FSI Insights: Financial Stability Institute

Financial Stability
Institute
FSI Insights
on policy implementation
No 7
The identification and

measurement of non-
performing assets: a cross-
country comparison
By Patrizia Baudino, Jacopo Orlandi and Raihan Zamil
April 2018
FSI Insights are written by members of the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), often in collaboration with staff from supervisory agencies and central banks. The papers
aim to contribute to international discussions on a range of contemporary regulatory and supervisory
policy issues and implementation challenges faced by financial sector authorities. The views expressed in
them are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the BIS or the Basel-based
committees.
Authorised by the Chairman of the FSI, Fernando Restoy.
This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). To contact the BIS Media and Public
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© Bank for International Settlements 2018. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or
translated provided the source is stated.
ISSN 2522-2481 (print)

ISBN 978-92-9259-138-0 (print)
ISSN 2522-249X (online)
ISBN 978-92-9259-139-7 (online)
Contents
Executive summary ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Section 1 – Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 3
Section 2 – Accounting and prudential frameworks for problem assets .................................................................... 5

Overview ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Accounting frameworks related to NPA identification.............................................................................................. 6
Accounting frameworks related to NPA measurement ............................................................................................ 8
BCBS guidelines on the treatment of problem assets ............................................................................................... 9
Section 3 – NPA identification and measurement practices in selected jurisdictions ......................................... 10

NPA identification ..................................................................................................................................................................10
NPA measurement .................................................................................................................................................................15
Section 4 – Implications for policy ............................................................................................................................................22

NPA identification – policy considerations ..................................................................................................................22
NPA measurement – policy considerations .................................................................................................................24
Section 5 – Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................................................26
References ..........................................................................................................................................................................................27
Annex ..............................................................................................................................................................................................29
NPA identification and measurement practices in Asia ..........................................................................................29
NPA identification and measurement practices in EU-SSM ..................................................................................37
NPA identification and measurement practices in the Latin America and the Caribbean region ......... 41
NPA identification and measurement practices in the United States ...............................................................48
The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

iii
The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-
country comparison 1
Executive summary
Non-performing assets (NPAs) are a recurring feature in financial crises. Poor asset quality translates
into lower interest income and higher loan loss provisions, eventually leading to a deterioration in banks’
profitability and regulatory capital. Over time, high NPAs can lead to bank failures, ultimately threatening
financial stability. This, in turn, has negative consequences for the banking system’s ability to provide
financing to the real economy.
The timely identification of NPAs helps to ensure that the stock of problem assets are
recognised on bank balance sheets. Applicable accounting standards on loan impairment and regulatory
guidance on NPA entry and exit criteria – which are not harmonised across jurisdictions – set the broader
context for the NPA identification process. Notwithstanding differences in both accounting and regulatory
frameworks, determining whether and when an exposure is considered “non-performing” is not always
clear-cut and requires banks and supervisors to exercise judgment, based on a combination of quantitative
and qualitative factors that are common features of regulatory NPA identification regimes.
Effective NPA measurement practices increase the likelihood that NPAs are appropriately
recognised in bank earnings and regulatory capital. The financial implications of NPAs boil down to
determining whether and, if so, how much provisions are needed to write down the carrying value of an
NPA to its estimated recoverable amount. Provisioning outcomes are heavily influenced by whether
jurisdictions are bound by accounting standards, regulatory provisioning guidance or a combination of
the two to recognise provisions through the profit and loss (P&L) statement. The various supervisory
approaches used to deal with the treatment of accruing interest income on an NPA and loan write-off
criteria, among others, also influence how NPAs impact earnings and regulatory capital.
Once a loan is placed on NPA status, the single biggest driver of the required level of
provisions is the value assigned to collateral, which is a heavily assumption-dependent process.
While international accounting standards do not prescribe valuation approaches, they require banks to
value collateral based on the net present value (NPV) method; that is, to consider the time and costs
required to acquire and sell collateral. The assumptions that underpin the NPV approach are particularly
important in jurisdictions where the legal framework results in long delays for creditors to gain collateral
access. Some jurisdictions impose regulatory prescribed haircuts on appraised collateral values supporting
an NPA. These two valuation methods differ and can lead to vastly different provisioning outcomes.
This paper focuses on the role that prudential regulation and supervision can play in
facilitating the prompt identification and measurement of NPAs, by taking stock of cross-country
practices. The FSI stock-take covered prudential requirements and their interaction with locally applicable
accounting standards. Select Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as the United States
and European countries were included in the study.
1
Patrizia Baudino, Raihan Zamil, Bank for International Settlements, and Jacopo Orlandi, Bank of Italy.
The authors are grateful to Rudy V Araujo Medinacelli, Enrico Bleve, John Colwell, Jeffrey Geer, Piers Haben, Lara Lylozian,
Daniel Mueller, Jonathan Rono, Shuchi Satwah and Fernando Vargas Bahamonde for helpful comments, and the representatives
from the Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries who participated in the FSI survey. We are grateful to Esther Künzi for
valuable support with this paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
BIS, the Basel-based standard setters or the Bank of Italy.
The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 1

The findings reveal considerable differences across jurisdictions in applicable accounting
standards, which are exacerbated by divergent prudential frameworks that govern NPA
identification and measurement. These differences make it difficult to make meaningful comparisons
both within and across jurisdictions on key asset quality metrics, which are often a driver of a bank’s overall
financial condition and operating performance.
Recently published guidelines by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
provide an opportunity for supervisory authorities to harmonise NPA identification frameworks. In
April 2017, the BCBS published its guidance on prudential treatment of problem assets (PTA), which
provides harmonised definitions for “non-performing” and “forborne” exposures, including entry and exit
criteria (BCBS (2017)).
There is no comparable internationally harmonised framework that governs NPA
measurement. In this context, the FSI stock-take reviews a variety of prudential approaches used in
different countries. A number of these practices may provide useful insights for prudential authorities.
Against this background, a range of regulatory and supervisory policy options can be
considered, if applicable, to improve existing practices for the identification and measurement of
NPAs as outlined below:
• NPA identification: extend the application of regulatory NPA identification regimes to encompass
all asset classes and exposures; introduce a regulatory definition of NPA and harmonise NPA
entry and exit criteria in line with the BCBS PTA guidelines, as necessary; place greater emphasis
on qualitative factors to classify large, wholesale exposures as “non-performing” and consider
expanding upon the qualitative “unlikely to pay” criteria to facilitate supervisory risk assessments.
• NPA measurement: gain powers, if not yet available, to impose prudential backstops (as a
downward adjustment in regulatory capital) to deal with situations where accounting provisions
on NPAs are deemed inadequate from a supervisory perspective; provide supervisory guidance
on the prudent valuation of collateral, if applicable; investigate whether banks realistically
consider the time and cost required to access and liquidate physical collateral that may support
an NPA; consider the introduction of time-bound provisioning requirements for repossessed
collateral that is held beyond a certain period of time; explore regulatory or supervisory measures
to address the accounting impact of accruing interest income on an NPA; collect supervisory
information on “accrued interest earned, not collected” on NPAs; and introduce loan write-off
criteria in line with applicable accounting requirements.
2 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

Section 1 – Introduction
1. Following episodes of financial crises, many countries experienced high levels of NPAs, 2
generating policy responses to facilitate their resolution. For instance, in the aftermath of the global
financial crisis that started in 2007, NPA levels surged in several countries. In the European Union, NPLs
more than doubled between 2009 and 2014 (Aiyar et al (2015)), with end-2016 NPL ratios reaching peaks
of 45% in some of the worst affected countries, in line with the highs recorded in some Asian countries
during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s (Baudino and Yun (2017)).
2. The recurring role of asset quality problems in triggering financial crises has shined a
spotlight on crisis prevention measures, including the need to ensure the timely identification and
measurement of NPAs. 3 High NPAs impair bank earnings by reducing interest income, increasing both
borrowing costs 4 and the amount of provisions required for incurred losses. Legal and administrative costs
also increase given the additional resources needed to manage and resolve problem loans. These factors
can overwhelm bank earnings and weaken regulatory capital, thereby negatively affecting banks’ ability to
lend to the real economy. 5
3. Accounting standard setters play an important role in the NPA identification and
measurement process. Applicable accounting standards prescribe the financial asset valuation principles,
which form the basis to determine whether an exposure is “impaired”, and to set the requisite provisions
needed to absorb losses. For banks, the reported stock of impaired assets and associated provisioning
requirements can heavily influence their published financial statements, which are used by market
participants to assess an institution’s credit risk profile, earnings performance and future prospects.
4. NPA identification and measurement also have significant prudential implications.
Identification practices are crucial for supervisors to fully appreciate the quality of banks’ assets. As for
measurement, accounting provisions that are recognised through the P&L account can directly affect
regulatory capital.
5. Supervisory authorities typically supplement accounting standards with different forms of
regulatory guidance. One reason why supervisory guidance may be necessary is because accounting
standards are principles-based and are applicable to all industries, not just banks. In practice, it means that
banks – whose main area of focus remains the origination, identification and management of credit risk –
might require more detailed guidance than what is provided under applicable accounting standards.
6. Yet supervisory guidance on the NPA identification process varies considerably across
jurisdictions. Based on a survey conducted by the FSI and relevant publicly available information, while
all sampled countries have some regulatory framework in place, only some have developed a formal NPA
definition. Regardless of whether formal or informal methods are used, there is no uniform NPA definition,
covering both entry and exit criteria across surveyed jurisdictions. Variations were also observed in regards
to the role of collateral in the NPA identification process, the regulatory treatment of multiple loans
2
The terms “non-performing assets”, “non-performing loans” and “non-performing exposures” are used throughout this paper.
However, the three terms are not the same. Of the three, non-performing loans is the narrowest concept, as it refers only to
problem loans, but is the term most commonly used in the academic literature as well as among market participants. Non-
performing exposures is typically the widest concept, and it includes loans, debt securities and certain off-balance sheet
exposures, but may exclude certain asset classes, such as foreclosed collateral. In some jurisdictions that provide a definition
of non-performing assets, they include various asset classes such as foreclosed collateral.
3
NPA identification refers to the process used by banks and supervisors to classify an exposure as “non-performing”, while NPA
measurement represents the level of provisions required to write down the NPA exposure to its estimated recoverable amount.
4
Depositors and institutional funds providers are likely to demand higher interest rates at a bank experiencing financial
difficulties and exhibiting a higher credit risk profile.
5
Given the links between high NPAs and the health of both individual banks and the financial system, the FSI has undertaken a
number of projects covering NPAs and provisioning practices. See Baudino and Yun (2017) and Restoy and Zamil (2017).

granted to the same borrower or a group of connected borrowers and whether the regulatory-based NPA
identification regimes apply to all or only a subset of asset classes. The recently published BCBS PTA
guidelines, if adopted by prudential authorities, should facilitate greater harmonisation of NPA
identification practices across jurisdictions.
7. Prudential approaches to NPA measurement also differ. Provisioning requirements under
applicable accounting standards generally follow an NPV approach, which requires banks to consider, in
the collateral valuation process, the time and costs required to acquire and sell collateral. In jurisdictions
that impose regulatory provisioning requirements, collateral is not always considered in determining
provisions; and in cases where collateral is recognised, supervisory prescribed collateral haircuts may be
imposed. These varied approaches to – and the judgment involved in – collateral valuation, in conjunction
with differences in the role and application of prudential backstops, the regulatory treatment of accrued
interest on NPAs, and loan write-offs, can lead to different provisioning outcomes.
8. The supervisory application of NPA identification and measurement requirements entails
significant judgment. While national authorities typically prescribe both quantitative and qualitative
criteria, the extent to which supervisors rely on past-due or qualitative criteria can materially impact when
an exposure is placed on NPA status. The timing matters because once an exposure is classified as non-
performing, it may trigger significant provisioning requirements; and in some jurisdictions it can also
impact income recognition. 6 In addition, the process of estimating provisions on NPAs is inherently
assumption-dependent and is driven by the estimated value of collateral.
9. An additional source of variability stems from the interactions between the prudential
requirements for NPAs and the accounting treatment of impaired assets. Accounting and prudential
standards on NPA identification and measurement are not necessarily aligned given their different
purposes, and supervisory authorities often require some adjustment of accounting data, for prudential
purposes. These differences are amplified across jurisdictions because countries do not necessarily follow
the same accounting standards. Even where the accounting standards are the same, the interplay between
accounting and prudential requirements may follow different approaches, leading to different outcomes
on both the reported stock of NPAs and the associated level of provisions.
10. This paper takes stock of NPA identification and measurement practices across select
jurisdictions and identifies a number of regulatory and supervisory policy considerations that may
be useful to supervisory authorities. The findings are based on the results of an FSI survey, along with
relevant publications from the BCBS (2015, 2017) and various international organisations, central banks
and supervisory authorities. 7 Section 2 outlines applicable accounting standards on NPA identification and
measurement and summarises the recent BCBS guidance on the prudential treatment of problem assets.
Section 3 discusses the key takeaways of the FSI survey on NPA identification and measurement practices
across sampled jurisdictions. Section 4 sets out policy options that supervisors may consider to enhance
their NPA identification and measurement process. Section 5 provides brief concluding remarks. The
Annex provides detailed information on NPA identification and measurement in the sampled countries.
6
Some jurisdictions require all or a subset of exposures designated as NPAs to stop accruing interest until the underlying asset
is upgraded to a performing status.
7
See, for instance, D’Hulster, et al (2014) for a similar exercise covering central and eastern European countries, and Aiyar et
al (2015) for a discussion of the challenges posed by NPLs in Europe. Gaston and Song (2014) and Bholat et al (2016) provide
an overview of the prudential and accounting issues. This paper is, however, unique in its coverage of a large number of
countries and regions, covering both NPA identification and measurement.

Section 2 – Accounting and prudential frameworks for problem assets
Overview
11. The identification and measurement of problem assets have traditionally been subject to
both accounting principles and prudential oversight. The published financial statements of banks are
typically the domain of accounting standard setters; as such, accounting rules provide a framework to
determine both the credit quality of an exposure and associated provisioning requirements to absorb
incurred and expected losses. The accounting principles that are followed by most jurisdictions are based
on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Separately, many prudential regulators also require
banks to classify assets according to their credit quality and often intervene with different degrees of
intrusiveness on banks’ provisioning practices. At the international level, the BCBS has issued guidance on
the identification of non-performing exposures, but there is no international regulatory standard on
measurement issues, including provisioning practices (BCBS (2017)).
12. On 1 January 2018, IFRS 9 became effective and replaced International Accounting
Standards (IAS) 39. 8 IAS 39 is often referred to as an “incurred loss” model because a loss event must
have occurred as of the balance sheet reporting date in order to trigger loan loss provisions. IFRS 9
eliminates this requirement and requires entities to calculate provisions based on expected rather than
incurred losses. From an international accounting perspective, these two standards 9 govern when an
exposure should be classified as “impaired” and prescribe a framework to calculate credit loss provisions.
IFRS 9 / IAS 39 is used in a large number of jurisdictions and is the benchmark accounting standard used
in this report.
13. Some countries, however, do not follow IFRS. For instance, in the United States, entities follow
US generally accepted accounting principles (US GAAP), which are not the same as applicable standards
under IFRS. Until 2020, US entities will follow an incurred loss approach to identifying and measuring
impairment based on Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 450 and 310, which are conceptually similar
to IAS 39. Starting in the first quarter of 2020, applicable entities will migrate to the current expected credit
loss 10 (CECL) provisioning model, which is broadly comparable to IFRS 9, albeit with some key differences.
Other countries may follow local GAAP, which may or may not be fully harmonised with IFRS. Key
differences between IFRS and US GAAP on relevant aspects of NPA identification and measurement are
documented in this section to illustrate the variations in accounting standards across jurisdictions.
14. The BCBS has recently introduced a definition of “non-performing exposures” (NPE) which
complements the accounting concept of “impaired”. The BCBS NPE definition is designed for
supervisory purposes and is not intended to undermine accounting standards that drive the accuracy of
loan impairments and associated provisions in published financial statements. In general, the BCBS NPE
definition encompasses a broader range of exposures that might not be considered as “impaired” under
applicable accounting standards.
15. With respect to NPA identification, there are important differences within accounting
standards and between accounting and prudential frameworks. For example, within IFRS and existing
US GAAP, the definitions of “impaired” are not identical, and these differences will be further accentuated
8
See International Accounting Standards Board (2014).
9
While IFRS 9 became effective in 2018, several jurisdictions which have adopted IFRS remain under IAS 39 as of the publication
of this paper, with differing planned dates to migrate to IFRS 9.
10
In June 2016, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued the CECL model, with a 2020 effective date (FASB (2016)). The
main difference between CECL and IFRS 9 ECL is that the former requires banks to book lifetime expected credit losses for all
loans at credit origination; in contrast, IFRS 9 requires lifetime ECL for Stage 2 and 3 loans only (ie loans where a significant
increase in credit risk has occurred since initial recognition or loans that are non-performing), with a 12-month ECL requirement
for Stage 1 loans (ie performing loans where no significant increase in credit risk has occurred since credit origination).

when CECL becomes effective in 2020. When comparing accounting with prudential frameworks, the term
“non-performing” is a regulatory construct that is broader than the accounting concept of “impaired”.
16. Variations also exist among the two accounting frameworks in regards to NPA
measurement. Applicable provisioning methodologies under IFRS 9 and existing US GAAP are different
as the former follows an expected loss approach, while the latter – for an interim period – continues with
an incurred loss provisioning methodology. When US GAAP migrates to CECL in 2020, provisioning
methodologies will still differ, despite both frameworks requiring provisions based on expected credit
losses.
17. The differences within IFRS and US GAAP provisioning frameworks are exacerbated by
variations between accounting and prudential frameworks. There is no internationally harmonised
provisioning framework and practices vary across jurisdictions. Provisioning outcomes are influenced by
whether authorities apply accounting or prudential rules, or a combination of the two. As a starting point,
the principles- based nature of accounting standards and the judgement involved in their implementation,
can lead to cross-country differences. In addition, where jurisdictions apply some sort of regulatory
guidance, the construct of the regulatory provisioning guidance and how it interacts with the accounting
requirements varies across countries. These varied approaches can lead to different outcomes than if
provisions were calculated solely under relevant accounting frameworks.
Accounting frameworks related to NPA identification
Impairment definition
18. While the definition of “impaired” has remained unchanged, IFRS 9 requires a more
granular assessment of credit risk in comparison to IAS 39. Under IFRS 9, applicable entities must now
place financial instruments into three distinct stages, including “performing” (Stage 1), “underperforming”
(Stage 2) and “non-performing” (Stage 3), rather than the “unimpaired” and “impaired” categories under
IAS 39. Stage 3 is similar to the IAS 39 definition of impaired. The three-stage classification process is used
not only to signify the credit quality of an exposure but also to determine the method used to calculate
expected credit losses.
19. In contrast, while US GAAP currently contains a definition of impairment, which is not
identical to IFRS, even that will be removed upon the adoption of CECL because it will no longer be
relevant for provisioning purposes. Unlike the current US GAAP impairment framework, the CECL model
does not require any threshold to be met (ie impairment) in order to trigger a change in methodology for
estimating provisions; and all exposures, regardless of credit quality, will be subject to the same
provisioning methodology. Therefore, the CECL framework no longer defines the term “impaired”. Table 1
outlines the variations of the ‘impaired’ definition under IFRS 9, existing US GAAP and CECL.

Comparison of the definition of impaired Table 1
US GAAP (until 2019) – incurred US GAAP (starting in Q1 2020)

IFRS 9 and IAS 39
loss model – CECL model
Evidence of credit impairment (any one or Definition of impaired Definition of impaired
more of the following events suggest evidence
of credit impairment)
Significant financial difficulty of the borrower A loan is impaired when, based None 11
on current information and
A breach of contract such as default or past-due
events, it is probable that a
event
creditor will be unable to collect
The lender has granted the borrower a all amounts due according to
concession due to the borrower’s financial the contractual terms of the
difficulty loan.
It is probable that the borrower will enter
bankruptcy
The disappearance of an active market for that
financial asset because of financial difficulties
The purchase or origination of a financial asset at
a deep discount that reflects the incurred credit
losses
Forborne exposures
20. There are subtle differences between the treatment of forborne exposures under IFRS and
existing US GAAP. Under IFRS 9, a financial asset that has been renegotiated (ie forborne) cannot be
automatically upgraded to a higher quality status without evidence of demonstrated payment
performance under the new terms over a period of time. 12 As the standard does not define what
constitutes payment performance “over a period of time”, practices could vary across banks in the absence
of relevant supervisory guidance. Meanwhile, existing US GAAP requirements make a general presumption
that a loan whose terms are modified in a troubled debt restructuring will have already been identified as
impaired.
21. When CECL becomes effective, the issue of whether a restructured troubled debt is
“impaired” is less relevant for accounting classification purposes, given the removal of the
“impaired” definition under the standard. As noted earlier, CECL no longer requires banks to identify
“impaired” exposures since the standard applies an identical provisioning methodology regardless of
whether an exposure is performing, restructured or impaired.
11
As noted, the removal of the impaired definition under CECL is because the same measurement principle (ie that provisions
should cover all cash flows not expected to be collected over the life of a loan) applies to all loans regardless of impairment
status.
12
In practice, this means that loans that are categorised as non-performing (Stage 3) or underperforming (Stage 2) cannot be
immediately moved to Stage 1 (performing) upon loan modification.

Accounting frameworks related to NPA measurement
Measurement of expected credit losses

22. Although IFRS 9 does not change the process used to estimate provisions for “impaired”
exposures, it does introduce a fundamental shift to the credit loss provisioning process. Under
IAS 39, banks were required to estimate loan loss provisions only if there was objective evidence of credit
impairment as of the balance sheet reporting date. IFRS 9 eliminates this requirement and requires entities
to calculate provisions based on expected losses, covering all credit exposures. In this regard, as soon as
a credit is originated (or purchased), banks are required to recognise provisions based on 12-month
expected losses 13 (ie Stage 1 loans). Once a loan has experienced a “significant increase in credit risk” since
initial credit recognition (although it may still be making timely payments) or is impaired, it should be
moved to Stage 2 and Stage 3, respectively, with provisions being recognised based on lifetime expected
losses. 14 Table 2 compares classification and provisioning requirements under IAS 39 and IFRS 9.
Comparing provisions for impaired exposures under IAS 39 and IFRS 9 Table 2
IAS 39 Unimpaired loans Impaired loans

Impairments: Impairments:
minimal lifetime incurred and
expected loss
IFRS 9 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Performing loans Underperforming loans Non-performing loans
Impairment: Impairment: Impairments:
12-month expected loss lifetime expected loss lifetime incurred and
expected loss
Sources: Barclays; IASB.
23. In the US context, existing US GAAP is similar in concept to IAS 39 in that a loan must be
impaired in order to trigger provisions. Due to differences between IAS 39 and US GAAP regarding the
definition of “impaired”, the threshold to trigger provisions may not always be the same, which, in turn,
could result in differences in accounting provisions between the two frameworks. Another source of
difference relates to timing differences of the adoption of expected loss accounting frameworks. IFRS
reporting jurisdictions will need to calculate provisions based on expected credit losses starting in 2018,
while US GAAP will – for an interim period – require estimated provisions based on impairment.
24. Going forward, the US CECL model will no longer require a threshold event to occur, such
as impairment, to recognise provisions. Unlike IFRS 9, CECL requires lifetime expected losses to be
calculated on all applicable credit exposures upon credit origination.
Collateral valuation
25. Under IFRS 9 and US GAAP, collateral is considered in the measurement of expected credit
losses, but there are differences in valuation approaches. IFRS 9 requires entities to consider the time
and costs required to foreclose and sell the collateral (NPV concept), discounted at the loan’s original
effective interest rate in order to determine expected credit losses. As IFRS is applied across a number of
jurisdictions globally, with different legal frameworks, the NPV approach to collateral valuation becomes
13
That is, the likelihood of default over the next 12 months multiplied by the loss-given-default.
14
That is, the likelihood of default over the life of the loan multiplied by the loss-given-default.

particularly important in countries where creditors face long delays in gaining collateral access of defaulted
borrowers due to congested legal frameworks. Such delays can materially affect the estimated value of
collateral, which, in turn, affects provisioning requirements.
26. Both existing US GAAP and the CECL standard specify that, for financial assets where debt
repayment is expected to be paid from the sale of collateral, there is no explicit requirement to
apply an NPV approach to collateral valuation. As a practical expedient, an entity can use the fair value
of collateral, less the costs to sell to determine the amount of credit loss provisions. In measuring fair value,
the time and costs required to sell collateral could, however, be implicitly considered.
Accrual of interest income on impaired exposures

27. The accounting treatment of interest income recognition on impaired exposures diverges
between IFRS 9 and US GAAP. Under current US GAAP and the forthcoming CECL model, the accrual of
interest income on an impaired exposure is not specifically addressed. In the absence of explicit guidance
in applicable accounting standards, US banks typically follow regulatory guidance which prohibits the
accrual of interest income on certain problem exposures that are placed on non-accrual status. 15
Meanwhile, under IFRS 9 interest income is accrued on a gross basis for Stage 1 and 2 exposures and on
a net basis (net of provisions) for Stage 3 (non-performing) exposures.
Loan write-offs
28. Write-off criteria under IFRS 9 and US GAAP are not the same and can lead to divergent
practices. IFRS 9 requires write-offs if the entity has no reasonable prospects of recovering a financial
asset in its entirety or a portion of it. Under the current US GAAP, the asset is required to be written off in
the period in which it is deemed uncollectible. 16
BCBS guidelines on the treatment of problem assets
29. In April 2017, the BCBS published supervisory guidelines on the prudential treatment of
problem assets (BCBS PTA guidelines). The guidelines provide globally harmonised definitions for two
critical terms that drive asset quality assessments within and across jurisdictions: “non-performing
exposures” and “forbearance”. 17
30. The definition of NPE includes harmonised criteria for classifying loans and debt securities
based on both quantitative and qualitative considerations. The BCBS definition of NPE includes all
exposures that are defaulted under the Basel II framework; all exposures that are impaired under applicable
accounting standards; and all other exposures that are not defaulted or impaired but are material
exposures that are more than 90 days past due or where there is evidence that full repayment is unlikely.
31. The BCBS PTA guidelines also cover various factors that can influence the classification of
an exposure as “non-performing”. In particular, the guidelines specify that collateral should not be
considered in the classification of an exposure as non-performing; 18 requires the uniform classification of
exposures on a debtor basis, outside of retail exposures; and introduces specific rules to exit the NPE
category.
15
These typically include exposures which are 90 days or more past due unless the asset is well secured and in the process of
collection and other exposures where full payment of principal or interest is not expected.
16
The same approach will be followed under CECL.
17
See BCBS (2017), pp 12–14.
18
Nevertheless, the guidance does note that collateral can be considered (both positively and negatively) when assessing a
borrower’s economic incentives to repay under “unlikeliness to pay” criteria.

32. Importantly, the guidelines outline the interactions between forbearance and non-
performing exposures. In this regard, the guidelines specify the prudential treatment when forbearance
is granted to both non-performing and performing exposures; supervisory considerations when multiple
forbearance measures are granted to the same debtor; and the criteria to reclassify a forborne, non-
performing exposure to performing status.
33. Collectively, the BCBS NPE definition is broader than the accounting concept of “impaired”.
First, the BCBS NPE definition includes a qualitative “unlikely to pay” criteria with no corresponding
equivalent in applicable accounting frameworks. Second, there are a number of elements specified in the
BCBS NPE definition – such as the NPE designation be applied on a debtor basis, 19 the criteria to exit the
NPA category and the minimum repayment period for forborne NPEs to return to performing status – that
are not explicitly noted under relevant accounting standards.
Section 3 – NPA identification and measurement practices in selected

jurisdictions
34. During the first half of 2017, the FSI launched a global study – covering selected
jurisdictions in Asia, the European Union (EU) countries that are part of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism 20 (EU-SSM), the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region and the United States –
to ascertain relevant accounting rules, regulatory requirements and supervisory practices related
to NPA identification and measurement. In carrying out the study, 11 countries from Asia and 10 from
the LAC region participated in a survey prepared by the FSI. 21 Information on select EU-SSM jurisdictions 22
and the US were obtained from publicly available documents, and from interviews with officials from the
ECB and the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System.
35. Notwithstanding some similarities, the results reveal significant differences in NPA
identification and measurement practices across surveyed jurisdictions. These differences hamper
market participants’ ability to make meaningful comparisons on key asset quality metrics, including the
reported level of NPAs and associated credit loss provisions, across surveyed jurisdictions.
NPA identification
36. In regards to NPA identification, there are four main reasons for key differences across
surveyed jurisdictions. First, there is no uniform definition of an NPA across sampled countries, including
both entry and exit criteria. Second, certain asset classes (such as foreclosed collateral) are exempt from
the NPA designation in a number of jurisdictions, while other respondents do not exempt any exposures
from the NPA category. Third, several respondents explicitly consider collateral in the NPA identification
process, while others determine the credit quality of an exposure without consideration of collateral
19
The BCBS PTA guidelines allow retail exposures to be assessed on a transaction basis.
20
In 2014, 19 EU member countries joined the SSM: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. As the SSM countries are
also EU members, area-wide regulation directly applicable to them is the same as that issued at the EU level. While a number
of SSM countries have issued national guidance on various issues related to NPA identification and measurement, this paper
generally covers guidance issued by the ECB that is uniformly applicable to all SSM jurisdictions (ECB (2017a,2018)).
21
The Asian countries in the sample are China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand. The LAC countries in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago.
22
The information on the SSM countries is sourced from the ECB publications (ECB (2017a,b, 2018)).

support. Finally, while all jurisdictions have prescribed both quantitative (past due) and qualitative criteria,
the extent to which supervisors rely on past-due criteria to place an exposure on NPA status varies across
jurisdictions.
NPA definition: entry and exit criteria

37. Outside the EU-SSM region, only some jurisdictions in the sample have issued a formal NPA
definition for regulatory purposes. 23 In the EU, a common definition of NPEs was introduced in 2014 24
by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and is based on a combination of “past due” (90 days) and the
forward-looking “unlikely to pay” (UTP) criteria, even if the exposure is currently paying as agreed. Some
other jurisdictions in Asia and the LAC region, which have prescribed an NPA definition, have broadly
similar criteria, but with added specificities. 25
38. Most jurisdictions have developed less prescriptive means to identify NPAs across
regulated banks. In the absence of an explicit NPA definition, market norms and supervisory practices
have evolved to leverage off existing regulatory asset classification frameworks or other country-specific
methods as proxies for determining NPAs.
39. In Asia and the LAC region, regulatory asset classification frameworks play a key role in the
NPA identification process. While the number of risk buckets used varies across sampled jurisdictions,
one common feature is that the most severe classification categories are typically considered as NPA
proxies.
40. The US also applies a regulatory asset classification framework, but there is no explicit link
between its framework and an NPA definition. In the US, the general market practice has been to
consider as NPA the sum of: all nonaccrual assets, all assets 90 days or more past due but still accruing
interest and foreclosed collateral. A loan is required to be placed on nonaccrual when payment in full of
principal or interest is not expected or the asset is 90 days or more past due unless the asset is both well
secured and in the process of collection. 26
41. Regardless of whether jurisdictions use formal or informal methods, all jurisdictions have
prescribed a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria to identify NPA exposures. The use
of qualitative criteria, in particular, allows authorities to consider certain exposures as NPAs that might not
necessarily be considered as “impaired” under applicable accounting frameworks.
42. The exit criteria from the NPA category varies significantly across surveyed countries. Some
jurisdictions allow an exit from NPA status once principal and interest (P&I) payments are in arrears for
less than three months and the remaining debt is expected to be repaid. Others require repayment of all
past-due P&I only or repayment of past-due P&I and an expectation of repayment of remaining principal.
23
In the EU context, the EBA NPE definition is only binding for supervisory reporting purposes. However, the ECB SSM guidance
(2017a) strongly encourages banks to use the NPE definition for their internal risk control and public financial reporting in order
to promote alignment.
24
The EBA introduced this definition, which was adopted via the introduction of the Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) (EBA
(2014)). This definition is applicable to all on-balance sheet loans and debt securities, as well as some off-balance sheet
commitments. For the definition of default applicable in the EU-SSM, see EBA (2016).
25
For instance, in one jurisdiction, in addition to the past-due and UTP criteria, assets are required to be classified as NPAs even
without any missed contractual payment when they are considered impaired under accounting standards or classified as
impaired Substandard, Doubtful and Loss (under its regulatory classification system). In another jurisdiction, all restructured
debt arising from financial difficulties of the borrower are to be placed on NPA status.
26
An asset is considered “well secured” if it is secured by securities or residential mortgages whose value is equal to or higher
than the value of the loan and any unpaid accrued interest or the guarantee of a financially responsible party. An asset is “in
the process of collection” if collection of the asset is proceeding in a timely manner through legal action or through collection
efforts not involving legal action but which are expected to result in debt repayment or restoration to a performing loan in the
near term.

Finally, several authorities require repayment of all past-due P&I plus continued debt repayment for a
period of time (ranging from two quarters to one year).
43. While most authorities have prescribed specific criteria to upgrade forborne (restructured)
NPAs to the performing category, the minimum payment performance period varies across
jurisdictions. An immediate exit from the NPA category upon restructuring is allowed only in a small
minority of countries. In most cases, a minimum number of interest payments must be made for a period
of time (ranging between one – three payments and one year) under the revised terms before the loan
can exit the NPA category.
The role of asset classification frameworks in NPA identification

44. Regulatory asset classification frameworks are commonly used in Asia, the LAC region, the
US and some EU-SSM jurisdictions. The US and nearly all (10 of 11) surveyed jurisdictions in Asia require
banks to use an asset classification system to classify credit exposures into various risk buckets (with the
most common being: Normal, Special Mention (or Watch), Substandard, Doubtful and Loss), based on
criteria developed by the prudential regulator. In the LAC countries, all jurisdictions in the sample require
banks to use an asset classification system to classify credit exposures into various risk buckets, with the
number of buckets varying quite substantially across countries, ranging from five to 16.
45. In Asia there is convergence around the use of a five-bucket risk framework, with the three
most severe asset classification categories (Substandard, Doubtful and Loss) considered as NPAs.
Therefore, the Substandard category (or its equivalent) is considered the entry point of the NPA
designation, with the over 90 days past due threshold typically serving as the quantitative backstop. The
qualitative criteria are more forward-looking (“well defined weaknesses that may jeopardise debt
repayment”) that allow supervisors to place exposures in the Substandard category, even if the loan is less
than 90 days past due or is not be impaired under applicable accounting rules.
46. The US applies a similar five-bucket risk framework, but, as noted above, there is no
specific link between its regulatory classification system and an NPA designation. US authorities
typically refer to the Substandard, Doubtful and Loss categories as “adversely classified assets”. Adversely
classified assets encompass a broader range of exposures than NPAs and are used as a standard proxy to
determine the aggregate level of credit risk at regulated entities. 27 The usual entry point of “adversely
classified assets” is the Substandard category, which includes assets that contain “well defined
weaknesses”, which, if not corrected, may lead to loss. Similar to the Asian and LAC countries, an exposure
can be placed in the Substandard category based on the “well defined weakness” criterion even if the loan
is currently paying as agreed.
47. In the LAC region, some countries use a five-bucket risk framework, while others employ a
more granular breakdown, both for the performing and the lowest quality asset classification
categories. In general, countries employing more than five buckets typically require greater risk
differentiation within the severe asset classification categories. 28 Supervisors combine the past-due
criterion, typically set at 90 days for a commercial loan to be considered non-performing, with qualitative
information tracking the borrower’s ability to repay, based on various indicators. 29
27
In general, this approach is used for banks that are not approved to use internal models to calculate credit risk under the
internal ratings-based approaches of the Basel framework.
28
There are two exceptions. In the sample of countries in the FSI survey, one country that uses a nine-bucket system considers
only buckets 8 and 9 as NPAs, while another country that uses a 16-bucket system considers its six most severe categories as
NPAs.
29
For instance, some authorities in the LAC region use indicators such as insolvency risk, deterioration in ability to repay due to
sector or market conditions, or cash flow analysis.

48. In the EU-SSM countries, some national authorities 30 have adopted asset classification
systems to supplement the NPE definition prescribed by the EBA. These regulatory classification
systems are broadly similar to the variations used in Asia, the LAC region and the US.
49. An illustration of the comparisons between the various regulatory (informal and formal)
methods to identify NPAs versus the impaired/unimpaired designations under applicable
accounting standards is shown in Table 3. Except for one authority, all other Asian and LAC jurisdictions
use regulatory classification systems to identify NPAs. While the number of risk buckets varies, there is a
broad mapping between various risk buckets and the most commonly used Normal–Loss categories used
under the five-bucket system. The US also uses a five-bucket classification system, but NPAs, in general,
are usually a subset of their “adversely classified asset” categories. While some jurisdictions within the EU-
SSM apply regulatory risk classification systems, the EU-wide regulatory definition of NPE is used for
comparing EU-SSM’s approach with the accounting framework in Table 3.
Mapping regulatory NPA frameworks with the accounting concept of impaired Table 3
Number of countries Framework Risk Pass / Special Substandard Doubtful Loss

buckets Normal Mention
or Watch
9 (6 Asia, 3 LAC) 5 1 2 3 4 5
2 (1 Asia, US) 31
5 1 2 3 4 5
3 (2 Asia, 1 LAC) 4 1 2 3 4
1 (Asia) 6 1 2 3 4–5 6
1 (LAC) Regulatory 6 1 2 3 4 5–6
1 (LAC) 6 1–3 4 5 6
1 (LAC) 8 1–2 3–4 5–7 8
1 (LAC) 9 1–2 3–4 5–7 8–9
1 (LAC) 9 1–7 8 9
1 (LAC) 32
16 1–6 7–10 11–16
2 (EU-SSM, 33
1 Asia )
34
2 Performing Non-performing
Accounting 3 Stage 1 and 2 (unimpaired) Stage 3 (impaired)
(IFRS)
This table is a very broad approximation of the classification used by the countries in the FSI survey, based on the authors’ interpretation
of applicable regulatory frameworks.
30
See the cases of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and Spain.
31
While there is no explicit mapping of the US regulatory classification framework with the NPA designation, for illustrative
purposes, the US working definition of NPA would generally include a subset of exposures classified within the Substandard,
Doubtful and Loss categories. One jurisdiction in Asia disaggregates Substandard exposures into impaired and unimpaired
components, with only the former being considered as NPAs in addition to all Doubtful and Loss exposures.
32
The number of risk buckets in the table applies for individual commercial loans only. For commercial loans evaluated on a
group level, consumer loans and mortgage loans, only two categories, normal and impaired, are used. In addition, in this
country, the regulatory categories are also used for accounting purposes since a carve-out was made from IAS 39 for loans and
receivables.
33
For the EU-SSM, the table refers to NPEs, not NPAs (ie it excludes foreclosed assets).
34
While this one authority in Asia does not apply a regulatory classification system, it has prescribed a regulatory definition of
“non-performing” which is broadly similar to the Substandard or worse definitions uses in other jurisdictions.

Comparison of regulatory definition of NPA and accounting concept of impaired
50. Regardless of whether countries have adopted a regulatory NPA definition or rely on less
formal means to identify NPAs, the regulatory frameworks used to capture the volume of NPAs (or
equivalent proxies) generally cast a wider net than the accounting concept of “impaired”. This is
mainly because the UTP criteria are embedded in the formal NPA definition adopted by some countries,
the non-accrual definition used in the US and the entry points of the regulatory classification system that
serve as NPA proxies in various jurisdictions in Asia and the LAC region. These qualitative criteria, if used,
allows supervisors to classify exposures as NPAs that otherwise might be considered as “unimpaired” or
“performing” under applicable accounting frameworks.
51. On the other hand, the survey results indicate a number of jurisdictions do not utilise the
UTP criteria to classify exposures as “non-performing” during on-site inspections. In the case of retail
exposures, the vast majority of surveyed jurisdictions rely on past-due criteria to classify exposures in the
NPA (or equivalent) category. This is to be expected as it is not feasible for banks or supervisors to
individually review small-balance retail portfolios. A more surprising finding is that a sizeable minority of
jurisdictions appear to rely mainly on past-due status to classify wholesale exposures in the more severe
classification categories. Similar to retail exposures, such an approach is sensible for certain lower balance
wholesale exposures (ie small business loans), but it might be more problematic if it is also extended to
large, complex wholesale exposures that could benefit from a more qualitative approach.
52. Outside the UTP criteria, many jurisdictions have also adopted a uniform treatment for
multiple loans granted to the same borrower, enabling authorities to classify certain exposures as
NPAs that would not be captured under applicable accounting frameworks. In a majority of Asian
jurisdictions as well as half of the LAC countries, 35 respondents noted that multiple loans granted to the
same borrower with at least one NPA are all treated as NPAs. In the EU-SSM jurisdictions, if 20% of the
exposures of a debtor is 90 days or more past due, all exposures of this debtor must also be classified as
NPE. Conversely, the US does not automatically require a uniform classification (non-accrual) treatment
on multiple credit extensions granted to the same borrower. Thus, if one loan meets the criteria for non-
accrual status, the bank is required to evaluate other loans granted to the same borrower to determine
their status.
53. Some jurisdictions have also extended the uniform regulatory treatment to different
borrowers belonging to the same group. In the EU-SSM jurisdictions, for connected borrowers
belonging to the same group, if one borrower belonging to a larger group is an NPE, non-defaulted group
members should also be considered as NPE, except for exposures affected by isolated disputes that are
unrelated to the counterparty’s solvency. In the US and the majority of both Asian and LAC countries, the
classification is done entity by entity.
54. These prudential approaches to NPA identification that go beyond applicable accounting
standards need to be weighed against certain design features of regulatory NPA identification
frameworks that can understate the level of NPAs. First, several countries in the study exclude certain
asset classes, such as “foreclosed collateral” from either the NPE designation (EU-SSM) or their regulatory
classification system (select countries in Asia and the LAC region). Second, a majority of Asian jurisdictions
and three LAC countries allow collateral to be considered in determining regulatory classifications, while
the US considers collateral 36 in determining whether an asset is placed in the non-accrual category. In the
US context, while assets that are 90 days or more past due but accruing interest would still be captured in
35
For credit exposures to different borrowers belonging to the same group, the classification is done entity by entity in the
majority of both Asian and LAC countries, consistent with international norms.
36
In this context, if a problem loan is both “well secured” and “in the process of collection” it can be excluded from the non-
accrual designation. In other words, both the bank and the supervisory authority expect that the bank will not incur any losses
on this exposure.

its NPA definition, exposures that are less than 90 days past due and still accruing interest would not be
captured under its framework.
NPA measurement
55. NPA measurement practices vary considerably and can be explained by a number of
factors. First, in addition to the different accounting standards followed by sampled jurisdictions,
provisioning outcomes are influenced by whether authorities apply accounting or prudential rules, or a
combination of the two, to set provisioning requirements. Second, while most jurisdictions allow collateral
to be considered in determining the amount of provisions, differences in the methods used to value
collateral can produce different results, leading to varied provisioning requirements. Third, differences
across jurisdictions in the regulatory treatment of the accrual of interest income on NPAs and asset write-
offs also play a role in NPA measurement outcomes.
Provisioning framework
56. Provisioning frameworks applied both across and within regions vary considerably. Outside
the EU-SSM countries and the US, 37 only a few jurisdictions in the sample recognise provisions in earnings
based solely on accounting standards. The remaining jurisdictions either use a combination of accounting
and regulatory guidance or follow only regulator prescribed rules. In cases where jurisdictions apply a
combination of accounting and regulatory guidance, the construct of the regulatory provisioning guidance
and how it interacts with the accounting requirements varies across countries, ranging from principles-
based guidance to very prescriptive methods. 38 These differences are further accentuated by the use of
different accounting standards in some jurisdictions (eg US GAAP versus IFRS), which, collectively, have a
material impact on how credit loss provisions are formulated and the amount recognised in the P&L.
Chart 1 summarises the various approaches used to recognise provisions in the P&L.
37
In the US context, authorities have issued detailed regulatory guidance in the form of an interagency policy statement on the
allowance for loan and lease losses to outline their supervisory expectations. However, the guidance is in line with US GAAP.
38
At one extreme, regulatory provisioning guidance consists of broad, principles-based directives that are used to supplement
accounting standards to ensure supervisory considerations are incorporated in the provisioning process. In other cases,
regulator-prescribed quantitative provisioning rules apply only if they are not satisfied with the bank’s application of accounting
provisions, while others require parallel calculations and take the higher of the two for purposes of P&L recognition. Various
other permutations also exist.

Approach used to estimate and recognise loan loss provisions in the P&L Chart 1
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
LAC Asia EU-SSM US
IFRS 9, IAS 39, US GAAP or other applicable local accounting standards only (%)
Regulatory provisioning standards only (%)
Combination of accounting and regulatory provisioning rules (%)
57. When accounting provisions only are recognised in the P&L statement, prudential
authorities typically require some form of backstop. When prudential authorities have no powers to
override the accounting standards, backstops can ensure that prudential provisioning considerations are
taken into account, at least, in the calculation of regulatory capital. Although approaches vary across
jurisdictions, they all aim at addressing the accounting shortcomings of IAS 39, 39 which generally does not
require provisions for non-impaired loans, including those deemed Substandard for regulatory purposes
but may not necessarily be “impaired” under accounting rules.
58. The type of backstop used by the countries in the sample varies in terms of construct, scope
and degree of prescriptiveness. For instance, a globally harmonised regulatory expected loss
provisioning backstop 40 is in place for banks that are approved to use internal models to calculate their
credit risk weights under the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches of the Basel framework. In Asia, of
the three countries that recognise only accounting provisions in the P&L statement, authorities have also
imposed prudential backstops for banks under the standardised approach to credit risk capital
measurement. In the EU-SSM countries, national guidance applies to the banks under direct local
supervision (ie less significant institutions), and such guidance varies across countries.
59. Where countries have recently experienced high levels of problem assets, authorities are
considering more prescriptive backstops to deal specifically with NPAs. Following the financial crisis
that started in 2007, some EU-SSM countries remain in the process of trying to resolve legacy NPAs. To
facilitate the process, the ECB issued non-binding supervisory expectations with respect to prudential
39
While IFRS 9 requires provisions for unimpaired loans, a number of jurisdictions in the FSI survey plan to retain IAS 39 for an
interim period. At this stage, it is unclear the extent to which prudential backstops will be retained upon the adoption of IFRS 9.
40
Under Basel II, IRB banks must calculate regulatory expected losses according to a pre-specified, globally harmonised
methodology and to compare their accounting provisions with total regulatory expected loss, with any shortfalls deducted
from regulatory capital.

provisions for uncollateralised and collateralised NPEs with a vintage 41 of two and seven years, respectively
(ECB (2018)). In addition, in 2018, the European Commission, as the regulatory arm of the EU, proposed
the introduction of minimum provisioning requirements, following a consultation launched in late 2017
(European Commission (2017c, 2018)).
60. Authorities that apply some variation 42 of regulator-prescribed rules for purposes of
recognising provisions in the P&L generally impose minimum provisioning requirements for all
regulatory asset classification categories, including the Normal and Watch category. Overall, such
approaches have enabled authorities to impose provisioning requirements on certain exposures that may
not necessarily be “impaired” under applicable accounting standards that are based on the incurred loss
provisioning approaches. 43
Role of collateral in provisioning and treatment of foreclosed collateral

61. Most jurisdictions allow collateral to be considered in determining the amount of
provisions for a collateralised NPA exposure. This is the approach taken in the US, EU-SSM jurisdictions
and most of the Asian and LAC countries in the sample. However, a notable minority of LAC and Asian
countries does not allow any collateral to be recognised for the purpose of determining provisions for all
collateralised financial exposures.
62. In jurisdictions that allow collateral to be considered in setting provisions, two distinct
approaches to collateral valuation are used. One approach follows a regulator-prescribed methodology
that uses the appraised collateral value as a starting point and applies supervisor-specified haircuts based
primarily on collateral type in order to determine provisioning requirements. This approach is more
prevalent in the LAC region (five out of the six countries that allow collateral valuation to affect provisions
follow this approach). The second approach, which is more prevalent in Asia and the EU-SSM, follows the
IFRS net present value (NPV) method, which requires banks to estimate collateral values taking into
consideration the time and costs required to access and dispose of collateral. US GAAP allows entities who
have exposures where debt repayment is expected from the sale of collateral, to use the “fair value” of
collateral, less costs to sell to calculate provisioning requirements. In measuring fair value, the NPV
approach – while not required – may be implicitly used. The supervisor-prescribed haircut and the NPV
approaches to collateral valuation are conceptually different and can lead to varied provisioning outcomes.
63. Provisioning requirements can vary depending on, among other factors, the size of the
supervisor-prescribed haircut and the time estimated to sell collateral under the NPV approach. The
example in Table 4 shows the key elements of the collateral valuation that are especially important for the
calculation of required provisions in the supervisory haircut and NPV approaches, respectively. To begin
with, the reliability of the most recent appraised value is a crucial starting point for either valuation method.
Under the supervisor-prescribed haircuts, conservatism in setting provisions can vary depending on the
level of haircuts applied to the estimated collateral value, and as haircuts increase, so does the level of
provisions. On the other hand, in the NPV approach, assumptions made on the time required to access
and sell collateral have significant implications for provisioning requirements.
41
This refers to the length of time an exposure has been classified as non-performing. The guidance applies to new NPEs that
are re-classified from performing to non-performing starting from 1 April 2018 onwards.
42
As noted earlier, this may be used either exclusively or in combination with accounting rules.
43
Under both IFRS 9 and CECL, banks are/will be required to estimate provisions on all of its credit exposures, including
“unimpaired” exposures.

Comparison of NPA collateral valuation approaches Table 4
Collateral valuation – supervisory haircut approach Collateral valuation – IAS 39/IFRS 9 approach (NPV)
Current book value 100 Current book value 100
Physical collateral (appraised value) 100 Physical collateral (appraised value) 100
Original interest rate 6% Foreclosure costs and cost to sell at 5% 5
of collateral
Supervisor-prescribed haircut at 25% of 75 Estimated value of physical collateral 95
appraised value
Unsecured amount subject to 25 Present value of estimated recovery: 80
provisioning (100% of unsecured assume 3 years, discounted at 6%
amount)
Required provisions under regulatory 25 Estimated impairment loss 20
requirements
64. Given the critical role of collateral in setting provisioning levels, most jurisdictions,
although less so in Asia, 44 have prescribed supervisory guidance on prudent collateral valuation
standards that support NPAs . In particular, supervisory guidance is especially detailed when collateral
is in the form of real estate assets, as seen in the US and in the EU-SSM countries. This guidance generally
requires, among other things, that banks have the internal capacity and processes in place to monitor and
report the quality of the collateral. EU-wide regulation also requires that the property valuation be
reviewed under certain circumstances and that this review be carried out by an appraiser who possesses
the necessary qualifications, ability and experience to execute a valuation and who is independent from
the credit decision process. 45 The US prescribes similar requirements. 46
65. In most countries, authorities take advantage of on-site inspections to assess the valuation
of collateral that back NPAs. Supervisors appear to regularly review collateral values as part on the on-
site process, in the US, EU-SSM jurisdictions, Asia and LAC countries. However, these assessments typically
do not trigger a change in the valuation of collateral. In some countries, such as the US, the focus of
collateral valuations is to identify material flaws in the assumptions that drive collateral values, and in these
cases, they typically require banks to conduct another appraisal. Meanwhile, authorities in the LAC region
appear to focus on ensuring that regulator-prescribed collateral haircuts are applied prior to determining
provisioning requirements. In the EU-SSM countries, when on-site inspections focus on collateral
valuation, the approach appears to be based on challenging the assumptions on the estimated time
required to foreclose and sell collateral, which, as noted earlier, can materially impact collateral valuations.
66. Once collateral is repossessed by the bank, it is subject to minimum provisioning
requirements or maximum holding periods in only a few jurisdictions. 47 In the US, banks that are
nationally chartered are generally subject to a five-year maximum holding period for foreclosed assets,
though the time can be extended with regulatory approval. One Asian jurisdiction has prescribed time-
bound provisioning requirements, requiring 100% provisions once the asset is held for more than five
years. Some countries in the LAC region require minimum provisioning requirements, which typically vary
depending on whether collateral is represented by movable or immovable property.
44
In Asia, four of 11 jurisdictions sampled have not prescribed prudential guidance on collateral valuation.
45
See Article 208(3)(b) Capital Requirements Regulation, European Parliament (2013).
46
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2010).
47
Some US states may also have maximum holding periods for foreclosed collateral.

67. Nevertheless, some authorities apply prudent measurement requirements on foreclosed
collateral to ensure a conservative accounting treatment is applied. For instance, the US authorities
require foreclosed assets to be carried at the lower of cost or their fair value, less costs to sell; in the EU-
SSM, a similar approach is strongly encouraged, while in many jurisdictions in Asia and slightly more than
half of the LAC countries collateral is generally required to be carried at its net realisable value.
Treatment of accrued interest income on NPAs

68. Once an exposure is considered “non-performing”, supervisory authorities need to decide
what to do, if anything, regarding interest income recognition on problem loans. Decisions taken
are typically driven by the guidance noted in applicable accounting standards together with the powers
available to prudential authorities.
69. Jurisdictions that follow IFRS 9 continue to accrue interest income on a non-performing
exposure even if the bank is not receiving any cash income on the underlying asset. Under IFRS 9,
interest accruals on non-performing (Stage 3) exposures are based on a net (of provisions) basis and reflect
the amount the institution is expected to recover. Under this approach, because impairment losses are
calculated – and recognised in the P&L account – based on the discounted amounts of principal and
interest that are not expected to be received, the accrual of interest in earnings merely reflects the
“unwinding” of the discount 48.
70. On the other hand, jurisdictions that have accounting powers or that follow US GAAP
typically either prohibit the accrual of interest income on a non-performing exposure or offset its
effect in the P&L statement. Under these approaches, the overarching view appears to be that once a
loan is “non-performing”, it may no longer be prudent to continue accruing interest on that exposure –
even on a net basis – since both the amount and timing of the estimated net recoverable value, through
the liquidation of collateral, is heavily assumption-dependent and may not be reliable. For this reason,
authorities typically focus on the income statement to ensure that if a bank’s assumptions prove to be
inaccurate – the P&L account will not be overstated.
71. The majority of sampled jurisdictions either impose restrictions on, or neutralise the effect
of, the accrual of interest income on NPAs, with some notable exceptions. Authorities in the US, all
the surveyed LAC jurisdictions and almost half of the Asian countries 49 require either all or a subset 50 of
NPAs be placed on a non-accrual status. The default approach in the EU-SSM countries is that NPEs
continue accruing interest on a net (of provisions) basis, in line with the accounting treatment under IFRS
(Chart 2).
48
The example on table 4 illustrates the concept of the unwinding of the discount. The right-hand column of table 4 shows a
hypothetical recoverable amount from collateral at 95 to be received in three years. After discounting the recoverable amount
of 95 using the original interest rate of the loan (6%), the present value of the recoverable amount equals to 80. However, since
the bank expects to receive 95 in three years, the difference between these two values (15) represents the unwinding of the
discount and is accrued into interest income over a three year-period.
49
An additional two Asian authorities allow the accrual of interest income on NPAs, but require a commensurate amount of
provisions to neutralise its impact on earnings.
50
In several jurisdictions, only the portion of NPAs that are over 90 days past due are subject to a non-accrual designation.

Extent to which banks place NPAs on non-accrual status Chart 2
100
80
60
40
20
0
LAC Asia EU-SSM* US
Yes, in all cases (%)

Yes, only in certain cases (%)
No – we follow IAS 39 or national equivalent (%)
* For the EU/SSM, the data refer to NPEs, ie exclude foreclosed assets.
72. For jurisdictions that place NPAs (or a subset) on non-accrual status, cross-country
differences emerge on the treatment of previously accrued interest earned but not collected on
NPAs. While the US requires all previously accrued but uncollected interest income to be reversed once
an asset is placed on non-accrual status, only half of the LAC countries in the sample require such a
reversal, while in Asia the proportion is even lower. These observations indicate that in cases where
authorities require banks to stop accruing interest income on NPAs, they have not always required a
symmetrical treatment for previously accrued but uncollected interest on NPAs.
73. The regulatory reporting of accrued interest on NPAs is not consistent across jurisdictions
and – in some cases – makes it difficult for supervisors to identify its materiality at both the
individual bank and banking system levels. In the US as well as some jurisdictions in Asia and the LAC
region, authorities require such assets to be reported separately from loans (either as “other assets” or
“accrued interest receivable”); others, including some EU-SSM jurisdictions, require banks to include the
amount with the underlying instrument (ie the relevant asset category balance such as loans or securities).
Some jurisdictions have not provided any regulatory reporting guidance.
Loan write-offs
74. In regards to loan write-offs, there is considerable variation in practices. Most jurisdictions
in the sample do not prescribe time limits for loan write-offs and leave this decision to banks. 51 In some
jurisdictions, such as the US, six of the sample LAC countries and two Asian countries, the designation of
an asset to the Loss category triggers a write-off requirement, but the time limits vary or are not specified.
In the US, Loss assets should be written off in the accounting period in which they are identified, 52 while
in some LAC jurisdictions the limit can be as high as up to 24 months. In addition to these differences, the
51
Write-off definitions also tend to be linked to tax regimes, so cross-country differences may stem not only from prudential and
accounting requirements, but tax regimes. The implications of tax regimes on loan write-offs are beyond the scope of this
paper.
52
In practice, this generally means the loan should be written off within the same month or quarter it is identified as Loss.

timing of when an exposure gets placed in the Loss category may not be consistent across jurisdictions,
further accentuating differences in write-off requirements even in jurisdictions that apply broadly similar
write-off criteria. In some jurisdictions, reluctance to trigger a write-off may also reflect its legal
implications. 53 Nevertheless, under IFRS 9, banks are required to write off assets, in whole or in part, if
there are no reasonable prospects of recovery.
75. Differences in write-off practices may affect key supervisory indicators for otherwise
similar banks. In the simplified balance sheet of a bank in Table 5, key indicators of asset quality, noted
in the bottom two rows of the table, improve once the bank has written off the NPLs. This simple example
illustrates that the write-off policy followed by a bank can have a material impact on key asset quality
measures used by both supervisors and market participants. This matters as in some jurisdictions write-
offs may not be carried out because of tax or legal reasons, which may imply weaker asset quality
indicators, even if the bad loans are fully provisioned as noted in the example below.
Example of write-off Table 5
Balance sheet items/ratios Bank A (before write-off) Bank A (after write-off)

Gross loans 1,000 1,000 – 50=950
Gross NPLs 100 100 – 50=50
Fully provisioned NPLs (included in gross NPLs) 50 Written off
Cumulative provisions 130 130 – 50=80
Gross NPLs/gross loans 100/1000=10% 50/950=5.3%
Cumulative provisions/NPLs 130/100=130% 80/50=160%
76. In addition, the lack of timely loan write-offs can allow banks to make minimal provisions
on NPAs when the underlying exposure is backed by sufficiently high collateral values. When a bank
is not required to set aside provisions on an NPL because of the high valuation of the collateral, this is
contingent on its ability to realise the collateral in a timely manner. For instance, Table 6 illustrates the
significant change to the value of collateral when the estimated time horizon for realising the collateral is
lengthened from two to eight years. The estimated value of collateral declines by 30% and the required
provisions more than double. Unless the time required to access and liquidate collateral is realistically
factored into the NPV calculation–- particularly in jurisdictions where the legal foreclosure framework can
result in long delays for creditors to access and dispose of collateral – it can materially overstate collateral
values and understate the requisite level of provisions. The imposition of timely loan write-off criteria
and/or a realistic NPV calculation that incorporates realistic time estimates to sell collateral can help to
ensure that banks do not carry underprovisioned legacy NPAs for an extended period of time.
53
In some jurisdictions, the borrower’s debt may be extinguished if the bank formally writes off the loan.

Sensitivity of changes in collateral values to changes in time estimates Table 6
Collateral valuation – sale in two years Collateral valuation – sale in eight years
Current book value 100 Current book value 100
Physical collateral (appraised value) 100 Physical collateral (appraised value) 100
Foreclosure costs and cost to sell at 5 Foreclosure costs and cost to sell at 5
5% of collateral 5% of collateral
Estimated value of physical collateral 95 Estimated value of physical collateral 95
Original interest rate 6% Original interest rate 6%
Present value of estimated recovery: 85 Present value of estimated recovery: 60
assume 2 years, discounted at 6% assume 8 years, discounted at 6%
Required provisions 15 Required provisions 40
Section 4 – Implications for policy
77. The analysis in the preceding two sections reveals differences across countries and within
jurisdictions in accounting requirements that are accentuated by divergent prudential frameworks
and supervisory practices on NPA identification and measurement. These differences show that
comparing the reported volume of NPAs and provisioning coverage levels across jurisdictions is complex
and may be misleading. Nevertheless, opportunities now exist to harmonise domestic NPA identification
frameworks based on recent guidance published by the BCBS. While there is no similar internationally
harmonised NPA measurement framework to draw upon, the variety of practices noted in this paper
highlight a number of prudential considerations that may be helpful to supervisory authorities. On this
basis, the following subsections outline a range of policy considerations that authorities may want to
contemplate in order to enhance their NPA identification and measurement frameworks.
NPA identification – policy considerations
78. Authorities may want to reflect on the following areas to strengthen their NPA
identification frameworks, where applicable.
• The scope of application of regulatory NPA identification regimes: The findings from the FSI
survey and relevant publicly available information indicate that several jurisdictions exclude
certain asset classes from the NPA designation. These asset classes include, among other items,
“foreclosed collateral”, “accrued interest earned but not collected” and “equity interest received
in a debt restructuring”. These practices can understate the volume of reported NPAs; therefore,
extending the application of regulatory NPA identification regimes to encompass all asset classes
and exposures would provide a more comprehensive measure of the stock of NPAs at each
regulated entity as well as the banking system as a whole.
• A regulatory definition of “non-performing exposure”: Outside the EU-SSM countries and a
few countries in Asia, the FSI study revealed that the vast majority of jurisdictions in the sample
have not prescribed a formal NPA definition, with several authorities relying on less formal,
jurisdiction-specific methods. The introduction of an official NPA definition – that is consistent
with the non-performing exposure definition noted in the BCBS PTA guidelines – can help to
standardise the NPA identification process and to facilitate more meaningful comparisons both

within and across jurisdictions. In this regard, the FSI survey uncovered three specific aspects of
the BCBS PTA guidelines that merit further attention by prudential authorities, as follows:
 The role of collateral in the NPA identification process: Several jurisdictions in the
sample noted that collateral is considered in determining the credit quality of an
exposure, including its designation within the NPA category. Such an approach
can lead to a downward bias in the stock of NPAs, as fully collateralised problem
exposures could be excluded from the NPA designation. In general, both the
BCBS PTA guidelines and IFRS 9 specify that collateral should have no bearing on
determining an exposure’s credit categorisation.
 The NPA classification treatment of multiple loans granted to the same borrower,
and if appropriate, to a group of connected borrowers: If a loan to a troubled
borrower is classified as “non-performing”, there is a likelihood that other loans
to the same borrower can be negatively affected. Consistent with the BCBS PTA
guidelines, the majority of surveyed jurisdictions automatically require a uniform
classification (ie if one loan is classified as an NPA, all loans to the same borrower
must also be classified as NPAs), while some jurisdictions allow banks to make a
loan by loan evaluation. The uniform classification approach, in some countries,
is also extended to different borrowers belonging to the same group. 54 While the
BCBS PTA guidelines do not require a uniform classification for borrowers
belonging to the same group, they do note that an NPA designation to one group
entity should be considered as one of several inputs when assessing the
creditworthiness of other connected borrowers.
 NPA exit criteria – including forborne NPAs: The criteria to exit the NPA category
vary significantly across surveyed countries. The BCBS guidance outlines a
number of specific criteria that should be met prior to an exposure’s upgrade to
the performing category. It may be useful for authorities to undertake a gap
analysis and to compare with the BCBS PTA criteria to ensure that jurisdiction-
specific rules incorporate similar factors.
• The application of qualitative factors to classify large, wholesale exposures as “non-
performing”: The review of country practices indicates that a sizeable number of jurisdictions
rely primarily on the over 90 days past due quantitative criteria to classify wholesale exposures
as “non-performing” or a relevant classification category. Such practices can potentially
undermine the effectiveness of the qualitative criteria (ie “unlikely to pay”) embedded in the NPA
regulatory identification frameworks across sampled jurisdictions. While the 90 days past due
criterion is a useful backstop, greater reliance on the qualitative “unlikely to pay” criterion would
allow supervisors to place exposures in the NPA category even if the exposure is less than 90
days past due.
• Supervisory guidance on the qualitative, “unlikely to pay” criteria: All jurisdictions surveyed
contain a mix of quantitative (90 days past due) and qualitative criteria to place exposures in the
NPA category. As noted above, the qualitative consideration typically includes a broad “unlikely
to pay” criterion or a similar concept (“well defined weakness”) that can be used by supervisors
to place an exposure in the NPA category even if the exposure is not yet delinquent (or is less
than 90 days past due). Nevertheless, as the criterion – by design – is highly subjective and the
survey results suggest that it is not always used, supervisory authorities may consider elaborating
on this concept in supervisory guidance, if possible, to facilitate supervisory risk assessments.
54
In the EU-SSM countries, for connected borrowers belonging to the same group, if one borrower belonging to a larger group
is an NPE, non-defaulted group members should also be considered NPEs, except exposures affected by isolated disputes that
are unrelated to the counterparty’s solvency.

NPA measurement – policy considerations
79. Authorities may want to reflect on the following areas to strengthen their NPA
measurement frameworks, where applicable.
• Powers to impose prudential backstops to deal with situations where accounting
provisions on NPAs are deemed inadequate from a supervisory perspective: Such a situation
can arise, for example, when a bank may have longstanding NPAs that are backed by physical
collateral, that may require little or no accounting provisions (because of the value assigned to
collateral), but supervisors determine that the collateral cannot be realised in the timeframe
projected by the bank. In these situations, supervisors need powers to deduct such prudential
provisioning shortfalls, at least from regulatory capital.
• Supervisory guidance on the prudent valuation of collateral that support NPAs: Once a loan
is classified as non-performing, the single biggest determinant of the level of provisions required
is the estimated value of collateral. As the collateral valuation process is subjective and heavily
assumption-dependent, supervisory authorities can play an important role in ensuring that the
valuation of collateral is prudent and, among other criteria, considers net realisable value. With
this in mind, authorities could provide supervisory guidance on the prudent valuation of
collateral. For instance, taking into consideration relevant guidance issued by some supervisory
authorities, prudent collateral valuation guidelines could include, but not be limited to, the
following elements: requirements for appraiser qualifications and independence, the
circumstances when external appraisals are required, re-appraisal/revaluation requirements and
appraisal review/monitoring expectations of the bank.
• A realistic assessment of the time and costs required to access and liquidate physical
collateral (ie the NPV approach) that may support an NPA: While such a requirement is
formally included under IFRS 9, the assumptions that underpin the NPV approach are particularly
important in jurisdictions where the legal framework results in long delays for creditors to gain
access to physical collateral. To the extent that banks develop overly optimistic scenarios to gain
access to collateral, they can materially understate the level of provisions needed on NPAs. For
instance, to ensure a consistent approach to estimating the time component of the NPV
approach, one jurisdiction imposes a regulatory prescribed time component to access and sell
collateral, by collateral type, 55 while in EU-SSM jurisdictions, the ECB has issued non-binding
supervisory expectations to encourage banks to steadily accumulate provisions up to 100% of
the carrying amount of collateralised NPEs, if the collateral is not realised within seven years. 56
• Provisioning requirements on repossessed collateral if held beyond a certain period of
time: The longer foreclosed collateral is held by a bank, the more likely that either the valuation
is too high in comparison to market prices, or the asset is highly illiquid, and its sale may only
occur over a longer period of time. The FSI survey shows that only a few countries impose
maximum holding periods or prescribe time-bound provisioning requirements on foreclosed
collateral. Some countries deal with the P&L implications of fluctuations in foreclosed collateral
values by imposing a lower of cost or market valuation approach for prudential purposes. This
approach, however, does not ensure that foreclosed assets will not be carried on a bank’s balance
sheet for an indefinite period of time. If not already in place, the introduction of time-bound
provisioning requirements can provide buffers for the bank to absorb the financial impact of a
sudden write-down or a write-off of foreclosed collateral. An added benefit of this approach is
55
See Bank of Thailand (2017).
56
See ECB (2018).

that it also offers tangible incentives for banks to remove non-earning assets from their books in
a timely manner.
• Regulatory or supervisory measures to deal with the accounting impact of accruing interest
on NPAs: The accrual of interest earned, but not collected, on NPAs – while required under IFRS 9
– may not always be sufficiently prudent from a supervisory perspective. This is particularly the
case when the complex estimates related to both the timing and recovery of amounts due
(including principal and interest) from a defaulted borrower prove to be inaccurate. Due to the
imprecise and assumption-dependent nature of this calculation, the majority of surveyed
jurisdictions have explicit powers to either prohibit the accrual of interest on all or a subset of
NPAs or can offset the impact by requiring banks to hold a commensurate amount of associated
provisions. 57 Without challenging the application of IFRS 9, authorities could, at a minimum,
require banks to report the amount of interest income accrued on NPAs so that other prudential
measures, such as deductions from CET 1 or Pillar 2 add-ons, can be considered, if needed.
• Supervisory information on ”accrued interest earned but not collected” on NPAs: In order
for authorities to determine the significance of accrued interest on NPAs at each regulated entity,
supervisors need to obtain the requisite bank-level information, and can benefit from collecting
such information where this is not already available. The survey results indicate that reporting
practices vary and there is no global consensus on the reporting of this line item. Regardless of
where banks report this line item in published financial statements, there is a rationale for
supervisory reporting purposes that banks provide the supervisor with information on the
cumulative amount of “accrued interest earned but not collected” in general, and “accrued
interest on NPAs” in particular, on a periodic basis. This is especially important in those countries
where the accrual of interest income on NPAs is allowed and follows the accounting guidance.
On-site inspections can give supervisors the opportunity to cross-check how the treatment of
this income source may affect their assessment of the robustness of a bank’s income stream
going forward.
• Loan write-off criteria in line with applicable accounting requirements: When there are no
reasonable prospects of recovery, IFRS 9 requires a write-off, in whole or in part, of the loan. The
results of the FSI survey reveal that prudential requirements vary considerably and most
jurisdictions do not prescribe time limits for loan write-offs and leave this decision to the banks.
Introducing loan write-off criteria would not only align prudential requirements with the write-
off principle in IFRS 9, but would also give banks a stronger incentive to manage NPAs promptly,
thus avoiding an accumulation of NPAs on their balance sheet. In addition, timely write-off
requirements can also facilitate greater comparability of both the stock of NPAs and associated
coverage ratios both within and across jurisdictions.
57
Ideally, and to the extent supervisory powers exist, such an approach would be accompanied by also triggering a reversal of all
previously accrued but uncollected interest income once the asset has been placed on non-accrual status.

Section 5 – Concluding remarks
80. The timely identification and measurement of NPAs play a key role in fostering the safety
and soundness of both individual banks and the broader financial system. Credit risk remains one of
the major drivers of bank solvency and, given the limited incentives for banks to promptly identify and
recognise NPAs – particularly when their risk profile deteriorates – high levels of NPAs have been a
recurrent driver of bank failures and, at a systemic level, of banking crises.
81. Both accounting and prudential requirements affect the identification and measurement
of NPAs, with practices varying across countries. Given the importance of NPAs for bank solvency
assessments, supervisory authorities have, in general, issued prudential requirements that supplement
accounting guidance, in order to ensure that banks identify and measure NPAs in a timely manner.
82. The accounting frameworks used to identify and measure impaired assets vary across
jurisdictions. While IFRS is the prevailing global standard, a number of jurisdictions do not follow IFRS,
which can lead to differences in determining both the volume of impaired assets and associated provisions.
Even in jurisdictions that apply IFRS, the judgmental nature of the collateral valuation process, particularly
in regards to estimating collateral values under the NPV approach, can lead to vastly different provisioning
outcomes across IFRS reporting jurisdictions.
83. The differences in applicable accounting frameworks are further amplified by variations in
regulatory NPA identification and measurement frameworks across jurisdictions. The FSI study
revealed a range of practices in regards to both the regulatory framework used to identify NPAs and to
measure the associated credit losses. Another key finding is that the interplay between accounting and
prudential frameworks in regards to NPA identification and measurement varies across jurisdictions.
84. Recently published guidelines by the BCBS on the definition of NPEs offer an opportunity
to strengthen country practices and to enhance consistency across jurisdictions. The BCBS PTA
publication provides the basis to harmonise the identification of NPAs across jurisdictions, which can
facilitate more meaningful comparisons of key asset quality metrics both within and across jurisdictions.
Beyond the BCBS PTA guidance, the findings from the FSI survey identify a number of other prudential
considerations that may be helpful to enhance NPA identification frameworks across relevant jurisdictions.
85. In addition, the range of practices outlined in this paper could help authorities to develop
approaches to strengthen their NPA measurement regimes. While there is no international standard
on NPA measurement practices, authorities may wish to consider the merits of the suggestions outlined
in this report, based on their country-specific needs and circumstances.

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Annex
NPA identification and measurement practices in Asia 58
NPA identification
NPA definition and role of asset classification frameworks in NPA identification

The vast majority of Asian jurisdictions do not have a formal NPA definition. In the absence of an
explicit regulatory NPA definition, market norms and supervisory practices have evolved to leverage off
existing regulatory asset classification frameworks as a proxy for determining non-performing assets.
Regulatory asset classification frameworks, which are widely used among surveyed
jurisdictions in Asia, play a key role in the NPA identification process. Nearly all (10 of 11) jurisdictions
require banks to use an asset classification system to classify credit exposures into various risk buckets
(with the most common being: Normal, Watch, Substandard, Doubtful and Loss), generally based on
quantitative and qualitative criteria developed by the prudential regulator.
The three most severe asset classification categories (Substandard, Doubtful and Loss) are
generally considered as NPAs. The Substandard category (or its equivalent) is generally the entry point
of the NPA designation. 59 The definition of Substandard is broadly consistent across surveyed jurisdictions
and includes both qualitative and quantitative criteria, with the over 90 days past due threshold typically
serving as the quantitative backstop. The links between regulatory asset classification categories and
performing and non-performing designations under IFRS 9 are shown in the conceptual example in
Table 7.
Mapping regulatory classification regimes in Asia 60 to NPAs (conceptual

example only) Table 7
Number of Regulatory Classification categories

countries risk buckets
7 5 buckets Normal Watch / Substandard 61 Doubtful Loss
Special
Mention
1 6 buckets Normal Watch / Substandard Doubtful Doubtful of Loss
Special Loss
Mention
2 4 buckets I II III IV
Accounting Performing Non-performing
(IFRS 9) (Stages 1 and 2) (Stage 3)
58
The Asian countries in the sample are China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand.
59
One jurisdiction disaggregates Substandard exposures into impaired and unimpaired components, with only the former being
considered as NPAs.
60
One country in Asia does not apply a regulatory classification system and therefore is not included in the chart.
61
One Asian authority that applies a five-bucket system differentiates between impaired and unimpaired Substandard, with only
the impaired Substandard in addition to Doubtful and Loss being considered as NPAs.

Regardless of the number of risk buckets used, the regulatory NPA identification frameworks
adopted across surveyed jurisdictions are, in general, broader than the accounting concept of
impaired. This is mainly due to the qualitative criteria (“well defined weakness”) embedded in the
Substandard (or equivalent) designation, which allows supervisors to place certain exposures in this
category even if they are less than 90 days past due or may not be impaired under applicable accounting
standards.
The majority of Asian jurisdictions have also adopted a uniform classification treatment of
multiple loans granted to the same borrower, enabling authorities to classify certain exposures as
NPAs that might not be captured as impaired under relevant accounting standards. Several Asian
authorities (six of 11), as noted in Chart 3 below, specified that if one exposure to a borrower is classified
as an NPA (or relevant classification category), then all exposures to the same borrower are automatically
classified as NPA. Of the four jurisdictions that checked “other”, two authorities require a uniform
classification if the sources of cash flows are connected or if the collateral is supported by the same pool;
another authority applies a uniform classification treatment for all wholesale exposures to the same
borrower, but multiple retail exposures to one borrower can be assessed on a loan by loan basis.
The uniform classification treatment is, however, rarely extended to a group of connected
borrowers belonging to the same group. Only two of 11 Asian authorities have introduced a uniform
classification treatment of different borrowers belonging to the same group, and, only if certain conditions
are met, such as if either the underlying cash flows of various entities within the group are connected
(Chart 3). The majority of surveyed jurisdictions allow an entity by entity classification, which is generally
consistent with international norms.
Uniform regulatory classification treatment Chart 3
Classification treatment of multiple loans Classification treatment of a group of connected

to one borrower borrowers
2
4
9
Uniform treatment applied (if one loan NPA,
all loans are NPA)
Classification is done exposure by exposure Classification is done entity by entity
Uniform treatment is applied in some cases
Other
On the other hand, there are certain features contained in the NPA identification
frameworks in several jurisdictions that can result in a downward bias to the reported level of NPLs.
First, seven of the 10 jurisdictions that use regulatory asset classification systems explicitly consider the

estimated value of collateral 62 in determining whether a loan should be graded Substandard or worse.
Second, some Asian authorities (four of 10) exclude certain asset classes, such as “accrued interest earned
but not collected”, “foreclosed collateral” and “equity interest received in a debt restructuring” from their
regulatory NPA identification regime.
In addition, the extent to which supervisors rely on qualitative or past-due criteria to place
exposures in the Substandard category have significant implications for both the timing and stock
of reported NPAs. The survey results indicate that the vast majority of jurisdictions (nine of 11) utilise
past-due indicators to place retail exposures in the Substandard or worse category; this is an expected
outcome and consistent with international norms, given the small balance and homogenous nature of
most retail credit portfolios (Chart 4). A sizeable number of respondents (four of 11) also noted that they
relied primarily on past-due indicators to place wholesale exposures in the Substandard or worse category.
These practices can affect the timing of when exposures are placed on NPA status, resulting in
commensurate delays in the recognition of requisite credit loss provisions.
Use of past-due criteria in asset classification during on-site inspections Chart 4
Do you rely on past-due criteria to classify exposures in the Substandard, Doubtful and
Loss categories?
10
0
Retail exposures Wholesale exposures
Most of the time Sometimes Rarely
NPA exit criteria

NPA exit criteria vary considerably across Asian jurisdictions and can materially impact the stock of
reported NPAs. Some jurisdictions allow an exit once there is repayment of past-due principal and interest
(P&I), while others require repayment of P&I and the remaining debt is expected to be repaid. One
jurisdiction allows an exit when it does not meet the accounting definition of impaired or the regulatory
definition of NPA. Even in cases where the criteria appear broadly similar across a number of jurisdictions
– for example, some demonstrated repayment history (quantitative) and an expectation of full debt
repayment (qualitative) – the demonstrated repayment history varies from P&I payments received for at
least six months, to full repayment of all past-due P&I, to repayment such that P&I is less than three
months past due.
Similar variations across jurisdictions were noted for restructured (forborne) exposures to
exit the NPA category. As Chart 5 illustrates, for restructured NPAs, the repayment period varies from
62
One of these authorities only recognises cash collateral or loans secured by government bonds for purposes of determining
credit classification.

immediate upgrades upon debt restructuring to continued repayments for a period of time (ranging from
one–three payments to one year). In one case, the decision to upgrade a restructured NPA is left solely to
the bank. These differences can also impact the reported level of NPAs.
Criteria for restructured NPAs to exit NPA category Chart 5
How many payments required on restructured exposures to exit NPA category?
Other
Continuous payment for 1 year
Continuous payment for 6 months
6 months (if monthly), 1 yr (if quarterly)
1-3 payments
Immediate upgrade in some cases
0 1 2 3 4
Number of countries
NPA measurement
The framework used to estimate and recognise loan loss provisions in the P&L statement varies
considerably across surveyed jurisdictions. Only three jurisdictions formulate and recognise provisions
based only on applicable international accounting standards, while the remaining jurisdictions either use
a combination of accounting and regulatory provisioning requirements or follow regulator-imposed rules
only. The variation in approaches can impact both how loan losses are measured and how much loss is
ultimately recognised in the P&L statement.
Of the three jurisdictions that recognise only accounting provisions in the P&L statement,
all impose regulatory backstops as a means to deduct provisioning shortfalls (with respect to
accounting provisions) in regulatory capital. While the target and construct of the backstops vary, all
three aim to address the accounting shortcomings under IAS 39, which generally does not require
provisions for non-impaired loans, including those deemed Substandard for regulatory purposes but
which may not necessarily be considered “impaired” under accounting rules. Chart 6 illustrates the
variations in provisioning frameworks across surveyed Asian jurisdictions.

Applicable provisioning frameworks in surveyed jurisdictions Chart 6
What is the basis to estimate and

If you recognise accounting provisions in the P&L do you
recognise provisions in the profit
impose a prudential backstop to adjust regulatory
and loss statement?
capital?
3 1 1
6
1
2
Yes – if regulatory provisions > accounting provisions difference

deducted from regulatory capital
Accounting only
Yes – banks are required to hold regulatory reserves of 0.5% -1%
Regulatory only of total unimpaired loans, which are deducted from regulatory
capital
Combination of accounting Yes – if collective provisions are less than 1.2% of total loans (net
and regulatory of individual impairments) the shortfall is deducted from capital)
For authorities that apply a combination of accounting and regulatory guidance to

determine provisions, the frameworks vary considerably and can lead to different provisioning
outcomes. As Table 8 indicates, some authorities impose regulator-prescribed provisioning rules only if
they are not satisfied with the bank’s application of accounting provisions, while others require parallel
calculations and take the higher of the two for purposes of P&L recognition. Various other permutations
are also noted below, with the one common denominator being that the prudential authority has powers
to impose regulator-prescribed provisioning rules for purposes of P&L recognition.

Interaction between accounting and regulatory frameworks Table 8
Interaction between accounting and regulatory guidance when both are used in combination to determine
provisions
Countries Description
2 Small banks or institutions whose accounting methodology is considered inadequate must follow
regulatory provisioning rules and recognise in the P&L
1 Follows accounting rules, but provisions of at least 1% of net loans (net of collateral and deduction of
individual impairment provisions) must be held and recognised in the P&L
1 Banks must calculate both IFRS and regulatory provisions and take the higher of the two for
recognition in the P&L
1 Banks must maintain IAS 39 provisions, but must also maintain reserve coverage of two other ratios
and take the higher of the two and recognise in the P&L: provisions to gross loans not less than 2.5%
and provisions to NPLs of at least 150%
1 Other – authority did not specify methodology
Most authorities that apply regulatory classification systems also impose minimum
provisioning requirements. Of the 10 jurisdictions that reported 63 their use, eight explicitly prescribe a
range of minimum provisioning requirements that are linked to each asset classification category. 64 The
prescribed regulatory provisioning ranges vary across jurisdictions, particularly for two of the three severe
asset classification categories that comprise NPAs: Substandard and Doubtful. The Loss category
provisioning ranges are broadly consistent across jurisdictions.

Collateral recognition practices differ across jurisdictions, which may have a material impact on the
amount of provisions held on NPAs. While the majority of jurisdictions allow collateral to be considered
for purposes of determining provisions on NPAs, a notable minority does not allow collateral recognition
for purposes of determining NPA provisions (Chart 7). The latter approach could be driven by either
prudential considerations or country-specific circumstances. 65 Interestingly, five jurisdictions that allow
collateral recognition for purposes of determining provisions on NPAs do not allow collateral to be
considered for purposes of determining provisions for a subset of performing or unimpaired exposures.
This approach may reflect authorities’ desire to impose a baseline level of provisions on unimpaired
exposures that might not otherwise be possible under IAS 39.
63
One authority removed its minimum provisioning requirements for Substandard, Doubtful and Loss exposures upon the
introduction of IFRS 9, but retained the minimum provisioning requirements for the unimpaired loans. This authority is not
included within the eight jurisdictions specified above.
64
In other words, minimum provisioning requirements are imposed on Normal, Watch, Substandard, Doubtful and Loss category
exposures.
65
For example, there may be long delays in the legal foreclosure process for creditors to gain access to the collateral of defaulted
borrowers, rendering the collateral value to be less relevant.

Role of collateral in provisioning Chart 7
Can collateral be recognised for purposes of determining provisioning requirements?
3 3
1
4
Yes – for all assets

Yes – except for "normal" loans and "unimpaired" loans
Yes – except for "normal" and "watch" loans
No
Despite the critical role that collateral plays in the formulation of provisioning levels, some
Asian jurisdictions (four of 11) have not prescribed supervisory guidance on prudent collateral
valuation standards. In cases where supervisory expectations are set, the guidance typically encompasses
appraiser independence, qualifications and circumstances when external appraisals are required, among
other factors.
Once collateral is repossessed by the bank (ie foreclosed collateral), the majority of
surveyed jurisdictions (10 of 11) do not impose minimum provisioning requirements, even if the
foreclosed collateral cannot be sold with a certain period of time. For foreclosed assets, the primary
prudential requirement is to ensure that the asset is carried at its net realisable value. One jurisdiction
requires banks to steadily build provisions of up to 100% of the carrying value of the foreclosed asset if it
is held for more than five years.

Regulator-prescribed rules in several jurisdictions impose some restrictions on a bank’s ability to
continue accruing interest income on an NPA. A majority (seven of 11) of jurisdictions require banks to
either suspend interest payment on NPAs 66 (ie placing loans on non-accrual status) or to neutralise the
impact on earnings by requiring a commensurate amount of provisions to be held. Nevertheless, the
timing of when a loan gets placed on NPL status – and therefore when interest accruals stop – can vary
across jurisdictions.
At the same time, most jurisdictions do not require banks to reverse previously accrued
interest earned but not collected on an NPA. Only two of 11 jurisdictions require banks to make such
reversals in earnings (ie reduce interest income by a commensurate amount), while one other jurisdiction
requires banks to fully provision the amount through the P&L.
66
Two authorities place loans on non-accrual status when they are classified as Doubtful – ie the second most severe regulatory
classification category.

Practices also diverge on the regulatory reporting of “accrued interest earned but not
collected”. Some authorities require such assets to be reported separate from loans (either as “other
assets” or “accrued interest receivable”), while others have not provided any regulatory guidance.
Loan write-offs
All but two authorities in the Asian sample do not require banks to write off Loss category
exposures or fully provisioned NPAs. In some jurisdictions, such an approach may reflect legal
implications of asset write-offs. 67 Nevertheless, under IFRS 9, banks are required to write off assets, in
whole or in part, if there are no reasonable prospects of recovery.
67

NPA identification and measurement practices in EU-SSM 68
NPA identification
NPA definition
All countries within the SSM use the same high-level definition of non-performing exposures
(NPEs). 69 In the EU, a common definition of NPEs was introduced in 2014 70 by the EBA and is based on a
combination of “past due” (90 days) and the forward-looking “unlikely to pay” (UTP) criteria, even if the
exposure is currently paying as agreed.
The NPE definition, however, is only binding for supervisory reporting purposes. In practice,
this means that for the purposes of a bank’s published financial statements and presentation, banks in the
EU are not obliged to adopt the EBA’s NPE definition. However, the ECB guidance (ECB (2017a)) strongly
encourages banks to use the NPE definition for their internal risk control and public financial reporting, in
order to promote alignment.
Collateral plays no role in the classification of an asset as an NPE. Banks are required to
classify exposures as non-performing without taking into account the existence of any collateral. 71
Consequently, even fully collateralised exposures can be classified as an NPE if they meet either the past-
due or UTP criteria (based on the creditworthiness of the borrower).

The EBA NPE definition covers two buckets, and some countries in the EU-SSM use additional
classification categories. The 2014 definition introduced by the EBA envisages only two buckets,
“Performing” and “Non-performing”, which broadly overlap with the Pass/Normal and Watch
(“Performing”) and Substandard, Doubtful and Loss (“Non-performing”). The two-bucket approach allows
applicable national authorities to include more granular asset classification frameworks under the EBA
umbrella NPE definition. For instance, some of the countries 72 with currently high levels of NPEs use
additional subcategories for performing and non-performing assets.
68
The EU-SSM countries are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. EU-wide regulation is directly applicable to them,
as for all EU members. This section draws on public documents issued by the ECB, as the central supervisory authority in the
SSM (ECB (2017a,2018)).
69
The information on the SSM countries relies primarily on ECB (2017a,b, 2018)).
70
The EBA introduced this definition, which was adopted via the introduction of the Implementing Technical Standards (ITS). This
definition, like the one for forbearance, is applicable to all on-balance sheet loans and debt securities, as well as some off-
balance sheet commitments, including foreclosed collateral and repossessed assets. The European Commission recently
proposed to introduce a common definition of NPEs in accordance with that of the EBA (European Commission (2017b)).
71
Paragraph 148 of European Parliament (2013).
72
According to ECB (2017b), these countries are Greece, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia and Spain. The subcategories for performing or
non-performing assets are, however, quite heterogeneous among them. For instance, in Greece NPLs are subdivided into four
categories: (i) loans in pre-arrears; (ii) loans in early arrears (1–89 dpd); (iii) NPLs; and (iv) “denounced” loans (ie NPLs to non-
cooperative or non-viable debtors). In Ireland, exposures are classified into five categories: (i) performing: includes the
subcategories performing without arrears, performing in arrears (1–30 days; 31–60 days; 61–90 days) and renegotiated loans
(for borrowers that are not in financial difficulty); (ii) non-performing; (iii) cured: category to reclassify loans that come out from
the NPL classification; (iv) foreclosed loans: loans for which there is no likelihood of repayment, resulting in the decision to
foreclose; and (v) forbearance.

The NPE definition is broader than the accounting concept of “impaired” and the prudential
definition of “default”. Under the EBA’s definition, NPEs can also include exposures that are not
recognised as “impaired” or “defaulted” in applicable accounting or regulatory frameworks.
Because of its scope, the NPE definition classifies as non-performing a broader set of credit
exposures that would not be captured as NPEs if based solely on applicable accounting frameworks
or the Basel definition of default. The main drivers for these differences are:
• Uniform classification treatment for multiple loans granted to the same borrower: if 20% of the
exposures of a debtor are considered as NPEs, all exposures of this debtor must also be classified
as NPEs.
• Uniform classification treatment of different borrowers belonging to the same group: for connected
borrowers belonging to the same group, a group classification treatment is required; that is, if
one borrower belonging to a larger group is an NPE, non-defaulted group members should also
be considered as NPEs, except for exposures affected by isolated disputes that are unrelated to
the solvency of the counterparty.
• Regulatory treatment of forborne (restructured) measures granted to the same borrower: for
forborne exposures that are reclassified as performing, banks are required to continue monitoring
and reporting the exposures for a period of two years as “forborne”. During this period, if a new
forbearance measure is granted to the same borrower or if the exposure is more than 30 days
past due it must be reclassified as an NPE.
On the other hand, the NPE definition appears to exclude certain asset classes. In particular,
foreclosed collateral and equity interest received in a company as part of a debt for equity swap (or to
extinguish the outstanding debt) appears to be excluded from the NPE designation. To the extent these
asset classes are material, this can potentially understate the level of reported NPEs.
NPA exit criteria

Exit from the NPE category is subject to specific regulatory requirements. EU regulations envisage
that exit from the NPE category – including NPE forborne exposures – to a performing status is conditional
on adhering to specific criteria, including a 12-month cure period to demonstrate the borrower’s payment
performance such that concerns about full debt repayment no longer exist. 73
NPA measurement
IFRS are the accounting standards in the EU and determine the level of provisions that are
recognised through the P&L. 74 Provisions must be set according to IFRS for almost all the significant
institutions (SIs) 75 and in most jurisdictions also for all of the less significant institutions (LSIs).
From a prudential perspective, regulatory provisioning backstops across the EU are in place
for SIs that are approved under the IRB approaches to credit risk capital measurement. For IRB banks,
73
In addition to demonstrated payment performance, other factors that must be met to exit the NPE category include the
following: the exposure is not considered impaired or defaulted; there is no past-due amount on the exposure; and the
borrower has settled an amount equal to all those previously past due or has otherwise demonstrated its ability to comply with
the post-forbearance conditions.
74
In the EU, IFRS is mandatory only for listed banks.
75
The exception is SIs that are not listed.

any shortfall in accounting provisions with respect to the regulatory expected loss concept is deducted
from Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1), in line with the requirements of the Basel framework.
Additional supervisory guidance on provisioning was issued in some EU countries. Several
high-NPL jurisdictions have issued non-binding provisioning guidance as a means of influencing more
conservative provisioning outcomes. In addition, the European Commission recently clarified that the ECB
is encouraged to influence a bank's provisioning level within the limits of the applicable accounting
framework and to apply the necessary adjustments (deductions and similar treatments) in case accounting
provisions are not sufficient from a supervisory perspective (European Commission (2017a)). In some
jurisdictions, authorities provide additional provisioning guidance. 76
Banks are encouraged to book the maximum amount of such provisions under applicable
accounting standards (through the P&L). If the accounting standards do not permit such a treatment,
banks are expected to examine how to adjust their CET 1 capital on their own initiative. Discrepancies from
the prudential provisioning expectations are part of the supervisory dialogue between the ECB and the SIs
during the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP).
More recently, the ECB issued non-binding supervisory expectations for prudential
provisioning of non-performing exposures. The guidance is applicable to all SIs and applies only to
new exposures classified as NPEs beginning in April 2018 (ECB (2018)). Under it, banks will be expected to
fully provision against uncollateralised NPEs within two years and gradually set provisions up to 100% of
collateralised NPEs, if the collateral has not been realised within seven years from the date when the
underlying exposure was classified as non-performing. 77 Furthermore, following a public consultation in
November 2017, the European Commission proposed a revision to the relevant EU regulation, to introduce
common minimum coverage levels for incurred and expected losses on newly originated loans that turn
non-performing (European Commission (2017c, 2018)). This modification would complement the ECB’s
supervisory initiative.

Among the SSM countries, the calculation of impairment provisions for a collateralised financial
asset reflects, among other factors, the value of collateral. In this regard, the provisioning calculation
must consider both the estimated time and costs required to acquire and sell the underlying collateral
(NPV approach). In particular, due to the protracted time required for creditors to gain access to physical
collateral in some EU jurisdictions, it may not always be possible for banks to realise collateral in a timely
manner.
Given the importance of robust collateral valuations in estimating NPE losses, most SSM
countries have issued guidance on the prudent valuation of collateral. Typically, these requirements
cover valuation requirements, data requirements and the appraiser professional requirements, even if in
some countries requirements are much more specific (eg limits on banks’ reliance on individual appraisers,
performance of individual appraisers, appraiser independence). For real estate collateral, authorities have
issued further guidance, in addition to the valuation requirements in the Capital Requirement Regulation
76
For instance, in Spain the supervisory authority (the Bank of Spain) is also the accounting regulator, a unique feature among
supervisors in the EU. The Bank of Spain issued binding requirements to guide both the development of own methods for
individual estimates of specific provisions and of internal methods for collective estimates of specific and generic provisions.
In Portugal, the supervisory authority issued non-binding guidance defining a set of impairment triggers beyond those already
established in the accounting standards. It also issued non-binding comply or explain prudential guidance defining the
minimum level of provisioning for loans to non-financial corporates depending on specific conditions.
77
On the basis of the ECB supervisory expectations, banks will be asked to inform the ECB of any differences between their
practices and the prudential provisioning expectations, as part of the SREP supervisory dialogue, from early 2021 onwards.

(CRR). In all SSM countries, supervised institutions are required to have a reliable data collection framework
for collateral and the pertinent loss-given-default parameters.
Once collateral has been repossessed as a bank asset, it is generally not subject to minimum
provisioning requirements, even if the asset cannot be sold within a predefined period of time.
Under IFRS, there are a number of approaches to value foreclosed collateral. 78 Although not binding, the
SSM strongly encourages banks to classify foreclosed assets as “non-current assets held for sale” under
IFRS 5. 79 The primary benefit of this designation, from a prudential standpoint, is that banks are required
to measure the foreclosed asset on an ongoing basis at the lower of cost or its fair value, less costs to sell.
Although collateral valuation is typically not within the scope of on-site inspections, when
it is (eg in the context of impairment calculation) reviewed, supervisors challenge the assumptions
that drive collateral values. Furthermore, on-site inspections with a quantitative focus challenge the
methodology for calculating the provisions, for instance the time estimated to realise collateral. On the
other hand, during on-site reviews with a more qualitative focus, there is typically no review of the
appropriateness of estimated collateral values; rather the emphasis is on processes for assessing collateral
values. When supervisory teams are sceptical about the processes and frequency of collateral valuations,
they can report their findings in the inspection report. In such cases, Pillar 2 add-on requirements via the
SREP review can be activated.

While the vast majority of SSM countries follow applicable accounting standards that allow for the
accrual of interest income on an NPA, irrespective of their actual collection, some jurisdictions have
developed their own criteria for the treatment of accrual of interest on NPEs. These criteria allow
income recognition only in particular cases, such as only if the relevant exposure is likely to be repaid. For
all the other jurisdictions, the introduction of IFRS 9 brings no substantial changes, as it continues to allow
the accrual of interest income – on the net amount of NPLs – for all Stage 3 loans.
Loan write-offs
Although there is no EU-wide guidance or requirement, some SSM supervisors introduced their own
write-off guidelines, particularly in high-NPL jurisdictions. These guidelines are mostly principles-
based, relying on three possible criteria, ie arrears, the start of bankruptcy proceedings or an institution-
specific approach. 80 At the EU level, the European Commission recently issued a proposal for regulatory
change and the ECB issued supervisory expectations, both of which are aimed at banks to fully provision
against unsecured and secured NPLs, after a prespecified period of time. While stopping short of
mandating write-offs, the European Commission’s and ECB publications mitigate the financial
consequences of retaining legacy NPLs on a bank’s books for an extended period of time. In the absence
of EU-wide write-off guidance, write-off practices can diverge quite substantially across countries.
78
Under the IFRS framework, the different valuation approaches are covered under IAS 2, IAS 16, IAS 40 and IAS 5.
79
Under this framework, at the time of initial designation of the foreclosed asset as “held for sale”, banks are required to write
down the asset based on the difference between its carrying amount and its “fair value”, less the costs to sell. After the initial
write-down (if any), the adjusted value becomes the new carrying amount of the asset.
80
According to IFRS 9, write-offs become compulsory once there is no expectation of recovery of the loan.

NPA identification and measurement practices in the Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) region 81
NPA identification
NPA definition
Not all LAC countries have issued a formal NPA definition for regulatory purposes. In less than half
of the sample, countries have no explicit definition of NPAs. In the rest of the sample, either an official
definition of NPAs was issued by the relevant authority, or an informal definition of NPAs is used.
The classification of an exposure as non-performing relies on both qualitative and
quantitative criteria. For the purpose of allocating exposures to the risk buckets, banks use quantitative
criteria, which typically include the concept of days past due (dpd), combined with qualitative information,
generally reflecting the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan, based on various indicators.
NPA definition and regulatory asset classification Chart 8
Definition of NPAs used in the country Link between NPA definition and regulatory
asset classification categories
1 1
2
3
4 4
Accounting only
Regulatory only All Substandard, Doubtful and Loss loans are NPAs
Accounting and regulatory No explicit link
Other Other
Most countries do not rely only on the accounting definition of impaired assets to identify
NPAs. Only one country maps the accounting definition of impaired assets one to one in its definition of
NPAs. Another country uses the definition of default in the Basel framework’s IRB approach to identify
NPAs. For the other eight countries, half use a combination of accounting and regulatory concepts, the
other half applies their regulatory NPA identification framework (Chart 8).
In some countries, prudential classification regimes contain certain features that may
understate the actual level of NPAs. For instance, several countries exclude certain asset classes from
regulatory classification, such as “foreclosed collateral”, “accrued interest earned but not collected”, “equity
interest received in a debt restructuring” and “government exposures”.
81
LAC countries in the sample: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and
Tobago.

Collateral is included in the asset classification only in a small minority of countries. This is
the case in only three 82 countries, while in the other cases collateral is considered only to adjust the level
of provisions.

Regulatory asset classification frameworks play a key role in the NPA identification process. All
jurisdictions in the sample require banks to use an asset classification system to classify credit exposures
into various risk buckets, with the number of buckets varying quite substantially across countries, ranging
from five to 16. This classification is used for supervisory monitoring and to set regulatory provisions, and
in one case also for the purpose of Pillar 3 disclosures.
Some countries use a five-bucket risk framework, and otherwise in most cases employ a
more granular breakdown. In general, countries employing more than five buckets typically require
greater risk differentiation within the severe asset classification categories. 83 The thresholds embedded in
the dpd criterion vary across countries and types of loans. For instance, the threshold is usually set at 90
days for a commercial loan to be considered non-performing, but in some countries it can be as low as 30
days for microcredit, commercial and retail loans, or a 30 day-delay in the monthly payment together with
a 120 days past-due repayment of capital.
In half of the countries, the prudential framework requires a uniform regulatory
classification treatment of multiple exposures granted to the same borrower. Multiple loans to the
same borrower with at least one NPA are all treated as NPAs in half of the LAC countries. For credit
exposures to different borrowers belonging to the same group, the classification is done entity by entity
in the majority of countries, consistent with international norms (Chart 9).
Treatment of multiple exposures or to a group Chart 9
Treatment of multiple credit exposures to Treatment of different borrowers belonging

same borrower for NPA recognition to same group
3 3
5
2 7
All exposures to one borrower with at least one

NPA are NPAs If one borrower within a group is NPA, all
borrowers within the same group are classified
Classification is exposure by exposure NPA
Classification is done entity by entity
Other
82
One of these authorities only recognise collateral when there is full collateralisation in the form of cash, gold or export rebates,
which affects the classification of the asset as an NPA.
83
There are two exceptions. One country uses a nine-bucket system and considers only buckets 8 and 9 as NPAs, while another
country uses a 16-bucket system and considers its six most severe categories as NPAs.

Comparison of regulatory definition of NPAs and accounting concept of impaired
Most countries do not rely only on the accounting definition of impaired assets to identify NPAs.
Only one country maps the accounting definition of impaired assets one to one in its definition of NPAs.
Another country uses the definition of default in the Basel framework’s IRB approach to identify NPAs. Half
of the remaining eight countries use a combination of accounting and regulatory concepts; the other half
apply their regulatory NPA identification framework (Chart 10).
The mapping between the accounting and the regulatory definitions of NPAs varies across
countries. In half of the countries in the sample, there is no explicit link between the two frameworks,
although practice provides guidance in the case of these countries, so that all Substandard, Doubtful and
Loss are considered NPAs. In the other half, in three cases the link is made explicit, by defining all
Substandard, Doubtful and Loss assets as NPAs, while in the remaining two case the Substandard class is
excluded from the NPA definition.
In all cases, the regulatory NPA identification framework is generally broader than the
accounting concept of impaired. As all sampled countries combine the dpd criterion with some form of
qualitative criteria, some exposures may be classified as NPAs even if they may not be considered impaired
under applicable accounting standards.
Use of past-due criteria in asset classification during on-site inspections Chart 10
Do you rely primarily on past-due criteria to classify exposures in

Substandard, Doubtful and Loss categories (or equivalent categories)?
Rarely
Sometimes
Most of the time
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Wholesale exposures Retail exposures
However, reliance on qualitative or past-due criteria to place exposures in the Substandard

and below categories could have significant implications for both the timing and stock of reported
NPAs. Concerning retail exposures, the majority of countries in the sample (eight out of 10) rely primarily
on past-due indicators to place retail exposures in the Substandard or worse categories. As expected,
given the larger unit size and heterogeneous nature of commercial credit portfolios, this criterion is less
frequently used for wholesale exposures. Nonetheless, in half of the countries, supervisors still rely
primarily on past-due indicators to place wholesale exposures in the Substandard or worse categories.
Because of the backward nature of the dpd criterion, these practices can delay the time when exposures
are placed on NPA status, and thus the recognition of commensurate provisioning requirements. On the
other hand, countries that rarely rely on dpd indicators tend to focus their asset classification on other

indicators, such as general economic conditions, LTVs or a broader assessment of repayment capacity,
based on cash flow analysis, collateral and the client’s management qualifications.
NPA exit criteria

Criteria for exiting the NPA class vary considerably across countries. Generally, all countries require
some preconditions for reclassifying an asset as performing, but the relevant criteria vary materially across
countries, such as a minimum repayment of a certain portion of the outstanding amount, together with
meeting all criteria of the next risk classification category. In other cases, authorities require objective
evidence (such as new collateral, improved cash flow, significant amortisation of loan), and in some cases
such evidence needs to be matched with no refinancing on other obligations. As for the minimum length
of time before a cured NPA can be considered performing, the performance period varies from three to
12 months.
Exit from the restructured NPA category is also subject to various conditions, and in most
cases it is not possible to upgrade an NPA immediately after the loan has been restructured. Only
two countries allow for such an immediate upgrade, and in one of them this is conditional on objective
evidence of the recovery in credit quality. In all other cases, a minimum number of payments is required,
although this varies from a minimum of one to three payments, to at least six instalments, or a minimum
of 12 months of timely instalments and unchanged credit classification (Chart 11).
Number of payments required prior to upgrading restructured NPAs Chart 11
Other
Banks need to assess borrower's ability to

repay interest and principal
3–6 payments
1–3 payments
Immediate upgrade in some cases
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
NPA measurement
Almost all countries do not rely only on accounting rules to estimate and recognise loan loss
provisions in the P&L. Excluding one case where loan loss provisions are set on the basis of accounting

rules only, 84 most jurisdictions either use a combination of accounting and regulatory provisioning
requirements (four) or follow regulator-imposed requirements (five) (Chart 12).
The introduction of IFRS 9 is not likely to change provisioning approaches. This is because
only two countries expect to introduce IFRS 9 in full at the beginning of 2018, while continuing to use a
combination of accounting and regulatory requirements for provisions. The other LAC countries either
have not yet made conclusive plans to switch to IFRS, or will continue to use a regulatory only approach,
based on local requirements.
Authorities that apply some variation of regulator-prescribed rules for purposes of
recognising provisions in the P&L generally impose minimum provisioning requirements for all
regulatory asset classification categories. The prescribed regulatory provisioning ranges vary across
jurisdictions. These ranges vary mostly for the equivalent of Watch and Doubtful assets, while there is
strong convergence for both the Substandard and Loss categories. In more than half of the sample
countries, minimum provisions, or a range of provisions, are set in the regulation.
Treatment of provisions Chart 12
What is basis used to estimate and recognise Do your regulatory provisioning rules require
provisions in P&L statement? a minimum provision, or range of provisions,
per regulatory asset classification category?
1
1
5
2
4
Regulatory only
Combination of accounting and regulatory
Accounting only Yes, for all assets No Not applicable

In more than half of the countries, collateral affects the level of provisions. While over half of the
countries (six) 85 allow collateral to be considered for purposes of determining provisions on NPAs, a
notable minority (three) do not allow any collateral to be recognised for purposes of determining
provisions for all credit exposures (Chart 13).
84
In this country, the prudential regulatory is also in charge of the local accounting standards. Another partial exception is one
country with a significant share of the domestic banking sector owned by foreign-owned banks. In this country, while local
provisioning requirements are set on the basis of domestic regulation, the consolidated accounts of foreign banks, including
provisioning requirements, are prepared under IFRS rules.
85
In one of these LAC countries, the value of collateral can be deducted only for some types of assets, ie mostly real estate loans.

Among those jurisdictions, most use a regulator-prescribed methodology for collateral
valuation. Five out of the six countries that recognise collateral in determining provisioning levels follow
a regulator-prescribed methodology. Under this approach, the appraised collateral value is used as a
starting point and supervisor-specified haircuts are applied, based primarily on collateral type.
Role of collateral in provisioning Chart 13
Can collateral be recognised for purposes of

determining provisioning requirements?
Yes, for all assets No
One country did not provide an answer.
Most jurisdictions have prescribed supervisory guidance on prudent collateral valuation

standards. Almost all countries have issued minimum requirements for the valuation of collateral, and
have recommended the use of haircuts, reference to market values for listed assets, cash flow analysis and
third-party evaluations, with regular updates required in a number of cases.
Once collateral is repossessed by the bank, half of the surveyed jurisdictions impose
minimum provisioning requirements. Once the collateral has been appropriated by the bank, it is
subject to minimum provisioning requirements in half of the sample countries, while in the other half no
minimum provisioning requirements are set. In jurisdictions where minimum provisions are required, it
depends on the type of collateral, for instance on whether collateral is represented by movable or
immovable property. For the latter, some countries require 100% of provisions for the value of the (part
of the) collateral not sold within three to four years since the acquisition of the collateral, while for movable
properties the requirement of the 100% provisioning is reached much faster, typically within the first year.
Supervisors also appear to regularly review collateral values as part on the on-site process.
Seven of ten respondent jurisdictions specified that collateral values are regularly reviewed as part of on-
site inspections, and gaps in the valuation of collateral are identified, approximately 60% of the authorities
noted that they require a downward adjustment based on the regulator-specified collateral haircuts
prescribed in regulation. This may be especially important for those cases where access to physical
collateral can take a number of years. For instance, Table 9 shows the time required to access physical
collateral, depending on the country or type of collateral, based on the information provided by survey
respondents.

Estimated time needed to go through the legal system to access physical
collateral (number of countries) Table 9
Sector 1 year or less 1–3 years 3–5 years 5–8 years Over 8 years
Residential real estate 6 2 1
Commercial real estate 5 3
Other corporate 1 5 3
Motor vehicles 4 5
The information in this table is incomplete: nine countries reported, and one did not report information on commercial real estate.

Regulator-prescribed rules impose restrictions on a bank’s ability to continue accruing interest
income on an NPA. All jurisdictions in the surveyed LAC 86 countries require banks to suspend interest
accrual on NPAs – in six countries, in all cases; in the others, under certain conditions. Nevertheless, the
timing of when a loan gets placed on NPL status – and therefore when interest accruals stop – can vary
across jurisdictions.
At the same time, there are some differences as to whether regulators also require banks
to reverse previously accrued interest earned but not collected on an NPA. Half of the countries report
requiring such a reversal, indicating that in cases where authorities require banks to stop accruing interest
income on NPAs, they have not always required a symmetrical treatment for previously accrued but
uncollected interest on NPAs.
Practices also diverge on the reporting of the line item “accrued interest earned but not
collected” on the balance sheet. Some authorities require such assets to be reported separately from
loans (as either “other assets” or “accrued interest receivable”), while others require banks to include the
amount in the loan balance and yet others have not provided any regulatory guidance.
Supervisors also use on-site reviews to check the appropriateness of accrual of interest
income on NPAs. In general, on-site inspections are used at least sometimes to conduct this type of
review in seven of the 10 countries in the sample.
Loan write-offs
In over half of the jurisdictions, authorities have developed some guidance on the write-off of Loss
category exposures or fully provisioned NPAs. Six of the LAC countries in the sample impose a time
limit for write-offs after the asset has been designated as “unrecoverable”. Time limits range from seven
to 24 months, and their length may also depend on the original maturity of the loan. 87 In the other four
countries, write-offs are determined by banks on a case by case basis. In some jurisdictions, such an
approach may reflect legal implications of asset write-offs. 88
86
All 10 surveyed jurisdictions in the LAC region require NPAs to be placed on non-accrual status if they meet the past-due
threshold. However, six of these jurisdictions also place NPAs on non-accrual status if the NPA designation was driven by the
more qualitative “inability to pay” criterion.
87
For instance, in one country the cutoff date for the write-off is 360 days for short-term loans and 720 days for long-term loans.
88

NPA identification and measurement practices in the United States
NPA identification
NPA definition
US regulators 89 do not have a statutory NPA definition. In the absence of an official definition,
supervisory practice adopted as general market practice has been to consider as NPAs, the sum of: all
non-accrual assets and all assets 90 days or more past due but still accruing interest (typically, loans held
for investment) and real estate-owned. A loan is required to be placed on non-accrual status when
payment in full of principal or interest is not expected or the asset is 90 days or more past due unless the
asset is both “well secured” and “in the process of collection”. 90
Collateral is a consideration in determining whether an asset is placed in the non-accrual
category. The exemption of loans that are both “well secured” and “in the process of collection” from the
non-accrual category appears to suggest that collateral support is taken into consideration in the non-
accrual designation. It should be noted, however, that assets that are 90 days or more past due but
accruing interest would still be captured in the US’s NPA definition, while assets that are less than 90 days
past due but accruing interest would not be captured under this framework.

For supervisory risk assessments, regulatory asset classification rules are used as the primary
mechanism to assess credit risk at regulated banks that are not using the advanced IRB approaches
to credit risk capital measurement under the Basel framework. The US regulatory classification regime
is based on a five-bucket system based on the Pass, Special Mention, Substandard, Doubtful and Loss
categories. All asset classes, including foreclosed collateral and government securities, as a general
principle are subject to the US regulatory asset classification system.
While there is no specific link between NPAs and the regulatory classification system, US
authorities typically refer to the Substandard, Doubtful and Loss categories as “adversely classified
assets”. This is a broader term than the NPA concept and is used as a standard proxy to determine the
aggregate level of credit risk at regulated entities – in combination with more specific indicators such as
past-due loans, non-accrual loans and NPAs.
The usual entry point of “adversely classified assets” is the Substandard category. This
bucket includes assets that contain well defined weaknesses, which, if not corrected, may lead to loss. In
other words, an exposure can be placed in the Substandard category based on the “well defined weakness”
criterion even if the loan is currently paying as agreed (such as a lack of credit support for full debt
repayment or an inability to generate sufficient cash flow to service the debt even if not currently
delinquent). The Doubtful and Loss categories are more severe than the Substandard designation and thus
are expected to experience greater loss.
Past-due criteria are generally used to classify small-balance retail exposures. Due to the
small-balance nature of these loans, it may not be feasible for banks and supervisors to review them on a
89
US regulators are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
90
An asset is considered “well secured” if it is secured by collateral whose value is equal to or higher than the value of the loan
and any unpaid accrued interest or the guarantee of a financially responsible party. An asset is “in the process of collection” if
collection of the asset is proceeding in a timely manner through legal action or through collection efforts not involving legal
action but which are expected to result in debt repayment or restoration to a performing loan in the near term.

credit by credit basis and therefore a uniform classification approach, 91which is based on delinquency, is
applied. This policy applies to retail credits that are extended to individuals for household, family and other
personal expenditures and includes consumer loans and credit cards.
Past-due criteria are also used to classify some smaller-balance wholesale exposures, while
larger, more complex exposures are evaluated based on qualitative factors. Certain smaller-balance
wholesale exposures, such as small business loans, may be assessed based on delinquency due to resource
constraints and the smaller-balance nature of these exposures; however, large-balance, complex
exposures (eg, large commercial real estate loans) are generally assessed on a sample basis based on
qualitative and quantitative considerations.
The Special Mention category is used as an early warning indicator of assets that might
migrate to the Substandard category. Special Mention assets exhibit potential weaknesses (as opposed
to “well defined weaknesses” for Substandard) that deserve bank management’s close attention. In
general, US regulators monitor both the volume of “adversely classified assets” and trends in Special
Mention exposures to identify both known and prospective weaknesses in asset quality.
Treatment of multiple loans granted to the same borrower and NPA exit criteria
As a general principle, the US does not automatically require uniform regulatory treatment of
multiple credit extensions granted to the same borrower. Thus, if one loan meets the criteria for non-
accrual status, the bank is required to evaluate other loans granted to the same borrower to determine
their status, based on the individual asset’s collectability and repayment ability. A similar approach is
followed for a group of connected borrowers belonging to the same group.
While there are no explicit regulatory requirements prescribed to exit the NPA category,
US authorities have outlined criteria to exit non-accrual status, which is an important component
of NPAs. Non-accrual assets can be restored to accrual status when: all past-due P&I is paid and the bank
expects repayment of remaining P&I; or when the asset otherwise becomes well secured and in the process
of collection.
NPA measurement
The US provisioning framework is based on applicable accounting standards. The starting point for
the formulation of credit loss provisions is based on the US GAAP on accounting for impairment and loss
contingencies, primarily the Accounting Standards Codification 450 (ASC 450) and Accounting Standards
Codification 310 (ASC 310). In general, ASC 310 deals with loans individually evaluated for impairment and
ASC 450 covers loss contingencies inherent in the rest of the loan portfolio. 92 Both of these estimates are
factored into the allowance for loan and lease losses.
91
In general, this policy specifies that open- and closed-end retail loans 90 days or more past due should be classified as
Substandard, while closed-end retail loans 120 days or more past due and open-end retail loans 180 days or more past due
should be classified Loss and charged off. Retail home mortgage loans that are 90 days or more past due and have an LTV of
less than 60% are generally not classified based solely on delinquency. For open- and closed-end loans secured by real estate,
an assessment of value should be made no later than 180 days past due, with any loan balance that is in excess of the property
value – less costs to sell – classified as Loss and charged off.
92
Under ASC 310, an individual loan is impaired when, based on current information, it is probable that a creditor will be unable
to collect the amount due according to the terms of the loan agreement. All other loans, including loans that are individually
evaluated but determined not to be impaired under ASC 310, should be included in a group of loans that is evaluated for
impairment under ASC 450. ASC 450 requires the recognition of a provision when information as of the balance sheet reporting
date suggests that it is probable and the loss can be reasonably estimated, even if the particular loans that are uncollectible
may not be identifiable (but may be, if viewed on a collective basis).

Nevertheless, the application of accounting standards is augmented with regulatory
guidance – based on the 2006 inter-agency policy statement on the allowance for loan and lease
losses (ALLL) – although the guidance remains within the confines of US GAAP. Under the ALLL
guidance, US regulators set expectations for the bank’s Board and its senior management to maintain an
adequate ALLL and to develop an appropriate ALLL methodology. The guidance also prompts banks to
consider various qualitative factors in estimating credit losses, including, but not limited to, changes in:
lending policies and procedures; international and domestic conditions; the experience of lending staff;
the levels of credit concentrations; the volume and severity of adversely classified assets; the quality of
collateral; and the quality of an institution’s loan review system.
Provisions are recognised through the P&L. Supervisory guidance is still considered within the
confines of US GAAP and thus, P&L recognition is considered appropriate.

Following US GAAP rules, US regulators allow collateral to be considered in determining the
amount of provisions required to absorb incurred and probable losses. In the US context, collateral is
viewed as a loss mitigant but has no bearing on assessing a borrower’s repayment capacity. Given the
close linkages between provisioning levels and collateral values – particularly for NPAs when collateral
becomes the primary repayment source – US regulators have issued detailed supervisory guidance on the
prudent valuation of real estate collateral.
Supervisory expectations for the prudent valuation of real estate collateral are set out in
the inter-agency appraisal and evaluation guidelines. In general, all loans secured by real estate in
excess of USD 250,000 are subject to the inter-agency appraisal guidelines. 93 Among other things, the
appraisal guidelines require an institution’s board to establish an effective real estate appraisal and
evaluation programme. The programme should address appraiser (and reviewer) independence, selection
and ongoing monitoring criteria of appraisers, the criteria for the content and appropriate use of
evaluations consistent with safe and sound practices, and criteria for reviewing and monitoring collateral
values (ie methods, assumptions, data sources and conclusions).
Under their appraisal regulations, the US agencies have the authority to require an
institution to obtain an appraisal or evaluation when there are safety and soundness concerns on
an existing real estate secured credit. Therefore, an institution should be able to demonstrate that
sufficient information is available to support the current market value of the collateral and the classification
of a problem real estate credit. When such information is not available, a supervisor may direct an
institution to obtain a new appraisal or evaluation in order to have sufficient information to understand
the current market value of the collateral.
Once collateral is foreclosed upon by the bank (“foreclosed collateral”), it is subject to fair
value guidelines under applicable accounting standards. On the date of acquisition, foreclosed real
estate assets are required to be recorded at their “fair value”, 94 less estimated costs to sell, based on the
appraised value of the collateral. While foreclosed collateral is generally exempt from the US agencies’
appraisal guidelines, the bank is still required to obtain an “appropriate evaluation” of the asset that is
consistent with safe and sound practices.
93
Business loans with a transaction value of USD 1 million or less when the sale of, or rental income derived from, real estate is
not the primary source of repayment are also exempt from this standard.
94
Fair value is the amount the creditor should reasonably expect to receive in an arm’s length sale between a willing buyer and
a willing seller.

Once established, the “fair value” becomes the cost of the foreclosed asset 95 and the
ongoing measurement of the asset is based on the lower of the cost or its fair value. In effect, this
requirement ensures that banks cannot recognise any gains in the P&L from appreciated foreclosed assets
until the asset is actually sold.
While the US agencies do not impose any time-bound write-down requirements for
foreclosed collateral, national banks are subject to maximum holding periods for foreclosed
collateral. In general, national banks must dispose of foreclosed collateral within five years, unless an
extension is granted by the national bank regulator. 96 Some US states require foreclosed assets to be
written down on a scheduled basis or to be written off at the end of a specified period.

US regulators have powers to place loans on non-accrual status 97 and once designated, banks are
required to stop accruing interest income on all such assets and to reverse previously accrued but
uncollected interest income. These dual requirements – to the extent that problem assets are placed in
non-accrual status in a timely manner – increase the likelihood that both the net interest income line item
and net income are not overstated. On the other hand, the timing of when a loan is placed on non-accrual
status can vary across institutions because judgment is involved.
In cases where cash interest payments are received on a non-accrual asset, banks cannot
automatically recognise such payments in the P&L statement. Cash interest payments received on an
asset placed on non-accrual status can only be recognised in the P&L if the carrying value of the assets is
deemed to be fully collectible. When sufficient doubt exists as to the collectability of the carrying value of
the asset, banks are required to apply any cash payments received to reduce the recorded investment of
the asset. Such a requirement – if appropriately applied – adds an additional layer of conservatism that
empowers bank risk managers and supervisors to use cash interest payments to write down an asset’s
carrying value as opposed to booking interest income.
An asset can be restored to accrual status when the loan is no longer past due and the bank
expects repayment of both the remaining principal and interest or when the loan otherwise
becomes well secured and in the process of collection. It is possible for borrowers’ financial condition
to improve through a modification of lending terms. To guard against a premature exit from a non-accrual
designation due solely to liberal debt restructurings, banks are required to maintain well supported
documentation of the borrower’s financial condition and prospects for principal and interest repayment
under the new terms, including a sustained period of repayment of at least six months of cash payments.
Loan write-offs
In general, when a loan is classified as Loss under the US regulatory classification system, banks are
required to promptly write off the asset. Loss assets are generally considered uncollectible and of such
limited value that their designation as a bankable asset is no longer warranted. In general, Loss assets are
required to be charged off within the period in which the loss was recognised (which generally means the
loan should be written off within the same month or quarter it is identified as Loss).
95
Any excess of the recorded amount of the loan over the recorded “fair value” of the foreclosed asset is recorded as a charge
to the allowance for loan and lease losses (ie the excess reduces the provisions held and may or may not result in a provision
expense depending upon the amount of provisions available to absorb such excess).
96
The national bank regulator is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which can grant multiple extensions which,
collectively, cannot exceed an additional five years.
97
Non-accrual loans typically trigger classification in at least the Substandard category or worse.

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Financial Stability

The identification and

ISSN 2522-2481 (print)

Section 1 – Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 3

Section 2 – Accounting and prudential frameworks for problem assets .................................................................... 5

Section 3 – NPA identification and measurement practices in selected jurisdictions ......................................... 10

Section 4 – Implications for policy ............................................................................................................................................22

Section 5 – Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................................................26

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 1

2 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 3

4 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 5

Accounting frameworks related to NPA identification

6 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

US GAAP (until 2019) – incurred US GAAP (starting in Q1 2020)

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 7

Measurement of expected credit losses

IAS 39 Unimpaired loans Impaired loans

IFRS 9 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

8 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

Accrual of interest income on impaired exposures

BCBS guidelines on the treatment of problem assets

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 9

Section 3 – NPA identification and measurement practices in selected

10 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

NPA definition: entry and exit criteria

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 11

The role of asset classification frameworks in NPA identification

12 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

Number of countries Framework Risk Pass / Special Substandard Doubtful Loss

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 13

14 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 15

16 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

Role of collateral in provisioning and treatment of foreclosed collateral

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 17

18 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

Treatment of accrued interest income on NPAs

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 19

Yes, in all cases (%)

20 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

Example of write-off Table 5

Balance sheet items/ratios Bank A (before write-off) Bank A (after write-off)

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 21

Section 4 – Implications for policy

NPA identification – policy considerations

22 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 23

24 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 25

26 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison 27

28 The identification and measurement of non-performing assets: a cross-country comparison

NPA identification and measurement practices in Asia 58

NPA definition and role of asset classification frameworks in NPA identification

Mapping regulatory classification regimes in Asia 60 to NPAs (conceptual

Number of Regulatory Classification categories