XIV.

Code of Judicial Conduct

A. Nature of Administrative Cases

OCA v. Judge Castaneda (SKIP)

Liwanag v. Judge Lustre

Facts: A proceeding for the violation of BP 22 was filed by the complainant with the Municipal
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, presided by herein respondent. Complainant Lualhati
M. Liwanag alleges that on several occasions, respondent Judge Paterno Lustre required
of her sexual favors in return for the processing of complainant’s case filed with the
respondent Judge. In one of the several occasions that respondent Judge allegedly had
molested the complainant, respondent allegedly caressed complainant’s breast and
required her to perform “fellatio” for him; and, in one instance, had taken her to
Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna and, as complainant said, “He ordered me to
perform "fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I
also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to
see him again on July 10 in his office.” Succeeding sexual favors were requested by the
Respondent and, when complainant refuses to do so, respondent would allegedly delay
the trial for her case.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent has committed impropriety in the performance of his duties.

Held: Yes. Respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of
members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well; all
to the grave prejudice of the administration of justice.
Respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with complainant in the
photographs submitted as evidence by the Complainant. He conveniently testified that
somebody else had posed for the photograph, but this is obviously an afterthought.
Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her complaint. He
could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to complainant’s charges. If
the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent
with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant
and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs,
respondent would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and under what
circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he failed
to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible
explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a
private room. The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the
officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances
the public’s faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondent’s disgraceful conduct surely
merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the serious
misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules
of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.
Ocampo v. Judge Palamos
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/march2007/MTJ-06-1655.htm

B. 2004 New Code of Judicial Conduct

CANON 1 INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair
trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual
and institutional aspects.

SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of
any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from
any quarter or for any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in
respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct
or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable observer.

SEC. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

SEC. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in
order to maintain and enhanc

CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions
on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding
or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or
otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they
are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not
limited to, instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the
matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter
in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or
the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil
degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings;

SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the
inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the
proceedings.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession
who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their
family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to
receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of
the judiciary.

SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests and
shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their
family.

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them
in the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used
or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law,
the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial
office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest,
loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a
token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge
in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

CANON 5 EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the
judicial office.

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences
arising from various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national
origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and
other like causes.

SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest
bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such
as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on
any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on
any irrelevant ground.

SEC. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting,
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.

CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial
office.

SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.
SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only
the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions,
but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.

SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for
this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial
control, to judges.

SEC. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international
law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.

SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial
duties.

DEFINITIONS
In this Code, unless the context otherwise permits or requires, the following meanings shall be
attributed to the words used:

“Court staff” includes the personal staff of the judge including law clerks.

“Judge” means any person exercising judicial power, however designated.

“Judge’s family” includes a judge’s spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughterinlaw, and any
other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who is a
companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.

This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the provisions or concepts therein are
embodied in this Code: Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of specific
provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
shall be applicable in a suppletory character.

This New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary shall take effect on the first day
of June 2004, following its publication not later than 15 May 2004 in two newspapers of large
circulation in the Philippines to ensure its widest publicity.

C. Rule 140 (Rules of Court)

Re: Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re:

Discipline of Justices and Judges
The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court regarding
the discipline of Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RULE 140

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special
courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of person
who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the
acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law,
the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.cralaw

SEC. 2. Action on the complaint. – If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy
thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10)
days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.cralaw

SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. – Upon the filing of the respondent’s comment, or
upon the expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are
required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report, and recommendation or assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to a
retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a
Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial
Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.cralaw

SEC. 4. Hearing. – the investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and send
notice thereof to both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral and documentary
evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.

The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from
the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant.cralaw
SEC. 5. Report. – Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of
fact and recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record containing the evidence
and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for the
exclusive use of the Court.cralaw

SEC. 6. Action. – The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law may
warrant.cralaw

SEC. 7. Classification of charges. – Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious,
or light.cralaw

SEC. 8. Serious charges. – Serious charges include:chanrobles virtual law library

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an

appropriate proceeding;

5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;

7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;

8. Immorality;

9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;

10. Partisan political activities; and cralaw

11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.cralaw

SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious charges include:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;

3. Unauthorized practice of law;

4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;

5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;

6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and cralaw

7. Simple Misconduct.cralaw

SEC. 10. Light Charges. – Light charges include:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;

3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and cralaw

4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.cralaw

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.cralaw

C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;

3. Reprimand;

4. Admonition with warning.cralaw

SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. – Proceedings against Judges of regular and special
courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and
confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record
of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator.
These amendments to Rule 140 shall take effect on October 1, 2001 following their publication
in two newspapers of general circulation on or before September 15, 2001.cralaw
Prosecutor Hernandez v. Judge Soluren
MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint against Judge Corazon D. Soluren (Judge
Soluren) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.

In a Complaint, dated August 12, 2011, Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Hydierabad A. Casar,
Jonald E. Hernandez, Dante P. Sindac and Aurora, charged Judge Soluren with Gross
Misconduct.

Complainants aver that on June 20 and 22, 2011 and July 19, 2011, Judge Soluren went to the
Aurora Provincial Jail and conferred with the inmates including those who had pending cases
before her sala. This was in contravention of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular
No. 03-2010, dated January 12, 2010, which suspended the conduct of jail visitation and
inspection by Executive Judges and Presiding Judges pending results of the re-examination of
the provisions of A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC.

According to complainants, the purpose of Judge Solurens visit was to persuade the prisoners
into signing a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, calling for the dismissal of
the administrative complaint filed against her by Atty. Juliet M. Isidro-Reyes, District Public
Attorney, Baler, Aurora, and for the removal of Judge Evelyn Atienza-Turla as Presiding Judge
of RTC, Branch 6, Baler, Aurora.

Attached to the complaint were: the certification2ςrνll issued by the Prison Guard
Administrator as proof of Judge Solurens unauthorized visits to the provincial jail and the
affidavit3ςrνll executed by Dolores P. Sollano, her companion during the visits. Also presented
was a subsequent handwritten letter4ςrνll signed by the detention prisoners admitting that they
were not aware of the import of the letter to the Chief Justice due to lack of explanation by Judge
Soluren. They wished to withdraw the same, not wanting to be a part of the conflict between
Judge Soluren and the Public Attorneys Office of Baler, Aurora.

In her Comment,5ςrνll dated November 5, 2011, Judge Soluren admitted that she went to the
Aurora Provincial Jail on four (4) occasions but they were not official jail visitations because she
went there without the presence and assistance of her staff member and not in compliance with
the orders of the Supreme Court.

After the filing of the Reply by complainants and the Rejoinder by Judge Soluren, the OCA
issued its Report, dated August 17, 2012, finding Judge Soluren guilty of Simple Misconduct and
imposing upon her a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from her retirement
benefits in view of her compulsory retirement from the service on January 29, 2012.

The Court resolves to adopt the recommendation.

Judge Soluren opened herself to charges of impropriety when she went to the Aurora Provincial
Jail to solicit the sympathies and signatures of the prisoners, especially those who had pendings
cases in her sala.
This Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but
even the mere appearance of impropriety6ςrνll because the appearance of bias or prejudice can
be damaging as actual bias or prejudice to the publics confidence on the Judiciarys role in the
administration of justice. To say the least, using detention prisoners who had cases before Judge
Soluren cannot be countenanced.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to APPROVE and ADOPT the findings and
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, Accordingly, the Court finds retired
Judge Corazon D. Soluren, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora, GUILTY of
SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and imposes upon her the penalty of FINE in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from her retirement/gratuity benefits.

SO ORDERED.

In Re: Pinto
FACTS
An anonymous letter-complaint dated August 12, 2010 was filed before the Office of the Comi
Administrator (DCA) against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga. Judge Pinto was charged with dishonesty, violation of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Gross Misconduct in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in connection with the reopening of a
criminal case whose decision was already final and executory and subject of an entry of
judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA). The anonymous letter-complaint narrated that despite
the finality of the decision in Criminal Case No. 91-937, Judge Pinto granted the motion filed by
the convicted accused (at large) to reopen the case and to adduce evidence in his behalf. Judge
Pinto alleged that the outright denial of the motion to reopen the case was improper, without
violating the accused’s opportunity to be heard, given the exculpatory evidence presented and
considering the lack of objection by the public prosecutor and the private complainant who were
properly notified of the motion. Judge Pinto also alleged that even granting that her acts were
indeed erroneous, they were done in the exercise of her adjudicative functions which cannot be
made subject of a disciplinary, civil or criminal action absent fraud, dishonesty and corruption on
her part. The OCA found the anonymous letter-complaint meritorious. In the Resolution dated
August 3, 2011, the Court re-docketed the anonymous letter-complaint and required the parties
to manifest if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
filed. In response, Judge Pinto filed a Manifestation and a Supplemental Comment where she
stressed her good faith and honest intention to prevent a miscarriage of justice, which led her to
disregard the mandatory character of the rule on the reopening of criminal cases. She offered her
sincere apologies to the Court and pleaded for compassion and understanding.

ISSUE/S
(1) Whether or Not Judge Pinto should be held liable for gross misconduct

RATIO
Judge Pinto had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion filed by the accused-movant to reopen
Criminal Case No. 91-937 because the CA’s decision, which affirmed the accused-movant’s
conviction, had become final and executory. Judge Pinto’s conduct was contrary to the clear
language of Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that the reopening of a criminal case may only be availed of “at any time before finality
of the judgment of conviction:”
In other words, a motion to reopen a criminal case is not the proper procedural recourse when
there is already a final judgment of conviction. This rule is consistent with the doctrine of finality
of judgment which Judge Pinto failed to apply.

“The doctrine of finality of judgment, which is grounded on fundamental considerations of

public policy and sound practice, dictates that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the
courts must become final and executory at some definite date set by law.”

In this case, the final decision of the CA should have been given effect. Moreover, Judge Pinto
should have respected the final decision of a higher court, instead of replacing it with her own
decision. We have previously ruled that a judge cannot amend a final decision, more so where
the decision was promulgated by an appellate court.

RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga, is found GUlLTY of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE. SO ORDERED.

Uy and Bascug v. Javellana

TOPIC: Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts/Summary Procedure

FACTS:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge,
grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against Presiding
Judge Javellana of the Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS JAVELLANA’S DEFENSE

In People vs. Cornelio, a case for the necessity of holding the accused in
malicious mischief, Judge Javellana detention became evident when it was
issued a warrant of arrest after the filing revealed during trial that the same
of a certain criminal case despite accused were wanted for Attempted
Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Homicide in another case.
Summary Procedure

In People vs. Lopez, a case for Malicious Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion
Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under
the Revised Rule on Summary the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Procedure and, instead, conducted a and added that he could not dismiss the
preliminary examination and
 preliminary investigation in accordance case outright since the prosecution has
with the Revised Rules of Criminal not yet fully presented its evidence.
Procedure, then set the case for
arraignment and pre-trial, despite
confirming that therein complainant
and her witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the material facts alleged
in their affidavits, which should have
been a ground for dismissal of said case.

In another case for trespass to dwelling, the Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a
Judge Javellana did not grant the jurisdictional requirement and the
motion to dismiss for non-compliance Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a
with the Lupon requirement under prohibited pleading under the Revised
Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Rule on Summary Procedure

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.

HELD:

YES. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were
charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the
Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should
be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in
violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that
"the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required."

Also, the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of a criminal case under Rule 16, but In People v. Lopez, Judge Javellana
conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not required or justified.

Further, a case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tapamayapa shall be
dismissed without prejudice.

OAS-OCA v. Judge Macarine

Topic: Freedom of Abode, Freedom to Change Abode and Right to Travel; Constitutional Guarantee Under Sec. 6,
Art. III of the Constitution

Doctrine: The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person
from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.

Quick Facts:

1. The Office of the Court Administrator filed an administrative case against Judge Macarine for violation of
OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
a. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires that judges and court personnel must secure a travel authority
from the OCA by submitting the following documents:
i. 1.) application or letter-request addressed to the Court Administrator stating the
purpose of the travel abroad;
ii. (2.) application for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably
recommended by the Executive Judge; and
iii. (3.) certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office, OCA as to the
condition of the docket.
2. Such requirements must be completed and submitted two weeks before the departure date. And failure
to complete such requirements will be subjected to disciplinary action.
3. On August 23, 2009, Judge Macarine wrote to Court Administrator Jose Portugal Perez requesting that he
be allowed to travel to Hong Kong with his family for his 65 th birthday on September 10-14, 2009. He also
stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave.
4. He did not submit requirement #2 which is application for leave. His application remained unacted upon.
5. Judge Macarine still went to Hong Kong.
6. On Jan. 28, 2010, he was informed that his application was disapproved for failure to complete the
requirements.
a. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to
the seven (7) days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave,
b. He was also required to submit an explanation on his failure to comply with the circular above.

Petitioner’s/Complainant’s Argument

 Judge Macarine claims that it was his daughter who booked the trip to Hong Kong.
 His family flew to Manila from Surigao on September 9, 2009 to complete the requirements.
 However, sensing time constraint and thinking of the futility of completing the requirements before
their scheduled flight, he opted not to immediately complete the requirements and simply went ahead
with their travel abroad. He thought of submitting his compliance upon his return to Manila.
 He acknowledged his mistake and regretted his failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He
promised not to commit the same infraction again. He further requested for reconsideration of the OCA’s
intended action to deduct his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was absent, instead of
charging his absences to his leave credits.
 ***The petitioner didn’t raise the issue about the right to travel but was discussed by the SC in the
decision. ***
Respondent’s Argument:

 OCA found that Judge Macarine is guilty of violating the OCA circular for traveling out of the country
without filing the necessary application for leave and without first securing a travel authority from the
Court.
 OCA decision: Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, MCTC, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte, be FINED in the amount of
P5,000.00 for Violation for Circular No. 49-2003 dated May 20, 2003; and c) the Financial Management
Office, Finance Division, OCA, be DIRECTED to DEDUCT the amount equivalent to the seven (7) days salary
of Judge Ignacio Macarine as a result of his disapproved and unauthorized leave of absence pursuant to
Section 50, Omnibus Rules on Leave, without deducting his leave credits thereof.

Issue:

Is the right to travel absolute?

 NO. It is not absolute.

Should Judge Macarine be absolved for not following the OCA Circular?

 Court said that “we should allow him some leniency” BUT he did violate the OCA Circular by not
completing the requirements. Judges and court personnel must secure a travel authority from the Court
for travels abroad.

Held/ Rationale:

True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such right is not
absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that
such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law.
This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative
supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To
"restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according
to rule.

To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No.
49-2003 requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of absence
duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics Division, Court
Management Office of the OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his Certificate of Service for the month
immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents
within three (3) months from date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.7

For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation of
OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, violation of Supreme Court
directives and circular is considered a less serious charge and, therefore, punishable by suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.8

Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the disciplining authority
the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. The Court had in
several instances refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts, such as the
employee’s length of service, acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feelings of remorse for the same,
advanced age, family circumstances, and other humanitarian and equitable considerations.

In the present case, the respondent, after learning that his daughter had already booked him and his family in a
hotel in Hongkong, immediately went to Manila to secure his travel authority from the Court. However, with the
short period of time from their arrival in Manila on September 9, 2009 up to the time of their booking in Hongkong
from September 13 to 15, 2009, he was pressed for time and opted not to complete the required travel authority,
with the intention of securing one after his travel. The respondent regretted his failure to comply with the
requirements of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He acknowledged his mistake and promised not to commit the same
infraction in the future.

We consider the outlined circumstances as mitigating. Following judicial precedents, the respondent deserves
some degree of leniency in imposing upon him the appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte,
is hereby given the ADMONITION that he acted irresponsibly when he opted not to immediately secure a travel
authority and is saved only from the full force that his violation carries by the attendant mitigating
circumstances. He is also WARNED that the commission of a similar violation in the future will merit a more
severe penalty. The recommendation of the Office of the Court Administration that his absences, which were
unauthorized, shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary is hereby APPROVED.

Gacad v. Judge Clapis

FACTS: In her complaint, CriseldaGacad said that she along with her father and sister-in-law
filed a murder complaint against Rodolfo Comania before the provincial prosecutor’soffice
where they met prosecutor Arafol. Gacad said Arafol even advised her not to hire a private
lawyer.

The next day, Arafol informed Gacad that a murder case against Comania was already filed
before the RTC and that the provincial governor kept on pressuring him about the case.

Gacad said Arafol even suggested to her that they should see Judge Clapis in order that the
motion for re-investigation filed by the accused would be dismissed and that she should prepare
P50,000 for the judge.

Indeed, Gacad claimed she, Arafol and Clapis had met at Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City
wherein they talked about the case. The next day, a cash of P50,000 was allegedly given to
Clapis at Mikos Coffee Bar. And on January 2010, Gacad received a court order handed down by
Clapis denying the accused motion for reconsideration.

Gacad added that Arafol then told him that Clapis wanted to borrow from her P50,000 for his
mother’s medication but she failed to produce the amount. Since then, Gacad said Clapis and
Arafol then always hid from her.

HELD: SC dismissed from government service (RTC) judge based in Compostela Valleyfor
granting bail to a person accused of murder without hearing the evidence of the prosecution.The
Supreme Court further noted Clapis’s act of conducting bail hearing without an application for
bail and his granting of bail to the accused without giving the prosecution an opportunity to
prove that the evidence against the accused is strong. With this, the High Court found Clapis
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt
Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule
1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to a
criminal case.

Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk
about the case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case, Graciano Arafol, informed the
petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her favor but on the pretext that in return she has to
give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the promise of
the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave
it all to me, we shall crush them.)

When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only
after the date of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an application for
bail and granting the same without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt
of the accused is strong. He set a preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set,
patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that
notices were made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides
were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings, petitioner was in court and
the orders were done in open court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently scheduled the
preliminary conference of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.

HELD: YES.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to
violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment.

The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a case pending before his sala and
telling those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial
reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability by
shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for
order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge’s
responsibility.
 The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality,
integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4,
Section 1.

We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without
a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to
prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so
gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law,
there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the
basic requirements of due process.

In re complaint of Marcos against Judge Ferdinand Marcos (1996)

Facts

--‐ Mrs. Marcos was the wife of Judge Ferdinand Marcos. She and her children
complained against her husband alleging that ever since Mr. Marcos was appointed as a
judge of the RTC at Cebu, his family had never seen/took hold of his checks, that they have
only been receiving a minimal amount which was insufficient for their education and for
their sustenance

--‐ Mrs. Marcos and her kids prayed that all the remuneration due Judge Marcos from the
SC be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the school where she has been serving for 20 years to
prevent Mr. Marcos’ mistress from getting them

--‐ Mr. Marcos says that he’s been supporting complainant and was regularly giving
his wife money. He also denies having a mistress

--‐ Deputy Court Administrator recommends: complaint be considered closed and

terminated as there was a letter-withdrawal submitted by complainants

o Report of DCA not approved by the Court Administrator and the case
remained suspended until CJ Davide reported to the court En Banc on the
incident he witnessed at the Fun Run

--‐ Judge Marcos has a woman with him at the Fun Run, upon the CJ questioning
Marcos, he admitted that he had been living with the woman and that he was
separated from his wife

--‐ CJ referred the case to the OCA and suspended Judge Marcos
 o During the hearing it was found out that Judge Marcos indeed have another
woman (bills that were paid by the Judge to an account unfamiliar to
complainant, things that were bought that she didn’t remember seeing, a car was
bought and was registered in Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo etc)

o Judge Marcos: it was actually his wife who had a lover, denies everything
else thrown at him

Issue: w/n Judge Marcos is guilty of violating the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Yes.

Ratio:

--‐ Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle -a Toyota Revo - and
had it registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle
with them as joint beneficiaries. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint
owners of the Toyota Revo.

--‐ Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse
nor even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not
his wife's.

--‐ Jdge Marcos candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice that he had been living
with Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was already separated from his wife. Bringing
Ms. Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste

--‐ considering that Judge Marcos was still very much married even if he and his wife
Rotilla were already living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Tacaldo as if she was
his wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be
beyond reproach.

--‐ The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case
against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once
charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate
and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint.

Judge Marcos is dismissed

Chu v. Judge Capellan (skip)

Belen v. Judge Belen

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge
filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36.

The Facts

Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with grave
abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to complainant, sometime in March 2004,
respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against complainant’s father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was
dismissed for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a
Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and
Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-
Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case.
Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1700. To
refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman, complainant executed an Affidavit
dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman as evidence in the CBD case. Complainant’s
Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were “false”; that Sunega-
Lagman was present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that
she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was
respondent judge who was absent during the hearings.

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the filing
of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning, complainant received a
mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived
and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge,
accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting
complainant’s piggery.

Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and
employees, requesting information on complainant’s piggery and poultry business; advising them of the
alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain environmental laws; and
reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and
license to complainant’s business establishment. We enumerate these letters below.

1. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of

Alaminos, Laguna, requesting confirmation of the issuance by said office of construction,
building and occupancy permits to “Michael B. Belen’s Piggery and Poultry in Brgy. IV and
House in Sta. Rosa,” and stating that non-compliance with, or violation of the National
Building Code is a criminal offense;

2. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal

Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judge’s previous letter dated 15
January 2007; citing provisions of the National Building Code on Building Use Affecting
Health and Safety (Sec. 1.01.05), Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection
and Certificates of Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: “These statutory provisions are
mandatory and any violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal sanctions. Thus, in
accordance with the National Building Code and Code of Conduct of Public Officers that
 mandates action and reply to any complaint within 15 days from receipt, may I know your
official action and reply on the matter”;

3. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser of

Alaminos, Laguna, expressing his appreciation of the “immediate action” taken by the
mayor in relation to the inspection of the piggery and poultry business establishment of
complainant; enumerating the environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e., Sec. 8
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9003, Section 49 of PD 1152, and Section 27 of Resolution No. 33, Series of 1996;
stating that “With the violations of the owner and his farm workers, appropriate criminal
actions shall be instituted against them;” and reminding the mayor that municipal officers
are mandated by environmental laws not to issue municipal clearance and permits, and to
close business enterprises within its jurisdiction, specifically complainant’s piggery and
poultry, violating environmental laws;

4. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel Bueser

of Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken by the mayor in relation to
respondent judge’s earlier letters and complainant’s alleged violation of environmental
laws, and emphasizing the responsibility of the mayor to withhold clearances and permits
from business establishments violating environmental laws;

5. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D. Apostol, the

Municipal Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a copy of the Inspection report
dated 11 January 2007; and

6. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal Engineer of

Alaminos, Laguna, requesting for prompt action on respondent judge’s previous letters
dated 15 and 23 January 2007, with a warning that the failure of the said office to reply to
respondent judge’s inquiries will compel the latter to file administrative and criminal
complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.

All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judge’s official
government position, viz:

From the Chamber of:

Medel Arnaldo B. Belen

Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial region, Calamba City

Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No. 07-246/07-
247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.

In his Comment, respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that as a
landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal complaints against
violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had the right, under the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public information from government offices, especially about the
complainant who was violating numerous laws. Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the
court’s official stationery or letterhead in his correspondence with government authorities and employees
of Alaminos, Laguna. He emphasized that the court’s official letterhead should appear as:
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

4TH JUDICIAL REGION

BRANCH 36

CALAMBA CITY

Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the same in his
private, not judicial, capacity.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding respondent judge guilty of violating Section
4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA stated that while
respondent judge did not actually use the court’s official letterhead but his own personal stationery, his
letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba City, and even stated that his letters
were “from the chambers of” the presiding judge. It is apparent from the acts of respondent judge that he
intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to promote his personal interest.

The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen be fined in
the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-docket the
administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative matter. Subsequently, the
OCA, in compliance with the Court’s Resolution, designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ramon R.
Garcia as the investigating justice of the administrative case.

The Findings and Recommendation

of the Investigating Justice

Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section 4 of Canon
1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary when he used
a letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36.
According to Justice Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead of respondent judge is not the official
letterhead of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of the same reflects respondent judge’s
designation and position in the judiciary, and indicates that the letters came from the “chambers” of the
presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly, respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his judicial
office for his own personal interest.

Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the administrative penalty of
fine in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

The Court’s Ruling

The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are well-taken.
 Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainant’s piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the laws
allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as government
officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing
these letters, respondent judge’s use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the
Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was “from [his] chambers,”
clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his office to influence said
government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those
letters were written. In other words, respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal
interest. This is violative of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. We quote these sections below:

CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE

xxx

SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all
the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.

x x x

In Oktubre v. Velasco, this Court held that respondent judge’s act of sending several letters bearing
his sala’s letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the administration of the estates of his
relatives, clearly showed the judge’s intent to use the prestige of his judicial office, and hence, violative of
Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court considered respondent Judge Velasco’s excuse for
using his sala’s letterhead, i.e., that he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the subject
properties, as flimsy, and emphasized that respondent judge had no business using his sala’s letterhead
for private matters, as the same should be used only for official correspondence.

Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos, it was held that respondent judge’s use of his sala’s official stationery
in his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel constitutes violation of Rule 2.03 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded that: “By using his sala’s stationery other than for official
purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guerrero (and himself) in
violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.”

In Ladignon v. Garong, respondent judge’s act of using the official letterhead of his court and signing
the same using the word “judge” in his letter-complaint to the First United Methodist Church in Michigan,
USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Court held, thus:

We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that “Judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”. (Canon 4,
 Section 1, New Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance
of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior
and everyday life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary. x x x

x x x

x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judge’s] use of the letterhead and his
designation as a Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave “the appearance that there
is an implied or assured consent of the court to his cause.” This circumstance, to our mind,
was what marked the respondent Judge’s use of his letterhead and title as improper. In
other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the
letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances
surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title.

x x x

x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the

surrounding circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the
element of “impropriety” or “appearance of impropriety”. In the present case, the
respondent Judge crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a
complaint involving an alleged violation of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws.
Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed
have conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of
“Judge” or “Justice” in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of
the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line
still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the
title can be used for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the
intent to use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or
other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct) To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and
Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides
that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge punishable by any of the following
sanctions:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that respondent judge,
for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting to P11,000, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and FINE him P11,000, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

D. Rule 137

Disqualification of Judicial Officers

Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas

Facts: Atty. Rojas was appointed a judge. One of the criminal cases he inherited was one in
which he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from presiding on
that case was because it was only after the belated transcription of the stenographic notes that he
remembered that he handled that case. He also says that the counsels did not object and he never
held “full-blown” hearings anyway.

Held: Judge is filed & reprimanded. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases where
they acted as counsel without the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict of
interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no
part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should administer
justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only cover hearings but all judicial
acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which Judge Rojas did make.

People v. Judge Ong and Imelda Marcos (skip)

BGen (Ret.) Ramiscal v. Judge Hernandez

FACTS:

Petitioner, Retired Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), signed several deeds of sale for the acquisition of
parcels of land for the development of housing projects and for other concerns. However, it appears that
the landowners from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots executed unilateral deeds of sale providing
for a lesser consideration apparently to evade the payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee conducted an extensive investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo created a Fact-Finding Commission (Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife,
Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the Commissioners. the Feliciano Commission
submitted its Report recommending, among others, the prosecution of petitioner. President Arroyo then
issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5, 2003, creating the Office of a Presidential Adviser under
the Office of the President to implement the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission. Professor
Carolina G. Hernandez was appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created office. Shortly
thereafter, respondent Justice Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
assigned to its Fourth Division. On October 11, 2004, eight additional informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner. Two were assigned to the Fourth Division of the court. Petitioner filed
two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal
Case Nos. 28022-23 pending before the Fourth Division. Petitioner cited that Justice Hernandez’ wife,
Professor Hernandez, was a member of the Feliciano Commission and was tasked to implement fully the
recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, including his criminal prosecution. Further, the
spousal relationship between Justice Hernandez and Professor Hernandez created in his mind impression
of partiality and bias, which circumstance constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Should the respondent inhibit himself?

HELD: No. In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to
impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part. This position is well-taken by the Court. mere imputation
of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose,
in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The relationship
mentioned in Rule 137, Section 1 becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge
is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to
show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before
the Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section 1
of Rule 137