ITF VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004.

On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the
system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for
the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election
System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting
and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission.

On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which
allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of
Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid".

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma.
Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the
Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had
been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

Issue: Whether the bidding process was unconstitutional;

Whether the awarding of the contract was unconstitutional;
Whether the petitioner has standing; and
Whether the petition is premature.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID Comelec
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the CAES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC).
Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific
eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from implementing any other contract or
agreement entered into with regard to this project.

Ople vs Torres
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator
Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the
order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order
No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on
the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power
of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance
and cannot be allowed.

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR
RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were
conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular
election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen
senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of
Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th
elected senator.

Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the
validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine
Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue
raised in this petition is likely to arise again

On the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required
under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of
this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such
special election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to Give
Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled
Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible
information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse
of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court
of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by
Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution
of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal
filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of
a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to
make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different
provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those
provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers
would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is
the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation
under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without the probation system.

Estrada v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon
us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides
the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c)
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his
co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A
series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.

RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY

SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'

Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR
PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT
THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA
IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE
PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Umalis vs Guingona
Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati,
March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential
memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations
during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance
and nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the
issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the
Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for
investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in
his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal
Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23,
the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its
Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12)
charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then
President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.

(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency and whether the petitioner can
raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis
for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Held: Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause
and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds
for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to
security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the
Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to
due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings
with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended the
hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance
of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of
what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau
of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of
CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO
eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal.
As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time
at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under
consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the
criminal case. The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of
investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum,
the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid
legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking
into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its
equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the
Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor
General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive
supervening events that cannot be overlooked.

ARCETA VS MANGROBANG

Facts:​ On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a check to Oscar Castro payable to cash for the

amount of Php 740k even with full knowledge that the account has no sufficient fund for the said amount.

The check was subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The City Prosecutor of Metro Manila charged

Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). She did not moved for the charge to be dismissed

and pleaded not guilty. She then petitioned for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the

constitutionality of BP Blg 22 citing the Lozano doctrine.

Issue:​ Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 is the lis mota of the case?

Decision: ​Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. Every law has in its favour the presumption of

constitutionality. To justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution

and not one that is speculative, doubtful or argumentative. Petitioner failed to show that BP Blg 22 by

itself or by implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution.