Attacking WiFi With Traffic Injection Cedric Blancher

Introduction
Really quick WiFi 101

Attacking WiFi networks
WPA, WPA2 and 802.11i
Conclusion
Bibliography
Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Why open and WEP 802.11 networks really suck
Cédric BLANCHER
[email protected] [email protected]
EADS Corporate Research Center Rstack Team
EADS/CCR/DCR/SSI http://sid.rstack.org/
Ruxcon 2005
Sydney - Australia
2005 October 1-2
http://ruxcon.org.au/
Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
2 Really quick WiFi 101
WiFi injection basics
3 Attacking WiFi networks
Where’s the police - Managing management traffic
Breaking the shell - WEP cracking
All naked - Attacking stations
Let me free - Bypassing captive portals
4 WPA, WPA2 and 802.11i
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
This talk is yet another ”people never learn” story

Goals
WEP is one of the weakest security protocol on earth
WEP is still widely deployed
Open WiFi networks can be found almost anywhere
Things have to change...

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
Of 802.11 traffic injection
Traffic injection is making things even worse

Increases DoS capabilities
Dramaticly increases WEP cracking capabilities
Allows traffic tampering
Allows stations specific attacks
Because attacks considered as theoritical are now practical

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
802.11 keypoints
802.11[IEEE99] is an IEEE wireless communication standard

It’s known as WiFi and is pushed by WiFi Alliance[WIFI] lobby
CSMA/CA based
Infrastructure vs. Ad-hoc
Distribution System (DS)
Management vs. data traffic
Concept of association/authentication

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
802.11 security
Available security schemes are

ESSID cloacking
MAC address filtering
Stations isolation
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy1 )
WPA (WiFi Protected Access)
802.11i/WPA2
The first 4 are weak and/or useless
1
No, it does not stand for Weak Encryption Protocol :)
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Arbitrary frames injection
Very common for wired adapter, not for WiFi

Need appropriate adapter/firmware
Need appropriate driver
802.11 aware library makes things easier
Existing drivers/libs/tools[AIRJ] mostly focused on management
traffic

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Toolkit
Proper adapter and driver for monitor mode raw injection

Hostap[HAP] (patched)
Wlan-ng[WLAN] (patched)
Atheros/Madwifi[MADW] (patched)
Intersil Prism54[PR54] (SVN+patch)
Some others...
Atheros is (imho) currently the best chipset

Introduction
Really quick WiFi 101 Where’s the police - Managing management traffic
Attacking WiFi networks Breaking the shell - WEP cracking
WPA, WPA2 and 802.11i All naked - Attacking stations
Conclusion Let me free - Bypassing captive portals
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Bibliography
Disclaimer :)
All materials described in this talk are for educational and

demonstration purposes only.
DO NOT USE THEM ON OTHERS’ NETWORKS WITHOUT

THEIR AUTHORIZATION
You could break the law and face prosecution...

Introduction
Bibliography
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Bibliography
Management traffic
Tampering
Completely unprotected regulation traffic...

You alter DS current state by tampering management traffic
Reject association requests
Inject disassociation frame
Inject fake associations
Wake up devices in sleep mode
Etc.
Lot of DoSes...

Introduction
Bibliography
Management traffic
Injection
Management traffic is easy to generate and inject

See Scapy[SCAP] packets classes :
Dot11
Dot11Disas
Dot11AssoResp
Dot11ReassoResp
Dot11Deauth
etc.
See Scapy in action[BIO04]

Introduction
Bibliography
Management traffic
Rogue APs (1/2)
Full management traffic support

Beacon frames emission
Answers to assoc/auth requests
Management traffic handling
Forwarding data frames

Introduction
Bibliography
Management traffic
Rogue AP (2/2)
Joker
If you can be an AP, you can

fake one...
Fake AP
Cheap solution for low level
traffic redirection Layer 2 traffic
redirection
Cool attacks against
automatic ”WiFi network
managers”[KARM] Batman
X
Rogue AP is the ”poor man”
attack that works so well
Legitimate AP

Introduction
Bibliography
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
WEP basics
24bits IV 40bits or 104bits WEP key
64bits or 128bits RC4 key
RC4 cipher RC4 PRGA
Auth with RC4

CRC32 ICV RC4 PRGA output
Cleartext message ICV (CRC32)

XOR
802.11 header (inc. IV) Ciphered message

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Attacks overview
Many flaws that can raise attacks possibilities

IV collisions
(Almost) Arbitrary frame injection
Cleartext attacks (e.g. authentication challenge) and
authentication bypass
PRGA2 output/IV couple table construction
Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack (weak IVs attack)
Korek optimization of FMS attack based on solved cases
Korek Chopchop attack
PRGA output/IV and FMS attacks need traffic gathering
2
Pseudo Random Generation Algorithm
Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
IV collisions
First WiFi (in)security paper published in 2000[WAL00]

Key space is 224 whatever WEP key length
More than 99% IV collision after only 12000 frames
Let C and C’ two cleartexts ciphered using the same key K
Key collision info extraction
P = C ⊕ RC 4(IV k K )
′
P = C ′ ⊕ RC 4(IV k K )
⇒ P ⊕ P′ = C ⊕ C ′
RC4 weak keys problem mentionned[RW95]

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Cleartext attack
WEP authentication is vulnerable to cleartext attack

Let C be a cleartext challenge.
PRGA extraction
P = WEP(C k ICV (C ))
= (C k ICV (C )) ⊕ RC 4(IV k K )
⇒ RC 4(IV k K ) = P ⊕ (C k ICV (C ))
Payload header is 8 bytes, C is 128 bytes and ICV(C) is 4 bytes

So we can grab 140 bytes of PRGA output for given IV

Introduction
Bibliography
Authentication bypass
”Your 802.11 Wireless Network Has No Clothes”[ASW01]

Challenge answer computation
P ′ = (C ′ k ICV (C ′ )) ⊕ RC 4(IV k K )
Once one authentication is captured, we can compute any further

answer P’ to challenge C’ using known PRGA output

Introduction
Bibliography
PRGA output/IV tables
For every IV, grab PRGA output

We know how to grab 140 bytes of PRGA output
We can generate traffic with known PRGA output (e.g.
GET / HTTP/1.0)
We can have traffic generated and grab longer PRGA output
(e.g. HTTP reply)
We can end up with a huge PRGA output/IV table (≈25GB)
allowing one to decrypt any packet on the air
We can boost this attack playing with disassociations :)

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Modified frame injection
Let C be our cleartext message and C’ a modification of C

Let Mod = C ⊕ C ′
Arbitrary message constant length modification
P = WEP(C k ICV (C ))
= (C k ICV (C )) ⊕ RC 4(IV k K )
′
P = (C ′ k ICV (C ′ )) ⊕ RC 4(IV k K )
= (C k ICV (C )) ⊕ RC 4(IV k K ) ⊕ (Mod k ICV (Mod))
= P ⊕ (Mod k ICV (Mod))
This means you can inject arbitrary layer 2 consistent WEP frames
and have them decrypted...
Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Arbitrary injection consequences
We can inject arbitrary 802.11 consistent traffic through WEP

without key knowledge
Launch oracle based attacks
Stimulate network in order to create traffic

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack
Article ”Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of

RC4”[FMS01], based on Roos and Wagner work
Weak key = info about internal RC4 state
Weak key + known first bytes of stream = info about K
So, what do we have ?

RC4 key is IVk K and IV is known
C is a 802.11 frame, so we can guess first bytes
We have ”known weak IVs” that provide informations about K and

lead to an effective attack against WEP
Korek added other ”solved cases”[KO04a]
Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Korek Chopchop attack
Arbaugh first published an inductive attack againt WEP[ARB01]

Korek published a similar (reversed) inductive attack[KO04b] with
a PoC called Chopchop
Batman
1 Grab a multicast/broadcast frame

2 Strip the last data byte To = Robin To = Robin
To-DS = 1 From-DS = 1
3 Guess last byte cleartext value
4 Correct frame ICV and reinject
Access Point
5 See if AP forwards the new frame
Robin
Extremely effective on ARP traffic (10-20s per packet).

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
Devine aircrack/aireplay WEP cracking
Using FMS and Korek optimizations, Christophe Devine released

aircrack and aireplay[AIRC]
1 Capture an ARP request, optionnaly decrypted with Chopchop
2 Inject ARP request again and again
3 Stimulate traffic and collect unique IV
4 Crack WEP key with optimized FMS
Full WEP cracking is now a matter of minutes (movie[WWEP])
And aircrack can be optimized...

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
So WEP is weak, but still in France...
Recent poll on french Linux dedicated portal

18% have no security at all
20% rely MAC filtering and/or SSID cloaking only
41% use WEP (64 or 128)
21% use WPA (PSK or EAP)
A recent study in business area ”La Défense” (Paris) show 66% of
wardrivable non-hotspot accesses are not protected...

Introduction
Bibliography
WEP cracking
And in the US ?
Wardriving running Kismet from Chicago downtown to far suburbs

(30 miles) : 1114 APs found
428 open networks (38%)
638 WEP networks (57%)
48 networks announcing WPA and/or WPA2 capabilities (5%)
No comment...

Introduction
Bibliography
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
What about associated stations ?
Associated stations are almost naked

LAN attacks (ARP, DHCP, DNS, etc.)
Traffic interception and tampering
Direct station attacks
Think of personal firewalls exception for local network...

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Station to station traffic prevention (isolation)
Batman
Security feature that blocks traffic Without PSPF

within DS (e.g. Cisco PSPF)
To = Robin
Station sends To-DS frame To = Robin From-DS = 1

To-DS = 1
AP sees it’s destinated to DS Access Point
AP drops the frame Batman
Robin
No From-DS frame, so no
With PSPF
communicationa : stations can’t talk to
each other... To = Robin X
To-DS = 1
a
Does not work between 2 APs linked via Access Point
wired network
Robin

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Isolation bypass with injection
Joker
Joker can inject From-DS frames To = Batman

From-DS = 1
directly
No need for AP benediction Batman
To = Robin
You can spoof about anyone From-DS = 1
You’re still able to sniff traffic

Traffic injection allows complete To = Robin X
To-DS = 1
isolation bypass Access Point
Robin

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Traffic tampering with injection
WiFi communication are just opened on the air

Listen to WiFi traffic
Match interesting requests
Spoof the AP and inject your own answers
Clap clap, you’ve done airpwn-like[AIRP] tool
Only think of injecting nasty stuff in HTTP traffic, just in case
someone would dare to use MSIE on an open WLAN

Introduction
Bibliography
Tampering traffic
Quick demo...
Download Wifiping/Wifidns at
http://sid.rstack.org/index.php/Wifitap_EN
Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Full communication with injection
Sending traffic directly to stations without AP authorization

Allows station to station communication
Allows communicating if AP is out of reach
Allows communication if AP refuses association
A smart way for talking to stations without being associated

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Proof of concept : Wifitap
Needed a PoC for PSPF-like systems bypass and wrote Wifitap

Written in Python[PYTH]
Relies on Scpay[SCAP]
Uses tuntap device and OS IP stack
Use WiFi frame injection and sniffing
Wifitap allows communication with station despite of AP
restrictions

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Wifitap in short
How Wifitap works

Sending traffic Receiving traffic
Read ethernet from tuntap Sniff 802.11 from BSSID
Add 802.11 headers Remove WEP layer if needed
Add BSSID, From-DS and Remove 802.11 headers
WEP Send ethernet through
Inject frame over WiFi tuntap
Attacker does not need to be associated

Introduction
Bibliography
Attacking stations
Quick demo...
Download Wifitap at
Introduction
Bibliography
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Bibliography
Bypassing captive portals

Commercial WiFi hospots
Commercial public Internet access

Captive portal based system
Authentication to billing system through web portal
Authorization for Internet access
Authorization tracking based on MAC and/or IP
It would be nice to be free... For free !

Introduction
Bibliography

MAC based authorization tracking
Batman
Joker
Authorized clients are identified by their

MAC: Batman
MAC address IP: Batman
MAC: Batman
IP: Joker
MAC address is easy to spoof
No MAC layer conflict on WiFi Internet
network Access Point
Just need a different IP
Firewall

Introduction
Bibliography

IP based authorization tracking
Authorized clients are identified by their Traffic
IP address Batman
sorting
Joker
IP address are just a little more

ARP cache
tricky to spoof poisoning on
Batman IP
ARP cache poisoning helps

Internet
redirecting traffic
Access
Traffic redirection allows IP Point
spoofing
See my LSM 2002 talk[BLA02], arp-sk Joker spoofs Batman IP
Firewall
website[ARPS] or MISC3[MISC] All traffic to
Batman IP
goes to Joker

Introduction
Bibliography

MAC+IP addresses based authorization tracking
The smart way for tracking people ? Batman

Traffic
sorting
Previous technic won’t help Joker
because of MAC address checking ARP cache

poisoning on
Batman IP
Send traffic with spoofed MAC
address Internet
Access
ARP cache poisoning and IP Point
spoofing
Hint : IP layer and MAC layer Joker spoofs Batman MAC
_and_ IP
don’t care much about each other Firewall
All traffic to
Batman IP
goes to Joker

Introduction
Bibliography

Hotspots with stations isolation
Some hotspots implement isolation in order to prevent clients from

attacking each other
Does not protect against ”session” hijacking3
Attacker eventually take over victim’s session
Victim does not have access anymore, and still pays for it
And among all, isolation is pretty useless...
3
Side effect : tools like arpspoof won’t work
Introduction
Bibliography

Hotspot with stations isolation bypassing...
Hijacking people authorization is not very kind

Use Wifitap to bypass isolation
Now you can send your poor victim his traffic back
Your victim and you are both able to surf transparently
Now, you ”can be a true gentlemanly [h|cr]acker”[ISCD] ;)

Introduction
Bibliography

Additional tricks
Things that can be tested

HTTP proxy left open on gateway
ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT prevents connections
drop when authorization expires on Linux based systems
Administration network on the same VLAN, accessible
through WiFi
Man in the Middle to relay authentication (Fake AP, ARP
MiM)
DNS based communication[OZY] or tunneling[NSTX]
Misconfigurations tend to be less and less common
Nevertheless, traffic redirection and DNS stuff work :)
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
WPA
Transitional recommandation[WPA] from WiFi Alliance (2003)

extracted from IEEE work for infrastructure networks only
New authentication scheme based on PSK or 802.1x
New key generation and scheduling scheme for keys
New integrity check through SHA1 based MIC with
sequencing
Pretty solid solution that can prevent injection/replay

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
WPA2 and 802.11i
802.11i[IEEE04b] is a standard from IEEE for WiFi security

WPA2[WPA2] is a recommandation from WiFi Alliance based on
802.11i
RSN4 concept : security algorithms negociation
Integrates Ad-Hoc security
Authentication using 802.1x
Ciphering using AES-CCMP
Integrity check using CCMP MIC
Return to the roots and use of a real adapted ciphering solution
4
Robust Security Network
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
WPA/WPA2 using Free Software
Building WPA/WPA2 aware network with free software
Client side SoftAP side

wpa supplicant[WPAS] hostapd[HAPD]
WPA/WPA2/RSN WPA/WPA2/RSN and
supplicant 802.1x[IEEE04a]
Linux, BSD and... authenticator
Win32 :) Linux, BSD

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
WPA/WPA2
Some flaws already ?
Yet some flaws have been discovered regarding WPA/WPA2

security
WPA weak PSK (<20 chars) bruteforce[MOS03]
(movie[WWPA])
Injection of spoofed first handshake message leads to memory
exhaustion[HM04] (DOS)
TEK attack in 2105 instead of 2128 (requires key
knowledge)[MRH04]
Counter-measures abuse (DOS) : traffic replay, dumb traffic
injection
Moreover, nothing will ever protect from layer 1 based DoS attacks
(bandwidth reservation, jamming)
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
So what ?
Although some flaws, WPA provides strong mechanisms for end

users
Good authentication mechanisms if properly used
Real session management
Session key management and re-keying
Real integrity check
Anti-replay, anti-injection mechanisms
WPA2 is even better.

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Conclusion
What we can see
Lots of ISPs provide

wireless/router/modem boxes with WEP
support only
Many WiFi compliant devices only
support WEP (PSP, Zaurus, etc.) out of
the box
Most commercial hotspots are still open
networks...

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Conclusion
What we should see
WiFi environnement are highly insecure and tough to secure

You just can’t cope with amateur style protection...
Then...
Don’t use WEP anymore, it ”has no clothes” at all
Don’t use open networks for public access, use WPA/WPA2a
Migrate to WPA, then WPA2 as soon as possible
a
BTW, RADIUS is far better for AAA
Vendors, journalists, etc. : stop telling people WEP is OK

Manufacturers : provide WPA/WPA2 support out of the box
Maybe ending WEP support would be a good idea...
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Thank you for your attention
Greetings to...
EADS CCR/DCR/SSI team

Rstack.org team
http://www.rstack.org/
MISC Magazine
http://www.miscmag.com/
French Honeynet Project
http://www.frenchhoneynet.org/
Download theses slides from http://sid.rstack.org/

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Agenda
1 Introduction
5 Conclusion
6 Bibliography

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography I
[IEEE04a] IEEE Std 802.1x, Port-Based Network Access

Control, 2004,
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.1X-20
[IEEE99] ANSI/IEEE Std 802.11, Wireless LAN
Medium Access Control and Physical Layer Specifications, 1999,
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-19
[IEEE04b] IEEE Std 802.11i, Medium Access Control Security
Enhancements, 2004,
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11i-2
[WPA] WiFi Protected Access,
http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access_archi

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography II
[WPA2] WiFi Protected Access 2,

http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access.asp
[RW95] A. Roos and D.A. Wagner, Weak keys in RC4,
sci.crypt Usenet newsgroup
[WAL00] J. Walker, Unafe at any key size ; An analysis of
WEP encapsulation, 2000,
http://www.dis.org/wl/pdf/unsafew.pdf
[ASW01] W.A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar and Y.C.J. Wan, Your
802.11 Wireless Network Has No Clothes, 2001,
http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/wireless.pdf

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography III
[FMS01] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin and A. Shamir, Weaknesses in

the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4, 2001,
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/rc4_ksaproc.pdf
[MOS03] R. Moskowitz, Weakness in Passphrase Choice in
WPA Interface, 2003,
http://wifinetnews.com/archives/002452.html
[HM04] C. He and J.C. Mitchell, 1 Message Attack on 4-Way
Handshake, 2004,
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/11-04-0497-00-000i-1

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography IV
[MRH04] V. Moen, H. Raddum and K.J. Hole, Weakness in

the Temporal Key Hash of WPA, 2004,
http://www.nowires.org/Papers-PDF/WPA_attack.pdf
[ABOB] Bernard Aboba, The Unofficial 802.11 Security Web
Page, http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/
[WIFI] WiFi Alliance, http://www.wi-fi.org/
[MISC] MISC Magazine, http://www.miscmag.com
[WWEP] Cracking WEP in 10 minutes with Whax,
http://sid.rstack.org/videos/aircrack/whax-aircrack-wep

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography V
[WWPA] Cracking weak WPA-PSK with Whax,

http://sid.rstack.org/videos/aircrack/whax-aircrack-wpa
[ARB01] W.A. Arbaugh, An Inductive Chosen Plaintext Attack
against WEP/WEP2, 2001,
http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/attack/v3dcmnt.htm
[BIO04] P. Biondi, Packet generation and network based
attacks with Scapy, 2004,
http://www.secdev.org/conf/scapy_csw05.pdf
[BLA02] C. Blancher, Switched environments security, a fairy
tale, 2002,
http://sid.rstack.org/pres/0207_LSM02_ARP.pdf

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography VI
[BLA03] C. Blancher, Layer 2 filtering and transparent

firewalling, 2003
http://sid.rstack.org/pres/0307_LSM03_L2_Filter.pdf
[KO04a] Korek,
http://www.netstumbler.org/showthread.php?p=89036
[KO04b] Korek, Chopchop,
http://www.netstumbler.org/showthread.php?t=12489
[AIRC] C. Devine, Aircrack,
http://www.cr0.net:8040/code/network/aircrack/
[AIRJ] Airjack,
http://sourceforge.net/projects/airjack/
Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography VII
[AIRP] Airpwn, http://www.evilscheme.org/defcon/

[ARPS] Arp-sk, http://www.apr-sk.org/
[EBT] Ebtables, http://ebtables.sourceforge.net/
[HAP] Hostap Linux driver, http://hostap.epitest.fi/
[HAPD] Hostapd authenticator,
http://hostap.epitest.fi/hostapd/
[KARM] Karma, http://theta44.org/karma/
[MADW] MadWiFi project,
http://madwifi.sourceforge.net/

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography VIII
[NSTX] Nstx, http://nstx.dereference.de/nstx/

[OZY] OzymanDNS,
http://www.doxpara.com/ozymandns_src_0.1.tgz
[PR54] Prism54 Linux driver, http://prism54.org/
[PYTH] Python, http://www.python.org/
[SCAP] Scapy, http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
[WLAN] Linux Wlan-ng, http://www.linux-wlan.org/
[WPAS] Wpa supplicant,
http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/

Introduction
Conclusion
Bibliography
Bibliography IX
[WTAP] Wifitap,
[ISCD] ISC Handler’s Diary,
http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?date=2005-06-26

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Introduction

Really quick WiFi 101

Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

This talk is yet another ”people never learn” story

Things have to change...

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Traffic injection is making things even worse

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

802.11[IEEE99] is an IEEE wireless communication standard

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Available security schemes are

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Arbitrary frames injection

Very common for wired adapter, not for WiFi

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Proper adapter and driver for monitor mode raw injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

All materials described in this talk are for educational and

DO NOT USE THEM ON OTHERS’ NETWORKS WITHOUT

You could break the law and face prosecution...

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Completely unprotected regulation traffic...

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Management traffic is easy to generate and inject

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Full management traffic support

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

If you can be an AP, you can

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

24bits IV 40bits or 104bits WEP key

64bits or 128bits RC4 key

RC4 cipher RC4 PRGA

Auth with RC4

Cleartext message ICV (CRC32)

802.11 header (inc. IV) Ciphered message

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Many flaws that can raise attacks possibilities

First WiFi (in)security paper published in 2000[WAL00]

RC4 weak keys problem mentionned[RW95]

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

WEP authentication is vulnerable to cleartext attack

Payload header is 8 bytes, C is 128 bytes and ICV(C) is 4 bytes

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

”Your 802.11 Wireless Network Has No Clothes”[ASW01]

Once one authentication is captured, we can compute any further

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

PRGA output/IV tables

For every IV, grab PRGA output

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Let C be our cleartext message and C’ a modification of C

We can inject arbitrary 802.11 consistent traffic through WEP

Cédric BLANCHER Attacking WiFi networks with traffic injection

Article ”Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of

So, what do we have ?