Should Have Been: Cralaw

[G.R. No.
157838 : February 07, 2012]
CANDELARIO L. VERZOSA, JR. (IN HIS FORMER CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE (IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT), RAUL C. FLORES, CELSO D.
GANGAN, SOFRONIO B. URSAL AND COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision[1] dated March 8, 2011 affirming COA Decision
Nos. 98-424 and 2003-061 dated October 21, 1998 and March 18, 2003, respectively. We upheld the COA's
ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the amount of P881,819.00 under Notice of
Disallowance No. 93-0016-101. cralaw
In compliance with our Resolution dated February 8, 2011, counsel for petitioner filed a Notice,
Manifestation and Apology confirming the demise of petitioner on June 24, 2010 and explaining the reason
for the delay in informing this Court.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner's counsel, son of petitioner, is anchored on the following
grounds:
1) There is no finding of fact in this Court's decision which supports the

serious finding that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon
the DAP-TEC to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the
computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system intended to favor
one of the bidders;
2) Assuming without admitting there was an attempt to alter the results of
the bidding, petitioner was not directly responsible for it since it was a
certain Rey Evangelista whose act in itself did not constitute bad faith as
to be interpreted as deliberately favoring TETRA;
3) The mere fact that petitioner was the signatory in the vouchers and
other documents for the processing of the purchase after the winning
bidder had been chosen does not by itself constitute bad faith, malice or
negligence. His participation as final recommending/approving authority
in the said purchase was merely ministerial;
4) Records of this case show that the COA decisions did not hold petitioner
solely liable for the disallowed amount of P881,819.00; there were
others adjudged solidarily liable with petitioner for the reimbursement of
said amount;
5) The decision in Arriola v. Commission on Audit[2] should have been
applied in this case. The TSO canvass coupled with confirmatory
telephone canvass should be re-examined given the admission made by
the COA Auditor in her 1st Indorsement dated June 6, 1994 and as held
in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno; and
6) The Court should consider the bases of comparison which is made
against a clone generic brand (and its reference price values), in light of
compliance with intellectual property laws on software piracy and
hardware imitations.[3]
On September 15, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment reiterating its position
that petitioner should not have been made liable for the disallowed amount since there was no substantial
evidence of his direct responsibility. It contends that the decision should not have ordered petitioner to
reimburse the disallowed amount on account of "overpricing of purchased equipment" because he did not
have any participation in the bidding that was conducted by the PBAC, nor did he have any participation in
influencing Mr. A. Quintos, Jr., the DAP-TEC evaluator, to change the evaluation results. As to the acts cited
by the COA in holding petitioner liable for the disallowed amount, these cannot be the "clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence" required by law to hold public officers liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties. There was no contrary evidence presented by the COA to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The OSG also cites the discussion in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno that the standards set in Arriola should have been observed by the
COA, i.e., it should have compared the same brand of equipment (with the same features and specifications)
with the items CDA purchased to determine if there was indeed overpricing.
Respondents filed their Comment asserting that the arguments raised by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration do not warrant reversal of the decision rendered by this Court. They point out that the bad
faith of petitioner was satisfactorily established when he prevailed upon DAP-TEC to modify the initial result
of the technical evaluation of the bidders' computer units. As to the contention that petitioner's act of
signing the documents for the processing of the purchase was merely a ministerial function, respondents
noted that the Certification in the Disbursement Voucher for the payment of the computer states that
"Expenses necessary, lawful and incurred under my direct supervision." Such certification definitely
involves the exercise of discretion and is not a ministerial act. Petitioner recommended to the Chairman of
the Board of Administrators of CDA the award of the contract to TETRA upon evaluation by the PBAC which
he reconstituted. He cannot therefore escape liability for the disallowed amount together with the other
liable parties, namely: Mr. Edwin Canonizado, PBAC Chairman, Ms. Ma. Luz Aggabao, PBAC Vice-Chairman,
and PBAC Members Ms. Sylvia Posadas, Ma. Erlinda Dailisan, Mr. Leonilo Cedicol, Ms. Amelia Torrente (IT
Consultant) and CDA Board Chairman Ms. Edna E. Aberilla. As to the argument that the COA-TSO canvass
was not accurate as it compared generic computers with the computers offered by TETRA, respondent
pointed out that aside from having already been passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered, the
report submitted by said office disclosed that certain specifications of the reference computers were either
similar or better than those of the Trigem brand offered by TETRA at a much lower price. COA Auditor
Rubico had allowed a 15% mark up on the prices of the items canvassed by COA-TSO, but still the actual
purchase prices were way above the maximum allowable COA reference prices, hence, the disallowance was
proper.
We find that the arguments raised in the motion have been adequately discussed and passed upon in our
Decision dated March 8, 2011. There are, however, two significant issues that need to be clarified: first,
whether the COA violated its own rules and jurisprudence in the determination of
overpricing; second, whether petitioner may be ordered to reimburse the disallowed amount in the purchase
of the subject computers.

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[G.R. No.

157838 : February 07, 2012]

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1) There is no finding of fact in this Court's decision which supports the

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