp.I 193·1225.
12. See. e.g.. Feith ( 1 962) pp.378IT. and 490.
13. See. e.g.. ihiu. pp.3731T. and Suucr ( 1959) Chup. XXIV. especially pp.1017-35 as well as fn. 1 1
ahove.
14. er. Robison ( 1 9 8 1 ) pp.19ff.
15. Cf. Higgins ( 1957) pp.163.
16. See. e.g.. Fci1h (1962) pp.375ff.. Rocnmore (1974) pp.173-193 and Sutler (1959) pp.1017-35.

95
The Communist Hothouse

17 Jaspan (1968) pp.16-22.

18. Feith {1962) pp.375rr.
19. lntervic" with Professor Sarbini. former head of economic statistics. Jakarta. 16 October
1980.
20. HindIcy ( 1964a) pp.253.
21. Sec. e.g.. Feith ( 1 962) pp.375ff.. Krocf (1958a) pp.2051T. as well as Twang ( 1 979) pp.70IT. and
Panglaykim and Palmer (1970) pp.931T.
22. Ibid
23. Interview with the late Siauw Giok Tjhan. former leader ofthe Indonesian Chinese in Bapcrki,
closely associated with the PKJ. in Amsterdam on 2 October and 1 November 1980.
24. Regional contradictions and regional rebellions are treated in a quaJilied manner by i.a. Lev
(1964) pp.39-53. Feith (1962) pp.3781T.. 487-99. 520-37 and Utrecht (1979b) pp.51-68.
25. For analyses of the economic crisis in Indonesia during the late lifties, see. e.g.. Sutter ( 1959).
Mackie ( 1959). ( 1967). ( 1971). Paauw ( 1955). (1967). Higgins ( 1956). Glassbumer ( 1962). Castles
(1965). (1967) and Palmer and Castles (1971).
26. Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.561T.. 63ff. and 1561T hinted that this would have been "correct".
27. Aidit (1959) in Aidit (1963) pp.316-23.
28. Cf. Tichelman ( 1980) Chaps. lJ and 14. who partly. I would maintain. encounters that conflict
and tries to save himself by pointing out the weakness of the opposition 10 Sukarno. This and
similar criticism of the work ofTichclmao docs not prevent there being much ofvalue in this
book. My analysis below has been inspired in several respects by his fruitful analyses.
29. Without agreeing completely with those who argue for a particular colonial and nco-colonial
mode ofproduction. I would like to note that at least their empirical criticism is often correc� and
1heir demands for beuer theoretical tools may be fruitrul. C[. e.g.. Ala,; (1975) and (1980).
30. As usual. I am primarily discussing Java.

96
10. The New Lords of
Anti-Imperialism

A State-Guided Economy

The campaign for nationalizations and a state-led economy was intensified

during the mid-fifties.1 First. the PKI's gamble on the national bourgeoisie
had not paid off. Second. a rising proportion of the bourgeoisie as a whole
tended to turn against the nationalists and the centralized ventures. instead
drawing closer to the rebels on the outer islands, participating in smuggling
and accepting help from the imperialists.
W11en the party evaluated the attempts of the nationalists to create a
national economy. they also emphasized that. while economic policies had
been severely criticized and sternly opposed, it had been simpler to pursue
demands for a progressive foreign policy.2 For example. to have opposed
government demands that the Dutch should leave Irion Jaya would have
been to commit political suicide.
Consequently. the communists (and the nationalists) strove to make the
idea of nationalization an inseparable part of the struggle for Irian Jaya.
One argument, for instance, was that the Dutch could continue occupying
lrianJaya with the help of profits from their companies in Indonesia, which
ought, therefore, to be nationaJized.3
It was intended that nationalization would not only give the state access
to imperialism's treasure troves, but also sufficient power to plan and start
building a national economy. The state would control all exports and
imports. I n donesia ought to be able to reduce its dependency on the
capitalist world market, instead seeking connections with the socialist
countries. The export of raw materials would be used to buy machines and
so on. making it possible rapidly to build up an import substitution
industry. Foreign investment ought not to be welcomed, but. on the other
band, international aid and credits should be accepted. Here the socialist
countries should be able to play a decisive role. Profits from state
companies should be used for investment in basic industry, which could
first supply the needs of agriculture for rnachin ery, etc. Both agriculture and
h andicrafts would be responsible for supplying the basic needs of the
population.
The state should be generous and supply credits for productive

97
The Comm1111sr
i Hothouse

investments. Domestic trade must be supervised so that merchants did not

enrich themselves through speculation and shortages. Both consumption
and producer co-operatives. truly democratically managed, should be
encouraged. The national bourgeoisie should have a good chance of doing
private business within the framework of state planning and on the basis of
state-owned basic industries. Obviously extensive anti-feudal measures
were needed to stimulate demand in the rural areas and increase access to
capital. But an extensive venn1re of the kind outlined nevertheless required
a negatively balanced budget. What was most important was that
production should rise.4
But what kind of a state would actually be able to nationalize foreign
companie:; and lead the economy? The PKI's analy:;is of the state wa:;
vague. but generally positive when compared to its views on private capital
interests generally and the so-called compradors. especially Masjumi and
the PSI. In the event, the Indonesian state was not regarded as the exclusive
tool of the capitalists, but rather as an instrument through which
nationalists of indistinct class base would be able to extend themselves. I n
the terminology of today, they were expected to run companies relatively
autonomously, and control the economy of the country pointedly directing
it away from imperialism and feudalism. In 1956 and 1957 the president, the
government and the central command of the army agreed to take tough
action against Dutch companies and regional rebel movements. Different
classes, fractions, groups and individuals were able to fight about how the
state should be changed and about the direction state policies should take.
Those who were politically strong had the same opportunities as the weaker
domestic capitalists. for instance, irrespective of whether their focus was
national or whether they co-operated with foreign capital.5
It was as unrealistic for the workers to dream of a workers' state as it was to
talk of a capitalist state. The workers would certainly be able to force
through nationalization, especially of Dutch companies, but they were not
able to run them, but would have to turn them over to the nationalists at the
head of the state.6 The central command of the army was not isolated as a
treacherous part of the state. but was analysed in positive terms, particularly
in comparison to the PSl and Masjumi, imperialism i n general and the
regional rebels in particular.7
The theoretical perspective as well as the analysis of the strategic
conclusions were, in other words, similar to the international discussion on
non-capitalist development which had started towards the end of the 1950s.
I n some respects, the PKJ anticipated the theoretical work of Moscow.

The Army's Role

Did the strategy of nationalization and state control lead to the creation of
the much-desired national economy? How did the analyses compare with
what actually happened?

98
 T/i(! New Lords ofA 111i-/111periolis111

Progress
Despite the intensified campaign against Dutch neo-colonialism with the
demand that the Dutch should relinquish lria11Jaya. and despite all the talk
about nationalization. there were no concrete plans for the state, let alone
the trade-union movement, to take over the running of the Dutch
companies. The objectives were rather to deprive the Dutch of as large a
portion ortheir profits as possible and to induce them to relinquish lrinn
Jayo. among other things, by threatening them only with nationalization.

We believed i1 possible to deprive a Du1chman ofalmost everything. even to seduce his

wife. so long as he still retained the companies which gave him all his money. Surely he
would give up lrian Jayo if only he were allowed to keep his plantations. his trading
houses . . . Bui we were wrong. Sukarno made more and more threats and heated up the
a1mosphcre. The Dutch refused to budge. Suddenly. on 3 December 1957. the KBKJ
!the na1ionalist tradc·union movement! lookover the KPM Ithe Dutch shipping line
tha1 was responsible for almost all transpon between 1he islands(. A few days later
Sobsi joined in and 1ook over a numher of other companies. And then rhe army
continued the proccss.8

Thus the actions which the PKJ demanded against Dutch capital occurred
sooner than anticipated. Just over a month before the first confiscation.
Haricm Rakjar. the PKfs daily paper, had declared that lndonesia did not
have the capacity lo take over all the Dutch companies in one fell swoop.
Furthermore. it was probable that there were fears that communist-inspired
occupations would provoke the nationalists and the military command to
join wiU1 Masjumi. There is nothing to indicate a change of opinion within
the PKJ, prior to the nationalists themselves throwing down the gauntlet.9
On 26 November the Indonesians failed to get the support of the United
Nations for concrete negotiations about lrian Jayn. On I December the
government decided to prohibit Dutch planes from landing in I ndoncsia.
which stopped the distribution of Dutch publications. At the same time the
government encouraged workers to conduct a 24-hour strike in those
companies which were wholly Dutch-owned. The strike was held on 2
December. The following day the KBKJ took over one of the largest Dutch
trading houses and the KPM. the all-powerful shipping line. On 4
December a further four major companies were taken over by KBKI and
SOBSI. By now the government was becoming hesitant. but the confisc­
ations continued. On 6 December in North Sumatra. Commander Gintings
declared that all Dutch companies there had been placed under the control
of the military. During the next few days other regional commanders
followed his example. On 13 December the head of the army. Nasution,
ordered the remaining commanders to confiscate the Dutch companies in
their regions.10The state of emergency, declared earlier in 1957 in response
to the regional uprisings. was a precondition for these rapid takeovers.
In this way. all fully Dutch-owned capital assets were confiscated: banks,
trading houses. transport companies. about 540 plantations (two-thirds of
all the plantations in the country) and so on.11 Hundreds of industrialists

99
The Communist Hothouse

and other business leaders were replaced.12

Furthermore. as early as December 1956, it was clear that significant
military leaders stood behind the nationalists and the government in
Jakarta against the Muslim. often bourgeois-based, rebels on the outer
islands. Tn Northern Sumatra. Commander Gintings armed communist
veterans and trade-union activists. for instance. and with them attacked the
rebels.13 And when the separatist state of PRRI was proclaimed in 1958,
army chief Nasution and President Sukarno united in struggle against
those whom the PK.I called compradors. Even Washington and the CLA.
who sympathized with and supported the rebels. became enemies of the
anti-communist military command.
Instead Moscow opened its purse-strings. Economic support for both
civil and military use soon rose to about $1.5 billion, or more than the value
of Soviet credits to China during the years 1949-57.1� Indonesia became the
largest non-communist recipient of military assistance and the third largest
recipient of economic assistance from the Eastern bloc. after India and
Egypt.15 Indisputably. the PK.I had contributed to shifting Indonesia some
way from the capitalist world market. and from both Dutch and American
imperialism. Instead, links with the socialist countries were now being
forged.
After intensive discussions and manipulations about bow to manage the
confiscated Dutch companies. the PKl won another victory in 1958. All
ideas of privatizing the companies were rejected. They were nationalized
and declared to be state property.'6
In the same year. 1958. the army also took over companies owned by
Chinese Iadonesians who were close to Taiwan. which was supporting the
rebels in Indonesia. But when, in 1959, a further step was taken and all
Chinese trade in the rural areas was prohibited in favour of rhetoric about
co-operatives. the PKI protested. and talked about racism.17
[f we add the considerable number of state-owned enterprises18 which
already existed to those unparaUeled far-reaching interventions in the
economy, we can comprehend that. by the end of the fifties, a basis for
decisions on a so-called ·'guided economy'" was to be found in Indonesia.
There was scope for dreams that the Indonesians themselves, via the state,
would at last be able to partake of all that they had been deprived of by
imperialism. Furthermore, with support from the Eastern bloc. the country
was no longer totally dependent on the capitalist world market. Compra­
dors had been isolated. The PKJ had some cause for pride.19

Problems: The Army Nationalizes

The workers 1ook over the imperialist enterprises not in theirown persona] interest but
to hand them over to the Republic or Indonesia. whose government was not yet a
20
government of the working class. (Aidil)

Unfortunately Lhe workers did not get the chance of taking over more than a
handful of companies. When they tried to do so, they were expelled from

100
 The New lords ofAnti-Imperiali
sm

the boardrooms before they had managed to gain control of the situation
and hand over their gift to the govemment.21 Not even militant plantation
workers in North Sumatra succeeded in the face of the army under
Commander Gin tings. "Right from the start we lost the initiative," said one
of the communists who was in charge in Sumatra.21
According to Lhe theoretical perspective of the party, the indistinct class
base of the state implied that political groups which were strong could
acquire decisive influence for themselves over the character and policies of
the state. The P K ! maintained that the nationalists and the communists
were politically the strongest, and indeed they were instrumental in
initiating the nationalization. But only a few weeks later the party's analyses
were contradicted by the hitherto relatively politically weak military, which
rapidly and efficiently was able to move ahead in the wake of the trade­
union movement. the parties, the government and the president.
For several years politicians in general and Sukarno in particular had
retained control of the army by pl�ying off the officers one against the other,
thereby sowing dissension. As the regional rebellions threatened the
nationalists, the government and Sukarno, the latter were, however. forced
to accept both the necessity of a loyal but powerful officer corps and a state
of emergency.23
"For me [the army's confiscation of companies] was a question not only
of stopping the PK.I, but also that the government worked too slowly," said
army boss Nasution.24
It was not only the government which was functioning poorly. The parties
were deeply split. Masjumi and the PSI dropped hints that the companies
should be returned if the Dutch were prepared to negotiate.25 Others held
that Indonesian businessmen should be given the chance to run the
companies if they could buy themselves in. For a time the government
sponsored such a solution.2h
The army, however, was not made up of the kind of people who could be
or wanted to be private capitalists.27 On the contrary. indirect threats of a
coup d'etat were made if the state could not meet the army's need for
advanced materiel and higher pay. etc. The Dutch companies made a good
substitute, as did the anti-imperialist policies which enabled the PKI to
attract military aid from the socialist countries.28
Finally, the P K l declared that companies should be state-run and that the
workers were those best equipped to run them.29
At last, at the turn of the year 1958-59, the government and parliament
decided to nationalize the companies. rt was easy to reject proposals from
Masjumi and the PST because oftheir contacts with regional rebellions. The
idea of national private solutions collapsed partly because the Indonesian
capitalists in question were closely linked to politicians who had bad
reputations after years of scandals about corruption.30 And on the question
.
ofwhether the companies should be privatized, the army and the P K J were
at one.
I n the meantime, the decision came more than a year after the army had

IOI
The Comm1111is1 Hothouse

taken overthe companies. Nasution had had adequate time to place officers
in the economy, among other thfogs as representatives of the autocratic
managers of the state of emergency.31
Officers who took the lead in business enterprises were subsequenlly
given inactive status and lost their right to command troops. Bul their
contacts with the army command nevertheless remained intact. Co­
operation with the civil administration in the rural areas, particularly with
the state's "bailiffs'· (pamong praja). improved and was intensified.32
There are grounds for asking whether Dutch companies became the
army's or whether they were controlled by parliament, the government and
the president. Nasution gives an intricate answer:

In 1958-59 we turned over the companies to the civil authorities . . . Yes. yes. the army
rciained a certain innuencc in the companies. Partly there was a lack of proper
business leaders. and partly not only I, but also Prime Minister Djuanda, wanted
discipline among the workers. Djuanda thought that business leaders should be
trained by the Americans. I wanted LO ensure that the government retained control. In
.
the words ofTito. I say: .A conscious general is beuer than a skilled expen. One can
always educate someone to become an expert, but it is not so easy to grasp
consciousncss."'33

Unfortunately, the consciousness amongst army officers to which Nasution

referred had less to do with how Tndonesia should crellte a national
economy under state leadership than how the officers might enrich
themselves and find money for the army.34

Corruption and Class Differentiation

The companies were mismanaged and profits misappropriated. Those
Indonesians who worked in subordinate clerical posts in tJ1e Dutch
companies often had to take responsibility for running operations. Young
administrators who were educated, or at least being educated, had to play
complementary roles. The officers took the responsibility for senior
contacts, authority and crucial decision-making, as there was a state of
emergency in the country. No workers were allowed over the threshold.
There was a low level of competence among company leaders. and there
were considerable risks of paralysing conflicts arising between them.35
Things were not improved by several of the miJitary heads or companies
being ofsuch poor quality that field officers of the modern schoo.l were onJy
too happy to allow them to become company directors. so that they would
be rid of them within the command structure of the army.36
Military business leaders often regarded their task as keeping "their"
companies free from the '"control of politicians and bureaucrats". This was
part of the philosophy, for instance, of that most dynamic of military
business leaders. colonel and medical doctor. Ibnu Sutowo.37 In 1957
General Nasution made him head of a new national oil company,
Pertamina. This soon became a state within the state and the most lucrative
tre::isure trove of the generals. Only i n the 1 970s did the banks. not least
through the International Monetary Fund. manage to unseat Sutowo.38

102
 The New lords ofA111i·fmperiali
sm

The regular army command expected the military business leaders to

make all efforts to collect money for the support of the country's defence. In
reality, the officers in business ventures saw to it that the army became "self­
supporting". At the same time, army commanders were given generous
sums for their own use. as thanks from military business leaders for being
allowed to retain their positions. These sums were meant to be sufficient for
the army officer's own life-style and for that of his men.
Within his preserve, each military business leader had substantial
authority and every chance of enriching himself. Although he could act
entirely alone, he was able to see to it that his men were given whatever
assistance they required to keep them working loyally.
Officers in business companies and particularly regular army officers
were not able openly to engage in private business. Thus they often acquired
a business partner - for instance. a competent Chinese capitalist39 The
latter was often fighting for his own survival as a businessman against the
racists and competitors who walked all over him with political and
administrative measures.
During the early fifties. politicians had used their influence to procure
licences (for a fee) from the Chinese. among others. The system was known
as theAIi-Baba scheme. Now people talked about the opposite, the Baba-Ali.
The military had, by direct or indirect means, gained profits from the
nationalized companies and needed help with laundering the money and
investing it.40
The most profitable activities for both company leaders and regular army
commanders were in the trading houses and in the possibility of controlling
the allocation of licences and concessions.41
Aside from the military, it was. of course possible for civil servants and
experts in companies and public administration to supplement their low
wages. Influential politicians. including some of Sukarno's ministers,
continued to offer licences and other benefits to their business contacts, in
exchange for substantial contributions to numerous funds. There arose a
circle of businessmen around the Minfater for Central Banking Questions,
Jusuf Muda Dalam, and others. who were known as the "palace
millionai res··.42
l n addition. the prohibition against Chinese traders. especially in the
rural areas, though meant to be advantageous for state buying and co­
operatives, not only threw a spanner in the works for the Chinese. but also
led to a deterioration in distribution. The low prices caused the farmers
suffering. and they produced less. When the military and civil admin­
istrators had taken 'their· share. only very little at very high prices remained
for the townsfolk."'3
The noble eight-year plan. which had been worked out in 1960 as the
framework of Sukarno's guided economy. thus became unrealistic.44
It ought to be added. however. that the poor results were caused not only
by incompetence, mismanagement and corruption. The Dutch had often
refrained from carrying out maintenance work and reinvestment because of

103
The Comm11nisr Horho11se

the unstable business climate and the uncertain political situatiob of the
previous years. On several plantations, for instance, replantation had been
neglected.4s Furthermore several of KPM's ships managed to escape to
foreign ports when workers occupied the head office. l o addition. the
regional rebellions meant that production was affected and exports sank.
Nor was the international state of the market propitious. Finally. it was
difficult to handle international sales and marketing, for which the Dutch
bad had complete responsibility.46
Establishment economists actuaJly compliment the country's new
masters on certain points: no one else succeeded so well in recreating the
colonial state's authority and firm hand.47 Ever since independence the
plantations had for instance, been eroded by so-called squatters, peasants
.

and plantation workers who occupied a piece of land for their own use.
Many sugar companies had been forced to close down because there was no
one any longer to force the peasants to cultivate sugar on their rice paddies.
Now. however. the army marched in if the military business leaders
required it. They could rely on the state of emergency and the argument that
every occupation or other action no longer affected the imperialists, but the
republic and the state-owned companies.48 The same was true also of
workers' wages, their right to organize, strike and criticize.49
In 1959 the government in addition decided to devalue substantially, and
to reduce the amount of money in circulation, which badly affected the
mass of the people.50 There was also default in the payment o f bonuses in
connection with Lebaran, the big feast at the close of the month of fasting,
and other privileges that workers employed at Dutch companies had
enjoyed.51
When the communists raised objections and talked about bureaucratic
capitalists. parliament was dissolved, members of the party leadership were
detained and interrogated, party papers were banned, workers' leaders
arrested, strikes stopped and all political activity prohibited for several
months.52
The party withdrew and decided to let their demands, for exa mple, for the
creation of heavy industry give way to immediate demands for light
industry, which could at least produce things like cloth for the people.53
Furthermore, in December 1960 the party's central committee had already
declared that the class struggle must be subordinated to the national
struggle.54
In 1962. however. the question was raised whether the state companies
were not more of an obstacle to promotion of a national economy than an
asset.5s

The Boomerang

We have already seen how the army empowered itself to take over the
Fonner Dutch companies. procured a decisive influence over the state's

1 04
 The New L-Ords ofA11ti·fmperialism

runningofthe economy and also corrupted tbe attempt to launch a national

economy. This stands, of course, in glaring contrast to the ideas of the PKI
on the nationalization of companies by politically strong nationalists and
communists, thereby creating an economic base for efforts to create a
national economy through help from the state.
As if that were not enough. one or two new capitalist fractions had grown
up within the framework of the PKl's indistmnctly class-based state. These
were the military business leaders and the regular anny officers and other
administrators who controlled the economy from central positions and
appropriated a considerable portion of company profits. Both fractions,
moreover. acquired certain private business interests.
The state still did not have a distinct class base in a private economy. But
that same state had acquired its own economic base. which the officers in
particular had seized and in different ways made their own economic class
base.
Anti-imperialist nationalism boomeranged. Instead of fighting imper­
ialism as had been predicted. the state turned against the PKI and in favour
of "guided" capitalism.

Weak and Strong Nationalists

Could the PKJ have made better analyses? The party did indeed take as its
point of departure the thesis that the class base of the state was indistinct,
and that politically strong groups could thus acquire determi ning influence
over the way in which the state was changed and the political direction it
took. This was not a capitalist state which bad to be overthrown and
replaced by a state of the working people. But different groups were
expected to continue wrestling for state power, and the outcome was still
unsure. The party was not tied to a deterministic perspective. Theoretically
i t was possible that reactionary army officers could win the tussle for control
of the state. and it was not entirely unthinkable that certain groups might
use the state to build up a stronger bourgeoisie. It is also clear that the PKI
was surprised by the rapidity of nationalization, at the initiative of the
nationalists, and without opposition from the army.
In addition, the theory did not prevent analyses which clarified the
inability of the nationalists to manage a large number of companies which
had been won at one fell swoop. The leaders of the PKI themselves pointed
out the risks. These were not in-depth observations. It couJd certaioJy have
been pointed out that the nationalists had already revealed their economic
incompetence, or at least their weakness for non-productive measures of
self-enrichment, during the attempts to create a so-called national
bourgeoisie.
Such analysis would have had even greater value ifthe party had not been
burdened with tbe theoretical weakness of regarding the nationalists as if
they had bourgeois interests simply because they turned against feudalism
and imperialism.
105
The Communist Hothouse

And it would have been possible to analyse more effectively how the army
bad been politically weak and split for several years. and how nevertheless
the struggle against the Dutch and the rebels had strengthened it. II would
have been possible to predict that the army's organization and ability to
manage the confiscated Dutch property far surpassed that of all other state
institutions.
But, even if the PK.I had. in this way. arrived at the conclusions that a
rapid nationalization ofall Dutch property would become a nightmare due
to lack of experience, capacity and strength. in the same way as the socialists
argued.S<i its strategy would nevertheless have remained unaltered. lts
theoretical perspective clearly showed that the chief enemy was imper­
ialism. And surely one does not refrain from nationalization and state
ownership. or in other ways avoid working against imperialism. simply
because there are a number of disagreements among those. including the
army. who want to conduct such a struggle?

The Theoretically Inconceivable Capitalists

Perhaps one refrains from working for nationalization and state ownership
if the theoretical framework treats the state as a capitalist state.
Assume that the PKI had shared the perspective of the Chinese
communists, for instance, on the bourgeoisie and the state. Then the big
bourgeoisie would have been analysed in terms of monopoly capitalists
who built most of their strength on feudal and imperialist forces. which was
why they could also be cal1ed comprador. They had state power. The state
had, in other words, its class base in the compradors. and thus also among
the imperialists and feudal lords.
Such a perspective would have differed drastically from the implicit
assumption made by the PK.I that the stale had an indistinct class base and
that the classes were weak. the consequences of which were that the
nationalists in the leadership had considerable autonomy. The conse­
quences of the Chinese perspective would have been a total conlicl with the
state and a massive investment in wholly independent worker and peasant
'
organizations. Obviously one would neither have avoided the struggle
against imperialism nor have refused to co-operate with a relatively
progressive government. But a pre-condition would have been that the party
first became independent of the state. the state of the comprador
bourgeoisie and of the feudal lords.
But up till 1962-63 the PKT did not bother with Chinese thinking in this
area. And I myself do not believe the PK.1 was wrong when it maintained
that the Indonesian state had an indistinct class base around 1957. Events
show clearly that neither the compradors, the so-called feudal lords nor the
national bourgeoisie. which had its inception in the early fifties. were able to
acquire a dominant position either separately or together, despite the
workers and peasants being relatively weak.

106
 The New Lords ofAnri-lmperialism

There was, instead. room for a substantialJy autonomous petty bour­

geoisie, intellectuals and others at the head of the state and ad ministration.
These could even pose a threat to imperialism and to the fundamental
interests of the compradors by embarking on nationalization and by
suppressing the rebellions. They could also place obstacles in the way oft he
national bourgeoisie, for instance by transferring all nationalized comp­
anies into state ownership, even the small ones. and by allowing the state to
take over a good deal of the domestic trade as well
Thus the theoretical problem does not concern the lack of a Chinese
perspective.57 The question is not whether a capitalist state i s dangerously
allied to imperialism. but whether an indistinctly class-based state with
substantially autonomous leaders, who indisputably pursue progressive
policies, is dangerous.
I do not maintain that that is the way it was, nor that it must always be so.
But I do maintain that the theoretical perspective of the PKJ prevented the
question from ever being placed on the agenda.
Theoretically it was possible for leaders of the state who had an indistinct
class base to ally themselves with the compradors, for instance, instead of
with the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. In a
situation of this nature, the state could be used to reinforce the interests of
the compradors. for instance by returning nationalized companies to their
former owners or by privatizing them.
By comparison. it was theoretically impossible for indistinctly class­
based leaders who fought against imperialism and the compradors, as weU
as fighting for nationalization of companies. nevertheless to ensure that
they created an unusual form of capitalism to meet their own interests.
Yet it was precisely the theoretically unthinkable which actually
occurred. The military in particular acquired their own control over state
production, distribution and economic policies. They were able to become
business leaders, administrators, to implement the state of emergency and
so on. They transformed the economic basis of the state to their own
advantage without privatizing it to any significant extent. When privatiz­
ation did occur. it was a matter of investing some of the gains o f corruption.
They did not put pressure on the compradors, the imperialists, or the small
national bourgeoisie which had grown up, during the first half of the fifties,
with political support. O n the contrary, the military was threatened by them
and forced to counteract them. lronically, it was the workers, peasants and
petty bourgeoisie, directed by the PKI, Sukarno and sections of the PNl,
who lent passive support to the army.

Wbat Is Wrong with the Tbeory?

In Chapter 9 I indicated that the problems of the PK.I were partly rooted in
the thesis that every consistent opposition to feudalism and imperialism,
with the sole exception of that of the workers, was assumed to be bourgeois.

107
The Cemmu11s1
i Ho1house

Thus the nationalists were dubbed bourgeois. But they did not have, nor did
they wish to have, objective interests in becoming traditionaJ capitalists.
Now, I see similarities in the case oft he new lords of anti-imperialism.As
long as the indistinctly class-based state and the relatively autonomous
leaders struggle against compradors and imperialists, and transfer nation­
alized companies to state ownership, according to the PKl's theory the state
cannot be regarded as a dangerous giant which favours a general and
unlicensed capitalist development. But, despite state ownership and the
struggle against imperialism, dangerous capitalists did arise. The problem
was that this was not traditional capitalist development with common
private capitalists.
In Chapter 9 I also established chat most of the nationalists could noc
make any worthwhile profits by investing in private trade and production.
Imperialism was too strong. It was instead natural for the nationalists to
make use of their strengths, their political and administrative positions and
their military efficiency. In other words, it was much simpler to take over the
state and to enrich oneself in that way than to try to compete against
imperialism on its own terms.
When it comes to the new lords of anti-imperialism, a bunch of officers
who take over the former Dutch companies, perhaps without even having
planned to do so, sit there wondering how to make as much money as
possible from au the banks, industries, plantations, trading houses. ships . . .
Even an officer of average intelligence, who is a fanatic devotee of free
enterprise and hates communism, is aware that if the companies were to be
privatized both the army and he himself would lose their chance of
enriching themselves. Then the companies would disappear to their clients.
i.e. the capitalists with their own capital and experience of running
businesses. As a result, the companies must become state-owned, even
though this is precisely what the communists advocate. It would have been
too much to demand that the army itself take over the companies. But the
officers could utilize their political and especially their military strength to
become company heads or control the state companies and economic
policies.
Any officer wishing to profit from production and trade thus had to take
great care not to become a traditional private capitalist. He ought, however,
to have invested a part of his profits from corruption in private enterprises
so as to acquire a small private and independent capital on which to Jive in
later years, or when be falls from grace or loses his job as company
head.
The inability of the PKI to imagine such a strange presentation of new
and somewhat odd capitalists meant that the party also lacked theoretical
tools for discussing in more detail the size ofthe presumed surplus from the
nationalized companies and whether it could be used to create a national
economy or not.
According to the party's theory, nationalization was a stage in the struggle
for an independent economy. The nationalists and the national bourgeoisie

108
 The New lords ofAnti-Imperialism

were expected to be interested in building a balanced domestic economy in

which production and demand stimulated one another and economic
development was not wholly dependent on either imports or exports. Only
through such an independent economy would they acquire the freedom of
action to withstand imperialism.
.
But the nationalists in general. and the new "unthinkable. capitalists in
particular, were able to stand against imperialism without building a
classical independent economy. Their way of safeguarding their prolit­
making opportunities was through reinforcing their political and military
positions. Thanks to these, they have become business leaders and central
directors who could milk the old colonial economy dry.
Consequently the inadequate contributions from nationalized comp­
anies to the building up of heavy industries were not solely the result of
mismanagement and corruption, though this was. of course. believed to be
the case by all of those who expressed a desire for traditional capitalism.
with or without state leadership. For military capitalists. however, it was at
least partly a question of rationally reinforcing their positions of military
and political power, so as to be able to build their own form of capitalism in
their own way.

Notes

I. See. e.g.. documents from 1he central committee meeting of 1957. ;\i<li1 (1957) in Ai<lit ( 1961b)
pp.123·I 59.
2. Aidi1 (1955) in Aidit (1961a) p.309.
3. Aidit ( 1 957) in Aidit (1961b) pp.241ff.
4. For a rcasonablycomple1e documenl on 1he view of the PKI on a s1a1e-led na1ional economy.see
1he repon from the PKl's economic seminar in 1959 in Rei•ie.,.. of/11do11esio (supplement) Nos. 4-5
(1 959). Earlieroutlinescan be found. 2interalia. in Aidi t ( 1956) pp.1 9·62 and ( 1957) pp.153-159. us
well as ( 1 958) pp.257·306 in Aidit (1961b). All are political rcpons to the central commiucc.
5. See above p.81 rr.
6. Sec Chaplcr 6 p.82 and fn. 45. Cf. Aidit (1958) in Aidit (l961b) p293.
7. Sce.c.g..Aidit( l957) in Aidit ( 1 96 1 b) pp.95ff. Thcchicfofthe army. the excculive head ofthcstu1c
ofemergency und soon even the Minister of Defence. General Nasution. declared !hat. as far as
he was concerned. the serious contradictions be1ween the officers in 1hc army and the PKJ lirs1
.
. . Prior to that. !he PKJ raised no objcc1ions when we took over Durch companies:
MancJ in 1960
Interview. 22 October 1980. Jalrnna.
8. Ernst UtrechL lntcl"\icw 2 October 1980. Amsterdam.
9. Hindley ( 1964a) p.267.
10. Sec. e.g
.
. Thomas and Glussburncr ( 1965) pp.166-9.
11. Mackie (1961·62) p.338.
12. Hawkins (1971) p.225.
13. See. e.g.. Kroef ( 1 965a) pp.88ff.
14. Pauker ( 1 962a) p.613.
15. Utrecht ( 1 979b) p.133. Sec also Muhajnni ( 1 967).
16. Sec. e.g.. Thomas and Glnssburncr (1965) pp.173·7.
17. See. e.g. Howkins (1971) p.231. Paauw ( 1 967) pp.210ff. and Feith (1967) pp.326ff. Re"it'lv of
/11do11esio 1 1 · 1 2 ( 1 959) ppJfT and l9fT. The lute Siuuw Giok Tjhan. former leader of the

109
The Communist Hothouse

Indonesian Chinese in Bacrki. and close 10 the PKI. nevertheless mainiained thal lhe PKI gave
in and compromised with the army. Interview. 2 October 1980. Amsterdam.
18. Al independence lhe Indonesians 1ook over some Dutch slate-owned compa nies (such as
railway companies and printi ng firms). German plantations which had been confiscated by the
Dutch. as well as shares in the mining and oil industries. Aflcr independence new businesses
were established - for instance. banks. transport companies. trading houses. cement factories.
Some foreign companies were also nationalized and the owners recompensed. See. e.g.. Castles
(1965) p.21 or. for basic material. Suner (1959) Vol I.
19. See. e.g.. documents from the central comminee meeting of March-April 1958. Aidit (1958) in
Aidii ( 1 961b) pp.257-306 andAidit"s speech on the occasion ofthc 39th anniversary ofthe PKI in
the Re'"i""' ofllldonesi
a. 6-7. (1959) (supplement).
20. Aidit ( 1 958) in Aidil ( 1 961b) p.293.
21. During the 1960s the workers nevertheless occupied a few plantations on Central Java and ran
them collectively. Bui1hcywcrevery few. primitive and no1 particularly successful. S1oler(l979b)
pp.13ff.
22. Interview No. 29. Jakarta CC Ananta (1971).
23. McVcy ( 1 972) pp.I 56ff.
24. Interview 22nd November. 1980. Jakarta.
25. Thomas and Glassbumcr (1965) p.174.
26. Ibid. pp. I 74ff.
27. Lev (1964) pp.85ff.
28. McVcy ( 1 972) pp.1571T.
29. See. e.g.. Aidit (1958) pp.246ff. and Aidit (1958) pp.296ff. in Aidit (1961b)
30. Mackie (1971) pp.SOff. Thomas and Glassbumer (1965) pp.IJ.llT
31. Lev (1964) pp.85ff.. Ocy (1971) pp.58ff.
32. See. e.g.. McVey (1972) pp.159, Feith (1967) p.3321T. Interview with J.D. Legge. 9 October 1980.
Melbourne.
33. Nasuiion in an interview 22 November 1980. Jakarta.
34. N11su1ion seems 10 be a remarkable exception.with personal integrity and a lack at lcas1ofprivate
corruption.
35. Panglaykim (1964). Interview 24 April 1980.
36. McVey (1972) p.161.
37. Arndt (1973) pp.I 14fi: Concerning the appointment. sec ibid. For Sukamo"s later decision see
Utrecht ( 197611) p.62. According to Utrecht. Sukamo knew that Sutowo was ''cry corrupL but the
president saitl that Sutowo was very efficient, and might as well steal a million ifal the same time
he made 1cn million for 1he s1a1e.
38. The International Mone1ury Fund (IMF) was unable 10 control the Indonesian economy since
Pcrtamina sidestepped 1he national budgcL This the IMF wished to hall Interview No.54 -.1th a
well-informed specialist. Jakarta. 1980. Cf. also OECD ( 1977).
39. Forihc latter sec abovc(aOcr fn.37) sec U1rech1 ( 1979b) pp.1031T. and in particular Crouch (1975)
and ( 1979) as well as Robison ( 1978) and McVey ( 1 972) pp.154-162. (Utrecht maintained that �a
new class of military business leaders·· was growing up in work done in 1959.)
40. Castles ( 1967) p.81.
41. See especially Crouch (1975) and Robison ( 1 978).
42. Ibid.
43. . Paauw ( 1967) pp.21Off.
See. e.g
.

44. Cf. ibid. pp.221-31. as well as Pauker (1961).

45. Machie (1961-62) imeralia. p.349.
46. See. e.g.. Thomas and Glassbumer (1965) pp.169ff.. Paauw ( 1 967) pp.192-6. and Panglaykim
(1964).
47. E.g.. interview with Panglaykim 24 November 1980 and ROdcn (I MF) 15 October 1980. Jakana.
Cf. Gordon ( 1 979a) p259.
48. .. McVey ( 1972) pp. 161 IT.. HindIcy ( 1962u) p.32
On the new hard line conccrningsquuncrs. sec. e.g
and ( 1962b) p.923.
49. For a good s ummary. see Hindley (1962b) und Krocf ( 1962a).

110
 111e Nl'IV Lords ofA111i-Jmperialism

50. Concerning the measures. see Paauw (1967) pp.238ff.

51. Mortimer ( 1974a) p.254.
52. See rn. 49 above.
53. Mortimer ( 1974a) p.270.
54. See PK.I (1961).
55. Aidi1 (1962) in Aidi1 (1963) p.473.
56. A typical nashback: ""Privatization would have been 1he same ns giving 1he companies 10 lhc
politicians. The only allemative was the military. It was a nightmare. We were so inexperienced.
There were so unprecedenlcdly few with the strength and capacity 10 lead a business venture."
lnlervicw with Panglaykim. 24 November 1980. Jakarta.
57. Despile the PKl's self-criticism. see. e.g.. PK! (1971).

111
1 1 . Democratic Cul-de-Sac

Nationalists, Communists and Democracy

The leaders of the PKI had determined to use peaceful and democratic
methods within the framework of a long-term strategy. To strengthen their
own position, the party needed protection against the anti-communist
forces which, according to the PKJ, were primarily organized in the PSI and
Masjumi. They also had widespread supporc in the army.
The PKI could find protection if the party offered the PNI, and soon also
Sukarno, critical support The nationalists were feuding with the orthodox
Muslims and the technocratic socialists.
A "front from above" with the nationalists would thus secure the
democratic freedoms which the PKI needed to be able to become a so-called
Leninist mass party, build its own fronts from below, such as trade-union
organizations, peasant movements and women's fronts, and successfully
take part in parliamentary elections. Fronts from below would altract the
large number of workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie who had joined
forces with parties like Masjumi and the PSI.
A strong party and a strong front from below were in turn preconditions
for the PKI to be able to take the initiative in their co-operation with the
nationalists. The front from above was necessary so that a popular
democratic government could be formed.
The leaders of the PKI maintained that the objectives of the day were to
create the preconditions for the struggle to complete the revolution of 1945
and nominate a popular democratic government. I n 1955 this objective was
fornrnlized as a definite stage. Support from a united front from above, as
well as successes during elections, ought to Jead to a national coalition
government with all who supported democratic rights and privileges, and
national unity and were against imperialism and feudalism.
The first stage was the starting point of the next, when the front from
below would create a new popular democracy and launch a popular
democratic government. It was not out of the question that even these
objectives could be attained by peaceful means, as the strength oftbe forces
of the international socialist camp, for instance, might cause the enemy to
refrain from violence.1

1 12
 Democratic C11/-de-Sac

During the lirst half ofthe 1950s Indonesia suffered under weak coalition
governments and corrupt party politicians. Nor did the election of 1955 lay
the ground for a stable cabinet. The military opposed the politicians.
Regional rebel movements grew powerful The struggle against the Dutch
intensilied and demanded an effective leadership, while the politicians
were paralysed. The president was subject to assassination attempts. The
PKJ came to agree with Lhe opinion of Sukarno and the central command of
the army that liberal democracy had outlived its usefulness and ought to be
replaced by a so-called "guided democracy".
The PKI did. indeed, insist that new elections ought to be held, and
refused to agree to the idea that all political parties should be banned. But
the communists had no weapon to use against more powerful presidential
powers. It was said that the alternative would be a coup d'etat. And the PKJ
did not make any signilicanl protest when the PSI and Masjumi. among
others, were banned in 1960-61. In a characteristic statement in 1958. when
the rebellions on the outer islands were being crushed, the PKI said it
supported guided democracy, since the bourgeoisie had itself given up its
liberal democracy and tried to lake power by extra-parliamentary methods.2
As early as 1957, the party leadership had praised the state of emergency
and urged the people to back the army against the Dutch and the
rebels.3
When the army central command joined the side ofthe president and the
government against the rebels, took over the Dutch companies. and in other
ways distanced themselves from the PSI, Masjumi and imperialism
generally, the PKI maintained in 1958 that a revolutionary situation was
approaching.4
According to the communists the preconditions now existed for a broad
patriotic front. virtually an historic compromise, a coalition government of
all revolutionaries who would be able to face the imperialist and feudal
forces.5
This was not to be. The PKI criticized the army in 1959 and 1960 for
meddling in politics. sabotaging democracy, the nalional economy. etc.
At the same time as the PKJ hurled its most devastating criticism at
Sukarno's government. bringing down upon itself heavy repression from
the army, the party leadership nevertheless still talked about non­
antagonistic contradictions "within the people".6
For the PKI, democracy meant two things: the struggle against feudalism
including extra-economic forces,7 and liberty for the communists to
organize, mobilize and criticize. If it were primarily the PSI and Masjumi
that were affected by authoritarian democracy, while Sukarno at the same
time protected the PKJ, there was thus, from the PKI's viewpoint, no reason
to defend liberal parliamentary democracy. The ohjective was a so-called
people's democracy, inspired by Eastern European models. Democracy
..
was for the "people", not for the "enemies of the people .
Whal then, were the arguments of the PKJ'? I have oullined them earlier
and will try to present them here in greater detail.

1 13
The Commu11is1 Ho1house

According to the PKI, the nationalists were progressive, since they were
rooted in the national bourgeoisie. ln its own interests, a national
bourgeoisie must create an independent economy. In order to do this, it was
forced to move against feudalism and imperialism.
A national bourgeoisie turned against feudalism since the feudal
landlords prevented the free formation of capital through political extra­
economic forces. Traditionally the economic strength of the bourgeoisie
was thus counlerposed to the extra-economic powers of the feudal
landlords. Furthermore. the imperialists collaborated with the feudal
landlords.
When the capitalists fought against political oppression, even the masses
got the chance of acquiring certain rights and freedoms, at the same time as
the capitalists' chances of success increascd if the oppressed fought at their
side against the feudal oppressors.
Economically powerful capitalists soon replaced the political oppression
of the feudal landlords with economic force. The masses could thus use
their political freedom only to support the bourgeoisie.
In Indonesia, however, the national bourgeoisie was weak, the class base
oftbe state was indistinct. and politically liberated workers. peasants, petty
bourgeoisie. intellectuals. etc. could act relatively autonomously. The
national bourgeoisie did not have the economic power to reduce the masses
to relatively dependent suppon troops. Instead they were forced. in their
own interests, to accept real political freedoms, even for the communists
since the national bourgeoisie needed them.
In an international perspective lhe same argument held good. The
national bourgeoisie needed support from the socialist countries. Al the
same time this was a guarantee for conducting a peaceful a n d democratic
competition in countries like Indonesia.
The weakness of the national bourgeoisie. of course. made it shaky and
able. from time to time. to abandon its own interests and collaborate with
the comprador bourgeoisie. These risks could. however, be overcome if
other forces, among them the communists, gave the national bourgeoisie
the support it needed.

Guided Democracy Guides the PKI

Progress
Only some months after the anti-communist raids by the Sukiman
govemmenr in August 1951, and not long after the PKJ in May 1952 had
proclaimed its new strategy, the PKJ leadership had succeeded in making
the PKI so acceptable that there were communists among the leading
organizers of the nationwide celebrations of the anniversary o f lndepcnd­
ence Day on 1 7 August.9
The critical support of the PKI for the PNl and Sukarno led, among other
things. to nationalist-led governments. The PKI was not formally

1 14
 Democratic Cul-de-Sac

represented until 1962, and even then this was mainly a matter o f form. But
the party's indirect influence was significant. It would not be inappropriate
to compare its role with that of the communists in Italy today.rn
Even more important was the fact thar by supporting the nationalists, the
communists recejved both physical and ideological protection. The PSI
and Masjumi tried propagating themes of rhe Cold War, thereby hoping to
unite all anti-communists, and. of course. all the religious forces. But the
PKI slipped out of reach. due to Sukarno's popularity, acted as convinced
nationalists who were prepared to co-operate with all patriots, irrespective
of whether or not they were religious, and succeeded in getting many to
listen to what they themselves, rather than others. had to say about the
PKI.11 A more concrete example of what that protection meant was that
Sukarno prevented the NU and the PNI from openly turning against the
PKI when the communists won votes at the expense of the other two
parties.12 Another example is that Sukarno saw to it that the PKI was able to
hold its sixth congress in 1959, despite opposition from the military.'3
Thus it was quite obvious that at least some nationalists needed the
support of the PKI. That meant they needed a democracy in which it was
possible for the P K I to exist and offer that support.
The PKI did not rest with its finger on the trigger. The party and the mass
organizations were mobilized and organized as never before. At the
beginning of 1952 there were scarcely 8,000 members or applicants for
membership of the party.1" A few months later, in May. the party claimed
the figure had risen to 100,000. After that recruitment proceeded a little more
slowly, rising to 165,000 in March 1954.15 Parallel efforts were made to build
up the mass organizations and to educate all members.16
A second recruitment campaign was started in 1954. and it led to claims
by the party that it had half a million members and applicants towards the
end of the year. In February 1956 the party talked about a million.17 Three
years later the figure was one and a half million, of whom more than half
were fully-fledged members. Now it was said that most ofthe members were
peasants. Efforts had also been made to organize the women. I n 1959 it was
announced that 258.000 of the membership of 1.5 million were women.18
During the second half of 1962 the number of members passed the two
million mark.19 Indisputably, the PKI was the largest communist party
outside the Eastern bloc. measured according to the party's own figures.
At the same time the different mass organizations grew in strength and
scope. It was not simply a question of the trade-union movement. where the
PK.I controlled by far the largest labour confederation in the country,
SOBSJ, and the peasants' organizations, the largest of which was controlled
by the PKJ. I shall return to these in the next two chapters. There was also
nota hie growth of the women's movements. the students' organizations, the
associations of cultural workers, etc. Even taking into account the usual
exaggerations which occur when organizations themselves release mem­
bership figures. and the dual membership which often occurred, the
number of party members and organized sympathiz.ers at the beginning of
the sixties was probably around eight million.20
1 15
The Communist Ho1ho11se

Needless to say, many questions can be raised about this rapid

expansion. But the PKI was not the first communist party in the world
which rapidly increased its membership. The Japanese invasion, for
instance. led to the Chinese Communist Party increasing its membership
tenfold. In 1940 tbe Yugoslav Communist Party had about 6,000 members;
by 1945 the figure had risen to 500,000. The party in Czechoslovakia had
50,000 members in 1938 and just over 1.5 million in 1946.21
The Indonesian election results in 1955 were also exceptional. The party
became the fourth largest in the country with 16.4 per cent of the vote and
more than 6.1 million voters. The gap between the PKI and the next biggest
party was very large - the PSil collected only 2.9 per cent. The differences
between the four largest parties was, on the other hand. rel.atively small. The
PNT got 22.3 per cent, Masjumi 20.9 and the NU 18.4 per cent From having
1 7 seats in parliament, the PKI now had 39.22
Like the PNI and the NU, the PKI was strongest in Central and East Java.
Even in West Java, Jakarta and parts of Sumatra, the PK! was among the
largest parties. Jn the outer islands in general, however. it did not have so
much support.23
The majcr losers in the election were Masjumi, which was hard hit by the
competing NU,24 the PSI which lost nine o f its 14 seats, and a number of
conservative national groups.
The PKJ made additional gains in the local elections in 1957 and 1958,25
and became the largest party on Java, and probably in the whole country.
Compared to 1957, the PK.I increased its share of the vote by more than 37
percent, and received 7.5 million votes, or 27.4 percent ofall votes cast. This
can be compared to a total of over 6.1 million votes in the whole country in
1955. Now it was primarily the PNI and also the NU which suffered losses.
The PK.I got more than 50 per cent of the votes in Semarang, in Solo, in the
area between Yogyakarta and Semarang and eastwards towards Solo, in the
areas around Madiun and Blitar. as well as in the south-western sections of
Central Java. After a by-election the PKJ also took over in Surabaya. On
WestJava and South Sumatra the PK.I became the second largest party. In
Kimantan, too, considerable gains were made.26
During the local elections many monopolies on the outposts of the state
apparatus were broken. The PKI itself chose to emphasize Masjumi's
losses. But the PNI was also badly hit, since so much of its strength came
from the state bureaucracy.27
The PKI was thus able to strengthen its position by peaceful means. At
the same time the communists succeeded in splitting and isolating their
enemies. As early as April 1952, the NU broke away from Masjumi.28 The
NU stood for an orthodox, but in several ways pragmatic, Islam, while
Masjumi can best be described as modernistic but somewhat dogmatic or
fanatical. The NU, primarily based in East and central Java, soon drew
closer to the PNI and Sukarno. During the parliamentary elections the NU
was perhaps the major victor. The Muslim front against communism
(among orher things) was partly broken.

116
 Democraric Cul-de-Sac

l n addition the army split in October 1952. Commander-in-Chief

Nasution and some socialists in the army command wanted to demobilize
the large number of self-taught soldiers who remained from the liberation
struggle, to make more room for their own people. These plans threatened
the military followers of the nationalists in particular. The nationalist
victory in parliament created a situation in which Nasution and his socialist
brothers-in-arms tried in vain to force President Sukarno to set aside
parliamentary democracy.29
Now Nasution and other instigators of coup d'etats were forced to resign.30
The army was split and for the next few years posed no serious danger. The
socialists, who had been most voluble in advocating parliamentary
democracy and had tried to stamp the communists as anti-democratic, were
demonstrably a threat to democracy.
In the same way, the PIG and the nationalists succeeded in branding
Masjumi as democratically unreliable through its contacts with DarulIslam
in WestJava. Darul Islam terrorized the local population and fought openly
against the republic in order to build a Muslim state. Later both Masjumi
and the PSI could be associated with the rebels on the outer islands. In 1960-
6 1 several parties were banned, amongst them Masjumi and the PSI.
In Sukarno's speech on Independence Day. 1 7 August 1959. the PIG got
more grist to its mill. Here the basis was laid for a political manifesto called
manipol, which outlined the Indonesian revolution in radical terms. The
objective was said to be lndonesian socialism. In the meantime a national
democracy must be attained through a struggle against imperialism and
feudalism. In this process the workers and peasants were the most
important social forces. To achieve these aims the party system had to be
"simplified··. and those that did not support manipol had to be purged from
the state apparatus. The ideology of the state was summarized in the
acronym usdek: the constitution of 1 945. with strong presidential powers,
Indonesian socialism. guided democracy and Indonesian identity.
Furlhermore. Sukarno did not simply talk about agowng-royong cabinet,
a coalition government, but said that Nasakom co-operation should be a
hallmark of the government and the state apparatus. and that the entire
country would benefit from unity between the nationalists. the religious and
the communists.31
Doubtless Sukarno dominated. But sheltered by him and the nation­
alists. the PKI had succeeded in mobilizing and organizing at least eight
million people. While the leaders of the PNI and NU became increasingly
dependent on Sukarno's goodwill. the PKJ had organized its own mass
base. The populist Sukarno needed that mass base. particularly when the
rebels and later the army rattled their sabres.
Another measure of the success of the P.KJ's investment i n peaceful
struggle and democracy was the role ofNasution, Commander- in-Chief of
the army. During the second half of the fifties he drew closer to the
nationalists in general and to Sukarno in particular. He refrained from
again inciting a coup d'etat. popular at the time (as in Pakistan in L958. for

1 17
The Communist Hothouse

instance). He fought against the Dutch over Jrian Jaya, nationaJized their
companies and defeated many of his former allies. who, with the support of
the Western powers. were leading rebellions in the outer islands.
I n tbe West hopes had been high that parliamentary democracy would
promote capitalism and counteract socialist tendencies. It looked as though
the reverse was happening in Indonesia. One of the leading scientific
advisers to Wasbington and the CIA, Guy J. Pauker, said that it was clear to
most people that the PKl would have won new parliamentary elections at
that time, becoming "the first Communist party anywhere in the world to
gain control of a national government by legal, peaceful means".32
It is to Pauker's credit that he persuaded Washington in 1959-60 to invest
in the army, despite its "betrayaJ", and not only to rely on the authentic if
relatively powerless anti-communist politicians in the socialist party,
Masjumi, et a l.·13 I f the views of the CIA and other hawks had prevailed. the
army command would presumably have been left to their own fate and,
more or less like Nasser's generals, been left to the mercies of Moscow.34

Problems: The Nationalists Abandon Democracy

The most cruciaJ problems started in the second half of 1957. The economic
policies of the nationalists had failed. Bourgeois-inspired regi.onal rebell­
ions were threatening. The PKl had woo overwhelming local election
victories, primarily at the expense of the PNI. ln the countryside. the front
Crom above with the nationalists shrivelled up.
The PKI. through the advances it had made, was depriving the
nationalists of the support of the people. In addition, the PKJ was breaking
into the local state administration, the power base of the PNI and its tool for
mobilizing the masses. The NU, too. was threatened by the PKJ's gains.
Regionally and locally the nationalists reacted by breaking the party
truce wit11 the PK.I. The N U broke off its contacts with the PKJ.35
The leaders of both the PNI and the NU in Jakarta also felt threatened by
the gains of the PKl. To remain i n power they would have either to force
through reforms which favoured the peasants. and in that way compete with
the PKl for the peasants· votes, or to accommodate to the conservative local
leaders who were traditionally able to mobilize the masses, though this
ability was now under threat.
The first was out of the question. There was no successful national
economy which could be used by the centraJ leadership to give local
compatriots the chance of building up capital stocks and increasing the
buying power of the masses, without the compatriots themselves losing out
on the deal.
The other alternative, of breaking wiU1 the PKl, was also difficult.
Sukarno would be wrathful. The government led by the PNI and the NU
would be weakened. There were threats of economic crisis and rebellions

118
 Democratic Cul-de-Sac

inspired by the bourgeoisie. Sukarno made it clear that his .government

needed all the support it couJd muster - even that of the PKI.36
Sukarno and the nationalists, as well as the "democratic Muslims" in
Jakarta, solved their dilemma by abandoning democracy. The central
leadership stood up for collaboration with the PK.I. Thus, in times of
national collapse and economic crises. the PKI had its backers organized.
But the threat from both the PKI and the local leaders also had to be met.
This was done by declaring a state of emergency. postponing the elections,
replacing locally-elected leaders with ones centrally-appointed and other
measures which strengthened the power of the central state.

The Anny Enforces 'Guided Democracy'

The state of emergency led to the army becoming the real rulers of the
country, alongside Sukarno and his popular supporters. With the former
Dutch companies in their hands, the military were even stronger. When the
army, with exceptional swiftness, crushed the regional rebellions, which it
had virtually done by the end of 1958, the military leadership was in a
position to refuse to relinquish any of its gains. Jakarta abounded with
rumours of an impending military coup d'etat if the army did not get the
political and economic power it desired and the resources it demanded.
In the previous chapter I showed how the military made the nationalized
companies into a form of individually-controlled state property. At the
political level the army command forced through "guided democracy".
The communists did, indeed, defend parliament and the party system.
But when the government in February 1959 proposed a bill which would
mean the reinstatement of the constitution of 1945, which sanctioned
stronger presidential powers. the PKI sided with Sukarno and the army. At
the same time, the PKI acceded to the proposal to reduce the number of
political parties. to open parliament to so-called functional groups of
workers. peasants, youth and the military. and to build a national front
parallel with and partly bypassing the parties.37
On 22 April Sukarno asked the constituent assembly to reinstate the
constitution of 1945. Then he went abroad for two months. Al the end of
May, Masjumi succeeded in uniting the Muslims in the constituent
assembly against the constitution of 1945, at which point it was not possible
to obtain the requisite two-thirds majority. A few days later. on 4 June. the
army command banned all political activities. Once again the PK.I rallied
round behind the army, this time together with the PNI and NU.
Sukarno returned towards the end ofJune. Nasution urged him to make a
unilateral proclamation of the 1945 constitution. Sukarno hesitated. Even
the PNI urged him to introduce guided democracy.38
Thus on 5 July 1959 Sukarno proclaimed the constitution o f 1945. The
following day the government resigned. Sukarno could now appoint a
cabinet of his own, responsible to him and not to parliament Twelve

1 19
The Communist Hothouse

ministers were military men. The PK.I was not represented n

i any way other
than indirectly through people who may have had some communist
sympathies.39

The Guided Democracy of Sukarno and Nasution

Guided democracy did include some political radicalism (such as the

concepts of manipol and Nasakom) and the representation of the PK.I in the
country's Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Perrimbangan Asung) estab­
lished by Sukarno, and in his National Planning Council.
But the PK.I was excluded from the government. The state of emergency
was prolonged. Elections were again postponed.
Parallel with these developments, the president declared that the locaJ
leaders (e.g. the mayors) who had been elected in 1957, would be replaced by
centrally-appointed leaders. This posed a serious threat to the election
victories of the PK.I. The central govern ment did. indeed, appoint a few
communists, but the PK.I most certainly lost through these controls.40
Instead good co-operation between the regional and local corps ofpamong
praja. local and regional administrators of the central government, was
cemented with the military administrators of the state of emergency.
Together they held virtually all the power in their areas.41
The old parliament remained until March 1960. Then the president
dissolved it after the assembly. including the PK.I, had been impudent
enough to demand control over state fina 1 1ces. fn June, Sukarno appointed
a new parliament in which both parties and functional groups were
represented. Among these functional groups was. or course, the army.42
Not all the parties were given seats in the new parliament. Masjumi and
the PSI were amongst those left out. In June new rules for the parties were
introduced. They should accept the constitution of 1945, endorse the
pancasila and work peacefully and democratically. Whenever he so desired,
the president could order an investigation or a party's administration,
[mances, etc., and could disband all who worked against or undermined
state policies.43
Later in 1960 the state also demanded complete copies of membership
registers from all political parties. The respective party branch, as well as a
list of members and their names. addresses, position in the organization
and date o fjoining should all be included. According to Hindley, the PK.I
banded in their Lists on 4 February 1961.44
Among the more important demands of the army was the depoliticiza­
tion or the state apparatus, which would enable the army to gain more room
for itself at the expense of the politicians. The introduction of guided
democracy meant that senior civil servants could not belong to political
parties. This applied to both the central and local administration, and
concerned state company managers, police, the military and so on. This
affected about 50,000 members of the politicaJ and administrative elites. It

120
 Democratic Cul-de-Sac

was. of course, possible to circumvent this decision. Hardest hi t was thus the
PKI, which had limited opportunities to work among already established
civil servants, and demanded renewed civil and political control of. for
example, state companies. state administration and military units.45
One of the PK.I's mass organizations was Perbepsi, a n organization of
communist-sympathizing veterans from the struggle for independence and
the largest organization of veterans in the country. The 300,000 Perbepsi
members, presumably all knowledgeable about weapons, were, narurally, of
considerable significance. During the years of 1957-59 the army succeeded
in uniting Perbepsi with other veterans· organizations, and then to make it
subservient to the army's own command. The PKJ initially approved this
amalgamati.on.46
The military was trying to break out of its isolation. The most important
project thus became the army's voluntary front for the liberation of Irio...n
Jaya. A number of civilian organizations co-operated, many of which were
influenced by the communists. Later Sukarno converted this creation to his
National Front. The army command. the nationalists, Sukarno and others
cultivated ideas about making the National Front the only political
organization permitted in the country.47 Subsequently the attempt was
abandoned. The PKJ succeeded in defending its rights to organize.
When it came to the orga nization of the workers, the army and the
nationalists also made strenuous efforts to work against the PKJ and
SOBSI. The Minister of Labour. Ahem Erningpradja and Nasuti.on tried to
create a confederation of trade unions. OPP!, with a country-wide
monopoly.48 The PKJ and SOBSJ were damaged, but did not disappear.
Needless to say. strikes were prohibited.49
Finally, there was a series of direct attacks on the P K J and its mass
organizations. In 1959, for instance, the army tried to stop the Sixth
Congress of the PK.I. When the party criticized the government towards the
end of 1959 and during 1960. the top leaders were detained and subjected to
intensive interrogation. The periodicals and newspapers of the Central
Committee were stopped. Only publication of the daily Harian Rakjat was
permitted. Censorship however. was severe. During the period January to
September 1960. 65 daily issues of Harian Rakjat were withdrawn. The
communist news agency was closed for several months. Even SOBS!'s
publications were prohibited. In 1961 all private printing presses and
duplicating machines were placed under the control of the state.
All political activity in the country was prohibited during the second half
of 1960. The army accepted the outlawing of Masjumi and the PSI, and
probably hoped that the PK.I would be banned as a service in return. But
despite everything, the PKJ survived. primarily because Sukarno needed the
support of the mobilized masses to back h j m up.50

121
The Communi
st Ho1ho11se

Democratic Patrons

The analysis of developments showed the PK.I was correct in assuming that
the nationalists needed broad popular support in their struggle against
imperialism and feudal oppression.
But the same analysis also indicated the PKI was incorrect in assuming
that the nationalists needed democratic rights and freedoms to secure this
mass support. Instead of breaking down the traditional, administrative and
patriarchal forms of political control of the masses, the nationalists re­
erected them within the framework of guided democracy. and used them to
mobiUze the people behind them.
This not only hit the PKJ's enemies, but badly affected the communists
themselves. The latter. more than anyone, needed democratic rights and
freedoms in order to be able to mobilize, organize and win elections.
One of the most common theses is that the problems were caused by the
party reverting to tJ1e theory that peaceful and democratic struggle was
possible. Such a theory obscures the opponents' tendency to disregard
beautiful principles when faced with a threat.51
In this case. however, that general thesis puts almost everything upside
down. During the "bourgeois democracy'', the PKI enjoyed huge gains. At
that point there was nothing wrong with peaceful and democratic forms of
struggle. When things started going wrong for the party, when the
democratic rights and freedoms were curtailed. the PKl had already given
up the theory of struggling within the framework of a "bomgeois'·
democracy. The PKJ actually went so far as to acclaim the guided
democracy which would give "the people", but not "the enemies of the
people". democratic rights.
If the PKl had succumbed to some sinful theory about how the struggle
should be conducted. it was thus not their belief in the "bourgeois"
democracy, but rather the belief in the nationaUsts· guided democracy.
Therefore. the f i rst question must be: could the communists have carried
out better analyses, while retaining their theoretical perspective, which
would have predicted the aversion of the nationalists to democratic rights
and freedoms? The answer must be yes.
From 1946 parliamentary democracy was not genuine liberal democracy.
This was common knowledge. The' masses were not able freely to elect
representatives according to their own interests and desires.
During the liberation struggle, one could. for instance, see the national­
ists mobilizing the masses by collecting people behind bapak. a fatherly
protective figure, and not by primarily breaking down similar traditional
patriarchal ways of acquiring popular support.52
Indeed. the nationalists were not only anti-colonial. but even to some
.
extent anti-feudal, when they forced out the old "bailiffs .. large landowners
and others. particularly those who had done the work of the colonjal
powers.53 Not many years passed, however, before the nationalists once
again started working with, appointing and using the old "bailiffs'· (pamong

122
 Democratic Cul-de-Sac

praja) for their own purposes.54

In 1954-55 this happened during Lhe parliamentary elections. The
nationalists made use of significant personages within the regional and
local administration. village leaders and others, who could mobilize votes
by reason of their authority. traditional loyalties, patron-client relations,
etc.55
But the PKI was. instead, making major gains. There were many who had
dared to take the step of voting democratically. And, as Aid it said, the gains
of the PNI and the NU were victories for the "democratic forces".56
True. the elections were not simply a formality. More than 16 per cent of
those eligible to vote defied the traditional leaders and voted for the
communists. Many rejected Masjumi and the PSI. etc.. which sold
themselves to regional rebels and instigators of coup d'etats. and which
really wanted to have the PKI banned.
But the way the nationalists and others mobilized popular support for
their own ends did not become more democratic simply because the PKI
made gains, while Masjumi and the PSI suffered setbacks. (In the next
chapter 1 will return to the question of the mobilization of the peasants.)

Nationalists Against Democratic Rights and Privileges

There were. however. theoretical obstacles to such clarity of vision. As we

have seen, the PKJ counted on the nationalists. alias the national
bourgeoisie. trying to build an independent and national economy.
subsequently with an increasingly controlled direction. This meant they
had their own bourgeois interests in capital formation. a liberal economy,
expanded domestic markets. etc. To reach this position. they not only
needed to struggle against imperialism and. for instance. nationalize
foreign companies. but Lhey would also be forced to break with the old
feudal lords' political and extra-economic force, which was backed by
imperialism. I n this way even the oppressed masses would be given the
opportunity of gaining certain democratic rights and freedoms. In addition.
the nationalists would not be able to counteract the liberation of the masses,
since they were dependent on their support. Finally. the national
bourgeoisie was so weak that. in contrast to the classical bourgeoisie. it
would not be in a position to replace feudal oppression with all­
encompassing economic coercion.
Even if the leadership of the PKJ had realized that the nationalists were,
in reality. democratic patrons, they were able to face the future with
confidence, and dared to support a guided democracy under the leadership
of the nationalists. Sooner or later. the theory predicted. the nationalists
would, in their own interests, work for the masses' democratic rights, but not
for those of the imperialists or the feudal landlords.
Expressed in a simple fashion, it was thus theoretically unlikely that
democracy would degenerate. And yet we know that was precisely what

123
The Communst
i Hothouse

happened. Where, then. did Lhe theory go wrong?

In the first place. as we have already seen in Chapter 9, the communists
were not able to predict the inability or, more accurately the lack of interest,
of the nationalists in starting to build a national economy, as good classical
capitalists should.
I showed that this rigidity of the leadership of the PKI depended
primarily on the theory that every consistent opposition to imperialism and
feudalism must be bourgeois, except that oft he workers. This was, however,
inconsistent with the fact that the nationalists were not especially interested
in private trading or production. The imperialists were too strong. What the
nationalists were concerned about was to utilize their political and
administrative positions to take over the state and thus to enrich
themselves.
Secondly, we have seen in Chapter 10 that even when the state intervened.
nationalized and began to guide the economy, no national economy
developed. Despite state ownership and the struggle against imperialism,
dangerous, if unusual, capitalists began to emerge. This was in direct
conflict with the predictions derived from the PKI"s theory. These
capitalists, like the nationalists, did not have an economic basis which they
must build an independent economy to safe-guard. Instead they utilized.
and sought to reinforce. their administrative political and military
positions.
Now I shall return to the question of democratic rights and freedoms.
Since the theory could not predict that the nationalists would lack interesl
in building a national economy in the classic bourgeois manner, neither
could it reveal that the nationalists also lacked the equally classic bourgeois
interests in breaking down the political monopoly and building a genuine
political democracy with the support of the masses. What the nationalists
needed, in reality. were their traditional instruments of power - admin­
istrative, political and ideological - in the struggle against imperialism and
feudalism. They were not a bourgeoisie with significant economic
strength.
The nationalists certainly needed broad mass support. Thus far they were
interested in democracy. As long as the PKI made a loyal contribution to
assembling the masses behind the nationalists, there was plenty of space for
the party and it was given the blessing of the nationalists. But when the
promises of the nationalists about a booming Indonesian economy, wb ich
would be advantageous to all but the feudal landlords and the imperialists,
fell Oat, it was no longer self-evident that in a free and democratic system the
masses would support the nationalists. And when the communists at the
same time tried to use their freedom of action to create and make use of
democratic rights and freedoms such as winning local elections and trying
to take over the administration of certain villages or the seat ofthe mayor in
larger towns. then the power base of the nationalists was threatened and
they raged against the PKI.
In other words, democratic rights and freedoms were a threat to the

124
 Democratic Cul-de-Sac

traditional administrative and patTiarchal instruments the nationalists

needed to mobilize ·'democratic mass support" and to enrich themselves in
the struggle against the feudal landlords and the imperialists. Subsequently
the latter tried to reinforce their position. and revolted when the
nationalists' economic policies did not succeed.
That the communists were not able to foresee that the nationalists would
be able to acquire mass support without democratic rights and freedoms,
and had interests in working against such rights instead of, as the theory
presupposed. extending them, was serious enough.
It was, furthermore, tragic that the communists, who were so dependent
on genuine democracy, contributed to the abolition of such democratic
freedoms as actually existed, and instead participated in the introduction of
"guided democracy". It was bad enough that the theory had incorrectly
identified the nationalists as being interested in genuine democracy. It
appears to me that the P KI leadership was so blinded by its instrumental
view of power and by its superficial ideas of a so-called bourgeois
democracy, that it never realized it was the communists themselves who
had most to win by an uncompromising defence of"bourgeois democracy",
which, I would maintain, is not merely an instrument for the use of the
bourgeoisie, but, does, indeed, have its own intrinsic value.
But worst of all was that the democratic cul-de-sac interfered with. and
severely limited, the value of the party's "front from above'", at the level of
parties and leaders. Democracy and calm were the most basic necessities
for the P K l to be able successfully to build a strong movement of workers
and peasants. a ''front from below" with individual membership, which
might have given the PK.I an independent base.
1t is high time now to look at the way in which the PKI mobilized the
peasants and workers.

Notes

l. For lhc s1ra1cgy and analys is. see Chap1ers 6 and 7.

2. Aidit (1958) in Aidit (1961b) pp.3571T.
3. Aidil (1957) in Aidil (1961b) pp.95ff.
4. Aidi1 (1958) in Aidit (1961b) pp.2570". and 299.
5. fbid_ pp.257-306. (e.g. pp.279ff. and 283n:)
6. Sec Mortimer( 1974a) p.105 and Reviewo.f/11do11e.,io 6( 1960) p.18. sta1cmcn1 by Njo10 (SOBSI) and
the Poli1buro.
7. Sec. e. g
.. Aidi1 ( 1 959) in Aidil (1963) p.287.

8. See above. pp.73ff and 81fJ:

9. See Aid it ( 1952) in Aidil (l 961 a) pp.48ff.
10. I am.1101 taking imo account 1he persons who were regarded as being close 10 1hc PKJ and who
had certain minis1erial posts. In 1953-54 1he BTJ"s Sadjarwo was in charge of 1hc Ministry of
Agricul1Urc. La1cr Sadjarwo joined the PNrs Pelani. and wishes 10 be regarded 1oday as an
extremely modera1c ex-minis1cr. (ln1crvicw with Sadjarwo. 26 November 1980. Jakarta.)
11. Cr.. e.g.. Hindley ( 1964a) pp.236-97.

125
The Communist Hothouse

12 Hindley (1962b) p.917.

13. Ibid. p.91 1 .
14. Hindley (1964a) p.70.
15. Ibid. pp.74 and 79. 49.000 full members and 1 16.000 candidaics. The figures arc. of course.
tentative. and very difficuh 10 verify. Above all. I have relied on Hindley's examina1ion of the
sources.
16. Ibid. Chapler IX
17. Ibid. p.80.
18. Ibid. pp.850:
19. Ibid. p.99.
20. Ibid. Chapler IX.esp. pp.136. 169 and 191. This careful calculation ls based on all members in 1he
pany as well as fronl organizaiions also being members of SOl3SI. BTI or Pemuda Rakjar
(respectively. the 1radc-union. peasanl and you1h organiza1ions). Of course ii someiimes
happened that a member of SOBS! ulso belonged LO 1he other two orgnniz111ions. But on 1he
01hcr hand. no1 all members of lhe parry or one of 1he smaller fron1 organizmions were al lhe
same lime members ofSOBSl. lhc BTI or Pt>11111dn Rnkjar. All in oil. SOUS! had over rwo million
members at most. 811 over five million and Pe11111dn Rakjm jus1 over one million. i.e. Ill leas1 8
million all togclher.
21 Debray. 1974. Swedish cdilion. pp.851T. 287.
22. I am only talking abou1 parliamen1ary elections. Soon afterwards clec1ions 10 a cons1itucn1
assembly were held. The results oflhe second clcclions were more or less the same as the former.
Forresull� and analysis of the ekcrionsof 1955. see firs! Fei1h ( 1971). as well as Kroef( 195711) and
(1957b)
23. About 65 percent ofthe popula1ion livedon Java.There lhe PNI gathered 86 pcrcen1 ofils votes.
lhe PKI 88.5 and the NU 85.5. In Eas1 and CentralJava lhe PNI gathered 65.5 percent ofi1svo1es.
the PKI 75 per cent. and the NU 74 per cent Masjumi. on the other hand. ob1ained only 50 per
cent of its vo1es in Java. and half of 1hcsc were casl io Wcs1 Java. Lev ( 1964) p.9.
24. The NU wen! from eight seatS in the provisional parliament 10 45. and !hereby became the main
vic1or of 1he elec1ions.
25. Besides Java. local eleclions were held only in Smuh Sumatra. Riau and Kalimantan. primarily
because of lhe intensive local rebellions.
26. For resulls and analysis of the eleciions of 1957 and 1958. which no one has looked at in dcrih.
see Lev (1964) pr.1 09-1 25 and Hindley (1964a) pp.223·9.
27. Sec Aidi1 ( 1 957) pp.1311T.. 2 141T. and (1958) pp.270ff in Aidi1 (1961b).
28. Sec Fcilh (1962) p.233.
29. For 1hc anemp1cd t'011p de
tar on 17 Oc1obcr 1952. see Feith ( 1962) pp.246-73. McVcy (1971) and
Utrcchl ( 1979b) pp.36-5
7
30. Nasution absolu1ely refused 10 agrcc1ha1 ii was an anemp1cdro11pde1m He said. "ljusr wanted 10
promoic 1hc kind of guided democracy which -..e la1ersucceedcd in securing in 1959.- (lntcrviclV.
22 November 1980. Jakana) Prominent socialists who were invol,cd. such as 1hc Budiurjo
family, noneiheless describe ii as an unsuccessful �"Cup. (lnlcrvie-..,01.Jakana 1979) Nasu1ion was
subsequenily reins1a1ed as commandcr·in·cbiefof 1he anny in 1955 by 1hc cab incl of Masjumi
and the PSI. which wa> in power bc1wcen Augusl 1955 and March 1956. Sec also Feith (1962)
pp.440-4 and Ulrecht (1979b) pp.51·7
31. For this and lhc previous paragraph. sec. e.g.. Feith ( 1967). imer a/in. pp.3660: Easily accessible
source malerial can be found in /11do111•sw11 Polincal T/1i11k11111 (1970).
32. Pauker ( 1969) p.5
33. Sec Pauker (I 958) esp. pp.1400: Cf Pauker ( 1962b). Ransom ( 1970) pp.42ff. as well as Feith and
Lev (1963) p.41.
34. Cf. Bunnell ( 1976).
35. Lev (1964) pp. 1 3 1 ·8.
36. Sukarno prcvenied 1he PNI and the NU from openly 1urning agains1 the PKI. See. e.g_ ibid. und
Hindley (1962b) p.917.
37. See e.g.. HindIcy (I 964a) pp.2721T.
38. J.H. Hardi. one of 1he mos! promincn1 right-wing leaders of the PNI. und first Deputy Prime
M inis1er be1ween 1957·59. says 1ha1 senior PNI officialsgalhered in his residence in Jakana and

126
 Democratic Cul·de·Sac

decided LO prevail upon Sukarno to proclaim the constitution of 1945.(lntcrvicw 250ctober 1980.
Jakana).
39. For Lhe above. and for how guided democracy was implemented, sec. e.g.• Lev ( 1964) pp.317 and
359. Concerning Sukarno·s reluctance. see also May ( 1978) p.84.
40. Sec Mortimer ( 1 974a) pp.l29JT.. Hindley (l964a) pp.2881T. and Hindley (1962b) pp.924n: The
mayors in Surabaya. Solo. Magelang. Salatiga er al. were still communists. as were the deputy
governors in Central Java. West Java and Jakarta. Sec RL••iew of /11do11esia J (1960) pp.9 and
31.
41. See Legge (1959) and ( 1 960). I am also using an interview with Legge (9 October 1980,
Melbourne). Cf. also Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.126·32 and McVey (1963) p.166.
When I asked the formerdeputySecrctary-Gcncrnl ofthe PNl. lsnaeni.on the right wing ofthe
pany. to characterize the work of the pany at that time. he made the stanling compurison with
Golkor; this is the present·day governing pany. a corporution of functional groups based in the
statecivil and mili1ary bureaucracy. tsnaeni is one ofthe Speakers in the Indonesian parliament
today and represents the new conservative nationalist pany. {Interview. 2 1 Oc1obcr 1980.
Jakarta.)
42. The new parliament had 283 seals. The PKl had been allotted 30 seats. the PNl 44, the NU 36. thc
Pro1estan1s 6. 1he PSll 5. the Catholics 5. Per1i 2. Murba (conserva1ivc Titoists) t. The functional
groups were allocated: the army 15. Lhe navy 7, the air force 7. the polices. workers 26. peasants 25.
Islamic authorities 24. the youth 9. women 8. cultural workers and teachers 5. others 23. Feith
(1967) pp.345 and 3631T. Sec also. e.g
.. Monimcr (1974a) pp.120ff.
43. See. e.g.. Hindley ( 1 962b) pp.920ff. and Mortimer (t974a) pp.I tsn:
44. Hindley (t962b) p.921.
45. See Feith ( 1962) p.242. ( 1967) p.362. Monimcr ( 1974a) p.128 and Krocf ( 1960c) p.225.
46. ForPerbepsissignHkance.see Mc Vey ( 1972) p.149. and cf. p.10:6. above. See also Hindley( l964a)
pp.2161T. Regarding the PKJ·s favourable attitude to the unilication of the ''Ctcran organizations.
with the army's approval. see Aidi1 (1957) in Aidil (1961b) p.152.
47. See. e.g.. Lev (1964) pp.57n:. SOIT•• and 257. Lev ( 1963·64) pp.352ff. McVey ( 1 963) pp.t691T.
48. Both Ahem Emingpradja and Nasution oonlirmed that Minister of LabourAhem and the army
co-operated in order to break the strong position of SOBSI and the PIG and creale a single
ws 25 October 1980 with Ahem and 22 November 1980
confeder.ition of trade unions. (Intervie
with Nasutio n. bo1h in Jakana.)
49. See Chapler 13.
50. The best summary of the attacks on Lhc PKl can be found in Hindley (l962b) p.920fT.
5 t. In this category belong not only auempts to make evaluations within thce:nn:mc left in 1hcWest.
e.g. Grieswold ( 1979). bul also the self-critical more or less Maoisl documents which were
produced within the PKI. e.g. PKJ ( 1971).
52. Sec above. pp.59-60.
53. Pluvierand Onghokham maintain thal 1his··anti-feudalism" was primarily a struggle against the
colonial state powers. (lnlerview 2 October 1980. Amslerdam. and 18 October 1980. Jakanu.) Cf.
Reid. ( 1974b).
54. Sec. e.g.. Feith ( 1 962) pp.343 and 369. and Jay (1956).
55. See. e.g.. Feith (1971). first published 195
7. and Kroef ( t957a) and (t957b).
56. Aidit (1955) in Aidil ( 1 961a) pp.319·23.

127
1 2. The Mobilized Peasant
Society

The PKI, the Nationalists and the Peasants

The PKJ characterized the processes of production in agriculcure in the

villages as semi-feudal. The major feudal lords bad I.he right to monopolize
the land used by the peasants. who were thus not able to own their land but
were forced to lease it. The rent was often paid in kind and the peasants were
heavily in debt.1
The interests of the feudal landlords were thus in contradiction to those of
the peasants. The peasants were stratified by Aidit in the mid-fifties in the
same way as Mao had done. First came the rich peasants who functioned in
a similar way to the landlords. but since they also worked themselves they
could at times be neutral in the class struggle and counteract imperialism.
After them came the middle peasants who were independent of both
superiors and hired labour. They could fend for themselves and thus join
rhe revolutionary forces. Finally came the poor peasants and agricultural
workers in the villages. They had insufficient land to survive, or hardly any
land at all. These so-called semi-proletarian peasants were the most
revolutionary forces in the villages.1
The PKJ estimated that the peasants made up berween 60 and 70 percent
of the population. Even the peasants who squatted on occupied plantations
were presumably included in these figures. According to the Ministry of
Agriculture, about 220.000 hectares of plantation land was occupied in 1957,
representing just over 3 1 per cent of the cotaJ plantation area in Java and
Sumatra.3 The squatters principally cultivated edible crops for their own
subsistence.
In 1953 Aidit noted that there were still members of the PKJ who believed
that villagers were on the wnole equals. In contrast to that equality he
painted a general picture of land concentration and exploitation of I.he poor
peasants. The party undertook an investigation of its own before the
Peasants· Conference of 1959. and the results were published in 1960. The
party maintained that it now had evidence that a concentration of land had
taken place. The major landowners usually owned considerably more than
half the land. The poor owned a very small portion. though they often made
up two-thirds of the population in the villages. The communists could also

128
 The Mobilized Peasanr Society

rely on the figures of the Ministry of Agriculture. which had been compiled
under the leadership of the former leader of the BTI. now a member of the
PNrs peasant organization Petani and the Minister of Agriculture,
Sadjarwo.4
In 1953 Aidit declared that "the agrarian revolution is the essence oflhe
people's democratic revolution in lndonesia."5 The spirit of this statement
was that all revolutionary activity must take the peasants' interests as its
point of departure. and not the more advanced demands of the working
class.6
Aidit referred to Stalin's and Mao's theories on the peasants and declared
that the Indonesian peasants were bourgeois. since they wanted their own
private land. Private ownership of land was noL of course. the ultimate goal
of the PKJ. But the peasants had to discover the disadvantages of owning
many small pieces of land before one could start talking about collect­
ivization.7
In the early lifties Aidit said that only about seven percent of the peasants
were organized. One of the most important reasons for this, he stated, was
that the communists did not start from a recognition of the peasants'
bourgeois interests. And in addition many cadres were reluctant to work in
"primitive" villages. And even within the communist-inspired organiza­
tions. there were some relatively large landowners.8 Finally. the organiz­
ations needed to join forces.9
Seasonal labourers in the plantations. the poor peasants and a
considerable number of squalters were relatively well organized and
rn ii itanl.

The PKl thus advocated a bourgeois land reform. Land should b e taken
from the large landowners and divided amongst those who were using it. It
would hardly be possible for the weak bourgeoisie to succeed in
implementing such a reform, which therefore would necessitate the
communists taking over. Through controlling the leadership i n China, the
communists there had already implemented a bourgeois land reform. The
first steps had also been taken in Vietnam.
But the PK.I was not in charge in Indonesia. The communists did not
have control over the peasants' struggle nor did they lead the national
struggle against colonialism and imperialism. lt was thus forced to start
from the ground up; it was forced to co-exist with religious anti-communists
and to seek co-operation on the terms offered by the so-called progressive
nationalists. And. above all. the PKJ was forced to start with peasants whose
political consciousness and schooling were not highly developed.
To be able to build a broad and strong peasants' organization. the PKI
advocated that the party concentrate on current short-term demands which
were being made by the peasants themselves. Included were lower land
rents, lower interest rates on extortionate loans. the right to make their own
decisions as to what foreign plantation owners should pay when hiring land
from the peasants, democratization of village leadership and so on.10
As soon as a peasant organization was formed it ought. according to PKI

129
The Com1111111is1 Ho1ho11se

instructions. take concrete action to defend the peasants, by distributing

cheap fertilizers, arranging for the repair of irrigation canals, building co­
operatives, organizing funeral associations. teaching and training agricul­
tural leaders, defending people who were brought to trial, eliminating
iUiteracy, organizing sport and cultural associations. etc.11
The PKJ emphasized that it was unimportant whether the demands were
particularly advanced or not. It was more important for the organization to
achieve results, so that the peasants saw that it was worthwhile to act.'2 In
addition. splits between the inhabitants of the viLIages should be avoided.
The communists must ensure that 90 per cent of the inhabitants could
participate and must base their work among the middle. poor and landless
peasants.'3 It was important for the communists not to alienate the religious
peasants nor criticize their cultural patterns.14 On the contrary. the PKJ dug
deep into Indonesian history. Particularly in the pre-colonial and anti­
colonial past, a great deal of communal solidarity was found, as weU as
cultural magnificence and political pride on which it was possible to build,
while trying to add a progressive content or angle.15
The programme of action was thus·moderate. The propaganda slogan -
"land to the tiller'" - was to be seen and heard everywhere. It was important
for the peasants to be continuously aware tbat all the injustices to which
they were subject were essentially caused by the feudal landlords and the
imperialists. But to try to realize the goals of a redivision of land was,
accordfog to the PK!, premature and "adventurous"'. since the organization
did not yet have sufficient strength.16
Despite this moderation. it was easier said than clone for the P K I to go out
into the villages at a time when a wave of anti-communism had just swept
the land. As we have seen in previous chapters, a precondition for work
amongst the peasantry was that the PKI should succeed in acquiring
protection and become acceptable through the "'front from above"' with the
nationalists. The front was primarily supposed to guarantee, and if possible
extend. democracy.
Moreover. the PKI counted on the nationalists, with their base in the
national bourgeoisie, having their own interest in acting against the feudal
remnants. Otherwise they would not acquire an increased formation of
capital, or enlarged domestic markets, or sufficient support from the
people.
Exactly how the PKJ regarded the nationalists· supporters in the rural
areas and the villages, l have not succeeded in grasping. My conclusion.
however. is that the PKI regarded rural nationalists as belonging primarily
to the petty bourgeoisie, i.e. middle peasants and to some extent rich
peasants.
There is every indication that the PKI counted on the nationalists in the
towns pursuing a national-bourgeois economy which demanded an explicit
anti-feudal stand from rural nationalists. Such a national economy would
enable rural nationalists to feel their slumbering bourgeois interests
becoming aroused. They would leave extra-economic repression behind

130
 The Mobilized Peasant Society

them. produce more and become more efficient. since there would be
money lo be made and profitable projects in which to invest.
As the P K l put iL the national-bourgeois politicians did from time to time
abandon their anti-feudal declarations. But on these occasions the party
leadership would comfort itself by saying that the national bourgeoisie
must in the long run continue the slniggle against feudalism so as not to
betray its own interests.17
As late as 1959 Aid it maintained that "if the progressive forces are great
and the Party programme is one which benefits the middle-of-the-road
forces . . . there is a possibility that the middle-of-the-road forces will. for a
long period of time, remain loyal to the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
strugglc."18
In sum. there was no contradiction between. on the one hand. the front
from above with the nationalists against i mperialism and for democracy.
and. on the other. the attempt by the communists to build an anti-feudal
workers' and peasants· front from below. The front from above was a
precondition which created a working climate. The front from below
strengthened the nationalists in so far as they had objective interests in a
bourgeois struggle against feudalism. In the long run. the peasants and
workers in a broad front from below would become so strong that they
would be able to push the nationalists ahead of them in the struggle against
imperialism and feudalism. for a coalition government and later for a
people's democratic government. This would be able, among other things,
to carry out a consistent anti-feudal land reform. transferring the land to
those that till it.
Aidit himself stressed that:

The anti-feudal front ofthe workers and the peasants is tbe basis ofthe anti-imperialist
united national fronL . . . The idea of jins i hing the national democratic r<?1°olwio11firs('
and then only "after rhe narionaf rl!l·ofurion has been compfered" ofcarrying out the "0111i­
fe11daf democraric m·of111io11" is a dangerous and incorrect idea. This is because tbe idea
of "completing rhe narional re1·ofu1io11" without struggling for tbc emancipation of the
peasants from the exploitation by the survivals of feudalism means not drawing the
peasants over to the side of the revolution.19

The PKI among Patrons and Clients

Progress
Between 1940 and 1941 the poor peasants started occupying plantation land
to cultivate edible crops. at first for their own consumption and later on for
their new Japanese masters too. During the struggle against the Dutch, the
occupations continued. now not only to produce food but also to paralyse
the colonizers at the same time. After independence the squallcrs naturally
felt no inclination to move. There was a dearth of good arable land in the
villages. Even i f it would have been possible to get the plantation economy
working again. which was hardly likely, it would have been a step

131
The Co111m1111is1 Ho1ho11se

backwards for the squartcrs to try to become planation workers rather than
remain as independent farmers.20
The Wilopo cabinet fell because it attempted to drive the poor squatters
from plantations in North Sumatra and to resurrect part of the colonial
economy.21
The lirst PNI government without Masjum i decided to meet some of the
demands of the squatters.22 In North Sumatra alone in 1957 about half a
roiJlion squatters with women and children were given some chance of
remaining on about 1 15,000 hectares of plantation land and of negotiating
with the authorities.13
With the nationalization of the Dutch plantations. the PKI asserted that
the government had linally acquired the necessary resources to guarantee
that the squatters could retain the land they had started tilling long ago.24 I n
areas where the PK1 had a majority, tbe squatters very often were given
those rights.25 The PKI. the BTI and to some degree SOBSI bad strong
representation umong the squatters. But a considerable degree of progress
for the squatters doubtless depended on the fact that they were numerically
strong and that several parties had supporters among them so that none
could afford to disregard them entirely.26
During the struggle for liberation the co-operation between the old
aristocracy and the colonial state was broken down. Some so-called feudal
privileges were done away with.27 The new state did not have the option,
whether or not it wanted to, to tax the peasants effectively.28 Inflation
reduced some of the burdens of those who were in debt. Many peasants
recovered the land which had been forcibly leased by the Dutch sugar
companies, for instance. The purchasing power, especially of the richer
peasants, increased.29 The nationalists were among the leaders of this anti­
feudal and anti-colonial movement.
By supporting the nationalists the PKI encouraged a certain resistance to
Darul Islam a s weU as to the PSI and Masjumi. The PKI maintained that
these were rooted in the feudal landlords. When the NU broke away from
Masjumi and moved towards the PNl and Sukarno, it was not only the
Muslim front against the PKI that was shaken. It became increasingly clear
that the PNl and the NU were opposed to commercialization in the villages,
presumably a commercialization based on "feudal'' modes of production.
The nationalists in particular advocated the alternative of a traditional
peasant economy of independent smallholders who worked collectively.
Thanks to the nationaLists and perhaps even the NU, the PKI was able to
reach the rural areas and the villages despite the anti-communism of the
early lifties.
Once this became possible, the PKl was able to mobilize and organize on
what amounted to virgin political territory. Most of the other political
movements relied on traditional loyalties and relations of dependency
which could be administered from the centres. The nationalists were no
exception. They often relied on their supporters in the local state
administration. (The lowest pamong praja was to be found al the sub-

132
 The Mobilized Pe(IS(lnt Society

district. or kecamatan. level. which included a number of smal I villages. He

would gather the village headmen together and supervise them.) I n
addition. there was a loss o f respect for the authority o f the state, since the
old aristocracy"s position had been undermined during and after the
liberation struggle. Sometimes the PK.I could circumvent the traditional
authorities and go directly to the peasants.30 The emphasis on collective
seli-help was an important means of reducing the dependence of the poor
and landless peasantry on the traditional authorities.31
Indeed, it appears that the PKI in the first place won the support of local
leaders among the intellectuals, such as the teachers. and the middle
peasants. as well as, in some cases, rich peasants.32 But this in no way
deviated from the Chinese communist experiences, for example, and did
not necessarily lead to setbacks.
During the elections of 1957 it appeared that the PK.I received almost as
large a proportion of votes in the rural areas as it did in the towns.33 The
party was no longer simply an urban phenomenon. In 1959 Aidit declared
that more than half the members of the party were peasants. According to
the PK.I, in 1956 there were branches of the party in 34 per cent of Java·s
rather more than 2 1 ,000 villages. and by 1959 thcre were party branches in
more than 84 per cent of the villages. At the next level the PKJ was in 1956
represented in bearly 70 per cent, and in 1959 in nearly 99 per cent. of the
kecamatans. 34
After an intensive recruitment campaign. the BTI could claim a total
membership of3.3 million by the end of 1955. I n 1957 there were said to be
local branches in 13,787 villages, of which 2.528 were outside Java; the BTJ
was strongest in northern Sumatra.35
Presumably these figures are. as usual. exaggerated. I n 1958. for instance.
Sudisman. a Politburo member. said that the BTl had only 1.6 million
members but could mobilize more than 3 million peasants.36 But the figures
indicate that remarkable progress had been made. I n 1962 the BTI claimed
a membership of more than 5.5 million in 43 per cent of the villages of
r ndonesia. 84 per cent of all kecamatans were included. rn other words, the
BTr claimed that it organized 25 per cent of the adult population.37
While the PK.I contented itself with working. in the long run. for a radical
bourgeois land reform. the nationalists led by Sukarno took up the question
of at least a cautious land reform as a slogan for their agcnda.38 At the same
time as Sukarno declared his political manifesto (ma11ipof) and opened the
session of the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimba11gan Asung) in
1959. he also declared that the land reform was an inseparable part of the
Indonesian revolution.
Thus in 1960 a law was passed on sharecropping. The tiller should receive
at least half of the net crop. Shortly afterwards the Basic Agrarian Law was
passed. as welJ as several other laws which have no particular significance
in this context.
In Part IH of this book I shall return to the land reform law, and in
particular to the way in which it was implemented. Without a doubt these

133
The Communst
i f/01ho11se

laws were a great success for the PKI, even if they could have been
considerably more radjcal. The nationalists had shown that they did at least
have an anti-feudal stance, and when the bill was being discussed in
parliament they even tried to appear to be more radical than the
communists.

Problems

To some extent the PKJ"s analyses thus corresponded with actual

developments. But there were also problems, which far surpassed the
advances made.
The communists welcomed the nationalization of Dutch plantations,
since tJ1e government now had a better chance of meeting the demands of
tl1e squatters. But the result was the opposite: the new state businessmen,
supported by the army, saw their chance to resurrect the colonial economy,
an opportunity which had been denied previous governments. fhe
communists protested but in vain. With every militant action it was possible
to accuse the militants of sabotaging the nation's own companies and its
attempt to build a national economy at the same time as the state had
acquired the old colonial powers of the Dutch.39
What was considerably more serious was that the front from above with
the nationalists imposed a more restrictive framework on the work of the
communists in the vilJages than the party had counted on.
Thanks to the nationalists. the communists did succeed in reaching the
villages but not in reducing any spontaneously anti-feudal class formations,
which was what the party had been hoping for. Instead the party reached
the Javanese of Sukarno and the PNI, the Syncretist nationalists,prijaji and
their peasants, abangan as well as the nationaUst patrons and their clients.
The party did not do so well among peasants who were not Javanese.
peasants who were close to the Muslim authorities, or those clients whose
patrons were not nationalists.
The history of Central and East Java, as well as of Bali, is primarily
concerned with agrarian. more or less Asiatic, modes of production, while
the north-western part of the island and the coast of Sumatra, among other
places, were dominated by commerce and, since the 12th century, by
Muslim trade and culture. As Islam spread in the archipelago, with the
exception of Bali. the same division occurred as within Javanese agrarian
society.40
The Javanese nobility employed regional and local ''bailiffs" (pr{iajis).
Most of these were taken over by the Dutch with their indfrect rule. At the
village level the leaders of the original inhabitants dominated. They were
allied to the prijajis. With the spread ofIslam, an alternative leadersb ip grew
up, that of the religious leaders and the orthodox Muslims. with solid. often
commercially-based. economic positions. In this way a distinctJy Muslim
culture took root. which was often ca!Jed santri. The old peasant culture,

1.34
 The Mobilized Peasam Sociery

subordinate to the nobility and the pruaps. absorbed some Islamic

characteristics. but retained several distinctive features, and was often
called abangan. 41
Not much was said about this at the beginning of the fifties. But in
connection with the election campaign in 1 955. it became obvious that the
parties. most ofwhich had no support in the villages and little acquaintance
with the problems of the peasants, made use of cultural differences to
mobilize votes. In this way cultural divisions were institutionalized.
Religious leaders utilized sanrri traditions to gain votes. The advantages
made by the NU in Central and East Java were considerable. The PNI. for
its part. liked to allude to threats from Muslim extremists. used the
terminology of the abangans and exploited its strong support among the so­
called new prijaji
s (regional and local public servantS who bad replaced
those who had co-operated with the Dutch). Sometimes whole villages
voted in the same way: often people from the same neighbourhood voted for
the same party.42
Perhaps the most important reason for the importance of the santri and
abangan cultures was (and is) that no distinct classes developed in the
Javanese villages. and that as a resuJt class contradictions were less
important than cultural differences. Starting from field studies in the early
rtfties. Clifford Geertz ascertained that village inhabitants coped with
colonialism mainly by relining that part of production they were allowed to
retain for themselves. For this Geertz coined the term "involution". Ever
larger numbers of people found work on the same pieces ofland. According
to Geertz. the villagers also shared the small surplus through a series of
traditional forms and rules. He talked about shared poverty.43
There is every reason to be sceptical of Geertz's term ..involution", and
especially of his thesis of shared poverty. William Collier, for instance, bas
pointed out that Geertz undertook his field studies at a time when theJavan
economy was economically depressed. Supported by earlier research and
his own studies, Collier says that Geertz's "involution" and ··shared
poverty" were hardly to be found in 1922, nor in the seventies when Java was
not marked by a depression. Perhaps it was so. however. in 1936 and 1952.44
Collier (among others) also pointed out that Geertz only discussed the
relations between landowning peasants. while abandoning the many
landless peasants lo their fate. and that he disregarded regional and local
differences, and failed to take into account their need to engage in other
economic activity in addition to agricultural production.�5
These remarks, and many more for which there is no space here,46
undermine at least some of the remarkable emphasis which a whole
generation of researchers has placed on the sanrri-abangan controversy.
In no way do l deny that the sancri-abangan conflict took place and was
important, not least because the parties exploited the issue, when times were
hard for Indonesian agriculturalists. But if involution and shared poverty
vary with the passing of time and do not necessariJy embrace the ever­
increasing number of landless peasants. then the significance of the sanrri-

135
The Communist Ho1ho11se

abangan paradigm must be given more modest proportions. W.hat then

becomes more interesting to discuss is whether the so-called patron-client
relationships did not have. and do not continue to have, a considerable
importance when it comes to uniting the population "of the rural areas
vertically. and not horizontally. according to class lines.
The thesis on patron-client relations, which in all essentials is an
empirical generalization and thus suffers from theoretical weaknesses, does
not deny the occurrence of classes in the way that Geertz did. On the
contrary, the thesis is based on the development of a kind of mutual
dependence between superior and subordinate under certain circum­
stances, a dependence which is seriously weakened when the patron is able
to develop a more commercial, and perhaps. in the end, a capitalist mode of
agricultural production.47
Ernst Utrecht bas shown, with great passion, that patrons often acquired
support amongst peasants irrespective of whether the patron and the
peasants belonged to the same cultural stream, e.g. whether samri or not.
Many within the abangan sphere were members of the N U (santri) and some
Islamic religious teachers called kyais were even members of the PK1.4S
Utrecht thus does noc deny that religious leaders often had tremendous
significance when it came to mobilizing people in the villages. But their
position as patrons was perhaps as important as their religion. It is
necessary to distinguish between the church and religion.
Under all circumstances. it is clear that the communists arrived among
vertically rather than horizontally stratified villagers. Protected by the
nationalists, the PK.I followed them to the old Javanese culture and abangan
as well as the nationalist patrons and their clients. It was considerably more
difficult to reach sanm�· or to gain a foothold amongst the clients of the
orthodox Muslim patrons.
Th is ought not. however, to have been an insurmountable obstacle for the
PKl. What could be more natural than to start mobilizing and educating
those peasants that could be reached? Especially as this occurred through
the support of the nationalists, who were regarded as a fraternal party which
had its own anti-feudal interests lo safeguard. Perhaps the PKI would be
able to liberate the peasants from vertical loyalties. through patient daily
work building up a system of collective self-help as an alternative to
protection from the patrons.49 And as both communists and nationalists
developed an anti-feudal policy. the peasants who belonged to other
cultural streams and/or patrons ought to join in the anti-feudal struggle.
That is not simply a favourable interpretation of the theoretical and
strategic perspective of the PKI. In 1957 it was also. co some extent, a
reflection of what was happening.50 During the local elections it was seen
that the PKI had won votes at the expense of both the PNI and the NU. The
communists were clearly in the process of winning a considerable number
of clients, especially from the PNl patrons.
The problem was that such an advance by the communists was not
acceptable to the nationalists nor to the orthodox Muslims, irrespective of

136
 The Mobilized Peasant Society

whether they, like the NU. co-operated with the PNI or not. In the villages
the nationalists' administrative power base and its grass-roots support was
threatened. The local leaders replied by taking an open stand against the
PKI.
The front from above with tbe nationalists was, however, as indispens­
able as ever for the communists. The PKI had certainly strengthened its
positions in the rural areas, but the organization of the peasants was far
from being so strong and independent that the party could go it alone. as the
Vietnamese and Chinese bad done when their nationalist allies withdrew.
The communists realized they were forced to support the nationalists
against bourgeois-inspired regional rebels. on conditions dictated by the
nationalists both in Jakarta and in the villages.
The result was that the communists paid for the right to mobilize the
nationalists' clients within the abangan tradition, and the price was that they
must not break thesantri and abangan traditions nor threaten the position o f
the patrons. The PKI could mobilize and organize but could not build on
cl.ass differences or create class consciousness.
Thus it came about that the PKJ even used its own patrons, when the
party could not reach out and dominate via youth who had been radicalized
in the struggle for liberation. With the help of influential and propertied
villagers whom the communists in the towns, for instance, mighc be related
to or know, Lbe PKJ was able to mobilize peasants without seriously
disturbing the PNI and the NU by resorting to class struggle. In the villages
where the PKI was the largest movement in opposition it also came about
that some village leaders who were not in power joined the PKl in order to
overthrow their rivals.51
Already during the elections in l 955. Aidil emphasized the importance of
showing the NU goodwill, since it supported the nationalists. As a result, the
communists could not take action against so-called patriotic feudal
landlords, but only against those who for instance. co-operated with
regional rebels. Demands for lower land rents sbould, of course. be made,
but nothing should be done to threaten the position of the patriots.52
This line was reconfinned at the peasant conference of 1959.53 It was only
when Sukarno and some radical nationalists tbe following year took the
initiative on land reform that the communists put the struggle against the
largest landowners on its list of bread-and-butter issues.54
At the second party congress in 1959, Aidit simply said that it was not
possible to overthrow imperialism and feudalism at the same time,
although both enemies were connected. First to be overthrown should be
imperialism and those who collaborated with tbe imperialists, some of
whom might. ofcourse, be feudal landlords, and only later would feudalism
come under attack. Naturally th e communists would defend the intcrests of
the peasants, but the party could not go onto the attack.55
That need not have been remarkable. Many socialist and communist
parties have pursued policies of class collaboration in order to get at the
worst of their enemies. But then the parties have departed from an

137
The Comm1111is1 Ho1house

independent class-based organization. and have had the opportunity of

holding their positions and of defending their members despite collabor­
ating with class enemies. But the PKI did not have such a class organiza­
tion. The communists co-operated with the nationalists, and even the
Muslim feudal lords in the NU, on conditions laid down by their
masters.
I n 1959 the PKJ itself confessed to some of these errors. There were. for
instance. feudal landowners within the BTI. In addition, party cadres
generally did not understand social relations in the villages.56
Jn 1959, when the party at least decided to work hard for lower )and rents
and demand that share-croppers should get 60 per cent of the harvest
(compared to at best 50 per cent previously). the BTI's organization said a
few months later:

The 6:4 action and other actions against the landlords· exploitation are entirely new for
the peasants and even for BTT cadres. The existence of examples ofsuccessful action
wil I facilitate our work to convince the peasanrs of thejustice of the 6:4 demand and of
the power of the peasants" duty.

The land-reform law of 1960 was certainly a surprising success for the PKI,
which had been prepared drasticaUy to clamp down on hopes based on the
anti-feudalism of the nationa!ists.58 But, as I will show in the next section of
this book. the law in all essentials was a paper product from above, from
among Sukarno's circle o f radical nationalists, who did not want the PKl to
monopolize the demand for land reforms.

Captive of its own Policy

Quite contrary to the PKfs own point of departure, there were contrad­
ictions between the.front from above with the nationalists and the attempts
by the communists to build an independent anti-feudal workers' and
peasants' front from below. The front from above was indeed a pre­
condition for the PKI to reach the rural areas. But when the PKJ tried to
build u p its front from below, the nationalists did not feel in the least
fortified by the bourgeois anti-feudal interests ascribed to them. rather the
reverse.
The PKl leaders found it necessary to distinguish between the struggle
against imperialism and the struggle against feudalism. though they knew
this meant that the peasants would not be Liberated from so-called semi­
feudal exploitation. The peasants were mobilized on the terms of the
nationalists and their friends. the "patriotic feudal landlords". Ir was the
nationalists' traditional peasant society which was mobilized, not the so­
called anti-feudal classes.59
The usual way to explain the problems the PKJ experienced in
mobilizing the peasants is to refer either to the lack of any distinct class

138
 The Mobilized Peasam Society

of peasants, or to the lack of class consciousness in the villages. Rex

Mortimer's viewpoint is tbat all these factors forced the P K I to organize
their foUowers in religious and cultural groups which cut right across the
vague lines of class.60
Surely there were faults in the PK.I's class analysis. Presumably
misjudgements were made concerning class contradictions and class
consciousness. But that does not explain the problems of peasant
mobilization which arose in tbe fifties. We do not even know whether it was
actually possible to pursue class-struggle politics in the villages.
As far as I know, the PKl was never able to initiate any proper attempt a t
class organization a n d activities related to the class struggle.''' First, the
organizations had to be created from the ground up. And then, when tbe
PKl and BTI were beginning to find their feet, they still could not go further
to simple class struggle actions or build an independent class organization.
So as not to face a united anti-communist front, the PK.I leadership was
forced to postpone any attempt to organize classes or class actions which
might disturb the nationalists, their allies in the NU and. before long, the
army command.
Thus we should hesitate before blaming all the problems of the PKI.
when i t came to mobilizing the peasants. on poor class analysis. We should
wait at least until the party did make serious attempts to organize the classes
in the class struggle, and failed. This is what happened to the PKI at the
beginning of 1963. and I shall return to this in the next section of this
book.
But our present task is to explain why the PKI made the mistake of
believing that the front from above would help. or at least not hinder, the
PK.I in trying to gather the peasants together for an anti-feudal class
struggle.
We must first go back to the theoretica l problems which I spoke of earlier
which prevented the communists from correctly analysing the lack of
interest of the nationalists i n building a bourgeois-national economy and in
promoting a genuine democracy.
In contradiction to the PKI's theoretical assumption about the national­
ists and the so-called national bourgeoisie, they were in no way classical
bourgeois with an economic base; the imperialists were far superior. For the
nationalists it was more interesting to exploit the political and admin­
istrative positions they controlJed in order primarily to take over the state
apparatus so as to enrich themselves from it
With such interests, it is obvious that the bourgeoisie does not create a
bourgeois national economy which demands a bourgeois anti-feudalism. I t
does not, for instance. act strongly against the nationalist landlords in the
rural areas who suppress private capital formation and commerce, among
other things. The nationalists were instead forced to put a stop to a n anti­
feudalism which primarily threatened their political and administrative
production base in the rural areas, especially in the villages. They needed a
guided economy in the same way as they needed a guided democracy.

139
The Communist Hotho11se

As long as the position of the nationalists i n production i n the villages

was threatened by private commercial interests of a more or less feudal type,
there were solid grounds for an anti-feudal unity between nationalist lords
and peasants mobilized by the communists.
But if the communists hinted that the struggle of the peasants against
feudalism ought also to include a considerable part of the traditional,
slightly communalistic forms of extra-economic force, for instance the
patron-client relations, th.en the nationalists' position in production would
b e threatened.
Thus it can be seen that the PKI was correct in assuming that the
nationalists in the rural areas had anti-feudal interests, but incorrect in
assuming it was a classical bollrgeois anti-feudalism. This theoretical
perspective only encompassed anti-feudalism based on the bourgeoisie, if
we discount the position of the workers. The theory lacked the means to
analyse class interests in :rn agricultural society dominated by imperialism
but stamped by extra-economic forces.
The result of the PKJ's faulty analysis and theory was thus that the
communists were forced to refrain from trying independently to organize
.
the classes and, as a matter of course, from initiating a policy of class
struggle. Consequently the peasants could not be liberated, their con­
sciousness could not be raised and the party could not "draw the peasants
over to the side of the revolution", a risk Aidit had foreseen in 1957.62
Thus, there was never any genuine alliance between the workers and the
peasants; this was to have been built on joint anti-feudal interests. and these
did not exist. The agrarian revolution, which was to have been the "core of
the people's democratic revoluti.on", could not even begin.
What happened, then, to the workers? Did they achieve anything, despite
the weak struggle of the peasants?

Notes

.I See further quotation. pp.70·1 above.

2. Aidi1 (1957) in Aldi! (1963) pp.53fC
3. Fei1h (1962) p.570.
4. Slamc1 (1968) gives a good account and commentary.
5. Aidi1 (1953) in Aidit (1961a) p.120.
6. Aidi1 (1954) in Aidit (1963) p.254.
7. Aidit ( 1 953) in Aidi1 (196La) pp.1 13-120.
8. Ibid.
9. Besides the BT!. the organizations were the PKl·do01inatcd .RTI (R11k1111 Tani llldonesia) and
SAKTI (Sarekat Tani lndo11esia). in which the PKI had some innuence. Hindley (1964a)
p. 165.
10. Aidit (1953) in Aidil (196la) imera/io p.1 19.
II. Hindley ( 1 964a) p.174. Cf. Aidit ( 1 953) in Aidit(l961a) p.119.
12. See ibid. pp.I 1 9ff.
13. See. c.g.. Aidit( 1957) in Aidi1 (196'.l) p.54. Presumably ttiie statistic of90 percent refers 10 all except
1he feudal landlords and those close to them. Cf. Aidil( 1959) in Aidi t (1963) p.311. Cf. also the

140
 The Mobilized Peasam Society

often-quoted investigation by H. ten Dam. firs1 published in 1956. in Dam ( 1961 ) : in a village on
West Java.90 pcr cen1of1he villagers had to work at lcas1 pan time. for insiancc as sharecroppers.
in order to survive.
14. Huiur ( 1974). p.107. mentions 1hat the PKJ and BTI punished cadres openly for propaga1ing
anti-religious propaganda.
15. Sec. e.g.. Monimcr ( l974b) and Huizer (1974) pp.109ff. Also an in1erview wi1h one of PKl's
agricullural expertS as well as a former leading member of 1he BT!: interviews No.27 and 67.
Jakarta. 1980. For 1he overall qucs1ions. sec Aidi1 (1957) in Aidi1 ( 1 96�) and McVey's analysis of
this text. McVcy (1979).
16. Sec. e.g.. Aidit (1953) in Aidit (1961a) p.120.
17. Sec. e.g
.. Aiui1 ( 1 959) in Aiuit (1963) pp.316ff.
18. Ibid. The so-called midulc·of-thc·road forces more or less corresponded to the national·
bourgeois forces: the nu1ionalists or. in 1be firsI place. the PNl and Sukarno. As early as the mid-
1950s. the PKI also began to include the '"friends'" of1hc nationalists. In 1956 thc middle-of-Lhe­
road forces thus included the feudal landlords! Sec Aidit ( 1 956) in Aidit ( 1 961a) p27. How the
feudal landlords could be expected 10 be loyal to an anti-feudal struggle is one ofthe mysteries I
shall return 10 shorlly. The essence or it was that 1hcse pa1riotic landlords would suppon the
nationalists in 1hc final analysis. and 1hat they. in turn. were at root anti-feudal
19. From 1hc 1957 edition of the handbook for the party school. Aidit ( 1957) in Aidit (1963)
p.48.
20. Pelzer ( 1957).
21. Fei1h (1962) pp.293ff.
22. Sec. e.g
.. Aidlt ( 1 954) in Aidi1 ( 1 96la) p.127.
23. Pelzer ( 1 957) pp.1521T.
24. Aidit ( 1 958) in Aidil (196lb) p.296.
25. Huizer (1974) p.105. which quotes a speech by Njoto of the Politburo in 1959.
26. Pelzer ( 1957).
27. Sec. e.g.. Lyon ( 1976) p.40.
28. Concerning laxes. see Paauw (1955) p.91 and Schmitt (1962) p286.
29. Regarding increased purchasing power. see Paauw ( 1955) p.91
30. Sec. e.g.. Mortimer ( 1 974b) pp.108. 1331T.. Feith ( 1 962) p.360. Jay ( 1 956) and Huizcr (1974)
pp.97IT.
31. Huizer (1974) p.108- 1 1 0.
32. Utrecht ( 1976b) pp.275ff. CC also McVey ( 1970).
33. Hindley (1962a) p.31. Sec also above. p.1 16.
34. Hindley (1964a) p.163.
35. Ibid. pp. 165fT.
36. lhid. p.167.
37. Ibid. p.169.
38. Regarding the land reform. see Chapter 17 below.
39 If indIcy ( 1962a) p.32. McVey (1972) pp.16lff_ Mackie ( 1961-62) p.349. Fe:>sen ( 1966) p.110. One
example: on East Java. round Jember and Kediri. the connicts became violent in 1961. 38
peasants were killed when they refused to leave the and
l they had occupied. Lyon (1976) p.5l
40. For a panicularly stimulating historical discussion sec Tichelman ( 1980). In addition. see Geertz
( 1 960) and ( 1 963) as well as Jay( 1964). In Koentjaraningrat( l967a). :is well as in the antholO!_!)' in
which his anicle is included. Villages 111 /11do11l'Sia, a reasonable review is presented of the
structures at village level du ring the fifties and sixties. See also Tripathis·( 1957) inlereSLingstudy
and Dam's (1961)
41. Ibid.
42. Sec. e.g
.. Feith ( 1971): Wcnheim ( 1959) pp.2 15ff.: Gcertz ( 1960) pp.171 ff.: Jay { 1963) pp.SS and 89:
Hindley {1964a) pp.218-29: and Kocntjaranin1;1rat ( 1 967h).
43. Sec Geenz ( 1 963).
44. Collier (l 978d) pp.5ff.
45. Ibid. pp.3rr. and 7ff. Most of the peasants had nnd have o number of di fferent jobs to be ublc 10
make ends mecL Sec. e.g.. Krocf ( 1958a) p.203 and ( 1960b) p.423. and White ( 1976). ( 1977) and
( 1978) pp. I 51T.

141
The Communist Horho11se

46. See. in addition.ibid (passim): Collier( 1 97Sb).( 1980a): White ( 1976): Utrecht( 1974) and ( 1976b):
and Bachtiar (1973).
47. Sec. e.g.. Scon ( 1972).
48. See Utrecht (1972). (1974) and (1976b).
49. er. Huizer (1974) p.110.
SO. Herb Feith drew my ancncion to chis with l11c strildng remark." 1957 was rather likeaksie
s pihak".
the communist-inspired unilateral actions during the peasant offensive or 1963-64. to which I
shall return in the nexc pan of chis book. (Discussion 10 October 1980. Melbourne.)
SI. Sec. e.g.. Mortimer (1974b) pp.I 13ff. er. also Sartono (1977a) and (1977b) and Wenheim
(1969).
S2. See. e.g.. Aidic (1955) p.313 and pp.319-25 in Aidit (1961a) pp.27. 381T_ 4411".
S3. See Aidit( J959) in Aidit ( 1963) pp.423ff. or documents from the conference in Rf!Viewofflldonesia
6-7 (1959).
54. See. e.g.. Asum's article in Re11i'e111 oflndo11esia 7 (1960) pp.30ff. In Indonesian in Suaro Tani
March-April 1960: BTJ's publication.
55. See fn. 53 above.
56. Aidit (1959) in Aidit ( 1 963) pp.4211T. er. also Aidit ( 1 962) in Aidic ( 1 963) pp.5261T.
57. From BTrs leading publication. Suara Tani. in January 1960. Quoted from Hindley (1962a)
p.34.
58. Aidit ( 1 959) in Aidit ( 1 963) p.31 1.
59. er. Aidit's statement above. pp.131-2.
60. See. e.g.. Mortimer (1969a) pp.9ff. and (1974b).
61. Perhaps some would argue that an attempt was made in 1948. in connection with the Madiun
uprising which was crushed and where. according to many. sa111rs
i fought against abangan. See.
e.g.• Tichelman ( 1980) p.187. Nevertheless. I think a large question mark must be placed ovcr the
mobilization actjvilies or the f'KI in the villages in 1948. Work amongst the peasams was poorly
developed and che policies quite different from under Aid it. In the event. the PKI was not able t0
initiate any genuine attempts to mobilize along class lines wbile following Aidit's policies.
62. Sec above. pp.131-2.

142
1 3 . Workers' Struggle in
the Face of Obstacles

The Basis of Class Collaboration 1

During tbe years immediately after independence, tbe communists pursued

a militant workers' struggle with many Jong slrikes. But when the PNl-led
Wilopo cabinet took over in April 1952. tbe communists in SOBSI
pressurized tbe strikers to return to work. or to withdraw their threats of
strike actioo.1
Why did they make this about-turn?
Aid it made efforts to assess the size of the I ndonesian proletariat. He said
it consisted of 500,000 workers in modem industry, about two million
workers i n small-scale industry and handicrafts and 3.5 million in forestry
and agriculture. If their families were included, the proletariat consisted of
20 million people. or about 25 per cent of tbe population.3 The figure of
500.000 industrial workers was consistent with offLcial statistics, but Aidit
surely exaggerated the other figures.4
Nevertheless. as Aid it was inclined to point out, the proletariat was small
in comparison to the peasantry. Indonesia was a so-calJed semi-colonial,
semi-feudal country. When the working class fought against capitalism. it
was certainly interested in socialism. Thus the proletariat was the most
revolutionary class. But a tiny proletariat would not be capable of
in1plementing socialism in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country.
Instead the struggle should be a nationaa and democratic revolution
which. under the leadership of the working class, would i n the long run be
capable of transformation into a socialist revolution.
In the struggle for a national and democratic revolution the workers
would be able to forge an alliance with the peasants based on the anti­
feudal. anti-imperialist interests of the peasants. All previous communist
offensives in Indonesia, said Aidil, had collapsed because the workers bad
isolated themselves instead of forging a n alliance with the peasants. The
workers should, among otJ1er things, be hel.ped by the peasants to topple the
feudal landlords who blocked a national economy with more industrial
production, more jobs and better wages.
The workers could also make common cause with the so-called national
bourgeo.isie. the class enemy of many workers. These two classes had a

143
The Communist Hothouse

mutual interest in the struggle for a national and independent economy.

The nationalists would also be able to allow the trade unions democratic
rights and freedoms.
These were the reasons why the communists in 1952 suddenly postponed
large parts of the militant workers' struggle to support a PNT-led
government. which, according to the PK.I, would primarily represent the
national bourgeoisie.
At this time, the trade unions should not make any demands for
nationalization or for higher wages within Indonesian industry, the
communists declared. On the contrary, they should help the national
bourgeoisie. Concepts such as ''class struggle" and "socialism" ought to be
avoided by trade-union leaders. Non-communist workers ought not to be
repelled.
SOBSI should demonstrate that it was not slavishly bound to one party,
as nearly al] the other trade unions were. Normal trade-union and social
work should be at the top of the agenda.5
In forei.gn-owned companies matters were somewhat different. These
companies could afford to raise wages." they were controlled by imperial­
ists. and in the long run they should be nationalized.
In state companies the trade unions ought. of course, to safeguard the
interests of the workers. but included in their tasks was to help raise
production, since the. state was regarded as an ally.7

The Working Class as a Punch Bag

Progress
During the preceding 10-year period SOBS! bad, at most, doubled its
membership. This was not much when compared to the other communist
mass organizations and to the party itself. But at the beginning of the fifties
the workers were already the best organized. The resources of the
organizations bad been substantially improved and they had more
employees, more branch offices. better education, etc. There were also
attempts to make inroads among the many difficult-to-organize urban
service workers, who usually worked singly, such as the drivers o f the becak,
the cycle taxis.s
I n l 959 the PKl admitted that it had not devoted sufficient attention to all
of those who in the forties and fifties had been forced from the rural areas to
the urban slums without finding proper jobs.9
But to the PK.I's credit must be mentioned the neighbourhood
associations in the slums of Surabaya. These bad originally been organized
by the Japanese to control the people. But the communists took over. anned
the people. and assisted with food and work, etc.10 This type of organization
in the residential areas is, to my knowledge the only effective method of
reaching the many proletarians who are not working. judging by the
experiences of Latin America.11

144
 Workers' Struggle in the Face of Obstacles

As with all the other orga nizations, the validity of SOBSI's membership
statistics is difficult to judge. Most researchers seem LO believe that it
controlled just over half the organized workers. The rest belonged lo
numerous smaller trade-union organizations. of which the vast majority
were closely tied to one political parry or another. ll appears to me a
reasonable estimate that at the beginning of lhe fifties SOBSI had about one
million members, and I 0 years later about two miUion.12 Among the largest
and most militant trade-union associations were those or the plantation.
sugar and forestry workers. where the number of seasonal and day
labourers from the villages was difficult to estimate.13
The major part oft he work of SOBS! trade unions during the [iflies was to
save jobs during an ever-worsening economic crisis. Of course, attempts
were also made to prevent the standard of living from falling. Despite only
limited success, SOBSI was by far the most successful confederation of
trade unions. In 1956. for instance, SOBS! succeeded in preventing mass
resignations from the state apparatus. And the many dockworkers and
sailors who lost their jobs when the Dutch companies tried to avoid
nationalization had state wages fixed for them by SOBSI till 1959. Some
wage increases were also won through negotiations, petitions. demon­
strations. open letlers, ctc.14
Since 1 9 5 1 strikes had been banned, except for unimportant places of
work and. ironically enough, for non-communist trade-union organizations.15
The PKI and SOBSl did succeed in having the anti-strike law somewhat
softened, and, among other things, trade unions were represented in
arbitration courts.16
Militancy and strikes were to be found in the foreign-owned companies
and plantations. The nationalizations of 1957 were regarded as a
tremendous victory for the communist and nationalist workers who had
taken the initiative.17
When the companies were Lhen taken over by the state. the PKI and
SOBSI with some success demanded that the workers should have some
influence over the worker-management councils and campaigned against
corrupt company executives and oflicers.18
SOBSI refrained from supporting the political activities of the commun­
ists and nationalists on every conceivable issue. thus distinguishing
themselves from most of the other trade-union organizations. Of course.
this did not prevent many so-called non-sectarian political activities from
occurring. During the Masjumi-led government of 1955-56 tbe number or
labour disputes, for example. rose dramatically. In 1956-57 armed
plantation workers participated when Commander Gintings crushed the
regional rebellion in Sumatra. And in connection with the government
crisis in March 1957, SOBSI was in a position to threaten the holding of a
nation-wide general strike if the new government included ministers from
Masjumi but not from the PKI. At the same time SOBSI workers in South
Sumatra held a 24-hour strike to support Sukarno's struggle against the
rebels.19

145
The Co111m1111is1 Ho1'1011.1·e

Problems
On the whole. however. the communist workers' struggle was a failure.
First. the nationalists· interest in democracy was not sufficient for them to
accept the communists' demands for the waiving of the serious restrictions
on the right to strike. On the other hand, the PNI government was not as
inclined as the Masjumi-led cabinet had been to resort to repressive
measures. But when. at last, modest reforms of the antj-strike laws occurred
in 1957-58. they made no significant difference. Sukarno and the army had
already introduced a state ofemergency, and the strike could not be used as
a weapon.20
ff it can be said that the workers had some success in their struggle against
imperialism on tbe plantations. for instance, and thereby contributed a
good deal to tbe breaking up of the colonial economy, it is also true that the
workers did not acquire an expanding national economy with more jobs
and increased purchasing power. On the contrary. foreign capitalists dared
not expand, partly because of political instability. And the national
bourgeoisie's attempts to build up a domestic industry failed.
Thts the PK.I and SOBSI could do very littJe about. On the one hand,
trade-union organization in small companies was poor.21 i.e. in the
companies of the national bourgeoisie. That was where labour disputes had
to be avoided, and where different kinds of family labour, relationships
between relatives and general patronage flourished. On the other hand, a
workers' offensive against corruption and inefficiency. and demands for
influence over investments. etc. within domestic indust 1y. would have
jeopardized the front with the nationalists.
The workers could certainly have been proud of old victories like the law
on a seven-hour working day. But how did that help when no worker could
earn enough in seven hours to Uve on?22 And the PKI said that workers
could not demand higher wages from domestic companies before
feudalism and imperialism bad been crushed.23 But the farmers could not
destroy feudalism. and the so-called national bourgeoisie"s attempts to
build a national economy bore no fruiL

Economic Crisis

The PKI and SOBSI were naturally hoping that conditions in the
nationalized companies would improve and become better than in the
private sector, particularly in comparison to the period when the Dutch had
owned them.
As I showed ill Chapter IO. however. the management of the state
comparues and the planners made these companies their own (mismanaged)
fiefs. l n addition. they lacked the immediate interest to invest the surplus in
a diversified, independent national economy. but addressed themselves to
the task of rei nforcing their own political. administrative and military
positions.

146
 Workers' Struggle in the Face of Obstacle.1·

The consequences for the workers were almost unbelievable. Wages fell.
I n several cases the country's wages dropped to below pre-war levels. The
bonus associated with Lebaran (the feast at the end of the period of fasting)
and certain other benefits were cut or removed. Many companies did so
badly that people were dismissed. The state currency and price policies
produced rapid inflation. Prices rose many times faster than wages. The
PKI used orficial statistics to show that wage rises during the period l 954-58
were on average 50 per cent, while the price index for the 19 most important
goods rose from 106 in 1954 to 258 in 1958 ( 1953 =100). The situation
deteriorated dramatically in 1959. when the government devalued and
reduced the amount of money in circulation. On 1 May 1960 the SOBSJ
leadership declared that, after 15 years ofindependence the situation of the
workers had still not improved. It demonstrated that. while prices in Jakarta
had risen by 75 per cent. wages had increased only by 25 per cent.25
At the same time. every attempt at militant opposition was thwarted. The
military company managers had both the economic power i n the
companies and the military. political and administrative power in the state,
reinforced by the state of emergency. Even cautious opposition meant that
the P.KJ and SOBS! laid themselves open to charges ofbetraying the nation.
at a time when rebels were threatening the state and Irian Jaya must be
wrested from the Dutch. To object to what was happening in a nationalized
company was the equivalent of splitti11g the nation and even of direct
opposition to Sukarno.
Thus it comes as no surprise that the number of strikes and disputes fell
drastically after the nationalizations. While 505 strikes were registered in
1956, for instance, with more than 340.000 striking workers and nearly seven
million man-hours lost, comparative figures for 1958 were 55 strikes, with
l3,000 workers involved and a loss of less than 100,000 man-bours.26 Poor
reports from the nationalized companies accounted for part of the
reduction in the number of strikes.27 No longer were all disputes reported to
the central administration.28 But such faults do not obscure the manifest
direction of the trend.29
By 1960. when most of the rebels had been co:nquered, the struggle against
the Dutch was less important, and dissatisfaction led to spontaneous action
Oaring up among the workers, the PKl and SOBSJ dared to voice severe
criticism of the government and the anny. as has been mentioned in
previous chapters.Jo Neither the government nor the military were slow lo
respond. Parliament was dissolved. Several party leaders were arrested and
i nterrogated. Hundreds of workers· leaders were detained. Newspapers
were banned or censored. SOBSrs newspaper was among those banned.
Print shops and duplicating machines were put under state control. The
communists were forced to hand over copies oftheir membership records to
the state. On I May demonstrators were not even allowed to sing the
Jnrernationale. and some of the speeches were censored.J1
The Minister of Labour and the leader of the PNJ's trade-union
confederation, Ahem Erningpradja, together with the army command

147
The Comn11mis1 Ho1house

under General Nasution, took tbeir cue from the restrictions imposed by
Sukarno in the party system and the introduction of so-called functional
groups. Together they tried to bring about a corporate state-controlled
umbrella trade-union organization, OPPI. Sukarno was said to have been
interested in the idea.32 Towards the end of 1961. the military company
managers made another attempt to create a corporate trade-union
organization. SOKSI. for the employees of state companies. To induce the
workers to accept it. payment in kind from state supplies was distributed.
There was initially some success.33
But the PKT and Sukarno also Lried working in a positive spirit, among
other things in the worker-management councils set up on Sukarno's orders
with the express purpose of increasing production.34
These councils did not. however. give the workers any direct influence
over the management oft he companies. and considerable time was spent in
dealing with local labour disputes. which were not formally part of the work
of the councils. For the communists. the results were often disbeartening. I n
addition to everything else. the P K l and SOBSI risked being held jointly
responsible for the poor state of the economy.35
The communist offensive of 1960 was thus a failure. The party retired and
soon began to talk about the need for the national struggle to precede the
class stmggle.36 But SOBS[ and other front organizations under the
communist umbrella had some opportunity to continue acting and
criticizing. In 1961 the workers occupied a number of Belgi a n companies.
mainly plantations. to show their solidarity witb the anti-coloniaJ struggle
in the Congo. Behind them the workers had Su kamo's anti-imperialism, as
long as they refrained from trying to run the companies rhemselves.37
When U1e workers at state companies shook their fists and revolted,
however. U1is was the last straw. As I have noted previously. i n East Java the
directors of state-owned plantations wanted to get rid of squatters and to
mechanize the operation of the plantations. Dozens of squatters and
workers were killed in clashes.38
I n North Sumatra the workers on state-owned plantations and on the
state-run railways went on strike for higher wages and bonuses. The PKI
and even SOBSI remained in U1e background so as not to draw fire from the
army or from Sukamo.39 Some of the demands of the workers were actuaUy
met. But afterwards company management managed to dismiss almost
l.000 workers who had been active in Leading the strikes.40
"We were powerless. It was a bitter Lesson," said one of the trade-union
chiefs who had travelled from head office to help the workers and who did
not try to prevent them from striking. as seems to have been the case in some
other provinces. "It was the last major strike." he added brusquely.41
I n the following year, 1962. a minor strike took place. for instance, at a
privately-owned plantation in North Sumatra. The slogan was, "No rice. no
work''. The strike was soon crushed.42

148
 Workers' Srmggle in 1he Face of Obsiacles

The Vanguard Which Was Left Behind

The working class was thus forced to endure considerable privations.

Exploitation and oppression came not only from the imperialists and
feudal landlords. but also from the state and the nationalists, despite the
factthat the latter, according co the PKI's analyses ought primarily to have
been friends. not enemies. No one could accuse the communist workers of
being provocative: on the contrary. attempts were made to support the state
and the nationalists.
Particularly among communists one of the most common explanations
of the problems of working-class struggles is the thesis that lhe bourgeoisie
obviously attack communists since they are class enemies. In other words.
the PKI pursued a treacherous policy of class collaboration. And, ii is
maintained. there was nothing curious about the stale moving against the
communist workers. since it was a bourgeois state.43
I f only it had been so simple. I f only SOBSI workers had collaborated
with economically enterprising capitalists. But this opportunity did not
exist. and this was the major problem.
The communist leaders did not ally themselves with a national
bourgeoisie which was doing its utmost to develop a national economy.
Matters were not improved when the state took over a large part of the
economy. Democratic rights and freedoms were curtailed rather than
extended. In addition. it was difficult to change course and go into
opposition. For then the workers would have been overwhelmed by the state
and the nationalists. In the meantime. wages fell and the number of
unemployed rose.
According to the PKfs theory and analysis. the vanguard working class
should wait for and back the progressive bourgeoisie's demands and
actions. But no such demands were made. even when the state took over part
of the economy. Accordingly. there was simply nothing for the vanguard
class to do.
The strategic problems of the communist workers were thus intimately
connected with three questions. Why were the leaders of the PKJ {a) unable
to predict the nationalists· lack of interest in building a bourgeois national
economy: (b) unable to predict that when the state nationalized and began
to "guide'· the economy. it still did not become a national economy, but
instead new capitalists evolved from within the state: and (c) unable to
predict that the nationalists would not show any interest in extending
democracy? I have already tried to answer these questions in Chapters 9. 10
and 1 1 .
But what about the peasants? I f the workers waited for and supported
bourgeois anti-feudal demands. the peasants would be drawn into the
struggle and. together with the workers. create an unbeatable alliance. What
became of the peasants. when the progressive state and an enterprising
national bourgeoisie failed to materialize? Would it not have been possible
for the workers to climb out of the trap with the help of the alliance with the
peasants'?
149
The Communist Hothouse

As I have shown in Chapter 12, the communists were not able to initiate
an anti-feudal struggle in the rural areas. The peasants were not liberated
and were not drawn into the struggle. Hence there was in reality no steadfast
alliance between the workers and the peasants. The Indonesian workers
were as isolated from the peasants as they were when. before 1952. the trade
unions had struggled uncompromisingly for socialism. But now they were
not even in a position to struggle.

Notes

I. For this scc1ion. when no other reference is specilied. sec Chapter6and Hindley ( 1964a) Chapter
13.
2. Feith ( 1962) p.238.
3. Aidit (1957) in Aidit (1963) p.54.
4. Monimer ( 1974a) p.149.
5. Aidit (1953) in Aidit(l961a) pp.90-99 and Hindley (1964a) pp.143IT. Nor does it appe:ir to have
been usual to havespontaneousconnicts.at least not in companies owned by Chinese. (Interview
with the late Siauw Giok Tjhan. Amsterdam. 2 October 1980. He was the former leader of the
lndochlnesc Chinese in Boperki and close to the PKJ.) Aidil. however. indicated l111cr. in 1959.
that the workers had begun 10 carry out spontaneous actions. Sec Aidi1 (1959) in Aidi1 (1963)
pp.426ff.
6, .. Feith (1962) pp.238!f.
See. e.
g
7. See. e.g.. PKI (1959) p.9.
8. See. e.g.. Hindley (1964a) pp.135-42. 146-49. Cf. also Hawkins (1971) p.207.
9. Aidil (1959) in Aidil (1963) pp.312IT.
10. Krod(l957b) p.416 and (1959) p.177. and Hindley (1964a) Pll.158IT. The PKJ tried 10 work in
similar \\<Jys in other towns. but enjoyed the greatest success in Surabaya.
I I. Lecture by and discussion with Bosco Parra. Uppsala. 8 May 1981. Sec Parra (1981),
12. Sec. in lhc first instance. Hindley (1964a) pp.135ff. and Tcdjasukmana (1958). and Richardson
(1958) quoted therein. Cf. also Hawkins (1967) and (1971). and Tcdjusukmana ( 1961 ). I nm also
basing myself on interviews with Tedjasukmana (25 October 1980. Jakarta}: 1wo other former
Ministers of Labour. including Ahem Emingpradja (25 Oc1ober 1980. Juknna) and 1111erv1ew
No.55 (Jakarta. 1980): as well as with a numbcroflcadcrs and ac1ivists wi1hin SOBSI. Regarding
other trade-union organizations. see. e.g.• the survey listed in Hawkins ( 1967) p.260.
13. .. Hindley (I 964a) p.14 I. Interview No.8 with a fonncr leading trade unionisl (Ams1erdam.
See. e.g
1980).
14. See. e.g.. HindJey( l964a) pp.147IT.. Hawkins {l967) p.249. lnterview No.55 with a former Minister
of Labour (Jakana. 1980). Interview No.8 with a former leading trade unionist (Amsterdam.
1980). and interviews with former central and promincn1 PKI leaders. e.g.. No.29 (Jakana.
1980).
15. Interview with Tcdjasukmana. thcn MinisterofLabour(25 October 1980.Jakana). Cf.Chapter 5.
p.65.above. and Note 28 above. where I presentTedjasukmana·s version. SecalsoTedjasukmana
(1961) pp.286-346.
16. Tedjasukmana (1961) pp.376·83 and Hindley (1964a) p.147.
17. See. e.g.. ihid. p.148. Ananta (1971) and Krocf( 1965a) pp.89. 202·12. Sometimes sympa1hy strikes
broke oul. 10 show solidarity as. e.g.. actions against Bri1ish and French companies during the
Suez crisis in 1956: sec Aidi1 (1957) in Aidil (196lb) p.127. See also Chapter 10 above.
18. Sec. e.g
.. PKI (1959) p.9. Interviews wi1h Ahem Erningpradja (25 October 1980). another former
Minister of Labour (No.55. Jnkana. 1980) and General Nasu1ion (Jakana. 22 November
1980).

150
 Worker;' Siruggle in die Face of Obswcles

19 Sec Aithl (1957) pp.137. 147. in Aidil (1961b). Kroef (1965a) pp.89 and 207. Regarding several
strikes hel\\ccn 1955-56.sce. e.g.. Tcdjasukmana ( 1961) p.230. and 1hc stalistics in Hawkins( l967)
p.l66.
20. Sec note 16 abo"e·
21. .
. Tedjasukmana (1961) pp.210fT.
See. e.g
22 Lukman (Politburo) in the Rn•if!w of/11do11esia 6 (1960) pJO.
23. Aidit (1954) in Aidil (1961a) p.2!0.
24. Tedjasukmana (1961) p2-16.
25. Regarding the cost-of-living index. see Aidit ( 1 959) in Aidit (1963) pp.307ff. Puauw ( 1 967).
pp.2381T.. explains the dc\'aluarion and monetary reform of 1957. For SOBSl's sli11cmcn1 in 1960.
see Rwiew oflndont>sia. 5 ( 1960) pp.27ff. Additional information about the deterioration is to he
found. e.g.. in lhc same publication. No.2 (1%0) pp.10-15. 2JIT.: No.3 ( 1 960) pp.31T.: and No.8
(1960) pp.201T. Cf. also Chapters 9 and 10 above.
26. Sec. e.g.. Hawkins ( 1 967) p.266.
27. lnrerview No.55 wilh a former Minister of Lahour (Jakana. 1980).
28. Panglaykim ( 1965). p.2-19.
29. All the interviews referred to in this chapter er also. e.g.. Hawkins (1967) p.265 and ( 1971) p.24-1.
as well as Lev ( 1964) p.78.
30. Sec. e.g.. Rel'if'\1•oflndo11es111 1 ( 1960) pp.10-15: No..l( 1 960) ppJff. No.5( 19611) pp.l7IT No.6( 1960)
p.28: and No.9 { 1960) pp.22IT. Hindley { 1962b) pp.IJ201T and the notes on spontaneous action in
fn.5 ahovc.
31. Kroef ( 1965) p.247. R1••u•11 of/11do111-sia No.6 ( 19{1()) p.26.
32. Sec rn. 48. Chapter 1 1 . Ahem maintained that Sukarno regarded 1he idea fa\'Ourabl). but needed
others to implement it ( Interview 25 October 1980. Jakana )
33. H:iwkins (1%7) pp.2(19ff. Lev ( 1'>63-64) p.361
34. Sec. e.g.. the PKI ( 1959) p.9 and R(�11�•·o
fl11do11e;;1a Nos. 9·10( 1 960)(the last issue before even th is
puhlica1lon was 1cmpomrily banned). p.22 .ind the following pages. devoted to repons from
SOttSrs third congress. Sec uho fn. I K. ahovc
35. The only scientific discussion I know of on the worker-management councils can be round in
Pungluykirn ( 1965). To this I have ;1tklcd an interview with the author .
?-I No"emher 1980.Jakana.
er. also 1':1ngl;1ykim ( 1 1)().1),
J6. Sec PKI ( 1961) from the meeting of the ccntml comminec in D<-cernbcr 1960.
37. Krocf ( 1%5a) pp.2221'1'. 243IT
3K. lhid. 1�.21 1. und Lyon ( 1 976) p.52.
39. Krocf ( 1 %5;1) p.244.
-10. Interview No.X wi1h the senior trade-union leader who was sent to Nonh Sumatra to assisl the
workers (Amsterdam. 1980).
41. Ibid.
42. Hawkins ( 1967) p.270.
43. Sec. e.g.. PKI (1971) and Griswold ( 1 979).

151
Part 3
Communist Offensive:
1 960-63 to 1 965
1 4. For An Offensive
Strategy

Locked Positions

The long-term strategy of the fifties. with its struggle for democracy, anti­
imperialism and anti-feudalism to set up a coalition government and. in the
longer perspective. a people's democratic government which would be able
to carry the national and democratic revolution to its conclusion. had. as I
have shown. become deadlocked, despite numerous successes.
The leaders of the PKJ were of course, not completely unaware of these
problems. At the peasants· conference in 1959 it was. for instance, resolved
to a greater extent than in the past to try to make the BTl a class
organization and encourage class consciousness particularly among the
poor and landless peasants.I
The incense criticism levelled at the government and army in 1 960 was
anotJ1er sign of the party's attempts to stand upright. This criticism
coincided with Moscow's new scepticism towards the so-caJLed national
bourgeoisie.2 But the PK.1 did not as whole-heartedly as Moscow replace i t
b y promoting non-capitalist development led b y the state a n d by indistinct
class-based nationalists. By sharply criticizing the so-called bureaucratic
capitalists and their corrnption of the state apparatus. the PKI expressed its
doubts.3 As yet chere was no non-capitalist development in Indonesia. The
Central Committee declared in December 1960 that non-capitalist
development remained to be realized.4 And when the Moscow leadership
counted Indonesia among the so-called national democracies. the PK.I
protested. The Moscow leaders said that in Indonesia there was not even a
coalition government in which the communists had any real innuence.5
During the years that followed, it became clear that the PKI leaders meant
that Moscow did not care whether the Indonesian communists were
included in the govern ment or not. The important thing was for the
government in Indonesia to have good relations with Moscow so that it
could be influenced from there.6 But, as I have shown, the communists'
open and forthright criticism of the state and government did not succeed.
Instead the army command was able to maintain that the PKJ had dejacto
turned against Sukarno himself.7

155
Communst
i Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

Class Struggle within the Framework of S u karno's Nationalism

The PKI's reaction to the setbacks of 1960 was to seek shelter behind
Sukarno. Al the Central Committee meeting in December 1960 the party
leadership emphasized that they completely backed Sukarno's policies. the
1945 constitution. Pancasila (even the principle of belief in one God). the
decision to '"simplify" the party system. etc.
It was a clear indication that no one would be able to isolate Lhe
communists by maintaining that they were working against the president.
On the contrary. the party·s main principle would be to expose and isolate
others, particularly the "bureaucratic capitalists'". who did not stick to
Manipol. Nasakom and other of Sukarno's guidelines.
For safety's sake, the PKJ issued the clear declaration that the party
intended to subordinate the class struggle to the national struggle.8
This has been used by both politicians and scientists to show the
unbelievable class collaboration of the communists.9 I have difficulty in
conforming to these interpretations. During the struggle against the rebels
on the outer islands, and perhaps above all during the 1958-59 period. the
communists did indeed devote nearly all their energies to avoiding class
connicts, and instead brought out the differences between patriots and
rebels. But the decision in December had another meaning: the PKI
emphasized the need to implement Sukarno's policies.1 0 And to implement
his revolutionary nationalism. a certain degree of class struggle was
required.
This was no more peculiar than that the Vietnamese. for instance.
directed an important blow against feudalism in the rural areas in the north.
at a time when the French were gathering large numbers oftroops from the
villages for the battle at Oien Bien Phu.
General Giap himself argued that.

Since the moment when our party paid more auention to the anti-feudal task.
especially since the mobilization ofthe masses. for rent reduction and land reform. not
only were the broad peasant masses in the rear ideologically roused. but our army -
the great majority being peasants and vecy eager for land -also realized more fully its
lighting objective. that it not only fough t for national independence. but also to bring
land to Lhe peasants and consequently its class consciousness and lighting spirit were
raised markedly.1 1

The class struggle and nationalism were thus seen to pollinate one another.
But, as imperialism was the major enemy. nationalism was the more
important.
Several years passed before the class struggle was to become really
important in Indonesia. But it did come after a while. First. however. the
dominant communist tendency was to refer to Sukarno every time they did
something. Mass actions were good. because Sukarno said so. The
communists should be part of the government because Sukarno talked about
a gorong-royong and a Nasakom cabinet. The imperialists were enemies

156
 For 011 Offensive Strategy

because Sukarno had said so. And so on ad injinitum.12 Sometimes it grew

quite comical when Aid it indirectly motivated his own support of Leninism
and the October revolution by saying that "Bung Karno" had also had some
good things to say about the Russian revolution.13
Even during Sukarno·s reintensified struggle against the Dutch for Jrian
Jaya. this was the dominating picture. But now the party"s position was
decisively reinforced, and the communists regained a lot of the ground lost
during the late lifties.14 As far as 1 can make out, both Sukarno and the army
command badly needed the support of the communists. They needed help
from the communists to get arms from Moscow. It was not a question of
small arms and a rew bazookas, like the arms donated to liberation
movements, but oftbe best arms and ammunition. Soon Indonesia became
the largest non-communist recipient of Soviet military aid.'5
In his own interests. Sukarno also tried to prevent the arms from being
used in any way other than as a deterrent, and also to avoid a victory which
solely depended on the military alone gaininglrian Jaya for Indonesia. To
that end, Sukarno used the mass actions of the communists, which, of
course. allowed the PK.I some room to manoeuvre.16The PKJ was thus able
to mobilize the masses by insisting that it was imperative to reinforce the
home front and support the president.'7
This meant an upswing for the PKI in the same way that the anti­
imperialist solidarity movement in Western Europe revitalized certain
kinds of communism in the 1960s.
These successes were not diminished by the fact that, in the end, it was
Sukarno and not the army that won Jrian Jaya for Indonesia. Sukarno was
able to reduce somewhat the power of General Nasution, the Minister of
Defence, the Army Chief of Staff and the real perpetrator of the state of
emergency. By kicking him upstairs to a new post as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces, Sukarno deprived hinn of being able directly to
command troops. Instead General Yani became the newcommanderofthe
army. By comparison to Nasution, Yani was corrupt and perhaps also
somewhat more inclined to support Sukarno. Io addition, Sukarno
announced at the end of 1 962 that the state of emergency would come to an
end on I May 1963.18
During 1961-63, the PK1 thus managed to regain its lost positions and
once more acquire some room to manoeuvre.
The party held an extra seventh congress in April l962. It was formally
held to ratify new regulations in line with the demands made by Sukarno
and the rules of the game of..guided democracy". In reality, the communists
used the congress to try to instil a spirit of renewed struggle amongst
members and sympathizers.19

26 May 1963
A cautious offensive was initiated in May 1963. At the meeting of the central
committee in February, the leaders of the PKI emphasized the importance
of consolidating the advances made during the struggle for lrian Jaya, at the

157
Communi.w Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

same time as considerable energy was invested in outlining a progressive

economic programme for the country.10
This should be seen against U1e background of Washington, first under
the Kennedy and then under the Johnson administrations, making
tremendous efforts to persuade Sukarno and the Jakarta government, as
well as the army, to implement an economic policy of tightening up and
reconstructing the budget in the spirit of the IMF, in exchange for
considerable foreign aid and credits. Washington could use the goodwill
acquired in forcing Holland to relinquish lrianJaya. which helped Sukarno
to find a political solution and to some extent dethrone the army. In
addition, Indonesia was in desperate need ofeconomic aid. since the crises
of the fifties deepened during the struggles against the rebels and rhe
Dutch.
At virtuaUy the same time as the proclamation of the government's
economic policy in proud nationalistic terms, quite a different classical
belt-tightening bourgeois economic policy was thus introduced, which was
partly intended to rationalize and liberalize state controlled trade and
production: the regulations of 26 May.
Parallel with this, the state of emergency was ended. The PKI met the
regulations of26 May by intensifying its campaign for Sukarno's officially
declared economic policy, in which one of the cornerstones was state
guidance towards a national independent economy, called dekon.
This was not so simple. Sukarno had acceded to the 26 May regulations,
while himself declaring that he did not understand economics. And a
political and perhaps even an economic potential alternative would have
demanded considerable economic assistance from the socialist countries.
But presumably Moscow was not prepared to supply more money. Jn the
Soviet Union attempts were being made to try to "build communism" in
only a few decades. and, in addition, a period of peaceful co-existence with
the US had been introduced.21
The PKI did, however. stand fast. It replaced the lack of a financial
alternative with demands for genuine national independence in the spirit of
Sukarno. If we must sell our independence to get international aid, then
nothing remains for us but to rely entirely on our own strength, the
communists argued.22
At the same time the PKI maintained that the liberalization oflhe 26 May
regulations concerning state production and trade would drastically
reinforce the power of the "bureaucratic capitalists''. They would be able to
privatize the economy and forge strong links to foreign capital. In this way,
the communists believed, the "bureaucratic capitalists" would be able to
acquire a proper class base for themselves in the form of considerable
private property and deep roots in international neo-colonialism.23

Confrontation with Malaysia

While the struggle about the regulations of26 May was raging most fiercely,
one of the most prominent standard-bearers of the government, First

158
 For <m Qffe11sfre S1ra1egy

Minister Djuanda. died. H e was succeeded by Foreign Minister Subandrio.

who was considerably more nationalistic.
An even more significan t threat to the 26 May regulations was the
growing cension becween Indonesia and the new stale of Malaysia which
che British were forming. At the new year Subandrio had already declared
that lndonesia·s attitude towards this "neo-colonial threat'" was marked by
total confrontation. Afterwards Washington made serious attempts to
resolve the conflict through the mediation of Robert Kennedy.
By September it was clear that the US had not succeeded. Indonesian
demonstrators attacked the British and Malaysian embassies. Kuala
Lumpur replied with counter-demonstrations and broke offdiplomatic tics.
At this. demonstrators in Jakarta burnt the Malaysian embassy and
destroyed residences of diplomats. Trade unions led by the PNI and the
PKJ occupied a number of British companies. On 21 September Indonesia
broke all economic ties with Malaysia. including Singapore, one of
lndonesia"s key trading partners and indispensable to the stabilization
programme of 26 May. One week later the IMF revoked its promises or
credits.24
This meant the foundering of the bourgeois belt-tightening and
stabilization programme. Now not only rhe PKI, but also Sukarno.
Subandrio and others began Lo talk seriously about self-reliance.
There was. of course. consternation in the West. but also in Moscow. The
confrontation with Malaysia was another military Oare-up reminiscent or
the Chinese policy of adventurism. as well as a threat lo peaceful co­
existence between the superpowers. The ideas or self-reliance. in which
priority was implicitly given to agriculture and light industry. were partly
pure Chinese voluntarism and. at best. poor man's communism. (The
Soviet communists advocated. among other things. intensive heavy
industrial undertakings, which implied receiving assistance from the
developed socialist countries.)2-�
In the Kremlin. an Indonesian request for more arms was refused. the
PKJ was hauled over the coals and auempts to find other friends in Jakarta
were made. Moscow looked. for example. to the army and the Murba party.
where men like Nasution and Adam Malik. respectively, had key roles.16
For the Indonesian communists. however. extreme national ism had been
of considerable help in drawing them out or their dilemmas. And the
confrontation with Malaysia had already neutralized the 26 May regula­
tions. From the point of view ofthe PKI, the comrades in the Soviet Union
let them down. Sell"-reliance and drawing closer to China was almost
unavoidable.
The emphasis on the class struggle within the framework or Sukarno·s
nationalism became a distinctly offensive move when the political
guidelines were laid down al the meeting or the central committee in
December 1963.27
A cornerstone or the modified strategy was to make use of militant mass
actions to support and accentuate anti-imperialism under Sukarno·s wing,

159
Communist Offe11sfre: 1960·61 to 1965

so as to be able to expose and isolate the "bureaucratic capitalists" as

traitors. I n principle this was the same model as the one used to neutralize
Masjumi and the PSI. But now the demands and the actions were more
radical.
The method was simple but ingenious. First, the PKI activated the
masses to lend their support to Sukarno to sharpen his criticism of
Malaysia, Britain. the US and others, as well as to proclaim guidelines such
as self-reliance. According to "guided democracy··. all were obliged to
counteract imperialism and work for self-reliance. The communists were
thereby able to outshine everyone else. including Sukarno. when it came lo
anti-imperialism and working for self-reliance. No one would be able lo say
that the PK.I broke with Sukarno. Nor would anyone be able to stop the PIG
without thereby breaking with Sukarno.18
The general immediate goal of the PIG was. as usual. to press for a
coalition government. a goro11g-royo11g government with a Nasakom
composition. The PIG liked to talk about a "Nasakomization" of the entire
state apparatus. to get the communists in behind locked doors. Jn the end
the party even used the principle of Nasc1kom to demand innucnce within
the armed forces as well.19
The general perspective was that the state had both "popular and anti­
popular aspects". The "popular aspects" were the most important. but the
"anti-popular aspects" dominated. In other words, Aidit meant that
Sukarno and the PKl had acquired the political initiative, but that the
"bureaucratic capitalists". above all. prevented the proper realization of the
decisions of the direction of the state.J(l

Confrontation in the Rural Areas

Steadfast action against the "bureaucratic capitalists" was. however,
unthinkable. least of all strikes in state-owned companies. Such actions
would have enabled the communists· opponents to accuse the PKl or
counteracting Sukarno and the state. ll would be a welcome excuse for the
army lo go on the offensive. The lot of the workers would improve once the
imperialists had been vanquished. Till then. '·our hearts are harder than
hunger". Aidit declared encouragingly.31
l n the rural areas. among the peasants. the communists. however. saw an
opening. The organization of the peasan1s had been reinforced since the
Peasant Conference of 1959. Sukarno and parliament had also adopted a
land-reform policy and it would be possible to demand that this reform
should be implemented. In addition. Sukarno and others talked of self­
rel.iance, which made i1 possible to demand rapid and considerable changes
in the structure of society in the rural areas so as to increase agricultural
production. in order to make Indonesia self-sufficient at leas! in food. It was
in the rural areas where nationalism and the class struggle should and
could be combined.
Officially the communists never advoca1ed militant peasant actions
beyond the bounds of the law. Instead it decided 10 encourage and support

160
 For 011 Offensive Strategy

peasant actions which aimed at the implementation of the land reform:12

The PKI leaders counted on gathering a considerable majority of the
peasants against the rural gentry. since, according to the PKl, they based
their power on acquiring and concentrating peasants' land. Presumably,
however, one counted on some fricti.on occurring in the "front from above"
for instance in collaboration with some of the nationalists. What was now
most important, indicated the PKI's leaders, was to make the transition
from class collaboration to class struggle in the rural areas. The PKl was to
move from a period in which the party had made use of the "front from
above" to build a strong peasant organization, to a more revolutionary
period. In this new period the communists could use the mobilization of the
peasantry to press the "front from above" further to the left and force
through radical national solutions. Even Aidit, who did not belong to the
left of the party, talked about using a current "revolutionary situation."33

Notes

I. Sec documeniation from the conrerence in Rl!•'tt'"' of/11do11l!Sta 6-7 ( 1959).

2. See above. Chapter J.
3. See above. Chapters 1 1 and 13.
4. PKJ ( 1961 ). inrer alia pp.40. 46.
5. Pauker (1962a) pp.6234.
6. er. Monimer (I974a) pp.137·8. 207·8, and his Chap. 8: also R:\anan ( 1966). I also base this on an
interview with a rormcr member or the leadership ofthe party. No.52 (Jakana. 1980).
7. er. Mackie (1961) p.274.
8. For the central commiuee meeting in December 1960. sec PKI (1961)
9. Sec. e.g.. Monimer ( 1974a) p.85.
10. See. e.g.. PKI (1961) p.15.
11. Giap ( 1 974) p.133.
12. See. e.g.. PKI (1961) and ( 1962).
13. Aidit ( 1 962) in Aidit (1963) pp.203-4.
14. er. Mortimer ( 1 969b) p.203.
15. er. Utrecht ( 1 979b) pp. 1 1 9. 133: Mortimer (1974a) p.187.
16. Cr. Mortimer ( 1 974a) Chap. 4.
17. lbid.• mteralia. pp.197-S. For some illustrolivccxamples from lhcsourcc ma1erial. sec PKI (1961)
pp.I I · 12. ( 1962) pp.14. 50ff. Aidit ( 1962) in Aidit ( 1963) pp.443. 455. 464. 483. 521-2.
18. Mortimer ( 1 974a) pp.188·96: McVey ( 1 972) pp.151·2: Utrcchl ( 1979b) pp.137ff.
19. Sec Aidit's rcpon to the congress. in Aidll (1963).
20. Sec Aidit (1963) in Aidit (1963).1111era/ta, pp.546-80.
21. Forthis and the paragraphs immcdiatdypreccding. sec. e.g.. Mortimer( l974a) pp.188·93. 205·14.
235. 263·7. 350. 1. and Madie (1967) pp.37-41. I rciurn to these questions in Chapter 16.
22. See Aid1t's rcpon to 1he central commince in February 1963. in Aidit ( 1963) pp.546·80. no1 lcast
p.564. Sec also. e.g.. Rf1'it"" of/11do11�ia I ( 1963) pp.26-31.
23. lhid.
24. For the immedimely preceding paragraphs. sec Monimer ( 1 974a) pp.204-222. 267.
25. er. ibid. pp.205·8. 235. 263-1. and pp.350·1 in Chap. ll or Ri1anan ( 1966). Arkipov ( 1 970-7 1 )
p.70.
26. See preceding fn. and McVey ( 1 969h) pp.376·7 ond Huuswcdell (1973) pp.138·9. In addition.
interview No.52(Jakarta. 1980)with a formercentml lender within the PKJ who.amongoihcrthings.
participa1cd in negotiations and discussions with the Russiuns.(Adam Malik.on theother hand. did
not wish to be officfolly cited on these mancrs. Interview. Jukana. 27 November 1980.)

161
Communist Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

27. For the remainder ofthis chapter.see PKI ( 1964). Aid it's report to the central committee meeting
in December 1963. where no other reference is specilied. er. also Mortimer ( I 974u) pp.370IT.
28. Roeder (1964) gi,•cs a telling contemporary portraynl of that part of the stratei;y at work.
29. See. e.g_ Monimer (1974a) pp.380·9.
JO. Aidit expounded his theory of the state in Aidit (1964) and in speeches from his visit to China
during 1963.
31. The quotation comes from the PKJ ( 1964) p.19. It was seldom that these questions were directly
discussed. but the aciual line was quite obvious: interview No.8 with u leading communist of the
time from SOBSI (Amsterdam. 1980). a member ofthe party leadership of the time. Nos. 52 and
62 (Jakarta. 1980) and a former Minister of Labour. No. 55 (Jukurta. 1980).
32. Interview No. 52 "ith a former member of the party leadeship
r (Jakarta. 1980) and u former
member of the BTI leader\htp. No. 67 (J:ikar1:
1 . 19N0).
33. See PKJ (196-1)

162
1 5 . Three Strategic
Problems

I n May 1965 Jakarta looked like a liberated city. In the capital and
throughout the country millions of Indonesians celebrated the PKJ's 45th
anniversary. The largest party in I ndonesia was also the world's third largest
communist party, and claimed Lo have 1 5 million members and organized
sympathizers.1
But the party"s strategy was undermined. A year later iL was banned, and
hu ndreds or thousands were imprisoned or murdered.
In my preliminary studies I have identilied three important problem
areas by checking whether or not it was possible LO follow the strategic lines
laid down by the party. so as Lo achieve its objectives.
Tbe lirst problem, Ami-imperialism agai11sr the wrong kind of capitalism.
deals with the PKJ's attempts to neutralize the "bureaucratic capitalists" by
setting extreme natjonalism against a ··neo-colonial" capitalism. This
strategy. however. neither threatened the fundamental positions and
interests or the new capitalists nor helped to establish an independent
national economy. The wage workers were the first to be hit, and the strategy
did not allow them to initiate steadfast actions in order to defend
themselves. The strategy also contributed to the establishment or a post­
colonial capitalism dominated by the state.2
The second problem. Peasants 'struggleagainst the wrong monpoly ofland. is
the story of how the peasants· attempts to wage a class struggle against the
rural gentry who. according to the PKI, based their strength on land
concenrration,J led to divisions in the ranks and to defeat. The gentry did
not base their power on land concentration, but on cenlralizing the surplus
produced by the peasants.4 After the defeat of the PKI. the overlords and a
considerable number of landed peasants could develop their agriculture
towards capitalism within the fra mework of the post-colonial economy
dominated by the state.
The third problem, Mass srruggle bypassed, elite conjlicr and massacre.
focuses on the way in which a totalitarian leadershi.p in a mass party
presumably discovered that the "'bureaucratic capitalists" blocked the
peasant struggle while the party"s broadly-based attempts to neutralize its
opponents with anti-imperialism had not borne fruit. This led a few leaders
to try to weaken the enemy by linking up with some of the dissidents within

163
Communi.w Q{fensive: 1960·63 to 1965

the army. The result was that the conspiracies came to nothing but rather
enabled the army to let loose an anti-communism purge and liquidate a
party caught unawares. since the acting leaders had decided not to draw it
openly into the conspiracies.
Three catastrophic problems with an almost magical power of attraction.
Each will be treated in turn in the three chapters which follow.

Notes

I. I am only counting the members of1hc You1h League. the peasan1s· organization and 1hc 1rade
union. 10 Lake ac.:oun1 or the fact 1hal many Indonesians were members of more than one of 1he
PKrs organizations al 1he same time. The ligures come from Mor1imcr (I 974a) p.366. which
quo1cs 1hc la1es1 figures of the PKI. da1ed August 1965. (As. according 10 Mortimcr"s figures. there
were 20 million members and sympa1hizers. i1 is possihk 1h<11 m)' estimate is on th<' low
side.)
2. Alavi ( 1975) p.1260 even men1ions a post-colonial mode of production (in India). But I do nol
argue in the same way. Do no1. 1hcrcforc. confuse Alavi's 1crm with mine. Our only poini of
agreemcnl is. I 1hink. that it is necessary 10 crealc conccp1Ual space to describe thal Third World
capilalism which is neither classic national capitalism nor simply a form of colonialism in new
and more modern dress.
3. By land concentraiion I refor 10 1hc process whereby landlords place under their conirol large
properties hy expropriming the land of 01hers. and whereby 1heir basic power is derived from
ownership of lnnd rcn1 from 1hcsc properties.
4. By cenlraliza1ion of the agricultural surplus. I refer 10 1hc process whereby 1hc overlords acquire
land rcnl from the land. no1 primarily from their own estalcs hut from formally more or less
indcpcndcn1 pcasan1s whose pitrccls of land are: too small 10 h� economically viable.
Consequently they become dependent on 1he patron who. 1hrough mortgages, exorbitant rcn1s.
Cle•• acquires indircel conirol over 1he land of 1he peasants.

164
1 6. Anti-Imperialist
Struggles Against the
Wrong Form of
Capitalism

Disarm the Bureaucratic Capitalists! 1

During the fifties the communists succeeded in isolating the compradors.

primarily represented in the PKl's view. by Masjumi and the PSI. This was
done by exposing their collaboration with imperialism. their offences
against Sukarno. 1heir support of domestic rebellions and so on. Thereafter
the so-called bureaucratic capitalists hecame the PKJ's domestic enemy
No.I.
In Chapter 10 I analysed bow the "bureaucratic capitalists" had grown up
in the sheller of the stale of emergency. the nationalizations and guided
democracy. The PKl talked aboul parasites in the state apparatus. who were
nol only corrupt but also invested their corrupt earnings in the private
sector. This made them capitalists. Sul their power base was political.
administrative and military. not productive-economic. as was the case with
the classical bourgeoisie, which is why they were called bureaucratic
capitalists. ConsequenUy. the PKrs "bureaucratic capitaEsts" were to a
considerable extent members of a political rather than as in the traditional
analyses. an economic category. The communists regarded civilian state
company managers. administrators. oflicers, and others who used their
positions 10 build up private capitalism as "bureaucratic capitalists".
This reasoning. which became ever more openly expressed in the early
sixties. led the communists to conclude that the ·'bureaucratic capitalists"
were interested in privatizing the slate economy. But since the bureaucratic
capitalists, according to the PKI. had hitherto not succeeded in privatizing a
subsiantial portion ofthe public. state-owned economic sector. they were, i n
the meantime. reduced to relying on their own political power base. Thus.
the PK.I did not want ro maintain that the bureaucratic capitalists had
acquired a definite class base. nor that they had taken overstate power. The
PKJ maintained that they should rather be regarded as individual rotten
eggs. as people who should be politically opposed, since their base was
primarily political. at the same Lime as the state economy should be
defended. The workers should be prepared to work themselves to the bone
to raise production and refrain from strikes and other actions which could
weaken the state economy. But they should do all they could to rid the state

165
Communist O.f(e11sfre: 1960-63 10 1965

of the parasites who sabotaged the state economy by channelling the

surplus produced there into private investments.
According to the PKI, the bureaucratic capitalists did not have a broad
popular base of work on which to found their political power. Nor, like the
national bourgeoisie, did they have a base in production. Thus they must
have based their power on feudal and imperialist forces. When that
conclusion was arrived at, the matter became simple: if the communists
could isolate the bureaucratic capitalists from the feudal and imperialist
forces. they would be relatively easy to combat in a straight political
struggle, especially as they did not yet have any significant economic
base.
During the years 1959-63 the communists combined an almost Chinese
picture of bureaucrats who used the state to make private investments and
gain capitalist profits, with a Soviet analysis of a progressive state
economy. This was possible since. according to the PKI. the bureaucratic
capitalists in Indonesia were not based on strong private monopoly capital,
as they were in Chiang Kai-Shek's China, but were based virtually
exclusively on political and admin istrative power. ln other words .
. the state
was not yet the possession of capital. State ownership was not the extended
arm of monopoly capitalism. as it was iJ1 countries with a stronger
bourgeoisie. where it also was a significant part of the so-called state
monopoly capitalist system. On the contrary, there was still relatively
autonomous freedom of action for the state. since the state did not have a
distinct class base.
Towards the end of 1963, the PKI, however, began to express itself more
sharply. The communists made no decisive alterations to the theses
described above, but pointed out that the struggle for control of the stale,
with its indistinct class base. was intensifying. The PKJ said the struggle
depended on the bureaucratic capitalists receiving powerful support from
the imperialists. especially from the Americans, to liberalize and privatize
the economy. according to the 26 May Regulations. In other words, the
imperialisrs were giving the bureaucratic capitalists a class base in private
monopoly capital. This increased the similarities with the former bureau­
cratic capitalists of China.
Aidit talked about a popular and anti-popular aspect of the state.
Although the popular forces. under Sukarno's leadership. had the initiative
politically, and spelt out state policies. the anti-popular forces nevertheless
succeeded in sabotaging many decisions, since they dominated that state
apparatus.
At the same lime, the bureaucratic capitalists tried lo hide their
connivance with the imperialists and the feudal landlords by fo1mally
applaudiJ1g Sukarno. These conjuring tricks had to be exposed, said the
PKJ.
The strategic implications have already been hinted at. The bureaucratic
capitalists should be exposed and purged from the state apparatus, which
would allow the basic progressive aspects of the state economy to emerge

166
 Anti-fmperialst
i Struggles . . .

and the workers' situation would improve. Then not even the army would be
a serious threat to the struggle to complete the nationaJ and democratic
revolution of 1 945.
The PKI's position was not so strong that it could dictate exactly when,
where and how the bureaucratic capitalists shouJd be exposed and isolated.
As I pointed out previously, in Chapter 14, the communists instead directed
themselves at backing Sukarno and accentuating his anti-imperialism as
well as his decrees on a guided economy. According to the PKJ's analysis,
anti-imperialism threatened the fundamental power base of the bureau­
cratic capitalists - imperialism. And the demand for a guided economy
was completely contrary to their interests in privatizing the state-owned
companies. Presented with a greatly emphasized anti-imperialism and a
guided economy. the bureaucratic capitalists would thus be forced to reveal
themselves, break openly with Sukarno and could thus quite simply be
exposed and isolated.2
The PK.I itself. on the other hand, was under no circumstances to initiate
any actions. such as workers' protests, which might, correctly or otherwise,
be used by the bureaucratic capitalists to maintain that they were directed
against the state and Sukarno. Militant actions were only tolerable against
foreign companies, etc. Within the state sector, one should highlight
mismanagement and corruption primarily by means of demonstrations,
petitions, deputations, etc.3

Anti-Imperialism, a Blunted Weapon

Progress
A wave of anti-imperialist rhetoric, but also of military engagements, swept
over Indonesia from late in 1963 and the years foJJowing. Doubtless the
communists were successful in fomenting these feelings and in seizing the
political injtiative. If anything were to go wrong, it would hardly be due to a
failure of the PK.J's efforts to conjure up an accentuated anti-imperialism.
Attempts by the US and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to
collaborate with kindred souls in Indonesia and realize the capitalist
stabilization programme from 23 May 1963 was blocked by means of a
policy of confrontation towards Malaysia.
The army command could not reintroduce the state of emergency. which
they lost on 26 May. unless they were prepared to engage in massive military
manoeuvres against the British in Malaysia and against US interests in
South-East Asia. The anny was not. prepared to go that far.4
The communists did indeed reinforce their weak position within the
cabinet.5 B ut it was primarily through extra-parliamentary activities "to
support Sukarno" and "to strengthen the home front" that the PK.I became
the driving force in the struggle against imperialism.
British compani.es were occupied by nationalist and communist-led
trade unfons in late 1963. At the beginning of 1964 the communists

167
Co1111111111is1 Ojfensfre: 1960·63 ro 1965

themselves took che iniciative to initiate further occupations and in 1965

attacked US companies.6
Jn 1963 the communists had succeeded in checking the development of
the state company managers' yellow trade union. SOKSI and in May 1964 it
was finally closed down.7
Instead the PKI and SOBSI continuously subjected company manage­
ment. administrators and army commanders lo intensive supervision
aimed al highlighting corruption and bureaucratic capitalism. This
occurred both in local worker-management councils and in the mass
media and central political organs. Demands for a 'retooling· of the
bureaucratic capitalists and the purging of traitors within the slate
apparatus caused considerable problems. particularly for the army.s
Zealously cheered on by the PKI. Sukarno forced a substantial part oft he
political opposition underground. In December 1 964 he prohibited the
. ..
. Body for Promoting Sukarnoism (BPS), which brought together a good
many of the anti-communist nationalists and others behind the demand for
a one-party state." TheMurba party's activities were banned in January 1965.
officially because the party supported the campaigns of the BPS. Murba
had been almost Titoisl a t the time of Indonesia's independence. and had
become somewhat of a meeting point for prominent members of the
government. One of these was Adam Malik. who had recently returned
from Moscow. where he had been ambassador. and who. as newly­
appointed Minister ofTrade. helped the anny to profit from the state-owned
trading companies. Other persons close to Murba were Chariul Saleh, one
of the deputy prime ministers. and Nasution, Defence M i n ister and
Commander-in-Chief of the army. as well as Russian emissaries who were
looking for new acquaintances as the PKl adopted policies which did not
follow Moscow·s recommendations.10
On the international level the anti-imperialist successes were even more
marked. At an early stage Sukarno assumed the role of standard-bearer of
what with the PKrs approval. he called the New Emerging Forces (Nefo). as
opposed to the Old Established Forces (Oldefo).
It was never really established whether the Soviet Union was counted
amongst Nefo or Oldefo. But it was clear that both Sukarno and the PKl
replaced the old international dichotomy between communism and
imperialism (as well as the trichotomy which also included a neutral camp)
with a new dichotomy in which the question of anti-imperialism was
central. By these activities. both actors moved closer to the Maoist
perspective of the time.11
Concretely this perspective led Indonesia to become the lirst nation in the
world to leave the United Nations on 1 January 1965. Its reason for doing so
was that Malaysia had joined. At the same time plans were leaked that
Indonesia and China were to start a revolutionary alternative to the UN.'1
. .
In addition. Sukarno asked the US to . go to hell with its aid .. but
Washington was sufficiently magnanimous not to withdraw the CLA­
backcd aidY He also suggested the formation of an axis between Peking,

168
 Anti-Jmperioli.rt Struggles . . .

Pyongyang (North Korea). Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Jakarta.14

Problems: Workers Hard Hit, Capitalists Gain

From 1964 Indonesia's economic crisis was aggravated. The colonial

economy had long since been run down. Income from exports did not
suffice for essential imports and a large number of the companies which
were dependent on spare parts, etc. from abroad were unable to utilize their
capacity. The nationalized companies were mismanaged. Even when a
surplus was produced. onJy small sums reached the state coffers. after
company managers. anny officers and various administrators had helped
themselves to their share.
A good deal of the local and regional trade bad been paralysed because of
the persecution of the Chinese minority. But what was worse was that the
substantial foreign loans started drying up in 1964 because of the conflict
with Washington. Nor was Moscow satisfied with Sukarno and the PKI.
and China had no economic faci l ities to put in its place. At the same time
stagnating domestic production enabled a purely speculative economy to
gain ground. The government totally lost control over inflation. which
rapidly rose to several hundred per cent annually. As if that were not
enough. the crops faiJed and contradictions in the rural areas. to which I
shall return in the next chapter. further aggravated the food shortage.15
or course, those who were hardest hit were those who had o n ly their
labour to sell. while those who could sell goods. protection. decisions and so
forth managed to get by comfortably. There were also degrees o fdeprivation
for wage workers. Those who were worstoffwere those with only temporary
jobs. while those in state employment were often happy to receive part of
their pay i n kind.'<'
In the rural areas. the poor peasanLs who bad to buy rice and other
necessiLies did nol manage much better than the disadvantaged wage
workers.17
The leadership of the PKI tried to the lasL to encourage the workers to
sacri lice themselves for the sake of anti-imperialism. Even during 1964 the
communists declared rhetorically that Indonesia would never be bankrupt
as long as the people were unitedY'
At the same time contradictions within the party leadership were
sharpened. SOBSI leader Njono was one of those said to have wanted to
initiate worker actions. if necessary even strikes. in order to h i t back at the
"bureaucratic capitalists" and to some degree rescue the standard of living of
the workers. Njono resigned, however. from the leadership of SOBSI.19
Early in 1965 the party leadership declared that if the imperialists and the
bureaucratic capitalists were to be combated. one first had to ftll the
stomach. But this was propaganda. and not a slogan for action accom­
panied by exhortations to the workers to engage in vigorous struggle.�0
If the deteriorating economic crisis in the wake of anti-imperialism

169
 i Ojfe11sfre: 1960·63 to 1965
Co1111111111s1

affected the wage workers and poor peasants badly, the bureaucratic
capitalists, politicians or palace millionaires round Sukarno were not
economically threatened. The key to success was po.litical. administrative
and military contacts within the state apparatus and/or good liquidity
which made speculative ventures possible. Private business nourished
outside and inside the state sector. I f anyone was stupid enough to try to
profit only from production, things went badly wrong. but there do not seem
to have been many who tried.21
Up to this point the conclusion is obvious: anti-imperialism was a
blunted weapon against the bureaucratic capitalists and their chances of
making a quick buck.

The Bureaucratic Capitalists Could Not Be Isolated

Nor were the communists able to succeed in exposing and isolating the
bureaucratic capitalists as pro-imperialist traitors who wanted to privatize
the economy by relying on their alleged base in imperialism. The campaign
for a so-called retooling of the state apparatus led lo the exposure of
individual rotten eggs. but not to any structural changes.12
I n the first place, the army officers clearly did not need to challenge the
ever more accentuated anti-imperialist state ideology expressed by
Sukarno.
As late as May 1956. the regional commanders at their conference
declared that "Being true to Pancasila and Nosakom. the army will for ever
be ready to sacrifice body and soul in the defence and implementation of
Bung Karno:� teachings... And Minister of Defence Nasution declared in
July of the same year that. ·The armed services have no political ideology
other than the pol itica I ideology of the state. I n th is connection, the armed
services know no compromise".23
Of course this does not mean that the army interpreted Sukarno's
teachings in the same way as did the PKJ. Instead. the army behaved exactly
like the PKJ: it tried to interpret the teachings of Sukarno to its own
advantage. One example of this is the way Sukarno's declarations were used
i n the campaigns co establish one national trade-union organization and
one national party.24
I n the second place. a long-cherished myth has been that it was the
communists alone, possibly with some help from Sukarno, who created the
confrontation with Malaysia. On the contrary. there are many indications
that it was the army officer corps which engineered the conflict. Army
Commander Yani was particularly active. but the Minister of Defence
Nasution was also involved.25
The most important reason appears to have been the army's fear of
demobilization. a reduced budget (early in 1963 a 47 per cent cur in state
military spending was discussed).21' and threats to their strong position after
the state of emergency had been revoked. In addition. by no means all the

170
 Anti·lmperiali.1·1 Struggles

officers in the army were enamoured of Nasution's idea that the army
should concern itself with civilian projects. help to build roads and so forth.
Finally. the army. exactly like the major established parties except for the
PK.I. had no interest in renewing the question of general elections. which
were Likely to be held if the country did not find itself in a political and
military crisis.27
This meant that Yani, and even Nasution. fel l out with Washington. But
as the PKJ and Sukarno pursued their policy of confrontation for their own
purposes. the army officers' interest in the project cooled. Military
operations remained decidedly limited. But the anny was still unable to find
a belier way or retaining irs fighting strength than by verbally endorsing the
policy Of confrontation.2K
The third and most important factor was quite contrary to the
assumptions of the communists. The PKl did not direct a knock-out blow at
the bureaucratic capitalists by combating and contributing to the dissolu·
tion of the 26 May 1963 regulations. the programme of liberalization and
stabilization of the economy.
The important thing about this package deal was that price controls were
removed, as a result of which prices (of kerosene. for example) rose sharply.
as did bus and train fares. At the same time the rate of exchange was
modified and aid from the US (see below) was accepted to increase imports.
I n addirion, state expenditure was to be heavily cut. the administration
reduced and so on. to achieve a balanced national budget. Last but not least.
the state-owned economic sector was to be made more efficient and every
state-run company was in principle 10 function like a private company in a
free-market economy. In exchange. the IMF. Washington and other
Western powers promised sizeable loans to the value of $400 million and
other Jong-term credits.29
The polilical parties protested against the rising prices. so as not 10 lose
popular support, and to prevenl the c;maller importers from hcing
particularly hard hit by the tough credit policy.30 In addition. no one
disagrees with the PK.I's thesis that the regulations were supported by the
army officers and other bureaucratic capitalists. since they desired to
privatize and liberalize the state economy through collaboralion with
foreign capitalists.31
Even independent researchers maintain that in 1963 the army officers
were on the side of the university economists who favoured the programme
of stabilization against the communists. According to this version, tbe
programme was stopped simply because of the confrontation with
Malaysia. which the army was forced to agree to.n
What does General Nasution think of this view of history? When I asked
him. he said:

Cenainly I agreed with Ojuanda13 that the economy needed rehabilitation . . . and
regarding the university and the Department of Economics. I did protect them against
Nasakomization . . . .but it is important to remember that there was n hidden connicl

171
Communst
i Ojfensil'e: 1960-63 to 1965

between myselfand the tei.:hnocrats. people like Sad Ii. Widjojo.34 indeed most of those
from the PSI. They were and remain technocrats. I am a nationalist. In the <1rmy we
wanted 10 have anti-rnlonialists in the companies. people we could rely upon. in the
same way as Tito had done. They wanted to have experts. They always argue for
i11tcllec:1ual solutions. hut there is much more 10 he thought of. In 1963 the position or
the US was much closer to theirs than to mine. The US gave them everything. even the
houses tJ1ey lived in:»

There are clear indications that Nasutioo·s reply is in line with actual
developments.
The programme of stabilization appears, contrary to what the PKJ said.
to have been a threat to the army officers and to their .. bureaucratic
capitalists'". i.e. the untrained company managers and economic admini­
strators who. nevertheless. were competent clients and guardians or good
order.
The bureaucratic capitaljsts who did not have a political, administrative
and military background but were. on the other hand. trained economists
were the only ones who earnestly desired the IM F's programme; we can call
them technocratic state capitalists.36
Why? If the programme of stabilization had been put into effect, both the
army officers and their bureaucratic capitalists would have been hard hit by
a heavily-reduced military budget. drastic savings plans within the rest of
the state apparatus, and attempts to give effective and educated technocrats.
who were willing to co-operate with foreign capitalists, power within the
stare-owned companies and the economic planning or the nation. This
wou Id not qnly have threatened certain individual business leaders, officers
and others, but also the army's opportunities for building u p their own
runds with money from state enterprises in order to finance the machinery
of violence independently of Sukarno.37
It should be added here chat the army was forced to choose between
confrontation with Malaysia and the policy of stabilization. As l have
already shown. the army needed this confrontation in order to avoid
demobilization. a reduced military budget and general elections.
The technocratic state capitalists, on the other hand, needed the support
of Washington to drive out the "incompetent bureaucrats and parasites"
from the state economy. to use their own words. I f they succeeded. the
technocrats expected an economic ·•take-off"' in collaboration with foreign
capitalists, the opportunity to put their own theories into practice and to get
the most important jobs, and the chance t o start their own ventures.3M
Agai 11st my analysis it can be argued39 that in 1966-67, when it had seized
power. the army actually did implement a stabilization programme of the
same type as that of 1963. And the foreign-aid consortium planned for 1963
was actually born in 1967 - IGGI. the Inter-Governmental Group on
Indonesia.
The answer to this is simpl.e. Not until Sukarno and the PKl had been
neutralized, in 1965-66, did the army officers and their bureaucratic
capitalists have enough power to ensure that the policies of stabilization of

172
 A111i-lmperiolis1 S1ruxglt•.t . .

the slate capitalists would not affecL the army negatively. The connict
between the state capitalists and the bureaucratic capital ists. however, lives
on.
By saying this I am also hinting a t one answer to the question of why
Sukarno first backed the 26 May Regulations. and was prepared to
collaborate with the Americans. before the confrontation with Malaysia
became more important to him.40The regulations might have weakened the
army: the technocrats would have been relatively easy to control for both
Sukarno and the PKI; and a political solution to the Malaysian question
would. in exacLly the same way as over the question of Irion Joya. have
dethroned the army. Sukarno would thus have been able to strengthen his
position. But the army officers refused to be overruled. mobilized against
Malaysia and ignored the stabilization programme. The communists did
the same thing. if for different reasons. Sukarno could not long delay
without being left behind. To regain the leadership he went a step further
and tried, with the help of the PKI. to step up the policies of confrontation
and find other solutions to economic problems: solutions which would pose
problems for the military, such as self-reliance and the purging of the
bureaucratic capitalists. Anti-imperialism. in the meantime. was. as l have
shown. insufficient in the struggle for self-reliance and in the purging of the
burectucratic capital ists.
Once again the conclusion is thus that anti-imperialism was a blunted
weapon against the bureaucratic capitalists. They could not be exposed and
isolated as imperialist traitors who wanted lo privatize the economy. since
they themselves needed to act against imperialism.just as they needed to act
against attempts to liberalize the economy in order to retain their
administrative positions of power and not 10 lose the political initiative.

A Post-Colonial Capitalism Takes S h ape

The Problems: A Summary

According 10 the theoretical perspective of the PKI. to summarize my
previous analyses. the so-called bureaucratic capitalists had a political.
administrative and military base. rather than. as capitalists usually had. an
economic base. The economy from which they enriched themselves was
public. not private. Hence the name bureaucratic capitalists. Lacking their
own economic base. the PKI said. the bureaucratic capitalists needed the
support of others. They accordingly fell back on the strength of the
imperialists.
Si nce these bureaucrats did not have any economic roots of their own,
they needed to acquire some. According to the communists. the bureaucrats
tried using their positions to privatize the stale economy in both major and
minor ways. They used stale capital in private ven1ures (simple corruption
is excluded here) and thus became more than bureaucrats: they became
"bureaucratic capitalists".

173
Co111111u11i.w Ojjemive: 1960-6.1 10 1965

Although assisrance from the imperialists grew throughout the early

sixties. the PKI maintained that the bureaucratic capitalists nevertheless
did not have state power. not even in the final analysis. They still did not
have a substantial economic base of their own. Thus the PKJ still
maintained that the state continued to lack a distinct class base.
Thus the communists should refrain from a general attack on the state.
state-owned companies. etc. and try to safeguard and improve the
.
··progressive . aspects of the state. The workers should not for example.
make demands for major wage increases or for power in the factories or the
plantations, but strive to raise production and to eliminate treacherous
bureaucratic capitalists.
This theoretical perspective must. as I have shown. be set beside actual
events:
( l) The communists could, of course, demonstrate that the bureaucratic
capitalists had contacts with imperialism. S.ut when it came to the connict
over Malaysia with the British and Americans. the army command. rather
than the communists. took the initiative. Not even when Sukarno and the
PKI t0ok over the confrontation against Malaysia and tried to use ir for their
own ends did the anny abandon the issue. even though the officers were
disgruntled. The anny and the bureaucratic capitalists had more to lose
than to win by allying themselves with the imperialists.
The technocratic 'state capital ists' did not have the same solid domestic
base as the army officers and rheir bureaucratic capitalists. and were an
exception. The technocrats relied in the first place on the imperialists.
(2) The relatively solidly based bureaucratic capitalists did not appear to be
significantly interested in privatizing the state economy. at least not as long
as this occurred on conditions dictated by others. They rejected tbc
stabilization and liberalization programme offered by the Americans, since
for the time being it posed a threat to their own political and economic
power base.
Once again the state capitalist technocrats proved to be an exception.
Their positions would have been reinforced ifthe stabilization programme
bad been implemented.
After the power shift of 1965-67. a similar stabilizarion and liberalization
programme was implemented. but under the command of the army and its
bureaucratic capitalists. The technocrats and their foreign cousins played
an important role, but the army and its bureaucratic capitalists retained
their grip on state power and the state apparatus and the surprisingly intact
stale sector or the economy. The difference between Suharto's Indonesia
and Pinochefs Chile on the question ofprivatization cannot be sufficiently
underlined. British and American companies which lndonesia had taken
over between 1963 and 1965 were, indeed, returned, and Holland was
compensated for the nationalized companies. But most or the former D ulch
companies remained nationalized. Trade and production were to a great
degree still directed via slate regulations and the order books of cabinet
ministers. Collaboration with foreign capitalists occurred with an

174
 A111i-Jmperialis1 S1ruggles . . .

investment of state power. which gave many officers and administrators a

lucraLive position as "'domestic counterparts'".41
(3) The bureaucratic capitalists lost some of their political initiative during
the early sixties. but nevertheless retained their power. This the PKJ itself
admitted at the beginning of 1965.42 Nevertheless. they did not have any
significant economic base and were not over-enthusiastic about acquiring
one. Nor did they unite with the imperialists to a degree which would have
explained their tenacious grip on positions of power. On the contrary. the
army retained its power through following anti-imperialist policies. I n
addition. when the British and American companies were taken over. they
joined the previous arsenal of nationalized companies.
The bureaucratic capitalists thus had to have another main source of
power which di ffered from the one the PKJ talked about and tried to
combat. This source is the one identified in Chapter 10. Through
nationalization and the state of emergency in the fifties. the state had
acquired its own economic base which served to strengthen the officers and
which they. in different ways, used as their personal power base. Many
became company managers. Others directed and led the state economy
from the central bureaux. The army acquired an independent economic
base for itself with the help of profits from the state companies.
Hence the communists' analysis of the class basis of the state must be
discussed. That the state had acquired an economic base orirs own. and that
the bureaucratic capitalists had usurped it and made it their own. is. of
course. contradictory to the thesis of an indistinctly class-based state in
which no single class was strong enough to take over state power. leaving
considerable room for manoeuvre to nationalists and other so-called
popular forces.
Indeed there was still considerable autonomy for Sukarno and his
standard-bearers in the leadership of the state. But that autonomy was a
good deal more relative and limited than, for instance. in the mid-finies.
The limited relative autonomy of the early sixties was not due to the fact that
no single distinct class had state power. but depended rather on Sukarno.
supported by the PKI. managing to use his power to some extent to prevent
the army and the bureaucratic capitalists from making full use of their state
power. particularly their political and ideological power.
The latter had acquired their state power by means of their newly-won but
separate class base. while Sukarno and his friends were some kind of
remnant from the time when the state genuinely was indistinctly class­
based.
Thus I must conclude that the PKI. by defending the national economy
a n d not least by postponing the workers· struggle in the state compan ies. did
not present a n y sign ifican t threat to the state power or the bureaucratic
capitalists.
The communists believed that they were defending a ··popular" aspect of
t h e state. In reality they were only defending Sukarno·s powerof the cabinet.
b u t were unable to prevent it being undermined. Now state power was. in the

175
Comm1111is1 Ojfem,it'e: 1960·63 10 1965

linal analysis. in the hands or the bureaucratic capitalists with the army in
the lead. Their state power was consolidated rather than weakened by the
PKJ"s derence or state ownership.

Military Bureaucratic State?

The contradictions between the PK l's analysis and actuaJ developments are
thus clear. A well-intentioned but not completely unreasonable answer to
the question or whether the PKI could have analysed capitalism more
accurately and retained its theoretical approach can be derived from
seeing whether the Marxist-oriented studies or the seventies can dissolve the
contradictions between the PKfs analysis and actual events.
These studies maintain that the Indonesian capitalism or today was
already being developed before 1 965. Thus. in principle. the PKJ could have
conducted similar studies. even ir access to racts had been more limited.
The answer is disheartening. The best of the Marxist-oriented analyses of
the seventies is Robison·s.�3 He exposes the bureaucratic capitalists·
economic power in a creditable way. Even the less formally Marxist
analysis ofCrouch is at least as cxhaustive.4� In a detailed analysis. which I
do not need to dwell on here. he exposes in panicularthe economic base of
the military.
.
Robison talks abolll the military bureaucratic state as being .neo·
patrimonial" and mercantilist. He says this depends on the bureaucratic
capitalists being clearly dominated by four or live fractions of the
bourgeoisie. (Robison unfortunately uses changeable categories to describe
the Muslim private. primarily trading. capitalists. the civilian technocratic
state capitalists, the client capitalists, who actually do the work for Lhe
patrons. and Lhe hurcaucraLic capiwlists. who arc primarily military men.
l n addition there arc the C h i nese capital ists. who resemble the client
capitalisLs and the foreign bourgeoisie.)45
The bureaucratic capitalists, according to Robison and even liberal
economisLs such as H.W. AmdL.41' are not like the ··ideal'" capitalists.
engaged in productive invesLments and the accumulation of prolit from
their own production. Instead they use their military and bu reaucratic .
powers to monopolize capital, goods and even raw-material markets. Then
they exchange shares in the markets and rights (concessions. orders.
licences. etc.) for shares in the prolits or production. which either the
domestic or the foreign capitalists account for. This is also true of oil.47
These prolits from production are used by the bureaucratic capilal ists. as
Marxist and liberal economists agree. nol to make productive investments
but to build up the armed forces. buy political support (patronage !"or lhe
client) and live in luxury. To the extent that investment occurs, it is
primarily concerned with speculation in land and property.4�
Only when it comes to the former Dutch-owned plantations are the
bureaucratic capitalists directly and to any signilicant degree involved in

176
 A11ti·lmperiaf1'.v1 Stn1ggle.r . . •

production. But in comparison with the monopoly on markets the

plamations are of limited account.49
Finally. the economy is still not radically privatized. which is, of course.
theoretically problematic for a class analysis. The companies owned by the
military are private, but usually it is still a unit of the army. for instance.
which owns the limited company. The capital does not move with the
generals. An ofliccr who is politically or bureaucratically out-manoeuvred
loses a considerable number of his economic privileges.50

'Bureaucrats with no Class Base'

The first conclusion is th us that the bu rcaucratic capitalists still do not have
a distinct class base. The only reasonable Marxist explanation of their
indisputable power is thus.just as the PKJ sajd. that they rely on some other
class. Robison. Tichclman. Mortimer. Gordon and others have no doubt of
it. when, like the PKl. thcy conclude that the bureaucratic capitalists in the
linal analysis establish their power on the class base of the imperialists. As
long as the imperialists get their licences. concessions. etc. the bureaucrats
in return get such a large section of production that they can live a life of
luxury and retain their political stability.�1 Crouch. however. is more
doubtful. or perhaps ··tess Marxist". He linds important differences between
the bureaucratic capitalists and the imperialists. using. for instance. the
Pertamina oil company as an example. But at the same time he agrees with
the others that it is a question of parasites with no distinct class base of their
own.5�

'Blocked Capitalism'
Another conclusion drawn from these studies of Indonesian capitalism is
also in line with the Lheories of the PKJ. Both Marxists and liberals agree
that the bureaucratic capitalists hamper capitalist development since they
a re speculative parasites who do not invest in productive work. Inspired by
the ideas of Stalin and the dependency school. the Marxists add that the
liaison between the bureaucratic capitalists and the imperialists guarantees
that Indonesian capitalist development is blocked.53
This conclusion becomes increasingly diflicult to defend. Several years
ago it was already remarkable that the Indonesian regime. which according
to current Marxist theory was a comprador regime with no significant
domestic base and was incapable of promoting capitalism. nevertheless
remained in power and the political situation was regarded as stable. Since
1966 we have still only seen one serious attempted coup d"etat.'4
In addition it may be worth remembering that while the communists were
indeed crushed through force of arms. Sukarno and his non-communist
followers were out-manoeuvred with the stick and carrot alone.�5
But even more important is the fact that a dynamic. if brutal and certainly
not crisis-free. capitalism is taking root in the midst of the ··parasitic
bureaucratic capitalists" who are so dependent on imperialism. Now it is
not only the IMF but also uncomfortable Marxists like Mt.:Farlane who

177
Communisr Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

point to this dynamic.57 lo l981 even Robison admitted that the foreign
capitalists who returned to lndonesia after l 965 did not invest i n traditional
colonial trade and production. but on local industry. for domestic as well as
foreign markets. Robison said i t was no longer a question of Dutch trading
companies, but of American and Japanese transnational companies.58
Thus. says Robison, the old "patrimonial" and mercantile state must
become more efficient. In addition, the bureaucratic capitalists find i t
necessary t o invest directly i n production. This sows dissension within tbe
ranks of the bureaucratic capitalist�; some only want a limited adaptation
which will allow them to retain their monopolies and their patronage, while
others prefer to try to become "proper·· capitalists.59
Robison is forced to choose. Either he must discard the thesis of the
"parasitic bureaucratic capitalists" who are totally dependent on imper­
ialism, or he must break with the dependency school's thesis that
imperialism blocks capitalist development. He chooses to retain his
parasites and dispose of dependency theory. He maintains that !he
transnational companies have stimulated the Indonesian capitalist
economy, forcing the bureaucrats to adapt, become more efficient and even
to become more and more like "proper" capitalists.00

Post-Colonial Capitalism and t h e State

Despite having the hindsight of history at their disposal now, the Marxist
analysis of the seventies did not succeed in explaining the basis of the power
of the bureaucratic capitalists i n a way which differed from that of the PKI.
At the same time we know that there must be a mistake somewhere. I have
even shown that the struggle of the PKI against imperialism. the alleged
base of the bureaucratic capitalists. did not weaken the new capitalists, but,
on the contrary, from time to time even reinforced their strength.
Even if the Marxists of the seventies have disposed of the dependency
school's conception of imperialism blocking capitalist development in !he
periphery, they retain the thesis of parasitic bureaucratic capitalists and
maintain that post-1965 development is the work of transnational
companies.
Indeed it is correct that imperialism has changed its nature and has
several faces today; in addition Indonesia has become an oil power. But the
class struggle is also impo1tant. We must not forget that it was a
considerable number of Robison's bureaucratic capitalists who firsL with
non-productive and parasitic means. neutralized their class enemies, and
thus were able to offer a good investment climate including monopolies and
well-controUed labour power; and who. secondly put pressure on certain
imperialists to adapL develop new forces of production and change the
mode of production from simple plunder and underdevelopment. This
.
means that the .parasites" have contributed to the creation of a new form of
imperialism which is somewhat less parasitic and less under-developing

178
 A11ri-lmperialis1 Srruggles . . .

than the previous form. Then came the opportunity for the '"parasites" to
make the transition to investment and direct participation in production
without being seriously rhrcatened.
I am therefore prepared to argue that current Marxism is not capable of
analyzing or explaining the growth of capitalism in a country such as
Indonesia. Without denying the military features of imperialism or the
reaJity of "'patrimonialism··. I would instead like Lo suggest that we built a
theory of post-colonial capitalism. rather than one of neo-colonial
capitalism. The former is dominated by the state and implemented by a
capitalist fraction which I will call "'post-colonial". These are neither neo­
..
colonial compradors. "bureaucratic capitaJists nor the national
bourgeoisie.
Robison and others are indeed quite right when they say that the
bureaucratic capitalists were not (and are not) '"genuine" capitalists with
their base in production. Instead. they are primarily engaged in the control
of Jabour power and the monpolization of raw materials and markets
through extra-economic means and in co-operation with foreign capitalists.
But. within current Marxism. capitalism and capitalists are in some way
clean and indivisible. Private property must exist. Politics and economics
should be separate spheres. The economy is productive whereas politics is
non-productive. But was there any difference between a speculative and
parasitic army officer who was a minorcapitalist and an equally speculative
and parasitic "ordinary capitalist'' during the early sixlies? All those who
wanted to make a profil seem to have primarily engaged in speculation.61
Incidentally. it does not seem to have occurred to anyone to deny outright
that finance capitalists in the industrialized countries have a base in
production: even though they seldom bother themselves with actual
production. but leave it LO their directors. Today. particularly in times of
crisis. they make their largest profits by land and property speculation.
currency deals. etc.. as well as by monpoliziog markets and m arketing.
The problem is that the powerful fraction of the Indonesian bureaucratic
capitalists has specialized in only a part of the economically essential
sphere of activity of every monpoly capitalist: co acquire monopolies and
control labour. The other part. actual production, was often left to those who
were best al it. and totally dominaled it. namely, foreign capitalists and the
C h inese businessmen.
The problem with current Marxist theory in this area is that it does not
fully take into consideration that the monopoly and control. or sub­
ordination. of the labour power of both the employed and those forced to
live on the margins. arc at least as important when it comes to creating
capitalism today as production in general and "'entrepreneurship" in
particular. As long as both functions are engaged in by a capitalist, these
weaknesses in Marxisl theory a re not particulairly noticeable. But the theory
becomes u n fruitful when lhese functions are separated.
This is especially true of a country like Indonesia. There. it is true.
C h i nese capitalists and others who do not have access to the state apparatus

L79
Co1111111111is1 Qffe11sfre: 1960-63 10 1965

are forced ro direct recourse to economic struggle with production and lrade
with the imperialists. or to subordinate themselves. But why should a
nationalisl usually a state administrator or military man_ with similar
interests in enriching himself. be served by directly throwing himself into a
monopolized field of production? Rather it is obvious that it is in his interests
to use what he is best at - politics. ideology. administration and martial
force - to make things more difficult for the traditional imperialist interests
on the one hand. while offering the more dynamic imperialists political
stability and a disciplined workforce in exchange for greater production
and part of the profits on the other.
In sum, Marxist theory has. to its credit. pointed out that imperialism has
usually made it impossible for a classic national capi talism to develop. But
there is a way of escape for the profiteers of developing countries - to
submit to imperialism as compradors. When nationalists within the civil
and military apparatus of the state try to use extra-economic means to
enrich themselves. Marxism consequently regards this as the bureaucrats'
way of subordinating themselves to imperialism while at the same time
receiving a share of the imperialists' profits. Whether any economic
development occurs must depend on whether the imperialists employ their
own power to change and develop their activities and whether they become
interested in encouraging a certain economic growth in a few developing
countries. (Otherwise they may be victims of the development of
technology.)
With the support of my empirical results,62 1 would rather maintain that
the Indonesian example indicates that certain admin istrators. politicians
and military men have used and continue to use the state apparatus to
nationalize companies and direct the economy, to monopolize raw
materials and markets as well as to control the labour force: all this in
struggle against not only the working people, but also domestic private
capitalists and troublesome imperialists. In this way they have acquired an
economic base of their own and offered important preconditions for
capitalist development which did not exist previously. They are therefore
able to build a post-colonial capitalist system which is not totally
subordinated to. but works in collaboration with. interested foreign
capitalists. Anti with a consolidated political and economic power base, the
post-colonial capitalists can finally take the step o f combining their
monopolies and control of the labour force with their own private ventures
in production. Hence the post-coloni<1 1 capitalists who are interested in
production acquire their own interest in improving the efficiency of the
stale a p paratus. And as they then become less dependent in a one-sided use
ofextra-economic instruments ofpower. it may be possible at best to ease up
somewhat on naked repression. and perhaps to create limited room for
modest democratic rights and freedoms.
Compared to the classical national bourgeoisie. the post-colonial
capitalists thus start building their capitalism on extra-economic positions
of power and lay stress on monopolies and the control of labour power

180
 Ami-Imperiali
st S1ruggle.v . . .

rather than on ··entrepreneurship". With such a class base oftheirown. they

also collaborate with foreign capitalists and expand within an inter­
national. and not an exclusively national. system of production.
Compared to the bureaucratic capitalists and the comprador bourgeoisie.
the post-colonial capitaJists have their own domestic class base. Using this
as a base. they collaborate with imperialism. On the other hand. the base of
the post-colonialist capitalists is not (as once Mao·s special bureaucratic
capitalists were) rooted in a p1ivate monopoly capital which led Lo
bureaucratic power, but. on the contrary. is rooted in political, admini­
strative and military positions.
ln the case oflndonesia at least, it is important to distinguish between the
post-colonial capitalists and those whom I previously called technocratic
state capitalists. The latter have no appreciable political and economic base
besides their administrative competence and advanced education. They
thus remind us of traditional bureaucrats in the apparatus o f the nation
state. Consequently. they alternate between seeking protection from the
post-colonial capitalists and advocating an efficient mixed economy, under
slate leadership. which would give them greater inOucnce.
The private bourgeoisie can no longer in a meaningful way be divided
into a national fraction and a comprador fraction. l am not even sure that
the considerable connict between Muslim and Chinese is based on
different ways of functioning, I would say it has more to do with a struggle
for the spoils. Most of the private capitalisls have been forced to become
clientS of the post-colonial capitalists, as executive directors. or simply
because they are dependent on patronage for diverse orders, pennits. etc.
Some are indeed more inclined towards domeslic production for a domestic
market than others. But this national accumulation is usually interwoven
with the expansion of the internationalized economy.
Of greater significance are certain incipient contradictions among the
post-coloniaJ capitalists themselves. Th is powerful rraction of the capitalist
class can be divided into those who still hay,e most to win by cxchangi ng
politicaJ and military power. as well as shares of the markets. for shares in
others· surplus production. and those who are sufficiently strong to make
the transition into the sphere of production. The latter want to retain their
extra-economic positions of power, but use them partly to increase their
own prolits from production. and are not prepared to share these profits
with those who only try LO acquire power over the surplus of otbcrs.63
When the economic crisis in the old industrialized nations has spread
itself to newer industrializing countries wilh oil, like Indonesia. it is not out
of the question that pressure from the IMF. for instance. can further split the
post-colonial capitalists. Real growth of the gross national product has
fallen from nearly I 0 percent in 1980 to two percent at most. This may mean
that those who have become properly involved in production might accept
some belt-tightening measures including a certain liberaJization and
rationalization of the state apparatus without giving up their positions of
power. while others continue to base their power over tl1e economy more on

181
Co1111111111iw Qffe•11M1·e: 1960·63 10 1965

administrative and military strength. and have difliculty in accepting

cutbacks in their preserves. At the same time. groups hard hit by
contradictory economic demands, with or without stable jobs. are
beginning to unite in protest at political ills and bad government and to
demand democracy. Such opposition can deepen the split within the
regime. And demands for democracy need not be directed only against the
most extreme forms of repression. but can be developed to deliver a death
blow to the undemocratic political. administrative and military base of
capitalist growth.
J n the long run the working class ought. indeed. Lo become more
important i n the struggle against post-colonial capitalism. since wage
workers arc becoming more numerous all the time. But the new growth
hardly means a broad industrialization process is under way. Modern
production is often limited to relatively capital-intensive plants. The
working class is growing. but not as rapidly as one might be led to believe.
Even in smaller. modem u nits. the workers are often split between the
comparatively privileged. permanently employed and contract workers.
day labou rers. etc.M The trade-union organizations which are permitted to
function arc run from the top and arc corrupt. and almost exclusively
concerned with the permanently-employed company workers. and seldom
reach the temporarily employed, in putting-out systems. petty commodity
production and trading and so on; in the wider sense of the term. the
absolute majority of the working class. Industry and trade are indeed the
core of the new capitalism, and the workers have the potential to paralyse
the economy. But only a small part of the necessary discipline and control is
to be found inside the gates oft he factories. The extra-economic base of the
state and its means of power arc seldom within the factory gates and are
only partially threatened by connicts between workers and management of
the companies.
In and around s1a1e companies the risk of state iniervention and
repression is particularly large. When the world economic crisis reaches, as
it finally has. even the dynamic developing coun1ries. the extra-economic
control of the workforce, not least that part of it which docs not have
permanent employment. is even more important. These are additional
reasons why a broadly-based struggle for democracy. which u n ites all who
are affected by the extra-economic repression and can be developed to deal
a death blow to the extra-economic foundations of a brutal but dynamic
capitalist expansion, seems to be more realistic and politically more fruitful
than unadulterated class struggle.
Furthermore. we do not know the reaction of all those who have been
proletarianized in the rural areas but have not become industrial
proletarians: those who have not found properjobs. Bui at this point I touch
upon the conclusions of the next chapter. on the struggle of !he
peasants.

182
 A11ti·fmperialist Struggles . . .

Notes

I. For tbc PKrs analyses of and deliberations over the so-called bureaucratic capitalists. see. e.g..
the PK! ( 1961) p.5. Aidit( 1962) pp.445. 4601T..473-476 and Aidit ( 1 963) p.570 in Aidit ( 1963). Aid it
( 1964) pp.73ff. and 93IT. as well as Re1•iewof/11do11esia No I . (1965) pp.7 and 32. C( also Archipov
(1970-71) p.69, Casiles ( 1965) p.23. Fessen { 1966) pp.56IT. Hauswcdell (1 973) p.1 3 1 IT. Leclerc( l972)
p.79. Oey ll971) p.328 and Mortimer ( 1974a) Chap. 6. p.258.
2. Unollicially the PKI said that it was. nevertheless. important that an anti-imperialist course
should not be so mili1an1ly and singlc-mindcd.ly pursued, that the army should be given the
chance of reimposing the state of emergency and once again equipping the army. Mortimer.
( l 974a) p.243.
3. Sec Chapter 1 4 fn.3 1 .
4. Cf. fn.2 above.
5. In connection witb the cabinet reshume in March 1962. Aidit and Lukmun were given the status
of ministers without portfolio. Sec the PK J's comments in. e.g., Aid it( 1962) in Aidit( l963) pp.422.
449 and 450. In 1964 Njoto was also allowed to join the more than 70 ministers. Sec Mortimer
( 1 974a) p.126 and Ocy (1971) pp.son:
6. See Chapter 14 above, as well as Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.225ff. 240 and 244. Krocr ( 1 965b) and
Casllcs (1965). p.22. Hunter (1971) pp.273.
7. Mortimer( 1974a) p.1 12.Rcvitovof/11do11esia 5-7 (1 964) p2.Aftcr 1965 SOKSI was revived for some
years.
8. Sec Casrlcs ( 1965). Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.267-275. 375-383 as well as Aidit's speech in Rei•iew of
/11do11esia 3-4 (1%4) pp.22·3 1 . as well as his statement ibid. No. I ( 1965). I have also found an
interview with Nasulion useful (22 November 1 980.Jakana). Regarding the worker-management
councils. see Panglaykim ( 1965),
9. See. e.g.. Mortimer ( 1974a) p.I 12ff.. 377.
10. Ibid. pp.3761T. as well as Chapter 14 above. Interview with Adam Malik (27 November 1980.
Jakarw.)
11. For an analysis of the PKfs position on the question of disputes within world communism. sec
Mortimer ( 1974a) Chap. 8: also ibid. pp.176-86 and 226-37.
12. See. e.g.. Palmier ( 1973) p.236.
13. New York 71mes 27 April 1966, p.28.
14. For a detailed but none too weighty analysis of this and similar questions. sec Simon (1969).
15. For general analyses of Indonesia's economic crisis during the first half of the SiJtties, see. e.g..
Castles ( 1 965). Mackie (1967) and ( 1971). Palmer (1978) Chap. 2 and Paauw ( 1967). Cf. also
Mortimer ( I974a) Chnp. 6.
16. See.e.g.. Castles ( 1965) pp.25-30. Feith ( 1967) pp.389·90. Mackie (1967) pp.37-89. Ocy ( 1 97 1) imer
a/fa p.106. Paauw (1967) i111er alia pp.199-206 as well as Mortimer (1974a) pp.386·7.
17. Cf Collier (1978c) p.6.
18. Rel'il'lv of /11do11esia 5·1 (1964) p.13. Cf. Mortimer ( 1974a) p.273.
19. Interviews Nos. 29. 52 and 59 with former members of the central leadership of the parry who
belonged Lo the opposition. (Jakarta. 1980.)
20. Rl'l•il'lv of/11do11vsia I ( 1965) p.5: cf. Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.273 and 3751T.
21. Sec fns. 15 a n d 16 above. I think the best analyses arc 10 be found i n Castles (1965). Feith (1967)
pp.398-402 and Mackie (1967).
22. On the errects of the retooling campaigns. see. e.g.. Castles pp.28·9.
23. Quoted from Ocy (1971) p.229. (Bung Komo is both a respectful and popular way of addressing
Sukarno.)
24. For 1radc·11nion organization see Chap. 13. and for political organization see Chap. 1 1 .
above.
25. Utrecht ( 1979b) pp.124-5, interview with Jan Pluvier (2 October 1980. Amsterdam). sec Pluvicr
(1965) and ( 1 978). cf. Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.208·9.
26. Hindley ( 1 964b) p.904.
27. For pa rticularly intercsting analyses of these questions. see ibid .. Utrccht ( I 979b) pp. I 24·5. Curtis
( 1 964) p.32. Krocf ( l 96.5a) pp.271ff.. Monimcr (l974a) pp.203·21.

183
Communist Offensfre: 1960-63 10 1965

28. Sec rn. 27. I have also found uscrul an in1crvicw wi1h Nasution (22 November 1980. Jnknrtn).
29. For a short prcscniation of the programme. sec. e.g.. Mackie (1967) pp.37·4 I. Hind Icy ( 1964h)and
Payer ( 1 977) pp.86ff. For a deiailcd 1rea1mcn1. sec Bunnell (1969) pp.308-441.
30. Sec. e.g.. Mackie ( 1967) pp.40-41.
31. The only clear exception is. according 10 Mackie (convers111ion in Jakar1u. 22 Oc1ohcr 19SO).
Hindley (1964b).
32. ln1crvicw wi1h Dorodjatun. Lhe economic foculiy u1 1hc Unlvcrsiws Indonesia ( 17 Oc1obcr 1980.
Jakarta).
33. Prime Minis1cr Djuanda. who was oneor1he forcmos1 udvoca1csof1hc s1ubiliza1ion programme.
died la1e in 1%3.
34. Aricr 1hc takeover or power in 1965·66. Widjojo h�camc chairnrnn of Bappt•11a.• (Nu1ional
Planning Bo:ird) und Sadli became chairman or 1he Foreign lnves1mcn1 Board. Bo1h were
among Lhc weightier members or the so-called ··eerkclcy mafia··. a corps of1cchnocrnts cducalci.1
in lhc US. who in 1965·66 were prepared 10 help the mili1ary and 1hc foreign capi1alis1s. Sec:
Ransom ( 1 '170).
35. I nicrvicw. 22 Oc1obcr 1980. Jakana.
36. For u Jiscussion of 1hc different buckgrouni.ls of various company managers. see Panglaykim
( 1964).
37. Cr. I lindky ( 1%4b). Cus1ks ( 1965). 1 huvc also found a discussion wi1h Utrcch1 userul (2 October
19XO. Ams1crc.lam).
38. lnlcrvicws wi1h primary sources. Nos. 17. 19. 21. 2(>. 50, 54. 60 and 66 (Jakarta. 1980).
39. Discussion whh Huroll.I Crouch ( 1 0 Oc1obcr 1980. Mdhoumc) and Oorodja1un ( 17 Ocioher
1980. Jukurla).
40. Huuswcc.lcll ( 1973). p.11�. pointed ou1 1h:11 11ll then no one had gi,cn a good explanation. I have
not seen one since 1973 either.
41. Sec. lirs1 Rohison ( 1978) uml ( 1981 ). Crouch ( 1975) und ( 1979). Palmer ( 1978). May (1978) and
Riefl'cl anJ Wirjasupu1rn ( 1972). On 1hc qucs1ion or1hc concurrent struc1ure and sys1cm. l have
made good use of in1ervicws. di,cussions anJ corrc�ponc.lcnce with Robison. Crouch
(Melbourne. 10 October 1980; Kuala Lumpur. 4 December 1980), Siauw (Amsterdam. I and 2
Oc1ohcr 1980). U1rech1 (Ams1crdam. 2 Oc1ohcr 1980). 11.W. Arne.JI anc.l o·Mullcy (Canherra. 8
October 1980). van Langcnberg(Sidncy. 7 October 1980). Hans ROdcn (IMF) (Jakann. 15 October
1980). Sarhini (Jakarta. HI October 1980). DorodJ:llun (Jakarta. 17 October 1980). M. Luhb
(Jakarta. 20 Octohcr 1980). Mackie (Jakana. 22 October 1980). Adi Sasono (Jakar1<1. 24 Oc1obcr
1980). Mochya10 (Yogyakarta. 5 l'ovcmber 1980). K\\lk Kian Gic (Jalrnrta. 1 8 Novcmher 1980)
Hadisasastro (Jakarta. 20 Novemher 1980). P:inglaykim (Jalrnrt11. 24 No"emhcr 1980) and Akx
Alatas (Jakarta. 26 Novcmher 1980).
42. Rei•it"'' oflndo11e�io I ( 1965).
43. Rohison ( 1978). whosummariz..-s imponant pans or his 1hesi>. In uddi1ion Mortimer\ antholoi;y
( 1973) should be named as well as. e.g.. Gordon ( 1978) und Tichclman ( 1980).
44. Crouch ( 1'175) nnd ( 1979�
45. Robison ( 1978).
46. Discussion 1'11h H.W. Ame.JI (Canberra. 8 Oc1obcr 19l\O).
47. Robison ( 1978) esp. pp.2
5 and n.
48. Sec rn. 41 ahovc.
-19 Personal communication wi1h Rohison.
50. E.i;. Robison ( 1 978) esp. p.32. Sec also fn. 41 ahow.
51 Robison ( 1978). Tichelman ( 1980) pp.I 5Sff� Moriimcr ( 1 973) and Gordon ( 1978) pp.213·14.
52. Crouch (1'>75) and ( 1978). us well us discussions with Crouch. us in fn. 4 1 ahove. Cf. Tichclman
( 1 9RO) p.m.
53. Sec rn�. 41 and 43 ahove. Mortimer ( 1973) is par1icul11rly ckHr on 1hc 1heses of the c.lepcnd�ncy
school
54. Sec. C.{!.• May( 197R) Chap I 0. On lhc qucsllon ofGeneral Sumi1ro·s a11cmptcdro11pdi'•w1 in 197-1.
I have found usc:ful discussions wi1h former studcnls who were prominenl al Ilic 1ime. ln1erviews
No. 71 (Jakurtu. I9X0) and No. 38 (BandunJ!. 19�0).

184
 Ami-lmperialisr Srruggles . . .

55. Pcrhups May"s ( 1980) l_!rcatest contrihution is the analysis of how Suharto gradually out­
manoeuvred h 1sopponcnL� and convened them to his viewpoint. I would not even like to rule out
1hc possihility 1ha1 Suhano might have been prepared to accept Sukamoas prcsiJcn1 if1hc Inner
hnd 1101. 1mmcdi:11cly after 30 Septem ber 1965. tried to ride roughshod overSuhanowhen it came
to nppoiniing n new commander of the army. aod had he not tried to defend the PKI. inste;id of.
us he hud formerly done. looking for new ways of collaborating with the army but withou1 1hc
hacking of 1hc PKI. Sec fu rther. Chap. 18 below.
56. ln1crview wi1h Hans ROdcn (Jakarta. 1 5 October 19X0).
57. McF:irlnnc ( 1977) pp.456f[
58. Robison ( 1981) pp .25ff.
59. !hid.
60. lhid.
61. Sec. e.g
.
. Mackk ( 1 967) and Castles ( 1\165).
62. Sec Chup. 10 and this chapter. I um not yet prepared 10 agree with Jan-Ono Andersson !hat 1he
nation state ht1s its own logic. compnruhlc tot hat ofcupitnlism. Sec lutes! summary in Andersson
( 1981 ).Such a state logic. I muintain. ought to he related to. hu1 not mcchnnically determined hy
or typologized on. the basis of differing models or uccumulntion.
63. Cr. e.g.. Rol:>ison ( 1981) pp.251T.
64. Recently it seems to he primarily those wi1h no pcrm:1ncnt cmploymcn1 who arc p rotesting and
strikin[!. Accordinti t o n sccrc1 police report. there occurred SI wild-cat strikes in and around
Jakartu alone from April 1979-March 1980. Ahou1 25.000 worker� were involved. I ntcrvicws No.
51 and 12 (Jakar1a. 19�0) ( rcliahlc sources). Cr. a lso Stolcr ( l 97'lol and ( 1 979b).

185
1 7 . Peasant Struggles
Against the Wrong
Monopoly of Land

Mobilizing the Peasants for a Political Offensi v e

A t the turn o f the year 1959-60 President Sukarno suddenly took the
initiative and passed a land reform law. For years the communists had been
pursuing very cautious policies regarding the peasants. Now they immed­
iately tried to expand their campaign for lower land rents (40 percent of the
net harvest to the landowner and 60 percent to the share-cropper) to include
demands for a redistribution of property.1 The BTI and the PK.I devoted
considerable efforts to these problems.
During the renewed offensive against Holland for control of lrian Jaya,
the attempts to pursue radical peasant policies were set aside in favour of
campaigns for 1 .001 ways of raising production··.1 But in 1963 the
..

communists renewed their attempts. At the same time as the serious

confrontation with Malaysia broke out in September. the PKJ leadership
placed the land question very high on its agenda.3 At the central commince
meeting in December, Aidit spoke of an imminent revolutionary situation
and declared that the party should support and lead peasant activities Lo
implement che land reform laws. even if these activities bypassed the
established co-operation and consultation between communists, nation­
aJists and Muslims (Nasakom).4 In the public debate, these activities were
called aksi sepihak, unilateraJ or one-sided actions.

Villages at the Focal Point

As I have shown in Part II. the direct background to the PKI's offensive was
that the communists found themselves at an embarrassing disadvantage
since their old strategy was a blunted weapon. To be able to withstand the
pressure and emerge from this subordinate position. it was not enough for
the PKI to be in alliance with Sukarno and some of the more prominent
nationalists in Jakarta. The communists also needed to mobilize their own
forces. Even the very cautious workers· offensive of 1960-61 had led to a cul­
de-sac. The positions of the ··bureaucratic capitalists·· had not been
affected.5
With an increasingly Maoist accent Aidit hinted that even if the
bureaucratic capitalists were strong in the towns, they were weak in the

186
 Peasant Struggles . . .

villages.6 Since the first peasant conference the communists had grown in
strength among the peasants in the villages. An extensive organizational
campaign, with strong emphasis on improving political work among the
peasants. was concluded in April 1963. Now the PK.I was said to be a well­
developed mass and cadre party with 2.5 million members, while it was
claimed that the BTI organized seven million adult peasants. or 25 per cent
of the active peasant population.7
Indeed. the communists still spoke oft he need for such basic measures as
the more effective establishment of the BTl among the poor and landless
peasants. as well as the need to get rid of the rich peasants and even of
individual feudal landlords. Their ideological influence was regarded as
particularly pernicious and undesirable. But the BTl leader Asmu
emphasized at the same time that much progress had already been
made."
In addition. by passing the land reform laws, Sukarno had legitimized
efforts to pursue the peasant struggle. Even the PNl had tied itself to the
land reform laws. and the NU had at least not opposed them openly. A
communist effort to see that the laws were implemented ought not lead to
political isolation and repress1on.9
The con frontation with Malaysia and the about-turn of Sukarno in
favour of a strategy ofself-reliance finally made it possible for the PKI and
the BTI to take the offensive with vigorous activities in the rural areas. With
Sukarno backing them, the communists were able to claim that a rapidly
implemented land reform, which would induce the peasants to produce
more. was vitally important to Indonesia, so that the counrry could be self­
reliaot and emerge victorious from the conflict with the imperialists and
Malaysia.111
In this way. Aidit believed. the PKI could combine nationalism and the
class struggle in the rural areas. Thanks to nationalism the party did not
need to break with Sukarno's Nasakom policy. despite the dictates of the
class struggle. Consequemly it would also be difficult for the PNI and the
NU to withdraw from the Nasakom front even though the communists were
called one-sided.1 1
The PK.I leadership had, in my view. made another skilful manoeuvre.
Hence there existed the organizational and political preconditions for
the communists to put into practice their theory of an Indonesian peasant
struggle led by the PK!.
Their fundamental assumptions were linked Lo Lenin's theses of the
L920s; that peasants i n the underdeveloped countries bad a more or less
bourgeois interest in struggling against the feudal lords and their
benefactors. the imperialists. In the struggJe against these enemies.
cuntra<lii.:tions bc::twc::c::n th e:: pc::as<1nts themst:lvc::s were:: of s uburd inatc::
significance. Secondly, preconditions existed for an anti-feudal unity
between the peasants on the one hand and, on the other, the revolutionary
(Lenin) and later the national (Stalin) bourgeoisie.
Meanwhile, imperialism weakened the anti-feudal bourgeoisie to such

l87
Co111m1111is1 Offensfre: 1960·63 to 1965

an extent thal it could not prosecute the anli-feudal and anti-imperialist

struggle to a victorious conclusion. As it then became obvious that lhe
bourgeoisie would not be able co solve the problems of the peasants, the
workers and the communist party should be able to shoulder the task
instead, and lead lhe peasants in the struggle to finalize the anti-feudal and
anti-imperialist revolution.
When in 1963 the PKJ came to the conclusion that the national
bourgeoisie was no longer pursuing the anti-feudal struggle.'1 the leader­
ship dressed up the theoretical issues primarily in Maoist terms. with the
important exception that rhe PKI did not advocate the armed struggle. Co­
operation with the nationalists, the representatives of the so-called national
bourgeoisie, was regarded as being of less importance than the alliance
between workers and peasants.13 The peasants were regarded as being
definitely the most important revolutionary force. In the alliance between
workers and peasants the party represented (replaced?) the workers.14
The national development strategy which the communists were lighting
for was now characterized by ideas of self-reliance rather than of non­
capitalist development. Hence peasant mobilization and land reform
became the fundamental recipe, even when it came to breaking out from
underdevelopment and to stimulating the economy.15
Finally, the communists produced a primarily Maoist analysis of the
classes in the rural areas. The leadership of the PKJ and the BTI made
strenuous efforts to produce and disseminate statistics and qualitative
studies which indicated that there was a considerable concentration ofland
in the hands of a small group of feudal landlords. while the vast majority
owned no land at all, or else so little that it did not suffice co support their
families'� - i.e. the landless and the poor peasants. Despite the political
importance of the middle peasants. the PKI, like Mao. played down their
importance and instead stubbornly emphasized bow important it was to
root the peasants· struggle amongst the landless and the poor peasants.'7
Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo used. for instance, to maintain. and the
communists used to quote him, tliat 60 per cent ofJava's and Bali"s peasant
families were landless and that 42 per cent of the arable land on Lombok
was owned by one frunily.18
As I pointed out in Chapter 12, the PKI started doing its own research
soon after the lirst peasants· conference in 1959. The following year BTI
chairman Asmu presented the results of 2 1 village studies. These showed
that a very small number offeudal landlords (seldom more than 10 percent
of the households) owned considerably more than half the land in these
villages.19
The party·s research was intensified during 1 963-64 to test, and if possible
confirm, the assumptions of land concentration and class structure which
the party and the BTI had made.20 Not unexpectedly, the studies - or at
least those that were published - unambiguously pointed to a very intense
concentration of land.11
First, the figures showed that those who maintained that the majority of

188
 Peasam Struggles . . .

peasants had lit11c land. but that very few had a lot of land. were wrong. Not
even in the villages where communal land ownership had untiJ quite
recently dominated did this hold. said Aidit. The feudal landlords did
indeed often appear to own only a linle land. perhaps only three or four
hectares. but surely they owned land in a number ofvillages and controlled
land which others formally owned. In consequence. there really were feuda I
landlords to be found who must be combated.22
Secondly. the figures showed that the concentration of land was so
significant that the landless and the poor. as well as the middle peasants.
must rationally have common interests vis-a-vis the landlords who
concentrated that land. By mobilizing these peasants. the PKI could
mobilize some 90 per cent of the village population against isolated feudal
landlords. Rich farmers would remain neutral. on condition that they were
not provoked.?
3
The communists identified seven so-called village devils: ··wicked
landlords. blood-sucking money-lenders. the ijon dealers !see Appendix III
wicked middle-men. bureaucratic capitalists. wicked authorities and village
bandits.''24 The figures indicated, in the third place. that all these devils were
more or less based on the feudal landlords' land.
According to the PKl and the BT!, a consistent anti-feudal land refom1
ought therefore to be directed by the slogan ''(free) land to those that till it".
All share-cropping would thus be forbidden.
When the Indonesian land reform laws were being debated in 1960, the
devout Muslims were amongst the first to protest. They said that to limit the
amount of land one person could possess was against Islamic law. In
addition. Sukarno pointed oul lhat a large number of under-paid civil
servants, who lived partly off the interest of their land. would be forced lo
return to their villages if the only ones allowed to own land were those that
tilled it.25
The compromise was based on fixing the maximum land a family might
own. including land which had been taken in pledge (gadai) or leased
(sewa). In the most densely populated areas. with rice cultivation in the
paddy fields, the upper limit was. for instance. five hectares. while the ideal
minimum was two hectares. This wasjudged to be the minimum necessary
for the survival of a family. In this way it was indicated th al those who still
had less than two hectares after the reform ought lo look for another job in
the expanding national economy, or else move elsewhere.J6
Landowners who did not live in the village. i.e. absentee landlords.
should give up their possessions. but exceptions were made for civil
servants. among others.
The property of religious organizations was also exempted from the
reform.
It was. however. prescribed that land which had been mortgaged for
seven years or more ought to be returned to the original owner. whose debt
ought after so many years. to be regarded as paid.
In addition. the land was not distributed free, but should be paid for, at a

L89
Communi.w O.Jfe11sfre: 1960-63 ro 1965

low rate of interest. over a period of 1 5 yea rs. Spiralling in nation lightened
these burdens.
Finally. share-cropping was retained. But now a law prescribed lhat the
net harvest should be equally divided between tiller and owner.
l n addition to the land which was to be redistributed. the laws also
referred to the redistribution of state-owned land. which was often land lhat
had previously been leased for plantation cultivation. and ofland underthe
jurisdiction of rajas and sultons. 21
I have outlined only the most important parts of the land reform laws.
They deviated from the communist view that the land should be
redistributed. without cost. to those that tilled it. But. on the other hand. the
laws did confirm the PKrs thesis that the national bourgeoisie was unable
to conclude the struggle against feudalism.
Thus the PKI, both in 1960 and in 1963. regarded land reforms as an
important first step. The leaders did indeed point out that the upper limit
(five hectares) was far too high. as many feudal landlords had less land. e.g.
in the area around Klaren in Central Java. In addition. the ideal lower limit
(two hectares) might make the poor and middle peasants unsure of their
position: would they forfeit their land if they did not have as much as two
hectares. And surely 60:40 was a more reasonable division of the net harvest
between tiller and owner than the 50:50 division stipulated by the law on
share-cropping. Bue despite this and similar criticisms directed against the
compromise. the communists accepted the laws and worked hard to
implement them.18
The actempt by the communists in 1963 to take the offensive by
combining nationalism and the class struggle did not. however. merely
concern the implementation of the land reforms within the pale of the law.
The PKJ and BTI also encouraged the retention of 60 per cent of the net
harvest, if the landlord refused to accept an equal division of the harvest as
the law prescribed.29 And. more important. the communists started an
intensive propaganda campaign to demand that the land be given free of
charge to the tiller..1-0
Perhaps the PKl wanted to show itself as being more radical than the
PNI. which in 1960 almost took the initiative away from the PKI when
Sukarno suddenly raised the question of land reform.31 But. more
important. the propaganda exercise was intended to raise the class
consciousness of the poor and landless peasants. in particular. as well as to
mobilize them Lo continue the struggle. The theoretical and strategic models
declared that it was up to the communists lo lead the peasants when it was
evident that the bourgeoisie did not have the capability of concluding the
anti-feudal struggle.n
Massive demands and demonstrations for a more radical land reform
would assist the PKI also to out-manoeuvre the opposition. force a Nc1srrkom
cabinet to Lake over and. from that platfom1, to pursue considerably more
revolutionary land reform policies. among other things.

190
 Peasani Srn1ggles . . .

The Land Reform: A Blunted Weapon

Progress
Towards the end of the fifties and during the early sixties the communists
mobilized and organized the peasants without breaking with the estab­
lished local leadership - the village leaders, religious leaders, local state
''bailiffs'· (pamong praja) and others.
Among the major successes of the new offensive was that the PKI and
BTI started to come to terms with some of these contradictions. By
beginning to combine nationalism with the class struggle. and by directing
unilateral peasant action to implement an officially-sanctioned land
reform, the communists were increasingly able to distance themselves from
the traditional leaders, whose authority was called into question even by the
centrally imposed and directed laws on agriculture.33
The BTI and PKI created their own alternative channels at the village
level and right up to Jakarta. The communists simply took the step ofopenly
offering an alternative to the political and economic patronage of the
establishment.34 This consciousness raised contradictions which at least to
some degree bore clear class characteristics.35 Now the poor and landless
peasants were often aligned against major landowners and others in the
upper echelons of the rural community - not always successfully, but that
is another matter.
The very fact that the PKI succeeded in developing and actively applying
a n offensive strategy of class struggle without sparking off massive
repression, only a few years after the situation had seemed to be one of total
deadlock, was a remarkable step forward, the importance of which cannot
be over-emphasized today, now we have the benefit of hindsight and most
of us, including myself. are concerned with what went wrong.
The PKI and BTI also developed as active organizations in the struggle.
And their analysis was clarified. In addition consciousness of conditions in
the rural areas rapidly increased. The radicals in the party who were
devoted to action became more important. (In the agrarian context they
were often linked to Ismail Bakri.) Studies of class structure in the rural
areas were on the verge ofproducing analyses which might have provided a
basis for a .less rigid strategy. Aidit, however, kept an eagle eye on the party's
interpretations and on what could be published openly.36
All this occurred without threatening the unity between the Nasakom
front and the almighty father of the nation, Sukarno. On the contrary, the
PKJ was able to point out that, as early as his Independence Day speech on
1 7 August 1960, he had indicated that the objective must be a land reform
law in which the land went to those that tilled it.37 And when conn icts broke
out over the unilateral actions of 1964. the president showed understanding
for the position of the peasants.38
I shall shortly show that the land reform. such as it was, was a fiasco. But
that it began to be implemented, that land-reform commjttees started work.
that the registration of land at least began to be supervised. even if only to a

191
Commu11s1
i Offensive: 1960·63 10 1965

limiced degree, thal agreements on share-cropping were improved to some

extent, and that at least a rew hundred thousand of the roughly three million
Landless families on Java and Bali were allotted land, was, in the first place,
due to the work of the communists.

Problems: The Land that Vanished

Problems of strategy were, however, to dominate. As I have shown. Lhe
communists had counted upon the "feudal landlords", a large number or
state administrators, local "bailiffs" (pamongpraja), and perhaps also those
who had or represented national bourgeois interests, sabotaging the land
reforms at their inception. In addition. this had proved to be the rule with
other land reforms in South and South-East Asia. The PK.I and the BTI
were prepared to respond with exposes oractual land holdings and vigorous
action to defend the legal rights of the poor and landless peasants: alJ with
the backing of Sukarno's authority and in the name ofLhe national interest
ff it were correct that land was concentrated in the hands ofa small number
of feudal lords, these would hardly be able to escape critical review. even i f
the administration o fthe land reforms was i n their hands. A landlord. even
a small one. could not entirely conceal all his property or abandon it
without losing power.
But it was not such a simple task Lo expose and reveal large property
holdings. And there were other loopholes which were more difficult to close
than the communists had expected. Quite contrary to the PK.rs assump­
tions, it was as though the landowners were able co spiric away a large part of
their land holdings without losing any of their power.
When the land-reform commitlces. which had been appointed from
above.39 finalJy started work i n Seplember 1962.w they worked badly.
Registration of "surplus land'" was often bungled. There was no reliable
register of land ownership on which Lo build.41 During Dutch colonial rule.
the peasants had tried to evade correcl registraLion of their properties, as
Landowners were heavily taxed.41 Village leaders and their assislants were
Lhe only ones with any real knowledge of which land was owned by whom.
and particularly of which land had been mortgaged (gadai) or rented
(sewa).�J (The law indicated that gadai and sewa should be included when
registering actual land holdings.44) But village headmen were particularly
liable to commit perjury. The law did not aITecl Lhe land owned by the
village and the significant areas ofvery fertile land which were reserved for
village headmen and their assistants, the tanah bengkok. Village leaders also
had private land interests and loaned out money. etc.45
Moreover it was only landlords with "surplus land" who were liable LO
declare their land holdings. The oLhers were exempt, and the committees
only checked the declarations which were submitted:16
If anyone made a complainl. the lords had considerable opportunity to
delay the lodging of all replies, for example on questions of rent and debt
arrangements. as well as rights of inheritance. The settlement of disputes lay
noc wilh the village headmen. but also with the committees al an infinite

192
 Peasant Srmggles . . .

number of levels, as well as with the overworked courts.47

FinaUy. the large landowners were able to circumvent tbe Jaw. They were
able to donate land to religious institutions, usually Islamic,48 but also
Catholic,49 whose land holdings were exempt from the law. They assigned
land to relatives and friends.50 They gave notice to inconvenient share­
croppers who in the first instance would have been given the surplus land of
the landlords, and replaced them with intimates, who were given the formal
land rights instead.51 What were tbe consequences?
The government in 1961 estimated that there were about 600,000 hectares
of state and principality land to distribute as weJJ as about 400,000 hectares
of"surplus" feudal land to redistribute.52 Keeping i n mind all the loopholes,
these figures should be more reliable than information reported
subsequently.
By 1963 the 600,000 hectares was reduced to 287,000. (Only 25 per cent of
principality land remained.) About half of this land was to be found in
"Area l ", in Java. Madura, Bali and Lombok. where the Land reform was to
be implemented first.53
Of greater interest is, however, the 400,000 hectares which was to have
been redistributed from the feudal lords to the poor and landless. In 1961
the government announced that there was 1 78,000 hectares of surplus land
in Java, Madura. Bali and Lombok. Shortly afterwards the lords declared
that they had a "surplus" of only 92,000 hectares. just over half the
government figure. Later the land reform committees reduced the lords'
figure to 73.700.54
Even less land was actually distributed. Official figures in 1963 revealed
that only about 120,300 hectares of state and principality land and 40,700
hectares of"surplus" land had been distributed in Java, Madura, Bali and
Lombok.55
Ladejinsky, a consultant from the Ford Foundation, who had been
specially brought in by the Minister of Agriculture, Sadjarwo. said that by
the end of 1963 only 128,000 families on Java had benefited by receiving
land in either category, and that the best forecast was a total of 248,000
farnilies.56 With a n average family size of seven persons, the best that could
be hoped for would thus be that 2.7 per cent of the 65 million inhabitants of
Java at that time would benefit; or a little more than eight per cent of the
three million landless peasant families in Java.57
On Independence Day on 1 7 August 1964 Sukarno did, however, speak
up for the poor and landless peasants.58 Some land-reform courts were set
up, the communists stepped up their unilateral actions, and it seemed
possible that more land would be found to distribute.
In January 1965 Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo maintained that in
Java. Madura, Bali and Lombok there were actually about 337,000 hectares
ofland to distribute.59This was at least 70 percent of the figure which he had
given in 1961 and, in addition. some 100,000 hectares more than the area
that was supposed to have been available a year earlier. In addition he
maintained that about 296,000 hectares had been distributed, nearly twice
the amount claimed the previous year.
193
Communist Offensive: 1960-63 to 1965

Hence, according to Sadjarwo, the land reform bad on the whole been
implemented in Area I. Sukarno bad been given the somewhat tighter
policy and figures be had demanded.60 Whether or not they were accurate is
an open question. The PIG protested vigorously. for example regarding
eastern Java. And in November J 964 some BTI leaders told Rex Mortimer
that no more than 57 percent of the land that the authorities had said could
be distributed or redistributed within Area l bad in fact been parcelled out.
They added that if one took cognizance of the acts of deception (mainly
distribution to intimates). the figure 9-10 per cent would be more
realistic.61
But i f we keep to the official figures which [ have cited, the conclusion
would be that only between 45 and 70 per cent of the land which the
government had said could be distributed was registered, and that at most
35-60 per cent of the 1961 estimate was distributed or redistributed.
That land could to this extent be spirited away indicates a lack ofvalidity
in the PKI's analyses and theses about a marked concentration of land.
Attempts to conceal land ownership are part of the common-place realities
of life in South and South-East Asia. But the conditions in Java, and the
degree of deception. were extraordinary. The land of the "feudal landlords"
was clearly not so concentrated that they could not use their political and
administrative powers, as well as a number of loopholes. to conceal a good
deal or their land. And their power was not based on such relatively large
land holdings that they could not, in their own interests, dispose of their
own direct control of portions of it, presumably secure in the knowledge that
they would be able to maintain their positions ofpower in other ways, which
the PKT was unable to analyse.

Splits among the Peasants

The Central Committee meeting of December 1963 became the launchi.ng­
pad for the communist rural offensive. The PIG and the BTI were to
mobilize peasants to participate in mass actions, involving 90 percent of the
villagers, in defence of the poor and landless peasants' rights in accordance
with the land reform laws. Distinctions between feudal landlords, rich
peasants, middle peasants and others were not too important. The enemy
was, quite simply, everyone who either had land which, according to the
law, could be redistributed or kept share-croppers who were given too small
a share of the harvest, as well as those who backed up these so-called
landlords. The rest could either remain neutral or join in the struggle for
reform.62
Right from the beginning the communists' activities were unilateral, in
the sense that the PK.I and the BTI took the side ofthe poor and the landless,
as well as giving them the benelit of the doubt in relation to those village
overlords who were among the nationalists and Muslims whom Sukarno
had tried to unite with the communists in his Nasakom front. But the
communists <lid not want to do anything to break the law. On the contrary,
they were out to see that the law would be observed. There are strong

194
 Peasant Stmggles . . .

indications that many communist leaders were convinced that they were
protected from the outbreak of severe confrontation and naked violence
because they stressed mass actions to isolate feudal landlords and could
rely upon the land reform laws, which, according to Sukarno. were
necessary in the nationalist and anti-imp�rialist struggle.63
The kinds of actions that were officially backed by the PKI and the BTJ
included the supervision of land registration. the exposure of false
information. the encouragement of the poor and landless to demand their
rights according to the law and a commitment to their protection. In the first
place demonstrations. petitions and deputations were organized, for
example when a share-cropper was sent away so that he would not acquire
rights over the land. if and when it was redistributed.64 To the extent that
forceful measures were adopted, they concerned, for instance, support for
those who were legally entitled to a specific piece of land, by ensuring that
they would be able to till it even if the lord delayed bis decision or forbade
them from using i1.6s
In addition. the PKI and the BTI encouraged share-croppers to keep 60
per cent of the harvest. and divide the rest equally between the state and the
landowner. until the landlord agreed to obey the provisions of the law.
which prescribed an equal division of the net harvest. And the share­
croppers on land which was to be redistributed did not need to deliver any
land rent at all to the feudal lords. in anticipation of the implementation of
their legal right to the land they were tilling.66
Even ifthe PK.I's and the BTfs actions were aggressive when compared lo
the particularly cautious politics of the fifties in the villages, they were
nevertheless relatively innocent and directed at defending or implementing
the land reform laws.67
But, in addition. the communists conducted a conscious propaganda
campaign for a land reform whose provisions would be more far-reaching
than the current laws. At meetings like the one which Politburo member
Nj oto addressed al Klaten, in Central Java. in April 1964. the foremost
slogan was "Land to the ti!Jer ..68
.

At the same time the communists aired their criticism that the upper limit
for land ownership, even in the heavily populated rice-paddy regions. had
been set as high as five hectares. The communists· studies showed that
many who owned much less were often rich and powerful. They did not
need to own more than perhaps two hectares.69
The PK.I's campaigns usually made a great impact. Its slogan was
probably better known to the poor and the landless than the current
regulations of the land reform laws. which. in addition, were very
complicated. Knowledge of the decrees from Jakarta was limited in the
villages, where many were illiterate.70
As I understand it, the communists' propaganda campaign for a more
radical land refonn reached the villages at about the same time as more and
more people became aware of the loopholes in the current laws. and that
there was not much land being registered which was due for redistribution
and that even less was actually being parcelled out.
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Commu11is1 Q_ffensive: 1960-63 10 1965

Tbe PKJ's seven "village devils·· perched unthreatened on their nests.

What is more. the PKT and the BT!. with their petitions. demonstrations and
other quite innocent acts. had not succeeded in improving things very
much.71 At the same time, the late rice harvest of 1963 on Java was very poor
because of the worst drought and the worst invasion of rats in living
memory. In February 1964 it was reported that more than a million people
on Java were starving. and many bad died.72
What l am trying to indicate is that the combination of. on the one hand,
starvation. a land reform which bad run aground and not appreciably
benefited the poor and tbe landless, and actions which did not lead to
concrete results, and. on the other hand, an efficient propaganda campaign
for a considerably more radical land reform policy - all this opened the
way for tough action.
This action legitimized the opposition's epithet "unilateral actions" (aksi
sepihak). I n answer to the sabotage oftbe land reform, the poor and landless
peasants took their own initiatives, overstepping the limits of the law, and
tried partly to implement the law by taking i t into their own hands and
partly to force through the kind of radical land reform advocated by the
communists. but which the communists did not encomage people to pursue
by means of concrete action.
A reliable source centrally-placed during the peasant offensive relates:

. . . Aksisepihak. yes. our opponent called all our actions that Butwe followed the law . . .
just saw to it Lhal the lan d lords followed the Jaw . . . No, I have sitid that we did not
occupy any land . . . Yes. there were difficulties involved in propagating "land to those
that till it'' and trying to follow the law at the same time. Tough action developed from
below. We supported il but mainly by going to the authorities to try to rind a solution . . .
The tough action gew r ever more common. Disputes arose. We tried to rind ways of
resolving them. it was difficult lo follow them consistently. Our opponents kept
accusing us of leading the connicts. Even if BT! m embesr were involved in them. the
BTl did not lead them and could not therefore be held responsible . . . They demanded
better contracts for share-croppers. village land, state-owned land. land from the
feudal landlords . . . They had been working there so long that they thought ofthe land
as theirown . . . and didn't give a damn if there was an upper limit of rive hectares. The
land should go to those that tilled it. And they could not understand the law about a
minimum of two hectares. when most people who owned land had hardly half a
hecta re . . . If the upper limit was rive hectares there would be hardly any land to
redistribute . . . Thus they demanded land even from those who had less than live
ilecta res . . . 73

During the second and third quarters of 1964 several "tough actions" were
reported in Central Java, especially i n and around the Yogyakarta­
Boyolali-Solo triangle, the centre being i n Klateo. Soon tbese actions
started spreading. In June and July there were frequent reports of .
confrontation often with acts of violence. in East Java.74
I n June these confrontations were the major natio.oal question. The
waves of debate between the PKT and the PNI reached new heights in
Jakarta, that is, within the Nasakom front itself. On 13 June Minister of
Agriculture Sadjarwo joined the very conservative leaders of the PNI in

196
 Peasam Struggles . . .

CenLral Java and banned the activities of the peasants. Acting President
Leimena also condemned them on 15 June.75
The PKJ replied Lhal the peasants were only defending themselves
against those who were trying to sabotage the land reform. The PKJ
gathered the support of differenl peasanl leaders. nol only communists. Al
the nalional conference of the party in early July. Politburo member
Lukman declared impudently that it was more important to support the
peasants and maintain the alliance with them than at all costs to retain the
united front with the so-called national bourgeoisie.76
On 1 1 - 1 2 July Sukarno calJed a speciaJ meeting in Bogar of the Supreme
Advisory Council to discuss the connicts. Poor and landless peasants were
disregarding the upper limit of five hectares. I n the rural areas rumours
circulated that, on the contrary. the upper limit was two hectares.
As has already been mentioned. Sukarno had greater understanding of
the peasants' situation than Leimena. But. according to Ernst Utrecht who
.
was a member of the advisory council. Sukarno asked. . Who has told the
peasants that the upper limit should be two hectares?'" Delegates from the
BTI and the PKJ replied. "Not us. Maybe it happens locally. I t could be a
provocation from Masjumi.·· Sukarno replied irritably. "Whal do you
mean? Don't you control your organizations?"77
Apparently, however, this was what the communisls did not do. Now.
indeed. the entire national press was forbidden to report on the rural
confrontations. But, particularly in East Java. the conflicts only grew
worse.78
The lack of reliable reports makes iL difficult to analyse these
confrontations more closcly.79 To a great extent the actions of the peasants
were a desperate answer to the lords' attempt to block any possibility of the
legal implementation of the land reform. The peasants had simply taken the
law inLo their own hands in order to implement the reform. Here are a few
typical cases:
• A landowner with "surplus'' land drives off a share-cropper to avoid
giving the land to him. The share•cropper and the BTl protest. but nothing
happens. The "law·· is on the side of the landlord, at least locally. The share­
cropper then refuses to pay land rent. and the conflict intensifies. When he
is evicted. the BTI is mobilized and the share-cropper occupies the land he
has been tilling. Theo the landlord mobilizes his supporters, including the
police. and a violent conflict ensues.
• Another case may concern mortgaged land. Peasants lay claim to land
which they maintain their families mortgaged. According Lo the law, land
mortgaged for more than seven years should now be retu rned to the
peasanL Of course the landlord protests and procrastinates, perhaps
mobilizing the village headman. There is no way in which the peasant can
prove he is in the right. Instead. supported by his fellows, he occupies the
land.
• But the peasants can go further. When there is no "surplus" land to speak
of, the peasants take the initiative and demand Lhat land is redistributed

197
Co111m1111ist Offensive: 1960-61 ro 1965

even when the landowner has less than the stipulated five hectares. They
challenge the village leaders by beginning to cultivate village land. by
deciding whether lhe village headmen have any surplus land of their own.
and by adding the landowner's privare land holdings to that part of the land
belonging to the village which he bas at his disposaJ instead of a cash wage
(tanah bengkok).
• In addition. many peasants refuse to follow the Jaw when it prescribes
what low-paid cash crops (sugar) they should cultivate for a company. The
peasants instead demand that the price should be based on the value of the
rice harvest which they could have sold ifthey had cultivated rice instead of
sugar.
• And on the plantations. the squatters continue their occupations.

Peasant Against Peasant

But confrontation often led to splits between the peasants. For less than 90
per cent of the villagers were involved in mass actions to isolate the feudal
landlords, which was what the communists had counted on and worked
for.
Poor and landless peasants disputed who should have the right to the few
pieces of land which could be redistributed. And a poor share-cropper
might well be working on land which was mortgaged. while a poor peasant
laid claim to it as land which should be returned to him. And so on.
When the militant peasants tried to carry out the slogan "land to the
tiller", many landowners with far less than live hectares were rhreatened.
And a considerable number of petty farmers, not only the feudal landlords.
had share-croppers. A t the same time the farmers themselves might be
share-croppers on someone else's land. (If the slogan had been strictly
followed in Klaten, each family would have received a maximum of a few
thousand square metres of land.)
Many poor and landless peasants clearly chose to seek protection, not in
a class collective, but from their patrons and their political as well as
religious organizations. In East Java the devoted Muslims rapidly
succeeded in depriving the confrontations of their class character, and
turned them instead inro a question for or against Islam. It was more
important to many peasants to combat the ..ungodly communists" than
their "seven village devils". And in most places the political organizations,
with their own peasant and youth organizations, pitted peasant against
peasant. Worst of all, the PNJ and the N U now worked together against the
PKI. And even the PKI and the BTI sometimes favoured their own
members in the first place, irrespective of whether they were large
landowners or landless peasants.
The communists bad not expected these violent confrontations in the
ruraJ areas, or the splits that developed between the peasants. To tackle
these problems, among others, the PKJ held a national conference i n July
1964, at which Aidjt talked of the importance of the PKT and the BTI
working with greater discipline. I n a number of villages the cadres had

198
 Peasa111 Stmgg/es . . .

become unreliable. They did not follow party rules and regulations and
refrained from implementing decisions taken by the leadership oflhe PKI
and the BTL Aidit said that he had seen this himselfearlier in the year when
he led the party's research projects in the villages.ro
The communists talked openly about these organizational problems.
But. conflicts on the other hand. between the cadres in the central
committee were hushed up. A group of radicals accused Aid it of stopping
mass actions amongst the peasants. according to one of the members of this
group:

. . . Aidit placed such severe restrictions on action that it was in practice prohibited . . .
He was not only critical of Ismail Bakri Ithe radical peasant expert on the central
commiueel. whom Aidit had made chairman in West Java to get rid of him from
Jakarta. Even Asmu (the BTI chairmanI had to hear that the unilutcral actions, which
he had backed. were destructive . . .
. No one defended Aidit directly. Instead. he himselfsaid several times: "Without me
the Central Committee might be belier:· But we did not have an alternative policy
ready to put forward. And Sudisman. who led the session. exhorted us to remain
united. So the problems were never solved . . . 81

The communists hesitated and did not follow a clear line. A reliable source
reveals that though no one stopped those members who participated in
confrontations. neither was any decisive attempt made to step i n and lead
them properly.82
During the latter part of 1964. Aidit repeatedly emphasized the
importance of safeguarding the Nasakom front. Tbe view that the priority
was to back up the peasants had become out of date.83
In November 1964 the BTl in EastJava admilled that there was chaos in
the villages. Needless to say, the counter-revolutionaries were blamed.84
Al the beginning of December, even Aidit admitted that their opponents
had succeeded in splitting the peasants. At the same time, Lukman declared
on the anniversary of the BTI that everything must be done to avoid
connicts between the peasants. In East Java, Asmu declared that terror
should not be met with terror, but with mass actions.85
Serious armed conflict outside Boyolali in Central Java led. al the
beginning of December. to three peasants being shot dead by police.86
On 12 December Sukarno called all the political parties to his Bogar
Palace to discuss the ever more serious peasant conflicts. I n the so-called
Bogor Declaration the parties once again pledged themselves to give first
priority toNasakom unity. to try to solve problems through negotiation and
at all costs to ensure that unity be safeguarded.R7
The PKI and the BTI tried to take the chance to make an ordered retreat.
But especially in East Java. their opponents were on "the offensive and the
communists had great difficulty in defending themselves against fanatic
Muslims.
During February and March 1965 the violence seems to have reached a
zenith. The religious overtones were now so obvious in East Java that the

199
Com1111111is1 Offensive: 1960-63 to 1965

PNI qualified its support for the NU in the struggle against the PK.I. The
NV's youth organization. Ansor. took the lead, with statements such as the
following:

. . . ir the government permits people to trample on the Koran, Ansor will crush them
itself: without belief in God. people will become crueller thnn rats.�8

As late as August. continued conflicts were reported, in both Central and

East Java.89
The communists had suffered an important defeat. but had not Jost the
battle. Al the national level in Jakarta. the failures were not so marked. But
in April 1 965 the PKl did not succeed i n mobilizing the customary millions
..
to participate in a spectacular "long march from East Java to Jakarta,
where the party was to celebrate its 45th anniversary in May.90
The fourth central committee meeting since the special congress of 1962
was also held in May. Aid it defended the communists· support of unilateral
action in support of the land refonns. There had been some successes.
Nevertheless, he admitted that in some places the feudal landlords had
managed to mobilize "'counter-revolutionary mass actions". The reason for
this. said Aidit, was that some party cadres had made mistakes. Io some
places BTJ cadres had not followed on "small-scale actions''. Nor had they
madt: sufficient preparations to gather the necessary 90 per cent of the
villagers behind them:

In several places. BT! cadres. carried away by their desire to spread the peasant actions
immediately. became impatient. indulged in individual heroism. were insufficiently
.
concerned with developing the consciousness of the peasants. and. wanting a . definite
..
event , were not careful enough in differentiating and choosing tbeir targets.

What was now vital was to safeguard national unity. The peasant actions
should be co-ordinated together with the land reform committees and
Sukarno's national front.�1
That leading communists themselves had incited local activists by
exhorting them to take the offensive and to give priority to campaigns for a
more radical land reform than the .current one was, or course, forgotten i n
t h e attempt t o place t h e blame o n those peasants who had taken u p the
light.
That the peasants were split. that the class struggle which was initiated
often degenerated into violent conflict between the peasants themselves,
..
that the ··seven village devils could split them along political. religious or
other vertical lines - all this indicates that there were faults in the
communists' analyses. The concentration ortand was not so unambiguous.
and the polarization not so clear. that a few feudal landlords could be
isolated by a huge mass of peasants who had similar interests in the land
reform question.

200
 Peasant Stmggles . . .

Problems of Analysis

There are thus clear contradictions between the PK.rs analyses on the one
hand and the actual developments on the other.
• The land of the feudal landlords was not so concentrated that many
could not hide a considerable part of it. They could even relinquish a part of
their direct control without jeopardizing their positions of power.
• The peasants were split and the class struggle often degenerated into
violent conflict between the peasants themselves. There was not sufficient
concentration of the land for the peasants to be able to unite on questions of
land reform and isolate a few feudal landlords.
Consequently, the strategic problems ought at least in part. to result from
inaccurate analyses by the communists which mistakenly showed a strong
concentration of land.
Could the communists have produced better analyses without changing
their theoretical perspective? First the leaders knew perfectly well that the
land in the heavily-populated rice-paddy areas would not suffice for all the
peasants. even ifall the land were redistributed equally to the tillers, not just
..
a certain amount of "surplus land.92 Before the Aid it group had assumed
the leadership this was, in fact, one of the reasons for demanding
communal and state-owned land instead of private ownership.93
But Aid it and the other communists held the opinion that if there were
feudal landlords who owned considerable land. then their land had to be
redistributed. even if it would not suffice for all the poor and landless. This
was the only way to crush the feudal landlords and their paralysing power.
And the poor and landless peasants had a bourgeois interest in their own
pieces of land. Only when they discovered that the pieces of land were too
small could they make the transition to the struggle for collective
solutions.94
Secondly. as early as 1952. Boeke. a "bourgeois" but very authoritative
researcher of considerable personal integrity, had shown that those
exploiters who were perhaps the most important ones in the villages - the
middle-men. usurers. etc. - would not necessarily be particularly hard hit
by a land reform aimed at feudal landlords who owned sizeable properties.
(This may also provide a partial explanation of why it was so easy for the
overlords in the villages to conceal their land holdings and avoid the
consequences of the land reform. This was exactly what Boeke cautioned
againsL)95
BuL according to current Marxism. the root of exploitation lay in the
ownership of land. in the control over the means of production. which was
why usury. etc. must be regarded as the result ofcertain people owning large
amounts ofland and others none at au. In a famous field study. H. ten Dam
showed in the mid-fifties that exploitation did have its roots in land
ownership.%
In the third place. Geertz. among others. had by the late fifties laid down
his theses. which I have discussed above.97 Lhat there were no distinct classes

201
Communist Offensive: 1960-63 to 1965

o f peasants. that there was no significant concentration of land, and that

tradition, as well as colonialism. forced the peasants to share both jobs and
surp.lus, i.e. poverty. Lacking clear classes and, to a greater degree, lacking
class consciousness, the villagers were vertically split on the basis of
religion, pre-colonial modes of production and trade, and the stmtri and
abangan.
Rex Mortimer, Ruth McVey and Fritjof Tichelman and others have, in
more or less developed forms, used the theses on the lack of distinct classes,
and on the conflicts between the sanrri and abangan. to explain the general
failure of the PKI and particularly the splits among the peasants.98
Others, such as Ernst Utrecht and at times Wertheim. are hesitanc about
accepting that it is only the difference between the santris and abangan
which split the peasants, and give some weight to strong patron-client
relationships, which had long been obvious. Hence they do not exclude a
definite class structure, but indicate that it manifests itself in a special way
- exactly how is unclear - which breeds patron-client relationships.99
In principle. at any rate, it was possible for the communists to discount
Geertz's theses by putting forward the type of factual criticism of the kind I
have already outlined in Chapter 12: his work involved only one case study
in one area at one particular time which ignored the landless and the work
done in addition to petty farming.
Even more important for the communists must have been the fact that
Geertz's picture, showing small class differences and relative egalitarianism
in the villages. corresponded neither with the personal experiences of many
of the politically active, nor with the research results of the party itself, nor
with the conclusions of many other researchers busy in the late fifties and
early sixties. •OO
It was more difficult for the communists to tackle patron-client
relationships. I have the distinct impression that some of those who had
responsibility for the party's research tried in vain to convince Aidit that the
PK.I and the BTI ought to pay more attention to the ties between the patrons
and the clients. At the same time, however. the communists were faced with
the task of simply and pedagogically showing cadres and peasants that
there were feudal landlords, and that the peasants could and should unite in
the struggle against them. Every nuance wbkh contradicted that basic
picture was presumably offending.i01 And even if the thesis on patron-client
relations is an empirical generalization without a proper theoretical
basis.102 nevertheless a considerably more complicated class structure is
implied, and a less unambiguous land concentration tlrnn that broadcast by
the PKI and BTI.
Without changing their theoretical points of departure, the communists
mjght thus have had difficulties in imprnving their analyses without
denying the existence either of a monopoly on land or of powerful
oppressors in the niral areas, while nevertheless taking note of the lack of
land, of the important figures who had no explicit control over land. of the
fact that classes were not as distinct. nor the land as concentrated as it had

202
 Peasant Struggles . . .

been in Russia and China, the countries in which the communist theories
had originated even though the pattern was complicated there as well. as
well as. finally, laking into account and giving theoretical backbone to the
patron-client relationship.

On Monopoly and Method

What is il. then, that is missing from the party's theories of land monopoly
and the agrarian class structure? One fruitful way of at least beginning to
attack the question is, I believe, to take into consideration that a monopoly
of land may not only be caused by land concentration, but also by the
centralization of the surplus produced.
To the best of my knowledge. this is not done in studies of land
monopolies. These investigations usually depart from institutionalized
relations of production. One possible exception, the only one 1 know of, is
Goran Djurfeldts and Staffan Lindberg's anempts to undertake a class
analysis of an Indian village by. roughly speaking, following the surplus,
and. among other things. seeing how it is produced and how it is
appropriated.103 1 have not tried to utilize their method, which would not
have been possible at my general level of analysis and due to Jack of tenable
data, but I have, perhaps. been inspired by their way of tackling the
problem.
It ought to be possible to talk ofland concentration when some few farms
become ever larger since the majority of the peasants become landless. The
feudal landlord bases his power on interest received from his large land
holdings.
An ideal picture could perhaps be drawn from the manors of the late
feudal period in Europe. The most important factor, however, is not the
absolute size of the estate, nor yet that the fields are concentrated. but that.
in relation to other land holdings, the manor is very large. and that the large
size results from the fact the majority of peasants have lost much of their
land.
When the surplus from the land is centralized, on the other hand. the
land is split up among different tilling units with more or less formally
independent peasants, despite the feudal landlords (or whatever they are to
be called) having a de facto monopoly on land. This centralization of
surplus is based on the small units not having sufficient economic liquidity
to be able to preserve the independence of their tillers. Instead a small
number of patrons are able to acquire indirect control over the petty farmer
(clients) without owning and often without even having the tiny pieces of
land at their disposal. In this case the power of the lords is not based on
interest from their own large properties, but on being able to expropriate
parts of the surplus which can be produced on formally independent units
of land by the petty farmers.
While the first type of feudal landlord stands or falls by whether he owns
or directly controls large land holdings, the second type is based upon the
fact that many peasants have land that is too small.

203
Communist Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

If the concentration of land into manors and estates is a phenomenon of

late feudalism. perhaps one can say that chere were traces of centralization
in early European feudalism, and. of course, in the Asiatic mode of
production. The landlords (the state). without owning or controlling land
direcUy. dominated the petty farmers in various ways, and could use the
surplus for their own ends.
Jt appears as though the centralization of surplus which occurred in
Europe was often followed by the feudal landlords concentrating indiv­
idual and relatively independent units of arable land into large estates,
which led to the majority of peasants becoming wholly landless, or very
nearly so. By this I do not mean that it inevitably has to become like this in
lndonesia as well. even if today's "green revolution" indicates that this is
happening. The most important factor is that the concentration ofland had
begun to complement centralization before the theoretically educative
peasant revolutions and land reforms occurred. In Mexico the concent­
ration of land had also become dominant, and a similar process was well
under way in China. This led to the current Marxist theories primarily
dealing with the concentration of land and the struggle against it. That is
one of the reasons why the current Marxist theories are so incomplete and
can be dangerous in analyses ofsocieties where concentration ofland is not
dominant but also the surplus is "only" centralized. I maintain that this is
precisely what happened in Indonesia. And now I shall attempt to
prove it.

The Centralization of Surplus

The question is whether the Indonesian. or. more accurately, the Javanese.
land monopoly rested primarily on the centralization of the surplus and. if
so, how.
The pre-colonial agricultural societies1� on the inner islands differed
from early European feudalism. especially in Central and East Java where
the PKI was strongest, in that there were relatively strong central powers.
Local landlords virtually functioned as bailifTs. They lacked extensive
private properties. or control of such properties. which might have given
them an autonomous class base. The peasants often had the right to till the
land, and were neither serfs nor completely independent landowners.
Naturally there were exceptions. In West Java private ownership was
more widespread than in Central and East Java, and even there there were
variations through geography and over time. And the Muslim traders made
inroads. But as a general tendency. the gentry found it difficult to
concentrate land when both they themselves and the peasants suffered from
a lack of direct control and private ownership. Rather. they were often
forced to centralize the surplus. In the name of the central despot and in
their own interests, they expropriated the surplus from relatively indepen­
dent small peasants.

204
 Peasa111 Stmggles . . .

The lack of private peasant ownership, which enhanced the right to

cultivate land and encouraged communalism, prevented even the peasant
collective from concentrating land holdings.
Through indirect rule, the Dutch colonfal powers105 took over the
..bailiffs.. and village headmen, who did not have significant owner interests
but had great innuence over the way land and labour were used in the
villages. where the peasants seldom had rights of private ownership. The
state confirmed this organization, generalized it106 and exploited it for its
own interests. rather like a despotic Asian state. "'Bailiffs" and ·village
headmen organized cheap labour for tobacco curing, plantations and road­
building, and saw to it that the peasants cultivated staple products such as
sugar and tobacco on part of the land. Furthermore. foreigners were
forbidden to own land. State concessions were granted to the plantations.
Private peasant land was so heavily taxed lb at it could be a disadvantage to
be registered as an owner.
Even if the land was nol concentrated to any significant degree. i1 is
probable that the number of landless grew. Those who had the right to till
the land developed different techniques for preventing further communal
distribution as the population increased. The zealous colonial civil servants
surely underestimated the number of landless, as they were primarily
interested in collecting taxes from those who owned land.'07
Since the concentration ofland was in contradiction to state-run colonial
exploitation. opposition was often very strong where there was significant
private ownership and Muslim commerce. There the state, with its "bailiffs''
and village headmen. was combated as vigorously as colonialism.
By saying this. l also mean that the simplest way of enriching oneself was
not to concentrate land, but to centralize the surplus. with the help of those
political and economic means of power which the village headmen. for
example, had at their disposat.'08
Village headmen without considerable private interests were, of course,
prepared to defend the state and their own right to centralize the surplus.
But of course they had every interest in retaining a major portion of the
expropriated surplus for themselves. at the expense o f their colonial
masters.
Young domestic intellectuals who did not become administrators,
··bailifTs" or village headmen went a step further and wanted to crush the
colonial state, before they built a new one where their (and the people's)
interests could be accorded their rightful place. Sometimes they collabor­
ated with subversive Muslim anti-colonialists.

Indonesia, China and Vietnam

These structural relationships, classes and class interests d iffered in several
ways from the siruation in China and Vietnam.'09 The peasant revolts and
land reforms there were important models for the communists in
Indonesia.
Especially in China. but also in Vietnam, the cash economy and private

205
 i
Communst Offe11sfre: 1960-63 to 1965

ownership had a significanUy longer historical tradition. A strong despotic

state did not develop in China, but the nobility often had their base in
private land ownership. French colonialism had a far more direct nature in
Vietnam than did Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. In both Vietnam and
China feudal landlords grew up and concentrated significant parts of the
land.110
It was seldom a question of large properties. In Vietnam's rice-paddy
areas. where there were slrong communalistic traditions. the process of
concentration was particularly slow. But the differences were nevertheless
marked by comparison with Central and East Java. In the delta areas of the
Red River. cultivation of extremely small pieces of land long retained its
dominant position, the land was fragmented and proletarianization
progressed slowly. But simultaneously a number of large owners expanded
into minor landlords.111
It is not so important that the lands in Tonkin. as in Java. were very small.
for. despite that, the landlords in Vietnam appear to have based their
exploitation on the possession of land rather than the centralization of
surplus. Proletarianization was also a result not simply of population
expansion but of the concentration of land.

The Colonial Legacy

During the 1940s tbe colonial state was crushed.m Princes (such as the
sultan of Solo), '"bailiffs"". village headmen and others who had rallied to the
support of the Dutch were fought againsL Did that mean the way was clear
for private ownership and land concentration? Both increased. but
centralization of the surplus continued to dominate.
That the intellectual nationalists took over the state apparatus and
allowed it to expand did not mean that the grip of the state over the land and
the villages was maintained. Al village level the wealthy increased their
room to manoeuvre.113 But they had difficuhies in expanding and
concentrating their land ownership since they had only small pieces ofland
to start with.114
In addition, there was no assistance from a continued high demand for
colonial staple products sucb as sugar. Most of the sugar mills collapsed
primarily because the peasants liberated themselves and the local lords
could no longer force them to cultivate sugar on their rice fields for small
sums of money.' 15
A similar fate met the bailiffs and village headmen. both those who
retained their posts and those who took up new ones. They had got rid of the
colonial state and were able to take a larger slice of the cake themselves. But
at the same time the cake had shrunk. as the colonial agricultural system of
production collapsed.'16
It was not only lack of resources that prevented them from concentrating
land. When they got rid of the colonial powers, they also lost its dictatorial
support. Now the village leaders. at least. needed to acquire deeper local
roots. That meant they could not use their aew-won freedom to strip the

206
 Peasa111 Stniggles . . .

peasants of their land. but were often forced to content themselves with
centralizing a portion of the surplus. They did not even have the power to
dispose of their own lands (tanah bengkok) al their own discretion. but had
to allow share-croppers and harvesters a certain freedom and grant them
some privileges. But centralization allowed the viJlage headmen to
distribute patronage to clients among the small peasants and the landless.
who thereafter were prepared to back their patrons.
Subsequently the multi-party system and vote-catching reached the
villages. The communists. who defended the poor and the landless. gained
strength. In the end. the land reform laws fixed a ceiling on the amount of
land one might own. That made it difficult not only for the village headmen
but for all the wealthy. to concentrate the land. They were often forced to be
content with centralizing the surplus. They could then exploit the peasants.
at the same time as they acquired many loyal clients.

Sifting tBe Evidence

Despite these obstacles. some land was concentrated. In particular the
number of absentee landlords increased. This was conlirmed in a number
of studies of villages in the late lifties and early sixties.117
Some of the studies indicated quite a high concentration of land. and
these were used by the communists co prove the correctness of their
analyses. But one can question whether the villages were representative11�
and wonder ro what extent the polarization, between a few major
landowners and a large number of landless peasants or owners of very
small parcels of land. depended on the wealthy concentrating the land by
raking it from the peasants. and how much can be explained by the creation
of more poor and landless peasants through the increase in population.11'1
Finally. special attention must be paid to the way in which the studies often
discuss the actual conlrol of land. This can have its merits. But there is a risk
that the extremely important question of how the landlords controlled the
land may be disregarded. Did they base their control directly or indirectly on
ownership. or on a substantial centralization of the surplus which was
produced on lands fomrnlly owned by other men. so that one can (by means
or a rather generous interpretation) maintain that the landlords did indeed
control this land loo? Surely the most important factor is not whether a
minority of the rural population control the major part of the land. but holl'
they do so. Hthe lords are to be effectively combated, then this question must
be answered unambiguously.
That land was not mainly controlled through concentration is i ndicatcd by
the experience of the PIG in seeing how "surplus·· land could be made to
''disappear"', and by ihe way in which U1e peasants could so easily be split. In
recent years this has also been supported by unusually systematic research
which has not only looked at formal ownership structures but has also tried to
account for acrual control of the land. Despite the researchers· emphasis on
and criticism of the considerable increase in concentration ofland after 1965.

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Com1111111s1 Ojfensfre: 1960-63 10 1965

they maintain that the wholly or virtually landless in Javanese villages are
still not more than 30-40 per cent of the rural population. About 30-40 per
cent of the peasants are in a middle category and about 20-30 per cent are
relatively well off. 120 (It could. of course. be maintained that many of the
landless today have managed to move to the slums in the towns, but we must
also take the population increase into account.) The estimates are, of course.
put forward with a number of reservations about regional and local
differences. faults in the investigation and so on. Nevertheless they are
considerably less inaccurate than the investigations carried out in the late
fifties and early sixties. with their rough estimates and haphazard viJJage
studies.
And if one relies on the official statistics from the population census of
1973, it is even simpler to refute the thesis of considerable concentrations of
land.121
1 would thus like to maintain that the concentration of land and
exploitation in the villages ought primarily (but not exclusively) to be
analysed in terms ofthe centralization ofsurplus agricultural production, at
least during the days of the PKl's expansion and presumably to some extent
also today. despite a certain concentration of land.
What are the characteristics of the post-colonial centralization of the
agricultural surplus?
There are still very few who own rela1ively large farms and who. with a
little goodwill, could be termed landlords who haveconcentrated their land.
It is important to remember that the official statistics do not always take into
account that the same owner can have several smaller properties. Bur when
the 1973 census indicates that only about 0.5 per cent of Java·s farms were
larger than five hectares. the figures are nevertheless illustrative. Even ifone
goes as far as counting the five per cent of properties which were the largest,
only 24 per cent of arable land is included.122 In Central Java only 0.8 per
cent oft he farms were larger than four hectares and accounted for less than
10 per cent of the land.123 Independent and often critical researchers
confirm this general conclusion. even if they can show somewhat higher
figures, especially from the rice paddies in the low lying areas. In Java there
appears to be the lowest degree of land concentration in the central
province. while it is somewhat higher in EastJava, and highest in WesUava.
It is probable tha1 ihe figures were considerably lower during the fifties and
early sixties, before the communists were crushed and the ··green
.
revolution . got under way. 124
Among rhe largest and best farming units is the village land reserved for
the village headmen and their assistants in lieu of wages (1a11ah bengkok). l n
Klaten i n Central Java. as much as 1 1 per cent of the rice paddies i s ta11ah
bengkok. Even ifthetanah bengkok of the village headman is large enough to
place him in the same group as the real landlords, at least if one includes his
private land, he could not do what he wanted with the land, especially
before 1965, when he was dependent on broad support to retain his position
and thereby his 1a11ah bengkok.125

208
 Peasant Stntggles . . .

The village overlords do not therefore have direct control of the major
part of the land. They do not have any tangible monopoly over a signrncanc
concentration of the land. The lion's share of the land is, instead, in the
hands of the peasants.
But the peasants· parcels ofland are often very small. In a rice-paddy area
a family can support itselfon 0.5-1 hectares with today's high-yield varieties,
particularly if one or more members of the family regularly do other work as
day labourers and so on.126 (Prior to 1965 more land was needed.) But, in the
first place. even such a family needs loans to pay for seeds and fertilizers, for
example. Secondly, most have less than 0.5 hectares. At a rough estimate
half the farms in Java. not only in the rice-paddy area. are smaller than 0.5
hectares.127 These pieces of land are too small for a family to be able to
support itself independently. It has to take loans. It has to do a lot of work
besides cultivating its own fields. This is true to an even greater extent of
those families which only own the land around their houses. (Somewhat
imprecisely. these are often included in the 30-40 per cent estimates of the
number of landless peasants. But they do still have a little land which they
could use, and the garden round the house can, if the soil is fertile and is
intensively cultivated. provide an important source of nutritious food and a
little cash for the household.)128
Thus one can say that most of the land is used by small and poor peasants
who have such tiny pieces ofland that they are unable to use them relatively
independently. The land that is available for most of them is not even
enough to support their families.
In the beginning. these peasants presumably cry to get help from friends
and neighbours. A poor peasant who cannot manage by himself may. for
instance, allow a better-off peasant to share-crop his piece ofland in return
for a small loan, or while the poor peasant tries to liod a job some­
where else.
But most peasants need to borrow money, and they are soon forced to
turn to the lords.
It is by "helping" these peasants to the brink of ruin 129 that the lords can
indirectly get control over a large part of the land. and of the surplus they do
not have themselves and cannot obtain from their own lands. The lords do
not concentrate the land but centralize the surplus.
This mutual but unequal dependency between the lords and the peasants,
which the centralization process leads to, is at the same time.I maintain, the
base for strong and extensive patron-client relatioosbips. The base
disappears as the concentration. including the process of proletar­
ianization. increases. Even when the land is concentrated but is primarily
used by tenants, especially share-croppers. certain weaker patron-client
relationships survive, while in the ideal case they ought mostly to have been
dissolved when property is tilled by ..free" workers.
There are many ways of centralizing the surplus. Here are some.
The patron can lend money against a mortgage of the land (gadai) or
himself lease additional land (sewa) for a minor sum. He can "help" the

209
Co11111111nis1 OJ!ensii'e: 1960·63 ro 1965

peasant by allowing him to remain working as a share-cropper on his own

land. with an extortionate agreement. The patron can lease in cheap non­
irrigated land and then use his powers to get it irrigated for himsel f. He can
also "help" a peasant by giving him a loan for seeds. fertilizer. equipment
and so on, at a rate of interest that considerably exceeds what the patron
needs considering his Iiq uidity. good connections and state credit subsidies.
And if the peasant cannot pay he may have to work as a bonded labourer
instead. He can ·'help" a peasant by giving h i m a loan against the harvest of
the standing crop (ijo11), the classical form of usury. He can "help" the
peasant by buying up localJy and later selling the harvest. the difference
being considerable. He can also "help'· tJ1ose peasants who want to travel LO
market themselves. by offering them room on a lorry or i n a bus. for a fee.
Finally. the village headmen. religious leaders and others assist in senling
conOicts, making contact with the authorities outside the village. etc.. again
for a fee. and with the possibility of arranging other people·s affairs to suit
their own interests.
Those patrons. primarily village headmen. who are dependent on clients
to retain their positions. from which vantage point they can continue to
centralize the surplus. are not able to take care of ilieir "enfeoffments"
(ranah hengkok) as though they were private property. but must favour some
of the poor and landless by allowing them to share-crop the land on tbe
basis of decent agreements. allowing many to take part in the work of
harvesting the crops. etc. The village headman simply does not have
complete control over the land. If he. on the other hand. can replace his
need for support from the local clientele by unreserved state support, as was
quite usual after 1965. ilien he can of course choose between dictating
extortionate share-cropper agreements. leasing out land to those who pay
the most or rationalizing operations himself. Then he has d i rect control
over the land. whether or not it is privately owned. The land monopoly and
exploitation relies more on the concentration of land than on the
centralization of ilie surplus.

The Land Reform and t h e Centralization of the Surplus

If. as my analysis indicates. the monopoly on land is primarily based on
centralization. what happens i f the peasant struggle is directed towards
implcmenting and radicalizing a land reform aimed at hitting the landlords
who have concentrated land? Let me draw the logical conclusion.
Jn the introductory phase the lords who have primarily centralized the
surplus will not be much affected by a reform intended to combat a
significant degree of land concentration. Those who centralize the surplus
have every opportunity ofconceding the extent of the land from which they
expropriate the surplus. Some lords are nevertheless affected: i.e. those that
really do have concentrated land. But they arc few. and their estates are
small.
l f the surplus is centralized. there are thus only a limited number of
landlords who can be identified as enemies. and there is little concentrated

210
 Peasant Struggles . . .

land to redistribute. The strategic problem in Indonesia is not the

tremendous scarcity of all land, but that so little of this scarce commodity is
concentrated in the bands of proper la11dlords. '-11 If tbe peasants try 10
bypass the problem by radicalizing the land reform and tu1ilaterally
lowering the ceiling for maximum land holdings, by tracing mortgaged and
rented land and by then taking up the struggle under the slogan "land to
those that till it", there are a number of serious consequences.
First. even the lords who primarily centralize the surplus are threatened.
Even though their private farms may not be very large. the peasants will now
want to redistribute them. In addition, the peasants will now take up the
struggle for mortgaged and leased land and for "enfeoffments"
(tanah
bengkok). These lords make unusually dangerous enemies. They are
strongly provoked but not significantly weakened. The peasants are not
able to hit hard at the basis of the centralization oftbe surplus: that so many
peasants are unable to manage on their owru pieces of land but become
dependent on the landlords. Indebtedness and other ills remain.
Secondly, a considerable number of peasants are threatened, far from all
of whom can be called landlords. since the poor and landless peasants who
take part in the offensive believe tlrnt even t11e relatively well-off ought to
share what they have, since there is so little access to land that can be
redistributed. Presumably it suffices for these relatively well-off peasants to
feel themselves threatened to effectively cause splits in a united and broad
peasant front. In the worst case. even the strategically important middle
peasants feel threatened.
Thirdly, even the poor peasants are split. More poor peasants allow
relatively well-offpeasants, sometimes even lords, to use their land as share­
croppers. while the poor peasant has perhaps been given a loan or worked
as a wage labourer. Now the "land is to go to those that till if'. Does that
mean that the poor peasant must relinquish his land Lo a wealthy tiller?And
whose is ilie right to mortgaged land? The tiller. or the peasant who long
since was forced to mortgage his land and is no longer able to till it? And
ought only the man wbo makes permanent use of the land, the share­
cropper. to have the right to tlle land, not the day-labourers? I n such
situations there are considerable risks mat poor peasants will not only fight
one another. but also seek help from their patrons and the various
organizations iliey belong to.
Finally. the landless. I f the surplus is centralized, the truly proletar­
ianized are not so numerous as if the land had been mainly concentrated.
Many poor peasants own a little land. even if only a garden round their
houses. This means that they are probably clients of a patron. which helps
them to retain the land but also to be exploited.
Even tlle completely landless doubtless find it hard to resist the offer to
become loyal share-croppers, for instance, in place of the previous share­
cropper who derna!lded that h.is right to tlle land be accepted. And which
landless peasant can afford to risk losing a share-cropper agreement
without having a strong alternative patTon to turn to. when he risks being

211
 i O.ffe1fre:
Commu11s1 1s 1960-63 10 1965

removed from agricultural production and often being forced into the
urban slums?
There are fewer completely landless than there would have been if the
land had been heavily concentrated. and the tremendous number who arc
nevertheless landless often have more to lose than to win by being in the
vanguard against the lords.
The above prognoses agree well with actual developments, which I
analysed in the chapter on the land that was spirited away and the peasants
who were split. The prognoses are. indeed, constructions after the event. but
not on the basis of the empirical answer-book. They are logically derived
from an analysis of land monopolies in terms of the centralization of
surplus.
With better theoretical tools of analysis. which would have included the
concept of centralization of surplus. the communists would already have
been able to make the same prognoses: the facts were there to be seen. It is
true that I have made use of a good deal of new research that was not
available to the leaders of the PKI. But the lack ofa concentration ofland is
nothing new. What is new, is rather the systematic character of the studies
and the fact that a marked concentration of land is getting under way.

Two Paths o f Development

Would it even have been possible to sketch an alternative strategy on the
basis ofanalyses of the centralization of surplus? l l is not impossible. But a
strategy does not automatically follow from an analysis.
What I can do is to outline some paths ofdevelopment which are implied
by the analysis. and which every strategy must take into account, try to
promote. modify or combat.
It follows from my analysis of the centralization of the surplus that there
were (and are) only two likely paths of development Either the peasants
themselves concentrate their land into financially sound units. which can
be independent of the lords. or the lords concentrate the land of the
peasants and lay the foundations "from the top" for a brutal capitalist
agriculture. A classical bourgeois land reform with redistribution of
relatively large feudal properties was out of the question.
The path of development in the interests of the peasants takes as its point
ofdeparture that. even if all the arable land in Java were to be redistributed,
this would not suffice to enable all peasant families to be decently
economically independent.132 lf one were to limit oneself to redistributing
the land which was concentrated by landlords, the effects would be
marginal. and the peasants would be split and would lose the struggle.
lf the peasants are really able to combat the basis or the power of the
patrons, they must primarily attack the centralization of the surplus. not the
concentration of land. It is centralization which affects the absolute
majority oftbe peasants. That is why the preconditions for a united struggle
lie here.
In the final analysis. centralization depends on the major part of the land

212
 Peasaw Srn1ggles . . .

being divided into so many and such small pieces of land that the peasants
become dependent on the patrons. Ir is not enough to expropriate the Land
of the patrons, since their main source of income does not come from their
own Land but from peasants who are dependent on them. And the peasants
will continue to remain dependent as long as parcels ofland are too small to
be independent. It is not enough to demand the return of mortgaged land, or
to combat usury, etc. As Long as the peasants have farming units which are
too small, they will continue to need to mortgage their land and get into
debt, paying extortionate rates of interest, etc.
To be able to combat centralization, the peasants must, in other words,
make their tilling units so large and farm them so eITectively that they can
become independent of the patrons.
In the short run it is in the interests of the landless peasants to collectivize
tl1e land, while those landowners who are not desperately poor are,
presumably. interested in concentrating the parcels of land of the poorest
peasants. But the landless are not able singlehandedly to push through
collectivization. Neither can the petty farmers, on the other hand, lay claim
to the bits ofland o f the poor peasants without offering them something in
return.
A concentration of land could perhaps occur if the peasants who are not
entirely without resources agreed lo place a substantial portion of their
surplus in co-operative enterprises, in exchange for which they would be
able to take over the patches of land belonging to U1e very poor. The co­
operative companies would produce tools and equipment for farming, buy
fertilizers and sell the harvest, build houses. etc. The companies could be
jointly owned by the newly-independent peasants and the old poor
peasants who have relinquished their land. lo the companies the poor
peasants who have relinquished their land would be given secure jobs. And
many of those who have been landless for a considerable period would be
able to find employment in these enterprises.
This model is hardly more fanciful and unrealistic than the old one of the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ), Urnt compensation to the Lords
for redistributed land could take ilie form of a division of shares in industry
or the form ofagricultural implements to enable industrial development to
get under way parallel with a development of agriculture). In my model,
however, the land is given to those small peasants who already own some,
while it is the poverty-stricken who receive compensation, in the form of
investment in local industry which creates jobs and promotes
development.
The path of development which is in the interests of the lords is. on the
other hand. based on the peasants having suffered defeat - for instance,
because they tried to pursue an impossible classical bourgeois land reform
- and have become vimtally defenceless.
In this way, the patrons are given every opportunity of complementing
their centralization of the surplus by concentrating Land. They can, quite
simply, get rid of a large number of poverty-stricken and defenceless
peasants.
213
Co111m1111is1 Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

What remains, besides the lords, are those peasants who in the past
already had enough land to retain their independence.
On the now relatively large farming units, cultivation is rationalized and
in the best case production is also raised. An agrarian capitalism "from
above'" starts to develop, while more and more peasants become proletar­
ianized and are forced out or the agricultural sector.
Since the land was not notably concentrated in the beginning, no
revolutionary anti-reudal land reform is necessary in the interests of the
peasants in order to promote capitalist development. It was not even
possible to carry through such a reform. On the contrary, the land quite
obviously needs to be concentrated, which demands that the majority of
peasants wilJ be brutally proletarianized and forced off the land.

A Post-Colonial Agradan Capitalism

This second path of development, which has been deduced from my
analysis of the centralization of the surplus of production, is in close
agreement with actual developments in Indonesia.
As early as February 1964. the specially-retained Ford Foundation
expert. Wolr Ladejinsky, wrote in a Jetter to Minister of Agriculture
Sadjarwo that what was primarily necessary for stimulating a (capitalist)
agricul tura 1 development in Indonesia was nor a redistribution ofland from
some parasitic feudal landlords to productive peasants. Land concentra­
tion was not a major problem. Above all there was too little land for
redistribution. What ought co receive priority were attempts to raise
productivity.133 What Ladejinsky was trying to sell was the "green
revolution".
The PKI and Lhe BTI, in particular, tried to block every attempt to ignore
the problems of the poor and landless peasants in order to engage in raising
production on the land of the wealthy.
The repressive tidal wave which broke in the latter part of 1965 tore down
not only the PKI and the BTI. but also the land reform. Utrecht estimates
that at least half the land which had been distributed was repossessed by the
landlords, or was taken by new military overlords.134
Once the communists were crushed, the poor and landless were no longer
able to defe11d themselves. At the same time the patrons were able. with the
backing of the military. to acquire dictatorial powers which enabled them to
be less dependent on the need to distribute patronage to as many clients as
possible.
Thus it was suddenly possible for the rural lords to allow innumerable
poor and landless peasants to survive as best they might, while the wealthy
engaged in disposing of the surplus themselves, and perhaps also trying to
increase it.
Hence the gates were opened to the green revolutio� which was to raise
production without giving any ''surplus"' land to the tillers; quite the
reverse.135
What are, then, the general effects? A few years ago Ben White made a

214
 Peasant Struggles . . .

significant summary:

. . . unequal distribution of the direct and indirect benefits of new biological and
chemical technologies in rice production; new technologies tn cultivation. weeding.
harvesting and processing which cuts costs for tlhe larger farmer but reduces the
employment and income opportunities of labourers: more frequent harvest failures
resulting from the new varieties: vulnerability to drought, nood and particularly to
pests. which have affected the income of small farmers more seriously than those of
large farmers: declining real agricultural wages; unequal access to agricultural and
other forms ofsubsidized govemmcntcrediL while i.nformal interest rates remain high
for small famiers and the landless: unequal access to other government services:
differential impact of innation on large farmers compared to small farmers or
labourers: shifls in the market system with Larger traders taking over the role of small
traders in the bulking process of rural produce: increasing landlessness and an
acceleration i n the purchase of agricultural land by wealthy villagers and the urban
elites: decline of many traditional labour-intensive handicrafts and home industries in
competition with more capital-intensive substitute products.1 3<>

What type of agricultural development is in question? Production per unit

of area bas increased and is greater than the growth of population. Perhaps
that is not so strange when it comes to the input into types o f rice, more
fertilizer. better irrigation and so on. in the various parts o f rhe green
revolution. What is more remarkable is that there has not been a more
significant increase.l.17
What is more interesting is that production per worker seems to have
risen and that the landlords invest and accumulate capital: in other words,
that some kind of capitalist development is under way.
It has not been possible to do any systematic research on the effects of the
land reform since 1 965.138 One thing, however, is clear: the fact that the land
reform was directed at private rather than communal or state-owned
property ownership simplified things for the wealthy, who were more easily
able to buy land, pa 1ticularly after 1965.139
Many case studies indicate that more and more land is being bought or
exchanged. But there is no one who knows exactly how much is involved. "If
one turns to official figures. no land whatsoever is being sold or exchanged
in this country," lamented Rudolf Sinaga, among others, at the Rural
Dynamics Study in Bogor.140 There is a certain hesitation about registering
land transactions for fear of becoming a target for another land reform.
But in addition it does nol always pay to buy expensive land. Often it is
much cheaper to lend money to the increasingly poorer small farmers. and
then to take good land in mortgage (gadai). or simply rent land (sewa) from
those who are in desperate need of money. Sometimes the land of the very
poor is even mortgaged to several different people, and if such land is
bought, debts pile up.141 Gadai and sewa have both' risen markedly.142
The increase in the occurrence ofsewa also depends on the fact that village
headmen and olher lords are now sufficiently powerful simply to rent out
their land to those who pay mos1.t�3 They no longer need the support of a
flock of clients and do not need to retain share-croppers. Of course they can

215
 i O.ffensil'e: 1960·63 10 1965
Comm1111s1

also employ workers and they themselves can ensure that operations are
more rationalized.
ll can be disputed whether or not the number of share-croppers has
fallen. The number of wage workers has. in any case, risen.144 On the one
hand, many share-croppers are being replaced by the leasing out of land
and/or by agricultural workers, or simply because the family that owns the
land manages to run it by itself with the help of a certain amount of
rationalization.145 On the other hand, there are now more who must
mortgage or rent out their land and who become share-croppers on their
own land, instead of remaining independent peasants.146 And often. when
the owner takes over the costs of seed, fertilizer, etc.. the share-cropper is
given so poor a contract that he may be cheaper than a wage labourer.'47
To increase production per employee. the landowners have also tried to
gel rid of the thousands of volunteer harvesters, who have a traditional right
to invade the lields and retain a certain proportion of what they harvest
(bmvon). Fewer workers with better tools, even if this means a sickle rather
than the ani-ani (the harvesting knife). does, of course, allow the owner a
higher yield.'4s Small peasant farmers may be able to manage the harvest
themselves or with the help of their relatives.
In order to tackle the problem of the many harvesters. many large
landowners started selling the standing crop to a penebas, whose workers
swiftly and efficiently take care of the work of harvesting the crops. so that
the farmer need not get rid of all the impoverished harvesters himself. This
so-called rebasan contract is an old "feudal trick" which guarantees the
landowner labour for the harvest which now prepares the way for an
,

agrarian capitalism by excluding all the workers who are not needed. When
the masses of harvesters have resigned themselves. the farmers appear to be
less interested in rebasan. The farmer himself can then ensure that the
har vesting is done as effectively as possible.'49
Another old ''feudal trick" is sometimes called kedokan. The owner agrees
with a worker that a certain amount of work will be done on the owners'
land. in exchange for which the contract labourer - or shall we ca l l him a
completely dependent share-cropper? - receives a certain proportion of
the harvest. Once again. the number of harvesters is reduced. Kedokan can
also be used by a smaller number of landowners, sometimes as a simple
exchange of Jabour.1so
There arc. indeed. a number of "feudal" methods which survive to
regulate relations between owners and tillers. but they appear not to
prevent. but rather to simplify. the process of proletarianization. the control
oflabour power and the raising of production. The crops put on the market
are, in addition. larger. And it is not only rice which becomes a commodity,
but land and labour power.
Hence. it appears to me obvious that we must build a theory not o nly of
post-colonial capitalism and the slate. as I emphasized in the previous
chapter. but also of agriculture. An ideal type of ca pitalist agricultural
development by the redistribution of relatively large feudal domains is not

216
 Peasam Stmggles . . .

only difficult but out of the question, if exploitation is primarily based on

centralizing the surplus and not on a concentration of land.
Instead, with the growth of post-colonial capitalism, we find a capital­
ization of agriculture wliich bappily combines with ''feudal remnants".
With the help of post-colonial capitalists in the state apparatus, the lords
can crush the peasant movements, effectively subordinate the peasants, and
combine centralization of the surplus with concentration of the land. In
addition, the post-colonial capitalists contribute to an effective input of
technology, credits and markets by. for example, the green revolution.
What then happens to the peasants. to the people? Even if an agrarian
post-colonial capitalism is developing, it appears to be to the advantage of
only a few of the old lords, who, like the Junkers in Germany, have adapted
themselves to capitalism.
It is, indeed, true that millions of villagers are pushed out of agricultural
production without getting jobs in industry. (This does not mean they can
afford to be out of work. On the contrary, they work like animals to survive
from their odd jobs on the margins of the production system, in petty
trading. services. and so on.)151 But at the same time. even the harshest critics
admit that between 20 and 30 per cent of the peasants actually find the
agrarian capitalist system useful.152
Thar 70-80 per cent find themselves in an unfavourable position is, of
course, unacceptable. But, on the other hand, 20-30 percent is still far more
than a handful of feudal lords, who can be isolated by 90 per cent of the
villagers. as traditional communist theory and strategy counted on. The
post-colonial capitalists have succeeded. where the national bourgeoisie
failed. to initiate capitalist development in the rural areas, and thereby lo
solve the problems of so many dissatisfied peasants that a broad peasant
coalition, wllich would be forced to support the communists' struggle for
bourgeois reforms leading on to socialism, will be impossible.153
As Laclau pointed out, the Russian revolutionaries had issued a warning
that if Lhe Tsar·s minister, Stolypin, succeeded in breaking down feudalism
to such an excent chat a strong class of capitalist farmers (or kulak:.) was
created, a possibility Lenin did not exclude, Stolypin would have removed
the preconditions for massive peasant support for the revolutionaries. who
wished to shoulder the traditional tasks of the bourgeoisie and then march
towards socialism. I o that case the communists should rather have to take
up a direct struggle for communism, exclusively with the help of a smaU
industrial and rural proletariat. which would delay the revolution for quite
some time.154
That many peasants in Indonesia have been displaced does not mean
that they have become a unified rural proletariat. still less that most have
become agricultural or industrial workers. Neither post-colonial industrial
capitalism not emergent agrarian capitalism offers very many jobs. Even
those who retain poorly paid agricultural jobs or work as share-croppers
with wretched contracts are relatively privileged, at least compared to those
who have been displaced from agricultural production and are completely

217
Communisr Offensive: 1960·63 ro 1965

reliant on petty trading. handicrafts, services. etc. on the margins. Whole

families have been forced into the towns and the slums. People try to remain
in their villages as long as possible. It even happens that parents prefer to
leave their children alone in the villages. with the older children lookjng
after the younger ones, the household and so on. A living can be eked out i n
the towns as domestic workers, petty traders and s o on. Working hours are
unbelievably long. Naturally many are ill fed. including lhe children
remaining in the villages to look after lhe household.
The outcast peasants become split. Those who can remain in the
agricultural sector do not have any uniform conditions of employment and
their small privileges arc put at risk if they light for their rights. Those who
have been marginalized often do not even have a visible employer against
whom to revolt. The peasants who are outcast are hardly likely to become lhe
spark to ignite revolution.

Notes

I. Concerning communist strategy in 1 h e rural areas hefore 1960-63. sec Chapter 12 above
2. Mortimer ( 1 972) pp.20-24.
3. Ibid. p.26.
4. See PKJ ( 1964) inter alia pp.ll-27
5. See Chapters 13 and 1 6 above.
6. Sec. e.g.. PK! ( 1 964) pp.84fT.
7. I bid. pp.122·3.
8. Mortimer ( 1972) pp.llfT.. Aidit ( 1 962) i n Aidit ( 1963) pp. 525fT.. Sartono ( 1977b) pp.108. Cf. also
Sartono ( J977a) p.16 and his thesis that the PKJ had bypassed and replaced village
authorities.
9. See. e.g.. R<'l'i
l'll'of"1do11<'sio 7 ( 1 960) pp.181T.. 8(1%0) p.7.and PKJ (1961) pp.I 8ff. ln1ervicw No. 52
with former central leader i n the PK! (Jakarta. 1980).
10. Sec. e.g.. PKI ( 1 964) pp.22·3 and Re1·iew of/11do11aio 8 (1960) p.7. Cf. Mortimer ( 1 972) pp16-7.
11. Ibid. and the interview referred 10 i n fn. 9 above
I2. .. p.22. Sec also Mortimer( 1972) pp.33-4. quotation from Bakri's speech at the same
PKI ( 1 964). e.g
meeting of the central comminec in December 1963.
13. Ibid. ttnd Rl'l•u•n• o/ llll1lo 11'S1a 8·10 (196-1) pp.8-14. esp. pp.8-9. a speech by Politburo member
Lukman.
14. lbi•I. and furth er information from the 1964 National Conference ofthe PK!. Reviewof/11donesio
5·7 (1964) p. 15 and the PK! (1964) pp.122·8
15. Sec. e.g.. Aidit (1962) in Aid11 ( 1 963) pp.471-l PK! ( 1 964) pp.29. 37·8.
16. Sec fn. 18 below.
I 7. Sec fn. 8 ahove.
18. Sec. e.g.. Rn'lt'w oflndo11e:sia 8 (1960) p.35. Hindley ( 1964a) p. I 77. Slamcl ( 1968). i nterview with
Sadjarwo (Jakarta. 26 November 1980): a good :1ccoun1 of rhc figures can he fouml in U1rech1
(1969) fn. 10 and 18 and in FAQ ( 1966) pp.11-15. Sec also Lyon (1976) p.24.
19. See. e.g. Slnmet ( 1 968) pp.18ff.
20. Interview No. 24 with one of those in charge (Jakarta. 1980) Cf. Mortimer ( 1972) pp. 38-39.
21. fbid. pp. 34·9. Rei·iewo/l11do11esio 5-1 (1964) pp.271T. and the interview rcfrrrcd 10 in fn. 20 nbovc.
ffbc PKJ researchers never managed 10 complere the processing of rhe material. At lcnsr one
cop) was destroyed since several names were mcn1ioncd which might have herrayed members
and sympathizers.)

218
 Peasant Stn1ggles . . .

22. Rl'l·iew ofllldo11esia 5-7 (1964) pp.271T.

23. Sec. e.g.. PK! {1964) pp.134-5. This does no1 mean thal the PKl"s posi1ion had changed: cf A1dit
( 1959) in Aidi1 ( 1963) p.31 1. On 1he other hand. and 1his was ofsome importance. the PKI seems
to have. to some cx1cn1. abandoned its own distinction between landlords on the one hand and
rich peasants on 1he other. Sec. e.g.. Aidit (1957) in Aidi1 (1963) pp.50-6. Instead the simpler
definition was adopted: !hose who have more land than the low allows arc landlords: sec. e.g..
Huizer (1974) pp.127·8.
24. See. e.g
.. Re1•iew of l11do11esia 5·7 (1964) p.28: 8·10 (1964) p.23. Utrecht (1976b) pp. 270-1 e'en
.. .. ..
includes rich peasants amongst the ..village devils . which is especially surprising since Aidit.
whom Utrecht refers to. always laid strong emphasis on the importance of isolating the landlord
clements. Sartono ( 1977a) p.20 fn. 31, nevertheless. using the same sources as Utrecht. possibly a
..
few pages further on in the same Aidi1 1ex1. does nol include rich peasants" amongst the seven
village devils. (J have not been able to consult the Aidit text used by Utrecht.)
25. See. e.g.. PKI ( 1964) pp.2JIT. and 28. For the posi1ion adopted in 1960. see the excellent summary
by U1recht (1969) pp.1·2.
26. Utrecht ibid. Interview with Sadjarwo (Jakarta. 26 November 1980) and Iman Soe1iknJO
(Yogyakarta. 4 November 1980).
27. Similar compilations can be found in ibid. Mortimer( 1972) Lyon ( 1976) and FAO ( 1966): the text
or the law can be found in English as a supplemen1 10 FAO ( 1 966).
28. See. e.g.. Re1·iewof/11do11esia 8 {1960) p.7. and BTI Chairman Asmus· article. pp.3 1-2: 9-10 ( 1960)
pp.2(H. as well as PKJ {1964) pp.24-5. See also Monimer (1972) pp.17-18.
29. See. e.g.. Aidit"s statement of 2 February 1964 in Re1·i""' of/11do11esia 3-4 {1964) p.2.
JO. Sec. e.g.. PKI (1964) pp.2JIT. and 28.
JI. As if ii were nol enough !hat Sukarno suddenly raised 1he question of land reforms. 1he PNI UI
first took a more radical position lhan 1he PKJ by suggesting that land which had been
.
mortgaged should also be regarded as ·surplus land
. . Even old nationalists on the righ1. who
ac1ually wanted 10 implement an English·stylc"enclosure" reform.s1ill enjoy relating how nearly
they succeeded in drawing the stingofthecommunists by being more ready 10 tttkc 1hc ini1iutive
and be radical in 1960. Interview with the ex-Speaker in Parliament lsnacni. formerly of Ihe PNI
(Jakarta. 21 October 1980).
32. Cf. fn. 30 above and pp.187-8 above.
3,3. Cf. Lyon {1976) pp.43-4 and Huizer (1974) p.93.
34. Sartono (1977a) pp.16ff.
35. See. e.g.. Wertheim (1966).
36. ln1erviews Nos. 16.24.29. 52. 58.62. and 67 with former centrally-placed and prominent members
and !hose near them (Jakarta. 1980).
37. f /11do11tsi
Rf!View o o 7 (1960) pp.ISJT. No. 8 ( 1960) p.7. and PKI ( 1961) pp.I 8-19.
JS. See. e.g.. Utrecht (1969) p.13.
39. FAO (1966) pp.9-10.
40. Utrecht (1969) p.13.
41. lbiJ. p.1 1. Anolhercomplication was that the landowners in several districts. orlwb11plltl!11s. were
difficult to estimate since the most important land-reform commillees were either al the sumc
level or below that.
42. Conversation wilh Ben White Haag. 29 September 1980.
43. Cf. FAO (1966) p.33 and Lyon (1976) pp.43-4.
44. Utrecht (1969) pp.4-5.
45. See. e.g.. Ladcjinsky (1964a) pp.7. 15-16. 20: and Utrecht (1976b) pp.276-7.
46. FAO {1966) pp.17-18.
47 Lyon (1976) pp.43-4. Ladcjinsl..)' (1964a) pp.181T
. as well as interview with Iman Soe1iknjo. who
prepared the land reform by investiga1ing 1hc legal preconditions {Yogyakarta. 4 November
1980).
48. Utrecht (1969) p.13. and Mortimer (1972) pp.SO·I. who quotes Lznce Castlc"s licld data. itmong
other things: an Islamic school in Eas1 Java had received 240 he<:lares in dona1ions.
49. Wertheim (1966) p.123.

219
Communist Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

50. See. e.g.. Utrecht ( 1 969) p.5. Ladejinsky ( 1 964a) pp.7 and 15. White and Wiradi ( 1979) p.41.
Mortimer ( 1972) pp.18ff. In addition. I have made special use of Interview No. 67 with a former
centrally-placed member of the peasant organization (Jakarrn. 1980).
51. The same interview. as well as. e.g.. Utrecht ( 1 973h) p.154. (1976b) p.280 and Mortimer ( 1 972)
p.21.
52. FAO ( 1966) p.11. In roomotes 52-56 I have chosen only to refer to the da1<1 from the FAO. These
figures have. however. as far as possible. been scrutinized with the help of Utrecht (1969). The
FAO and others point out. of course. that the figures arc very preliminary.
53. FA0 ( 1966) pp.ll-12 and 15.
54. Ibid. pp.11-12.
S.S. lhid. pp.18-19. It can be added that while the orlicial figures IOr the amount of surplus land
redistributed in Java alone was ahout 36.000 hectares. the PKl's Ismail Bakri maintained at the
same time that the cnae figure was only 19.000 hectares. Mortimer ( 1972) p.19.
56. Ladcjinsky (1964a) p.5.
57. The figure of three million landless. and the size of the family. come from Utrecht ( 1969) fn. 18.
and arc based on data from the Minister of Agriculture, Sadjarwo.
58. Ibid. p.13.
59. Ibid. p.14.
60. Ibid.
61. Mortimer ( 1972) pp.19-20.
62. Huizcr ( 1974) pp.127-8.
63. Interviews Nos. 52 and 67 with former central leaders of the PKI/BTI (Jakarta. 1980).
64. Ibid. Sec also pp.186-91. above.
65. The interview mentioned above. No 67. Cf. Utrecht ( 1 976b) p.280. and Review oflndom>sia 5-1
( 1964) pp.29-30.
66. Review of /11rlom·�·ia 3-4 ( 19(>4) pp. 2 and 5-6. both statements by Aid ii.
67. Drastic occupations. and other events in which Lhe peasants took the law into their own hands
and 1inally went beyond the land refom1 laws.do not belong in this context. Usually it is claimed
that the PKI nnd the BTI initiated such actions around (or soon after) the beginning of 1964. But.
first. they began somewh;at later. and. secondly. they were hardly consciously planned by the
communisL�. Those who want to besmirch the name ofthccommunists ofcourse communly date
the ac1ions as early as possible. as well as blaming both the PKJ and the BTI. But even in work
like Mortimer"s ( l972) it is quite unclear as to when the confrontations began. The term "ksi
sepilmA has come to refer to both the quite innocent und the more violent activities. Mortimer
pursued the thesis that the actions were initiated from the top. without distinguishing between
restrained and unrestrained actions. Sec. e.g.. pp.26-34. See also Lyon ( 1956) pp.52 and 56.
68. Mortimcr( l972) p.40. (Sartono ( 1 977a} p.20 mentions a conference at KJaten. a month earlier. at
which similar appeals were made.) The appeals were even taken up at Lhe centre. e.g. in
connec1ion with the 44th anniversary celebrations in May 1964. On that occasion Aiditeven said
..
that the slogan land to those that till it.. ought to be implemented as soon as possible. Re1•iew of
/11do11esia 5-7 ( 1964) p.13.
69. Rl�'il'll' ofIndonesia 5-1 ( 1964) pp.27ff.
70. Ladcjinsky ( 1964a) bears wi1ness to the poor local knowledge and the dirficulties in distributing
inCormaLion on the complicated laws. which led to considerat:>le latitude in interpretation.
Interviews with Soetiknjo (Yogyakarta. 4 November 1980). Utrechl (Amsterdam. 2 October 1980)
and with the former leading communislS within the peasant organiwtion whom I have
interviewed.
71. See. e.g.. Mortimer (1972) p.19.
72. Ibid. p.31. secalso Review offlldonesi" 3-4 ( 1964). in which several articles arc devoted to the food
problem.
73. Interview No. 67 (Jakana. 1980),
74. Lyon ( 1976) and especially Mortimer( 1972) pp.40-44 and 48-53 provides a good overview. Walkin
( 1969) gives more detailed information on Lhc question of East Java. even if the form is
tendentious. Soegijanto Padmo has done a field study on the question of the Klaten area in
Central Java. (Interview with Padmo. Yogyakarta. 4 November 1980.) In Utrecht ( 1969). (1974)
and ( 1 976b) there is also valuable information.

220
 Peasam Srrnggles . . .

75. Monimcr ( 1972) pp.44fT.

76. lhid.
77. Interview with Utrecht (Amsterdam. 2 October 1980).
78. Monimcr ( 1972) pp.46-7.
79. The following analysis is so structured that I r�peatedly use several sources or studies for each
point in succession. Hence they arc presented together: H uizcr( 1974) pp.124-34: Lyon (1976)esp.
pp.53-9: Monimer (1972) pp.40-4. 48-53: Utrecht (1969) pp.7·12. (1976b) pp.l79ff. and (19793):
Walkin ( 1969); and Wertheim ( 1 966) and (1969). In addition. Interviews Nos. 24 and 67 with
centrally-placed leading communists (Jakuna. 1980) as well as with the following researchers:
K.S. Astika (Denpasar 13 November 1980). Jang A. Mutialib (Yogyakarta. 4 November 1980). S.
Padmo ([email protected]. 4 November 1980). Sanono (Yogyakarta. 16 November 1980). I. Soctiknjo
(Yogyalmna. 4 November 1980). E. Utrecht (Amsterdam. 2 October 1980). Sadjarwo (Jakarta. 26
November 1980) and field data in Collier ( 1980b).
80 Sec. first.Aidit's speech in the Re-dewoflndo11esia 8· 10(1964) pp.2fT. See also resolutions adopted.
ibid. p IS.
81. Interview No. 52 (Jakarta. 1980). This was. however. a pointofcontradiction between the leaders.
and not. as far as I can ascenain. a contradiction between the leaders and the peasant masses.
which some other researchers. such as Wcnheim (1966) and (1969). have suggested in order to
exrlain why the unilateral actions stancd. Cf. also Monimer ( 1972) pp.29-33. who gives an
accoun1 and confutation or these arguments.
82. Interview No. 67 (Jakana. 1980).
83. Monimcr ( 1972) p.46.
84. Ibid p.54.
85. Ibid. pp.54-5.
86. lhid. p.55.
87. The Declaration can be found in Rt'Vie"' of/11do11eso
i (1965) p.12.
88. Mortimer ( 1972) pp.S6ff. (quotation from p.57). Lyon (1976) pp.6H>7.
89. Monimcr ( 1972) p.64.
90. Ibid. pp.62 und 64 and Mortimer ( 1974a) p.376.
91. Mortimer (l972) rp.60-1.
92. Interviews with Utrecht (Amslerdam. 2 October 1980). No.24 with a former prominent
agricultural researcher forthe BTI (Jakarta. 1980). and No.67with a former l�ding and centrally·
placed person in the peasant movement (Jakana. 1980). Lack ofland has been used (illfer11/i11) by
Pauker to explain why the peasant struggle failed. See Pauker ( 1968) and (1969).
93. Sec Chapter 6. above.
94. My interpretation is based.iml!ra/io. on Aidit's analyses from 1953(Chapter6.above). comments
on research results in 1964. (sec fn, 22. above) Siamet ( 1968) and interview No.24 wilh one ofthose
rcspomiblc for the preliminary investigations (Jakarta. 1980).
95. Boeke ( 1952).
96. Dam ( l961).
97. Sec Chapter 12. above.
98. Sec. e.g.. Mortimer ( 1 969a). (1972). ( 1 974a and b). McVey (1963) and (1969c} and Tichclman
( 1 980).
99. Sec. e.g.. Utrecht (1972). (1973a). ( 1 974) and (1976b}. as well as Wenhcim (1966) and (1969).
100. Even researchers like Krocf emphasized this. See. e.g
.
. Kroef (1960a). (1960b) and (1963). In
addition, see Siamet { 1968).
IOI. Interview No. 24 (Jakarta. 1980) with fom1cr leader among the PKJ's researchers.
102. Thi� also applies. I would argue. to Scott's well-documented and very interesting emrirical
gencralizutions: Scon (1972).
103. Djurfcldt and Lindberg ( 1975).
104. I am building. first. on Anderson (1972a). Geertz (1971). Gordon (1978) and ( 1979b). Knight
( 1 980). Mulherin {1970·71). Sutherland (1973). (1974) nnd (1975). Discussions with Tommy
Svensson in Goihenburg have also been very useful to me. Sec also Svcnsson's work referred to in
the Bibliography.

221
Comm1mis1 Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

105. On the question of colonial times: sec ibid. and Breman (1980). Collier (1978dJ, ( 1 980a). Elson
(1978). Gordon (1979a). Kocmjaraningrat (1967. a and b). Sartono ( 1 972). Uirecht (1972) and
( 1 974) os well as relevant analyses. with references in Chapters 4. 5 and 6 above.
106. Observe Knigh1 ( 1980) in an ioiercsting polemical exchange with Gecnz. Knight
. mainta.ins that
there was a good deal of private initiative lcrt to be found in parts ofJava. especially on the
western and central-northern coasLwhich was suffocated by the Dutch.who thus did not simply
take over some kind of Asian communalism. Sec also Breman ( 1 980).
107. lnicrview with Ben While (The Hague. 29 September 1980).
108. See 1he interesting work of Elson ( 1978). who shows that particular village leaders were able to do
good business with the Dutch sugar industry. thereby gaining considerable control overthe land.
..
Gcenz·s "shared poverty was conspicuous by iLS absence. (Elson studied an cxlcnsivc area of
East Java.)
109. For a contradictory opinion. sec Smith ( 1 974).
1 10. Tichelman (1980) esp. Chaps. 4 and 5.
111. Ibicl_ esp. pp.75. l 56 and 234.
112. For the 1940s. sec relevant analyses with references in Chapters 5 and 6. above.
113. Interviews with Jan Pluvier(Amsterdam. 2 0ctober 1980) and Wertheim (Wageningcn.3 October
1980).
114. Interview wi1h Onghokham (Jakarta 18 October 1980).
115. Gordon ( 1979a).
116. Ibid.
1 17. .. the investigation referred to in Fcsscn ( 1966). Krocf ( I 9(i()a and b). 1963. Pelzer (1967)
See. e.g
and imer a/ia in Slamet ( 1968). Cf. also Taintor (1974).
118. Cf. Mortimer·s criticism of Lyon (1976) in Mortimer ( 1970-1). Lyon ( 1976) was first published in
December 1970.
1 1 9. Java·s population has increased from an ollicial 4.5 million in 1 8 1 5 -or. at mosl. three times that
amouni. abou1 13 million: see Svensson (1982) pp.63-67 - lo today's ligureofabout 90 million.
The island is about one-third the size of Sweden and has no significant possibilities for new
agricuhural development. as well as having rural areas reckoned 10 be among the most densely
populated in the world
120. Interviews with Ben White (The Hague. 30 September 1980). Jang Aisya M. (Yogyakarta. 4
November 1980). Lochocr W.A. (Saltiga, 7 November 1980). John lhalauw and Nico Kanan
(Saltiga. 8 November 1980). Sanono (Yogyakarta. 16 November 1980). Will Collier and R. Sinaga
(Bogor. 25 November 1980).
121. Sec Booth and Sundrum ( 1976) and Booth (1976). (The lauer provides a scathing revicwof Kcilh
. ..
Grirr.n·s .The political economy of agrarian change . Harvard, 1974.)
122. Booth and Sundrum (1976) pp.94-5.
123. Boo1h (1976) pp.130-31.
124. See fn. 120 and tJ1e works of those interviewed there, as well as Hickson ( 1 975).
125. Se
e fn. 120.as well as interview with Hotman Siahaan (Surabaya. 15 November 1980). According
10JangAisya and others. there is no research focusing directly on the village headmen and their
methods of enriching lhemselves. II is, however. conlim1ed that they are wealthy. The figures
from K
Jatcn arc taken from Booth (1974) pp.135-6. a follow-up study 10 lhat of Utami and
lhalnuw ( 1973).
126. This concerns Klaten; see. for ins1ance. interview wi1h Jang Aisya (Yogyakarta, 4 November
1980).
127. Booth aad Sundrum (1976) p.94.
128. Booth (1976) p.131.
129. !mer o/ia. John lhalauw (Snla1iga. 8 November 1980) points out that not even 1he peasants who
cultivate rice paddies of Li1tle more than a heclare caa survive witJ1out loans for a number of
simple inputs.
130. Sec fn. 124. Sturgess and Wijaya (1979) as well as interview with Mocbya10 (Yogyakarta. 5
November 1980).
131. Cf. the Pl<rs analysis; see pp.201-2. above.
132. Sec p.201. above. and fn. 92 above. and cf.. e.g.. Ladejinsky (1964a) p.23.
133. Ibid.. pp.23-32. Cf. also ibid. (1964b).

222
 Peasanr Struggles . . .

134. Utrech1 (1979a) p.179. sec also ibid. ( 1 973b).

135. For a good overview. see Manin-Schiller ( 1980).
136. White ( 1 978) p.8.
137. Sec, c.g_ Collia ( 1978c). According to the Asian Agricultural Survey. the production index of
Indonesian food production per capita rose from 95 in 1963-67 to 102 in 1970-74 ( 1952-56= 100).
and production numbers were 122 and 159 rcspcciivcly: ADB ( 1 977) p.39. According to World
Bank figures. the increase in agricultural produce was 2.7 pcrcenl for thc period 1960-70 and 3.6
per cent for 1970·79: World Bank ( 1981) p. 136. During the sume periods the rate or popula1ion
growth was 2.0 and 2.3 per cent rcspeciively (ibid. p.l 66). According 10 the Asiatic Development
Bank's more detailed 1978 report. the increase in production was nevertheless somewhat less
than expected. particularly after 1974.
138. While and Wiradi (1979) p.40.
139. Sec. e.g_ ibid. p.21 and Collier ( 1978b). Even 1he in1crview with Collier (Bogar. 25 November
1980).
140. ln1erview with Sinaga (Bogor. 25 November 1980).
141. Interview with Nico Kanan (Saltiga. 8 November 1980) and R. Sinaga (Bogor. 25 November
1980).
142. One of the mos1 common results of the research of recent years: sec 1hc collcc1cd references in
Appendix II. For one of several interesting examples. sec Sinhaan ( 1979).
143. Ano1hcr common result from research. See.e.g.. Collier ( 197Sb) pp.3ff.. ( 1978d). and Utami and
lhalauw (1973). Interviews with Collier. (Bogor 25 November 1980) and Loehocr Widjnjanto
Adhincgara (Salmiga. 7 November 1980).
144. Interviews with Ben While (The Hague. 29 and JO Sep1cmber 1980). See. e.g.. White and Wiradi
( 1969) pp.32-3.
145. White ( 1 978) p.19.
146. Conclusions drawn from (i111er alia) interviews with Lc-obocr and Kanan (Salatiga. 7 and 8
November 1980)..
147. Common result of research. Sec references in Appendil<I II. A good analysis can be found in
Collier (1980b) and Frans HOskcn ( 1979).
148. Yet anoihcr common result of research. Collier. Utmani and Jhalnuw and others in Bogor and
Salatiga are among the pioneers. See refercm:cs in Appendix II. See also Hayami and Hafid's
( 1 979) ancmpt empirically LO check 1he paradigm of Collier el al. Also notes Aass' ( 1 977) study
from 1he same area that Geer12 (e1 al.) invcsLigaced in the 1950s.
149. !hid.
ISO. Ibid. esp. Collier ( 1978b) pp. I 7IT. and ( 1980b) pp.49 and 58.
151. While ( 1976) is excellent.
152. ln1ervicws with Whilc(The Hague. 29 and 30 Scpicmber 1980). lhalnuw (Salatiga. S November
1980). Sinaga and Collier (Bogor. 25 November 1980). S;:c also. e.g.. Collier ( 1978c).
153. Cf. PKl's analysis is Chapter 17. p.J. above. in this manuscripl and the communist tradition in
Chapter 3. above.
154. Laclau (1971) pp.28-9
._

223
1 8. Mass Struggle
Bypassed: Elite
Conflicts and Massacre

Led by the chief of Sukarno's bodyguards. Lieutenant-Colonel Untung. a

group of junior officers, known as the 30 September Movement. tried to
arrest seven o f l n donesia's leading generals, among them Defence Minister
Nasution and the Army Chief of Staff, General Yani. on the night of 30
September to 1 October 1965.1
The movement believed it had proof that the seven generals were
building a council which, with the support of the CIA. was planning a coup
d'etat on 5 October. Army Day. The movement wanted to forestall the coup
and defend Sukarno by arresting the generals. moving them to the Halim
airforce base, just outSide Jakarta, interrogate them and then hand them
over to the president The movement was planning to build a national
revolutionary council which would organize general elections. which in
tum would lead to a government in which all political trends were
represented. including the PIG.
One of the seven generals. Defence Minister Nasution. managed,
however, to escape from the soldiers who were sent to arrest him. Three of
the others were killed when they resisted arrest. The other three were soon
executed at the Halim base. At the base there were. among others. Airforce
Commander Dhani (who came out in support of the 30 September
Movement) and probably also Aid it of the PIG. Sukarno found the central
buildings in Jakarta occupied by the 30 September Movement and arrived
at the airforce base in the morning to seek security. It is not clear whether he
became fully informed of the killing of the generals or not.2 but he was
aware that blood had been split.
The president had to appoint a successor to General Yani. He refused to
appoint his deputy. General Suharto. Commander of the Strategic
Reserves, who was not one of the seven generals who were assumed to be
planning a coup. and had therefore not been arrested. Instead, Sukarno
appointed Pranoto. a general of lower rank. as acting commander of the
army.
After some hesitation. Suharto launched a counter-offensive in Jakarta,
cheered on by Nasution. Suharto refused to allow Pranoto to join "the
enemy'' at the Halim base. and instead Suharto occupied the base that
evening. Sukarno moved to his summer palace in Bogor. Aidit Oed by plane

224
 Mass Struggle Bypassed

to Yogyakarta.
During the following days, Sukarno had to admH that Suharto had taken
control over the army, and had to give him the powers to restore law and
order.
Suharto executed these orders with adroit efficiency. While putting down
revolts by officers in Semarang, Yogyakarta and Solo i n Central Java.
among other places. Suharto broadcast on the radio that the bodies of the
dead generals had been found in a well a1 the Halim base. He said that the
airforce must have been involved. But he added that members of the PKfs
youth and women's organizations had also received training in arms and
ammunition at the Halim base. The bodies were exposed in the press and
on television.
Soon. however, the PKJ was made solely responsible for the actions ofthe
30 September Movement. Rumours were spread that the communist
women and youtJ1 had committed sexual. ritual murders of the generals.
The press in the West faithfl.1Uy reported this. After the funeral on 7 October
of the young daughter of Nasution, who had been killed during the
attempted arrest of the general. Muslim extremists were incited and paid to
attack the headquarters of the PKI and also Aidifs home. In addition. on 1 7
October Colonel Sarwo Edhie moved his commando soldiers into Central
.
Java to . clean up". Tb is move legitimized not only protests against the PKI,
but also the murder of communists. The massacres were most macabre in
Central and East Java as well as in Bali. During this period. on 22
November, Aidit was arrested and executed.3
Neither in the towns nor in the rural areas did the communists offer any
substantial resistance. Sukarno did his best to halt the reaction and restrict
the excesses, yet in March 1966 Suharto was able LO demand more personal
power and the fomrnl banning of the PKI.4 The number of corpses
continued to increase, the prisons were overOowing and throughout the
country prison camps mushroomed.
What the PKJ's analyses and strategies were vis-a-vis the coup and the
massacre is still not clear. Did the PKI really support the 30 September
Movement? Was it purely an internal army affair, in which some
communists simply found themselves in the vicinity? Why was Suharto not
arrested? Was he informed of what was going to happen? Was it all a
conspiracy against the PKJ? What part was played by Sukarno? To what
extent was the CIA involved?
There are still no definite answers to questions like these. despite
intensive research and a good deal of speculation.� In this book 1 shall not
make another in-depth study of the historical material. My investigation is
not a historical one which has as its primary objective to lind new sources.
nor yet to reconstruct what happened in September-October 1965. What I
wish to do instead is to use my earlier analyses of the party's strategic
problems to reconstruct the probable long-term deliberations which
preceded and characterized the actions of the PKJ during the latter half of
1965. Did the strategic problems pave the way for the coup? Did the leaders

225
Comm1111i
sr Offensive: 1960-63 10 1965

of the PK.I have any reason to join in a conspiracy? Is it correct as has been
maintained by several researchers, that the peaceful strategy of the PKJ had
been so successful that there was no reason for the leaders to reject the mass
struggle and engage purely in struggles among the elite?6 By doing thfa. I
may also be able to contribute fruitful hypotheses for the continued work of
historical detectives.
The same is true of the massacre. which has become something of a
mystery. The most important thing in my study is not to try to clarify how
many hundred thousand people were murdered. nor exactly what
happened, but. through an investigation of the strategic problems, to make
fresh suggestions as to how such a large and strong communist party could
collapse within just a few months. Was the PKJ's strength a bluff. as many
researchers on both the right and the left have hinted?7

Mass Struggle Bypassed

As I have shown in Chapter 17. the communists were forced to give up the
peasant struggle towards the end of 1 964 and in early 1965. Besides certain
mistakes made by a number of lower cadres, Aidit was unable to detect any
faults in the party's analyses and strategy.8 Instead. in his 1965 New Year
Message. for instance. he maintained that setbacks were due to the
"bureaucratic capitalists" who were strong enough to split the peasants and
sabotage the land reform.9
Consequently the tough peasanc struggle was shelved. The PKJ ought
instead to return primarily to combating the ··bureaucratic capitalists". An
offensive directed at them was. according to AidiL the primary task for
1965.10
But, as I have shown in Chapter 13. the PKJ had also postponed the
workers' struggle against the capitalists. Now Aidit said, in a commentary
on the counter-revolution in Brazil in 1964. for instance. that it was
important for the Indonesian communists to back Sukarno. He recom­
mended a return to the broad fronL11 which ought to be directed lirst at
accentuating the anti-imperialism of Sukarno. and then at exposing and
attempting to purge those who broke with his guidelines.
In Chapter 16. however. I showed how the work of the broad front equally
did not lead to any signilicant results. The "bureaucratic capitalists" were.
indeed. forced to retreat ideologically. but they were able to retain their
positions of power.
When the communists continued to employ this strategy, with all the
problems it entailed. they encountered new difliculties in 1965, which soon
led to a risky direct confrontation berween the PKJ and the army.
I have dealt with the background to this unfortunate connict between the
PIG and the army in Chapter 16. In December 1964 Sukarno banned the
BPS. the Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism. which had gathered a
considerable part of the anti-communist nationalists. In January 1965 the

226
 Mass Srruggle Bypassed

Murba Party was also banned. Consequently a number of innuential anti­

communists in the government and the army. with contacts in the West and
in the East, lost their ability to demonstrate their opposition in more or less
democratic forms. lo addition. up to the middle of the year, the right wing
within the PNT, which had its strongest support on Central Java. was forced
to leave the leadership of the party. Amongst them was the former deputy
prime minister. Hardi, who tried to collaborate with Nasution.'2
Since the Socialist Party and Masjumi. among other parties. had been
banned in an earlier phase. all secularized and legal political opposition
was now formally eliminated. The communists' commitment to political
democracy was, as r have shown in Chapter 1 1. remarkably tenuous. But
this was the last time they applauded restrictions of democratic rights.

Democracy: With Limitations

The result of the bannings was that the opposition was forced to abandon a
relatively democratic public arena. where they had been forced to follow at
least certain rules of the game and where the PKI and others could keep a
watchful eye on them. r nstead the opposition was now forced to collaborate
with extremist Muslim groups whose existence was still tolerated, and. what
was worse. they were driven right into the arms of the army. There the
communists were least likely to be able to get at their opponents. The
political opposition may have been isolated. but it was. in truth. not
disarmed.
Consequently nothing remained for the PKI but to engage in direct
connict with the army, which had become the largest "'opposition
..
party .
The PKJ tried to disarm the military. following the same principles they
had used in the general struggle against the "bureaucratic capitalists'". The
PKI had partial success in interesting Sukarno in a people's militia. a fifth
am1ed force besides the army. airforce, navy and police, justifying this
through the need to intensify the struggle against imperialism in general
and Malaysia i n particular. The PKI also had some success in arguing that
.
it was necessary to "Nasakomize. the armed forces. i.e. that representatives
o f the nationalists. Muslims and communists should be placed as political
officers at different levels in the military.'3
A people's militia would not pose a real military threat to the other
branches of the armed forces. but they would lind a nedglingcuckoo in their
..
nest Together with the political oflicers, this fifth force'" would be able to
open locked doors and break down much of the camaraderie and
unity.14
First. the PKI mobilized broad mass opinion behind these demands, to
help Sukarno to pursue these questions by reference to the popular opinion.
Then they had lo force the military 10 chose sides. for or against Sukarno.
and to '"retool" the disloyal among their ranks.

227
Communi
st Offensfre: 1960·63 10 1965

The result was half-hearted. I n June, Sukarno encouraged the military to

seriously consider his proposal of a ··firth force''. (Now, it should be noted.
Sukarno presented the proposal a s his own, and not as that of the PKI.)
The Commander of the Airforce, General Dhani. agreed immediately,
and added that he had noth ing against Nasakomization. In July the airforce
began training volunteers from the Nasakom movements, including the
PKI.
Like the airforce, the navy was particularly dependent on support from
Sukarno to get a small part of state funds in competition with the gigantic
army. which. in addition. had treasure troves among the state-owned
companies. So the navy d utifully agreed to a fifth force.
Even if Army Chief of Staff General Yani was reluctant to go against the
wishes of Sukarno. he clearly showed bis displeasure by maintaining that it
was up Lo the president Lo make his own decisions.
On 17 August. Independence Day, Sukarno seems to-have made up his
mind about creating a fifth force. On 2 7 September, Yani was forced to
confirm that the army was definitely against the idea.
Doubtless the communists had succeeded in splining the military and
had forced the army command to oppose Sukarno. But even if their
opponents were in a tight corner, they were still very strong. The
communists had nOL succeeded in getting any of the key figures weeded out.
but had managed to provoke several generals. Rumours of imminent coups
d'etat became frequent. But not only were there rumours of coup attempts
against Sukarno and the PKI. but also ofgrowing discontent among junior
and younger officers.15
I n addition. at the beginning of August, Sukarno fell ill. and Jakarta
immediately began humming with speculation about which politicians and
generals were jockeying for the best positions in preparation for the day
when the tightrope walker with such incontestable authority and unrivalled
charisma would disappear."'
The economic crisis at the same time deepened. The price of rice. for
instance. quadrupled in Jakarta during July. August and September.17 And,
as has been mentioned previously. Sukarno told the US to "go to hell" and
proposed an axis between Peking, Pyongyang, Hanoi, Phnom-Penh and
Jakarta.
In the same way as the army infiJintted the PKI. Aidit had some years
before secretly allowed a former socialist trade union leader called Sjam, to
whom he probably owed a favour, lo organize what its opponents called a
special bureau. Biro Klrnsus. Its tasks were to gather information and make
contacts in the armed forces.18 Aidit had not asked his central committee for
their approval of his little information bureau.19 It would presumably have
been devastating if the army could have proven that the PK.I was trying to
infiltrate the army in exactly the same way as the army was trying to
infiltrate the PKI. And there were risks of leaks from the central committee.
In addition. there were major Oaws in the internal democratic processes
within the PKI. Aidit governed with an iron and sovereign band.20

228
 Mass Struggle Bypassed

Aidit and presumably also some other members oftbe Politburo thus had
the possibility of informing themselves both oftbe threats, true or false, of a
coup against Sukarno and of the counteraction planned by the officers in
the opposition.
The position in which the PKJ leaders found themselves was very
awkward. It was unthinkable to meet the threat from the military with a
renewed and tough mobilization of the peasantry, as the peasants' struggle
was blocked. The same had long been true of the workers· struggle. And a
broad mobilization of the masses behind Sukarno was troublesome for the
generals, but did not affect their basic positions of power. I f the leaders of
the PKI chose to beat the drums of propaganda and with the help of the
party a n d the mass orga nization s pu h licize revelations of the likelihood of
the generals planning a coup d'etat, the threat would, of course, be instantly
removed. But there would have to be indisputable proof if the coup-makers
were not to retain their positions and make new plans.
What my earlier analyses indicate. and from what I have learned from
former leading communists, it appears that Aidit instead abandoned the
mass struggle in favour of elite conflicts. Presumably he judged that the
advantages outweighed the risks when he decided not to stop, but on the
contrary to more or less foment the 30 September Movement. This might
partly make possible what Castro had achieved so successfully, i.e. to take
up the cudgels for communism without having the hammer and sickle
stamped on their foreheads.21 In the best case it would disarm the most
prominent and most powerful anti-communists in the country, and in the
worst case. if it failed, it would still cause considerable damage and lead to
splits within the army. H only Aidit could keep the PKJ as an organization
outside it all, then the risks should be minimal.
In other words, mass struggle was the first to be abandoned, and then also
cadres as high up as members of the central committee, presumably also
some members of the Politburo. l n the end, only Aidit and some of his
trusted aides remained.
Understandably, there is considerable bitterness directed towards Aidit.
"He betrayed us·· is one of the most common conclusions. But the tangible
peasant and worker struggles were in fact blocked, as long as there were no
changes in the analyses and strategies. which could not be done with a wave
of the hand. And any attempt to expose a number of plans for coups d'etat
might have lifted the struggle for the day. but would bardJy have prevented
the generals from retaining their positions nor from trying to find new ways
of getting al the PKl. ln that situation, when the army was on the offensive,
Aidit would surely have been criticized for not having displayed sufficient
interest in the contradictions within the armed forces and for having lost the
chance of allowing an officers· movement to disann the generals. This
might have given the PKJ room to breathe and new opportunities.

229
Commu11ist OJ!ensfre: 1960-63 10 1965

Elite Conflicts

The unsolved strategic problems I have analysed in previous chapters

would thus indicate that it ought to have been natural for Aidit to abandon
the mass struggle and instead bank on the possibility that the officers'
movement that had emerged could stem the military threat primarily
against the communists.
The actions of the 30 September Movement were. however, such a
resounding failure that the new command of the army was able lo maintain
that the PKl was the spider in the web and in that way unite the divided
armed forces against the communists. and not attempt the impossible by
trying to turn them against Sukarno.
The first thing that happened was that the arrested generals were
murdered instead of being detained. interrogated and turned over to
Sukarno. according to the orders of Lt-Col. Untung.
Second, Defence Minister Nasution managed to escape and lo make
demands in Jakarta for rapid action against the 30 September Movement.
Third, General Suharto did not remain neutral. which the 30 September
Movement had obviously believed he would. In the end it was he who hit the
movement hardest.
These are the main circumstances which led to significant historical
research which indicates that the 30 September Movement was infiltrated
and perhaps should even be regarded as a group plotting against the PKI.22
How was it possible, otherwise. for an officers· movement to make such a
grave mistake?
But provocation and infiltration arc one thing. conspiracy is quite another.
What we know at present indicates that the 30 September Movement grew
up quite independently. and that some of the top communist leaders knew
what was in the offing. Consequently I stick to my thesis that the strategic
problems forced Aidit to abandon the mass struggle and instead in some
way to foment the officers' movement which had already grown up.
I do not deny that many provocations were directed at the PKI during the
latter part of 1965. It would be surprising ifthere had not been. The military,
many political groups which had been driven out into the cold, and others
- including the CIA- had similar vital interests in ··exposing" the PKl for
offences against the state and against Sukarno, as the PKI had in exposing
the generals. It has. for instance, never been conclusively proven that there
was a real council ofgenerals which was planning a coup against Sukarno.
It might have been just a rumour in order to provoke compromising
counteractions from the P Kl.23 On lhe other hand. the new regime has of
course done all it could to hide possible traces of evidence that the
murdered generals really were involved in planning a coup d'etat.
But the generals themselves could hardly have conspired against the PKl.
since they were the ones to be killed.
If others, such as members of Murba. the army's secret service. or
American or British under-cover agencies. arranged the murder of the

230
 Mass Struggle Bypassed

generals in order to discredit the PKl. why did they not see to it that all the
generals were killed at the Halim airforce base, for there were one or two
communists there to take the blame? And why did they not gather more
communists at Halim? It has been difficult for the regime to prove that the
communists were responsible.24
The killing of the first three generals may, as Crouch maintains, have
been a mistake clue to ambiguous orders. And maybe the three remaining
generals were simply shot in panic, to silence witnesses. etc.25 It appeared
that Sukarno was prepared to smooth this over, saying. 'That sort of thing
will happen in a revolution.''26 And in Jakarta everything depended on what
steps Nasution and Suharto, the latter believed to be neutral, would take.
It was Suharto who gained most from the actions of the officers. Can he
have engineered a conspiracy against the PI<l?27
Suharto was certainly aware of the plans of the 30 September Movement.
But this was not because he himself was bebind them, but because one of
the real leaders, Colonel Latief, informed him that a coup was being
planned by other senior officers, and that preventive action was being
planned by an officers' movemenL Latiefwas convinced that his old friend
and colleague Suharto would not turn against the 30 September
Movement.28
Suharto was in the good books of neither Nasution norYani. But that he
would attempt to have them murdered is unlikely.29
Above all, he did not need to. It is plausible that when Suharto learned of
the plans of the 30 September Movement. be refrained from informing
Nasution and Yan� in order to await events. Since Suharto was ordinarily
Yani's deputy. he would consequently replace him, or at least get
considerably more power even ifYani were not murdered but only arrested
for planning a coup, particularly if Nasution were also neutralized.
Nasution had been trying to pin corruption charges on Suharto.30 And if the
officers' movement were to faiJ, Suharto would aJways be able to bend with
the wind and hit the rebels hard, thereby ''saving the nation".
Consequently Suharto at first hesitated. But Nasution had got away. Thus
Suharto was not able completely to ignore his orders to launch direct action
to destroy the 30 September Movement.31 Only when Suharto found out that
Sukarno had not appointed him as Yani's successor, but had appointed
Pranoto. a lower-ranking general who was much more friendly towards
Sukarno, and who bad tried to get Suharto charged with corruption, did
Suharto take up the big stick and allow Colonel Sarwo Edhie to occupy the
Halim base.32 And another few days passed before Suharto became
obsessed with accusing the communists of the actions of the 30 September
Movement. At first the culprit was held to be the airforce.33 It is hardly likely
that Suharto can be held solely responsible for planning such a gigantic
conspiracy against the PK!.
Only too soon, however. the army took advantage ofthe situation to dea! a
death blow Lo the communists at the same time as the divided military
thereby acquired a common enemy. reunited, and mobilized support from

231
Communist O.ffensfre: 1960-63 10 1965

fanatic Muslims. Christians, righL-wing nationalists, former leading

socialists. the WesL etc.

Massacre

With the exception ofa very rew leaders and activists the entire apparatus of
the Communist Party and the mass organizations were caught napping by
the unsuccessful actions of the 30 September Movement and the
accusations levelled against the PK.I. Indeed several of the members of the
Politburo were away at the turn of the month.34
On 5 October a declaration was issued by those members of the Politburo
who were able LO meet. They made it clear that the 30 September Movement
was an internal affair of the armed forces. in which the PKI had not
interfcrccl and would not interfere. They warned that there might be
provocations and encouraged their members to join ranks behind Sukarno.
relying on him to solve the connicts. On 6 October Lukman and Njoto
participated in a meeting of the government.JS
But Aidit had Oed. or perhaps had been tricked into Oeeing. to
Yogyakarta, which was unprepared to receive him. He was forced 10 creep
stealthily round in the PKI heartland round Solo. without achieving
anything more Lhan helping the cadres to avoid being provoked too far.
Finally he was betrayed. arrested and. on the general orders of Suharto.
executed. without standing trial. on 22 November.31> Not long afterwards. the
rest of the prominent leaders were divided among themselves and were also
on the run like Aidit. By December 1966. all the members of the Politburo
were either dead or in detention. with the exception ofJusuf Adjitorop. who
was in China at the time of the events.37
Not even the radical opposition 10 Aid it within Lhe leadership ofLhe party
was able to offer an alternative leadership. After the meeting in Jakarta in
October, divisions arose on questions such as whether all collaboration
with Sukarno was unacceptable and whether a new central commiuee
could be proclaimed or not.311
And Sukarno was unable. despite his single-minded attempts, to stop the
anti-communist crusade which was now being organized.39
All that remained was a total catastrophe.
First the world's third largest communist party. with probably lens of
millions of sympathizers. had been put aside because the mass struggle had
been blocked by insoluble strategic problems. Then a few individual
centrally-placed leaders had taken over the so-called Leninist mass party
and staked everything on elite conOicts in general and particularly on a
rebel officers· movement. while the membership. doubtless "for the sake of
the party". was kept in blissful ignorance.
Thus it was of course impossible for the innocent masses to organize
themselves Lo meet the repression. let alone initiate a strong workers· and
peasants' struggle. since this avenue was blocked. But they were noL even

232
 Mass Struggle Bypassed

prepared to launch a broad defensive movement. Their leaders did not

..
succeed even in meeting. let alone in uniting and Leading "their huge mass
party with a firm band. Consequently, the entire party was left in the dark
and the strongly-centralized movement left without a hope of defending
itself. despite Sukarno's support. Had things been otherwise, it might have
been possible to mobilize everyone for fundamental democratic principles.
or at least for the human right to live without the threat of terror and
murder.
It was primarily because of this sabotage of the necessary preconditions
for the functioning of a mass party that the army could freely arrest and
murder whoever it wished. There was no genuine party democracy, nor
informed members and sympathizers. It was not because the P K I may have
been a bluff. nor yet because it was a broad mass party with many poorly­
scbooled members and sympathizers which came nowhere near the
Leninist standards of an elite party, as some researchers and political critics
have argued.4<1
And without broad popular protests against the attacks, the army's
rampage suddenly opened the way for those forces which had been
muzzled during the struggle for a land reform: religious. political and
economic contradictions could come to the forefront.41 The PKI's
opponents were able to take the law into their own hands. particularly in
East Java and Bali. and with no restrictions, meeting no opposition to speak
of.42 nor even any authoritative admonitions to exercise some self-control,
they were able to destroy, plunder. burn, murder, expel . . . 43
In the same way. racism against the Indonesian Chinese was unleashed
again, once the only consistently anti-racist parry had been destroyed.
in West Java, where the PKI was not as strong as further east, and where
there was little division in the armed forces, it appears that communists a11d
communist sympathizers were for the most part arrested, despite several
murders and general terrorism.44
The picture in Central Java was more complex. First showing itself
capable of extreme terror and murder, the army was later able to work quite
'"legaJJy'" in some cases. It could use lists of registered communists, or get
help from certain viUagers in identifying people and complementing their
information. and those identified would then be arrested. ln other cases, the
army and young right-wing terrorists helped each other to hunt down and
execute people with left-wing sympathies.45
The most widespread massacres occurred in those places where the army
did not manage the situation alone, or where it did not need to do so, but was
helped by anti-communists leagues. This was the predominant pattern in
East Java and Bali.
[n EastJavu fanatical Muslim youth organizations were the lirst to go out
in a "'holy war" against the communists. Afterwards it was possible to see
that the population density fell in areas where the PKI had had the most
votes in previous elections.46 And in the Kediri area it was necessary to
prevent the bodies in the rivers from noating into the irrigation canals

233
Comm1111i
st Olfensfre: 1960·63 to 1965

leading to the rice paddies. When the bodies in Surabaya were StTanded on
the banks at low water. they became a health hazard.47 Many communists
were teachers. When the schools in East Java opened in early 1966, more
than a third of the teachers were missing.48
In Bali it was not Muslim fanatics but primarily young right-wing
nationalists who managed to create such a bloodbath that the entire social
structure was threatened. and the military had to be called in to check the
excesscs.49
It was in Java and BaJi, where the PKI had been strongest, that there were
the most murders and arrests. But there were also reports of massacres in
other areas. In North Sulawesi Christian groups were behind the mass
murders. And in Sumatra General KemaJ Idris is said to have murdered
about 20 per cent of the plantation workers. on the orders of Suharto.50
It is impossible to slay how many people were murdered in the whole
country. The figures vary between 100.000 and a million. Probably many
more were arrested, even if the majority of detainees were released after a
few months. But up to a fewyears ago about 100.000 people still remained in
prison and internment camps.
At first it was possible for some communist leaders to live underground
and try to reorganize. But the most prominent leaders were arrested one by
one. People came under increasing pressure and grew frightened. The
Secretary-General of the PKJ, Sudisman. who led the Politburo after the
death of Aidit. and who delivered a Maoist-coloured self-cricicism.5 1 was
arrested in December 1966. After that. 1he leaders. with Central Committee
member Hu tapea in the vanguard, seem 10 have found it necessary to create
liberated areas from which Maoist-style guerrilla struggle couJd be
launched.s2 In 1968 the army succeeded in crushing most of the
guerrillas.53
Today not only the communists, but the left as a whole. are trying once
more to develop analyses and lines of action which do not simply copy
famous foreign models. As far as I know. they are trying to build a broad.
informal fron1, sufficiently vague so as not to become a living target. but
strong enough to undermine the regime and force through the protection of
democratic rights.

Notes

I. The following brief accounl or cvcnls is primnrily based on Crouch (1973). Holznppcl ( 1979).
May ( 1978) Chap. 3. McVcy ( 1969h) pp.378-88. Mortimer ( 1974;i) Appendix A and 0. Rey (1966).
U1rcc:h1 ( 1 979h) pp 141·52. Werlhcim ( 1970) and (1979) nnd Budiordjo ( 1 982).
2. See esp. Holzappel (1979) p.233.
3. In rn. 36 below I return to 1his point
4. See. c.g_ U1r�cht ( 1 979b) pp.152·64 and May (1978) Ch;ip. 4.

234
 Mass Stn1ggle Bypassed

5. Sec literature in fn. I and other references in those works. For the version ofthe regime and those
close to it sec. e.g.. accounts in Mortimer ( 197411) pp.4181T.. Brackman ( 1969). KroeJ (1966) and
Pauker( 1969). For a macabre thesis on the possibili1yofSukarno being involved see Dake (1973)
and cf. Utrecht"s ( 1975b) review.
6. Sec. e.g.. Mortimer (1974a) pp.392fT. and Wertheim (1979) pp.202-3.
7. Sec. e.g.. Brackman (1969) Chap. 1 1 . Cf. Griswold { 1979) and note a typical answer in interviews:
-At most 5 per cent of the 3.S million members were real communisl.'i:· Interview No. 22 with
former PKI activist (Jakarta. 1980).
8. Mortimer ( 1972) pp.60- l.
9. Ibid. and R�l"tt'l<• of/lrtlonesia l (1965) pp.1·6 and 8·11.
10 Ibid
11. Ibid. and Rl'l'1t•11• of/11do11t-sia Nos. 5·6 ( 1974) p.19.
12. Rocamora ( 1974) pp.531·9. Interview with Hardi (Jakarta. 25 October 1980).
13. For the suggestion of the PKJ and the development of events. which is retold below. see. e.g..
Mortimer ( 1974a) pp.381·5.
14. Ibid. p.383. which cites personal communication with McVey.
15. Sec references in fn I above. Utrecht says. e.g.. that Njoto of the Politburo told him as early as
April 1965 that dissatisfied officers "·ere planning an action against the generals in Jakarta.
Utrecht ( 1 979b) p.141 Sec also Holzappcl ( 1 979) p.221 .
16. Sec. e.g.. Brackman (1969) p.51 amongst the references in fn. I and 5.
17. Mortimer {1974a) p.386.
18. In addition to the general references in fn. I. I here base my wri1ings on interviews with former
leading members of the party who had central positions as well as a former relatively close
associate of the Biro Kl11m1s and a reliable activis1; some of them have had the opportunity of
j
questioning. 11111•r alia. S nm and Njono. Sudisman and Njoto ofthe Politburo. For the dcht of
!hanks to Sjam see also p.63. above
19. Interviews No. 29. 52 and 58 with former members of the central committee (Jnkana. 1980).
20. Ibid. and fn. 18.
21. In addition lo the parallels with Castro. whose successes and methods were discussed in leading
pnrty circles. former activists have pointed out in intervie"'S how Aidit analysed the fall of Ben
Bella in Algeria. A formerclose associate of the part)' mentionsthatAidit had priva1clyexplained
thnl a coup or revolution like that in Algeria did not affect the balance of forces between the
classes 10 any significanl extent. bu1 that it could be used as an excuse to mobilize 1he people.
"Aidit encouraged an Algerian activist to use Boumedicnne·s need of popular support 10
rnohililC 1he peopk behind more radical demands and to invohe them in more far-going
actions. Maybe he had similar ideas about the 30 September MovcmenC Interview Nos. 16 and
24 (Juknrlll. 1980). To wha1 extent the fact that Aidit - according 10 a reliable source quoting
Aidil's wife- had leamed that he was seriously ill (which he had kept as a lop secret) affected his
decisions is more dubious.
22. Sec. e.g
.
. Wertheim (1970) :ind (1979). Holzappcl ( 1 979) and Budiardjo (1982).
23. Wertheim ( 1979) pp.2 1 l IT:(Sj:1m·s role as leader forthe BiroKlwsus has also been debated; was he
a double-agent'! Sjam is the s1ronges1 source orevidence enabling the regime 10 prove that it was
the PKI which was the spider in the web. Doubtless Sjam had a grip of some kind over Aidit.
because or the debt of gratitude owed to Sjam. See p 63. above. and fn. 18).
24. Ahhough Holzappcl (1 979) promotes the conspiracy theory. he himselfshows how double agents
s
did not ucceed in involving communists in these actions.Ofall the PKJ leaders. it was only Aidit
who presumably was al the Halim air base (see pp.244-5). and II has been dinicuh to show that
there really were communist ac1ivists involved in the murder of the generals at Halim. {Cf. May
(1978) pp.103-114. as an example of 1he difficulties involved in pinning the blame on the
PKI.)
25. Crouch (1973) pp. 16-17.
26. May ( 1 978) p.99.
27. Wertheim (1970) and (1979). and Budiardjo ( 1 982). indicate this.
28. Ibid. ( 1 979) pp.208fT. and the Latief case ( 1 979) or the complete Indonesian version in Laticr
(1978).

235
Communist Offensfre: 1960·63 10 1965

29. Holzappel ( 1979) p237. also admits this. Concerning theconOict between Suharto and Nnsution
see. e.g.. Wertheim ( 1979) p.209. 1 have also made good use ofan interview with Nasution (Jakarta.
22 November. 1980). Concerning the contradictions between Suharto and Yani. sec especially
Budiardjo ( 1982) pp.13-14. but also May ( 1978) p.1 19. Similar contradictions were pointed out to
me in Jakarta in 1979 during conversation No. 02 with people close to Yani"s widow.
30. Utrecht ( 1 979b) pp.69-70 and Wertheim ( 1979) p.209 on Nasution. Suk;1rno and Suharto·s
corruption.
31. According to Na.sution (interview. Jakarta. 22 November 1980). Suharto did not carry out
Nasution's order - until sometime between 2 and 3pm - to use the radio transmitter in
Bandung to answer the 30 September Movement and rapidly call troops to Jakarta from the
reliable Siliwangi division. Suharto used his own troops instead and troops from EastJava which
until quite recently had belonged to the rebels. As for as I have been able to ascertain. General
Nasution·s version is correct.
In addition. it ought to be noted that Suharto made sure of gelling rid of Nasution on the
morning of I October. by sending him to hospital for the treatment of slight injuries sustained
during his ecape
s from the soldiers and probably also for the tre:1tmcnt ofhis daughtcr·s serious
injuries during the auempt to arrest him: May ( 1978) p.99. Later Suharto succeeded in
outmanoeuvring Nasution completely. Since 1968 Nasution has belonged to the conservative
opposition. When I asked him about why the oflicer·s movement did not arrest Suharto. he even
thought Wertheim·s thesis on Suharto having prior knowledge of the 30 September Movement
etc. was very interesting.
32. Sec fn. 28 and Utrecht ( 1979b) p. 148. and Wertheim ( 1970) p.55, on .how Suh:mo played a double
waiting-game once before. <luring the revolution in the forties. Cf. also how he used a similar
tactic in outmanoeuvring General Sumitro in 1973-74. May (1978) p.3041T.
33. Werthdm ( 1 979) p.200.
34. Sec. e.g.. ibid. p.204 and fn. 37 below.
35. Mortimer ( 1 974a) pp.388-9.
36. According to former communists who have looked into the circumstances surrounding Aidit"s
night (for example. through interviews in prisons). Sukarno first planned to leave Halim by air
for the Mudiun air base. He did not do this because of the threat ofauack by Suharto·s soldiers
who had access to anti-aireraftsystems. and because he was thus afraid ofprovoking a civil war.
In that situation. Aidit was duped into fleeing to Central Java. while Sukarno travelled to Bogor
(personal communication No. 73). Sjam is said to have ordered Aidit to go to Yogyakarta. Noone
is believed to have been there to meet Aidit in Yogyakarta. who searched in vain for some
comrades and then took the bus to Solo. He continued by bicycle to a ccnain village. but returned
10 Solo again. One of his assiswnL�. Kusno. tried to help him to nee further to EastJava. but Aidit
refused since he could not speak Javanese. {Aiclit was born in Medan in North Sumatra.)
Interviews No. 22 and 29 (Jakana 1980). In the end. Aidit was betrayed by an oge111 pro»ocareur
who was working in the PKI on Nasution·sordcrs. Aidit was arrcst�d in Solo on t.hc momingof22
November and was first treated well. as befitting a cabinet m i nister. Later he was to be taken to
Semarang. Colonel Yasir Hadisubroto left the column with Aidit. however. and at a hase in
Boyolali. just west of Solo. he was executed by angry soldiers who reacted when Aidit bt.'gan
agitating while standing against a wall. The present governor and now General Ha<lisubroto.
who mentioned this in a newspaper interview (Kompas. Jakarta. 5 October 1980). added that he
allowed Aidit to be executed on the orders of Suharto. See Tapol (1980).
37. Mortimer ( 1 974a) p.J9J.
38. Interviews 52. 58. 59 and 62 with some ofthe participants Jakarta
( 1980). 1 do not want to make the
details public. Sec also p.234.
39. May ( 1978). e.g.. Chap 4. Sukarno was removed from office in March 1967 and died on 21 June
1970. On his death. sec ibid. pp.240ff.
40. See fn. 7 above. Hauswedcll ( I 973) pp.141·2 is perhaps an exception. The fact that in due course of
time leading cadres were informed nbout the likelihood ofa generals· coup. and that the party"s
response would be to wait and strike back afterwards. but that another alternative - to Lnkc their
own initiatives - was introduced only a rew days before 30 September among a very limited
numhcr or members. did not improve mailers.

236
 Mnss Sm1ggfe Bypassed

41. O n the conncct1on bctw1.·cn the strugl!le over l!lnd reform and the mnssacrcs. sec. i n addition to
Chap. 17 above. Monimer ( 1972) pp.64ff. and Wcnhcim ( I "66).
42. Some limited local and prcsumahly spontaneous resistance did. however. occur. al least in the
PKI heartland round Solo and Klatcn in Central Javn. For example. activists blocked the roads
wuh trees they had cut down to stop troop transpons. Resistance also occurred in the area around
Banyu-..angi 1n East Java. as well as around Medan in North Sumatra. Interview No 52 with
former lcadini! member of the party (Jakarta. 1980).
43 A readable general report on the massacre is Hughes ( 1968). See also Ron Hatlcy"s forthcoming
doc1ornl thesis on the massacre.
44. Jackson (1978) pp.7·8. Nusution was also keen 10 point to these circumstances. According 10
Nasuuon. a responsible army would even. after 1968. have been able to create some kind or
reconciliation between all tho�e who once had backed the PKI. in cxncl.ly the same way as was
done wuh the rebels of 1958 once they had been conquen:d. As I have already pointed ouL
Na.ution joined the conscrvati\c opposition against Suharto in 1968. Interview (Jakarta. 22
November 19�0) In 1hisc:onnec1ion it ought 10 be added that the PKrsorg;1niza1ion in WestJava.
undcroneor1he lcti-wingopposihon members within the party. Ismail Bakri. rapidly t.lissociatl!d
itself from the 30Scptembcr Movement. Interview No. 29 with a former PKI leader who took part
in thi� decision (Jakart:i. 1980). Also note that Secretary-General Sudisman. in his defence
speech does not mention any extensive mass murders in West Java. Sudisman. ( 1 975) p.21.
45. Interviews with Ron Halley (Bendigo. Australia. 10 October 1980) as well as researchers in
Yoi!yalmrta (4 and 16 November 1980).
46 Hatley. op. cit
47. Moy ( l 978) p.l23.
48. Hatley. op. cit
49. May. op. cit
50. Ibid. p.123-4.
51. The self-criticism which was the mo�� Maoist in colour was dated Septemher 1966: sec PKI
(1971). II has since been internationally publicized. especially by the former member of the
Politburo.JusufAdjitorop. who has been based in Peking since 1965. Sudisman was co-author of
this document. II was wrincn as a reaction 10 the so-called Bandung theses. which. among other
things. put the blame for failures on the collaboration with Sukarno. Bakri"s idcns lie behind
rhesc theses. Though many of these theses were also 10 be found in Sudisman·s self-criticism.
Bakri and Sudisman were not able to put forward a joint viewpoint. For references. see fn. 38
above.
Sudisman·s defence speech in 1967 (Sudisman. 1975) ncvcnhclcss exhibits considerably more
nuance und i� based on nn independent re11ppraisal from the standpoint of genuine Javanese
conditions. when compared 10 the self-criticism.
52. I111erviews No. 3 1 . 52. 58. 62 and 67 with former leading communists and others with lir..1-hand
knowledge of those who tried 10 carry on the work of the PK! and 10 remodel it as a Maoist
guerrilla party (Jaknna. 1980).
53. Sec. e.g.. Utrecht ( i 975a) and May ( 1978) Chap. 6. e.g.. pp.203-4.

237
Summary and Conclusions

1 9. Why Did the PKI Fail ?

Defective Theory a n d Analysis

In my approach and method I have used research on structural factors

which determined policies in order to see to whal extent the PKI succeeded
in taking these factors into account when its strategy was formulated and
applied.
It was, doubtless, obvious that there were factors which the leaders did not
have the opportunity of taking into account nor of affecting, and which
contributed to the failure of the party - so-called objective causes. It was
also obvious that the organization of the party had major defects and that
one couId discuss whether the path orpeace and democracy was practicable
or not. But I have not paid particular attention to so-called objective causes
or organizational problems, nor to the question of the peaceful or the armed
struggle. With my approach and method I have, instead, been able lo show
that the analysis oftbe development of society by the leadership of the party
was so defective that the strategy could not possibly have led to success
without a considerable amount or sheer good fortune. This is because a
strategy based on a sound analysis of the factors determining political
developments must be regarded as a necessary, if insufficient, precondition
for a communist party's success.

Ethnocentric Theory on the Rise of Capitalism

The strategy of the communists was directed towards critical support ofand
collaboration with the social forces interested in realizing a "national and
democratic revolution". These, of course, included the workers and
peasants, but also, according to current theories, those bourgeois forces
which tried to build a national capitalism but were prevented from doing so
by imperialism and feudalism. Other capitalists, compradors and so-called
bureaucratic capitaUsts, as well as feudal forces, would be out-manoeuvred
and isolated through an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal policy.
Since national capitalist development was regarded as being blocked
within both the agricultural and the industrial sectors, those who were

238
 Why Did the PK! Fail?

working for such a development would not be able to complete the

revolution. The communists would thus be able to take over the leadership,
and, with the support of the masses, ensure the economic and social
development which the bourgeoisie had managed to bring to Europe, but
had not succeeded in implementing in the Third World. Successively they
could then advance towards socialism.
One of the basic causes of the failure of the PKI was tbat this strategy did
not hold. Tb is was because capitalism in both agriculture and industry and
trade, while not being able to develop in the same way as in the current
European model, could nevertheless develop in different ways and in other
fonns that the communists were not able to analyse. Relevant Marxist theory
lacked and still lacks good tools for analysing how capital ism can develop
in areas where imperialism coexisted with and dominated pre-colonial
modes of production. I t is not fruitful to talk in terms of Europe's pure
capitaJjsm and feudalism.
The way in which capitalism emerged in Indonesia was very different
from that of its classical European counterpart, the model for both Marxist
and non-Marxist theories. Consequently. newly-emergent capitalism could
not be properly understood by using the theories of the communists, nor
could it be counteracted by their established strategies.
Io no way do I deny the decisive importance of state intervention in the
development of European capitalism. for example, in Germany, Russia and
Sweden, as well as in the countries where it origi nated. But the significance
of this has too often been neglected i n prevalent theories, including Marx.isl
ones. We must also take into account the colonial heritage of countries such
as Indonesia. They inherited a stale that was far ahead of the domestic
economy and classes. Furthermore, it is obvious Lhat the emergence of new
forms of capitalism is not only due to extensive state intervention led by a
bureaucratic social category. but also to the success or decisive sections of
this '"bureaucracy" in getting individual control of parts of the state
apparatus. Thus these "bureaucrats" were able lo develop their own bases,
and to use their political, administrative and military powers over the
economy to subordinate labour. to monopolize markets and to control
natural resources in building capitalism. The importance of international
capital is a new phenomenon compared Lo the period in which European
capitalism emerged. Thus the new potential capitalists in Indonesia could
offer a vitally important ability to control the extra-economic prerequisites
for capitalist development to international and domestic Ch inese owners of
capital.
It is true that it was possible for the national upperclasscs to reach success
by directly investing in trade and production. Thesesecmrs were dominated
by foreign capital. But it was perfectly possible for certain fractions of these
same upper classes to use extra-economic powers to create their own bases,
as well as new and better preconditions for capitalist trade and production
which served their own interests. and benefited those fractions of domestic
and foreign capital which were prepared to co-operate.

239
Summary a11d Conc/11sio11s

Similarly, the theoretically ideal type of agricultural development which

required the redistribution of relatively large landed estates was out of the
question in Java. There was no traditional feudalism where landlords
dominated and concentrated the land. The predominant pattern was.
instead. that of patrons centralizing a surplus produced by clients whose
plots were too small to give them the economic strength to stay independent.
Thus extra-economic powers were required within agriculture too, against
the many small and poor peasants, in order to separate man from land, to
concentrate the land thus acquired, and lo tum both men and land into
monopolized commodities. 011ly then was it possible to introduce today's
controversial "green revolution" and to capitalize agricultural production.
The P Kl could neither analyse the vacillating interests of the nationalists
in private capitalism, democracy and anti-feudalism in the villages, nor
appreciate how the nationalists in the state apparanis. most of whom were
in uniform, were able to build not a neo-colonial but a post-colonial
capitalism - with the assistance of anti-imperialist forces. of forma!Jy state­
owned. but in reality privately-controlled monopolies, and by control over
the labour force. As 1 wrote in Chapter 9, the bourgeoisie in Europe
advanced where feudalism was weakest - on the economic level. In most
underdeveloped countries. the bourgeoisie was. however, hampered by the
economically superior imperialists. Many of those who otherwise might
have become private capitalists thus went i n for careers in administration
and politics, where the imperialists were relatively weak, and used extra­
economic positions of power to build themselves another capitalism.
The PKJ was also unable to make a correct analysis of what kind of
monopoly of land determined the decisive contradictions and hampered
development in the rural areas. The rural lords did not mainly base their
exploitation on concentrated land but on centralization of surplus
produced on others' land. Consequently the PKJ did not realize that the
typical capitalist model of redistribution of relatively large properties was
excluded and that there were basically only two ways open for development
to take place. Either the peasants would have to concentrate the land
themselves or else the overlords, supported by the post-colonial capitalists
in the state apparatus. would be able to subordinate the peasants and
combine centralization of the surplus with the concentration of land.
thereby laying the foundation for a brutal post-colonial capitalization of
agriculture.
In all essentials, this meant there was nothing left of the PK.l's strategy.
The mass struggle was not effective. despite considerable dissension and
despite th e very broad support the PKI enjoyed. The leadership of the party
took refuge in elite struggles in Jakarta. They failed, and were followed by a
massacre of the left, which was caught napping and was utterly
defenceless.

240
 Why Did the PK/ Fail?

Nationalists without Classic Bourgeois Interests -

Post-colonial Capitalism and the State

The narional bourgeoisie and other monstrosities

The communists sought collaboration with and supported the nationalists
generally. primarily the PNI and particularly Sukarno. It was said that they
represented the interests of a so-called national bourgeoisie in building a
traditional capitalist development which was in conflict with imperialism,
compradors and feudaJ landJords.
The result was. certainly. the launching of an anti-imperialist foreign
policy and the beginning of the disintegration of the colonial economy. But
there was no attempt to build a national economy which could replace what
was ruined. Instead, Indonesia was hard hit by economic and political
crises. The so-called national bourgeoisie of the nationalists became largely
a corrupt monstrosity trying to use political and administrative positions in
the stale lo enrich themselves. At the same time. skilled Chinese capitalists
were hampered from going from trade to domestic production. And the
blows to the colonial export economy not only hit imperialism. but also
adversely affected domestic producers for export, as well as traders. These
were mainly to be found on the outer islands, where there was now
intensified smuggling and where extensive regional rebellions broke ouL
The contradiction between the analyses of the PKI and actual develop­
ments was significant. The communists may well have been able to make a
more subtle analysis of their concept of the national bourgeoisie by
deciding lo apply Lenin's theory consistently. and not a mixture of his
theories and Stalin·s. (The reader will recall that the PKI identified a
national bourgeoisie on the same political grounds as Lenin, but built its
analysis of how this bourgeoisie would act on Stalin·s economic theories.)
With Lenin only, the PKI wouJd at least have been rid of Stalin's
determinism: capitalist development is blocked and the national bour­
geoisie musr move against imperialism. As I wrote in Chapter 9, it has
seldom happened that a party so large has attached so much importance to,
invested so many hopes in and adapted itselflo such a degree to a fraction of
a class that it has known so little about.
But an analysis built on Lenin's theories would not have revealed that the
nationalists would tum against imperialism and feudalism mainly by
acquiring political and administrative positions. and not by trying to build
a 1raditional capitalism. As long as the na1ionalists had not acquired any
significant political and administrative power over the economy, even the
political road to capitalism was. however, not traversable. What the
communis1s· so-called national bourgeoisie actually did was lo push
I ndoncsia from a colonial economy into a nationaI economic crisis. without
the leadership of the PKI being in a position to foresee this by use of its
theoretical 1ools.

241
Summary and Co11c/11sio11s

The New Lords ofAnti-Imperialism

Side by side with, and increasingly complementary to. the investments in a
so-ca Ued national bourgeoisie, the PKI worked hard for the nationalization
of foreign companies and for a state-run national economy. The communists
had a vague but positive view of the state. It was no longer colonial and the
capitalists were so weak that they could not use the state exclusively as their
own tool. The PKl believed that the nationalists could seize control of the
state apparatus and use it in the struggle for a national economy and against
imperialists, compradors, corrupt domestic businessmen, feudal landlords
and so on. Even the army was looked on with some approval. At least it
fought against regional rebels who were trying to collaborate with
imperialism. In several respects, the PKI anticipated the discussion of the
early sixties on non-capitalist development
As part of the struggle for Irian Jaya. all the Dutch companies in
Indonesia were confiscated and nationalized, much more rapidly Urn a the
communists had anticipated. According to the PKI's strategy, the workers
would take over the companies and then turn them over to the government,
but what actually occurred was that the workers were driven out of the
boardrooms or were forestalled by the army. A state of emergency was
proclaimed and retained up to 1963. And the army did not do more than
formally hand over the companies. On the contrary. the officers acquired a
firm grip over the state's guidance of the economy. New capitalists grew up
within the indistinctly class-based state that the PKJ; conceptualized: they
were partly military company managers with civilian subordinates, and
partly regular army oCficers who guided the economy at the centre, side by
side with civilian bureaucrats. The new capitalists often mismanaged the
companies, pocketed large portions of the surplus themselves and sent the
rest to the army. which thus acquired an independent financial base.
Not only was the PKI's analysis overtaken by actual developments but so
were its Lheoretical assumptions. It cannot be maintained that a proper
capitalist state proved to be the danger. And the capitalist threat did not
depend on certain nationalists allying with the comprador bourgeoisie and.
with its support, trying to unite the state with imperialism. which would
have been a theoretical possibility. Instead, it was the nationalists of
indistinct class base who started to build an unusual form of capitalism in
their own interests. despite, or rather because of. their role in combating
imperialists and compradors nationalizing foreign companies and allying
themselves with the PKI (among others), when it came to preventing the
privatization of the companies.
According to current Marxist theory. it was inconceivable that indist­
inctly class-based leaders could transfer the economic base of the state to
their own control without privatizing it to any significant extent.
The officers in Indonesia did not have any greater interests than t11e
civilian nationalists did in trying to create a traditional form of private
capitalism against imperialism. The officers would have lost every single
company they had confiscated if they had agreed to privatize them!

242
 W/Jy Did the PK/ Fail?

The ideal national bourgeoisie would, according to the lheory. have used
the surplus from the nationalized companies to build a nationally
integrated and balanced economy and used it to defend themselves against
imperialism. The PKI was counting on the nationalists doing just that,
when they had finally acquired economic power. But the inconceivable
capitalists did not need to put priority on an integrated national economy in
order to withstand pressure from imperialism. What they needed was even
stronger political, administrative and military positions. Thus they used the
surplus to reinforce these exu·a-economic mechanisms. This was their path
to capitalism. And the PKI was unable to anticipate it.

Democra1ic Cul-de-Sac
The communists tried working with the help of peaceful and democratic
methods and a so-called Leninist mass party, within the framework of a
long-term strategy in several stages. The PKI declared that this was possible
because the progressive bourgeois nationalists themselves needed a
bourgeois democracy in order to dissolve the political power monopoly of
the feuclal lancllords anrl liherate as well as mohilize the masses against the
feudal landlords and the imperialists.
Indeed the nationalists protected the PKJ. And several attempted coups
were pre-empted. The party and the mass movements grew rapidly and the
electoral gains made were considerable. The nationalists and the commun­
ists co-operated in isolating the so-called anti-democratic forces.
But the isolation was soon followed by prohibitions, the state of
emergency and demands from Sukarno, among others. for "guided
democracy".
From the point of view of the communists, there was no reason co protest
as long as it was the enemy who was feeling the pinch and the PKJ was
protected. The party spoke about a future people's democracy, democracy
for the "people" and not for the "enemies of the people''.
AU was well. as long as the PKI gathered the masses behind the
nationalists. But when it became impossible to keep promises of a
nourishing national economy, and the PKI tried to create democratic rights
and freedoms in connection with the elections of 1957. which made the PKI
the largest political party in Java, the nationalists' real power base was
threatened, just when their need for it was greatest. The PKl threatened
nationalist control over the state apparatus, both centrally and locally, right
down to the headmen of the villages and including the patriarchal
instruments of mass mobilization.
The army command and the nationalists forced through a guided
democracy which, among other things, led to the cancellation of the general
elections clue to he held in 1959. The PKT would surely have won th em anrl
would thereby have become the first communist party to have achieved
government power entirely through democratic means. Now, however,
centralized controls and the state of emergency were used against the
comm un ists too.

243
Summary and Co11c/11sio11s

The leaders of the PK.I should have been able to have produced better
analyses which would have made them more sceptical of the democratic
reliability of the nationalists. Ever since the inception of the ..bourgeois
democracy" in 1946. the nationalists had devoted more energy to acquiring
mass support from above as patrons than to giving tbe people democratic
rights and freedoms.
But, at the same time, it was theoretically unlikely that democracy would
degenerate. As I wrote in Chapter 1 1 . since the theory could not predict that
the nationalists would lack all interest in building a national economy in
the classic bourgeois manner. it could not reveal that the nationalists also
lacked the equally classic bourgeois interest in breaking down the political
monopoly and building a genuine political democracy with the support of
the masses. What the nationalists needed. in reality, were their traditional
instruments of power - administrative. political and id'eological - in the
struggle against imperialism and feudalism. They were not bourgeois and
had no significant economic strength.1
In addition. the communists were not really completely reliable when it
came lo democratic issues. even though. relatively speaking. they belonged
to the most prom inenl democrats in the country. especially at local level as,
for example. in tbe villages. The strategic problems of the postponement of
democracy hardly depended on the PKJ engaging in democratic mass
organization without regard for the risks of repression. During the period of
the "bourgeois democracy"', the party was able to celebrate considerable
victories. which it could use against its enemies. It was only after even the
PK.I had given up pluralism. and began to applaud "guided democracy"'
instead. that things started going wrong for tbe party.
The limitations imposed on democracy had. in tbe end. made it diflicult
for the PKI to organize and mobilize the very base for its work. the peasants
and the workers.

The Mobilized Peasam Sociery

According to the PKJ. the peasants were the most important factor in the
national and democratic revolution in Indonesia. Thus an alliance between
workers and peasants was required. an alliance based on the peasants·
bourgeois anti-feudal interests.
The PK1 had counted on being able to pursue careful and basic
schooling. mobilizing and organizing of 1he peasants. sheltered by the
"front from above·· with the nationalists for. among other things democracy.
The PKJ further assumed that the nationalists. who were seen to represent
the interests of the national bourgeoisie. would not disagree with the
communists starting their struggle against feudalism in the rural areas. For
the national bourgeoisie to be able to build their classic national economy,
they would first have co destroy the remnants offeudalism. The "front from
above" with the nationalists for democracy and against imperialism did not
stand i n contradiction to the communists' "front from below··. the anti­
feudal alliance between peasants and workers, in Aidit's view.

244
 Jlllty Did 11te PK/ Fail?

The communists succeeded in reaching out to the villages and initiated

an unusually successful mobilization of the peasants. Together with the
nationalists. the communists were. moreover. able to isolate commercial,
feudal, often Islamic, forces and the nationalists documented their interests
in anti-feudalism by passing the land reform laws.
But the front from above set an unexpectedly narrow framework for the
PKrs work among the peasants. The communists fast reached the peasants
whom the nationalists bad gathered on cultural grounds in competition
with the Muslim leaders and with the help of patronage. The P K I was
unable to break with this vertical mobilization of the peasants by inflating
..
the class struggle against "feudal remnants , since that would threaten the
"front from above" with the nationalists. A good deal of the strength of the
nationalists was based on palronage and other extra-economic power
monopolies. To safeguard the "front from above" against imperialism and
not lose its protection. the PKI was forced to set aside the alliance between
the peasants and the workers and even to accept the so-called patriotic
feudal landlords.
The theory and analysis of the communists vis-a-vis anti-feudal
nationalists was thus correct in so far as the nationalists were interested in
combating a private, commercial and often Islamic feudalism which
threatened their power. But as I have shown previously. the nationalists
based their power not on free economic activities. as did the classic
bourgeoisie of the theory, but rather on political and administrative
positions. Consequently, the communists' theory and analysis were
incorrect as they emphasized the interests of the nationalists in breaking
down all forms of feudalism, even traditional patronage in the villages.

Workers' Struggle in the Face of Obstacles

According to the PKJ. the working class must wait before struggling for
socialism. Instead, workers should build an alliance with the peasants
against feudalism and defend a front with the so-called national bour­
geoisie against imperialism and for democratic rights. or course. the workers
ought to defend their jobs and their standard of living. But, said the PKl,
only an independent national economy could give the workers a
considerable number of new jobs and substantially raise the standard of
living. Consequently the workers ought to support the national bourgeoisie
and state non-capitalism, as well as concentrating their activities on hitting
out al foreign companies.
The trade union movement closest to lhe PKI reinforced its positions and
was the most successful when it came to defending the workers. In addition.
the workers were successful i_n counteracting foreign capitalists.
But no independent national economy was created either by a national
bourgeoisie or by the state. As T have already shown. the PKI was unable to
utilize its theoretical perspective to analyse and foresee this.
There were fewer jobs and the standard of living of the workers fell.
According to the strategy. the workers were supposed to support the

245
Summary and Co11c/11sio11.1

nationalists. But the more they did so. the more they supported the new
capitalism, which was quite different from an independent national
capitalism that might have given the workers a better standard of living.
Nationalists both in and out of uniform met the opposition of the workers
with undisguised repression. Quite contrary to what the PKJ's theory
predicted. they based their capitalism on the reinforcing of their own pol­
itical, adminstrative and military powers over the economy. not by strength­
ening their powers within the economy and becoming classic industrious
capitalists who replaced political repression with economic force.
As 1 wrote in Chapter 13. the leading class (the proletariat) was out of the
picture. since those who ought to have been Jed by it - the nationalists. the
state and the peasants - contradicted the theoretical perspective of the
party and did not raise progressive bourgeois demands and actions. On the
contrary. the state and many nationalists allacked the workers.

Anti-imperialism agai11s1 the Wrong Form of Capitalism

As J have outlined above. the PKl analysed the problems of the state's non­
capitalist development as a deviation caused by the so-called bureaucratic
capitalists. Up to now. the Ialter did not have the significant economic base
in production as prescribed in the Chinese models. but only political.
administrative and military strength. This was based on favours to and. i n
exchange. support from feudal and particularly imperialist forces. said the
.
communists. Lacking their own class base. the "bureaucratic capitalists.
had not been able to take over state power. The stale continued to have
considerable autonomy and was still not a true capitalist state. But i t might be­
come one since a characteristic of"bureaucratic capitalists·· was thaL with
the support of imperialism. they would try to privatize state companies and
drastically reduce the state guidance of the economy. according to the PKl.
The PK! leaders believed that, consequently, the best way of combating
the "bureaucratic capitalists" was to accentuate the anti-imperialism of
Sukarno and the declarations he had made in favour of a powerful state
economy aimed at national self-reliance. Thus. it would he possible to ex­
pose the "bureaucratic capitalists·· for going against Sukarno and in the end
to have them purged. The workers would be able to contribute to such
exposes a t the same time as they demanded the right to be consulted in the
boardrooms of state companies and indicated that foreign firms which
remained should be nationalized. But the workers were not allowed to
threaten public companies. Were that to happen their opponents would be
able to say that the communists were going against Sukarno, as well as
against the interests of the state. and would be able to use this as an excuse to
use open repression.
The PK! was successful in intensifying the anIi-imperialism of Sukarno.
l n addition. the state of emrgency was lifted. which gave the communists
greater freedom. while more and more of the political opponents of the PKJ
and Sukarno were forced underground.
But quite contrary to the theoretical pespective of the communists. the
PKl was unable to expose the majority of the so-called bureaucratic

246
 Why Did the PK/ Full?

capitalists as pro-imperialist traitors who wanted ro privatize the economy.

They did not need to break with Sukarno. They participated in the
confrontation with Malaysia. Many of them even worked against the
proposal by the US and the IMF for a liberalization and stabilization
programme. While the "bureaucratic capitalists'" were consolidating their
positions of power within the state economy and administration,.as well as
living luxuriously. the political, social and economic conditions of the
workers grew very much worse. And the strategy stipulated that they were
not allowed to use direct action to defend themselves.
By the end of the fifties, the "bureaucratic capitalists" had already. partly
with the help of the nationalizations. started making the economic base of
the state their own. instead of building their political, administrative and
military strength primarily on feudalism and imperialism. By adopting an
intensified anti-imperialist stance, accepting new nationalizations, state
ownership. stronger state guidance and so forth. they were able to reinforce
their class base even more during the first years of the sixties.
The new capitalists are specialized in part of the necessary area of work of
every monopoly capitalist: acquiring monopolies and controlling the
labour force. When it comes to building capitalism today, these qualities are
at least as important as being directly engaged in production. especially in a
country like Indonesia.
Since the new capitalists made the economic base of the state their own.
the state also acquired a distinct class base with reduced freedom of
manoeuvre for the nationalists. the communists and others. By defending
the state economy and postponing the workers· struggle in state companies.
the communists hardly contributed to the struggle against the state power of
the bureaucratic capitalists. Quite the contrary.
Without modifying their theoretical tools as I have suggested, the PIG
would not have been able to produce much better analyses. Even present­
day Marxist analyses, though they have access to the empirical answer
book. continue to talk about ··bureaucratic capitalists··, without a class base
of their own. who impede capitalist development by being parasitic rather
than real classic capitalists, as well as by being especially dependent on
imperialism.
I have suggested that, instead of talking about "bureaucratic capitalists".
we should start building a new theory, not about neo-colonial but about
post-colonial capitalism. The example of [odonesia shows that classic
national capitalism is hampered by imperialism. But administrators.
politicians and military men do not necessarily need to subjugate
themselves to imperialism as the compradors do.
They can instead create their own economic base and offer important
preconditions for capitalist development which did not exist earlier. They
do this by using extra-economic methods within the state apparatus to
nationalize companies. control the economy. monopolize raw materials
and markets and control the labour force. in Lhe process combating both the
working people and the internal private capitalists and traditional

247
Summary and Co11c/11sio11s

imperialism. Thus they can build a post-colonial capitalism i n co-operation

with more dynamic foreign capitalists, and when they have consolidated
their positions, they can take the step of uniting powerover the economy and
the labour force with involvement in the economy and in direct
production.
The growth and expansion of a post-colonial capitalism certainly
increases the number who become marginalized. But at the same time the
working class is also expanding and is alone in having the potential ability
to hit hard at the heart of the new ruling class - modern industrial
production.

Land Monopoly without Land Concentration - Post-colonial

Agrarian Capitalism
Peasanrs Struggle againsr rhe Wrong Monopoly of Land
The PKl assumed that the absolute majority of peasants had common
interests Lo combating feudal landlords. who were preventing agrarian
development from taking place. The power of the landlords and the
obstacles to development depended on their having acquired a monopoly
of the land by concentrating it. This agrarian stagnation, of course, made it
impossible lo implement policies that would enable the establishment of an
independent and national capitalism as a whole. A national bourgeoisie
.
would thus find it in its interest Lo counteract the .feudal remnants... but
were prevented from leading the peasants to victory by the strength of
imperialism. the PKI believed. When this became obvious the communists
would, instead. be able to shoulder the task of bringing the anti-feudal
struggle to completion.
At the beginning of the sixties. the workers· struggle was blocked and the
"'bureaucratic capitalists" perched unrufOed on their nests. But they were
weaker .in the villages. The peasant movement had reinforced its positions.
said the PKl. In addition. Sukarno had passed a law concerning a limited
bourgeois land reform and made demands on national self-reliance as a
part of an intensified anti-imperialist struggle. The communists said that
this made it possible co conduct a radical struggle in the rural areas without
challenging nationalism. the very foundation of the Nasakom "front from
above".
Consequently, the communists di.rected themselves at realizing Suk­
amo·s limited land refom1 to stop land concentration. But, at the same time.
they campaigned intensively for a complete showdown with the feudal
landlords and for the land to be redistributed to the tillers. When the
nationalists were hesitant and tried to avoid implementing their own
reform. the PKI thought that the time was ripe for taking over the leading of
the peasants and declared that it was more important for the party to
maintain its alliance with the peasants than with the national
bourgeoisie.
As I pointed out in Chapter 17. the fact that the PKI succeeded in
developing. and actively started to apply. an offensive strategy based on

248
 Wlty Dir/ rite PK/ Fuil?

class struggle without meeting massive repression. only a few years after the
situation had appeared to reach deadlock. was already a tremendous step
forward. Today. when we sit with the answer book in our hands. prepared to
investigate what went wrong, tbis success cannot be overemphasized. ll was
primarily due to the work of the communists that the land reform did not
simply remain empty rhetoric from Jakarta.
But the most dominant problems were strategic ones. The contradictions
between the theoretical and analytical perspective or the PKI on the one
hand, and actual developments on the other, were obvious. I t appearcd to be
very difficult to expose large properties which. according to the land reform
law. ought to be redistributed. There were many loopholes which were
difficult to close. The land of the "feudal landlords" was not so concentrated
that they could not conceal a great deal as well as refraining from direct
control of tbe land without losing their power.
The concentration of land was not so marked that the peasants could
unite against and isolate a few landlords. The class struggle turned instead
into violent conflict between the peasants themselves.
The strategic problem in the peasant offensive was thus based on an
analysis which overestimated the concentration of land. The power of the
rural lords and the stagnation of agriculture must have had another basic
cause which the communists ought to have combated.
But without altering their theoretical perspective the communists could
hardly have produced better analyses. as I have summarized in Chapter 17.
which did not deny monopolies of land and powerful oppressors in the
countryside. and yet rook into account the scarcity of land. the important
lords who bad no direct control of land and the fact that the land was often
less concentrated than it had been in the countries where the theories had
originated. China and Russia (but perhaps needed to become more
concentrated in order to be able to develop agriculture) and also accounted
for and gave theoretical backbone to patron-client relationships.
The problem with current Marxist thinking on land monopolies and
agrarian class structure is that it does not account for land monopolies
being based not only on concentration of land but also on concentration
of the agricultural surplus.
The land becomes concentrated when a few landlords appropriate more
and more land so that the majority o f the peasants become landless. The
power of the feudal landlords is derived from interest from their large
properties.
When the surplus rather than the land is centralized. a large number of
formally independent agricultural units survive. Tbe base of this fonn of
centralization is the fact that these small units are incapable of being
economically independent. Instead. a patron can centralize the surplus
from clients who acquire some protection in exchange.
Modern theories of peasant revolutions and land reforms originate in
areas where concentration of land has replaced centralization of the
surplus. That makes current Marxist theories incomplete and even

249
Summary and Conclusions

dangerous i n areas where land concentration does not dominate.

I have tried to show that the Indonesian land monopoly, especially in
Java where support for the PKI was at its strongest. was in U1e fast place
based on the centralization of the agricultural surplus. The tendency
already existed during the pre-colonial period. It was consolidated and
became generalized during the period of indirect Dutch rule. In that
respect. Indonesia differed from China and Vietnam. Independence led
only to a limited concentration ofland, since the economy was stagnant and
politicaJ forces such as the PK.I placed obstacles in the way of such a
development. Since 1965. however, a clear change- has occurred, but there is
still no particularly extensive process of land concentration. (The mode of
exploitation should not ofcourse be confused with unequal distribution of
land among various strata because of, for example. the increase of
population.)
An analysis of land monopolies in terms of surplus and centralization
would have enabled the PKJ to foresee the strategic problems which
confronted it. A reform directed against those who concentrated the land to
a significant degree did not affect the majority ofoverlords who centralized
a surplus from land belonging to others. And very few "real" feudal
landlords existed from whom land could be confiscated.
If the reform were radicalized and prescribed that the land should go to
the tiller, a policy which the PKl advocated and which the peasants tried to
implement, the overlords who centralized the surplus would be threatened.
But they would not lose their very basis of power. Only their own, relatively
unimportant, land holdings would be affected to some extent. The basis for
their centralization of the surplus would remain intact: many peasants still
did not make ends meet on their own litUe parcels of land but remained or
became dependent on the overlords. Their indebtedness, for example,
continued.
In addition, a large number of independent peasants would be badly
affected. perhaps even the middle peasants who had not concentrated their
land to any significant degree. Even the petty peasants had tillers on some
parts of their lands - and the really poor believed that everyone should
have the same amount of land.
The poorest peasants were also split. Those who were forced to allow
wealthier peasants to use their land were hardly likely to feel happy about a
reform which gave tillers all the land. And was access to land to be solely
reserved for permanent tillers. or could workers also have some land? And
so on.
Finally, fewer were completely proletarianized when the surplus was
centralized than when the land was concentrated. Many more poor
peasants owned a small parcel of land round their houses. They needed
protection and assistance from a patron. And share-croppers as well as
those who were permanently employed were relatively privileged and tied to
their patrons, compared to those who were marginalized in agricultural
production.

250
 Wily Did tire PK/ Fuil?

An analysis of land monopoly in terms of the centralization of surplus

would also have been able to disclose that an ideal type of capitalist
development through the redistribution of relatively large feudal properties
was out of the question. Instead there were only two probable p�Hhs of
development for which to fight, or which ought to be combated. Either the
peasants themselves ought to concentrate their land into self-supporting
units which could be linanciaUy independent of patrons. Or, if the peasants
desisted from this or were defeated in the struggle to consolidate. then the
overlords themselves would be able to subordinate the peasants and
combine a centralization of the agricultural surplus with a concentration of
the land. Al the same time they would thereby lay the foundation for a
brutal post-colonial capitalization of agriculture.
Even if all agricultural land in Java were to be equally distributed.
peasant fa milies would still remain dependent on patrons who would be
able to centralize the surplus. Instead. it was the peasanis themselves who
must concentrate the land. But collectivization was politically impossible
and the relatively poor could not take from the extremely poor without
giving something in return. Thus the peasants who gained land ought to go
in for trade and producer co-operatives connected to agriculture and jointly
owned with those who have relinquished their claims to land and found
work in the co-operatives instead.
Post-colonial capitalization of agriculture can occur when the peasants
have failed. or. as happened in Indonesia, have tried to implement an
unrealistic classic bourgeois land reform. The peasants arc then defenceless
and, with the help of post-colonial capitalists in the state apparatus. the
overlords can subjugate the peasants and at the same time complement
their centralization ofthe surplus with a concentration ofland. They can get
rid of innumerable peasants and get an effective injection of new capital
.
and markets through, for example. the ··green revolution .. Capitalization
and "feudal remnants·· can be most effectively combined. A kulak class
develops and becomes more extensive than the few feudal landlords who,
according to current Marxist theory. the peasants ought to unire against and
isolate. A post-colonial agrarian capitalism which favours considerably
more Lhan a handful of overlords slarts to strike root.
This development gained momentum in Indonesia after 1965. The
peasants were split: some were favoured. others became proletarianized.
Some of the wholly or partly proletarianized were Lied to the lords but did
not have regulated forms of employment. though they could remain in
agriculture. Others were marginalized: most of them not becoming workers,
but being forced to work in the informal sector. where they often do not even
have a visible employer against whom to revolt.

251
Summary and Co11c/11sio11s

Problems in Meeting the Threat from the Army with Steadfast

Mass Struggle
Mass Struggle Bypassed: Elite Conflicts and Massacre
The PKI was forced to give up the peasant offensive. In 1965 Aid it declared
it was blocked by the "bureaucratic capitalists". who bad to be more
effectively isolated before the struggle in the ruraJ areas could be
continued.
Since the workers· struggle was impeded. the PKI had to isolate its
opponents more effectively by working through the broad front led by
Sukarno.
But. as I have shown, not even the intensified anti-imperialism led to any
significant gains. The "bureaucratic capitalists" were forced onto the
ideological defensive, but were not exposed as traitors nor purged.
In addition. this strategy led to new problems during 1965. The PKI and
Sukarno succeeded in banning the last of the secularized opposition. Thus.
their opponents gathered in religious. primarily Islamic, organizations and
particularly round the army. To gel at their enemies, the PKI had to take up
the struggle directly with the army. But the leadership of the army was not
signiflcaatJy weakened. On the contrary. they were provoked. a11d rumours
of the generals planning a coup d'etat became quite common.
But the PKJ had difficulties in meeting the threat from the army with
steadfast mass struggle, since this was blocked by all the unsolved strategic
problems. With the help of the mass organjzations the PKI leadership was
able only to expose and disarm specific current plans for a coup: the
position of the generals remained u naffected.
In that situation, it was clear that a few individual leaders who were weU­
informed (in a so-caUed Leninist mass party with limited internal
democracy) chose to invest in an (already established) dissident officers·
movement. without having received a mandate from the central committee.
The masses were also kept in ignorance. presumably to protect tJ1e party
from accusations of being involved.
The officers' movement was a total failure. ll is probable that it had been
infiltrated. But it was hardly a question of a genuine conspiracy against the
PKJ.
The army officers soon accused lhe PKI of being responsible for the
actions of the officers· movement. in order to keep the armed forces united
and to neutralize the PKI. Violent repression became the order of the
day.
After the actions of the officers' movement. the party leaders were hardly
able to meet, still less to lead "their" mass party in a broad mobilization for
basic human rights, for example. And since the entire communist
movement was caught nappi11g by the elite connicts in Jakarta, the masses
themselves were not able to do very much to stop the repression.
lt was i n tbe first place tJ1is sabotage against the most basic preconditions
for the functioning of a mass party - i.e. a working party democracy with
informed members and sympathjzers - which made it possible for the

252
 Why Did the PK/Fail?

army to arrest and murder without let or hindrance. as well as giving free
rein to the contradictions caused by the struggle over land reform, after
which anti-communist gangs perpetrated the worst attacks and massacres.

Notes

1. For a na1ional bourgeoisie to lind it in itS own interests to take up the struggle for. and to upholcl
democrucy. it must be in the process of building up a relatively trnditional private capitalism. as
perhaps in India. Cf. Martinussen ( 1980) and his exciting explanatory paradigm on the material
preconditions for democracic regimes in capi1alis1 de,'eloping councries. To be able to apply
Martinusscns' paradigm in the case oflndonesia. and in several othcrdevelopingcountries-the
bourgeoisie of India is unusual - 1 believe one muse go beyond the dislinction ""national
bourgeoisie/no national bourgeoisie·· and in addition count on ocher important domestic
capitalists who are trying to create capitalism by other means than the traditional national
bourgeoisie and who. therefore. irresp�'Ctivc of how domestic or how national they are. do not
have the same potential interest in democracy.

253
20. What Are the
Implications of the
PKI's Strategic
Problems for Prevailing
Theories on the Struggle
in the Third World?
Concurrently with the growth of nationalism and anti-imperialism in the
early post-independence period. the PKI grew in strengtJ1 and importance.
By comparison wiili the compromised compradors and the weak national
bourgeoisie. the communists appeared as guarantors for a national political
and economic development which could create both growth and a decent
standard of living. for which millions oflndonesians had been fighting and
which they had been hoping for since their liberation from the Dutch and
the Japanese. Up to this point the strategy bore fruit
The PKI fell. however. with the rise ofa new capitalist fraction which built
a post-colonial capitalism within the framework of the nationalist state and
anti-imperialist struggle. without the communists being able to analyse
what was happening. let alone shape and apply an alternative strategy
adapted to the changed circumstances in the country.
Wha� then. was this post-colonial capitalism. which was neither national
nor neo-colonial? I have not concentrated on analysing the political
economy of the emergence of post-colonial capitalism. But in my
investigation of the strategic problems of the PKI I have at least idemified
the contradictions. the forms for subordination. exploitation and resistance
which the party was unable to take into account in its analyses because of
the faulty theoretical tools at its disposal. With these neglected factors as a
point of departure. it is possible to lay the ground for a revised theory on
how post-colonial capitalism develops in a society like the Indonesian.
After the final achievementofpolitical independence in 1949. production
and trade were still dominated by foreign capitalists and domestic
middlemen. Tbey were primarily Dutch and some US owners of capital,
and locally there were Chinese businessmen. The important planLation
sector. however. fell behind as the new state was unable to subjugate the
labour force and outgrowing peasants, as well as their land. as the colonial
state had done. Domestic businessmen had difficulties in making progress.
But administrators and politicians with nationalist aspirations could use
the state apparatus to acquire some infiuence over the economy. for

254
 implications of the PKJ's Strategic Problems . . .

example by the use of import licences.

Feudal land concentration was not predominant in the agricultural
sector, and the limited commercial production of staple commodities was
minimized when the repressive colonial power was abolished. Instead some
village leaders won more powerful political and administrative posts.
The administration and political nationalists. and soon military officers
too. began. however. to make use of extended state intervention within the
economy to acquire a share of the surplus produced, in order to remedy the
paucity of opportunities for advancement within trade and production.
There were three methods which were mainly used. First, they pursued a
nationalist and anti-imperialist line politically, to restrict foreign capitalists
and domestic production for export. Th is was intended to benefit domestic
importers and to lay the ground for import substitution. In the end. most of
the foreign companies were nationalized. This enabled the nationalists to
win wide popular support and allowed, for example, strikes to take place in
companies and on plantations still owned by foreigners.
Secondly. a state-governed guided economy was. intToduced. Licences
and numerous concessions became more and more importa nt. Certain
nationalists within the state gained access to important markets and even
petty rice trading was drastically restricted. The nationalized companies
were not privatized. but controlled by certain individuals within the state
apparatus, especially by military officers. Groupings within the state
apparatus saw to it that they got personal control over natural resources that
were formally ·state-owned. and then distributed various concessions to
themselves and traded them informally to others. Foreign aid passed. of
course. through the coffers of the state.
Thirdly. so-called guided democracy was gradually enforced. General
elections were postponed. A state of emergency helped the army to
dominate the state apparatus and the economy. Strikes could now be even
more restricted and labour could be more efficiently controlled by the
military.
Within agriculture this extra-economic power over the ecoDomy
corresponded to the age-old tendency of the local lords to substitute
centralization of the surplus produced by formally independent peasants
for the lack of concentration of the land. This centralization of surplus
through parron-clienc relations was now further developed. I t grew in
importance and became increasingly affected by ethnic and cultural
divisions as the patrons had to mobilize votes and other sorts of political
support amongst the villagers. They did this by mobilizing the peasants
essentially as their clients. The nationalists and their local followers
supported anti-feudal measures against certain commercial activities, but
they did not support measures which threatened the political and admini­
strative positions of the patrons. since these positions were the ones that
made the centralization of surplus possible. This stare of affairs was
cemented by the so-called guided democracy. which blocked the efforts of
the communists to make local assemblies and administration more
democratic.
255
Summary and Conclusions

From the very beginning. political. administrative and military national­

ists achieved personal control of various parts of the growing state
apparatus, the nationalized companies, the licences, concessions, market
monopolies, foreign aid, etc. But their control and power were not total.
There were certain politicians, workers and others who were reluctant to
follow suit. and these were led by Sukarno and the PKJ with its mass
organizations. Domestic private and petty capitalists, who often lacked
profitable connections with the leaders of the state, were also threatened.
The lack of support from foreign capitalists, diminishing Western aid and
other problems also caused worry. But a t this time, such support could only
be received in exchange for less state intervention. more privatization and
other measures that would have reduced the powers of the administrators.
politicians and military leaders. and thus their chances of appropriating
substantial parts of the surplus produced would have been dim inished.
The agricultural patrons also lacked effective control of land and labour.
Their chances of concentrating land and of centralizing substantial
amounts of surplus were limited. among other reasons because they had to
protect many clients in order to retain their support and also because of the
strength of the peasant organizations. At the same time, a traditional
bourgeois land reform involving the redistribution oflarge amounts ofland
was out of the question. as the principal contradiction was not between
land-concentrating landlords and peasants.
Most administrators and military leaders and certain politicians and
agricultural patrons could, however. enforce their need for more effective
and tighter control when the Sukarno regime had been crushed and the
communists were eliminated. With the consolidation of their extra­
economic power over the economy and the labour force. including the
multitude who were not in permanent employment, the way was then open
to co-operation with foreign capitalists, international groups of creditors.
etc. without the administrators. military leaders and politicians risking their
own positions. Capital and expertise were thus introduced to the now
relatively favourable preconditions for trade and production. Market
monopolies. sole rights to land or to other natural resources. etc. and
efficiently subordinated labour were offered. Domestic bureaucrats,
technocrats and private businessmen. especially the larger Chinese
capitalists. often became clients of administrative and military patrons with
a growing class base of their own.
Within agriculture these developments corresponded to the elimination
of the peasant movements. while at the same time the patrons got their more
absolute powers secured by the state in general and by the army in
particular. Thus they were now able to get rid of. for example, economically
supcrnuous clients and to add to their centralization or the surplus a
substantial concentration of land. That the patrons had effective control of
labour power and land was a decisive prerequisite for the capitalization of
agriculture and for the capitalist production that now emerged. The
additional contribution of foreign capital. which it was now possible to

256
 lmplic01io11s qfthe PK.l:� Strategic Problems . . .

introduce. was analogous to the agricultural inputs and credits through the
"green revolution". "Semi-feudal remnants" within production and
administration were combined with more capitalist methods, when the
latter were more effective and more proritable.
Since then, this new post-colonial capitalism within trade and industry as
well as agriculture has gradually developed further. Several post-colonial
capitalists and new village leaders have added direct involvement in
production as well as some privatizing of persona!Jy controlled state
activities to their former extra-economic powers over the economy.
During the last fow years. however. the impressive rate of economic
gro\vth has declined. mainly because of external factors. The real increase
of the gross national product has shrnnk from nearly 10 per cent in 1980 to
some 2 per cent in 1983. The cutbacks in the old industrialized countries
lead to export problems in countries like Indonesia. In particular, the high
rates of interest in the US cause creditors and investors to be more restrictive
towards the new industrializing countries. Jn addition. countries like
Indonesia have suffered from lower oil prices, which is significant when
some 70 per cent of the income of the state is from oil.
But in a longer perspective this is just as threatening for the Western
economies in general. and the transnational banks and companies in
particular. as it is for regimes such as Indonesia's. International capital
might not make a ''fair prolif' out of investments and might lose dynamic
export markets. And while the International Monetary Fund criticizes
bureaucracy and state intervention, it is presumably also aware of the fact
that state control of labour. raw materials and markets is precisely what has
made it so extremely proritable to invest in Indonesia, among other
countries. Thus the expansion of capitalist relations or production and
markets continues. This is the most important aspect from a political point
o fview. The crucial question is no Jongerwhe1/rer capitalism expands or not,
but how it does so, and with what political consequences.
My brief sketch of a theory ofthe growth ofa post-colonial capitalism in a
society like Indonesia's must, of course, be complemented and refined by
investigations or other countries where domestic capitalism has developed
after independence. Such a task has not been undertaken in this book. It is
worthwhile, however. to point out the importance ofextra-economic faccors.
especially of the stare, in the development of severaJ developing coumries.
This has also been the case in those bastions of private capitalism. South
Korea and Taiwan.2 Even in India, that classic example of an Asian country
which has relatively well developed private capitalism and a strong
national bourgeoisie. there have been significant extra-economic inputs.
These are not solely concerned with the almost corporative power
monopoly of the Congress Party and its various fractions and the state of
emergency proclaimed in the seventies. 1t should also be noted that the
national bourgeoisie has not been strong enough to survive without the help
of the village leaders in securing votes among their clients, and it has been
incapable o f implementing a traditional bourgeois land reform.

257
Summary and Co11c/11sio11s

The inability of the PKI to analyse the growth of post-colonial capitalism

or. despite tremendous popular support. to counteract it with an effective
strategy, was not only based on theoretically faulty instruments for the study
of Indonesia alone. Indeed the dominant theses in international commun­
ist thought on how societies in the Third World ought to be analysed, and
the struggle prosecuted. had been modified by the PKl to fit Indonesia. But
they were used as a starting point. And the analytical faults must be traced
back to the general theses I have outlined in Chapter 3. It is not only
important but also feasible to re-examine them to see whether they hold in
the light of the experiences of the PKI and the growth of a post-colonial
capitalism.

The State, Imperialism and Democracy

Lenin's Theses
The Comintern's and Lenin's theses on the struggle in the underdeveloped
nations. as well as Stalin's revised version. were given a new lease of life
during the lifties and are still cornerstones for many of the revolutionary
movements in Asia and Africa. But the validity of these theses is
undermined by the causes of the strategic problems of the PKl.
The thesis that the revolution in the underdeveloped countries must be of
a bourgeois-democratic nature is contradicted by the growth of a deviant
post-colonial capitalism. l t is not possible to talk of the main contrad­
iction being between pre-capitalist modes of production and a traditional
capitalism. The majority of the nationalist movements in no way struggled
for a classical capitalist development against feudalism and
imperialism.
Lenin was indeed correct in saying that a classical capitalist development
was hampered by imperialism. But with his theoretical perspective one is
not able to analyse the growth of that deviant capitalism which I have called
post-colonial. And Stalin, who maintained that all capitalist development
worthy of the name was blocked, was quite definitely wrong.
This means that the current grounds for communist co-operation with
Lenin's "revolutionary bourgeoisie" and especially with Stalin's "national
bourgeoisie''. against feudalism and imperialism and for democracy. are
baseless. The tiny bourgeoisie, which resembles the European theoretical
ideal. cannot become a powerful force for leadership. partly because of the
power of the imperialists and partly because of their lack of political,
administrative and military force. The so-called national bourgeoisie is
thus. presumably, incapable of conducting operational anti-feudal and
anti-imperialist policies or of starting to build an independent national
economy with democratic liberties. as the communist doctrine assumes.
"Bourgeois democracy" will thus hardly be stable enough to protect
communists when they try to attract followers from a weak position. Nor
will workers be able to get new jobs and a higher standard of living when a

258
 Implications of the PKJ's Strategic Problems . . .

national economy fails to be successfully started. There will hardly be

enough power to disann die-hard enemies. The national bourgeoisie wiU
not allow communists to stage anti-feudal peasants· movements on a
consistent class basis. This thus hinders communist efforts to build an
independent worker-peasant alliance within a "front from below", while
.
protected by a front from above. with the national bourgeoisie - an
..

alliance which would give the communists a base of their own and enable
them to move to a strategically more advanced phase.
To build capitaJism it is not necessary for the nationalists to consistently
go beyond aJ1 so-called feudal forms of extra-economic control. On the
contrary. a large part ofthem are required to build post-colonial capitalism.
Nor are the nationalists forced to create a "genuine bourgeois democracy''.
Instead, they need to use patronage and populist autocracy to create their
own capitalism with the help of representative political orga ns as well as
administrative bureaucracies! It is true that in the introductory phase they
must combat imperialism. But when post-colonial capitalism has taken
root, it can coexist with a modified imperialism.
It is, of course, possible that the so-called national bourgeoisie has been
and still is stronger in other countries in the Third World than is indicated
by tbe example of Indonesia. Ifwe limit ourselves to Asia, which is the part
of the world to which Lenin and Stalin's theses are primarily meant to
relate, it is India. with its relatively strong domestic capitalism and national
bourgeoisie, which appears most devianc. As 1 have already indicated,
however. we should not forget that the Indian nationalist movement has
never been capable of coming to grips with anti-feudal questions. Even
Gandhi avoided the problem.4 The Congress Party and its fractions also
appear to have been instrumental in building up capitalism with extra­
economic means, and in 1975 a state of emergency was imposed. The
possibility of generalizing and refining criticism of Lenin's and Stalin's
theses. based on my results, would be improved by comparing them with
India and its indubitably more traditional capitalist development.

Nationalism. state inrervemion and 11011-capilalist development

Because of rhe vaciJJating national bourgeoisie, some commun isLc; turned
instead to nationalist political leaders and used state intervention i n
particular to complement their role. The argument is that t h e state in the
Third World does not have a distinct class base. Feudal and imperialist
forces have been weakened, but no domestic capitalist class witJl hegemony
has emerged. The state in the Third World thus has an extremely relative
autonomy compared to the state in industrialized countries which have a
solid class base. Consequently the state apparatus can be used by
individuals and groups to further their own interests. Progressive leaders.
whether in or out of uniform. can, for example, nationalize foreign
companies. build state-owned industries in vital sectors. support anti­
rnonopolistic fractions of the national bourgeoisie (i.e. the middle
bourgeoisie) and implement anli-feudal land reforms.

259
Summary and Conclusions

According to even more optimistic ideas of non-capitalism, the national

leaders wiU have to rely on support from workers and peasants. as well as
aid from socialist states. against imperialists and other enemies, thus
in troduci ng some sort of democracy, at least for those who rnobi 1ize workers
and peasants, such as the communists. in order to carry out the "state
project'". It is uncertain whether. after that, there will be a11y room or role left
for a communist party. Due to industrializaLion the proletariat should.
however. grow in number and the leaders of the state will have to introduce
democratic reforms. Non-capitalists might thus be able to bypass fully
developed capitalism. replace it with their "state non-capitalism" and open
the way for socialism.
The indistinct class base of the state is, nevertheless. motivated by a lack
of capitalism. by the blocking of genuine capitalist development. That. of
course. means that the theory of non-capitalist development is completely
contradicted by the experience o f lndonesia. wbicb shows that it is possible
to have a post-colonial capitaljst development. Tbe state acquired a distinct
class base and there was reduced room for manoeuvre.
J n some sense. the theory of non-capitalist development was. however.
correct. in that the administrative. military and political power of the state
in developing countries was and is a better source of development than the
economic positions of tbe private bourgeoisie. Post-colonial capitalism
grew within the framework of the non-capitalist and rormally indistinctly
class-based state! Nationalists in the state apparatus could make the
economic base of the state their own without needing to privatize state
companies. for instance, or to depend primarily on compradors or
imperialists.
l do not maintain. as do the Chi nese. that non-capitalist development is
treacherous because the state in the developing world is already based on a
domestic and foreign bourgeoisie, but because the class base is created
within the state itself. as part or a post-colonial capita]jst developmenl
This also corrodes the thesis ofstate leaders needing to create and support
a democracy to gain the people"s support for their non-capitalist develop­
ment which conflicts with the so-called feudal remnants and imperialism.
In principle. the peasants and workers could be helped by this democracy to
organize powerful movements. preferably a communist party, which could
in the long run pursue socialism. But no. the stale leaders can build their
own class base on which they can rely, instead of depending on support
from the peasants and workers. State leaders can develop and safeguard
their post-colonial capitalism through the exploitation of employees in
state companies, through a strictly centralized agricultural policy to move
food surpluses into the towns and through repression and a general lack of
democracy.
Consequently, it is very difficult for the communists to mobilize the
growing proletariat against the new capitalists. This is not only because of
the political. administrative and military power of the latter, but also
because of their capacity for dividing Ihe people and buying off workers.

260
 lmplica1io11s ofrhe PKl's Srrategic Problems . . .

The general lack of genuine democracy plays a role. and protests can be
labelled threats against the state. the nation and the need to build a national
economy.
It is. of course. possible that the thesis of state intervention and non­
capitalism can be corroded by forces other than those which develop within
and around the state itself. To return to India and its stronger domestic
capitalism. it is possible that the communists. who tried investing in a so­
called national democratic state and in non-capitalist development in co­
operation with Indira Gandhi's Congress Parcy. did not succeed because
the domestic private capitalists counteracted the efforts of the state. BuL it
was Mrs Gandhi"s Congress Parcy which proclaimed the state of
emergency. And it was the state which. under her leadership. favoured
monopolistic development of capit al is m in the country. Once again. further
comparison between Indonesia and India should be fruitful.

A111i-i111perialism and 1/ie Class Srrugg/e

The problems with t he Comintern·s theses of collaboration with a
progressive bourgeo is ie do not diminish because Stalin divorced himself
from his national bourgeoisie in 1928. nor because the Chinese re-evaluated
the bulk of the bourgeoisie as compradors and bureaucratic capitalists
whose base was in domestic and international monopoly capital. In the
1960s and 1970s. the theorists of the dependency school refused to admit
that the so-called national bourgeoisie had a feudalism to combat, but said
it had to choose between a foreign-dominated capitalism or soci al ism. No
domestic independent capital was regarded as existing.
At the same time as the leading theorists wrote off the bourgeoisie. they
continued formulating alternative recommendations on the assumptio n
that real capitalist development was and is blocked. For example. since the
national bourgeoisie cannot create a genuine capitalism, they are forced to
jo i n the compradors and choose tbe destructive capitalism of imperialism,
especially when the peasants and workers make their protests felt. Thus the
communists can and must take the vanguard role right from the beginning.
To take a stand againsL imperial ism is the equivalcnl of taking a stand
against capitalism. Consequently. nationalism and anti-imperialism on the
one hand. and the class struggle against capitalism on the other. must be
combined in a struggle for liberation. irrespective of whether it is armed or
noL. gathering a very large proportion of the population behind the more or
less openly committed communists.
The state. such theorists maintain. has no special autonomy. It is based
on feudal. in particular imperialist. forces. It is a peripheral state. Con­
sequently it is despotic but weak in all essentials. and can be successfully
overthrown in a direct confrontation. according to the dependency
school.

261
S11mmary and Conclusions

The experiences of Indonesia contradict all of that. It is true that a

traditional capitalist development was blocked, but that did not mean that
the only alternative was a neo-colonial capitalist development with
compradors and the state as a prolonged arm of foreign capitalism. A post­
colonial capitalism with a domestic base and a strong state could develop
instead. The nationalists who started building that post-colonial capitalism
did not take a stand for the compradors and imperialists. On the contrary,
they counter-balanced them. and became equal partners in collaboration. It
was not helpful to try to judge these nationalists as being pro-imperialist. In
addition, it was very difficult for the workers to make direct attacks on and
within state-owned companies and plantations, as long as the stale and its
rulers did not collaborate with imperialism. Those companies which were
nationalized. after the workers had struggled against foreign capitalists,
were taken over by the post-colonial capitalists and their slate.
There was no way in which the communists could combine nationalism
and class struggle, the two forces which had been so important in all
successful Third World revolutions, such as China's and Vietnam's. When
it became possible to start building a post-colonial capitalism, nationalist
anti-imperialism tended to strengthen the new capitalists and the state.
Nor are the chances of succeeding with a classic Leninist frontal attack
on the state substantial. A revolutionary situation seldom exists. The state
may be despotic, like that in Czarist Russia. But it is not small and does not
lack the power to act. O n the contrary, it is very large and innuential at
almost all levels, playing a significant role in the emergence of capitalism.
Others tend to use Indonesia as a good example of a foreign dominated
capitalist system with a military and a bureaucracy based on imperialism.
Thus it is probable that my criticism of the theses on anti-imperialism are
even more relevant in cases like India, with its considerably stronger
domestic capitalism. The catastrophic failure of the Maoist Naxalites in
India, in what was believed to be a revolutionary situation in the late sixties.
in their attempt to strike against what was postulated to be a weak state
based solely on imperialism and feudal landlords, is clearly an indication
of the general applicability of the criticism.

Domestic Class Struggle

When Lenin put forward his theses on the struggle in the Third World, the
Indian delegate, M.N. Roy, protested. Roy disputed Lenin's idea ofa central
contradiction between some sort of feudalism, upheld by imperialism. and
national capitalism, which opened the way for temporary co-operation with
a progressive bourgeoisie. Roy argued, among other things, that the
national bourgeoisie was already fairly strong and that it therefore did not
want to fight imperialism. only to compete with it, and that the national
bourgeoisie had no interest in uniting with communists to mobilize the
workers and peasants. The state was thus primarily based on the domestic
big bourgeoisie, which in addition to its own strength, was allied with
compradors, imperialists and some feudal forces.

262
 lmplicatio11s of 1he PKJ's Srrategic Problems . . .

That capitalism dominated society did not however. mean that it was
capable of developing it. Following the Russian example, it was argued that
the national bourgeoisie could not carry out its historical development
mission, and that the communists thus had a chance of successfully taking
over.
The communists should. consequently, initiate outright anti-capitalist
measures against domestic capitalist forces and confront the state in the
same phase, actingagainstcapitalism, and not beginning with the remnants
of feudalism. The basis for these actions would be provided by the workers
and the large number of agricultural labourers produced by the penetration
of capitalism into agriculture.
Neither the analysis nor the strategy were applied to Indonesia. But the
experiences of the PKI and the emergence of post-colonial capitalism may
b e used to deduce critical propositions.
First, capitalists other than the paralysed national bourgeoisie may be
able to start implementing capitalist development, thus reducing the
chances of a communist take-over even with the full support ofworkers and
agricultural labourers.
Second, it is not the theoretically prescribed private, traditional national
bourgeoisie that is the decisive and dynamic force within post-colonial
capi alism
t (even though strengthened post-colonial capitalists may co­
operate with domestic as well as international capitalists). When post­
colonia1 capitalists set the pace of development, they do it in a way that
differs from that of a traditional national bourgeoisie. Consequently, it 1s
very difficult to mobilize and organize workers when they are subordinated
and exploited through U1e extensive use of extra-economic force, which
does not leave room for free and open activity nor for the emergence ofclass
consciousness. Post-colonial capitalists are not at all as interested in
"bourgeois democracy" as are the traditional private national
bourgeoisie.
It may be possible to confinn the validity of these extrapolations from the
case ofl ndonesia in the more national capitalist India, where after 1 964 the
new Communist Party-Marxists tried to apply the analyses and strategy
outlined above. The Indian Communist-Marxists almost foresaw the risks of
a state of emergency being declared. but not the full implications of it nor its
consequences in causing splits within the bourgeoisie. Only later did the
Marxists realize that they had fi.rst to struggle for democracy, long before
they would be able to stage an outright anti-capitalist class struggle. And the
problems of how to carry out this class struggle are still not solved.5

"Socia1-democratic Marxism"
In the meantime. it is not only the communist-oriented recommendations
of how a revolutionary ought to relate lo the state, to imperialism and to
democracy which are undermined by the ability of a post-colonial
capitalism to grow, contradicting theses of an inhibited or blocked
capitalism.

263
Summary and Co11c/11sions

Nor could ··social-democratic Marxism" foresee the rise of deviant post­

colonial capitalism. Classic Marxism from the time of the Second
lnternatioDaL recently revived by Bill WarreD.6 which was optimistic about
the role of capitalism, does acknowledge that global capitalism can also
lead to capitalist developmeDt in the colonies. This must occur before
socialism can take root. But the tbeory is based on traditional E u ropean
capitalism, which has not spread. Its growth is still being inhibited by
imperialism and now, also, by domestic post-colonial capitalists, who have
no interest in '·bourgeois democracy" and do not develop a capitalism with
many new employment opporlunities and a substantial domestic demand
from the majority of the people.
Imperialism has not disappeared because it now allows a certain specific
type of capitalist development. Nor is this development in the interests of
the majority of the population. even though. until recent years. we believed
that capitalist development in the Third World was blocked. and therefore
equated development with a rise in the living standards of the majority of
the populace and mass participation. etc.

Radical Peasant S truggle

One of the basic assumptions in communist theory and analysis of the

struggle in the Third World is that a development in the direction of
socialism under communist leadership re.ally is possible since the
bourgeoisie does not have the strength to solve the problems of the
peasantry. beset b y feudal and imperialist exploitation. The alternative is to
build an alliance between peasants and workers.
Generally it is regarded that exploitation of the peasantry is based on a
few feudal landlords concentrating the land. This is especially applied to
Asia. Consequently. the communists. it is argued, should mobilize, organize
and stage land reforms against concentration of land. the so-called "land to
the tiller·· demands. This supports petty-bourgeois interests, opening the
way for agrarian development, which benefits the rural masses and also
industrial development. At this initial stage. all peasants may u n i te against
a small number of landlords and other exploiters. even though the poor and
landless peasants are regarded as being the most reliable force.
The problems of the communists in Indonesia indicate. however. that the
dominant form of exploitation was not through land concentration but
through the centralization of the surplus. The peasants were split. A classic
land reform intended to redistribute large landed properties was not on the
cards. £nstead. it was possible LO develop agriculture th rough a post-colonial
capitalization. which reduced the possibilities the communists had
acquiring a broad peasant base.

Land Monopoly a n d Land Reform

Where land is scarce. land fragmentation is a real problem and

264
 Implications ofthe PKl's S1ra1egic Problems . . .

centralization of the surplus. rather than concentration of land. is the

dominant form of exploitation. Hence classic land reform is inadequate.
Communists who light to give land to the tillers are confronted with
intense competition among the peasants for the few available parcels of
land, and by strong patron-client relationships generated by the central­
ization of surplus. The peasants are thus divided. while patrons arc seldom
seriously burt. Land fragmentation means that the peasants cannot gel
enough new land to become independent of the patrons. who can continue
to centralize the surplus of the peasants even if they lose part of their
holdings. Consequently. the patrons may use the divisions among the
peasants to subordinate them more effectively and to combine central­
ization of the surplus with the concentration of land they require.
Instead of struggling for a classic land reform in this kind ofsituation. the
peasants themselves ought to try to concentrate the land and develop
auxiliary crafts and other economic activities alongside agriculture.
It is unclear lo what extent centralization of the surplus dominates in
other countries. especially in Asia. or whether the traditional communist
theses arc also inapplicable there.
Presumably. concentration of land is more common in other countries.
such as India. This docs not. however. prevent the communists in West
Bengal from declaring that there is a lack of concentrated land i n some
areas and that the peasants are easily split in the struggle for the land that is
available.

The Worker-Peasant Alliance

The lack of land concentration in Indonesia meant that there was no
possibility of implementing a classic land reform. When the peasant
movement had been split and the peasants were effectively subjugated by
the overlords. agriculture could instead be capital izcd from above.
Centralization of the surplus from many small and formally independent
cultivated units was complemented by concentration or land. With the
"green revolution''. capital was injected from outside. "Feudal remnants"
were combined wilh capitalist features. Thus peasants were not liberated
from extra-economic oppression. Many types of patronage including. for
example. share-cropping are now used to promote authoritarian capitalist
development within agriculture.
Even if land concentration has a more important role in other places
where a redistribution of large estates is not excluded. a similar post­
colonial capitalism has also occurred in several such areas in Asia and
elsewhere. For here. too. the communists as well as the so-called national
bourgeoisie have not been capable of mobilizing the peasants or of
implementing a land reform.
Post-colonial capitalization is very brutal and marginalizes many
peasants and their children. But at the same time. far more than a mere
handful oflandlords can make a living. About 20-30 percent of the peasants
seem to have their petty bourgeois interests satisfied. These obviously find

265
Summary and Conclusions

no reason to support a communist-led alliance between workers and

peasants.
Thus are shaken the very foundations for a n alliance not only with
workers and peasants, but also with communist-led revolutionaries in the
Third World, before capitalism is fully developed and the working class is
in the majority.
But what of alJ the peasants who are unable to make a living? What of all
the proletarianized and the marginalized? Can they not support the
workers in an anti-capitalist slruggle against imperialism and conduct a
similarly rapid revolulion? Lenin had already warned the Bolsheviks that
unless they had massive peasant support, the revolution would have to be
indefinitely postponed, especially if they were forced to rake up the struggle
directly for socialism and only had the support of the proletariat in the cities
and in U1e rural areas.
Today we can see that the marginalized peasants have not even become a
homogeneous proletariat. Post-colonial capitalism does not offer many
new jobs in industry and agriculture. Those who manage to remain in
agriculture are dependent on patrons, lack uniform conditions of employ­
ment and, despite the terrible conditions. are relatively privileged. The
marginalized are forced to do odd jobs, petty trading, service, etc. and
seldom have a visible enemy to combat.
Thus the marginalized peasants hardly become an igniting spark. The
Indonesian experience suggests that the day of the large peasant-based
revolutions may be over. Perhaps the proletarianized and marginalized
peasants must be mobilized from above by the workers. In all circum­
stances. workers are the only ones who have the potential or striking the
post-colonial capitalists at the heart or the economic system: in industry
and trade.

How Does the Left React? New Solutions?

Ir the rise of post-colonial capitalism undermines current theses on the

struggle in the Third World. it is reasonable to pose the question of whether
the lefr has succeeded in developing new analytical tools, and to sketch
alternative strategies for tackling the problem. It is irrelevant in this
connection to inform oneself of the occasions on which the left embraced
other old alternatives. such as when some chose Maoist theses instead
of'l:hose the PK! adopted and sought to apply. What is important is to hunt
for fresh suggestions which go beyond the inability of the old theories to
tackle post-colonial capitalism.
Naturally this is a question requiring considerable fresh research, and I
have not systematically addressed myself to this task here. Preliminary
studies o r indonesia since 1965, and of India, do point in four directions:
discussions of the struggle in democratic forms, the question of the struggle
within the state, renewed worker and peasant struggle. and finally the

266
 Implications of the PK.l's Strategic Problems . . .

struggle for democracy as a potential strategic opening.·

The Party, the Masses and Democratic Work

The PKJ did not try to apply only the general basic communist theories.
Lenin's theory of the party was also revised, and at the same ti me the PKJ
tried to build a cadre and mass party. In addition. the PKJ did not engage in
armed and illegal stmggle, but instead tried to struggle lhrough peaceful
and democratic means.
A simplified analysis of the strategic problems of the party does. of
course. indicate that it was foolish to revise Leninism in this way. The broad
mass party showed itself to be quite incapable of tackling open repression
which came particularly from the military. and the peaceful path ended
abruptly in massacres.
First. however, we must keep in mind that the break with the old cadre
party in the early fifties was well founded, led to successes and did not lack a
base in the communist tradition. The PKJ retained democratic centralism.
had a totalitarian central cadre and emphasized education. while stressing
that it was the party which ought to lead the people. and should not aUow
itself to be controlled by their spontaneous consciousness. Leninism does
not only consist of !he extreme theses in What Is To Be Done?1 The leaders of
the PKl were more inspired by the considerably more cautious 'Left-Wing'
Communism - An Infamile Disorder.H as well as by Mao's attempt lo
complement elitist cadres with good contacts and collaboration with the
masses.
But aside from the established theses for revision, there is no reason to
blame the problems on an over-abundant democracy, either within the
party or when it comes to the forms of struggle. The essential problem was
not that the PKJ grew into a lax, oversized party. That the members and
sympathizers were dumbfounded in late 1965 depended more on the
neglect of party democracy by totalitarian cadres and on the small group of
leaders who steamrollered the movement right up in the central committee,
thereby undermining the preconditions for effective mass party work. If
there is one thing that most of the surviving communist leaders now agree
on. it is how reprehensible the lack of party democracy was.
Nor is there any good reason to initiate armed struggle if the
preconditions for peaceful democratic work are sound. as they were in the
early fifties when the central lines of the strategy were laid down. The most
important problems did not arise while the PKJ doggedly defended
"bourgeois democracy". They arose only after the party itself had helped
..
Sukarno and the army to implement "guided democracy . Perhaps the
communists neglected political work within the armed forces but. on the
other hand, the demands for a people's militia and the attempts to utilize
internal contradictions within the army contributed lo the catastrophe of
late 1965.
It would seem that a growing consciousness of the indispensability of
democracy is spreading in the left today, both in Indonesia and in India.

267
Summary and Co11clusio11s

where the old communist party acted like the PKJ. applauding the Congress
Party and contributing LO the declaration of martial law in 1975. It is an
open question whether the new attitude to democracy depends on the
insight th al a necessary precondition for being able to prosecute a struggle is
that the activists remain alive and that people dare to involve themselves.
or whether it also depends on new analyses which reveal that the post­
colonial capitalists stand or fall through their extra-economic powers.
including the lack of democracy.9
ln any case. the demand is more emphatic. and neither in 1 ndonesia nor
in India is the left out of sympathy with alliances with bourgeois forces
directed towards numerous power monopolies. l n India the struggle for at
least parliamentary democracy has been in the foreground for the new
Marxist Communist Party ever since the declaration of the state of
emergency. Thereby the party successfully broke with the current theses
applied by both the PKI and the former Indian Communist Party.10

Long-Term Manoeuvres within the State

That Aidit, step by step. developed a strategy of long-term manoeuvres. as
well as advocating struggle within the state. even though he noted in 1963
that it was about to acquire a fixed class base. is indeed a deviation even
from cautious Leninism. But revisionism was necessary. The Indonesian
communists probably realized that not even a very strictly class-based state
is, as Poulantzas later put it in analyses of the fall of southern European
dictatorships. 1 1 a monolithic unit but rellects the class struggle in society.
irrespective of whether the classes are formally represented or not Thus the
class struggle ought Lo be conducted even within the state. Unlike Lenin's
Tsarist Russian state. which was small. despotic. isolated and lacking the
power to act. the Indonesian state was despotic but it was also large. It had
innuence over most of the central and local activities in society. including
economic enterprises. ll was not paralysed and unable to act, especially not
the army. Perhaps the colonial state was more reminiscent of the Russian
than of the European state. But that is hardly the case today. when states in
the Third World and especially post-colonial state-initiated capitalism are
growing. Surprise frontal attacks are useless in this situation; only patient,
step-by-step class struggle will bring about the desired results.
In a difficult situation. I would myself maintain that it may even be a
disadvantage to have a solidly welded and easily identiliable party which
can be destroyed by a concentrated attack from, say. the army. an attack
which can then serve as a pretext for demands for more weapons and more
repressive measures.
Such insight is not lacking in Indonesia today, even if one hears less
about patient class struggle within the state apparatus than previously with
regard to those who have tried to liberate certain areas. But presumably the
painstakingly slow class struggle being conducted today is more effective,
more realistic and more responsible, keeping in mind the risks of a new
bloodbath. This is particularly relevant when it comes to a combination of

268
 /111plicatio11.� of rite PKl:r Srrat£'gic Probll!ms . . .

struggle within the state and campaigns directed against the abuse of power
and especially against corruption.
In India today the most independent and regenerated party of Marxist
communists has had some success through the parliamentary form it has
adopted. at the same time as it attempts LO appear as an uncorrupt and
upright alternative. At the same time it has tried to combine positions within
the representative and federal organs with the mass struggle outside. 12

Renewed Workers' Struggle a n d Controlled Peasant Militancy

My analyses indicate that the workers are the only ones who have the power
to strike the post-colonial capitalists at the centre of economic growth -
industry and trade. But at the same time l have shown that this form of
capitalism also limits the possibilities open to the workers· struggle. The
working class is growing. but not so strongly as one might be led to believe.
The majority do not have permanent jobs. but are to be found in handicraft­
type production, sub-contracting and petty trade. Only a tiny parl of the
control and discipline exercised occurs inside the factory gates. The extra­
economic base and instruments of power are seldom to be found there. and
are seldom challenged by conOicts between workers and company
management. Trade unions are led from the top and are corrupt.
In conclusion. post-colonial capitalism lacks certain possibilities
available to traditional capitalists. namely the ability to allow trade union
organization. since the laller can always fall back on their �olid power in
production and trade. Therefore the workers· struggle is considerably
circumscribed by extra-economic instruments of power which split and
isolate the workers' organizations.
A hopeful sign. however. is that the workers seldom content themselves
with a hard fight only to improve their own economic gain (with only
economic demands permanent employees at least could be bribed. as in
Singapore). At the same lime. they are often forced to take up the cudgels for
basic rights and for a different kind of economic growth model. With such
broad demands for democracy and for an alternative economic policy. they
may evoke a response far beyond the factory gates, perhaps even among the
marginalized and divided masses in the rural areas. I will return to this
shortly.
Let me first add that my impressions o f lndonesia today are reinforced by
the strikes in the Sao Paulo area of Brazil. which indicated a similar
direction, and where the backing given to the workers was reminiscent of
that behind Solidarity in Poland. Even in Jndia, worker actions have
sometimes been combined with support from the rural poor.1 3
On the question, of the mobilization of peasants, where the problem is a
lack of concentrated land. the Indian Marxist communist attempts should
be studied. Towards the end of the 1970s, the party limited militant activities
in West Bengal to those which were practicable. and did not. for instance,
allow occupation of land if there was a risk of splilling !he peasants
and inviting open repression. As a complement to the

269
Summary and Conclusions

redistribution of the land which had actually been concentrated, some

attention has been paid to the system of placing the peasants in debt, the
middle peasants' inability to pay higher wages to their agricultural labourers
and attempts at a modest industrialization of the rural areas, which would
provide jobs for many of those who have no chance of acquiring
economically viable parcels of land.14

The Struggle for Democracy - A Strategic Opening?

As I have previously pointed out. it is probable that the day of the broad
peasant revolution is over. and that post-colonial capitalism also involves
tremendous difficulties for a pure workers' struggle. Instead, my analyses
indicate, particularly the outline for a theory on post-colonial capitalism,
that the struggle for democracy can provide a strategic opening. I mean that
the demand for democracy must have particular significance, since the Jack
of it is one ofthe bases oflodays brutal but dynamic capitalist growth. It has
been significantly created with the help of extra-economic powers.
Not least. when the crisis of the industrialized countries is affecting the
newly industrializing countries. there is the need for political control and
repression necessary to spread capitalism and maintain some growth. And
it is far more important that workers who value the freedom to organize, and
liberals who defend freedom orexpression, may gather together in. and help
to shape, movements with a centralized demand for democracy. This is
because the masses are repressed with extra-economic measures.
Here the permanently employed have joint interests with day labourers
and even with hawkers. Strikes do not need to be for isolated pay demands,
or for the defence of the few who have jobs when some of them can be
bribed. Student protests can be linked with workers' protests. The poor
peasants and rural labourers can unite and link up with the workers in the
towns. The struggle against corruption can be radicalized and directed
towards political and administrative power monopolies, as well as
involving private capitalists who are being hampered by the despotic
state.

Concluding Remarks

The causes of the strategic problems of the Indonesian communists appear

to indicate that the background of the failure of the mid-sixties depended
partly on faults in the general Marxist and communist theories about
whether and how capitalism develops in the Third World and how the
struggle there should be conducted. I n the meantime, the PKl in Indonesia
is but one ofseveral cases. As I have indicated in this final chapter, I believe
that it is important to complement my results by investigating the causes of
the problems of the communists in India, where capitalist development
after independence seems to differ from that of Indonesia.
Latter-day attempts to develop new theories and strategies, through the

270
 lmplicario11s of tlte PKl's S1raregic Problems . . .

experience o f struggle also need to be analysed and evaluated i n Indonesia

as well as in a country such as India. There have scarcely been any major
liberating steps forward. But there are the seeds of new developments in the
ongoing struggle. for the struggle continues, of course, both inside and
outside the communist parties. Exploitation and oppression do not
disappear simply because we have difficulty in analysing them.
It is also important to scrutinize the effects of these Third World
developments on the left in Europe and elsewhere. The upswing in anti­
imperia.ljst solidarity paradoxically came at a time when it became obvious
tbat there were major problems in the Third World. For a while we could
ride on the wave which was proclaimed in the culcural revolution in China
(in which it was politically necessary to identify an upswing). For particular
reasons the liberation struggles in Vietnam and in the former Portuguese
colonies were victorious. But then the problems revealed themselves, with
devastating effect. in the newly liberated countri�s too. And with post­
colonial capitalism. as well as economic growth in the newly-industrialized
countries of the Third World, it is no longer possible to equate economic
development in the Third World with a development which is advanta­
geous to the bulk of the population.
How have these changes in the Third World. and especially the problem
of developing new and effective political strategjes in changed circum­
stances, affected the relationship of the communist and socialist move­
ments in the developed coun1·ries to the ongoing liberation struggles in the
Third World, while at the same time the economic crisis has become
general? 1 am afraid that the results of such a study would not be very
encouraging. But i t is important not to be afraid of the uncomfortable. not to
search for substitutes in the essential but somewhat Eurocentric struggle for
peace, and to make every effort to ensure that we move onwards.
Finally, I have no complete proposals to offer for an alternative concrete
strategy. I have identified the most significant analytical and theoretical
faults which we must tackle. and at the same time started work on finding
new tools. The most likely directions development will take have also been
oullined. But how they can be promoted or counteracted in organized
political work cannot be sketched only from theories and a nalyses. To
derive policies from analyses is collective political work which must take
place i_nside the concrete societies in which we live. each with its own
specific properties. The experrs alone cannot solve problems. It would be a
major step forward if the people. the experts and even the politicians
stopped imagining that they could.

271
S11m111ary and Co11clusio11s

Notes

I. Cf. concerning an analysis of 1hc si�tc. Anderson ( 1982). which I only recently acquired
access co.
.2. Sec. e.g., mos! recently Hamilton ( 1983).
3. Sec fn. I. Chap. 19.
4. See for ex.
ample Sen Gupta ( 1972) p.289.
5. Sec rurtber. Sen Gupta ( 1 979).
6. Warren. {1 980).
7. Lenin ( 1961-). CW 5. pp.347JT.
8. Lenin ( 1961-). CW 31. pp.17JT.
9. See. e.g.. Marx Lane ( 1 982). I have also based this on several anonymous interviews. 1980.
10. Sec further Sen Gupta (1979).
11. Poulantzas ( 1976).
12. Sen Gupw ( 1 979) and. concerning Indonesia. ec
s fn. 6 above.
13. Cf.. e.g.. Waterman ( 1 983).
14. Sec further Sen Guptn ( 1979).

272
Appendices

Appendix I
Glossary a n d Abbreviations

Where possible I have tried to use the spelling used in Indoncsia today for place
names. designations. etc. I beg the reader's indulgence in the event of mistakes.
since the official spelling has continually been changed.
.
I would also like to point out that I have used the term ..Indonesian Chinese.
in the broadest possible sense to refer 10 the pennancntly domiciled people in
Indonesia who arc of ethnic Chinese origin. As I see it. a narrower definition
leaves the doorwide open for the racism which is rife in Indonesia. particularly
since 1 965.

Aba11ga11: The old Javanese peasant culture. subordinated to the princes and
..
their bailiffs. prijajis. which adopted several characteristics from Islam. but
..

retained several distinctive features.

Adat: Customary law.
Aksi sepiltak: Unilateral actions. The opponents of the PKJ used this term to
characterize the radical peasant actions in 1963-65.
Ali-Baba arrangements: Politicians who get paid for using their influence to gel
Chinese businessmen. among others. licences.
A11i-a11i: A knife used in the harvesting of rice. (See also Appendix IL)
Ansor: Muslim youth organization linked lo the NU (see below). (Ansor is
derived from the Arabic al-ansor. those that help the Prophet.) These black­
shirted youths played a prominent part in the killings in East Java.
Baba-Ali arrangement: Cf. Ali-Baba above. This is the opposite. Now the
politicians and military use the Chinese businessmen. among others. lo )au nder
·

their money and invest it profitably.

Bapak: (Bapakism) Father. protector. respected man.
Baperki (Badon Perm11sjawarata11 Kewarga11egt1raa11 l11do11esia): Consultative
Body for Indonesian Citizenship. A pressure group for Indonesian Chinese.
Undisputed strong leader: the late Siauw Giok Tj han. who was close to the
PKI.
Bappenas (Bada11 Pere11canaa11 Pembanguan Nasional): National Planning
Board.
80111011: Share of the crop. (See Appendix 11.)
Becak: Tricycle taxi. rickshaw.
BIMAS (Bimbi11gan massal): The Indonesian regime's agricultural development
programme after 1965. linked to the "green revolution".

273
Appendices

Bimang Merah: The Red Star, the PKI's theoretical organ.

Biro Khusus: The special bureau. The PKI's enemies used the term to refer to a
presumed section within the PKI which had the task of infiltraling the armed
forces as well as initiating a coup d'etat on 30 September 1965.
BPP (Badan Permusjawara1an Partai-Partai): The advisory counciJ of the
political parties: a short-lived creation from 1951. in which the most significant
opposition parties were gathered.
BPS (Badan Pendukung Sukarnoism): The Movement for the Defence of
Sukarnoism. an attempt in the early sixties co unite aJlti-communist nationalists
and others behind the demand for a one-party system.
BTI (Barisan Tani /11do11esia): Indonesian Peasant Front, the country's largest
peasant organization. close to the PKI.
Bung Kamo: Respectful and popular reference to Sukarno.
CGMI (Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia): Student organization close
to the PKI.
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency. United States' secret service.
Comintern: Third International, Communist.
Darul !slam: Islamic state. An extremist Muslim movement with its centre in
West Java. which fought the Dutch but continued with weapons, terror. etc. to
fight for an Islamic state after independence, during the period 1948-62.
Dekon : Sukarno·s economic declaration from March 1963, in which he talked
about a guided economy and self-reliance but still left considerable space for
private businesses.
Dewan Pertimbangan Asung: Supreme Advisory Council. Sukarno's highest
advisory council. constituted in 1959.
Djala11 Baru: The New Way. Self-critical document and new programme of
action for the PKJ in 1948. Later used as a platform by Aidit and co. when they
took over the reins of power i n the party in 1950-5 1 .
FAO: UN's Food and Agriculture Organization.
From Demokrasi Rakjat: A united front within the left after the fall of the
popular-front government in January 1948.
Gadai: Mortgaging of land. (Sec Appendix ll.)
Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia): lndonesian Women's Movement. close to
the PKI, formerly known as Genvis.
GOLKAR Golonga11 K(//ya: Today's governing "party". A corporation of
fu nctional groups based mainly in the state civilian a n d military
bureaucracy.
G01011g royong: Mutual co-operation. (See Appendix II.) Gotong royong govern­
ment: coalition governmenl.
Harian Rakjat: The PKI·s central daily newspaper.
IGGI: The Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia. an international consor­
tium of aid-giving countries and banking groups.
fjon: Usury. (See Appendix II.)
IMF: lnternalional Monetary Fund.
IPPI (/kaw11 Pemucla Peladjar i11clone:;ia): The PKJ-inOuenced organization for
secondary-school pupils.
lria11 Jaya: West lrian, Western New Guinea. called Irion Barat under Sukarno
and West Papua by today's independence movement in the province.
lSDV (/11dische Social Democrati
sche Vere11i11gen ): Social-democratic party that
in 1914 grew out of the early trade unions in Indonesia. In 1920 il was

274
 Appendix I

transformed into the PKJ.

Kabupaten: A second-level administrative unit the district, below the province.
(E.g. Province: West Java. district: Bogor). Cf. Kecamatan.
KBKJ (Kesaruan Buruh Kerakjaran Indonesia): A confederation of trade unions
linked Lo the nationalist PNI.
Kecamaran: Sub-district. (Cf. kabuparen. above.) Below the kecamarans are
villages. desa: towns. kampunger: hamlets and neighbourhoods. rerangga.
Kedokan: Form of sharecropping or contract labour. (Sec Appendix li.)
Konsepsi: Signilicant speech by Sukarno in February 1957. in which he
advocated a broad coalition government (gorong royong government) and hinted
..
at the imminent ..guided democracy .
KPM (Koninfijke Paket11Gar1 Maarsdrappij ) : The Dutch company which hand­
led nearly all trade and communication between the Indonesian islands priorto
1957.
Kyai: Religious teacher of Islam.
Lebaron: The feast al the close of the Muslim month of fasting. Ramadan.
LEKRA (Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat}: People·s Cultural Institute. an organiz­
ation of cultural workers close to the PKJ.
Manipol or Manipol-usdek: Sukarno's speech on Independence Day. 17 August
1959. which was later developed to become a national political manifesto. by
Dewan Penimbangan Asung (see above). Usedek is an acronym condensed from
the cornerstones of the state's ideology: the 1945 constitution with central and
strong presidential powers, Indonesian socialism. guided democracy and
Indonesian identity.
Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia): Political party and umbrella
organization for several Muslim organizations. After the N U (see below) broke
away from Masjumi. it was regarded as modernistic and the N U as orthodox; at
the same time. Masjumi was often less pragmatic than the NU.
(Partai) Murba: During the late 40s a left-wing nationalist party, thereafter less
leftist: Murba: simple. ordinary.
NASAKOM: Sukarno's acronym for the three main movements collaborating 10
form the base of national unity: Nas for the nationalists.Agwna for the Muslims.
and Kom for the communists.
NEFO (New Emerging Forces): Sukarno's name for the anti-imperialist forces
in the world, especially in developing countries. Cf. OLDEFO.
NU (Nahdatul U/ama): Onhodox Muslim political party. but relatively prag­
matic in many questions.
OLDEFO: Old established forces. Cf. NEFO.
OPPI (Organisasi Persatuan Pekerdja Jndonesia ): joint organization for all
r ndonesian workers. An attempt by anti-communists to establ ish a single statc­
controlled trade union confederation in the early 60s.
Pamong praja: The regional and colonial administrators of the Ministry of
Interior. most closely resembling bailiffs.
Pancasila: The live principles which Sukarno adopted as his point of departure
when declaring Indonesia to be independent and when he dissociated himself
from the idea of an Islamic state. The live principles were: nationalism.
internationalism. democracy. social justice and faith in one God.
Parrai Socia/is: The old socialist party. PS. In early 1948 it split and the right built
the PSI (see below). Most of the others later joined the PKJ.
Pemuda Rakjar: Popular Youth, PKI's youth league.

275
Appendices

Penebas: An ··emrepreneur" who buys·standing crops and gets his own workers
to do the harvesting (see Appendix Il).
Perbepsi (Persaman Baksa Pedj11ang Seluruh Indonesia): Organization of war
veterans from the liberation war, close 10 the PK!. Enveloped by a central
organization controlled by the army, 1957-59.
Pertamina: The state-owned oil company of Indonesia.
Pe11i (Pergerakan Tarb(iah Islamijah): Muslim political party, regionally strong
in Central Sumatra. but weak nationally.
Pertani (Persaruan Tani Nasional !11donesia): Peasant organization Linked to the
nationalist PNI (see below).
Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia): Paramilitary left-oriented youth league
during the lndonesian Revolution. Reconstituted in 1950 as Pemuda Rakjat (see
above).
PK! (Parrai Komuns
i Indonesia): the Communist Party orI ndonesia: establ ishcd
in 1920.
PNl (Part<li Nasional Indonesia): The National Party of l ndonesia: foundcd in
1927. After the Declaration or Independence on 17 August 1945. the new PNl
was constituted, t 946-71.
Pr(iaji: Sec above. abangan.
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusio11er Rep11blik Indonesia): The Revolutionary Govern­
ment of the Indonesian Republic: the rebel government proclaimed on the outer
islands in 1958.
PSI (Panai Sosialis Indonesia): The Socialist Party of Indonesia. formed in 1948
after ii had broken away from the considerably more radical PS (see above).
Banned 1960-6 1 . but informally the well-placed cadres were able to continue
working.
PSfl (Parwi Sarekar ls/am Indonesia): Muslim party with its main support in
West Java. Sulawesi and Sumaira.
Raya: Sanskrit for king: domestic ruler.
RT! (Rukun Tani Indonesia): Communist-influenced peasant organization
whicb was absorbed by the BTI in 1953. (See above.)
.
Sajap Kiri: Front of the left . from above"'. 1946-48, with communist partici­
pation. Fo.llowed by Front Demokrasi Rakjar (see above).
SAKTT (Sarekar Tani Indonesia): Indonesian peasant organization in which the
communists had some influence. ln 1951 SAKTI joined BTJ.
Samri: An articulate Muslim cultural stream i.n Java. Compared to the prijaji·
abangan (see above). they are more open to private commercial ventures.
Samri: religious (Muslim) student.
Sarbupri (Sarekar Buru Perkebunan l11donesit1): Trade union of plantation
workers affiliated lo SOBS! (see belo.w).
Sarekar Islam: The Islamic movement; the first major anti-colonial mass
movement in Indonesia. fom1ed in 1 9 1 2.
Sewa: to lease. (See Appendix U).
SOBSI (Senrral Organi sasi Buruh Selu111h Indonesia): Central Organization of
Indonesian Workers. The largest confederation oftrade unions under Sukarno.
close to the PK.I.
SOKSI (Senrral Organisasi Kmyawa11 Sosialis): "'Yellow" confederation of trade
unions for state employees. initiated by state company management and others
in the early sixties. Temporarily stopped in 1964.
Suara Tani: The main organ of the BTI (sec above).

276
 Appendix If

Tanah bengkok: Land belonging to the village and used by the village headman
and his men instead of payment; virtually a grant.
Tebasan: The sale of standing crops to a penebas (see above). (See further
Appendix 11.)
UN: United NaLions.

Appendix II
Key to some land tenure agreements in Javanese Agriculture

The objective of this appendix is Lo unburden the text of the book of several
investigations on different land tenure agreements which are referred to, and at
the same time to offer the reader a brief outline of these agreements. The list is
not exhaustive. but adequate as reference material in this book. There is no
reliable information concerning the spread of the various agreements,
especially those of the fifties and sixties. The best studies have been carried out
during the seventies. For analytical commentary. I refer the reader to Chapters
12 and 17.

Gadai (mendak/mbacok):Mortgage of the land for longer or shorter periods.

Very common. According to the land reform law. those who have had their land
mortgaged for more than seven years should get it back. even ifthe debt has not
been paid. which could, of course. be avoided. The formal owner often remains,
working the land as a sharecropper. for instance. during the time the land is
mortgaged.
Sewa: The wealthy lease land from the poor and pay for it in advance. The land
rent is less if the rich tenant pays it well in advance. Several tenants can pay in
advance and form a queue. Sewa appears to be spreading. Sometimes the formal
owner stays on, as a sharecropper. for instance.
Baskup: The poor lease out their land for payment in kind. which is decided
ahead of time. e.g. 2-21h tons of rice per hectare per annum. According to studies
of some villages in East Java, baskup is very common nowadays. (Siahaan,
1 979.) I do not know how widespread it used to be.

Up to the 1970s share-cropping was the most common form of leasing. Now
gadai and sewa. as well as rebasan (see below), are more common than before. In
addition the sharecropper·s contract is getting worse. Hiisken has shown that
sharecropping can easily survive increased commercialization and more
capitalization or production. In all the cases outlined below. the sharecropper
does all the work.

Maro: 50-50sharingofboth input and output. From thegross outputthe costs or

the input are subtracted. then Lhe net harvest is equally divided. This type of
contract was prescribed in the land reform law on crop-sharing. During the
Iiflies and early sixties the tiller was able to sign more advantageous contracts.
Naturally the despised 50-50 division or the gross harvest also occurred. Here
the sharecropper had to stand the costs of the entire input alone. This made it
unauractive to use more effective and more expensive inputs. and there was no
incentive to raise production.
Merrelu: The owner provides seeds and fertilizer and takes two-thirds of the

277
Appendices

outpul leaving only one-third for the tiller.

Mrapat: The owner provides all the input and takes three-quarters of the harvest.
The tiller retains one-quarter.
Maro miring: As Mrapat. but the owner takes three-fifths. the tiller two-fifths.
Maralima: Four-fifths to the owner. one-fifth to the tiller.
Sromo must be added to this list. In those areas where the Degotiating position of
sharecroppers is particularly weak. the tiller must often pay key money in advance.
to have the chance of sharecropping.
Negedok (ceblokan, kedokan) are on the border between sharecropping and
contract labour. being the lowest form of sharecropping or an advanced form of
contract labour. The owner enters a contract with ··workers" that they should
perform a specificjob on his land. in return for the right to a certain proportion
of the coming harvest, e.g. one-quarter or one-fifth of what the worker harvests,
or the more common one-sixth. The owner th use has control overall the work in
the fields both before and during the harvest. In addition he has a very
favourable loan from the "workers" in the form of their pay. which varies with
the result of the harvest.
Long ago negedok was a way for the owner to ensure he had labour power.
Nowadays it is more concerned with getting rid of a large portion of the
workforce which has traditional right to share the harvesting in return for a
proportion of the harvest.
The owner can use the negedok system to rationalize the work both before and
after the harvest and pay his fellow workers more than the larger number
traditionally would be entitled to. at the same time as he retains a larger
proportion of the surpJus.
Negedok can also take the form of exchange of work. Less wealthy rarmers
help one another. at the same time as they exclude the more or less landless
harvesters.

Mortgaging (gadai) and leasing (sewa) are not always easily distinguishable
from sell.ing the harvest. usury. etc.

Jjon: The classical forrn of usury. The basic principle is that the harvest is used
as security for a loan or is sold while it is still green ({jo). The owner and tiller still
see to it that the land is cultivated and the crops delivered. Payment of the loan
can be in kind or even th rough work. ljon was and is regarded as "dirty" and is
very difficult to investigate. Indications are. however. that (ion is very common
and wiJJ survive as long as no modern system of loans and credits is introduced
which can provide loans to peasants who are far Crom being credit-worthy. (If
this were to happen, presumably most petty farmers would be bankrupt and the
land concentrated by a banking institution. or the question of a land reform.
which makes it possible to concentrate land and form co-operatives. must be put
on the agenda.)
Tebasan: The larger landowners' variation on kedokan (see above). Tebasan
means that the owner sells his standing crops to a penebas. a kind of agricultural
entrepreneur, who allows his agricultural workers to do the work of harvesting
the crops.
Forn1erly rebasan was a way of guaranteeing labour power to tbe landowner.
Now it is more a way ofgetting rid of the "hordes of voluntary harvesters" who
have tbe right to a share of what they harvest. Tebasan workers take care of the

278
 Appendix fl

harvest swiftly and efficiently using a sickle rather than an a11i-a11i (a knife
which cuts each blade individually). They are also paid somewhat more than a
voluntary harvester.
Tebasan is also concerned with landowners who are in need of cash. But this
can hardly be a basic cause. since payment is sometimes made only after the
crops have been harvested.
A few years ago 1ebasa11 was spreading rapidly. Now it would seem that some
stabilization has occurred. The poor harvesters stay away even when nopanebas
has bought the standing crops. The landowner can himself organize a more
effective and less labour-intensive cultivation.
In this connection bawon ought to be mentioned. Bawon refers to the share
taken by the harvester and the owner or tiller. If a harvester takes six bundles of
rice. for example. which she has cut on the fields, to the house of tbe owner or
tiller, she will be given one bundle in exchange forthe work of harvesting, while
the owner or tiller will keep the remaining five. Traditionally everyone has the
right to participate in the harvest. and to get their own bawon. But with the help
of tebasan and kedokan this can be prevented.

Finally. a few words aboutgo1011g royo11g. joint work. Aside from spontaneously
working togeth er. three main forms can be distinguished:
• The state. and at the lowest level the village headman. offers communal work
on roads. bridges. etc. This presumably has its roots in pre-colonial times. but
later was tum.ed into colonial forced labour.
• Voluntary communal labour.
• Obligations such as night watchman's duty in the fields. tilling communal
land. repairing irrigation channels. etc.
Go1011g royong is also used to refer to co-operation outside the agricultural
sector. e.g. gotong royong government or coalition government.

For references and further information see Aass ( 1977).Aisya ( 1980). Collier (all
references). FAO ( 1 966). Franke ( 1 972). Hyami/Hafid ( 1 978). Hickson ( 1 975).
Hilsken ( 1 979). Martin-Schiller ( 1980). Siahaan ( 1 979). Sinaga ( 1 978). Slamet
( 1968). Sturgess and Wijaya ( 1979). Utami and lhalauw ( 1 973). Utrecht ( 1974).
White (all references). White and Wiradi ( 1979). Villages i11 /11do11esia ( 1967) and
Wiradi ( 1 978).
I have also made particular use or the following interviews: Jang Aisya M.
(Yogyakarta. 4 November 1980). Will Collier (Bogor. 25 November 1980). John
lhalauw (Salatiga. 8 November 1980). Nico Kanan (Salatiga. 8 November 1980).
Lochoer Widjajanto Adhincgara ( Salatiga. 7 November 1980). Holman 0.
Siahaan (Surabaya. 15 November 1980). Rudolf Sinaga (Bogor. 25 November
1980). K. Sudhana Astika (Denpasar. 13 November 1980), Ernst Utrecht
(Amsterdam. 2 October 1980) and Ben White (The Hague. 29 and 30 September
1980).

279
Appendices

Appendix ill
The course of events - a short chronology

This short chronology is meant as a complement to Chapter 4. 'The PK!. the

Communist Tradition and the Course of Events in Indonesia". It gives thi:
reader who is unsure of developments between 1945-65 a chance of orienting
him or herself in time, while reading the book. Thus I have only included some
of the most important events.

L912 Sarekac Islam is formed, the first major anti-colonial movement in

Indonesia.
1914 ISDV. the Social Democratic Party. is formed.
1920 The PK! is formed.
1926 Communist-inspired attempted revolt in West Java.
1927 Communist-inspired attempted revolt in West Sumatra.
The PKI is crushed.
The nationalists. led by Sukarno, start acquiring hegemony over the anti­
colonial struggle.
1942 Japan occupies Indonesia.
1945 The Japanese leave.
British troops arrive.
The Republic of Indonesia is proclaimed on 1 7 AugusL
Sukarno i nitially becomes a strong pres ide nt Hatta vice-president
.

The armed struggle against the British and the returning Dutchmen.
The resurrection of the PK!.
Parliamentary form of government.
Coalition government led by the socialist Sjahrir.
1946 The armed struggle and the revolution continue.
British troops leave.
The Dutch are temporarily forced to accept the republic i n Java. Madura
and Sumatra.
Tan Malaka heads tough opposition.
1947 Republic under increasing pressure from Dutch troops.
Popular-front type of government under the socialist. Amir Sjarifuddin.
an unofficial communist
1948 Dutch on the olTensive.
Sjarifuddin's government falls (January).
Vice-president Hatta forms new government.
Socialists split: the radicals join the communists in tough opposition.
Extensive strikes.
Musso arrives. the PK! undertakes new analyses and changes its strategy.
Djo/011 Baru. with the intention of taking the lead of the "betrayed national
and democratic revolution" (August).
The government answer is repression and threats of demobilizing the
armed forces of the left.
The Madiu n revolt (September).
Daru/ lslam revolt for an Islamic state starts in West Java.
1949 Communists beaten and split.
Round-table agreement with Holland in The Hague.
The Netherlands recognizes 1he United States of Indonesia. but retains
Irion Jayo.

280
 Appendix /I1

Vice-president Halla forms a new government (December).

1950 Proclamation of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.
Aidit ..quartet.. starts taking over the PKI Lo pursue the new way, Dja/a11
Bani. of 1948.
Widespread strikes.
Natsir builds a new government led by Masjumi and the PSI
(September).
1951 Aidit "quartet'" take over power in the PKI (January).
Opposition to Natsir unites in coalition organ BPP.
But new conservative government formed under Sukirnan. with the
strongest parties being Masjumi and the PNI.
Continued widespread strikes.
Anti-communist witch-hunt: the PKI leadership goes underground.
Anti-strike law.
1952 New PKI analyses and strategy.
Sukiman government falls because of collaboration with the US.
PKI gives critical support to new PNI government led by Wilopo.
Communists curb the strike wave.
Demands from lria11 Jayo gain in importance.
NU breaks away from Masjumi.
Attempted coup d'etat with socialist involvement (October).
Nasution !ired as commander-in-chief of the army.
During the year. according to the PKrs own figures, membership rises
from 7.000 to 125.000.
1953 The PKI starts getting involved in peasant questions and continues its
campaign to enrol new members.
The Wilopo cabinet falls. after a conOict with squatters on North
Sumatra. Ali Sastroamidjojo forms a new and more radical nationalist
government (July).
The PKI and Sukarno move closer together.
1954 Failed attempt to start creating an independent national economy with
the help of trade regulations.
Growing opposition in the outer islands.
The PKJ holds its fifth congress (March) and lays down the new analyses
and new strategy to be adopted.
1955 The birth of the Non-Aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference.
The cabinet. Sukarno and the PKI increasingly nationalistic.
PKI talks about the struggle for a coalition government before the time for
a popular democratic government.
The army fails to submit to the government. which falls.
Vice-president Hatta gives Harakap of Masjumi the task of forming a new
government (August). The PNl in the opposition.
Parliamentary elections (September). (to constituent assembly in
December).
The four major parties: PNI 22%. Masjumi 21%. NU 18% and the PKI 16%
(figures approximate).
Nasution reappointed commander-in-chief of the army.
1956 Indonesia revokes the union with the Ne1herlands.
New nationalist led government under Ali Sastroamidjojo (March).
Indonesia revokes debt agreement with the Netherlands.

281
Appendices

Revolts in the outer islands and tough confrontation within the army. An
attempted coup led by one phalanx under Lu bis. Nasution leads the other
and draws closer to the politicians and the nationalists.
Sukarno critical or ··splitting parliamentary democracy".
The PKJ supports Sukarno. looks for collaboration with the NU and
reports membership has risen to one milJion.
Hatta resigns the vice-presidency.
1957 Sukarno's Konsepsi speech (February) in which he advocates a broad
coalition government including the PKJ. and hints at the need for guided
democracy.
Revolts on the outer islands become more serious.
The government resigns (March).
State of emergency. Sukarno appoints a nationalist. Djuanda. to head the
government.
The PKI supports Sukarno and the state of Emergency.
The PKJ wins most votes in the local elections in Java (27%).
The UN docs not recognize Indonesian demands for lrian Jaya.
Nationalist and communist trade unions occupy Dutch companies
(December). The arn1y continues and takes over.
1958 The rebels in the outer islands unite and put forward an ultimatum
(February) and then form the PRRI. the Republic of Indonesia's
Revolutionary Government. They are supported by ClA. among
others.
The army. under Nasution's leadership. crushes the PRRI.
The PKJ directs itseJf to the struggle against the rebels and the
compradors.
Al the turn of the year. the appropriated Dutch companies are
nationalized and turned over to the state. but control is retained by the
army.
1959 New Parliamentary elections are postponed.
Sukarno suggests a return to strong presidency (April).
The PKJ holds a major peasant conference(April) lo advance the peasant
struggle.
The army and Sukarno introduce guided democracy (June-July).
New government formed under Sukarno with strong military represent­
ation. The PKJ excluded.
Sukarno holds his Ma11ipol speech ( 17 August).
The PKI holds its sixth congress (thanks to Sukarno who defied the army)
and reaffirms its support of Sukarno and of guided democracy. The PKI
also declares itself to be in favour of a state-guided national economy (cf.
non-capitalist development) and that its membership is now I Vi million.
The communists gain representation in Sukarno's newly-formed Plan­
ning Council and Supreme Advisory Council.
The government's economic policies hit the masses hard. particularly the
workers.
1960 Sukarno and the Supreme Advisory Council place great priority on a land
reform.
The PKJ and SOBSI are very critical of the government. Communists talk
of bureaucratic capitalism.
Repression of the communists.

282
 Appendix lfl

Parliament is dissolved. and later replaced by a new parliament in which

the so-called ft1nctional groups are heavily represented. in addition to the
political parties which have been approved.
The PSI and Masjumi are banned.
The army and the Minister of Labour try launching the idea of a unitary
trade union confederation and form OPPL In 1961 SOKSI is formed.
The central committee of the PKl decide to subordinate the class struggle
to the national struggle (December).
1961 Belgian companies occupied during the Congo crisis.
Eight-year plan is presented as basis ofgt1ided economy. but remains on
paper.
The struggle for lrian Jaya intensifies.
Extensive economic and military aid from the Soviet Union.
The PKl makes a recovery by linking its political demands with the lria11
Jaya issue.
1962 AU rebel movements. even Daru/ Islam. are defeated.
The Kennedy solution means that Indonesia wins lrian Jaya.
The PKI holds an extraordinary seventh congress to adapt the regulations
and the organization of the party to Sukarno·s demands. but mainly to
gather support for a new strategy and tactics now that lricm Jaya has been
won.
Indonesia declares itself to be against the new state of Malaysia.
1963 The PKJ continues winning support
lrian Jaya is handed over to Indonesia.
The State of Emergency is lifted (May).
Sukarno declares there is a new economic policy, Dekon. under state
leadership (March).
The government proclaims instead a programme of economic stabiliz­
ation and liberalization in co-operation with the IMF, among others (26
May regulations).
The 26 May regulations meet heavy opposition. not only from the
PKJ.
Prime Minister Djuanda dies and is replaced by Subandrio, a more
radicaJ nationalisL
Confrontation policy with MaJaysia.
British companies are taken over.
Hesitation in Moscow: Sukarno and the PKl draws closer to Peking.
The 26 May regulations collapse because of confrontation.
Self-reliance is the watchword.
The central committee of the PKl proclaim an offensive policy directed
towards the peasant struggle and linked to the confrontation with
Malaysia (December).
1964 Further occupations and confrontation with British companies.
The peasant struggle intensifies and lead to unilateral actions (aksi
sepihak), with tough connicts and contradictions also between those
faithful to Sukarno.
BPS, which organized anti-communist nationalists etc.. is banned.
Conference at Bogor to iron out differences. not least in the rural areas
(December).
1965 Contradictions continue in the rural areas with Muslim fanatics on the
offensive.

283
Appendices

M11rhais banned.
When Malaysia is voted in as a UN member. Indonesia leaves.
The PKI intensifies i1s campaign against US interests and so-called
bureaucratic capi1alists.
The PKJ fails to mobilize masses of peasants on a long march to the 45th
anniversary celebrations of the party in Jakarta (May).
Later reports membership of 3.5 million.
The PKJ demands a popular militia and the "'nasakomization" of the
armed forces.
Rumours of a right-wing coup and of left-wing officers planning a
coumer-coup.
Economic crisis deepens.
Sukarno ill. but recovers rapidly.
30 September Movement tries to forestall rumoured right-wing generals'
coup; arrests and kills six leading generals. including the commander-in­
chiefo f the army. Nasution escapes. Deputy army chief Suharto is not
arrested.
Suharto and Nasution manage to crush the 30 September Movement.
The PKJ accused of being behind 1he plot
Mass arrests and massacres.
Sukamo is unable to stop Suharto-Nasution.
The PKJ leadership is paralysed. 1he mass movemcn1 taken by
surprise.
Aidil is murdered.
1966 Mass arrests and massacres eon1inue.
Sukarno forced 10 hand over more and more power to Suharto. who also
our-manoeuvres Nasution.
The hunted PKl leadership is split. Secretary-General Sudisman has the
1ime to indulge in Maoist self-criticism before he. too. is arrested.
1967 Sukarno is deposed as president.
1968 Those communists who try to organize a Maois1 guerilla war are
crushed.
1970 Sukarno dies.
1974 The only serious coup attempt against Sukarno is led by General
Sumitro.

284
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Dilemmas of Third World Communism

Interviews, etc. referred to in the text

Anonymous references
The information given is of such a nature that to cite interviewees is un·
desirable.
Numbered n
i terviews: 0 1 , 02, 8, 16, 1 7 , 19, 20, 21 , 22, 24, 26, 29, 3 1 , 35,
38, 50, 5 1 , 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 7 1 , 72, 73 (letter). More
details can be found in the end notes to each chapter. Several discussions
were also held with authors and cultural workers who were leaders in the
cultural struggle under Sukarno.

Other interviews, etc.

Alex Alatas, former secretary of the previous vice-president, Adam Malik.
Jang, Aisya Muttalib, Centre for Rural and Regional Studies and Research,
Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta; now with the United Nations,
Jakarta.
Prof. H. W. Arndt, Department of Economics, Research School of Pacific
Studies, Australian National University, Canberra.
Prof. William Collier, 1980 Begor Agricultural University Agricultural Devel­
opment Council Inc. and Agro Economic Survey and Rural Dynamic
Study.
Dr Harold Crouch, Jabatan Sains Politik, Universiti Kabangsan Malaysia,
Bangi, Selangor.
Dr Dorodjatun, Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta.
Ahem Eningpradja, former Minister of Labour.
Prof. Herbert Feith, Department of Politics, Monash University, Clayton,
Victoria.
Dr Hadisasastro, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
J.H. Hardi, fernier deputy Prime Minister (1 957-59) (PNI).
Ron Hatley, Bendigo College of Advanced Education, Victoria.
Prof. John Ihalauw, Universitas Kristen Sataya Warana, Salatiga.
M . Isnaeni, former first chairman, PNI.
Nico Kanan, Lembaga Penelitan Ilumu Social, Universitas Kristen Sataya
Warana, Salatiga.
Kwick Kia.n Gie, Formerly at Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
now businessman in Jakarta .
D r Michael van Langenberg, University of Sydney.
Prof. John D. Legge, Department of History and Dean of the Faculty of Arts,
Monash University, Clayton, Victoria.
Loehoer Widjajanto Adinegara, Lembaga Penelitan Ilumu Social, Universitas
Kristen Satay Warana, Salatiga.
Mochtar Lubis, Authoratative economic journalist, author, artist, Jakarta.
Prof. J.A.C. Mackie, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National
University, Canberra.
The late Adam Malik, former vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia,

302
 Bibliography

former member of the Murba Party, former Minister of Trade, former

Ambassador to the Soviet Union, etc.
Prof. Moebyato, Fakultas Ekonomi and Centre for Rural and Regional
Studies and Research, Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta.
Gen. Nasution, former Minister of Defence, chief of the army and the armed
forces.
Dr Bill O'Malley, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National
University, Canberra.
Dr Onghokham Fakultas Sastra, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta.
Soegijanto Padmo, Centre for Rural and Regional Studies and Research,
Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
Dr J. Pangalaykim, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.
Dr Jan Pluvier, lnstituut voor modeme gescJtiedenis van Zuid Oost Asie,
University of Amsterdam.
Dr Richard Robison, School of Human Communication, Murdoch University,
Western Australia. (Letter.)
Hans Roden, in 1980 with the International Monetary Fund, Jakarta.
Sadjarwo, former Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs.
Prof. Sarbini, former head of Central Bureau for Statistics. Now economic
journalist and editor.
Prof. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Centre for Rural and Regional Studies and
Research, Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
Adi Sasono, head of the l..embaga Studi Pemgangunan (Institute for Develop­
ment Studies), Jakarta.
Hotman Oleh Siahaan , Fakultas Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, Universitas Airlangga,
Surabaya.
The late Siauw Giok Tjhan, former leader of the Indonesian Chinese, Baperki.
Dr Rudolf Sianga, in 1980 head of Rural Dynamics Study, Bogor.
Prof. Iman Soetiknjo, Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta, who conducted
preparatory studies for the land reform during the late 50s and early 60s.
Dr Ketut Sudhana Astika, Department of Anthropology. Udayana University,
Denpassar, Bali.
Dr I. Tadjasukmana, former Minister of labour.
Dr Ernst Utrecht, Trans National Institute, Amsterdam, and Trans National
Research Project, University of Sydney, former member of the Supreme
Advisory Council under Sukarno, former member of left of the PNI.
Prof. Emeritus W.F. Wertheim, University of Amsterdam.
Dr Benjamin White, Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, former consultant
to the Agro Economic Survey, Rural Dynamics Study, Bogor.

303
 Index

army 5 1 - 5 , 6 1 -3, 70, 8 1 , 84-5, 87, analysis: bureaucratic capitalists;

9 1 , 98-108, 1 1 2- 1 3 , 1 1 7-21, 1 3 9 , Indonesian Chinese 46, 5 5 , 5 9 , 68-9,
145-8, 1 5 5 , 1 57-8, 160, 164, 1 6 7 , 89,, 90, 93-5, 100, 1 0 3 , 1 6 9 , 176,
174-8 1 , 242-3, ch. 1 8 passim, 252, 1 79, 239, 2 4 1 , 254, 2 5 6 ;
2 5 5-6, 267-8; see also PKI analysis: post-colonial 1 0 5 , 108, 109, 179,
army; PKI strategies : division 1 82 , 216-18, 240, 2 5 1 ;
within the army agrarian 247-8, 254-64, 269, 270-1
China 21-9, 3 1 , 33-5, SO, 54, 72, 80,
bourgeoisie: 14-2 1 , 22, 24, 26, 27-8, 86-7, 1 5 9 , 164, 168-9, 203-6,
30-1, 33, 37-9, 47, 59-6 1 , 64, 228, 249-50, 260, 262, 2 7 1 ;see
68-9, 90-7, 105, 1 1 3 , 1·19, 1 24, also capitalists : Indonesian
144, 176, 190, 2 38-40, 260-2, Chinese capitalists; Mao's theories,
264; strategies, etc.
comprador 26, 3 1 -2, 39, 50, 62, 69, CIA see USA
75-6, 82, 84, 86, 98, 1 00, l 06-8,
1 1 4, 165, 179-81, 238, 241-2, dependency theories 3 1-3, 37, 1 7 7-8,
247, 254, 260-2; see also PKI 26 1 ; see also PKI analysis: bureau­
analysis: comprador bourgeoisie; cratic capitalists; PKI strategies:
national 21-3, 25, 26, 27-33, 39, 49, anti-imperialism and class struggle,
50, 62, 70, 74-7, 8 1 , 84, 86, 92-4, radical peasant struggles
97-8, 105-7, 1 14, 1 2 3 , 143, 146,
149, 166, 179-81, 187, 190, 1 9 2 , Hatta 49, 52, 5 9 , 6 1 -4, 70, 89, 9 1
1 97, 2 1 7, 238, 241-5, 248, 254, Holland 46-50, 52, 55, 5 9 , 6 1 , 63-5,
257-9, 261-3, 2 6 5 ; see also PKI 68, 70- 1 , 8 1 , 86-8, 90-1, 97-105,
analysis: national bourgeoisie; 108, 1 1 9, 1 3 1 , 134, 1 46-7, 158,
PKI strategies : co-operation with 1 74, I 76, 178, 186, 1 92, 205-6,
national bourgeoisie ; 242, 250, 2 5 4 ; see also PKI
petty 26, 30, 33-5, S O , 7 0 , 74-5, 93, strategies: anti-imperialism and
107, 1 1 2, 1 1 4, 1 3 0 ; see also class struggle
peasants
BTI 60, 74-5, 129, 1 3 2-3, 1 3 8-9, intermediate strata, nationalists, etc.
1 86-92, 1 94-200, 202, 2 1 4 29-30, 34, 48-9, 5 1 , 53, 59, 68,
70, 76, 8 1 , 84, 88-9, 94-5, 9 7 - 1 0 1 ,
capitalists: 1 04-5, 107-9, 1 1 2, 1 1 4- 1 5 ,
bureaucratic 26, 3 1 , 39, 53, 54, 82, 1 1 7-18, 1 21-4, 1 3 8 , 206, 239,
84, 104, 1 5 5-6, 158, 160-l, 163, 240-2, 244-6, 254-6, 259-62
ch. 1 6 passim , 186, 189, 226, 238,
246-8, 25 2, 2 6 1 ; see also PKl landlords 18, 7 1 , 74-5, 77, 82, 86-7,

305
 Dilemmas of Third World Communism

94-5, 125, 1 28-9, 132, 137, 143-4, 246-7, 252;

149, 1 87-90, 1 92-8, 200-4, 206-8, comprador bourgeoisie 69, 75, 76,
2 1 0- 1 1 , 214-15, 2 1 7 , 240-3, 245, 82, 86;
248-51, 256, 264-5; see also PKI national bourgeoisie: a) interest in
analysis: national bourgeoisie c) democracy 73-5, 8 1 , 1 1 2-14,
interest in anti-feudalism, and 1 22-4, 149, 243-4; b) interest in
rural class relations; PKI strategies: national economy and anti­
co-operation with national colonialism/anti-imperialism 76,
bourgeoisie c) against feudalism; 86-7, 90, 92-3, 98, 108, 149, 241,
rural lords 245-6; c) n
i terest in anti-feudalism
Lenin's theories, strategies, etc. 2, 77, 1 29-3 1 , 138-9, 188, 190,
14-22, 25-36, 37, 39, 48, 50-1, 244-5, 248; see also PKI strategies:
60, 69-70, 72-5, 92-3, 187, 217, co-operation with the national
241, 258-9, 262, 264, 266-8 bourgeoisie;
role of working class 76, 84, 86, 98,
Mao's theories, strategies, etc. 25-8, 100, 143, 144, 149, 160, 1 6 5 ,
31-2, 37, 50-1, 53, 6 1 , 69, 73, 1 6 7 , 1 6 9 , 174, 242, 245-7;
74-5, 82, 92, 106, 129, 166, 188, rural class relations 7 1 , 77, 87,
234, 246, 261, 264, 266-7 1 28-30, 132, 138, 160-1, 1 86-90,
Masjumi 50-3, 59, 6 1 -2, 64-5, 69-70, 192, 1 94, 200, 201-4, 207 , 2 1 2,
73-5, 8 1-2, 86-93, 98, 1 0 1 , 1 1 2, 244-5, 248-50;
1 1 3-14, 1 16-2 1 , 123, 132, 145, the state 76, 8 1 , 82, 97-8, I 05-8,
146, 160, 165, 197, 227 149, 1 56-60, 166, 174, 242,
246-1; see also PKI analysis: army,
non-capitalist development, theory and bureaucratic capitalists
and strategy 29-30, 37, 53, 1 5 5 , PKI strategies:
1 6 6 , 188, 242, 246, 259-61 anti-imperialism and class struggle
NU 51-3, 87, 9 1 , 1 1 5-19, 123, 132, 53, 82, 1 56-60, 163, 1 66-7, 1 74-5,
1 3 5-7, 139, 160, 187, 198, 200 226, 246-8;
division within the army 163-4,
peasants 1 6-20, 22, 24-8, 30-1, 33, 227-8, 252; see also PKI analysis:
35-7, 39, 48, 5 1 -4, 64, 69-71, army;
74-9, 84, 87-9, 104, 106-7, 1 1 2, co-<>peration with national bourgeoisie:
1 14, 1 1 7-19, 1 25, ch.12 passim, a) for democracy 73-5, 8 1 , 84, 90,
143, 1 49-50, 160-1, 163, 169, 1 12-14, 243-4; b) for a national
ch. 1 7 passim, 226, 229, 232, economy 76-7, 84, 86-7, 93, 97-8,
238, 240, 244-5, 248-51, 255-6, 143-4, 241, 245-6 ;c) against
259-60, 262, 264-5, 269-70; see feudalism 77, 84, 1 29-3 J , 137-40,
also PKI analysis: rural class 143, 144, 244-5 ;see also PKI
relations ; PKI strategies radical analysis: national bourgeoisie;
peasant struggle ; workers progressive state intervention 52-3,
81-2, 84, 97-8, 144, 242, 245-6;
PK! analysis: radical peasant struggle 54, 1 60-1,
army 82, 98, 1 0 5-6, 226-8, 242;see 163, 1 86-90, 192, 1 94-5, 1 99-202,
also PKI analysis : bureaucratic 2 1 0-12, 248-50; see also PKI
capitalists, and the state; PKI analysis: rural class relations
strategies: division within the PNI 50-2, 59, 62, 64-5, 70, 73-5, 84,
army; 86-8, 90-2, 107' 1 1 2, 1 1 4-19,
bureaucratic capitalists 82 I 04 1 5 8' 123, 129, 132, 1 34-7, 143-4, 146,
7
160-1, 165-7, 1 73-4, 1 6, 1 8, 7 159, 1 86-7, 190, 200, 224-33,

306
 Index

241, 246-52, 256, 267 Themes

PSI 50, 52-3, 6 1 , 69, 73-5, 8 1 -2,
86, 9 1 , 98, 1 0 1 , 1 1 2-14, 1 1 6- 1 8 , Approach and method: ch.2
120-1, 123, 1 3 2 , 1 5 5 , 1 6 5 , 1 7 2 ,
Contradictions between PKI's
227, 241
analyses and strategies and actual
developments: ch.9, pp.88-92;
Roy's theories, strategies etc. 20-1, ch.1 O, pp. l 00-5; ch. l I , pp.118-2 1 ;
39, 262, 263 ch.12, pp.134-8 ; c h . 1 3 , pp.146-8;
rural lords 203-14, 240, 249-5 1 , ch. 1 6 , pp.169-73; ch.17, pp.192-
255-6, 265; centralizing agricul­ 200; ch.18, pp.226-9
tural surplus, see also landlords Course of events: ch.4 and Appendix
3
SOBS! 60, 74-5, 99, 1 1 5 , 1 2 1 , 1 3 2 ,
Historical background: ch.4 and 5
143-7, 169
social-democratic Marxism 13-14, Implications of the PKJ's problems
263-4;see also PSI for prevailing theories on the
Soviet Union 1 5-24, 27-3 1 , 33-4, struggle in the Third World: ch.20
49-50, 6 1-72, 87, 98, 100, 1 5 5 ,
1 5 7-9, 1 68-9, 203, 249;see also struggle in the Third World: ch.3
Lenin's theories, strategies, etc; and 20
Mao's theories, strategies, etc. Materials used: Preface, ch.2 notes,
Stalin's theories, strategies etc. 22-9, and list of references
33, 37 48-5 l , 60- 1 , 70, 72, 75,
' PKl's analyses and strategies: for
86, 92, 129, 1 7 7 , 1 8 7 , 258-9,
overview: ch.6, 7 and 1 4 ; for
2 6 1 , 264
details: ch.9, pp.86-7 ; ch . I O ,
Sukarno 48-9, 51-5, 59, 63-5, 70,
pp.97-8; ch. I I , pp.I I 2-14; ch.12,
73-5, 8 1 , 84, 86-7, 91-2, 94,
pp.1 28-3 1 ; ch. 1 3 , pp.143-4; ch.16,
100- 1 , 1 0 3 , 107, 1 1 2- 1 5 , 1 1 7-20,
pp.165-7; ch. I 7, pp.186-90;
134, 137-8, 145-8, 1 5 5-8, 160,
ch. 1 8 , pp.226-9
1 65-75, 1 77 , 1 86-7, 1 89-95, 1 9 7 ,
PKJ's progress historically: ch.4 and
224-33, 2 4 1 , 246-8, 252, 256,
5 ; 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 6 5 ch.9, pp.87-8 ;ch.IO,
267
pp.99-IOO ; ch. 1 1 , pp. 1 1 4- 1 8 ;
c h . 1 2 , pp.131-4;ch.13, pp.144-5;
USA 33, 49-50, 52-3, 55, 62, 9 1 , 100,
ch. 1 6 , pp.167-9 ; ch . l 7 , pp. 1 9 1 -2 ;
1 1 8, 1 58-60, 1 66-9, 1 7 1 -5 , 1 7 8 ,
ch. 1 8 , pp.226-9
224-5, 228, 230, 247, 254
Reasons for the strategic problems:
workers, proletariat, etc. 14-21, 24-8, bad analyses and undermined
30, 33, 35-9, 47-8, 5 1 -2, 64, 69, theories: ch.9, pp.92-5 ; ch . I O ,
74-9, 84, 86-9, 9 1 , 93, 98-102, pp. 105-9; ch. 1 1 , pp.1 22-5; ch.12,
104, 106-7, 1 1 2, 1 1 5- 1 7 , 1 1 9 , pp.138-40; ch.13, pp.149-50;
1 2 1 , 1 24, 1 2 5 , 1 3 1 , 138, 140, ch. 1 6 , pp.173-8 2 ; c h . 1 7 , pp.201-
ch.13 passim, 160, 163, 165, 167, 1 8 ; ch.18, pp.226-34
169, 1 7 5 , 182, 188, 226, 229, Situation in Indonesia when PKI
232,238, 242, 244-8 , 250�. carried out its analyses and devel­
255-6, 258-60, 262-6, 269-70; oped its strategies: ch.5 and 1 4
see also peasants
What strategical problems are
analysed? ch.8 and 1 5

307
ASIA TITLES FROM ZED PRESS

POLITICAL ECONOMY
Francois Houtart and Genevieve David Elliot
Lemercinier THAILAND: ORIGINS OF
HAI VAN: MILITARY RULE
Life in a Vietnamese Commune Hb and Pb
Hb and Pb
A. Rudra, T. Shanin ana J. Banaji
Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua et al
PEASANTS AND POLITICS IN STUDIES IN THE
KAMPUCHEA, 1942-1981 DEVELOPMENT OF
Hb and Pb CAPITALISM IN INDIA
Hb and Pb
David Selbourne
THROUGH THE INDIAN Bulletin of Concerned Asian
LOOKING GLASS Scholars
Pb CHINA: FROM MAO TO DENG
The Politics and Economics of
Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid Socialist Development
(Editors) Hb and Pb
PAKISTAN: THE ROOTS OF
DICTATORSHlP Hua Wu Yin
The Political Economy of a CLASS AND COMMUNALISM
Praetorian State IN MALAYSIA:
Hb and Pb Politics in a Dependent Capitalist
State
Stefan de Vylder Hb and Pb
AGRICULTURE IN CHAINS
Bangladesh - A Case Study in Ruth and Victor Side!
Contradictions and Constraints THE HEALTH OF CHJNA:
Hb Current Conflicts in Medical and
Human Services for One Billion
Rehman Sobhan and Muzaffer People
Ahmad Hb and Pb
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN AN
INTERMEDIATE REGIME: Betsy Hartmann and James K.
A Study in the Political Economy Boyce
of Bangladesh A QUIET VIOLENCE:
Hb View from a Bangladesh VilJage
Hb and Pb
Satchi Ponnambalam
DEPENDENT CAPITALISM IN Rehman Sobhan
CRISIS: THE CRJSIS OF EXTERN AL
The Sri Lankan Economy, DEPENDENCE
1948-1980 Hb and Pb
Hb
Elisabeth Croll Selig Harrison
THE FAMILY RJCE BOWL IN AFGHANISTAN'S SHADOW:
Food and the Domeslic Economy in Baluch Nationalism and Soviet
China Temptation
Hb and Pb Hb and Pb

W.F. Wertheim and Matthias Stiefel Musimgrafik

PRODUCTION, EQUALITY AND WHERE MONSOONS MEET:
PARTICIPATION IN RURAL History of Malaya
CHINA Pb
Pb
Lawrence Lifschultz
BANGLADESH:
Srikanl Dull
The Unfinished Revolution
INDIA AND THE THIRD
Pb
WORLD:
AJlruism or Hegemony
Salehi Ponnambalam
Hb and Pb
SRI LANKA:
The National Question and lhe
CONTEMPORARY HISTORYI
Tamil Liberation Slruggle
REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES Hb and Pb

Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei HUMAN RIGHTS

Liong
THE WAR AGAINST EAST L. Wiseberg and H. Scoble
TIMOR (Editors)
Hb and Pb ACCESS TO JUSTICE:
The Struggle for Human Rights in
Susantha Goonatilake Soulh East Asia
ABORTED DISCOVERY: Hb and Pb
Science and Crealivily In the Third
World Permanent People's Tribunal
Hb and Pb PHILIPPINES:
Repression and Resislance
Olle Tornquist Pb
DILEMMAS OF THIRD WORLD
COMMUNISM Julie Southwood and Patrick
The Destruction of the PKI in Flanagan
Indonesia INDONESIA:
Hb and Pb Law, Propaganda and Terror
Hb and Pb
Sumanta Banerjee
INDIA'S SIMMERING Kimmo Kiljunea
REVOLUTION: The Naxalile KAMPUCHEA
Uprising Decade of the Genocide
Pb Hb and Pb

Wilfred Burchell
THE CHINA, CAMBODIA,
VIETNAM TRIANGLE
Pb
RELIGION Arlene Eisen
WOMEN IN THE NEW
Kirn Yongbock VIETNAM
MlNJUNG THEOLOGY: Hb and Pb
People as the Subjects of History
Elisabeth Croll
WOMEN CHINESE WOMEN
Hb and Pb
Bobby Siu
WOMEN OF CHINA: Patricia Jeffrey
Imperialism and Women's FROGS lN A WELL:
Resistance, 1900-1949 Indian Women in Purdah
Hb and Pb Hb and Pb

Else Skjonsberg Madhu Kishwar and Ruth Vanita

A SPECIAL CASTE? (eds.)
Tamil Women In Sri Lanka lN SEARCH OF ANSWERS
Pb Indian Women's Voices
Hb and Pb
Gail Omvedt
WE WILL SMASH THIS Mi Mi Khaing
PRISON ! THE WORLD OF BURMESE
Indian Women in Struggle WOMEN
Hb and Pb Hb and Pb

Agnes SmedJey Kumari Jayawardeoa

PORTRAITS OF CHINESE FEMINISM AND NATIONALISM
WOMEN IN REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD
Pb Hb and Pb

Marie Mies ECOLOGY

THE LACEMAKERS OF
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ASIA/CONTBll'OlY
lAI HISTORY

DILEMMAS OF THIRD WORLD

COMMUNISM
The Destruction of the PKI In Indonesia
OLLE TORNQUIST
Dilemmas of Third World Communism is a study of the
Indonesian Communist Party that aims to answer more general
questions about the difficulties, and even defeats, encountered by
so many left-wing movements in the Third World. Dr. Tornquist
argues that one fundamental reason for the Indonesian military's
successful destruction of the world's third largest communist party
in 1965 lay in the failure of the Party itself to analyse the nature of
the post-coloQ.ial capitalist society that was emergin9.· The Party
was unable, as a result, to develop effective long-term strategies at
the political level.

Thisbook analyses, for each stage in the PKl's history, the range of
theoretical issues confronting the Party, including the land
question, the role of the bourgeoisie, the consequences of
nationalisation, and the problem of democracy. The author argues
that the Party relied unthinkingly on the analyses prevalent within
Marxism generally, and did not perceive how these issues were
altered by the specific forms post-colonial capitalism was taking in
the Third World. The consequent theoretical misconceptions
resulted in fundamental errors of strategy, that in the end led the
Party to disaster.

The lessons drawn in this analysis of the PKl's defeat are relevant
to many Third World revolutionary movements, but particularly to
those in countries with large peasant populations, semi-capitalist
agrarian relations, and ruling classes using the state to promote
accumulation under these conditions. Consequently, the analysis is
also of importance to international solidarity movements.

Dr Olle Tornquist is a Research Fellow and Lecturer at the

University of Uppsala, where he has worked for several years in
Development Studies. The field research for the present study was
conducted in Indonesia and an earlier version of the book published
in Sweden.

'An ambitious and significant attempt . . . to understand why

revolutionary movements in the Third World were so often
defeated.' Professor Sven Eric Liedman, University of
Gothenburg.

'A brilliant thesis . . . The attempt to develop new theory is one of

the most original and suggestive that I have read in recent years.
Professor John Martinussen, Roskilde University Centre .

ISBN Hb 0 86232 278 2

Pb 0 86232 279 0