G.R. No.

76595 May 6, 1988

PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO RANCES, respondents.

Acaban, Corvera, Valdez & Del Castillo Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Valentin A Zozobrado for private respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

The petitioner, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor, in short), seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Resolutions of the public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986, denying Pascor's appeal for having been filed out of time and
denying its Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

Sometime in March 1984, private respondent Teodoro Rances was engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator
of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later,
and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along
with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of private
respondent Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. 1

Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration tion (POEA) for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination," which case was
docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent denied the charges set out in the complaint and by
way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in
his favor against petitioner's foreign principal. In due course, on 4 September 1985, the POEA found private
respondent liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist
fight and imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension, with a
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer disciplinary sanction.
The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of private respondent. 2

On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner, docketed as POEA Case No: M-85-10-
0814 and entitled "Teodoro Rances v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In this complaint, he sought to
carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which
he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private respondent claimed that be had filed an
action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a
return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$
1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] Private respondent
further claimed that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her as 'an allotment for the 3-month
period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under
the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 3 As evidence of this
foreign award, private respondent submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the decision" of the Dubai
court written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a
copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for
Philippines." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the transmittal letter are set
out in the margin. 4

In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: that the copy of the
Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly
authenticated; that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; that the POEA had no jurisdiction over
cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-
84-09-848, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim.

In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor liable to pay private respondent Rances the
amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." This decision was served on
petitioner's counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed a 'Memorandum on Appeal and/or Motion for
Reconsideration" on 29 April 1986.

Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and for issuance of a writ of execution, upon the
ground that petitioner's appeal had been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and that, consequently,
the POEA decision had become final and executory.

Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of execution, arguing that the one (1) day delay in
filing its Memorandum on Appeal had been occasioned by an excusable mistake.

On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, paid the docket fee and posted the required supercedes bond in connection with its
appeal.

On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the
NLRC.

On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as flied out of time. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was similarly denied.

In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraint '
9 Order, Pascor urges that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its
jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for reconsideration.

We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an intent to delay the proceedings but rather a
genuine and substantial effort on the part of petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its Memorandum on Appeal
which, in the circumstances of this case, should not have been disregarded by respondent NLRC. The
circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing of petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed up
by petitioner in the following terms:

30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as messenger in the law firm representing the
petitioner was tasked with the delivery of the memorandum on appeal in the afternoon of April 28,
1986 (the last day for filing the same).

30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the memorandum, he noted that the same is
addressed to the respondent NLRC and he erroneously concluded that it should be filed with the
offices of the NLRC in Intramuros, Manila.

30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at the docket section of respondent NLRC,
he was advised that the same should be filed with the offices of the POEA in Ortigas, San Juan,
Metro Manila.

30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error immediately proceeded to the offices of the
POEA in order to have petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received but unfortunately, by the time he
arrived thereat, the POEA office had already closed for the day. Thus, the appeal was filed the
following day.

To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed by Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted
a certification dated 2 May 1986 executed by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of respondent NLRC stating
that she had read to receive the Memorandum on Appeal on or about 4:15 P.M., 28 April 1986, because the
Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA office in Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.

The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a sufficient basis for giving due course to the
appeal. In the present case, however, the factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the case urged by
the petitioner to move us to the conviction that respondent NLRC should have recognized and heeded the
requirements of orderly procedure and substantial justice which are at stake in the present case by allowing the
appeal. In Siguenza v. Court of appeals, 5 the Court stressed that the right to appeal should not be lightly
disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious
and the interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal:

In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782), we stressed the importance and real
purpose of the remedy of appeal and ruled:

An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the courts to
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal (National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and
instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities (A. One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590). <äre||anº• 1àw>

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The
rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial justice.
(Gregorio v. Court of Appeals [72 SCRA 1201). Therefore, we ruled in Republic v.
Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the perfection of the
appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA
396, this Court held that the delay in four (4) days in filing a notice of appeal and a
notion for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of
equity.

We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the of an appeal in some cases where a sent
application of the rules would have denied it only when to do so would serve the demands
of substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity junction.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on appeal should not be strictly construed as
to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since on its face the appeal appears to be
impressed appeal especially with merit. 6

We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint and of the Manifestation and Motion filed by
respondent Rances in POEA Case No: M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded by respondent Rances
was enforcement of the decision rendered by c. Dubai Court which purported to award him, among other things, an
additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain circumstances. In the complaint dated 23 October 1985,
respondent Rances stated:

Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To include place and date of occurrence of
case of action and amount of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$ salary for three (3) months stated in the
compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total of 2,795.50 US$ [as] per decision from Civil Court of Dubai U.A.E. 7

The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent Rances may be quoted in extension

1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89 which he filed with the Dubai Court for
adjudication.

xxx xxx xxx

2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court in a decision dated September 12, 1984.
Xerox copy of the decision is hereto attached as Annex "B" and the authentication as Annex "B-l'
and made an integral part thereof.

3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above reads as follows:

Both parties came to a decision that the opponent would pay to the claimant the
amount of Five Thousand & Five Hundred dollars for the withdrawal of the claimant
and providing him return ticket to his country. The opponent declared that he would
 pay One Thousand & Five Hundred Dollars to the opponent in case the wife of the
claimant doesn't agree with the amount sent to.

4. During the hearing leading to the Compromise, I emphasized that the allotment I was giving my
wife was US$ 765.00 per month and at the time the case was filed the allotment was already 3
months in arrears which already amounted to US$ 2,295.00.

5. The amount sent my wife which is only P 13,393.45 through PASCOR and confirmed by a
Certification of the Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City Branch, hereto attached as Annex 'C' is
definitely very meager compared to the exchange value of US$ 2,295.00;

6. My wife certainly did not agree and cannot agree or admit that only P 13,393.45 will be given her
as an allotment for the 3-month period; hence, urder the Compromise Agreement, we are entitled to
recover the additional US$ 1,500.00;

7. The agreement insofar as the additional remittance to my wife of US$1,500.00 is reasonable in

that adding the same to the P13,393.45 my wife received would sum up to US$2,295.00
corresponding to the accumulated 3 month allotment due my wife.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Office to —

Cause or require respondent to remit and/or pay the undersigned or his wife of the amount of US$
1,500.00 as mandated under the Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the
Dubai Civil Court. 8

It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only the Dubai Court decision; he did not submit
any copy of the 'Compromise Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to writing) which he presumably
believed to have been absorbed and superseded by the Dubai decision.

That the cause of action set out in respondent Rances' complaint was enforcement of the Dubai decision is further,
indicated in the decision dated 14 April 1986 rendered by the POEA. This decision provided in part as follows:

Complainant alleged that his original claim of US$ 9,364.89 for unpaid salaries, termination pay and
travel expenses was filed in Dubai. In a decision rendered by the Dubai Court, his claim was
compromised in the amount of US$ 5,500.00 plus return plane ticket. The amount of US$ 1,500.00
will be paid to his wife if she does not agree with the amount sent to her. The three (3) months
unremitted allotments refers to the months of April, May and June 1984. As evidenced by the
Allotment Shp, respondent approved the authority given by complainant stating that the amount of
US$ 765.00 be remitted to his wife belong with the month of April 1984. The amount remitted to his
wife for allotment cover the three (3) month period was only P 13,393.45. The basis of complainant's
claim is the reservation in the decision of the Dubai Court which states that in case the wife of the
claimant does not agree with the amount sent to her, the opponent shall pay US$ l,500.00. 9

Clearly, therefore, respondent Rances' action was for enforcement of the Dubai decision to the extent that such
decision provided for payment of an additional amount of US$1,500.00 and that respondent relied upon such
decision.

Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign
court. Under Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that the POEA has
jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." Respondent Rances, however,
relied not upon the employer - employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and the latter's
foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already
been partially satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear
and decide a claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular courts.
The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.
Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily applicable in proceedings before
courts, are observed in proceedings before the POEA. 10

Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still
respondent Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the
POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25
and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following
terms:

Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or
litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court. (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having
legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a
faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular
Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh,
Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26
nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25. 11

There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is
accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that translation is
legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-
official language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or
Spanish or Filipino. 12 In Ahag v. Cabiling, 13 Mr. Justice Moreland elaborated on the need for a translation of a
document written in a language other than an official language:

... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than
Spanish, if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated into Spanish by the official interpreter
of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation
sent to this court. In the case before us, there is an untranslated exhibit written in the Visayan
language. 14

In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 15 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, had
occasion to stress the importance of having a translation made by the court interpreter who must, of course, be of
recognized competence both in the language in which the document involved is written and in English. The Court
said:

[t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation given by the Chinese Embassy, specially in
the absence of a delete assurance that said translation was correct and that it was made by the
Embassy Adviser himself. On the other hand, the translation made by the court interpreter is official
and reliable not only because of the recognized ability of said interpreter to translate Chinese
characters into English, but also because said interpreter was under the direct supervision and
control of the court. .... 16
In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which
respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an
official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the
translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English translation
submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has
that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one.

The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court
decision, even on the basis of the English translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not purport on its face
to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances
simply assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign principal. The Dubai decision does not
Identify the parties to the litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai decision can scarcely
be enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be rendered
against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever been
acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before
the Dubai Court. 17 Respondent Rances has not proved the contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant.

Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Pascor's foreign principal — Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. — it still would not follow that Pascor would
automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach
to the contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal with persons like respondent
Rances. 18 Such statutory inability does not extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship
Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside Philippine territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit
may involve a contract of employment with a Filipino seaman.

We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Decision dated 14 April 1986
and its Order dated 20 May 1986, and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November 1986 denying petitioner's appeal and
Motion for Reconsideration. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of respondent Rances to initiate another
proceeding before the POEA against petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of employment
which existed between said respondent and petitioner or petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances
may seek to show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not remitted by his employer to his
wife.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the Resolutions of public respondent NLRC dated 14
August 1986 and 19 November 1986 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
issued by this Court on 8 December 1986 is hereby made PERCENT. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.