SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000.]

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Algarra Mutia & Trinidad Law Offices for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. He stayed in the

Philippines since 1932 wherein he found an employment, started his own business
and married a Filipina with whom he had four children. At the age of 66, he filed a
verified petition to be admitted as Filipino citizen in accordance with the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. During the hearing, petitioner testified as to his
qualifications and presented three other witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
The prosecution having been convinced by the evidence presented by the
petitioner, did not present any evidence to refute the testimony of the witnesses for
the petitioner. Hence, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed. The State's appellant's brief with corresponding annexes
alleged that the petitioner (1) failed to state all the name by which he is or had
been known as evidenced by an attached copy of the 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by the petitioner with the Special Committee on
Naturalization; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence as evidenced by
his Immigration Certificate of Residence; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner as he lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 to 1977 as evidenced by his marriage contract; (4) has no
known lucrative trade or occupation as reflected by the 1973 to 1977 income tax
returns; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. Hence, this petition.

The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rule may be applied by analogy or
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 suppletorily in such case is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by
the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Moreover, it is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced

and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. As
noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7, clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with
the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the
instant petition ought to be denied.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS;

EXCEPT BY ANALOGY AND SUPPLETORILY, FORMAL OFFER OF
EVIDENCE IS NOT APPLICABLE; NOT COVERED BY RULE ON RES
JUDICATA. — The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."
That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State
for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient
course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not
covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does
not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

2. ID.; EVIDENCE; FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE; PURPOSE. —

The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility.

3. ID.; ID.; OBJECTION; PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF

THE RIGHT TO OBJECT TO AUTHENTICITY OF DOCUMENTS
SUBMITTED TO APPELLATE COURT BY THE STATE. — Petitioner cannot
claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
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 documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included
his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals,
thus: The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No.
031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been
established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is
031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is
031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by
the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. Indeed, the objection is flimsy
as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number
is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the Special Committee on Naturalization
which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner
offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the
State.

4. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; RULE. — The Court notes that

these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's
income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed
under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory
showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.

5. POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION LAW; RIGIDLY

ENFORCED AND STRICTLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT; APPLICANT MUST SET FORTH IN THE PETITION HIS
PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE; NOT COMPLIED IN
CASE AT BAR. — We shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to
include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7,
C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989
petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address
in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes,
such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is allegedly
because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by
such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the
opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression
of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community
where he may have lived at one time or another. It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
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 government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7
clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition
his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. THIcCA

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1(1) of the Court of Appeals
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South
Cotabato 2(2) admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship. prLL

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a

nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking."
Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and
eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four
children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated
—

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under
the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee
on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the
said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization
by administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and

presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was
Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon
being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness against
him, he remarked: prcd

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 Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself
which is rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with
the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are
convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted
as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present
any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3(3)

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to
state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and
his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention
of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence. 4(4)

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
SCN Case No. 031767, 5(5) in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name
of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia
Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition
for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. 6(6) The State also
annexed income tax returns 7(7) allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to
show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove
that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge
in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife
without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any.
The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract 8(8) and a
Joint-Affidavit 9(9) executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show
that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage
license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because
petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife
since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his
claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of

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 Residence, 10(10) petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not
include said address in his petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which,
as already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for
naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State
is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal. 11(11) The appellate court held: cdrep

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,

petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present petition for naturalization
his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to
include the same militates against a decision in his favor . . . This is a
mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by
those other names to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal
objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for

naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and
"Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires
the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of
residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to
comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason
for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies
of the government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be
informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By failing
to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said
agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and

irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and
sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy
and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from
being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization
Law," and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization. . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of

P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not
lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he is not
liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . ." It is not only
that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an
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 income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses
as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in
their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance
given to them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder
children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative
because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION
CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS
OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE

PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME
NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. LibLex

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,

THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS
ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE

PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER
AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in

considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's
decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are
mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12(12) so it was argued,
because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13(13) of
the Rules of Court which provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
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 cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (italics added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132,
§34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14(14)
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and
formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the
right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due process. 15(15) We are not persuaded. Indeed,
the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. 16(16) Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the
State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals, thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN

Case-No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270
has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for
naturalization . . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually
filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal. 17(17)

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at

most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner
himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the
petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18(18) of
the Special Committee On Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case
No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the
authenticity of the documents presented by the State. prLL

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition
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 in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit
executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all public
documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity
that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion
that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of
this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of
petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in
accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A
of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention
said address in petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, 19(19) with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20(20)
This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought
to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part
in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. 21(21) It is
settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22(22) As noted
by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization
shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23(23)
This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases
defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition
ought to be denied.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and

the instant petition is hereby DENIED. LLpr

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras and
Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez.
2. Presided by Judge Rodolfo C. Soledad.
3. TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Italics added)
4. Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.
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 5. Annex B; Id., pp. 129-138.
6. Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.
7. Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4; Id., pp. 144-157.
8. Annex D; Id., p. 139.
9. Annex E; Id., p. 140.
10. Annex A; Records, p. 16.
11. CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted.
12. Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.
13. Now found under Rule 1, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
14. Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).
15. Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.
16. See Peninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma, 194 SCRA 667 (1991).
17. Appellee's Brief, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 184.
18. Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that the petition
be dismissed as petitioner failed to meet the requirements under LOI 491 because
his income is insufficient for his support and that of his family and also because
he failed to show that he believes in the principles underlying the Constitution.
19. In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.
20. Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.
21. Watt v. Republic, supra.
22. Chan Chen v. Republic, 109 Phil. 940 (1960), citing Co Quing v. Republic, 104
Phil. 889 (1958) and Co v. Republic, 108 Phil. 265 (1960).
23. Comment, p. 23; Rollo, p. 110.

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 Endnotes

1 (Popup - Popup)
1. Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras and
Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez.

2 (Popup - Popup)
2. Presided by Judge Rodolfo C. Soledad.

3 (Popup - Popup)
3. TSN, p. 152, June 27, 1991. (Italics added)

4 (Popup - Popup)
4. Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.

5 (Popup - Popup)
5. Annex B; Id., pp. 129-138.

6 (Popup - Popup)
6. Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.

7 (Popup - Popup)
7. Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4; Id., pp. 144-157.

8 (Popup - Popup)
8. Annex D; Id., p. 139.

9 (Popup - Popup)
9. Annex E; Id., p. 140.

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 10 (Popup - Popup)
10. Annex A; Records, p. 16.

11 (Popup - Popup)
11. CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted.

12 (Popup - Popup)
12. Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.

13 (Popup - Popup)
13. Now found under Rule 1, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

14 (Popup - Popup)
14. Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).

15 (Popup - Popup)
15. Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.

16 (Popup - Popup)
16. See Peninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma, 194 SCRA 667 (1991).

17 (Popup - Popup)
17. Appellee's Brief, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 184.

18 (Popup - Popup)
18. Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that the petition
be dismissed as petitioner failed to meet the requirements under LOI 491 because
his income is insufficient for his support and that of his family and also because
he failed to show that he believes in the principles underlying the Constitution.

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 19 (Popup - Popup)
19. In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.

20 (Popup - Popup)
20. Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.

21 (Popup - Popup)
21. Watt v. Republic, supra.

22 (Popup - Popup)
22. Chan Chen v. Republic, 109 Phil. 940 (1960), citing Co Quing v. Republic, 104
Phil. 889 (1958) and Co v. Republic, 108 Phil. 265 (1960).

23 (Popup - Popup)
23. Comment, p. 23; Rollo, p. 110.

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