Pollo v.

David

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio Ricky
A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him
guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.

The factual antecedents:

Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the
Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.

On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked Confidential and sent through a courier
service (LBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the
Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in
which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the
aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.

The letter-complaint reads:

The Chairwoman

Civil Service Commission

Batasan Hills, Quezon City

Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!

As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright
for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee having a pending case in the
csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the
chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have
pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue.Please
investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.

Concerned Govt employee[3]

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions .[4] After some
briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their
arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director
IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson Davids
directive.

The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said
activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who
were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their
divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:

Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the
Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better.

All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair.

CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.

We cant do anything about it its a directive from chair.

Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint; ill send a copy of the memo via mms [5]

Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he
will just get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the
presence of the team from CSC main office: Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin. [6] At
around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the
computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored
therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD
computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the
CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files
copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters [7] in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order[8] dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioners personal files, Chairperson David made the
following observations:

Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected
with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-
NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for
and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise
to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and
advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of
pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated
practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and
certainly against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this
customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above)
appears to insinuate the collection of fees.That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer
assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in
their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and disposition. [9]

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for
people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his
comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the
unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007
in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of
his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against
self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property,
the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is
ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply
with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer
without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree. [10]

On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 [11] finding prima facie case against the
petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice
and indicate whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the
URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon
receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal
charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any
people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared
not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his
computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty.
Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioners CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado,
the latter being Atty. Solosas client who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or
bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner
contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal
complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had
instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed
on him. In its Resolution No. 070519[12] dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The
CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners answer.

On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition [13] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No.
070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an
administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff,
Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a
separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida. [14]

On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of
the case on April 30, 2007. OnApril 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO
and preliminary injunction.[15] Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30,
2007, the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his
counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the
formal investigation ex-parte.[16]Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference,
claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his
petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May
18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsels non-appearance.
[17]
This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the
hearing officer, in indirect contempt.[18]

On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071134 [19] denying petitioners motion to set aside the
denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard
G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner
was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420, [20] the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky
A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations. [21]

On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioners computer, the CSC noted
the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as
employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official
use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and
without the latters consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United States
Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of OConnor v. Ortega[22] as authority for the view that
government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct
search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the probable cause or warrant
requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United
States v. Mark L. Simons[23] which declared that the federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any
inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein
recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondents legitimate expectation of
privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employees
office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search
pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its
inception and scope.

With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view
of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any
privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy,
the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioners computer successfully passed the test of
reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited
authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and that
it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related misconduct, which exempts
it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence
having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the charges
of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of
R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioners dismissal from the
service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum[24] filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing
him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a
subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 071800 [25] which denied his
motion for reconsideration.

By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not
charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding
investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could
not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioners computer and later confiscating the same,
Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy
declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3)
there is nothing contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no
restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY
AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE
CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2ndPARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-
1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING
TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF
OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND
EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING
THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;

III

THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE
EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE
DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL
HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE
GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED
UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A
JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS,
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION
ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007
AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007.IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR
URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO. [26]

Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his
constitutional right to privacy.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution,[27] which provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable
searches and seizures.[28] But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of
resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in
another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti[29]:

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. (Sec. 1[3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction. [30]
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,[31] the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). [32]

In Mancusi v. DeForte[33] which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the
workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard
to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their
guests could enter the office. The Court thus recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.

That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case
of OConnor v. Ortega[34] where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital,
claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees
and other irregularities involving his private patients under the state medical aid program, searched his
office and seized personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically
declared that [i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer. [35] A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct
analysis has two steps: first, because some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or
the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider [t]he operational realities
of the workplace in order to determine whether an employees Fourth Amendment rights are implicated;
and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employers intrusion on that
expectation for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. [36]

On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their

workplace, OConnor teaches:

x x x Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employees expectation of privacy must be assessed in
the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are
continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others
such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public may have frequent
access to an individuals office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that [c]onstitutional protection against
unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the
right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer, x x x but some government offices may
be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable . x x x Given
the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has
a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. [37] (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortegas
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable. Given the undisputed evidence
that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept
personal correspondence and other private items in his own office while those work-related files (on
physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being no evidence that the
hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing
personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not
create any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr.
Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. [38]

Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable,
the OConnor plurality decision discussed the following principles:

Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of
Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the searchwas not a reasonable search under the
fourth amendment. x x x [t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public
employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches[W]hat is reasonable
depends on the context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the
appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of
reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires balanc[ing] the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. x x x In the case of searches conducted by a
public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy
against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.

xxxx

In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employees office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine
conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such
cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is
simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors
in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal
laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency. Under
these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with the common-sense
realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a
constitutional matter. x x x

xxxx

The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace.Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the
work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they
entered an employees desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it
is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context,
much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the
concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for
the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency,
therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related,
noninvestigatory reasons.

We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related

employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest
substantially different from the normal need for law enforcement. x x x Public employers have an
interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of
these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-
related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted with
tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the
agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public
employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding
interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner . In our
view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose
intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by
the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and
often irreparable damage to the agencys work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x

xxxx

In sum, we conclude that the special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
theprobable-cause requirement impracticable, x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will
neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation
of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold,
therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of
work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion
must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
whether the action was justified at its inception, x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search
as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place, x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the nature of the [misconduct]. x x x[39](Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the
character of the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was
undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search
and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.

In OConnor the Court recognized that special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
[40]

OConnor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employers search of an office computer, United
States v. Mark L. Simons[41] where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child
pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with anyone, and a computer
with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that employees were to
use the Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful material was
specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency will periodically
audit, inspect, and/or monitor the users Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its
contractor for the management of the agencys computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited
internet activity originating from Simons computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination of
Simons computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were
pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simons computer were copied from a remote
work station. Days later, the contractors representative finally entered Simons office, removed the
original hard drive on Simons computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency
security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched Simons office in the evening when
Simons was not around. The search team copied the contents of Simons computer; computer diskettes
found in Simons desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes;
and various documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these
evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.

Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons computer and
office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the
search remains valid under the OConnor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the
crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons violation of
the agencys Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said
employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in OConnor because at the inception of
the search, the employer had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the hard drive would yield
evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access
to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably
related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of
privacy with regard to the files in his computer.

x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to
prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x

xxxx

x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by FBIS retrieval of Simons hard drive from his office.

Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his
Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would audit, inspect,
and/or monitor employees use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all
e-mail messages, as deemed appropriate. x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could
not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether
Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief
was not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x
x Accordingly, FBIS actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer files Simons downloaded
from the Internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

xxxx

The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x
x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the operational
realities of Simons workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is
no evidence in the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an
effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy
in his office.

xxxx

In the final analysis, this case involves an employees supervisor entering the employees government
office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely no
expectation of privacy equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by
the employee in the employees office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal
acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the
conduct that violated the employers policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider
that FBIS intrusion into Simons office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer
might engage. x x x[42] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board [43] which involved the constitutionality
of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students
of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may
be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)

Applying the analysis and principles announced in OConnor and Simons to the case at bar, we now
address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office
and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of
the hard drive on petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope?

In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include (1) the employees relationship
to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was
seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. These factors are
relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the
two questions together.[44] Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his
office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any
search of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment. [45]
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal
files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone,
or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege
that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer
files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally
would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even
allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of
people, his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions
at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals,
in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of
name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the
office as a paying customer. [46] Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he
claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.

Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 Computer Use Policy (CUP) explicitly provides:

POLICY

1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for
legitimate business purposes.

2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs.

3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.

xxxx

No Expectation of Privacy

4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and processes.

5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other computer
network. Users understand that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of
itsComputer Resources.

6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the
exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or
operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.

xxxx

Passwords

12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access
to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to
others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using their passwords. No User may access
the computer system with another Users password or account.

13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to
encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the
material they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global
passwords that permit access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a particular Users password. Only members of the
Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.

x x x x[47] (Emphasis supplied.)

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that
the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only
for such legitimate business purposes.

One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining whether an employees
expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy. [48] In
one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the universitys computer
policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to
conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched
when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation.Petitioner employee
thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials conducted a
warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials. [49]
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioners
computer, we answer in the affirmative.

The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her
sworn affidavit:

8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown
sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as,
staff working in another government agency, selling cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done
during office hours and involved the use of government properties;

9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to
warrant an investigation;

10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions
involved in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;

11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its
effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up the
files in the computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;

x x x x[50]

A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was
held that where a government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with
pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any personal
privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the government
employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and
therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for
child pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first remotely
examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was
inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the
office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited
websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were
taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were
secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as
well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.[52]
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception
and scope. We quote with approval the CSCs discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent
as it were with the guidelines established by OConnor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind
of the Commission that the search of Pollos computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness
for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It
bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of
the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint
was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having
pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was
serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly
repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast
clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of
administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually
impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and
confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or
limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a
likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and
transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the
vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself
was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his
computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo
was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and
efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence
derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.[53]
Petitioners claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that OConnor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already
mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation
being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in
administrative searches defined in OConnor.

The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales,
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila [54] involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was
investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing
and attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a
spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty. Morales personal computer
and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the
CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was
seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to
the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating
Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC
personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges
against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA
recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held
that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court
employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it
violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no
evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the
consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the
persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and
specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no
other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of
Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges
against him for insufficiency of evidence.

The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved
a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of
which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the
item seized (office computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances under American Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed
to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to
him.

Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible
in the administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in
finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not
only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. [55]

The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and
documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses
it presented during the formal investigation. According to theCSC, these documents were confirmed to
be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either
with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of
those pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the
explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive
actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer
for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the
circumstances. We hold that the CSCs factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings
and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:

It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to
the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a petition
for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof
knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties
contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved documents
the phrase, Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo, lends plausibility to an inference that the
preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable
motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same for the money
a legal mercenary selling or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.

Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the
presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said
computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testifiedseeing a
written copy of one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the respondent. This
was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the interest of the
Commission, his very own employer.

To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents
were the personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally
served as his counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself
executed a sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly
rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she
never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the respondent.Reyes more particularly stated
that she worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally
knows, was using the computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the
formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence
unworthy of weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo
submitted.

At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that
he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official purpose,
not only once but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the
interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable cooperationOr at
the very least, he should be responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources,
that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially
intended.

Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing
in one of the documents, Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo, was a private joke between the
person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything
more sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a
legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to do with
it?[56]

Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint
since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:

Rule II Disciplinary Cases

SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course
unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the
proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.

No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation
therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may
be required to comment.

xxxx

We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have
been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files
stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part
of the disciplining authoritys own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima
facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil
Service Commission v. Court of Appeals[57] --

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil
service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed
and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint,
jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant
consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the
CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner
Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum
to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the
Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact
exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by
her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time
saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of
the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order. [58] Moreover, being an
administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC
and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity. [59]

In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that
petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on
petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules
and regulations.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.