805 Scra 438

1/31/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 805

G.R. No. 221062. October 5, 2016.*

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS, petitioner, vs. THE ESTATE
OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. and ROLANDO OGSOS, JR.,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Period; Since March 29, 2014

fell on a Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were completely
justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on the next
working day: Monday, March 31, 2014.—The CA failed to take
into consideration that March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In
these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court provides
that: Section 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of
time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of
the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day. Since March 29, 2014 fell on a
Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in
filing their motion for reconsideration on the next working day:
Monday, March 31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have
considered it filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion
on the merits. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.

http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000168a28850636a3f1625003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
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VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 439

Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr.
the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the

merits. However, when there is already enough basis on which a
proper evaluation of the merits may be had — as in this case —
the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of
remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the
case and to better serve the ends of justice. In view of the
foregoing — as well as the fact that petitioner prayed for the
resolution of the substantive issues on the merits — the Court
finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
Same; Same; Counterclaims; Docket Fees; The rule in
permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to
compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.—
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of
whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule
with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are
required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In general, a
counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
against an opposing party.—In general, a counterclaim is any
claim which a defending party may have against an opposing
party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred
if not set up in the same action. On the other hand, a
counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be
filed separately in another case.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Docket Fees; Counterclaims;
Permissive Counterclaims; In view of the finding that the
counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the

courts a quo, respon-

440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be

clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees,
per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their
counterclaim.—In view of the finding that the counterclaim is
permissive, and not compulsory as held by the courts a quo,
respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be
clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees,
per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their
counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the
initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal
provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period;
and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to
defraud the government.
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Counterclaims; The counterclaim
should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the
docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the
monetary awards in respondents’ favor.—Verily, respondents’
reliance on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous,
exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more
their intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the
counterclaim should not be dismissed for nonpayment of docket
fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment
lien on the monetary awards in respondents’ favor. In
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-
Legasto, 487 SCRA 339 (2006), citing Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, the Court held that in instances where a litigant’s
nonpayment of docket fees was made in good faith and without
any intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of
the court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount of
deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute
a judgment lien on the amount awarded to him, and enforce such
lien, as in this case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Semaco P. Sacmar & Associates for petitioner.
Cynthia M. Sulit-Portugaleza for respondents.

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VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 441

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated February 28, 2014 and the Resolution3
dated October 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 03710, which affirmed with modification the
Decision4 dated July 2, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 36 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 12708,
thereby: (a) ordering petitioner Elizabeth Sy-Vargas
(petitioner) and her sister, Kathryn T. Sy (Kathryn), to pay
respondents the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. (Ogsos, Sr.)
and Rolando Ogsos, Jr., (Ogsos, Jr.; collectively,
respondents) the amount of P10,391,981.76, representing
the value of the sugar and molasses that could have been
produced from 1999 to 2004, if only respondents were not
deprived by petitioner and Kathryn of possession and
enjoyment of the leased agricultural farm; and (b) deleting
the awards for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
the attorney’s fees and costs of suit against respondents.

The Facts

On February 10, 1994, Ogsos, Sr. and the Heirs of
Fermina Pepico (Fermina), represented by their Attorney-
in-Fact, Catalino V. Noel, entered into a Contract of Lease5
(lease contract) covering five (5) parcels of agricultural land
owned by the latter, with an aggregate area of 23 hectares,
more or less, situated in Maaslum Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental (leased premises). Based on the contract, Ogsos,
Sr. agreed to pay the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 15-44.

2 Id., at pp. 49-61. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-
Padilla, with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando and Carmelita
Salandanan-Manahan, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 63-65. Penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-
Yap, with Associate Justices Pamela Ann A. Maxino and Renato C.
Francisco, concurring.
4 Id., at pp. 124-135. Penned by Judge Cesar Manuel U. Cadiz, Jr.
5 Id., at pp. 70-71.

442

Heirs of Fermina 230 piculs or 290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.)

of centrifugal sugar every crop year, starting from crop
year 1994-1995 to crop year 2000-2001, as lease rental.6
On June 5, 1996, the term of the lease contract was
extended for three (3) years, or until the end of crop year
2004, due to Ogsos, Sr.’s introduction of improvements on
the leased premises.7 Thereafter, or on December 30, 1996,
the said contract was amended, modifying the lease rental
from 230 piculs or 290.95 lkg. of centrifugal sugar every
crop year to P150,000.00 cash, beginning the crop year
1996-1997.8
Petitioner and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of
Fermina, claimed that the lease rentals from crop year
1994-1995 to crop year 1998-1999 were not paid. Thus, on
April 27, 2000,9 they filed a Complaint10 for Specific
Performance and Damages against respondents, before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 12708, to recover the
unpaid lease rentals. Pertinently, they did not include in
their claim the lease rental for crop year 1999-2000 because
respondents had already abandoned the leased premises
since the said crop year.11
Summons was served in May 2000, but respondent
Ogsos, Jr. only filed a motion to admit answer12 and
answer13 to the complaint after more than two (2) years, or
on December 17, 2002.14 Thus, petitioner and Kathryn filed
on January 28, 2003, an opposition thereto, and moved to
declare respon-
_______________
6 See item 3 of the lease contract; id., at pp. 70; 52-53 and 126.
7 Id., at pp. 53 and 126.
8 Id.
9 Erroneously dated as “March 27, 2000” by the CA; id., at p. 50.

10 Dated April 26, 2000. Id., at pp. 66-69.
11 Id., at pp. 19 and 67.
12 Not attached to the Rollo.
13 See Answer with Counter-Claim and Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction dated December 16, 2002; Rollo, pp. 72-84.
14 Id., at pp. 50-51 and 124.

443
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 443

dents in default, which the RTC granted in an Order dated

March 7, 2003.15
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the RTC, respondents, then, elevated the matter via a
petition for certiorari to the CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 79463, wherein the CA granted respondents petition
and remanded the case to the RTC. The CA ordered the
RTC to admit respondents’ answer so as to give them the
opportunity to be heard and to present their side on the
merits of the case.16
In their answer,17 respondents alleged that they had
faithfully complied with their obligations as embodied in
the lease contract and its subsequent amendments.18 They
denied abandoning the leased premises and claimed that
sometime in December 1998, petitioner and Kathryn
unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and
appropriated for themselves the sugarcane ready for
harvest under the pretext that they would apply the
proceeds thereof to the unpaid rent.19 They likewise alleged
that in the same year, Ogsos, Sr. and his wife fell ill, which
incidents forced respondents to obtain loans from several
businessmen, namely: Emiliano “Nonette” Bacang, Zaldy
Roleda, and Pastor Domocol.20 The arrangement regarding
the foregoing loans was that the said creditors would be
allowed to harvest the sugarcane from the leased premises
and apply the proceeds thereof to the loans.21 However,
when the creditors were about to harvest the sugarcane,
they were prevented by petitioner and Kathryn; resulting
in
_______________
15 Id. (Pleadings and Order mentioned are not attached to the Rollo).

16 Id., at pp. 51 and 124-125.
17 Id., at pp. 72-84.
18 Id., at p. 74.
19 Id., at p. 75.
20 Id., at p. 78.
21 Id.

444

respondents’ default in the payment of their debts.22 On

March 22, 2000, Ogsos, Sr. died.23
Respondents also averred that since crop years 1994 to
1997-1998, the average production of sugarcane is 1,308.68
lkg. of sugar and 30.409 tons of molasses per year, as
computed on the basis of the Planter’s Production Reports.
Thus, when petitioner and Kathryn took possession of the
leased premises, respondents lost their profits equivalent
to the aforesaid production starting from crop year 1999-
2000 until the termination of the lease contract on crop
year 2003-2004.24 Accordingly, respondents filed a
counterclaim for these lost profits plus damages.25
On June 6, 2005, respondents moved for the dismissal of
the complaint in view of the absence of the required
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. In a Resolution dated
November 9, 2005, the RTC dismissed the case without
prejudice.26
On December 15, 2005, respondents moved for the
hearing of their counterclaim, to which the RTC required
petitioner and Kathryn to submit a comment, but none was
filed. Hence, in an Order dated February 9, 2006, the RTC
set the case for reception of evidence on respondents’
counterclaim.27
On February 28, 2006, respondents filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial, which was granted by the
RTC on March 1, 2006, setting the pretrial on March 30,
2006. Petitioner, Kathryn, and their counsel failed to
appear at the pretrial and to file their pretrial brief. Thus,
respondents filed a manifestation with motion to present
evidence ex parte on June 7, 2006, praying that petitioner
and Kathryn be declared in default, and that respondents
be allowed to present
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 54, 78-79.

23 Id., at pp. 75 and 80.
24 Id., at pp. 54 and 79.
25 Id., at pp. 79 and 83.
26 Id., at pp. 51 and 125.
27 Id.

445
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 445

evidence on their counterclaim ex parte, which the RTC

granted in an Order dated June 28, 2006.28
Thereafter, or on August 16, 2006, petitioner and
Kathryn moved to quash the June 28, 2006 Order, which
was, however, denied on September 1, 2006 on the ground
that the period to ask for reconsideration or for the lifting
of the order had already lapsed.29
On October 17, 2006, petitioner and Kathryn filed a
motion to dismiss respondents’ counterclaim arguing that
the same were permissive and that respondents had not
paid the appropriate docket fees.30 However, the RTC, in
its November 16, 2006 Order,31 denied the said motion,
declaring respondents’ counterclaim as compulsory; thus,
holding that the payment of the required docket fees was
no longer necessary.32

The RTC’s Ruling

In a Decision33 dated July 2, 2007, the RTC granted
respondents’ counterclaim, and consequently, ordered
petitioner and Kathryn to pay respondents the following
amounts: (a) P10,391,981.76 worth of sugar and molasses
produced representing the value of 1,308.68 lkg. of sugar
and 30.409 tons of molasses for each crop year that
defendant and Ogsos, Sr. were deprived of possession and
enjoyment of the leased premises; (b) P500,000.00 as moral
damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d)
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 for each
personal appearance of respondents’ counsel before the
RTC; and (e) P50,000.00 as costs of suit.34 In so ruling, it
found that Ogsos, Sr. faithfully paid the lease rent-
_______________
28 Id., at pp. 51-52 and 125.

29 Id., at pp. 52 and 125.
30 Id., at p. 52.
31 Id., at pp. 85-86. Issued by Judge Cesar Manuel U. Cadiz, Jr.
32 Id.
33 Id., at pp. 124-135.
34 Id., at p. 134.

446

als during the crop years 1994 to 199735 but eventually

stopped their payments when petitioner and Kathryn took
possession and harvested the sugarcane in the leased
premises sometime in December 1998, despite respondents’
objection.36 Accordingly, petitioner and Kathryn reneged on
their obligation to maintain respondents’ peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of the leased premises when the
former forcibly and unlawfully deprived the latter of
possession thereof in December 1998, despite payment of
the lease rentals. Due to this, petitioner and Kathryn were
held liable for breach of the lease contract.37
Dissatisfied, petitioner and Kathryn appealed to the
CA.38

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision39 dated February 28, 2014 (CA Decision),
the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC but deleted the
awards for moral and exemplary damages, as well as the
attorney’s fees and costs of suit due to the absence of proof
that petitioner and Kathryn acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.40
The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in ruling that
respondents’ counterclaim is not permissive but
compulsory; hence, payment of docket fees was not
necessary.41 Further, the CA ruled that even though the
counterclaim was compulsory, the same would not be
automatically dismissed upon the dismissal of the action if
the dismissal was caused by the fault of the plaintiff, as in
this case.42
_______________
35 Id., at p. 130.
36 Id., at p. 75.
37 Id., at p. 130.
38 See appellants’ brief dated December 21, 2011; id., at pp. 136-139.
39 Id., at pp. 49-61.
40 Id., at pp. 59-60.
41 Id., at p. 57.
42 Id., at pp. 58-59.

447
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 447

The counsel of petitioner and Kathryn received the CA

Decision on March 14, 2014.43 On March 31, 2014,
petitioner and Kathryn filed their motion for
reconsideration,44 which was denied in the Resolution45
dated October 1, 2015 for being filed out of time; hence, the
instant petition solely filed by petitioner.46

The Issues Before the Court

The essential issues for resolution in this case are
whether or not the CA correctly ruled that: (a) petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; (b)
respondents’ counterclaim for damages is compulsory and
not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket
fees is required; and (c) respondents are entitled to such
counterclaim.

The Court’s Ruling

I.

Records bear out that in the assailed October 1, 2015
Resolution, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for being purportedly filed out of time. The
CA explained that since the registry return receipt showed
that petitioner and Kathryn’s counsel received the assailed
March 14, 2014 Decision, it only had until March 29, 2014
to file a motion for reconsideration. However, they only
filed such motion on March 31, 2014, thus, rendering the

assailed CA Decision final and executory.
Notably, however, the CA failed to take into
consideration that March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday. In
these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court
provides that:
_______________
43 Id., at pp. 63 and 217.

44 Dated March 31, 2014. Id., at pp. 217-228.
45 Id., at pp. 63-65.
46 Kathryn T. Sy no longer filed an appealed.

448

Section 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of

time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of
the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day.

Since March 29, 2014 fell on a Saturday, petitioner and
Kathryn were completely justified in filing their motion for
reconsideration on the next working day: Monday, March
31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have considered it
filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion on the
merits. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that
the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on
the merits. However, when there is already enough basis
on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had —
as in this case — the Court may dispense with the time-
consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further
delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the
ends of justice.47 In view of the foregoing — as well as the
fact that petitioner prayed for the resolution of the
substantive issues on the merits48 — the Court finds it
appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.

II.

Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is
determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is
required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is
_______________
47 Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 214241,

January 13, 2016, 781 SCRA 63, citing Real v. Sangu Philippines, Inc.,
655 Phil. 68, 90; 640 SCRA 67, 89 (2011).
48 See Rollo, p. 43.

449
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 449

bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.49 On the other

hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory
counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.50
In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by
the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory
counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.51
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it
does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with
the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case.52
In Spouses Mendiola v. CA,53 the Court had devised
tests in determining whether or not a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive:
_______________
49 Bungcayao, Sr. v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and

Development Corporation, 632 Phil. 391, 400; 618 SCRA 381, 390 (2010).
50 See Alba, Jr. v. Malapajo, G.R. No. 198752, January 13, 2016, 780
SCRA 534. In Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma (566 Phil. 1, 20; 542
SCRA 1, 17 [2008]), it was held that “effective August 16, 2004 under Sec.
7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now
required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.” However,
in OCA Circular No. 96-2009 entitled “Docket Fees For Compulsory
Counterclaims,” dated August 13, 2009, it was clarified that the rule on
imposition of filing fees on compulsory counterclaims has been
suspended. Such suspension remains in force up to this day.
51 See Alba, Jr. v. Malapajo, id., citations omitted.
52 Id.
53 691 Phil. 244; 677 SCRA 27 (2012).

450

The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is

compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of
fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such
that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims
of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of
effort and time by the parties and the court? Of the four, the
one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation
between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the
counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail
substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the
court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and
legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic
controversy between the parties. If these tests result in
affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.54
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the above mentioned standards, the Court

finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in
nature. This is because: (a) the issue in the main case, i.e.,
whether or not respondents are liable to pay lease rentals,
is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e.,
whether or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for
damages for taking over the possession of the leased
premises and harvesting and appropriating respondents’
crops planted therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents’
respective causes of action arose from completely different
occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata
had they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate
proceeding; (c) the evidence required to
_______________
54 Id., at pp. 265-266; pp. 45-46.

451
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 451

prove petitioner’s claim that respondents failed to pay lease

rentals is likewise different from the evidence required to
prove respondents’ counterclaim that petitioner and
Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad
faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner’s claim is not
contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents’
counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not
result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort
of the court and the parties.
In view of the finding that the counterclaim is
permissive, and not compulsory as held by the courts a quo,
respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it
must be clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the
required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to
the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long been settled
that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its
nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading
does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that:
(a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b)
there was no intention on the part of the claimant to
defraud the government.55
Here, respondents cannot be faulted for nonpayment of

docket fees in connection with their counterclaim,
primarily because as early as November 16, 2006, the RTC
had already found such counterclaim to be compulsory in
nature.56 Such finding was then upheld in the July 2, 2007
RTC Decision and affirmed on appeal by the CA in its
assailed Decision. As such, the lower courts did not require
respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to rule
on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents’ reliance
on the findings of the courts a quo, albeit erroneous,
exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees,
much more their intention not to defraud the government.
Thus, the counterclaim should not be
_______________
55 See Unicapital, Inc. v. Consing, Jr., 717 Phil. 689, 707-708; 705
SCRA 511, 532 (2013).
56 See November 16, 2006 RTC Order; Rollo, pp. 85-86.

452

dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the

docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the
monetary awards in respondents’ favor. In Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto,57
citing Section 2, Rule 14158 of the Rules of Court, the Court
held that in instances where a litigant’s nonpayment of
docket fees was made in good faith and without any
intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court
of the court a quo should be ordered to assess the amount
of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will
constitute a judgment lien on the amount awarded to him,
and enforce such lien,59 as in this case.
That being said, the Court now resolves whether or not
respondents are indeed entitled to their counterclaim.

III.

In this case, the RTC found that under the lease
contract, petitioner and Kathryn were bound to keep
respondents in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
leased premises for the entire duration of the lease and

that respondents faithfully paid their lease rentals for a
period of four (4) years, or until crop year 1998. Despite the
foregoing, petitioner and Kathryn unlawfully took
possession (sometime in December 1998) and harvested
respondents’ crops over their objections. The RTC further
found that due to such unlawful disposses-
_______________
57 Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-

Legasto, 521 Phil. 469; 487 SCRA 339 (2006).
58 Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim
not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading,
the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect
the corresponding fees.
59 Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-

Legasto, supra at pp. 480-481; p. 351.

453
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 453

sion of the leased premises, respondents were deprived

of profits for six (6) crop years (i.e., from crop year
1999 to crop year 2004, which was the last crop year
of the lease) in the amount of P1,731,996.96 per year,
or a grand total of P10,391,987.76.60 Such factual
findings were then affirmed by the CA in its assailed
ruling. It has long been settled that factual findings of the
trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal,61 save for certain
exceptions,62 which petitioner failed to show in this case.
As such, the grant of said counterclaim is upheld.
_______________
60 See Rollo, pp. 130-132.

61 See Bacalso v. Aca-ac, G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016, 780
SCRA 308, citing Pascual v. Coronel, 554 Phil. 351, 360; 527 SCRA 474,
483 (2007).
62 As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for

review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however,
this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows: (1)
When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) When the inference made by the
Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (5) When the appellate court, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) When the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts; (7) When the
Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) When the findings of
fact are themselves conflicting; (9) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by
the evidence on record. (Treñas v. People, 680 Phil. 368, 378; 664 SCRA
355, 363-364 [2012], citing Salcedo v. People, 400 Phil. 1302, 1308-1309;
347 SCRA 499, 504-505 [2000])

454

Nonetheless, the Court finds it proper to deduct from the

counterclaim award of P10,391,987.76 the amount of
P900,000.00, which represents the lease rentals that
should have been paid by the lessee, i.e., respondents,
during the six (6) crop years (i.e., crop years 1999 to 2004)
that they were deprived possession of the leased premises.
As the Court’s counterclaim award of lost profits during the
said period stems from the recognition that the lessor, i.e.,
petitioner and Kathryn, should have complied with their
obligations to keep respondents in peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the leased premises for the entire duration of
the lease, it is but fair and just that respondents be also
held to their obligations thereunder — that is, to pay the
lease rentals for the entire duration of the contract.
Perceptibly, respondents’ gain of profits during such period
presupposes a valid and subsisting lease contract, which is
rendered legally possible if only they themselves
discharged their own obligation to pay the lease rentals

therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated February 28, 2014 and the Resolution dated October
1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 03710
are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deducting
from the counterclaim award of P10,391,987.76 in favor of
the Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. and Rolando Ogsos, Jr.
(respondents) the amount of P900,000.00, which represents
the unpaid lease rentals for the crop years 1999 to 2004 as
above discussed. Moreover, a judgment lien shall be
imposed on the monetary award given to respondents
corresponding to the unpaid docket fees on the permissive
counterclaim. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36, or his
duly authorized deputy, is hereby ordered to enforce the
judgment lien and to assess and collect the appropriate
docket fees from respondents.
SO ORDERED.

455
VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 455

Leonardo-De Castro** (Acting Chairperson), Bersamin

and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Official Business.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with

modification.
Notes.—It has long been settled that while the court

acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the time of
the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid
within a reasonable period. (Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing,
Jr., 705 SCRA 511 [2013])
The petitioner’s counterclaim is a permissible direct
attack to the validity of respondents’ torrens title. (Firaza,
Sr. vs. Ugay, 695 SCRA 26 [2013])

——o0o——
_______________
** Per Special Order No. 2383 dated September 27, 2016.
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1/31/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 805

G.R. No. 221062. October 5, 2016.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Period; Since March 29, 2014

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 439

the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the

counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 441

1 Rollo, pp. 15-44.

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Fermina 230 piculs or 290.95 liquid-kilogram (lkg.)

9 Erroneously dated as “March 27, 2000” by the CA; id., at p. 50.

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 443

dents in default, which the RTC granted in an Order dated

15 Id. (Pleadings and Order mentioned are not attached to the Rollo).

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

respondents’ default in the payment of their debts.22 On

22 Id., at pp. 54, 78-79.

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 445

evidence on their counterclaim ex parte, which the RTC

28 Id., at pp. 51-52 and 125.

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

als during the crop years 1994 to 199735 but eventually

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 447

The counsel of petitioner and Kathryn received the CA

filed such motion on March 31, 2014, thus, rendering the

43 Id., at pp. 63 and 217.

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of

47 Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 214241,

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 449

bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.49 On the other

49 Bungcayao, Sr. v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is

Based on the above mentioned standards, the Court

54 Id., at pp. 265-266; pp. 45-46.

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 451

prove petitioner’s claim that respondents failed to pay lease

Here, respondents cannot be faulted for nonpayment of

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. Instead, the

leased premises for the entire duration of the lease and

57 Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-

59 Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 453

sion of the leased premises, respondents were deprived

60 See Rollo, pp. 130-132.

62 As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Nonetheless, the Court finds it proper to deduct from the

discharged their own obligation to pay the lease rentals

VOL. 805, OCTOBER 5, 2016 455

Leonardo-De Castro** (Acting Chairperson), Bersamin

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with

Notes.—It has long been settled that while the court

** Per Special Order No. 2383 dated September 27, 2016.

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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