9 Agapay vs. Palang

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340 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agapay vs. Palang
*
G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and

HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
Family Code; Husband and Wife; Cohabitation; Co-Ownership; Under Article 148 of

the Family Code, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.—The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973,
was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article
148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are notcapacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de
facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that
actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states
that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
341
VOL. 276, 341

JULY 28, 1997
Agapay vs. Palang
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001671088e85bae461998003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the youthfulness of the woman, she being only

twenty years of age then, while the man she cohabited with was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of a parcel of land, there being no proof of the
same.—In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged
in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-saristore but failed to persuade us that she
actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on
the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of
the same.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a woman who cohabited with a married man fails

to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of a riceland, there is no basis to
justify her co-ownership over the same—the riceland should revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the man and his lawful wife.—Since petitioner failed to prove that
she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we
find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the
riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Property; Compromise Agreements; Separation of

property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order
or, without judicial conferment, when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlement; Where the judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not
specifically and expressly for separation of property, the same should not be so inferred as
judicial confirmation of separation of property.—Furthermore, it is immaterial that
Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of their
daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting
their compromise agreement “in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the
separation of property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership.”
Separation of property between spouses
342
342 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agapay vs. Palang
during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The
judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not specifically and expressly
for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
Same; Same; Same; Donations; The prohibition against donations between spouses
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.—With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood
of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money
for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of
the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition
of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Illegitimate

Children; Filiation; Succession; Probate Proceedings; Questions as to who are the heirs of
the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate
of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a
special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action for recovery of ownership and possession.—The second issue concerning
Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate is
here resolved in favor of respondent court’s correct assessment that the trial court erred
in making pronouncements regarding Kristopher’s heirship and filiation “inasmuch as
questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children
and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated
in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
cannot be adjudicated in the instant
343
VOL. 276, 343

JULY 28, 1997
Agapay vs. Palang
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings and Practice;Parties; Guardians; A

minor who has not been impleaded is not a party to the case and neither can his mother be
called guardian ad litem.—As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher
Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial
court’s decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party
defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction through his
mother/guardian ad litem. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been
impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be
called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds
that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is the
illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. Petitioner’s grave error
has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to
resolve the settlement of Miguel’s estate and Kristopher’s successional rights has been
pointed out.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Simplicio M. Sevillejafor petitioner.
Ray L. Basbas and Fe Fernandez-Bautista for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled “Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and
Herminia P. Dela Cruz” dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two
parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private
respondent’s legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took
private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
344
344 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agapay vs. Palang
Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A

few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii.
Miguel and Carlina’s only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in
1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in
Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial
court found evidence 1
that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with
private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted 2
his second
marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months
earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale,
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on
September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120
covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation
3
as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the
latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
4
property consisting of
six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
_____________
1 From the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. U-4265, page 2, citing Exhibit E of the
Records; Rollo, p. 29.
2 At the Methodist Church of Binalonan.
3 Civil Case No. U-2501, CFI Branch 9, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
4 The judicially-confirmed settlement reads in part: “COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled
case, assisted by their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit this
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
345
VOL. 276, JULY 28, 345

1997
Agapay vs. Palang
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on

December 6, 1977. In 1979,
5
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage
upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la
Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for
recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located
at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation

with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by
TCT No. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had
already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added
that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having
bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded
from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their
conjugal estate to Herminia.
_______________
1. That defendant hereby admits all the material allegations in the complaint;
2. That the parties have mutually agreed that, for their mutual interest and that of their only
child, Herminia B. Palang, all their present conjugal properties, real and personal, be conveyed or
transfered (sic) to their said daughter, except some personal properties such as the car mentioned in
the complaint which shall remain in the possession of the defendant; x x x”
5 Criminal Case No. U-0509. Miguel Palang, then seventy years of age, was sentenced to a
minimum indeterminate penalty of three months and eleven days of Arresto Mayor and a maximum
of one year, eight months and twenty-one days of Prision Correccional. Erlinda Agapay was
sentenced to four years and two months of destierro.
346
346 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agapay vs. Palang
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989
dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove
that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and
Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the
parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguel’s illegitimate son. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered—
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;

2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot
located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120,
Lot 290-B including the old house standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural

land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080
square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda
Agapay;
4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father,
Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel
Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this
decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims
to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal
properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated
October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be
settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney’s fees.
6
SO ORDERED.”
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court’s decision. The Court of
Appeals rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 with the following dispositive
portion:
______________
6 Penned by Judge Manuel D. Villanueva, Rollo, pp. 28-36.
347
VOL. 276, JULY 28, 347

1997
Agapay vs. Palang
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED

and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;

2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to
herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of
title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
7
No pronouncement as to costs.”
Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the
validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot,
the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor
of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate
court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang’s illegitimate
son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel’s estate. Third, respondent court
erred, according to petitioner, “in not finding that there is sufficient pleading
and evidence that Kristoffer A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be
considered as party-defendant8
in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court
and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent
provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and affirms
the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property
subject of this action. Petitioner assails the
______________
7 PerJustice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with the concurrence of Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Fermin
A. Martin, Jr. in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199, “Carlina (Cornelia) V. Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz v.
Erlinda A. Agapay,” Rollo, pp. 78-90.
8 Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p. 15.
348
348 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agapay vs. Palang
validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no
dispute that the transfers of ownership from the original owners of the riceland
and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes, respectively,
were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was
patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de factoseparation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to
Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is 9not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony 10
that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to
persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland.
Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner
was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four
and a pensioner of the
_______________
9 TOLENTINO, I CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE 500 (1990 edition).
10 TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 78; per Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 86.
349
VOL. 276, JULY 28, 349

1997
Agapay vs. Palang
U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that

in 1973 she11
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property, there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel
and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added
assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of
the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their
adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively
that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation,
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would
still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase
price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasi-nan, we find no basis to justify her
co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to
donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The
trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise
agreement “in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the
separation of12 property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal
partnership.” Separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
13
when
there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment
which resulted from the parties’ compromise
______________
11 The entire property was bought for P7,500.00. Exhibit C; Decision of the trial court, Rollo, p. 29.
12 Decision of the trial court, p. 5; Rollo, p. 32.
13 Article 134 of the Family Code.
350
350 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agapay vs. Palang
was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The
testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
that Miguel Palang provided the money for the 14
purchase price and directed that
Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family
Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between
15
persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of 16
those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an

illegitimate son and heir to Miguel’s estate is here resolved in favor of
respondent court’s correct assessment that the trial court erred in making
pronouncements regarding Kristopher’s heirship and filiation “inasmuch as
questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto
should be ventilated in
______________
14 TSN, October 1, 1986, pp. 13-16.
15 Thelaw states: “Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.”
16 TOLENTINO, supra, page 376 citing Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679 and Matabuena v.
Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284.
351
VOL. 276, JULY 28, 351

1997
Agapay vs. Palang
the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
cannot be adjudicated in the 17
instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of
ownership and possession.”
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should
be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial court’s
decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party
defendant but theorized that he18had submitted to the court’s jurisdiction through
his mother/guardian ad litem. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not
having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His
mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved
in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file
another action to prove19
that he is the illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Petitioner’s grave error has been discussed in the
preceding paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the
settlement of Miguel’s estate and Kristopher’s successional rights has been
pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado(Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., On leave.
Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—An unrecognized spurious child has no rights from his parents or to

their estate. (Ilano vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 242[1994])
______________
17 Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 89.
18 Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 35.
19 Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 18.
352
352 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. De la Cruz
Failure to present relatives who could have negated petitioner’s testimony that
she had been acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased gives
rise to the presumption that their testimonies would be detrimental to the
respondents had they been presented as witnesses. (Alberto vs. Court of
Appeals, 232 SCRA 745 [1994])
——o0o——

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340 SUPREME COURT

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and

Family Code; Husband and Wife; Cohabitation; Co-Ownership; Under Article 148 of

VOL. 276, 341

Agapay vs. Palang

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the youthfulness of the woman, she being only

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a woman who cohabited with a married man fails

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Property; Compromise Agreements; Separation of

Agapay vs. Palang

Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Illegitimate

VOL. 276, 343

Agapay vs. Palang

ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings and Practice;Parties; Guardians; A

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

344 SUPREME COURT

Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A

VOL. 276, JULY 28, 345

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on

at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation

346 SUPREME COURT

1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;

3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural

VOL. 276, JULY 28, 347

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED

1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;

Hence, this petition.

348 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 276, JULY 28, 349

U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that

350 SUPREME COURT

The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang’s status and claim as an

Cervantes, 38 SCRA 284.

VOL. 276, JULY 28, 351

Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.

Notes.—An unrecognized spurious child has no rights from his parents or to

352 SUPREME COURT

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