TRANSPARENCY REPORT

FEBRUARY 2019

PROSECUTOR-LED
BAIL REFORM:
YEAR ONE
 10 KEY TAKEAWAYS
FROM YEAR ONE OF BAIL REFORM

1. Prosecutor-led bail reform works in Philadelphia

2. Data-driven reform was implemented fifty days into District Attorney Larry
Krasner’s administration
3. The reform cost no money to implement, and freed up resources
4. The reform promoted the discretionary decision to not seek cash bail for 25
specific charges
5. Wide-ranging reform, with the 25 charges enumerated in the policy accounting
for 61% of all charges in 2018
6. The reform successfully increased Release on Recognizance (ROR) rates, allowing
approximately 1,750 additional Philadelphians to be released without cash bail
in 2018
7. The reform did not increase recidivism rates
8. The reform did not increase Failure to Appear (FTA) rates
9. The reform helps make the presumption of innocence a meaningful reality
10. Instituting meaningful bail reform in Philadelphia provides an opportunity to
reimagine the future of justice
CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION
LETTER FROM DA LARRY KRASNER

II. THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM

THE URGENT NEED FOR REFORM
LOCAL AND NATIONAL REFORM EFFORTS

III. EVALUATING REFORM

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
PUBLIC SAFETY

IV. TRANSFORMING JUSTICE

V. RESEARCH NOTES
TERMINOLOGY
LIMITATIONS
TABLES
REFERENCES
 DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
THREE SOUTH PENN SQUARE
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19107-3499
(215) 686-8000

In January, 2018 a movement for criminal justice reform took over the Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office (DAO). That movement had promised to address the injustice of cash bail by
bringing about bail reform. In February, 2018 the DAO announced its new policy on cash bail,
which has remained in effect ever since. We call it Philly Bail Reform 1.0. We are keeping our
promise.

One year later, an independent academic analysis agrees with our own internal analysis:
Philly Bail Reform 1.0 is working. This freedom really is free. Substantial reductions in our
recommending cash bail have freed people from jail without increasing crime and without
increasing failures to appear in court. Taxpayers have saved many millions of dollars on
unnecessary pre-trial incarceration. This report, bolstered by independent science, is just one
example of the transparency Philadelphians deserve. It is also an example of the way forward: it is
the evidence that will be the basis for further bail reform: our Philly Bail Reform 2.0.

Because we understood in early 2018 that the Pennsylvania legislature was not yet ready to
join other states and eliminate cash bail statewide, we at the Philadelphia DAO in collaboration
with community partners and in consultation with others in the criminal justice system developed
Philly Bail Reform 1.0, a policy intended to expand the number of cases where no payment bail
was required by finding types of charges for which our office would ordinarily recommend NO cash
bail.

Using years of criminal justice data, our criminology, data and policy teams identified 25
charges (comprising 61% of all cases) where the courts had been setting bail very low—requiring
payment of less than $1,000. Everybody could pay the bail except the poor. None of the 25
offenses were violent offenses or sex offenses. For these specific charges, we created a
presumption that ordinarily we would recommend no cash bail. We hoped this policy would allow
people to return to their lives, their families, their jobs, and their communities. We hoped it would
reduce our County jail population. We believed, based upon our research into other jurisdictions,
that it would not cause a crime spike or result in defendants skipping court.

1
 Our analysis and an independent policy evaluation show that it worked. As this report details,
the reform achieved all of its goals:

• Approximately 1,750 additional Philadelphians were released without bail in 2018

• There was no increase in pretrial recidivism for people released without bail
• Defendants released without bail attended court at the same rate as before the reform
• No crime spike, as confirmed by the Philadelphia Police Department’s own data: 0% overall
increase in crime during 2018 and a 5% decrease in violent crime during 2018.1

Bail reform is essential to meaningful criminal justice reform. The use of cash bail in
particular has fed mass incarceration and discriminated against the poor and people of color. Cash
bail has degraded criminal justice in our courts by coercing those who cannot pay cash bail to plead
guilty regardless of their innocence or guilt and to accept the sentence of incarceration they have
already served awaiting trial even when that sentence is excessive.

The complete elimination of cash bail has been successful for 30 years in Washington, D.C.,
and more recently elsewhere. In general, it results in a system that holds a small portion of
defendants (12% in Washington, D.C.) who are considered dangerous and/or unlikely to appear in
court. This group cannot pay their way out pre-trial custody no matter how much money they have.
The other group, who are not considered too dangerous and/or unlikely to appear in court are
released with no requirement of any payment (88% in Washington, D.C.).2

While we look forward to the day when our Pennsylvania legislature is ready for statewide
bail reform, we are not waiting. We are acting now to reform bail because we cannot wait for
justice. Our power to achieve criminal justice reform now flows directly from the movement and the
people we serve, all Philadelphians.

Lawrence S. Krasner
District Attorney of Philadelphia

The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office provides a voice for victims of crime and protects the community
through zealous, ethical and effective investigations and prosecutions. The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office
is the largest prosecutor's office in Pennsylvania, and one of the largest in the nation. It serves the more than 1.5
million citizens of the City and County of Philadelphia, employing 600 lawyers, detectives and support staff.

www.phila.gov/districtattorney

2
 II. THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM: THE URGENT NEED FOR REFORM
CASH BAIL PROCESS IN PHILADELPHIA
Bail is set at a bail hearing by a Bail Commissioner shortly after BAIL SET & PRETRIAL DETENTION
arrest. During the bail hearing, the District Attorney’s Office and
Defender Association of Philadelphia may recommend bail types. CAN’T PAY IN JAIL

1. INITIAL 2. BAIL 3. BAIL INCARCERATION

BAIL SET & UNTIL PAYMENT
ARREST HEARING DECISION PAYS Can take days, weeks, or months to
post bond.

IMMEDIATE
NO CASH RELEASE
The final bail decision is made by the Bail Commissioner. If
they set cash bail, 10% of the amount must be paid as bond BAIL Even when there is no cash bail, the
defendant must comply with non-
for the defendant to avoid being detained. 3
monetary bail conditions.

CASH BAIL DEFINED INTENDED PURPOSE

• “Cash Bail” refers to the money that a defendant Increase the likelihood that a defendant will
has to pay in order to return to the community appear in court as required for the duration
rather than be incarcerated while awaiting trial. of their case.4
• It is a contract with a looming penalty: miss court
or commit a crime before your case is resolved Decrease the likelihood that a defendant will
and you forfeit your bail; show up and stay out of pose a threat to the community or commit a
trouble, and you get your money back. new crime.5

THE PROBLEM WITH CASH BAIL

Cash bail has been misused. In a criminal justice system that disproportionately impacts people without
means, cash bail punishes the poor before a determination of guilt. Even a few days in pretrial detention
due to cash bail is associated with a host of negative consequences.

Increases Decreases
• Disparate impact on poor people and people • Fairness, racial equity11
of color6
• Coerced guilty pleas7 • Long-term public safety12
• Negative outcomes such as lost jobs and • The ability of the accused to support their
housing, missed medical care, and loss of family, receive public benefits, and stay
custody of one’s children8 attached to their community13
• Pre- and post-trial recidivism among low-risk • Pre- and post-trial employment14
defendants9
• Incarceration10 • The presumption of innocence15

3
II. THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM: REFORM EFFORTS
BAIL REFORM COAST TO COAST
Efforts to reform the bail system are ongoing throughout the United States at the federal, state, and local
levels. Change at the federal and state levels has generally been intentionally driven by legislation or forced
through court decisions following lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the cash bail system. A range
of other factors have motivated bail reforms, including a broader rethinking of the value in spending 17% of
our total correctional budgets—an estimated $14 billion annually—on incarcerating people who have not yet
been found guilty.16

Examples of Jurisdictions with Legislation or Court Decisions:

Washington, D.C.; New Jersey; California; Massachusetts; New Mexico, Illinois (Cook County); Georgia
(Atlanta & Calhoun Counties); Alabama (Cullman & Randolph Counties); Texas (Dallas & Harris Counties);
Louisiana (Lafayette & Orleans Parishes); Missouri (Jennings County); Oklahoma (Tulsa County); Ohio.17

BAIL REFORM IN PHILADELPHIA

In Philadelphia, bail reform has been accomplished through policy changes implemented by District
Attorney Krasner to correct clear inequities and unfairness and to safely end unnecessary pretrial
incarceration caused by the cash bail system. DAO policies supported Philadelphia’s participation in the
MacArthur Safety & Justice Challenge and turned a resolution passed by City Council calling for bail reform
into a practical reality.18

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S NEW CASH BAIL POLICY

On February 21, 2018, the District Attorney’s Office implemented a new policy intended to reduce reliance
on cash bail in Philadelphia.

BIG IMPACT PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

61% Based on an analysis of five years of Although the policy presumes no cash
historical data, the policy identified 25 bail for the enumerated charges,
charges, listed below, for which the DAO Assistant District Attorneys have
would not seek cash bail, with some
discretion to seek cash bail in
exceptions. These charges represented
individual cases when necessitated by
61% of all charges brought in
the facts.
Philadelphia in 2018.19

CHARGES IN THE BAIL POLICY20

Offense grade level indicators: M = Misdemeanor, F = Felony, S = Summary.

Theft Related Access Device FraudM,F, Burglary (only of locations not for overnight accommodation when no person
is present)F, ForgeryM,F, Fraud in Obtaining Food Stamps and Public AssistanceM,F, Identity TheftM,F,
Retail TheftS,M,F,
Receiving Stolen Property (not graded F2)M,F, Theft by Deception or False ImpressionM,F, Theft by
Unlawful Taking (not graded F2)M,F, Theft from Motor Vehicle (not graded F2)M,F, Trademark
CounterfeitingM,F, Unauthorized Use of Motor VehiclesM

Controlled ContrabandM,F, DUIM, Intentional Possession of a Controlled SubstanceM, ParaphernaliaM,

Substance Possession of CannabisM, Possession with Intent to Deliver (less than 5lb of cannabis, non-cannabis
Related subject to caveats)F, Unlawful Purchase of a Controlled SubstanceM

Other Criminal MischiefM,F, Sex WorkM, Providing False Identification to Law EnforcementM, Resisting
ArrestM, Trespass (non-residential)M,F

4
III. EVALUATING REFORM: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
POLICY TRACKING AND INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
The District Attorney’s Office (DAO) developed internal metrics to track the new cash bail policy, and
invited an independent assessment by academic experts in the area of cash bail.21 While this report
focuses on the DAO analytics developed to assess the policy, the external evaluation rigorously considers
the policy’s impact. These efforts reflecting our belief in public transparency and scientific accountability are
outlined below.

DAO METRICS FOR MEASURING SUCCESS

The DAO policy balances maximizing the number of people who safely remain in the community before a
determination on guilt with minimizing the potential that those released may not show up for court or
commit new offenses.

Metric Definition Successful Outcome

Release on Recognizance Percentage of people released with $0 Large increase (see page 6)
(ROR) Rate bail (see page 14).

Pretrial Recidivism Rate A pretrial arrest for a new incident within No/minimal increase (see page 8)
4 months (see page 14).

Failure to Appear (FTA) Rate Failure to appear at one or more hearings No/minimal increase (see page 8)
within 4 months (see page 14).

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF PHILADELPHIA DAO’S 2018 BAIL REFORM

“Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating Prosecutorial Requests for Cash Bail,” by Dr. Aurélie Ouss, Ph.D., and Dr.
Megan Stevenson, Ph.D. (February 15, 2019; see https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138).22

POLICY OUTCOMES PUBLIC SAFETY SUCCESS

Increase in the eligible • No detectable evidence that the decreased use

23% defendants released with no of monetary bail, unsecured bond, and release
on conditions had adverse effects on
12 Percentage monetary or other conditions
Points (ROR). appearance rates or recidivism.

Decrease in the use of • No detectable change in appearances or

41% monetary bail in amounts of recidivism for ineligible defendants,
suggesting that there were no concurrent
7 Percentage $5,000 or less.
Points policy changes that led to overstating or
understating how accountability affects
Decrease in the number of compliance among eligible defendants.
22% defendants who spent at least
5 Percentage one night in jail.
Points

5
III. EVALUATING REFORM: INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
The bail policy successfully increased the percentage of people who did not have
to pay to secure their release following an arrest . Approximately 1,750
additional people were released without monetary bail as a result of the bail
policy from February to December 2018.23

Over the four years prior to the implementation of the bail policy, defendants facing one of the 25
charges targeted by the bail reform were Released on Recognizance (ROR):
• 82.6% of the time for misdemeanors
• 23.9% of the time for felonies

Compared to average rates from 2014-2017, the ROR rate in the 10.5 months following the cash
bail reform increased to:
• 89.9% for misdemeanors (+8.84% increase, +7.3 percentage points)
• 31.5% for felonies (+31.8% increase, +7.6 percentage points)

ROR RATE ROR RATE: Percent of Cases with No

For bail-policy charges Bail Policy Offenses (2014-2018)
Felonies
PRE-POLICY Misdemeanors

2014-2017
83% 24% 90%
83% 83% 83% 81%
Misdemeanors Felonies

POST-POLICY
2018
90% 32% 23% 24% 26% 22%
32%

Misdemeanors Felonies

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Source: DAO analysis of regularly shared court data

6
“There is absolutely no reason why someone who will
show up for court, is not a flight risk, and is no threat
to their neighbors and community needs to sit in jail
for days because they can’t post a small amount of
bail. It’s simply not fair. We don’t imprison the poor
for poverty."
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner
February 21, 2018
III. EVALUATING REFORM: PUBLIC SAFETY
One year after implementation we can conclude that the DAO bail policy successfully allows
people to safely return to their lives while awaiting a determination in their case with
minimal effects to the community.
• There were no significant increases in the Failure to
RECIDIVISM RATE Appear (FTA) and Pretrial Recidivism rates in the
For bail-policy charges period immediately following the implementation of the
receiving no bail
policy.

• For the charges targeted by our policy, people

PRE-POLICY 13% 19% released without bail in 2018 had slightly lower
2017 recidivism rates than people released in 2017, and
Misdemeanors Felonies were rearrested at rates similar to people released
with bail.
POST-POLICY 12% 17% • Although there was an increase in the FTA rate, it is
2018 not attributable to the bail policy. This is because the
Misdemeanors Felonies FTA rate was trending up for several years prior to the
policy implementation.24

FTA RATE: Percent of Cases with No Bail

FTA RATE
For bail-policy charges
Policy Offenses (2014-2018)
receiving no bail Misdemeanors Felonies

14.0%
PRE-POLICY 12% 5.9% 11.8% 12.4%
10.9%
2017 9.1% 9.1%
Misdemeanors Felonies
5.9%
4.5%
POST-POLICY 14% 9.1% 2.9% 2.7%

2018
Misdemeanors Felonies 201 4 201 5 201 6 201 7 201 8

Source: DAO analysis of regularly shared court data

Historically, a proportion of people who are released before trial fail to appear for court or are re-arrested
pretrial. This predates our policy and is based on factors unrelated to bail. We will continue to monitor
these public safety metrics, recalibrate the policy accordingly, and find new ways to support people who are
released.

While the DAO policy took responsibility for increasing the ROR rate, all stakeholders share credit for
maintaining the high percentage of people who successfully appear in court and stay arrest-free pretrial—
especially the people released to their communities and those who support them.

8
IV. TRANSFORMING JUSTICE

A MAJOR DRIVER OF MASS INCARCERATION

The use of cash bail to detain people accused of crimes is a major driver of mass
incarceration in Philadelphia and nationally.

• Reducing the reliance on cash bail is a key part of DA Krasner’s broader vision to
end mass incarceration and transform the justice system.
• Cash bail unfairly punishes poor people solely because of their inability to pay even
a small amount of bail, while those who can afford to pay can be released even
when charged with serious offenses.
• The presumption of innocence and the right to liberty should apply to everyone, not
just to those who can afford to pay for their freedom.

COST-BENEFITS
It is challenging to calculate how much money the system saves by allowing people
to immediately return to their lives while awaiting trial. Criminal justice agencies incur
the costs of transporting people to and from jail, booking and screening people
entering jail, and incarcerating people waiting for their trial or to be bailed out. Making
the entire system more efficient by safely removing individuals from this process
saves money while simultaneously improving long-term public safety.

Prison costs are complex. A prison construction project might anticipate upwards of a
billion dollars in capital and operating expenses over two to three decades. Adding or
subtracting incarcerated people does little to change that picture because the
greatest costs associated with a prison come from building and running it, not the
number of people who reside in it. Once the project starts, the residents of
Philadelphia are locked in to paying the bill.25

INVEST IN PHILLY
The greatest savings associated with the DAO 2018 Bail Reform Policy will be what
Philadelphia can save in the future by reinvesting in people rather than building new
jail facilities. Reinvestment means fighting poverty and eliminating the causes of
crime—improving education, workforce development, neighborhood stability, housing
and food security—and strengthening infrastructure for mental health treatment, drug
and alcohol treatment, rehabilitative options while people are incarcerated, and
restorative reentry services when they are released.26

9
IV. TRANSFORMING JUSTICE
Beyond monetary benefits, there are broad social benefits that flow from not needlessly
incarcerating people awaiting trial. The fabric of Philadelphia’s communities is
strengthened when a defendant, presumed innocent and not a danger to the community,
is allowed to return home shortly after arrest.

FAMILIES COMMUNITIES EQUITY

• A person who can return home • Communities benefit from • The justice system benefits
shortly after arrest will be able stability and local businesses when people are not
to keep a job that may benefit when people remain in needlessly held in pretrial
otherwise be lost due to the community, keep their detention. Removing people
unexcused absences, avoid jobs, and maintain public from pretrial detention reduces
the destabilizing effect of benefits. Individuals who are the jail population, allowing for
losing housing, or continue incarcerated often lose these safer staff-to-detainee ratios.
receiving medical treatment benefits, which expands Rather than process and
that might be lost if absent for poverty rather than offering support thousands of people
a few days. support and stability when they each year accused of
are needed most. committing low-level crimes,
• Children benefit when parents jails can focus on supporting a
and neighbors are not smaller number of inmates,
incarcerated pretrial. Parental keeping them safe, and
incarceration can be helping them reenter society.
psychologically traumatizing,
cause economic strain, and • People released prior to trial
lead to placement in the foster are also less likely to plead
care system. guilty solely to gain their
freedom, leading to a more fair
and just system.27

MOVING FORWARD
The success of the cash bail policy isn’t just about rates and percentages. There is a very real human
impact to the policy. Approximately 1,750 additional individuals were released without cash bail because of
the bail policy, allowing them to return to their families, communities, and lives without having to pay to
secure their freedom.

The ROR rate did not reach 100% for any individual charge, and there is room for
ROOM FOR targeted improvement. That some individual offenses have somewhat low rates is not
IMPROVEMENT necessarily a failure of implementation, but rather a sign that the DAO and ADAs are
being thoughtful about how we approach bail.
Given the success of the 2018 reform, we will identify policy changes for Philly Bail
MORE ANALYSIS Reform 2.0.
Prosecutor-led bail reform sets presumptions for one actor in the system, and is limited
by the options available. With additional stakeholder engagement and community-
MORE OPTIONS
based resources, more defendants can remain in the community without bail
conditions.
10
V. RESEARCH NOTES: TERMINOLOGY
TERMINOLOGY
The following technical terms are used in the report. The same definitions and approaches were used for
charges targeted by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office 2018 Bail Reform, and those not targeted by
the reform; for analyzing 2018 data, and for data from prior administrations. The terms are defined as
follows:

Metric Definition

Release on Recognizance (ROR) Rate The Release on Recognizance (ROR) rate is the number of cases that
received ROR divided by the total number that were considered for bail.
A person is released on their own recognizance if they are released with
$0 bail. People who were released with cash bail, but were able to pay no
bond to be released (a practice called “signing one's own bond”), are not
included in this figure.
Pretrial Recidivism Rate The Pretrial Recidivism rate is the percentage of cases in which the
defendant is rearrested by the police and recharged by the District
Attorney’s Office in the first four months after the start of a case or before
the resolution of the case, whichever is earlier. Although this report is
generally concerned only with misdemeanors and felonies (because
summary offenses do not lead to money bail), new summary charges are
counted as recidivism for the purposes of this report.

Recidivism can refer to a wide variety of behaviors, from re-arrest to re-

conviction to reincarceration. Accordingly, it is calculated in different ways.
Generally, recidivism is considered at the person level—how many people
were rearrested—not at a case level. The rate provided in this report is
for case-level recidivism: the percentage of cases for which a defendant is
recharged. If a single defendant has four (4) pending cases and is
recharged with a new offense, that is counted as four (4) instances of
recidivism. This was done to measure the effect of bail on defendants in
individual cases while those cases are pending, not longer-term
recidivism questions that may not be tied directly to bail. While measuring
the overall pretrial recidivism rate would be ideal, cases can take longer
than six (6) months to resolve. Measuring only pretrial recidivism in the
first four (4) months allowed for an evaluation of the bail policy through
September 2018 and recidivism through January 2019.
Failure to Appear (FTA) Rate The Failure to Appear (FTA) rate is the percentage of cases in which the
defendant missed at least one hearing in the first four (4) months after the
start of a case. The frequency with which defendants were asked to
appear over time was not accounted for in this report. Therefore, it is
possible that in recent years defendants were asked to appear more
frequently in the first four (4) months of their case—i.e., for systemic
reasons unrelated to bail or the DAO cash bail reform.

11
V. RESEARCH NOTES: LIMITATIONS
LIMITATIONS
There are limitations in what can be measured that stem from measurement systems, data quality, and
analytical constraints. A responsible analysis should not attempt to do or say more than the data allow,
while acknowledging limitations. The analysis presented herein is strong despite the acknowledged
limitations. By consistently applying the same analytical methods to cases over time, the same standards
were applied to data from before and after the 2/21/18 bail reform.

Limitations include:

• All of data came from information entered into CPCMS, the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania
Courts unified criminal case management system.

• Some data may have been entered incorrectly, e.g., by clerks at the First Judicial District. Though
there are no specific problem, human error is endemic to criminal justice data, and those errors may
be incorporated into the analysis in this report. There is no reason to believe that human error in the
system is prevalent enough to affect the conclusions of this analysis.

• Trends can be complex. For example, a one- or two-month increase in the pretrial recidivism rate
may be the start or middle of a trend, a few aberrant months, or part of seasonal fluctuations.

• The data presented here are annual data. That was done to smooth out some of the seasonal
fluctuations, standardize the time periods for comparison, and make this report more readable.
Internally, more granular data is used to inform decision-making as to the effectiveness and potential
unintended consequences of the policy.

• The follow-up periods used to measure Pretrial Recidivism and Failure to Appear (FTA) rates are
limited to four (4) months because the bail policy is being analyzed less than one (1) year into its
existence, limiting the amount of data available.

• The analysis is based on the final bail set in each case, rather than the bail offers made by the
District Attorney’s Office (DAO). An evaluation of the 2018 DAO Bail Policy might also consider the
frequency that $0 bail was requested or not objected to by the DAO in relation to the final bail set.

• A number of charges were excluded from the analysis because they were rarely pursued by the
DAO in 2018. Cannabis possession and charges related to sex work are rarely filed by the office,
and retail theft charges are rarely processed as misdemeanors or felonies. Including these charges
could therefore skew comparisons of 2018 data to statistics from previous years.

12
 V. RESEARCH NOTES: TABLES
TABLE 1: 25 BAIL REFORM CHARGES, BY VOLUME

Statute 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

18 Pa.C.S. 3304 Criminal Mischief 172 184 155 164 192

18 Pa.C.S. 3502 Burglary 1531 1393 1296 1338 1105

18 Pa.C.S. 3503 Criminal Trespass 284 337 348 371 415

18 Pa.C.S. 3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking 1696 1571 1576 1466 1418

18 Pa.C.S. 3922 Theft by Deception 146 128 133 148 144

18 Pa.C.S. 3925 Receiving Stolen Property 654 730 707 663 591

18 Pa.C.S. 3928 Unauthorized Use Motor/Other Vehicles 81 48 63 78 105

18 Pa.C.S. 3929 Retail Theft 2469 2417 2386 2029 365

18 Pa.C.S. 3934 Theft from a Motor Vehicle 139 145 129 244 130

18 Pa.C.S. 4101 Forgery 304 347 335 286 228

18 Pa.C.S. 4106 Access Device Fraud 21 8 14 35 46

18 Pa.C.S. 4119 Trademark Counterfeiting 46 12 4 6 10

18 Pa.C.S. 4120 Identity Theft 33 28 28 20 16

18 Pa.C.S. 4914 False Identification to Law Enforcement 57 65 37 34 27

18 Pa.C.S. 5104 Resisting Arrest 156 133 117 86 79

18 Pa.C.S. 5123 Contraband 54 69 61 28 19

18 Pa.C.S. 5902 Prostitution 1352 1030 956 1040 362

35 PS 780-113 A16 Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance 4243 3190 2951 3439 3010

35 PS 780-113 A19 Purchasing a Controlled Substance 1870 2433 2157 3176 3154

35 PS 780-113 A30 Possession with Intent to Deliver 5504 5302 4945 5605 5217

35 PS 780-113 A31 Possession of Marijuana 2460 994 1014 1276 209

35 PS 780-113 A32 Paraphernalia 59 125 59 50 64

62 PS 481 Fraud in Obtaining Food Stamps & Other Public Assistance NA NA NA NA 2

75 Pa.C.S. 3802 DUI 1st Off 3658 3782 3524 3227 2902

13
 V. RESEARCH NOTES: TABLES
TABLE 2: 25 BAIL REFORM CHARGES, RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE (ROR) RATES

Statute 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

18 Pa.C.S. 3304 Criminal Mischief 42.33 46.39 38.67 45.96 42.59

18 Pa.C.S. 3502 Burglary 8.32 5.07 6.2 7.78 14.21

18 Pa.C.S. 3503 Criminal Trespass 40.29 46.06 42.65 37.4 47.67

18 Pa.C.S. 3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking 47.98 54.85 56.38 55.83 65.47

18 Pa.C.S. 3922 Theft by Deception 82.07 68.8 78.63 70.55 81.36

18 Pa.C.S. 3925 Receiving Stolen Property 50.49 57.12 59.67 59.35 71.66

18 Pa.C.S. 3928 Unauthorized Use Motor/Other Vehicles 81.25 89.58 82.26 85.71 94.79

18 Pa.C.S. 3929 Retail Theft 72.11 75.91 78.8 74.19 78.67

18 Pa.C.S. 3934 Theft from a Motor Vehicle 44.53 53.96 55.04 60.74 65.25

18 Pa.C.S. 4101 Forgery 55.81 60 70.95 60.64 78.65

18 Pa.C.S. 4106 Access Device Fraud 52.38 57.14 57.14 50 50

18 Pa.C.S. 4119 Trademark Counterfeiting 82.61 90.91 100 83.33 80

18 Pa.C.S. 4120 Identity Theft 54.55 64.29 64.29 26.32 76.92

18 Pa.C.S. 4914 False Identification to Law Enforcement 68.42 65.08 72.97 88.24 92.31

18 Pa.C.S. 5104 Resisting Arrest 80.65 72.73 80.87 81.18 83.82

18 Pa.C.S. 5123 Contraband 22.22 19.4 26.67 22.22 18.75

18 Pa.C.S. 5902 Prostitution 88.86 90.69 90.44 87.35 93.57

35 PS 780-113 A16 Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance 88.3 89.49 87.47 86.26 94.64

35 PS 780-113 A19 Purchasing a Controlled Substance 93.34 93.47 93.78 90.38 98

35 PS 780-113 A30 Possession with Intent to Deliver 12.92 12.28 11.17 7.55 23.26

35 PS 780-113 A31 Possession of Marijuana 96.2 95.74 92.86 80.26 78.12

35 PS 780-113 A32 Paraphernalia 75.86 74.59 80.7 88 92.98

62 PS 481 Fraud in Obtaining Food Stamps & Other Public Assistance NA NA NA NA 100

75 Pa.C.S. 3802 DUI 1st Off 69.68 70.05 73.11 72.73 82.83

14
 V. RESEARCH NOTES: TABLES
TABLE 3: 25 BAIL REFORM CHARGES, PRETRIAL RECIDIVISM RATES

Statute 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

18 Pa.C.S. 3304 Criminal Mischief 23.19 9.09 6.9 5.41 13.04

18 Pa.C.S. 3502 Burglary 18.03 11.76 12.82 8.91 11.82

18 Pa.C.S. 3503 Criminal Trespass 15.18 25.66 20 17.04 16.96

18 Pa.C.S. 3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking 14.62 12.53 12.74 15.41 20.86

18 Pa.C.S. 3922 Theft by Deception 3.36 1.16 0.97 0 4.23

18 Pa.C.S. 3925 Receiving Stolen Property 9.23 15.54 13.69 17.77 16.74

18 Pa.C.S. 3928 Unauthorized Use Motor/Other Vehicles 7.69 13.95 25.49 9.09 15.52

18 Pa.C.S. 3929 Retail Theft 22.92 21.59 24.49 24.7 29.13

18 Pa.C.S. 3934 Theft from a Motor Vehicle 19.3 30.67 21.13 27.21 27.59

18 Pa.C.S. 4101 Forgery 6.55 5.88 6.47 1.75 4.72

18 Pa.C.S. 4106 Access Device Fraud 18.18 0 12.5 5.88 14.29

18 Pa.C.S. 4119 Trademark Counterfeiting 2.63 20 0 0 0

18 Pa.C.S. 4120 Identity Theft 0 0 0 0 0

18 Pa.C.S. 4914 False Identification to Law Enforcement 15.38 14.63 7.41 13.33 6.25

18 Pa.C.S. 5104 Resisting Arrest 17.6 12.5 9.68 18.84 17.39

18 Pa.C.S. 5123 Contraband 8.33 15.38 6.25 0 0

18 Pa.C.S. 5902 Prostitution 23.33 18.16 13.36 15.59 7.18

35 PS 780-113 A16 Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance 15.63 12.7 12.61 13.29 15.3

35 PS 780-113 A19 Purchasing a Controlled Substance 16.41 14.01 10.95 15.39 13.7

35 PS 780-113 A30 Possession with Intent to Deliver 23.57 17.94 20.73 25.84 19.82

35 PS 780-113 A31 Possession of Marijuana 11.52 8.05 4.98 8.87 7.69

35 PS 780-113 A32 Paraphernalia 11.36 9.89 6.52 4.55 8.51

62 PS 481 Fraud in Obtaining Food Stamps & Other Public Assistance 5.18 4.76 4.86 4.12 4.97

75 Pa.C.S. 3802 DUI 1st Off 23.19 9.09 6.9 5.41 13.04

15
 V. RESEARCH NOTES: TABLES
TABLE 4: 25 BAIL REFORM CHARGES, FAILURE TO APPEAR (FTA) RATES

Statute 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

18 Pa.C.S. 3304 Criminal Mischief 1.64 6.78 6.45 8.11 8.11

18 Pa.C.S. 3502 Burglary 3.7 0 3.7 4.69 7.59

18 Pa.C.S. 3503 Criminal Trespass 10.75 12.04 9.76 8.82 17.14

18 Pa.C.S. 3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking 6.4 6.54 10.9 10.4 9.49

18 Pa.C.S. 3922 Theft by Deception 3.03 1.69 13.33 10.61 8.51

18 Pa.C.S. 3925 Receiving Stolen Property 3.85 3.99 7.28 9.06 10.08

18 Pa.C.S. 3928 Unauthorized Use Motor/Other Vehicles 6.35 14.63 5 15.69 11.67

18 Pa.C.S. 3929 Retail Theft 14.36 12.07 15.88 15.59 14.74

18 Pa.C.S. 3934 Theft from a Motor Vehicle 12.5 5.41 15.22 12.5 15.79

18 Pa.C.S. 4101 Forgery 1.72 3.7 1.34 3.12 10.39

18 Pa.C.S. 4106 Access Device Fraud 14.29 0 14.29 12.5 6.25

18 Pa.C.S. 4119 Trademark Counterfeiting 0 0 0 0 33.33

18 Pa.C.S. 4120 Identity Theft 0 0 7.14 0 0

18 Pa.C.S. 4914 False Identification to Law Enforcement 2.78 10.53 8.7 10 0

18 Pa.C.S. 5104 Resisting Arrest 15.79 10 8.62 10.64 15.38

18 Pa.C.S. 5123 Contraband 12.5 0 0 0 0

18 Pa.C.S. 5902 Prostitution 10.34 17.32 18.83 20.86 8.39

35 PS 780-113 A16 Intentional Possession of a Controlled Substance 10.85 13.09 12.38 14.07 16.38

35 PS 780-113 A19 Purchasing a Controlled Substance 12.57 15.08 17.83 16.91 21.84

35 PS 780-113 A30 Possession with Intent to Deliver 4.11 3.11 5.29 6.96 10.24

35 PS 780-113 A31 Possession of Marijuana 0.84 0.97 3.12 0.97 5.13

35 PS 780-113 A32 Paraphernalia 4.76 11.76 15.22 9.76 8.89

62 PS 481 Fraud in Obtaining Food Stamps & Other Public Assistance 1.94 1.74 0.99 1.78 2.76

75 Pa.C.S. 3802 DUI 1st Off 1.64 6.78 6.45 8.11 8.11

16
V. RESEARCH NOTES: REFERENCES
REFERENCES
LETTER FROM DA LARRY KRASNER:

1. Crime Stats Reports: Citywide Year End 2018. Philadelphia Police Department, 7 Jan.
2019,drive.google.com/drive/folders/1vb9uu5K6priz-oBhfVQNhi_M8PJEOmQP.
2. Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia FY 2018 Agency Financial Report,
November 15, 2018, www.csosa.gov/wp-content/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/2018/11/CSOSA-FY-2018-Agency-
Financial-Report.pdf, pg. 29; Interview with Truman Morrison, Senior Judge on the D.C. Superior Court, Interview
and transcript: www.npr.org/2018/09/02/644085158/what-changed-after-d-c-ended-cash-bail; Marimow, Ann.
“When It Comes to Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s Way.” Washington Post, 4 July 2016,
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs-
way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html.

THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM

3. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 528: Monetary Condition of Release on Bail,

www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter5/s528.html. The different types of bail are enumerated in Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 524. www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter5/s524.html. They include Release on
Recognizance, Release on Nonmonetary Conditions, Release on Unsecured Bail Bond, Release on Nominal Bail,
and Release on Monetary Conditions. To learn more about the arraignment process in Philadelphia, see
Stevenson, Megan T. “Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes.” The Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization, 34(4), 1 November 2018, pp. 511–542, doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewy019;
“Philadelphia Bail Watch Report” (2018), www.phillybailfund.org/bailreport/.
4. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 523: Release Criteria,
www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter5/s523.html), and Rule 524: Types of Release on Bail
www.pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter5/s524.html.
5. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 523: Release Criteria.
6. Research has for some time suggested that “Racial minorities are sentenced more harshly than whites if they …
are detained in jail prior to trial.” See Spohn, Cassia. “Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially
Neutral Sentencing Process.” Criminal Justice, 3, 2000, http://www.justicestudies.com/pubs/livelink3-1.pdf, pp. 462,
citing Chiricos, Theodore G., and William D. Bales. “Unemployment and punishment: An empirical assessment.”
Criminology, 29, 1991, pp. 701–724; and Crew, Keith. “Race differences in felony charging and sentencing: Toward
an integration of decision-making and negotiation models.” Journal of Crime and Justice, 14, 1991, pp. 99–122.
7. Stevenson, “Distortions of Justice”: In Philadelphia. pretrial detention increases chances of conviction by 13%,
mostly by increasing the likelihood of a guilty plea. See Dobbie, Will, Jacob Goldin, and Crystal S. Yang. "The
Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned
Judges." American Economic Review, 108(2), 2018, pp. 201-40,
www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20161503; Gupta, Arpit, Christopher Hansman, and Ethan Frenchman.
“The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization.” Journal of Legal Studies, 45(2), 2016, pp.
471–505; Heaton, Paul., Sandra G. Mayson, and Megan T. Stevenson, “The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention.” Stan. L. Rev., 69, 2017, pp. 711-794,
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1148.
8. Stevenson, “Distortion of Justice”: In Philadelphia, pretrial detention leads to more court fees than for similarly
situated people who are released. “83% of defendants who were charged court fees [between 2006-2013] are still
in debt by December, 2015, with an average debt of $725, or 86% of the total amount.” See Dobbie et al. "The
Effects of Pretrial Detention”; Heaton et al. “The Downstream Consequences.” Gupta et al. “The Heavy Costs of
High Bail.”
9. Heaton et al. “The Downstream Consequences”; Lowenkamp, Christopher T., Marie VanNostrand, and Alexander
Holsinger. “The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention.” LJAF Report, Nov. 2013,
craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf.
10. “95% of all jail population growth between 2000-2014.” Why We Need Pretrial Reform. Pretrial Justice Institute,
www.pretrial.org/get-involved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/, citing Zhen Zeng, “Jail Inmates in 2016.”
(NCJ 251210), Bureau of Justice Statistics, February 2018, www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf; Why We Need
Pretrial Reform. Pretrial Justice Institute, www.pretrial.org/get-involved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/.

17
V. RESEARCH NOTES: REFERENCES (CONTINUED)
REFERENCES (CONTINUED)
THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM (CONTINUED)

11. Stevenson. “Distortion of Justice”: In Philadelphia, pretrial detention is applied to black defendants 40% more
frequently. Pretrial detention is applied to defendants from poor neighborhoods 17% more frequently than to
defendants from wealthy neighborhoods. Half the detention rate gap would disappear if black defendants or
defendants from poor neighborhoods posted bail at the same rate as non-black defendants or defendants from
wealthy neighborhoods.
12. Lowenkamp et al. “The Hidden Costs”; Dobbie et al. "The Effects of Pretrial Detention”; Heaton et al. “The
Downstream Consequences.” Gupta et al. “The Heavy Costs of High Bail.”
13. Dobbie et al. "The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from
Randomly Assigned Judges”; Gupta et al. “The Heavy Costs of High Bail”; Heaton et al. “The Downstream
Consequences.”
14. Dobbie et al. "The Effects of Pretrial Detention.”
15. Dobbie et al. "The Effects of Pretrial Detention”; Gupta et al. “The Heavy Costs of High Bail”; Heaton et al. “The
Downstream Consequences”; Stevenson. “Distortion of Justice.”
16. Stevenson, Megan, and Sandra G Mayson. “Pretrial Detention and Bail.” Academy for Justice, A Report on
Scholarship and Criminal Justice Reform , vol. 17-18, 23 Mar. 2017,
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939273.
17. Marimow, Ann. “When It Comes to Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s Way.” Washington Post, 4
July 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisdictions-
do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html; Wykstra, Stephanie. “Bail Reform,
Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from Jail, Explained.” Vox, 17 Oct. 2018, www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality”; Brangan v. Massachusetts, SJC-12232
(Mass. Aug. 25, 2017), from https://www.vera.org/state-of-justice-reform/2017/bail-pretrial; Morgan Lee. “Bail
reforms take hold in New Mexico as legal culture shifts.” AP, 5 June 2017,
www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/bail-reforms-take-hold-in-new-mexico-as-legal-
culture/article_4455815f-772a-50b3-bed7-a36089d23b6a.html; Gonzalez, Suzannah. ”Illinois judge orders reform
of Cook County bail system.” Reuters, 17 July 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-bail/illinois-judge-orders-
reform-of-cook-county-bail-system-idUSKBN1A22EB; Following that ruling by a Cook County Circuit Judge, the
State Circuit Court of Cook County revised their procedures for bail hearings and pretrial release. See State of
Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County. “GENERAL ORDER NO. 18.8A - Procedures for Bail Hearings and Pretrial
Release.” 18 September 2017.
www.cookcountycourt.org/Manage/DivisionOrders/ViewDivisionOrder/tabid/298/ArticleId/2562/GENERAL-ORDER-
NO-18-8A-Procedures-for-Bail-Hearings-and-Pretrial-Release.aspx; See Civil Rights Corps for additional
information, www.civilrightscorps.org/work/wealth-based-detention.
18. Philadelphia City Council Resolution 180032, “Encouraging the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office and the First
Judicial District of Pennsylvania to institute internal policies that reduce reliance on cash bail; and further calling on
the Pennsylvania State Legislature and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to revise state laws and procedure codes
governing bail to allow for the elimination of cash bail statewide, or to provide for an exemption in the law for cities
of the first class.” Adopted 1 Feb 2018. phila.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3320331&GUID=26509E32-
9EA2-426D-A521-5CEE7484C3EF; MacArthur Safety & Justice Challenge: Philadelphia, PA.
www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/challenge-site/philadelphia/.
19. The bail reform charges represent 61% of all “lead charges” in 2018. Commonly thought of as “most serious
charge,” lead charge refers to a single charge identified out of all charges on a transcript, algorithmically in a
relational database that integrates police and court data, as most representative of the type of crime a case is
considered to be. It is in the vast majority of cases the most serious charge on a transcript; however when charge
grades (i.e. levels of felony and misdemeanor offenses) are equal, a case will be assigned the charge considered
to be more representative by the authors of the algorithm.

18
V. RESEARCH NOTES: REFERENCES (CONTINUED)
REFERENCES (CONTINUED)
THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM: THE URGENT NEED FOR REFORM (CONTINUED)

20. The offenses in the bail policy can be found at: 18 PaCS 3304 (Criminal Mischief), 18 PaCS 3502 (Burglary), 18
PaCS 3503 (Criminal Trespass), 18 PaCS 3921 (Theft by Unlawful Taking), 18 PaCS 3922 (Theft by Deception),
18 PaCS 3925 (Receiving Stolen Property), 18 PaCS 3928 (Unauthorized Use of Automobiles), 18 PaCS 3929
(Retail Theft), 18 PaCS 3934 (Theft from Motor Vehicles), 18 PaCS 4101 (Forgery), 18 PaCS 4106 (Access Device
Fraud), 18 PaCS 4120 (Identity Theft), 18 PaCS 4119 (Trademark Counterfeiting), 18 PaCS 4914 (False
Identification to Law Enforcement), 18 PaCS 5104 (Resisting Arrest), 18 PaCS 5123 (Contraband), 18 PaCS 5902
(Prostitution/Sex Work), 35 PS 780-113 A16 (Knowing and Intentional Possession of Controlled Substance), 35 PS
780-113 A19 (Purchase of a Controlled Substance), 35 PS 780-113 A30 (Possession with Intent to Distribute a
Controlled Substance), 35 PS 780-113 A31 (Possession of Small Amounts of Marijuana), 35 PS 780-113 A32
(Drug Paraphernalia), 62 PaCS 481 (Fraud in Obtaining Public Assistance), 75 PaCS 3802 (DUI).

EVALUATING REFORM

21. Dr. Aurélie Ouss, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Megan
Stevenson, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Law at the George Mason University Antonin Scalia School of Law.
22. Ouss, Aurélie, and Megan T. Stevenson. “Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating Prosecutorial Requests for Cash
Bail.” 15 February 2019, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138.
23. The estimate that roughly 1,750 additional people were released on their own recognizance because of the policy
was calculated by comparing the number of people who were actually released ROR in 2018 (post-policy) to the
number of people who theoretically would have been released in 2018 post-policy had the 2017 ROR rates
remained unchanged in 2018. For each of the 25 charges, the formula was: (2018 ROR Rate for charge i X 2018
number of cases charge for charge i) - (2017 ROR Rate for charge i X 2018 number of cases charge for charge i).
The final result was 1745 people. It is an approximation of 1750 because the number represents a
counterfactual—there is no way to know how many people would have been given ROR had the policy not come
into effect.
24. Ouss and Stevenson. “Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating Prosecutorial Requests for Cash Bail.” Furthermore,
the frequency with which defendants were asked to appear over time was not accounted for in this DAO report.
Therefore, it is possible that in recent years defendants were asked to appear more frequently in the first four (4)
months of their case—i.e., for systemic reasons unrelated to bail or the DAO cash bail reform.

TRANSFORMING JUSTICE
25. John F. Pfaff, JD, PhD, Personal Communication, 31 January 2019. Dr. Pfaff is a Professor of Law at Fordham
University School of Law.
26. Ibid
27. The broad social benefits enumerated in this section are informed by literature already cited in this report.

19
Letter:
District Attorney Lawrence S. Krasner, Esq.

Report:
Oren M. Gur, PhD, Michael Hollander, JD, and Pauline Alvarado, MS(c), MPA(c)

Thanks:
Charging Unit, Moshe Berman, Karli Libbey, Mike Lee, Ben Waxman, Dustin Slaughter, Cameron Kline, Sangeeta Prasad, Sue Hackett, Keith
Daviston, Aurélie Ouss, PhD, Megan Stevenson, PhD, and John Pfaff, JD, PhD, Liam Riley, Dana Bazelon, Lyandra Retacco, Arun Prabhakaran,
Robert Listenbee, and Carolyn Engle Temin.
W: www.phila.gov/districtattorney
TRANSPARENCY REPORT
M: medium.com/@philadao FEBRUARY 2019
FB: www.facebook.com/philaDAO/
T: @philadao
IG: @philadao
P: (215) 686-8000