Cecilio de La Cruz and Eustaquia Devis de La Cruz vs. Manuel Jesus de La Cruz Facts
Cecilio de La Cruz and Eustaquia Devis de La Cruz vs. Manuel Jesus de La Cruz Facts
Cecilio de La Cruz and Eustaquia Devis de La Cruz vs. Manuel Jesus de La Cruz Facts
CECILIO DE LA CRUZ and EUSTAQUIA DEVIS DE LA CRUZ vs. MANUEL JESUS DE LA CRUZ
FACTS:
The adoptive parents appealed from the order of the CFI of Pangasinan dismissing the petition for
revocation of the adoption of Manuel J. (Aquino) de la Cruz in accordance with Article 348 of the Civil Code.
On August 16, 1954, the minor Manuel J. Aquino was declared by the CFI of Ilocus Sur the legally adopted
child of the spouses Cecilio de la Cruz and Eustaquia Devis de la Cruz. Seven years later, the adopting parents filed
a petition before the CFI Pangasinan to revoke the decree of adoption on the ground that the adopted minor had
definitely repudiated the adoption by open display of defiance, animosity, revulsion and disobedience to
petitioners and had for more than three years abandoned petitioners' home by living with his natural mother,
Felicidad Dasalla, in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur.
The counsel for the minor filed a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) the court
lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof; (2) the Court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the adopted minor; (3) venue was improperly laid; and (4) the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. It was granted contending that the expediente in said Case No. 1041 is still, presumably, open for
the herein petitioners to come in and ask for the revocation of the decree of adoption and that it had no power to
interfere with the judgment of another court of coordinate jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue on revocation of adoption was properly filed by the Spouses de la Cruz.
RULING:
Yes.
The Rules of Court designate the venue of proceeding for adoption, which is the place where the
petitioner resides (Section 1, Rule 99), but is silent with respect to the venue of proceeding for rescission and
revocation of adoption (Rule 100). It is clear that the two proceedings are separate and distinct from each other. In
the first what is determined is the propriety of establishing the relationship of parent and child between two
persons not so related by nature. For that purpose the court inquires into the qualifications and disqualifications
of the adopter; the personal circumstances of the person to be adopted; the probable value and character of his
estate; the other proceeding either the adopting parent or the adopted seeks to severe the relationship previously
established, and the inquiry refers to the truth of the grounds upon which the revocation is sought. Once the
proper court has granted a petition for adoption and the decree has become final the proceeding is terminated
and closed. A subsequent petition for revocation of the adoption is neither a continuation of nor an incident in the
proceeding for adoption. It is an entirely new one, dependent on facts which have happened since the decree of
adoption.
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The venue of this new case, applying Rule 99 in a suppletory character, is also the place of the residence of
the petitioner. In the present instance petitioners reside in Pangasinan, having moved there from their former
residence in Ilocos Sur.
ISABELITA S. LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM")
FACTS:
The spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support
of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order
granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses
for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo"
to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City alleging
that despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo
to Lahom, that respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein
petitioner and that in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner.
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption.
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions
of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.
The trial court dismissed the petition. Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not
adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the
case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can file the petition for revocation of adoption.
RULING:
No.
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It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the
adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition
that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a
"right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by
statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter
to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by
statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism
that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from
severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
FACTS:
An optometrist by profession, Monina is married to Primo Lim who are childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. Monina and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). However Primo Lim died. Thereafter, Monina decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. Monina then filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption. Michael also gave his consent to his
adoption. Moninas husband Olario likewise consented for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. In the
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Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an
abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.
The RTC court dismissed the petitions and ruled that since Monina had remarried, petitioner should have
filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the
wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
RULING:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to
affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other,
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the
ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children
to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not
the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must
comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for
civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
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Distinguish: Writ of habeas Corpus vs. Writ of Habeas Data vs. Writ of Amparo
Writ of Habeas Corpus- All cases of illegal confinement and detention which any person is deprived of
his liberty; or rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled. Actual violation before writ
issues. Note Villavicencio v. Lukban on applicability of the writ in case of constructive restraint.
Writ of Habeas Data- Involves the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party and covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Writ of Amparo- Involves right to life, liberty and security violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee or a private individual or entity. It covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
B) Limitations:
Writ of Habeas Corpus- May be suspended in cases of invasion or rebellion when public safety requires it. (Consti.
Art. III Sec. 15)
Writ of Habeas Data- Shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights (RWD Sec. 23)
Writ of Amparo- Shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights (RWA Sec. 24)
May be filed: By a petition signed and verified; by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person on
his behalf.
May be granted: SC or any member thereof, on any day and at any time; CA or any member thereof in instances
authorized by law; RTC or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, enforceable only within his judicial district;
and MTC OR FIRST LEVEL COURTS in the absence of RTC judges in a judicial region (section 35 BP 129)
By: Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the WHD. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by (also successive): a. Any member of the immediate family of the
aggrieved; b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the 4th civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
Petition may be filed with: RTC where the petitioner or respondent resides or that which has jurisdiction over the
place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of petitioner. If public data files
of government offices, petition shall be filed with the SC, CA, or SB (RWD Sec. 3)
Writ of Amparo-
By: the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order: a. Any member of the
immediate family; b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved within the 4th civil degree
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of consanguinity or affinity; c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution. Filing by the
aggrieved or representative suspends the right of all others (RWA Sec. 2)
Filed on any day and at any time: SB, CA, SC, or any justice of such courts; RTC of place where the threat, act, or
omission was committed or any element occurred.
Enforceable: If SC or CA issued, anywhere in the Philippines; If granted by the RTC or judge thereof, it is
enforceable in any part of the judicial region (Section 21, BP 129 which modified the term judicial district in
Section 2, Rule 102 into judicial region) where the judge sits.
Returnable: If the one that granted the writ: Is the SC or CA, or a member thereof, returnable before such court or
any member thereof; or an RTC; An RTC, or a judge thereof, returnable before himself.
Returnable: If issued by: The SC or any of its justices, before such Court or any justice thereof, or CA or SB or any
of its justices, or the RTC of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides / has jurisdiction over the place
where the data or information is gathered, stored or collected. The CA or SB or any of its justices, before such
court or any justice thereof, or the RTC (same with scenario: SC issued and then returned in RTC). RTC, returnable
before such court or judge
Writ of Amparo-
Returnable: If the one that granted the writ: SC or any of its justices: before such court or any justice thereof, or
before the SB or CA or any of their justices, or to any RTC of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred. The SB or CA or any of their justices, before such court or any justice
thereof, or to any RTC of the place where the threat, act, or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred. RTC, returnable before such court or judge.
E) Docket Fees
Writ of Habeas Corpus- upon the final disposition of such proceedings the court or judge shall make such order as
to costs as the case requires.
Writ of Habeas Data- None for indigent petitioner. Petition shall be docketed and acted upon immediately, w/o
prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than 15 days from filing.
Writ of Amparo- NONE absolutely. Petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees. Court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately.
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F) Essential allegations/ Contents of petition
Signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended or by some person on his behalf, setting
forth:
*The person in whose behalf whose the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty
*Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information
*The location of the files, registers, or databases, the government office, and the person in charge or control
Writ of Amparo-
*The right to life, liberty, and security violated or threatened with violation,
*May include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs
G) When proper
Court or judge must, when a petition is presented and it appears that it ought to issue,
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>the clerk of court (CoC) shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or
>in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may depute any officer or person to
serve it (102.5)
Also proper to be issued when the court or judge has examined into the cause of restraint of the prisoner, and is
satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned
Upon filing of the petition, the court, justice, or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face
it ought to issue.
>CoC shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within 3 days from issuance; or
>In case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize
any officer or person to serve it
Writ of Amparo-
Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice, or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its
face it ought to issue
>CoC shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or
>In case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand,
Writ may be served in any province by the (a) sheriff, (b) other proper officer, or (c) or person deputed by the court
or judge
Service is made by leaving the original with the person to whom it is directed and preserving a copy on which to
make return of service (personal service)
If that person cannot be found, or has not the prisoner in his custody, service shall be made on any other person
having or exercising such custody (substituted service)
*by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service
In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
Writ of Amparo-
*by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service
In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
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Discuss the rule on custody of minors in relation to habeas corpus (AM- 03-04-04)
The governing rule for petitions for custody of minors and writs of habeas corpus in relation thereto is A.M.
03-04-04-SC, while the Rules of Court applies suppletorily.
Any person claiming such right to the custody of a minor may file such petition.
The petition is filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides, or where the
minor may be found
As to Motion to Dismiss, the general rule is the respondent cannot file a motion to dismiss except lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Other grounds for dismissal may be
raised as affirmative defense in the answer.
The Answer must be personally verified by the respondent and filed within 5 days after service of summons
and a copy of the petition.
The Court may order a social worker to make a case study of the minor and the parties and submit a report
and recommendation to the court at least 3 days before the scheduled pre-trial.
Mandatory pre-trial notice is given within 15 days after the filing of answer or expiration of the period to file
answer.
The order of pre-trial must contain (1) fixing a date for pre-trial conference, (2) directing the parties to file and
serve their pre-trial briefs, (3) requiring the respondent to present the minor before the court.
If the petitioner fails to appear personally at the pre-trial, the case shall be dismissed. Unless his counsel or a
duly authorized representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the
petitioner.
If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear at the pre-trial, the petitioner shall be allowed to
present his evidence ex parte. The court shall then render judgment on the basis of the pleadings and the
evidence thus presented.
During the pre-trial, the parties may agree on the custody of the minor. If the parties fail to agree, the court
may refer the matter to a mediator who has 5 days to effect an agreement. If the issue is not settled through
mediation, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference.
Provisional Orders under the Rules are Temporary custody, Temporary visitation rights, Hold departure order,
Protection Order, Support Pendente Lite
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In provisional order awarding custody, the order of preference are (i) both parents jointly, (ii) either parent, (iii)
grandparents, (iv)eldest brother or sister over 21 years of age,(v) Any other person or institution the court may
deem suitable
In awarding custody, the court considers (1) Best interest of the minor, (2) Material and moral welfare of the
minor
General rule – Court shall provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to the
non-custodial parents. Except when court finds said parent/s unfit or disqualified.
General rule – Minor child subject of the petition shall not be brought out of the country while the petition is
pending except with prior order of the court
Court can issue ex parte hold departure order motu proprio, or upon application under oath
The petition for writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors is filed with the Family Courts, Regular
Courts in places where there are no Family Courts, Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members.
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