Plato1

His Life and Works

1. Profile of His Life

Aristocles was nicknamed Plato (from πλάτοδ = broadness) on account of his broad shoulders.
He was born in Athens in 427 B.C. Coming from a noble family with relatives occupying high
government positions, it was logical that Plato should have taken politics as his career. His
family background, his own aptitudes and upbringing—all pointed towards this direction. It was
his long acquaintance with Socrates, however, and, above all, the unjust execution of his master,
that changed his entire life.
Plato always stayed in Athens, and devoted himself to the pursuit of philosophy and science.
Especially after the foundation of the Academy, he also dedicated himself to the education of the
youth. He would only leave Athens to make trips, usually for political reasons. Only his first trip
abroad was motivated by non-political reasons—this was in 399, after the death of Socrates.
Probably in order to escape from possible persecution, he left along with other disciples of
Socrates for Megara, where he was received as a guest by Euclid. From Megara, Plato went to
Crete, Egypt and Cyrenaica, before returning to Athens around the year 396.2
He made three other trip’s outside of Athens, all as part of his effort to realize his ideal of
the philosopher-king. Plato himself explains this in his 7th letter:
“I was forced to say, when praising true philosophy, that it is by this that men are enabled to
see what justice in public and private life really is. Therefore, I said, there will be no
cessation of evils for the sons of men, till either those who are pursuing a right and true
philosophy receive sovereign power in the States, or those in power in the States, by some
dispensation of providence become true philosophers.”3
While remaining above all a philosopher, Plato always kept his lively interest in politics. It
was an interest that was not without its philosophical side, too, for politics—as we have read
from Plato himself—cannot be separated from philosophy: it finds in philosophy its best
justification and guide.
Plato went on his second trip abroad in the year 388. He went to Tarento and Sicily. It was
in Sicily where he made the acquaintance of the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius I the Old, who for
a number of reasons had Plato sold as a slave. Plato was later ransomed and freed by a friend,
Aniceris. After this, he returned to Athens where he founded the Academy in 387.
At the request of Dionysius the Young, Plato returned to Syracuse in 366 (his third trip), and
remained there until he was once again banished from the land. Nevertheless, he returned there
in 361 (his fourth and last trip) accompanied by some members of the Academy. In 360, Plato
returned to Athens, where he remained until his death in 347 B.C.

1
Excerpts from Ignatius Yarza, History of Ancient Philosophy, Sinagtala Publishers, Manila, 1983.
2
The most relevant information about Plato’s life is found in Diogenes Laertius, III, 1. The little autobiographical
data we have on Plato are found above all in his letters, especially the Seventh Letter.
3
The Seventh Letter, 326 a.

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2. Plato’s Works

The Dialogues

The strong influence exerted by Socrates on Plato is seen not only in Plato’s teachings but
also in Plato’s manner of expounding them. The Dialogues of Plato are nothing but a
transcription, along with Plato’s own adaptations, of the dialogues his master often engaged in.
Socrates, in fact, is the protagonist of most of the Dialogues. Plato, therefore, uses the method of
Socrates, and presents his philosophy in a living, non-systematic way. Each dialogue has a
central theme, but in the course of the conversation, other questions are invariably raised, and
each is resolved in a different way. As in ordinary conversations, recourse is made to metaphors,
analogies, and even myths. Not that Plato had no intention of engaging in real philosophy, for he
uses these devises to better clarify his teaching. He employs myths, for instance, to help the
human spirit soar to heights hardly attainable by reason alone: myths are, for Plato, the intuitive
complement of rational arguments.
Especially during his early years as a philosopher, Plato closely followed the teachings of
Socrates. With time, however, Plato came to know of other philosophers and to mature his own
thought. Cosmology and metaphysics begin to attract his interest along with ethics. The solutions
he adopts gradually take on form peculiar to his way of thinking, thereby constituting a properly
Platonic philosophy distinct from that of Socrates.’ This is reflected in the dialogues which Plato
wrote in his mature years.
To attempt a precise chronological listing of the works of Plato is no easy task.
Nevertheless, it is necessary for an over-all understanding of his philosophy. Leaving aside the
many problems historians of Plato have had to grapple with in tracing the evolution of his
thought, we present the following chronological account of the different dialogues which can be
considered sufficiently accurate.4

Earliest dialogues

The first dialogues of Plato are basically concerned with ethics, and are written in a
thoroughly Socratic way.
They were written after the death of Socrates and before the year 390. Among them are the
Apology, Charmides, the First Book of Alcibiades, the Hippias Minor, and Protagoras. They
deal with virtues like justice and wisdom. Like his master, Plato affirms that virtue can be taught
like any other science, and that ignorance is the origin of evil actions. Genuine wisdom is the
virtue proper to the soul, and it is absolutely necessary in order to act correctly.
After the year 390 and before the period of Plato’s maturity, we have another group of
dialogues characterized also by predominantly ethical themes but showing more maturity and
originality. To this period belong Gorgias, Meno, and Cratylus.

4
G. Reale (“Platone” in Questioni de storiografia filosofica, 1, pp. 181 ff.) gives us a comprehensive picture of the
different interpretations of Plato’s thought.

2
Dialogues of his Mature Years

The second period of Plato is marked by a return to the old metaphysical problems of the
pre-Socratics. Plato realized that the question about man and his moral behavior could not be
answered adequately without recourse to metaphysics. Socrates had developed his ethical
philosophy on the basis of his novel idea of the soul; however, he did not attempt to define its
specific nature and explain why he held the soul to be immortal and superior to the body. His
notion of the Godhead was likewise intuitively rich in content but with hardly any metaphysical
explanation.
It was Plato’s interest in the philosophy of nature that brought him to the discovery of the
Ideas, the supra-sensible reality that constituted the pivotal doctrine of his entire philosophy. He
discusses them at length during this period of his life, and recasts the philosophical insights of
Heraclitus and Parmenides from this new perspective. The maturity of Plato’s thought is
evidenced by the way he dealt with the different problems that his doctrine of Ideas posed.
During his old age, he was to further develop the many insights he discovered during this period.
The dialogues of Plato’s mature years were written between the years 387 and 367. The
most important among them are the Banquet, Phaedo, The Republic, and Phaedrus,

Dialogues of his old age

These dialogues were written between the years 367 and 348. In them, Plato discusses three
questions at length: the metaphysical problem of the Ideas, cosmology, and politics. The political
problems he dealt with were but a continuation of the inquiries he had earlier made in The
Republic. We can read them in the Laws, the last of his dialogues.
Up until then, Plato had separated the sensible from the intelligible world. The only union
between the two that he could conceive of at that time was in the cognitive order. Ontologically,
a problem still remained: What was the reality of the sensible world? What was its relation to the
world of Ideas?
In Theaetetus, Philebus and especially in Parmenides, Plato tackles the question of the
reality of the sensible world. Should we, along with the Eleatics, affirm the unicity of being, and
deny as a consequence the reality of the many? Or rather, should we accept the multiplicity of
being and reject the doctrine of Parmenides? As we shall presently see, Plato proposes his
solutions to these problems in Parmenides and later on in the Sophist: it is in these dialogues
where he further develops his doctrine of the Ideas with the theory of the supreme genera or
community of Ideas. The end result is a rather artificial construction, whereby Plato, in a way
that is more logical than real, manages to preserve the world of the senses without giving up the
world of Ideas.
Timaeus contains Plato’s cosmology, which is also related to the doctrine of Ideas. Plato
assumes the existence of an uncreated matter from which the world was formed thanks to the
work of the Demiurge.

Unwritten teachings

Besides what we find in the Dialogues, Plato has some teachings which we do not find in his
writings but which have been transmitted to us by Aristotle. These teachings have been called

3
Plato’s esoteric doctrines. They give us another, more profound, explanation of his theory of
Ideas—how the ideas and all of reality proceeded from the principles of the One and the big/
small Diad.
Some of Plato’s historians are of the opinion that these teachings only represent the final
phase of his thought. Others think that they contain the central core of Plato’s thought which he
already subscribed to during his mature years. If the latter were true, the teachings contained in
the Dialogues would still reflect Plato’s philosophy, but they would have to be complemented for
a deeper understanding by this unwritten theory of the principles.5

3. Metaphysics

The Ideas

The doctrine of Ideas constitutes the center of Platonic thought. Plato evaluates other
philosophers from this standpoint, and devotes himself to finding answers for the new questions
which this doctrine, in its turn, posed. In spite of the many difficulties Plato had to face on
account of this teaching, he constantly upheld its validity and importance.
Plato explains how he came to discover the world of Ideas in the Phaedo. Using Socrates as
his mouthpiece, he recalls his desire to know the cause of sensible reality.
“When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of
philosophy which is called the investigation of nature.”6
After describing the vain attempts of the pre-socratics to explain the origin of the sensible world
through various material elements (water, earth, air, fire...), he gives his own answer—the
intelligible world of the Ideas. He describes his discovery as a second navigation:
“I will explain to you, if you like, the second navigation I have made in search of the
cause... I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts. I
shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of everyone, and
first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the
like...”
“I cannot help thinking, if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty should
there be such, that it can be beautiful only in so far as it partakes of absolute beauty.”7

5
Among other reasons, the negative attitude of Plato himself regarding putting one’s thoughts into writing (cf.
Phaedrus, 274 c ff. and Seventh Letter, 341 a), leads us to think that these teachings do not represent a tentative
phase in the development of his thought but the final conclusion of his philosophy which he chose to keep within the
limited circle of his disciples on account perhaps of their highly speculative and abstract nature. See L. Robin, La
theorie platonicienne des Idees et des Nombres d’ apres Aristotle, Paris 1908, for arguments defending the late
chronological position of Plato’s unwritten teachings, and which consequently limit their importance. See H.
Kramer, Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica, Milan 1982; and G. Reale, Per una rilettura e una nuova
interpretazione di Platone, Milan 1984, for arguments defending the key role played by the doctrine of the
principles in understanding the teachings contained in the Dialogues.
6
Phaedo, 95e.
7
Phaedo, 99 e. By “second navigation,” Plato means the intellectual effort one personally exerts to discover the
truth. The “first navigation” refers to the thoughts of other philosophers which he would have earlier acquired. The
comparison.is taken from the vocabulary of the sailors of time, for whom the first navigation meant allowing the

4
 Plato, therefore, affirms that there are two orders of reality— one which is sensible and
material; another which is immaterial and invisible, and which can only be grasped by the
intellect.

Nature of the Ideas

It is not the concept or universal which Plato endows with subsistence when he speaks of the
Idea. Idea for him means being or the truly real. It is that which the mind looks at when it thinks.
Without Ideas, there would be no thought at all. It is the essence, cause and principle of all
things. Intelligible by its very nature, the Idea can be grasped but not produced by the
intelligence.
For Plato, Ideas exist by themselves and in themselves. In saying this, he rejected the
relativism of Protagoras, who made truth depend on the knowing subject. At the same time, he
also rejected the relativism of the Heracliteans, who affirmed that the nature of things was not
stable, and, therefore, not intelligible.
“It is evident that things have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in
relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are
independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.”
Moreover, Ideas are immutable unlike the ever-changing world of the sensible.
“‘Well then’, added Socrates, ‘let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one
seen, the other unseen.
‘Let us suppose them’
‘The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?’ ‘That may also be
supposed.’”8
We see the influence of Parmenides in Plato’s doctrine of the Ideas: Ideas constitute the
world of what is truly real, and this world is completely immutable. On the other hand, we also
see the influence of Heraclitus when Plato speaks of the physical world as constantly changing.
Plato’s teaching of the two separate worlds of the sensible and intelligible is, therefore, a
synthesis of the philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus.9
Plato’s dualist vision of reality was severely criticized by Aristotle. On one hand, Plato
affirms two distinct levels of reality—one sensible and the other intelligible. These two levels are
completely separated from each other because the Ideas transcend the ontologically different
world of the sensible (this aspect of Platonic philosophy is discussed in detail in the dialogues
that followed the Phaedo). But on the other hand, Plato also affirms that the Ideas are the cause
of the sensible: they exist in the sensible and make them to be what they are (this is emphasized
especially in the earlier dialogues).

ship to be led along its route by a clement breeze, while the second navigation meant using all one’s expertise as a
sailor to navigate the ship event against contrary winds.
‘This interpretation of the Ideas seems to be more acceptable than the interpretation given by Aristotle (see H.
Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Baltimore 1944).
8
Phaedo, 79 a.
9
It is almost certain that Plato was familiar with the poem of Parmenides since he makes direct references to this
poem in his Dialogues. As regards the philosophy of Heraclitus, Plato probably came to know of it through Cratylus,
for Aristotle tells us in his Metaphysics that Plato was Cratylus’ disciple during his youth (I, 6, 987, a 33).

5
 In saying that Ideas are the cause of the sensible, Plato wanted to point out that the visible
world of nature could not be explained apart from the intelligible. This affirmation was readily
accepted by Aristotle. What Aristotle objected to was the transcendent character of Plato’s Ideas:
if the Ideas transcended the physical world, how could they be its cause? It was this problem that
gave Plato his greatest difficulties. Plato tried to solve it in various ways.
In some dialogues, he explained the relation between the sensible and the intelligible in
terms of participation or imitation; in other dialogues, he used the ideas of community and
presence. We shall not discuss each of these theories in detail or analyze the difficulties they
involve. What we wish to point out is that Plato understood that some point of contact between
the world of sense and the world of ideas was necessary, since one was the cause of the other.
However, as we shall see presently, Plato’s solution did not answer all his problems.

Hierarchy of Ideas

With the doctrine of Ideas, Plato found answers to some of the contradictions in the
philosophies of his predecessors. There was one problem, however, which remained to be
solved: how to find a principle of unity for the multiplicity of the world of Ideas. If he found no
solution to this problem, his intelligible world of Ideas—as Aristotle would later on point out—
would be a useless replica of the sensible world.
Plato had conceived of a multiplicity of Ideas: there were moral and aesthetic Ideas, Ideas of
sensible realities, and even Ideas of artificial things: everything that existed had a corresponding
Idea. But there had to be an order or hierarchy among the Ideas, and a First from which all the
other Ideas proceed. At the same time, Plato had to take into consideration the Eleatic doctrine
according to which the multiplicity presented to us by the senses was only an appearance since
there only was one reality: the being of Parmenides, which, like the Ideas, was immutable and
eternal.
Plato gives different orders among the Ideas in different dialogues. And each time he
discusses the question, the problem posed by the being of Parmenides is always present in the
background.
a) In the Republic, Plato establishes a hierarchy among the Ideas, with the Idea of the Good
as the unconditioned principle of the truth and being of the other Ideas. He presents his doctrine
with descriptive imagery:
“That which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what
I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem to be the cause of
science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful
too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as
more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly
said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth
may be deemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honor yet
higher. (...)
“You would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all
visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not
generation?”
“Certainly.”

6
 “In like manner, the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all
things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far
exceeds essence in dignity and power.”10
Using the simile of the sun, Plato describes the relation of the Idea of Good with regard to
the other Ideas, but does not explain the basis of this relation and its exact nature. He does not
clarify how the Ideas are related with one another and how they all depend on a single principle.
More than answering the problem, therefore, Plato puts it in greater relief. The need for a
satisfactory solution will make itself more strongly felt in the later dialogues.
b) In the second half of Parmenides, Plato expressly rejects the Eleatic notion of Being as
One. If sensible multiplicity is to be affirmed (and with it, the multiplicity of the Ideas which
cause the sensible), the being of Parmenides cannot be accepted. Plato argues his points
logically: the One cannot be separated from the many, because in the same way as there can be
no multiplicity without the One, there cannot be a One without multiplicity.
“Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor any of the others either as one or many; for
you cannot conceive the many without the one.”11
Having put forward this answer to the absolute unicity of the being of Parmenides, Plato was
in a position to affirm the multiplicity of Ideas. But one problem remained to be solved— that of
movement; for even granting that many Ideas exist, they still are endowed with a permanence
and immutability no less than the being of Parmenides. How then can movement be explained?
c) It is in the Sophist where Plato continues his attempt to overcome the Parmenidean
dilemma. In order to do this, he modifies his own teaching by introducing the doctrine of the
supreme genera of Ideas.
After discussing the opinions of the ancient philosophers about being, the protagonist of the
dialogue, the Stranger from Elea, inquires about the teachings of the “friends of the Ideas.”
“You would distinguish becoming from being, would you not?”
“Yes.”
“And you would affirm that by means of the body and through perception we participate
in becoming; on the other hand, that by means of the soul and through thought, we
participate in true essence; and essence you would affirm to be always the same and
immutable, whereas generation or becoming varies.”12
Plato’s doctrine and the problems that it raises lead him to affirm the existence of the
supreme genera of the Ideas —Being, Rest and Movement. But in order for Being (and in like
manner, Rest and Movement) to be what it is, it has to be identical with itself and different from
the other genera. Plato, therefore, adds two new Ideas to the list of the supreme genera—that of
Identity and Diversity. Each one of the supreme Ideas is different from the rest, by virtue of its
participation in the idea of Diversity, and it is identical to itself in virtue of its participation in the
idea of Identity.

10
Republic, VI, 508 e.
11
Parmenides, 166 b.
12
Sophistes, 248 a.

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 Through participation in these five supreme genera, Plato allows for the existence of
movement. Movement is a participation in two Ideas, that of Being and Diversity; because it
participates in the latter, it is—like the other Ideas—different from Being, and is therefore non-
being in some way.
“The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not?”
“Nothing can be plainer.”
“Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class; for the nature
of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so non-
existent.”13
However, Plato does not affirm that everything participates in everything. Like the letters of
the alphabet which cannot simply combine in just any way, there is a limited number of ways
whereby Ideas can participate in one another. It belongs to the philosopher to determine these
different combinations.
Plato overcomes the solid block of Parmenidean being by affirming that “non-being has an
assured existence and a nature of its own.”14 The unicity of the being of Parmenides is overcome
by acknowledging the existence, alongside Being, of other supreme genera: these supreme
genera exist in as much as they participate in Being; but they are also non-being in so far as they
are distinct from Being; and since Movement exists, the problem of their immobility is also
overcome. Moreover, Ideas participate in one another, and this also solves the problem of the
permanence and immobility that was earlier attributed to the Ideas.
d) The world of Ideas of Plato has other properties. In the Philebus, Plato speaks about the
Unlimited and the Limited, a doctrine of Pythagorean origin. The Limited determines the
Unlimited by virtue of an intelligent cause, and from this union emerges a mixture of what is
limited and what is unlimited.15 It is not easy to interpret the nature of these four elements within
the framework of the world of Ideas alone. It would seem necessary to relate this doctrine with
the cosmology described in Timaeus. In this case, the unlimited would correspond to the
material, indeterminate or infinite element; the limited would correspond to the formal principle
that determines matter; the mixture would result from the union of both principles; and the cause
of the mixture would be the divine mind.16
e) In his unwritten teachings, Plato identifies the One and the Diad big/small as his ultimate
principles. All beings—in each one of the different orders of being: Ideas, Number-Ideas, and
sensible reality- proceed from these two principles. Things come to exist by virtue of the One
and the unlimited multiplicity of the Diad. The sensible world, just like the intelligible world,
would be constituted by a material principle (the Diad) and a formal principle (the One).
Everything that exists, exists as something concrete, determined, distinct, identical to itself and
permanent, insofar as it participates in the One; but in order for it to be some concrete thing by
participating in the One, it must at the same time participate in the opposite principle of
unlimited multiplicity.

13
Sophistes, 256 e.
14
Cf. Sophistes, 258 d.
15
Cf. Philebus, 12 c.
16
Cf. G. Reale, o.c., II, pp. 60 ff.

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 If the assumption is correct that these unwritten teachings represent not the final phase but
the nucleus of Plato’s doctrine of the Ideas, it becomes easier to interpret the different Dialogues.
The Good of the Republic, whose essence Plato does not disclose,17 would be the One of the
esoteric teachings. By identifying the One with the Good, Plato explains how the one acts as the
cause of being, of essence, of the truth, and of the knowability of the Ideas. In the Parmenides,
Plato postulates the reality of the many alongside the reality of the one, of non-being alongside
being; in this way, it becomes necessary to affirm a duality of first principles. For its part, the
Sophist should be interpreted as dealing not with the first principles but with some problems that
assume the existence of the two first principles. The supreme genera of the Ideas would be
absolutely supreme since they are still limited; this limitation points to a still higher genera—that
of One and the Diad—which, consequently, would go beyond being. As for the Philebus, we can
easily see the relationship of the Limited and the Unlimited to the One and the Diad.18

4. Ethics

The difficulties which Plato encountered in explaining the relationship between the sensible
and the intelligible are brought to sharper focus in his philosophy of man, a being composed of
body and soul. The Orphic-Pythagorean strain in Platonism is very much felt in the field of
ethics: for Plato, body and soul are not only different from each other but also opposed and
irreconcilable.
The body is described as the jail and tomb of the soul.19 Man is deprived of true life for as
long as he remains chained to the body since the essence of man is his soul. It is the body that
gives rise to every conceivable evil—the passions, strife, ignorance, etc.
Plato’s ethics looks, therefore, to freeing the soul from its bondage to the body. It seeks
purification from the sensible and awaits death as the beginning of true life.
“Whence come wars, arid fighting, and factions? Whence but from the body and the lusts
of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired
for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all these impediments we
have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and
betake ourselves to some speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing
turmoil and confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from
seeing the truth. It has been proven to us by experience that if we would have pure
knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul herself must behold things
in themselves; and then we shall attain the wisdom we desire, and of which we say that
we are lovers, not while we live, but after death.”20
Sensible pleasures are, therefore, devoid of moral value; or better still: they have to be
regarded as the antithesis of the good.21 On the other hand, the intellectual life is more akin to
17
“Let us leave aside for the moment the question as to whether or not this be the Good in Itself...” (Republic, VI,
506 d).
18
15A clear and brief exposition of the unwritten teachings of Plato can be found in E. Berti, Aristotele. Dalla
dialettica alia filosofia, Padua 1977, pp. 95 ff. For an interpretation of the Dialogues in the light of Plato’s unwritten
teachings, see H. Kramer, op tit., pp. 178-213.
19
Cf. Gorgias, 492 e.
20
Phaedo, 66 b.
21
Cf. Phaedo, 83 b. In later dialogues, however, Plato mitigates this anti-hedonistic position by distinguishing
pleasures according to the different parts of the soul they correspond to—concupiscible, irascible and rational. For

9
divine life, and although this is not completely attainable in this life, man can and ought to strive
for it.
The road towards the true life of the spirit is a path of purification where man exerts effort to
reach genuine wisdom. The soul is purified as it reaches ever higher degrees of knowledge; it is
healed of its sensible affections and made virtuous. Plato subscribes, therefore, to the
intellectualism of Socrates. Although he does acknowledge an irrational part of the soul (that
corresponding to the concupiscible and irascible appetites), he nevertheless gives primacy to the
rational part and makes virtue depend exclusively on it. The presence of a volitional element of
the soul is implicitly and intuitively described in Plato’s discussion of love. Love is conceived as
the impulse towards beauty, wisdom and goodness; it is the striving for happiness in the
possession of the absolute.22
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the contemplative life, which for Plato was the
ethical ideal, was also a religious ideal. The divinity belonged to the transcendent order. Ideas
have a divine character, just like the Demiurge and the soul; and the life which most closely
reflects the divinity is the life of virtue.23
“God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man, as men commonly say
(Protagoras)... And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like him
and such as he is... This is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all
sayings—that for the good man to offer sacrifices to the gods, and hold converse with
them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best
of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet.”24

5. Politics

Socrates never wanted to involve himself in politics. Plato, on the other hand, always felt an
attraction for it, and was only prevented from doing so by the political circumstances of his time
and by the unfortunate death of his master. However, his interest in politics remained with him
for the rest of his life, and was intimately linked to his philosophy.25
According to Plato, only philosophers qualify to be genuine politicians, for only they
possess true knowledge. Moreover, man is above all his soul, and so the soul must be the first
concern of the statesmen.26

Plato, the true pleasures would be those that correspond to the rational soul, although he does not condemn the
others provided they remain subordinated to the superior part of the soul.
22
Plato gives much thought to the question of love and makes it the central theme of the Banquet. Cf. L. Robin, La
theorie platonicienne de l’amour, Paris 1908.
23
Plato conceives divine reality as a multiplicity possessing diverse characteristics. In some cases, it involves
personal deities, like the demiurge, the inferior gods created by the demiurge, and some gods of traditional religion
whom Plato acknowledges; in other cases like that of the Ideas, it involves an impersonal deity. Cf. A. Dies, “Le
Dieu de Platon” in Autour d’ Aristote, Paris 1955, pp. 61-67.
24
Laws, 716 c.
25
The study W. Jaeger makes about Plato in his Paideia tends to emphasize this point. See especially pp. 589 ff.,
which comment on the Republic.
26
Plato puts Socrates forward as the example of a true politician vis-a-vis the sophists: “I think that I am the only or
almost the only Athenian living who practices the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time.” (Gorgias,
521 d). The ethical role which Plato assigns to politics is highly significant and stands in sharp contrast to the way

10
Plato elaborates on his political philosophy in the Republic, the Statesman and the Laws.
a) In the Republic, Plato describes the ideal nature of the state if it is to form perfect men.
The state must be composed of three types of citizens—the workers, the guardians and the
politicians. These three classes correspond to the three kinds of soul.27
The guardians are to forego having their own families and are to relinquish any kind of
private property, possessing what they have in common ownership. This teaching of Plato has
always been a subject of controversy among Plato’s historians, who have interpreted it in
different ways. Certainly, it cannot be understood as an endorsement of Communism or scientific
materialism. Plato’s philosophy is the complete opposite of a materialistic interpretation of man
and society. If there should be an error close to the spirit of Platonism, it would be that of seeing
the whole (the race, the society) as superior to the individual, and the individual merely in
function of the group.
b) Whereas the state depicted in the Republic is somewhat utopic, that which is described in
the Statesman and afterwards in the Laws is more practicable. Plato still maintains that only the
philosopher is qualified for politics since only he is fit to govern according to the standards of
virtue and knowledge. Such qualified men are not to be easily found, however; therefore, he
argues, primacy in the state must be accorded the laws. Having affirmed this, Plato proceeds to
study the different kinds of political constitutions, all of which should be patterned after an ideal
model.
In the Laws, Plato tackles concrete problems and proposes a legislative model for the city. It
has a practical end in view, and it is possible that the constitutions elaborated by Plato’s disciples
were based on this model.

6. The Allegory of the Cave

The well-known allegory of the cave, which appears in the Republic, is useful as a graphic
representation of Platonic thought.
“And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or
unenlightened: —Behold! human beings living in an underground den, which has a
mouth opened towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from
their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can
only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads.
Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the
prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the
way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they
show the puppets.”
“I see.”

political activity is understood today where only economic and individual or party interests are given prime
consideration.
27
It is difficult to look at the Republic as a treatise that deals exclusively with politics. Ethics and politics are closely
related for Plato since he does not distinguish the citizen from the individual man. It is for this reason that Plato
develops the section of the Republic devoted to politics after he has explained his concept of man and of the virtues
a man should live, especially that of justice. See A.E. Taylor, Platone, Florence 1968, pp. 409 ff.

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 “And do you see. I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and
statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which
appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others are silent.”
“You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.”
“Like ourselves,” I replied. “And they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one
another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave.”28
The allegory represents the different degrees of reality, from the shadows of things reflected
on the cave, to the sun. Also represented are the different degrees of knowledge which
correspond to these degrees of reality: at one end is the knowledge of appearances proper to the
prisoners, and at the opposite end is the vision of the sun, the attainment of which requires
having progressively acquired the knowledge of the other objects (the dialectic process, in
Plato’s terms). To arrive at the contemplation of the sun (or science), one must first free himself
from the chains that bind his neck and legs—an allegorical explanation of Plato’s ethics, which
pursues the liberation of the soul from the body and the senses. Finally, whoever has
contemplated the sun cannot but return to the cave for the purpose of liberating the other
prisoners, showing them the truth and exposing their error. This is the task of the philosopher-
king, an undertaking he must pursue even at grave risks, death included (such was the fate of
Socrates). In the allegory, the men bound with chains seek to put to death the man who attempts
to free them from their comfortable but false position.
“Imagine once more,” I said, “such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced
in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?”
“To be sure,” he said.
“And if there were a contest, and he had to compete measuring the shadows with the
prisoners who have never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before
his eyes have become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new
habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of
him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it were better not even
to think of ascending; and if anyone tried to lose another and lead him up to the light, let
them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.”29
The greatness of Platonism lies in its discovery of supra-sensible reality. This discovery
constituted a “radical revolution in the categories of philosophical thought... With his discovery
of the intelligible world, Plato introduced a series of structural changes that revolutionized
ancient thought; sensible reality, now seen in contraposition to supra-sensible reality, was cast in
a completely different way; the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible threw a new
light on the problem of knowledge, which thereupon acquired its genuine significance; the
heightened awareness of the spiritual implications of the knowledge of ideas also revolutionized
the philosophy of man and of moral values, and the interpretation hitherto given to the meaning
of life and of death.

28
The Republic, VII, 514 a.
29
Ibid., 516 e.

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 “Lastly, the divinity is for the first time conceived in a proper way—as an immaterial
reality.”30
Alongside the new vistas of knowledge opened up by Plato’s discovery of the intelligible
world came a host of problems arising from the very principles of the philosophy itself and
which Plato was unable to solve. The root of these difficulties was the thorny question of the
relationship between the sensible and the intelligible, between the world of the senses and the
world of Ideas. As regards man, the problem was one of clarifying the relation between the body
and the soul, two realities which for Plato, were in mutual opposition. Plato’s views on the
subject only heightened the awareness of the problem. Also vexing was his three-fold division of
the soul and his affirmation that several divine beings existed. It was this legacy of insights and
difficulties that Plato passed on to his disciple Aristotle, who in turn, took up the challenge by
building on this foundation a philosophy of his own.

30
G. Reale, o.c., II, p. 233.

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