Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de

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260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de


Paris

*
G.R. No. 151242. June 15, 2005.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE


PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE CORPORATION and AUTO-1
CORP, petitioners, vs. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS,
respondent.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Jurisdictions; Docket Fees; It


is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the
action.—1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period; 2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; 3. Where the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and


resolution of the Court of Appeals.

_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
1 The petition names the Court of Appeals as a respondent. However,
under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the lower court need not be
impleaded in petitions for review. Hence, the Court deleted it from the
title.

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Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     Purita Hontanosas-Cortes for petitioners.
     Agcaoili & Associates for Banque Nationale de Paris.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

It appears that sometime in 1995, petitioner Proton


Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed of the credit
facilities of herein respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris
(BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-
petitioners Automotive Corporation Philippines
(Automotive), Asea One Corporation (Asea) and Autocorp 2
Group (Autocorp) executed a corporate guarantee to the
extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently
entered3
into three trust 4 receipt agreements 5 dated June 4,
1996, January 14, 1997, and April 24, 1997.
Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton
would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold
them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the
vehicles subject to the condition that it would deliver the
proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations
to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return
them to BNP, together with all the accompanying
documents of title.
Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the
sale and return the unsold motor vehicles.
Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded
from Automotive, Asea and 6Autocorp the payment of the
amount of US$1,544,984.40 representing Proton’s total
outstanding

_______________

2 Records at pp. 18-22.


3 Id., at pp. 12-13.
4 Id., at pp. 14-15.
5 Id., at pp. 16-17.
6 According to respondent BNP, Proton failed to remit (1) the amount of
US$ 844,674.07 under the trust receipt agreement dated June 4, 1996, (2)
the amount of US$171,120.53 under the trust re

262

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

obligations. These guarantors refused to pay, however.


Hence, BNP filed on September 7, 1998 before the Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint against petitioners
praying that they be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40
plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid and (2) an
amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from petitioners
as attorney’s fees.
The Makati RTC Clerk of Court7
assessed the docket fees
which BNP8
paid at P352,116.30 which was computed as
follows:

First Cause of Action — $ 844,674.07


Second Cause of Action — 171,120.53
Third Cause of Action — 529,189.80
    $1,544,984.40
5% as Attorney’s Fees — $ 77,249.22
TOTAL …………..   $1,622,233.62
Conversion rate to peso   x 43
TOTAL …………..   P69,756,000.00
    (roundoff)

Computation based on Rule 141:


 
COURT JDF
P 69,756,000.00 P 69.606.000.00
- 150,000.00 x .003
69,606,000.00 208,818.00
x .002 + 450.00
139,212.00 P 209,268.00
+ 150.00  
P 139,362.00  

_______________

ceipt agreement dated January 14, 1997, and (3) the amount of
US$529,189.80 under the trust agreement dated April 24, 1997. These
amounts are inclusive of interest and other related charges accruing
thereon as of August 15, 1998. However, the complaint does not provide a
breakdown as to which amounts comprise the respective principal and
interest of each of the three trust receipt agreements.
7 Records at p. 24.
8 Id., at p. 89.

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Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
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LEGAL : P139,362.00
  + 209,268.00
  P348,630.00 x 1% = P3,486.30
P 139,362.00  
+ 209,268.00  
3,486.00  
P 352,116.30—Total fees paid by the plaintiff

To the complaint, the defendants-herein9


petitioners filed on
October 12, 1998 a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees to thus prevent 10
the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
As additional ground, petitioners raised prematurity of the
complaint,
11
BNP not having priorly sent any demand
letter. 12
By Order of August 3, 1999, Branch 148 of the Makati
RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, viz.:

“Resolving the first ground relied upon by the defendant, this


court believes and so hold that the docket fees were properly paid.
It is the Office of the Clerk of Court of this station that computes
the correct docket fees, and it is their duty to assess the docket
fees correctly, which they did.
Even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not properly
paid, the court cannot just dismiss the case. The Court has not yet
ordered (and it will not in this case) to pay the correct docket fees,
thus the Motion to dismiss is premature, aside from being without
any legal basis.
As held in the case of National Steel Corporation vs. CA, G.R.
No. 123215, February 2, 1999, the Supreme Court said:

xxx
‘Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff

_______________

9 Id., at pp. 124-126.


10 Id., at pp. 124-125.
11 Id., at pp. 125-126.
12 Id., at pp. 145-146.

264

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de Paris

in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time within the


expiration of applicable prescription or reglementary period. If the
plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should
timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in
estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between appropriate docket fees
and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien or
(sic) any award he may obtain in his favor.’

As to the second ground relied upon by the defendants, in that


a review of all annexes to the complaint of the plaintiff reveals
that there is not a single formal demand letter for defendants to
fulfill the terms and conditions of the three (3) trust agreements.
In this regard, the court cannot sustain the submission of
defendant. As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, failure to
make a formal demand for the debtor to pay the plaintiff is not
among the legal grounds for the dismissal of the case. Anyway, in
the appreciation of the court, this is simply evidentiary.
xxx
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to13 Dismiss
interposed by the defendants is hereby DENIED.” (Italics
supplied)
14
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial
of their Motion15 to Dismiss, but it was denied by the trial
court by Order of October 3, 2000.
Petitioners
16
thereupon brought the case on certiorari and
17
mandamus to the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of
July 25, 2001, denied it in this wise:
. . . Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court excludes interest
accruing from the principal amount being claimed in the pleading
in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. The complaint was
submitted for the computation of the filing fee to the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City which

_______________

13 Ibid.
14 Id., at pp. 147-152.
15 Id., at pp. 170-174.
16 Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo at pp. 2-148.
17 Id., at pp. 186-189.

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VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 265


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de Paris

made an assessment that respondent paid accordingly. What the


Office of the Clerk of Court did and the ruling of the respondent
Judge find support in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ng
Soon vs. Alday and Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte. In
the latter case, the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that “where
the action is purely for recovery of money or damages, the docket
fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs.”
Assuming arguendo that the correct filing fees was not made,
the rule is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the
payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon
such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
cognizance of the action unless in the meantime prescription has
set in and consequently barred the right of action. Here
respondent Judge did not make any finding, and rightly so, that
the filing fee paid by private respondent was insufficient.
On the issue of the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange, the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati pegged it at P
43.21 to US$1. In the absence of any office guide of the rate of
exchange which said court functionary was duty bound to follow,
the rate he applied is presumptively correct.
Respondent Judge correctly ruled that the matter of demand
letter is evidentiary and does not form part of the required
allegations in a complaint. Section 1, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure pertinently provides:

“Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,


concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitted the
statement of mere evidentiary facts.”
Judging from the allegations of the complaint particularly
paragraphs 6, 12, 18, and 23 where allegations of imputed
demands were made upon the defendants to fulfill their respective
obligations, annexing the demand letters for the purpose of
putting up a sufficient cause of action is not required.

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266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

In fine, respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion


amounting to lack
18
or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari
and mandamus. (Italics supplied)
19
Their Motion for Reconsideration
20
having been denied by
the Court of Appeals, 21petitioners filed the present petition
for review on certiorari and pray for the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully


prayed of this Honorable Court to grant the instant petition by
REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the questioned Decision of
July 25, 2001 and the Resolution of December 18, 2001 for being
contrary to law, to Administrative Circular No. 11-94 and
Circular No. 7 and instead direct the court a quo to require
Private Respondent Banque to pay the correct docket fee
pursuant to the correct exchange rate of the dollar to the peso on
September 7, 1998 and to quantify its claims for interests on the
principal obligations in the first, second and third causes
22
of
actions in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 98-2180. (Italics
supplied)
23
Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94, petitioners
argue that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees as the
said circular provides that in the assessment thereof,
interest claimed should be included. There being an
underpayment of the docket fees, petitioners conclude, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Additionally, petitioners point out that the clerk of
court, in converting BNP’s claims from US dollars to
Philippine pesos, applied the wrong exchange rate of US $1
= P43.00, the exchange rate on September 7, 1998 when
the complaint was filed having been pegged at US $1 =
P43.21. Thus, by peti-

_______________

18 Id., at pp. 188-189.


19 Id., at pp. 196-201.
20 Id., at p. 212.
21 Rollo at pp. 13-245.
22 Id., at p. 27.
23 Effective August 1, 1994.

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Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
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tioners’ computation, BNP’s 24claim as of August 15, 1998


was actually P70,096,714.72, not P69,756,045.66.
Furthermore, petitioners 25submit that pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular No. 7, the complaint should have
been dismissed for failure to specify the amount of interest
in the prayer.
Circular No. 7 reads:

TO: JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE


COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS, SHARI’A DISTRICT COURTS;
AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SOUGHT NOT
ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADING,
BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER
TO BE ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR
FILING. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO
SPECIF IED IN THE COMPLAINT SHALL
BE THE BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE
AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.

In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, No.


L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562, this Court condemned the
practice of counsel who in filing the original complaint omitted
from the prayer any specification of the amount of damages
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of
the complaint. This Court observed that “(T)his is clearly intended
for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of
the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when,
even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed
an amended complaint, deleting

_______________

24 This figure was arrived at by multiplying 43.21 with 1,622,233.62.


25 Dated March 24, 1988.

268

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de Paris

all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body
of the complaint. x x x”
For the guidance of all concerned, the WARNING given by the
court in the afore-cited case is reproduced hereunder:

“The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a
repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions,
answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case (115 SCRA 193) in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.”

Strict compliance with this Circular is hereby enjoined.


Let this be circularized to all the courts hereinabove named
and to the President and Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, which is hereby directed to disseminate
this Circular to all its members.
March 24, 1988.
(Sgd). CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE
Chief Justice
(Emphasis and italics supplied)

On the other hand, respondent maintains that it had paid


the filing fee which was assessed by the clerk of court, and
that there was no violation of Supreme Court Circular No.
7 because the amount of damages was clearly specified in
the prayer, to wit:
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Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

2. On the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION—


(c) Defendant PROTON be ordered to pay the sum of (i) US
DOLLARS EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR AND SEVEN CENTS (US$
844,674.07), plus accrued interests and other related charges
thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998, until fully paid; and (ii)
an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from said Defendant,
as and for attorney’s fees;
3. On the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION—
(d) Defendant PROTON be ordered to pay the sum of (i) US
DOLLARS ONE HUNDRED TWENTY AND FIFTY THREE
CENTS (US$171,120.53), plus accrued interests and other related
charges thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid;
and (ii) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from said
Defendant, as and for attorney’s fees;
4. On the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION—
(e) Defendant PROTON be ordered to pay the sum of (i) US
DOLLARS FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE AND EIGHTY CENTS
(US$529,189.80), plus accrued interests and other related charges
thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid; and (ii) an
amount equivalent to 5% or all sums due from said Defendant, as
and for attorney’s fees;
5. On ALL THE CAUSES OF ACTION—
Defendants AUTOMOTIVE CORPORATION PHILIPPINES,
ASEA ONE CORPORATION and AUTOCORP GROUP to be
ordered to pay Plaintiff BNP the aggregate sum of (i) US
DOLLARS ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR AND FORTY
CENTS (US$1,544,984.40) (First through Third Causes of Action),
plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid; and (ii) an amount
equivalent to 5%26
of all sums due from said Defendants, as and for
attorney’s fees.

_______________

26 Records at pp. 9-10.

270
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

Moreover, respondent posits that the amount of


US$1,544,984.40 represents not only the principal but also
interest and other related charges which had accrued as of
August 15, 1998. Respondent goes even further by
suggesting that in light 27
of Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of
Tagum, Davao del Norte where the Supreme Court held,

Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages,


the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate 28
amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.
(Emphasis and italics supplied),

it made an overpayment.

When Tacay was decided in 1989, the pertinent rule


applicable was Section 5 (a) of Rule 141 which provided for
the following:

SEC. 5. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—(a) For filing an action


or proceeding, or a permissive counter-claim or cross-claim not
arising out of the same transaction subject of the complaint, a
third-party complaint and a complaint in intervention and for all
services in the same, if the sum claimed, exclusive of interest,
of the value of the property in litigation, or the value of
the estate, is:

1. Less than P 5,000.00 ...................................................... P


32.00
2. P5,000.00 or more but less than P 10,000.00 48.00
....................
3. P10,000.00 or more but less than P 20,000.00 64.00
..................
4. P20,000.00 or more but less than P 40,000.00 80.00
..................
5. P40,000.00 or more but less than P 60,000.00 120.00
..................
6. P60,000.00 or more but less than P 80,000.00 160.00
...................
7. P80,000.00 or more but less than P150,000.00 200.00
..................
8. And for each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 4.00
............
9. When the value of the case cannot be estimated 400.00
..............
10. When the case does not concern property 64.00
(naturalization, adoption, legal separation, etc.)
......................................................

_______________

27 180 SCRA 433 (1989).


28 Id., at p. 443.

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Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
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11. In forcible entry and illegal detainer cases appealed


from inferior courts
.............................................................................................. 40.00

If the case concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof shall
be considered in computing the fees.
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed
is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fees shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.

When the complaint in this case was filed in 1998,


however, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, Rule 141
29
had been amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94
which provides:

_______________

29 It should be noted however that Rule 141 has been further amended
by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC which took effect on March 1, 2000. Thus,
Sections 7 and 8 now read:
Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim
against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a
third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention,
and for all clerical services in the same, if the total sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in
litigation, is:

1. Less than P100,000.00 .................................................... P 500.00


2. P100,000.00, or more but less than P150,000.00 ........... 800.00
3. P150,000.00 or more but less than P200,000.00 ............ 1,000.00
4. P200,000.00 or more but less than P250,000.00 ............ 1,500.00
5. P250,000.00 or more but less than P300,000.00 ............ 1,750.00
6. P300,000.00 or more but less than P350,000.00 ............ 2,000.00
7. P350,000.00 or more but less than P400,000.00 ............ 2,250.00
8. For each P1,000.00 in excess of P400,000.00 .................. 10.00

xxx
Sec. 8. Clerks of Courts of the First Level.—
(a) For each civil action or proceeding, whether the value of the subject
matter involved, or the amount of the demand, inclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses,
and costs is:

272

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

BY RESOLUTION OF THE COURT, DATED JUNE 28, 1994,


PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 (5) OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION, RULE 141, SECTION 7 (a) AND (d), and
SECTION 8 (a) and (b) OF THE RULES OF COURT ARE
HEREBY AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

RULE 141
LEGAL FEES
xxx

Sec. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts


(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money
claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with
leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a
complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same,
if the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Not more than P100,000.00 P


............................................ 400.00
2. P100,000.00, or more but not more than P150,000.00 600.00
...
3. For each P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 5.00
..................

xxx
Sec. 8. Clerks of Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts
(a) For each civil action or proceeding, where the value of the
subject matter involved, or the amount of the demand,
inclusive of interest, damages or whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, is:
1. Not more than P20,000.00 P120.00
................................................
2. More than P20,000.00 but not more than 400.00
P100,000.00 ..
3. More than P100,000.00 but not more than 850.00
P200,000.00

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

_______________

1. Not more than P20,000.00 ............................................... P150.00


2. More than P20,000.00 but not more than P 100,000.00 500.00
3. More than P100,000.00 but not more than P200,000.00 1,250.00
4. More than P200,000.00 but not more than P300,000.00 1,750.00
5. More than P300,000.00 but not more than P400,000.00 2,500.00

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Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
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The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee
by taking into consideration “the total sum claimed,
inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of
the property in litigation.” Respondent’s and the Court of
Appeals’ reliance then on Tacay was not in order.
Neither was, for the same reason, the Court30 of Appeals’
reliance on the 1989 case of Ng Soon v. Alday, where this
Court held:

. . . The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was


not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix
the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of “the sum
claimed, exclusive of interest.” This clearly implies that the
specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.
Factually, therefore, not everything was left to “guesswork” as
respondent Judge has opined. The sums claimed were
ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant
to Rule 141, section 5(a).
Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent
Judge, the amounts claimed need not be initially stated
with mathematical precision. The same Rule 141, section 31
5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal “more or less.”
Thus:
“In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed
is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.”
In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the
Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be
additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as
the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial
payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount
of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved.

_______________

30 178 SCRA 221 (1989).


31The third paragraph of Section 5(a), Rule 141 was not retained in the
subsequent amendment to Rule 141.

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274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

“. . . there is merit in petitioner's claim that the third paragraph


of Rule 141, Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a situation where
an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint but is less or
more than what is later proved. If what is proved is less than
what was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional
fees will be exacted. Otherwise stated, what is subject to
adjustment is the difference in the fee and not the whole amount”
(Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., et als.,32 vs. Court of Appeals, et
als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989). (Emphasis and italics
supplied)

Respecting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the clerk


of court did not err when he applied the exchange rate of
US $1 = P43.00 “[i]n the absence of any office guide of the
rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty
bound to follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is
presumptively correct,” the same does not lie. The
presumption of regularity of the clerk33of court’s application
34
of the exchange rate is not conclusive. It is disputable. As
such, the presumption
35
may be overturned by the requisite
rebutting evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners36
have
adequately proven with documentary evidence that the
exchange rate when the complaint was filed on September
7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21.
In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were
insufficient.
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in light of the
insufficient docket fees, the same does not lie.
True, in 37Manchester Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, this Court held that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket

_______________

32 Id., at pp. 226-227.


33 Rules of Court, Rule 131, sec. 2.
34 Rules of Court, Rule 131, sec. 3, par. (m).
35 Rules of Court, Rule 131, sec. 3.
36 Records at p. 87.
37 149 SCRA 562 (1987).

275

VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 275


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

38
fees, hence, it concluded that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
It bears emphasis, however, that the ruling in
Manchester was clarified
39
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the
former there was clearly an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees,
whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his
willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as
required.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the


present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on
the government, this Court held that the court a quo did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the
amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the
rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must
have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus
paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court.
It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to
pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was
paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.
This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or
his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in charge should
determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must
require the private respondent to pay the same.

_______________

38 Id., at p. 569.
39 170 SCRA 274 (1989).

276

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate


initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-
party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by
the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified
the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to 40 enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)

The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was echoed in the 200541


case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor:

Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a


jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as
long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, more so when the party involved
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially
paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud
the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
(Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)

_______________

40 Id., at pp. 284-285.


41 G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460.

277

VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 277


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the


assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to
be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court
has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must
pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the
complaint merits dismissal.
Parenthetically, in the complaint, respondent prayed for
“accrued interest . . . subsequent to August 15, 1998 until
fully paid.” The complaint having been filed on September
7, 1998, respondent’s claim includes the interest from
August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee
corresponding to its claim for interest from August 16, 1998
until the filing of the complaint on September 7, 1998. As
priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94, which was
the rule applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint
currently stands, respondent cannot claim the interest
from August 16, 1998 until September 7, 1998, unless
respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint
within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of
interest42petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September
7, 1998 and pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of
the complaint, the same can only be determined after a
final judgment has been handed down. Respondent cannot
thus be made to pay the corresponding docket fee therefor.
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be
made to pay additional fees which shall constitute a lien in
the event the

_______________

42 The clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court will not be able to
determine the interest due for the period from August 16, 1998 to
September 7, 1998 because the complaint does not provide a breakdown of
the principal and interest owed by petitioners as it merely lumps them
into the amount of US$1,544,984.40.

278

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Banque Nationale de
Paris

trial court adjudges that it is entitled to interest accruing


after the filing of the complaint.

Sec. 2. Fees as lien.—Where the court in its final judgment awards


a claim not alleged, or a relief different or more than that claimed
in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees
which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of
said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the
corresponding fees.
43
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in interpreting the
third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of
claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held that
the same refers only to damages arising after the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to
which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.

. . . The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or


before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be
specified. While it is true that the determination of certain
damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound
discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the
court may make a proper determination, and for the proper
assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims
although specified are left for determination of the court is
limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant
44
to specify nor speculate as to the
amount thereof. (Emphasis and italics supplied; citation
omitted)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. The July


25, 2001 Decision and the December 18, 2001 Resolution of
the Court Appeals are hereby MODIFIED. The Clerk of
Court

_______________

43 181 SCRA 687 (1990).


44 Id., at pp. 690-691.

279

VOL. 460, JUNE 15, 2005 279


Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals

of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is ordered to


reassess and determine the docket fees that should be paid
by respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of
this Court, and direct respondent to pay the same within
fifteen (15) days, provided the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the
trial court is ordered to proceed with the case with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,


Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution modified.

Note.—It is a fundamental rule that, in the


determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, shall be controlling. (Vda. De
Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 [2001])
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