Chapter

NARCISSISM OR JUSTICE: IS IT
IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER?

Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, US

ABSTRACT
Social psychological conceptions of narcissism have conceptualized
it as a dispositional trait, leading to what might be termed the “Passover
question”: How is this trait different from all other traits? This chapter
responds to that question by classifying narcissism instead as a label for
the activation of a universal justice motive (M. J. Lerner 2003, D. T.
Miller 2001). That argument is developed and elucidated through
descriptions of multiple parallels between narcissistic behaviors and
documented responses to justice threat. In addition, multiple experimental
tests that could confirm or disconfirm our perspective are proposed.

INTRODUCTION
Narcissists are preoccupied with dreams of success, power, beauty,
and brilliance. They live on an interpersonal stage with exhibitionistic
behavior and demands for attention and admiration but respond to threats


Corresponding author: Yogesh Raut. Department of Psychology, MSC 3452, New Mexico State
University, P. O. Box 30001, Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001. E-mail: [email protected].
2 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

to self-esteem with feelings of rage, defiance, shame, and humiliation. In

addition, they display a sense of entitlement and the expectation of
special treatment. They are unwilling to reciprocate the favors of others
and are unempathetic and interpersonally exploitative. In addition … they
have relationships that oscillate between idealization and devaluation
(Morf and Rhodewalt 2001, p. 177).

Narcissism is poorly understood. Its etiology is unclear (Thomaes,

Bushman, Orobio de Castro and Stegge 2009). It is methodologically difficult
to distinguish from normal functioning (Foster and Campbell 2007). It is
defined in terms of a self-view (Raskin and Terry 1988), but the content and
structure of that self-view remain a matter of fierce debate (c.f. Bosson et al.
2008). It has been divided into subtypes that bear little resemblance to each
other (Dickinson and Pincus 2003, Wink 1991). Theoretical models draw on
the psychodynamic (Kernberg 1986, Kohut 1966), clinical (Westen 1990),
addiction (Baumeister and Vohs 2001), personality (Bradlee and Emmons
1992), motivation (Foster and Trimm 2008), self-control (Vazire and Funder
2006), self-regulation (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001), self-esteem (Campbell,
Rudich and Sedikides 2002, Kernis 2001, Zeigler-Hill 2006), and evolutionary
(Holtzman and Strube 2011) literatures with little or no attempt at unification.
Most relevantly, all of these perspectives either do not address or, in our
opinion, fail to convincingly answer a key question: Why does narcissism
exist? It is commonly held in psychology that narcissism is a form of self-
esteem (c.f. Bosson and Swann 2009) and self-esteem is a sociometer for
gauging one’s level of acceptance within a group, thus allowing one to adjust
one’s behavior if one is in danger of rejection (Leary and Downs 1995).
However, if narcissism is an adaptation designed for belongingness regulation,
it is a singularly illogical one. Rationally speaking, a group member in danger
of being outcast should focus on winning the support of other group members,
even to the point of obsequiousness. Narcissists, by contrast, lash out through
aggression (Baumeister, Smart and Boden 1996, Bushman and Baumeister
1998) and derogation (Kernis and Sun 1994) when things don’t go their way.
They are also marked by high levels of disagreeableness, as indexed by both
trait measures (Bradlee and Emmons 1992, Paulhus and Williams 2002) and
overt acts (Holtzman, Vazire and Mehl 2010).
Thus, we believe it unlikely that narcissism arose as a functional
adaptation. Rather, we suggest that it is the byproduct of a universal motive for
fairness, or justice (c.f. M. J. LernerLerner 2003), which may itself have
evolved as a signal of one’s value to a group (Lind and Tyler 1988).
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 3

Our argument is predicated on parallels; from the sources cited above, we

have synthesized a narcissism syndrome reflecting a consensus view of the
features most commonly associated with narcissism, and in this chapter we
will demonstrate striking similarities between the narcissism syndrome and the
cognitions, affects, motivations, and behaviors linked to the activation of the
justice motive.

DEFINITIONS
Researchers conceptualize narcissism as a mélange of intrapersonal
cognitions and affects and interpersonal behaviors broadly organized around
the themes of constructing, presenting, maintaining, and defending the self-
concept (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001). For the purposes of simplicity, in
cataloging the components of the narcissism syndrome below we will accept
any operationalization of narcissism that has been published in a major peer-
reviewed journal; later in the chapter, we will present our own conception.
Nearly all of these operationalizations use some version of the dyadic, forced-
choice, self-report measure known as the Narcissistic Personality Inventory
(NPI, Raskin and Terry 1988).
Justice, for the purposes of this paper, refers to a tightly linked
constellation of cognitions comprising distributive justice (the belief that
treatment and outcomes should be proportional to one’s worth), procedural
justice (the belief that one is entitled to voice objections to, and hear
justifications for, one’s treatment by others), and retributive justice (the belief
that it is permissible to take negative actions against the source of an
injustice1). Justice threat occurs when a violation of distributive or procedural
justice (pertaining either to the self or to others 2) is witnessed; it is
accompanied by a compulsion to act in the service of retributive justice (see D.
T. Miller 2001, for an overview). Justice is a concern of animals (Brosnan and
de Waal, 2003) and very small childrenhuman babies (c.f. Bloom 2013) and is
considered a basic foundation of universal morality (Fehr, Bernhard and
Rockenbach 2008) and is considered a basic foundation of human morality
(Haidt 2012) linked to an adaptive suite of cognitive, affective, and perceptual

1
Some have demarcated retributive justice from restorative justice, which is a dispassionate
motive to exact only a limited amount of punishment, but Gollwitzer (2009) convincingly
argues that this distinction does not exist in practice.
2
See Meindl and M. J. LernerLerner (1983) for evidence that the justice motive extends beyond
the self.
4 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

phenomena (Tetlock and Fincher 2015). A list of shared features between

narcissism and justice is explicated in the following paragraphs.
ON THE PARALLEL STRUCTURE OF
NARCISSISM AND JUSTICE STRIVING
Entitlement. Twenge and Campbell’s (2009) popular book on narcissism
was subtitled “Living in the Age of Entitlement,” and nearly all descriptions of
the narcissism syndrome include the word “entitlement” somewhere. This
makes it quite fascinating that D. T. Miller (2001) writes, “To ask people what
they consider … unjust is, basically, to ask them what they consider people to
be entitled to from others” (p. 531) and later, citing Furby (1986), adds, “The
question of what people are entitled to is fundamentally a question about what
it means to be a person” (p. 545).
Indeed, one of the items on the NPI is “I insist upon getting the respect
that is due me” (Raskin and Terry 1988, p. 894). In his highly influential book
A Theory of Justice, the philosopher John Rawls (1971) defines justice as the
right to be treated in a way that fosters self-regard, and it appears that
narcissists are intuitive Rawlsians. Yet a sense of entitlement to certain
interpersonal considerations, sometimes termed interactional justice (Bies and
Moag 1986), is hardly unique to narcissists. Most people believe that they are
entitled to interpersonal sensitivity (polite and respectful treatment),
accountability (explanations for actions with personal consequences for them),
and voice (to have a say and be listened to in dealings with others, see Lind
and Tyler 1988, D. T. Miller 2001, Tyler and Lind 1992 for reviews).
Of course, the entitlement that characterizes the narcissism syndrome is
relative; narcissists believe that they are entitled to more than others.
Intriguingly, this exact belief is mirrored in a series of studies by Zitek, Jordan,
Monin and Leach (2010), who found that experimentally inducing a sense of
injustice directly results in an increased sense of entitlement. As they put it,
“Wronged individuals feel that they have already done their fair share of
suffering … and consequently, they feel entitled to spare themselves some of
life’s inconveniences” (p. 245). In other words, to experience injustice is to
believe oneself deserving of a better level of treatment from the world at large
than other, non-wronged people.
Hypervigilance. Using a lexical decision task, Horvath and Morf (2009)
found that narcissists are highly sensitive to subliminally presented words
connoting worthlessness, indicating a “chronically vigilant state to detect
potential threats” to their self-concept (p. 1253). This neatly parallels findings
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 5

showing that after justice threat is invoked, justice-related words “pop out”
such that they are more detectable near the threshold of awareness (Gantman
and Van Bavel 2014) and create more interference on a modified Stroop task
(Hafer 2000).
Dualism. Just as narcissists see others as either angels or demons, a
tendency called splitting in the psychodynamic literature (Kernberg 1975,
Kohut 1971, see Siegel 2006 for empirical validation), perceivers tend to
assimilate injustice scenarios to a schema that separates the parties involved
into a moral patient, who is harmed, and moral agent, who does the harming.
This process is known as moral typecasting (Gray, Young and Waytz 2012).
Self-defeating behavior. Vazire and Funder (2006) and J. D. Miller et al.
(2009) both connect narcissism with self-defeating behavior, or behavior that Formatted: Font: Italic
undermines one’s own goals, life success, and well-being. Correspondingly,
while M. J. LernerLerner (2003) notes that combating injustice drains
cognitive resources and impairs the ability to act in one’s best interests (see pp.
394-396). At a broader level, narcissistic behaviors, such as self-enhancement,
are often linked to positive consequences in the short term and negative
consequences in the long term (Colvin, Block, and Funder 1995, Paulhus
1998, Robins and Beer 2001). This pattern is mirrored in the lives of people
who perceive themselves as victims of discrimination; that perception helps
buffer their self-esteem in the short term (Crocker and Major 2003) but has a
deleterious effect on their long-term well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt and
Harvey 1999).
Emotions, motivation, and self-regulation. Viewing or experiencing
injustice is typically accompanied by a combination of anger and a powerful
drive to engage in active punishment (Goldberg, J. S. Lerner and Tetlock
1999, Mikula, Scherer and Athenstaedt 1998), and while linkages remain
speculative at the moment, it is suggestive that narcissists are particularly
prone to both reactive anger (Rhodewalt and Morf 1998) and proactive (or
approach) motivation-related behaviors (Foster and Trimm 2008). In addition,
both narcissists (Tracy, Cheng, Robins and Trzesniewski 2009) and victims of
prejudice (Crocker and Major 1989) engage in self-protective attributions in
order to ward off feelings of shame.
Lack of empathy. Narcissists have the capacity for empathy, but rarely feel
it (Hepper, Hart and Sedikides 2014). It seems plausible that sufferers of
injustice would be equally unlikely to extend a warm heart to non-sufferers
(c.f. D. T. Miller 1977), and the results of DeWall and Baumeister (2006,
Study 4) are indirect but suggestive in this regard. They found that participants
who were giving false feedback stating they would end up alone in life due to
6 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

their personality were unempathetic toward a target who had recently gone
through a breakup.
While the authors did not interpret these results through the lens of justice,
it does not seem unreasonable to assume that being unilaterally informed that
one would will be denied the experience of lifelong companionship, especially
in a culture wherewhen one believes that most people in one’s culture do get to
have that experience, activated activates a sense of both distributive and
procedural injustice. The solicitation of sympathy on behalf of a person whose
suffering was comparatively minor no doubt exacerbated the experience
feelings of relative deprivation, to the extent that one participant
spontaneously responded, “Tough shit!” (p. 10).
Hostility and antagonism. Hostility and antagonism, extremely common
components of the narcissism syndrome (Rhodewalt and Morf 1995, Ruiz,
Smith and Rhodewalt 2001), also rise in response to prejudiced treatment (e.g.,
Major, Kaiser and McCoy 2003).
Politicized collectives, which are often formed around fairness concerns,
make adversarial attributions for the behavior of others (Simon and
Klandermans 2001). Recipients of manipulated social rejection, which as
noted above is possibly construed as justice threat, are more likely to project
hostility into neutral information (DeWall, Twenge, Gitter and Baumeister
2009). Participants who were given a test manipulated to be difficult and told
that it was diagnostic of their achievement were subsequently rated as hostile
and antagonistic by interaction partners, but only when they had high self-
esteem (Heatherton and Vohs 2000); those with low self-esteem likely did not
consider the test to be unfair.
Aggression. Narcissism is generally associated with aggression in
response to threat (Baumeister, Bushman and Campbell 2000), but some of the
most famous studies of narcissistic aggression suggest a pattern in line with
retributive justice concerns. In Bushman and Baumeister (1998), narcissists
who were given gratuitously cruel feedback on an essay they had written, and
were given no chance to answer the criticisms, aggressed against the evaluator,
but not against a third party. This is in line with research on general
populations, who respond to unfairness with aggression (Baron 1988, Baron,
Neuman and Geddes 1999) but mitigate that aggression when they feel that the
target doesn’t deserve it (Johnson and Rule 1986, Kremer and Stephens 1983,
Twenge, Baumeister, Tice and Stucke 2001).
In apparent contrast, Twenge and Campbell (2003) found that threatened
narcissists did aggress against an innocent third party. However, in this case
they had been rejected by an entire group, and as Twenge (2005) pointed out,
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 7

the third party was a student at the same university as the rejecting group and
thus could be classified as part of them. Taken together, these results are
consistent with a rule of personal retribution for a personal crime and
collective retribution for a collective crime. Twenge and Campbell (2003)
even explicitly invoke justice concerns in the title of their article, quoting a
statement by one of the Columbine shooters: “Isn’t it fun to get the respect that
we’re going to deserve?”

NARCISSISM AND JUSTICE: IS THERE A DIFFERENCE?

In addressing the issue of defining narcissism, we draw attention to an
article in the widely-read peer-reviewed journal American Psychologist by Sue
et al. (2007) about the necessity to be alert to racial microaggressions in order
to combat the deleterious effects of systematic racism. In defining and
describing what a microaggression is, the authors recount an anecdote from the
point of view of the first author, Columbia psychology professor Derald Wing
Sue, in which he (an Asian American) was traveling on a small, unpopulated
airplane flight with an African American male friend.

As the attendant was about to close the hatch, three White men in
suits entered the plane, were informed they could sit anywhere, and
promptly seated themselves in front of us. Just before take-off, the
attendant proceeded to close all overhead compartments and seemed to
scan the plane with her eyes. At that point she approached us, leaned
over, interrupted our conversation, and asked if we would mind moving
to the back of the plane. She indicated that she needed to distribute
weight on the plane evenly.

Both of us (passengers of color) had similar negative reactions. First,

balancing the weight on the plane seemed reasonable, but why were we
being singled out? After all, we had boarded first and the three White
men were the last passengers to arrive. Why were they not being asked to
move? Were we being singled out because of our race? Was this just a
random event with no racial overtones? Were we being oversensitive and
petty?

Although we complied by moving to the back of the plane, both of us

felt resentment, irritation, and anger. In light of our everyday racial
8 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

experiences, we both came to the same conclusion: The flight attendant

had treated us like second-class citizens because of our race. But this
incident did not end there. While I kept telling myself to drop the matter,
I could feel my blood pressure rising, heart beating faster, and face flush
with anger. When the attendant walked back to make sure our seat belts
were fastened, I could not contain my anger any longer. Struggling to
control myself, I said to her in a forced calm voice: “Did you know that
you asked two passengers of color to step to the rear of the ‘bus’”?

For a few seconds she said nothing but looked at me with a horrified
expression. Then she said in a righteously indignant tone, “Well, I have
never been accused of that! How dare you? I don’t see color! I only asked
you to move to balance the plane. Anyway, I was only trying to give you
more space and greater privacy.”

Attempts to explain my perceptions and feelings only generated

greater defensiveness from her. For every allegation I made, she seemed
to have a rational reason for her actions. Finally, she broke off the
conversation and refused to talk about the incident any longer (Sue et al.
2007, p. 275).

Sue, whose published autobiographical accounts (Sue 1998, 2001) and

admiring biographical profiles (Canel-Cinarbas and Mestas Vigil 2008,
Romero and Chan 2005) emphasize a childhood marked by discrimination and
cite Malcolm X and Martin Luther King as influences, is undoubtedly sincere
in his efforts to combat racism. Still, it is impossible to deny the
uncomfortable parallels between his behavior and Ruiz, Smith, and
Rhodewalt’s (2001) description of the narcissism syndrome as “the tendency
to experience anger, behave aggressively, and perceive ambiguous social cues
as threats or slights” (p. 538). Sue himself seems to be aware of the possible of
multiple characterizations of his behavior, writing, “Were it not for my
colleague who validated my experiential reality, I would have left that
encounter wondering whether I was correct or incorrect in my perceptions”
(Sue et al. 2007, p. 275).
Without passing personal judgment on an experience we were not present
to witness, we simply note that we do not believe that there is a way divorced
from subjectivity to arbitrate whether Sue was in fact “oversensitive and petty”
or righteous. In the eyes of the flight attendant and anyone unsympathetic to
him, Sue was being a narcissist; in the eyes of Sue, his friend, his co-authors,
and anyone on his side, he was not.
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 9

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0"

A NOTE ON THE SELF-OTHER DISTINCTION

One potential objection that might be raised to our argument is that
narcissism is by definition a self-related motive and can be distinguished from
justice by its self-relevant nature. Justice, in this view, can be oriented toward
either the self or others, whereas narcissism can only be in service of oneself.
However, recent theoretical perspectives suggest that the boundary between
personal and social identity is flexible, such that others can be incorporated
into the self-concept when it comes to self-interest (Swann and Buhrmester
2015). In additionMoreover, pursuing justice on behalf of others can always be
conceptualized as pursuing self-interest by affirming one’s own unselfish
heroism (c.f. Meindl and M. J. LernerLerner 1983).
Still, it is worth wondering what the narcissism motive would look like if
applied purely to an object outside the self. Hypothetically speaking, an other-
directed narcissist might be expected to idealize a specific other or, perhaps
more likely, a specific group of others. Our imaginary narcissist would see this
group as a victim of perpetual discrimination. He would argue that this group
is entitled to special privileges. He would be hypersensitive to slights against
this group. He would view this group in glittery, idealistic terms, possibly to
the point of imagining himself a part of them, or even their leader. He would
not hesitate to commit aggression against anyone he perceives as wishing or
causing harm against this group.
Does this sketch of a hypothetical narcissist sound familiar? It should, as it
is a perfect description of the protagonists of no less than three extremely
popular and critically acclaimed Hollywood movies over the past few decades:
Dances With Wolves (1990), The Last Samurai (2003), and Avatar (2009), the
latter of which to this day remains the highest-grossing movie ever made. In
all of these films, a Caucasian American male enters into contact with a
minority culture, comes to believe that the minority culture is superior to his
own, takes a lover from the minority culture, adopts the customs and physical
appearance of the minority culture, and, at the film’s climax, takes charge of
the minority culture during a violent struggle in which he kills many members
of his own former group on behalf of his adopted group.
10 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

Thus, we believe that other-directed narcissism is not an absurdity or an

aberration, but rather a highly identifiable and recognizable behavioral
syndrome – even, in some circles, an aspirational fantasy – within our culture.
Indeed, the ego-defensive aggression that characterizes the narcissism
syndrome may have its analogue in the form of the severe other-supportive
aggression that some commentators term vindictive protectiveness (Lukianoff
and Haidt 2015).
Formatted: Indent: First line: 0"

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0"

ADVANTAGES OF THE LABELING VIEW OF NARCISSISM
One of the biggest advantages to defining narcissism in terms of a label is
that it resolves the ultimate paradox of narcissism: How can a trait that is
viewed so negatively among laypersons (Campbell 2001a) and clinicians
(Paulhus and Williams 2002), yet is found exclusively in persons prone to
positive self-presentation, be assessed by a self-report questionnaire? The only
reason NPI items are endorsed by narcissists is that there exist cultural
narratives capable of framing virtually any narcissistic behavior in a positive
light: grandiosity as swagger, entitlement and hypervigilance as self-respect,
neediness as human vulnerability, competitiveness as ambition, lack of
empathy as tough love, derogation as having high standards and not suffering
fools, aggression as not being a pushover or as defending one’s honor or
putting others in their place, and so on.
Another advantage has to do with the question of etiology. Our view is
consistent with the portrait by Morf and Rhodewalt (2001) and Tracy et al.
(2009) of narcissism as a regulatory system for maintaining the self-concept.
However, these theories resort to unverified psychodynamic models of warped
upbringing (Kernberg 1975, Kohut 1971) to account for the individual
differences in self-view that lead to narcissism. Positivity itself cannot explain
these differences, as correlations between self-esteem and narcissism are only
on the level of r = .29, according to a meta-analysis by Campbell (2001b, cited
in Campbell, Rudich and Sedikides 2002), and these correlations drop to near-
zero levels among children (Barry, Frick and Killian 2003, Evans 2009).
Although low correlations between self-esteem and narcissism are a
problem for traditional views of narcissism, they are entirely consistent with
our viewpoint because narcissism is located not in the self-view but within the
interpersonal field, occurring whenever injustice concerns are aroused by an
outside source. What matters is not the level of positivity of the self-view in
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 11

absolute terms, but the extent to which the gap between self-evaluation and
other-evaluation initiates feelings of disrespect and injustice, which in turn
give rise to behavior that is labeled narcissistic by those who do not see it as a
proportionate response.
As for the source of individual differences in narcissistic behavior, they
are accounted for by the objective behavior of the other party and the
individual’s context-specific sensitivity to that behavior. Research by Skitka
(2002; Skitka, Bauman and Sargis 2005) has shown that when the behavior of
another triggers a moral mandate by violating a strong moral conviction (such
as that invoked by justice concerns), individuals respond with a desire to
punish, mediated by anger (Mullen and Skitka 2006) and linked to
endorsement of extreme punitive aggression (Skitka and Houston 2001).
Our view is also consistent with the observation by Vazire and Funder
(2006) and J. D. Miller et al. (2009) that narcissism is marked by a failure to
gain support for one’s beliefs and behaviors in the eyes of others. In their
formulations, narcissism refers to a trait (or cluster of traits) correlated with
the failure to evoke support; in ours, narcissism is a description of what
happens when support is not achieved 3.
However, this raises the question of why narcissism is positively
associated with certain characteristics that should make it easier to gain
support, such as being physically attractive (Holtzman and Strube 2010),
superficially likable (Paulhus 1998), or famous (Young and Pinsky 2006). We
believe this occurs because aggrieved people who gain support in the eyes of
others can end up like gamblers on a winning streak: they bet bigger and
bigger until they lose. This is especially true when a context shift means that
they are no longer evaluated by those who originally offered support (see
Campbell and Campbell 2009).
A case study can be seen in research on the culture of honor in parts of the
United States. Men from states that are part of this culture tend to construe
social situations as insults and feel compelled to respond to insult with
aggression (D. Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle and Schwarz 1996), a propensity that
is condoned in the eyes of others (D. Cohen and Nisbett 1994) and therefore
perpetuated (Nisbett and D. Cohen 1996). Accounts of narcissistic aggression
(c.f. Baumeister 1997) are virtually indistinguishable from this syndrome.
Evidence consistent with a less macro-level version of this process was
found by Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides (2009), who report that what they term
formidable individuals – i.e., those with the greatest power to inflict costs and

3
See Kaiser and Miller (2001) for a discussion of seeking social support for injustice claims.
12 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

benefits on others, which they equate with physical strength in men and
attractiveness in women – feel greater entitlement and anger. Anger is an
inherently interpersonal emotion (Averill 1983) linked to the perception of
insult (Lazarus 1991), and since formidable people almost by definition are
less likely to be the recipients of deliberate insult, formidable peoplethey
appear to be perceiving more insult in ambiguous or neutral situations, just
like narcissists. Moreover, due to their formidability they probably also receive
inflated social support for their hypersensitive appraisals. As with men in the
culture of honor, multivalent labeling allows narcissism-like behaviors to
flourish in formidable people up until the moment when those behaviors come
to the attention of an audience that does not support them, at which point they
are labeled full-blown narcissism.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED EXPERIMENTS

To believe that one has been wronged is often to grant oneself a license to
wrong others. It is an unfortunate fact of life that this toxic mentality does not
differentiate between those whose unfair treatment is all in their heads and
those who are true victims. Sufferers of genuine travesties of justice are not
sanctified by the experience; rather, even the best of them must struggle
against the temptations of bitterness, entitlement, and vindictiveness, and
many a monster grew out of a legitimate grievance.
While we believe that our perspective on narcissism derives some value
from the way it crystallizes these difficult truths, we are aware that, like all
scientific theories, it will (and should) rise or fall on the strength of data. Thus,
we conclude this chapter by proposing three empirical tests that would provide
convergent evidence for our model of narcissism and demonstrate its utility.
The simplest and most obvious involves directly priming injustice within a
general population and tracking whether this produces an increase in scores on
the NPI. If priming injustice substantially influences narcissism scores, this
would cast doubt on conceptions of narcissism as a genetic or natural
dispositional trait.
It would also be helpful to draw a direct line between injustice and self-
enhancement, which is not as intuitively tied to unfair treatment as other key
features of the narcissism syndrome, such as defensive aggression. Injustice
has been thought to serve as an evolved signal that one is not of value to one’s
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 13

group (Lind and Tyler 1988), and thus there is logic to the notion that one
would react to injustice by asserting one’s worth through self-enhancement.
Still, while self-enhancing illusions have been documented in narcissists
(Gabriel, Critelli and Ee 1994, Gosling, John, Craik and Robins 1998, John
and Robins 1994), no parallel findings appear in the literature on injustice. We
hope to close this gap with future research.
Finally, we believe it would be instructive to apply our perspective to the
domain of aggression reduction. In line with theories tying narcissism to the
self, researchers have reduced aggression in narcissists by buttressing self-
esteem through a self-affirmation process (Thomaes, Bushman, Orobio de
Castro, G. L. Cohen and Denissen 2009, see Sherman and G. L. Cohen 2006,
for more on self-affirmation generally). We find this consistent with our
perspective, in that self-affirmation might affirm justice by restoring a sense of
voice (c.f. Lind, Kanfer and Early 1990), or it may simply counteract the
aversive affective component of justice threat. However, our perspective
makes the unique prediction that narcissistic aggression can also be reduced by
affirming a sense of justice independent of the self.
While a basic experiment to test this (following the template of Bushman
and Baumeister 1998) would be straightforward – a 1 x 3 design with the
levels being narcissists under no threat, narcissists under threat with no buffer,
and narcissists under threat who are allowed to affirm justice independent of
the self, with interpersonal aggression serving as a dependent variable –
several conceptual concerns arise. One concern has to do with the nature of the
justice-affirmation manipulation: simply reflecting on fairness, or engaging in
an exercise that allows the participant to behave fairly, may actually backfire –
similar to the affirmation backfire described by Sherman and G. L. Cohen
(2006, pp. 218-221) – through triggering feelings of relative deprivation
(Olson, Herman, and Zanna, 1986) by reminding participants of how their own
situation falls short of norms of fairness.
Another issue is that it is not completely clear that if affirming something
– whether self-esteem or justice – reduces narcissistic aggression, then
aggression must have been caused by a threat to that thing in the first place.
After all, taking aspirin removes a headache, but headaches are not caused by
a lack of aspirin; in a similar fashion, affirmations may simply alleviate the
affective symptoms of the original threat.
Also, the nature of the psychological system that connects threat and
defensiveness remains vague (see Hart 2014, for an overview of issues). For
example, some theorists argue that both self-esteem and worldview are part of
a larger integrated system of meaning (Heine, Proulx and Vohs 2006), which
14 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

implies that self-affirmation and justice-affirmation could both be considered

forms of meaning affirmation and therefore broadly substitutable (c.f. Proulx
and Heine 2006).
In response to these issues, we propose a manipulation we believe to be
unique in the social psychological literature, and which we term privilege
affirmation. In this manipulation, participants are asked to reflect on the ways
in which the world has been unfair in their favor, such that they should
consider themselves to have benefited from injustice in the past.
We do not believe that this manipulation, following induced feelings of
threat, will produce counteractive affect – if anything, it should result in even
more aversive arousal – and we also do not believe that it will bolster self-
esteem or confirm an existing worldview.
Rather, we think that, within the bounds of a single incident, it will reduce
feelings of injustice by allowing participants to construe that incident as part of
an overall evening of scales when viewed in terms of an abstract big picture.
This, in turn, eliminates the need to commit further actions in the name of
retributive justice. If our privilege-affirming manipulation succeeds in
palliating aggressive impulses within narcissists, it would both rule out
alternative explanations for the effects predicted by our theory and introduce
an important practical development.

REFERENCES
Averill, J. R. (1983). Studies on anger and aggression: implications
Implications for theories of emotion. American Psychologist, 28, 1145-
1160.
Baron, R. A. (1988). Negative effects of destructive criticism: Impact on
conflict, self-efficacy, and task performance. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 73, 199-207.
Baron, R. A., Neuman, J. H. and Geddes, D. (1999). Social and personal
determinants of workplace aggression: Evidence for the impact of
perceived injustice and the Type A Behavior Pattern. Aggressive
Behavior, 25, 281-296.
Barry, C. T., Frick, P. J. and Killian, A. L. (2003). The relation of narcissism
and self-esteem to conduct problems in children: A preliminary
investigation. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 32,
139-152.
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 15

Baumeister, R. F. (1997). Evil: Inside human violence and cruelty. New York:
W. H. Freeman.
Baumeister, R. F., Bushman, B. J. and Campbell, W. K. (2000). Self-esteem,
narcissism, and aggression: Does violence result from low self-esteem or
from threatened egotism? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9,
26-29.
Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L. and Boden, J. M. (1996). Relation of threatened
egotism to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem.
Psychological Review, 103, 5-33.
Baumeister, R. F. and Vohs, K. D. (2001). Narcissism as addiction to esteem.
Psychological Inquiry, 12, 206-210.
Bies, R. J. and Moag, J. S. (1986). Interactional justice: Communication
criteria of fairness. In: R. J. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard and M. H. Bazerman
(Eds.), Research on negotiations in organizations (pp. 43-55). Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press.
Bloom, P. (2013). Just babies: The origins of good and evil. New York:
Crown.
Bosson, J. K., Lakey, C. E., Campbell, W. K., Zeigler‐Hill, V., Jordan, C. H.
and Kernis, M. H. (2008). Untangling the links between narcissism and
self‐esteem: A theoretical and empirical review. Social and Personality
Psychology Compass, 2(3), 1415-1439.
Bosson, J. and Swann, W. B., Jr. (2009). Self-esteem: Nature, origins, and
consequences. In: R. Hoyle and M. Leary (Eds.), Handbook of individual
differences in social behavior (pp. 527-546). New York: Guilford.
Bradlee, P. M. and Emmons, R. A. (1992). Location of narcissism within the
interpersonal circumplex of the five-factor model. Personality and
Individual Differences, 13, 821-830.
Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T. and Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving
pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for
group identification and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Formatted: Font: Italic
Psychology, 77, 135-149.
Brosnan, S. F. and de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay.
Nature, 425, 297-299.
Bushman, B. J. and Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Threatened egotism, narcissism,
self-esteem, and direct and displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-
hate lead to violence? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
219-229.
Campbell, W. K. (2001a). Is narcissism really so bad? Psychological Inquiry,
12, 214-216.
16 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

Campbell, W. K. (2001b). A meta-analysis of the narcissism-self-esteem link.

Unpublished manuscript.
Campbell, W. K. and Campbell, S. M. (2009). On the self-regulatory dynamics
created by the peculiar benefits and costs of narcissism: A contextual
reinforcement model and examination of leadership. Self and Identity, 8,
214-232.
Campbell, W. K., Rudich, E. and Sedikides, C. (2002). Narcissism, self-
esteem, and the positivity of self-views: Two portraits of self-love.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 358-368.
Canel-Cinarbas, D. and Mestas Vigil, P. L. (2008). Derald Wing Sue. In: F. T.
Leong (Ed.), Encyclopedia of counseling (Vol. 4, pp. 401-403). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F. and Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult,
aggression, and the southern culture of honor: An “experimental
ethnography.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 945-
960.
Cohen, D. and Nisbett, R. E. (1994). Self-protection and the culture of honor:
Explaining southern violence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
20, 551-567.
Colvin, C. R., Block, J. and Funder, D. C. (1995). Overly positive self-
evaluations and personality: Negative implications for mental health.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 1152-1162.
Crocker, J. and Major, B. (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: The self-
protective properties of stigma. Psychological Review, 96, 608-630.
Crocker, J., and Major, B. (2003). The self-protective properties of stigma:
Evolution of a modern classic. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 232-237. Formatted: Font: Italic
DeWall, C. N. and Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Alone but feeling no pain:
Effects of social exclusion on physical pain tolerance and pain threshold,
affective forecasting, and interpersonal empathy. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 91, 1-15.
DeWall, C. N., Twenge, J. M., Gitter, S. A. and Baumeister, R. F. (2009). It’s
the thought that counts: The role of hostile cognition in shaping aggressive
responses to social exclusion. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 96, 45-59.
Dickinson, K. A. and Pincus, A. L. (2003). Interpersonal analysis of grandiose
and vulnerable narcissism. Journal of Personality Disorders, 17, 188-207.
Evans, R. (2009). Understanding narcissism and self-esteem in children:
Proposing a new conceptualization of narcissism (Master’s Thesis).
Retrieved from ProQuest LLC (UMI No. 1465826).
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 17

Fehr, E., Bernhard, H. and Rockenbach, B. (2008). Egalitarianism in young

children. Nature, 454, 1079-1083.
Foster, J. D. and Campbell, W. K. (2007). Are there such things as
“narcissists” in social psychology? A taxometric analysis of the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Personality and Individual Differences,
43, 1321-1332.
Foster, J. D. and Trimm, R. F. (2008). On being eager and uninhibited:
Narcissism and approach-avoidance motivation. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1004-1017.
Furby, L. (1986). Psychology and justice. In: R. Cohen (Ed.), Justice: Views
from the social sciences (pp. 153-204). New York: Plenum.
Gabriel, M. T., Critelli, J. W. and Ee, J. S. (1994). Narcissistic illusions in self-
evaluations of intelligence and attractiveness. Journal of Personality, 62,
143-155.
Gantman, A. P. and Van Bavel, J. J. (2014). The moral pop-out effect:
Enhanced perceptual awareness of morally relevant stimuli. Cognition,
132, 22-29.
Goldberg, J. H., Lerner, J. S. and Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Rage and reason: The
psychology of the intuitive prosecutor. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 29, 781-795.
Gollwitzer, M. (2009). Justice and revenge. In: M. E. Oswald, S. Bieneck and
J. Hupfeld- Heinemann (Eds.), Social psychology of punishment of crime
(pp. 137-156). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Gosling, S. D., John, O. P., Craik, K. H. and Robins, R. W. (1998). Do people
know how they behave? Self-reported act frequencies compared with on-
line codings by observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
74, 1337-1349.
Gray, K., Young, L. and Waytz, A. (2012). Mind perception is the essence of
morality. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 101-124.
Hafer, C. (2000). Do innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world?
Evidence from a modified Stroop task. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 79, 165-173.
Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics
and religion. New York: Pantheon.
Hart, J. (2014). Toward an integrative theory of psychological defense.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9(1), 19-39.
Heatherton, T. F. and Vohs, K. D. (2000). Interpersonal evaluations following
threats to self: Role of self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 78, 725-736.
18 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

Heine, S. J., Proulx, T. and Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance

model: On the coherence of social motivations. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 10(2), 88-110.
Hepper, E. G., Hart, C. M. and Sedikides, C. (2014). Moving Narcissus: Can
narcissists be empathic? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40,
1079-1091.
Holtzman, N. S. and Strube, M. J (2010). Narcissism and attractiveness.
Journal of Research in Personality, 44, 133-136.
Holtzman, N. S. and Strube, M. J (2011). The intertwined evolution of
narcissism and short-term mating: An emerging hypothesis. In: W. K.
Campbell and J. D. Miller (Eds.), The handbook of narcissism and
Narcissistic Personality Disorder: Theoretical approaches, empirical
findings, and treatments (pp. 210-220). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Holtzman, N. S., Vazire, S. and Mehl, M. R. (2010). Sounds like a narcissist:
Behavioral manifestations of narcissism in everyday life. Journal of
Research in Personality, 44(4), 478-484.
Horvath, S. and Morf, C. C. (2009). Narcissistic defensiveness:
Hypervigilance and avoidance of worthlessness. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 45, 1252-1258.
John, O. P. and Robins, R. W. (1994). Accuracy and bias in self-perception:
Individual differences in self-enhancement and the role of narcissism.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 206-219.
Johnson, T. E. and Rule, B. G. (1986). Mitigating circumstance information,
censure, and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
50, 537-542.
Kaiser, C. R. and Miller, C. T. (2001). Stop complaining! The social costs of
making attributions to discrimination. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 27(2), 254-263.
Kernberg, O. F. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism.
New York: Jason Aronson.
Kernberg, O. F. (1986). Factors in the psychoanalytic treatment of narcissistic
personalities. In: A. P. Morrison (Ed.), Essential papers on narcissism (pp.
213-244). New York: New York University Press.
Kernis, M. H. (2001). Following the trail from narcissism to fragile self-
esteem. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 223-226.
Kernis, M. H. and Sun, C. R. (1994). Narcissism and reactions to interpersonal
feedback. Journal of Research in Personality, 28(1), 4-13.
Kohut, H. (1966). Forms and transformations of narcissism. Journal of the
American Psychoanalytic Association, 14, 243-272.
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 19

Kohut, H. K. (1971). The analysis of the self. Madison, WI: International

Universities Press.
Kremer, J. E. and Stephens, L. (1983). Attributions and arousal as mediators of
mitigation’s effect on retaliation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 45, 335-343.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory
of emotion. American Psychologist, 46, 819-834.
Leary, M. R. and Downs, D. L. (1995). Interpersonal functions of the self-
esteem motive: The self-esteem system as a sociometer. In: M. H. Kernis
(Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem (pp. 123-144). New York: Plenum
Press.
Lerner, M. J. (2003). The justice motive: Where psychologists found it, how
they lost it, and why they may not find it again. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 7, 388-399.
Lind, E. A., Kanfer, R. and Earley, P. C. (1990). Voice, control, and
procedural justice: Instrumental and noninstrumental concerns in fairness
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 952-959.
Lind, E. A. and Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural
justice. New York: Plenum Press.
Lukianoff, G. and Haidt, J. (2015, September). The coddling of the American
mind. The Atlantic, 316(2), 42-52.
Major, B., Kaiser, C. R. and McCoy, S. K. (2003). It’s not my fault: When and
why attributions to prejudice protect self-esteem. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 29, 772-781.
Meindl, J. and Lerner, M. J. (1983). The heroic motive in interpersonal
relations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 1-20.
Mikula, G., Scherer, K. R. and Athenstaedt, U. (1998). The role of injustice in
the elicitation of differential emotional reactions. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 24, 769-783.
Miller, D. T. (1977). Personal deserving and justice for others: An exploration
of the justice motive. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 1-
13.
Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. Annual
Review of Psychology, 52, 527-555.
Miller, J. D., Campbell, W. K., Young, D. L., Lakey, C. E., Reidy, D. E.,
Zeichner, A. and Goodie, A. S. (2009). Examining the relations among
narcissism, impulsivity, and self‐defeating behaviors. Journal of
Personality, 77(3), 761-794.
20 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

Morf, C. C. and Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of

narcissism: A dynamic self-regulatory processing model. Psychological
Inquiry, 12, 177-196.
Mullen, E. and Skitka, L. J. (2006). Exploring the psychological underpinnings
of the moral mandate effect: Motivated reasoning, identification, or affect?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 629-643.
Nisbett, R. E. and Cohen, D. (1996). Culture of honor: The psychology of
violence in the South. Denver, CO: Westview Press.
Olson, J. M., Herman C. P. and Zanna, M. P. (1986). Relative deprivation and
social comparison: The Ontario symposium. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-
enhancement: A mixed blessing? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74, 1197-1208.
Paulhus, D. L. and Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality:
Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in
Personality, 36, 556-563.
Proulx, T. and Heine, S. J. (2006). Death and black diamonds: Meaning,
mortality, and the meaning maintenance model. Psychological Inquiry, 17
(4), 309-319.
Raskin, R. and Terry, H. (1988). A principal-components analysis of the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory and further evidence of its construct
validation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 890-902.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Rhodewalt, F. and Morf, C. C. (1995). Self and interpersonal correlates of the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory: A review and new findings. Journal of
Research in Personality, 29, 1-23.
Rhodewalt, F. and Morf, C. C. (1998). On self-aggrandizement and anger: A
temporal analysis of narcissism and affective reactions to success and
failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 672-685.
Robins, R. W. and Beer, J. S. (2001). Positive illusions about the self: Short-
term benefits and long-term costs. Journal of Personality and Social Formatted: Font: Italic
Psychology, 80(2), 340-352.
Romero, D. and Chan, A. (2005). Profiling Derald Wing Sue: Blazing the trail
for the multicultural journey and social justice in counseling. Journal of
Counseling and Development, 83, 202-213.
Ruiz, J. M., Smith, T. W. and Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Distinguishing narcissism
and hostility: Similarities and differences in interpersonal circumplex and
five-factor correlates. Journal of Personality Assessment, 76(3), 537-555.
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 21

Sell, A., Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (2009). Formidability and the logic of
human anger. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 106(35),
15073-15078.
Sherman, D. K. and Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense:
Self-affirmation theory. In: M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 183-242). San Diego, CA: Academic
Press.
Siegel, J. P. (2006). Dyadic splitting in partner relational disorders. Journal of
Family Psychology, 20(3), 418-422.
Simon, B. and Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity: A
social psychological analysis. American Psychologist, 56, 319-331.
Skitka, L. (2002). Do the means always justify the ends, or do the ends
sometimes justify the means? A value protection model of justice
reasoning. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 588-597.
Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W. and Sargis, E. G. (2005). Moral conviction:
Another contributor to attitude strength or something more? Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 895-917.
Skitka, L. J. and Houston, D. (2001). When due process is of no consequence:
Moral mandates and presumed defendant guilt or innocence. Social
Justice Research, 14, 305-326.
Sue, D. W. (1998). A personal look at psychology in my life. In: L. T.
Hoshman (Ed.), Creativity and moral vision in psychology (pp. 106-125).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sue, D. W. (2001). Surviving monoculturalism and racism: A personal and
professional journey. In: J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas, L. A. Suzuki and C.
M. Alexander (Eds.), Handbook of multicultural counseling (pp. 45-54).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A. M.
B., Nadal, K. L. and Esquilin, M. (2007). Racial microaggressions in
everyday life: Implications for clinical practice. American Psychologist,
62, 271-286.
Swann, W. B., Jr. and Buhrmester, M. (2015). Identity fusion. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 52-57.
Tetlock, P. E. and Fincher, K. (2015). Social functionalism. In: B. Gawronski
and G. V. Bodenhausen (Eds.), Theory and explanation in social
psychology (pp. 266-282). New York: Guilford Press.
Thomaes, S., Bushman, B. J., Orobio de Castro, B., Cohen, G. L. and
Denissen, J. J. A. (2009). Reducing narcissistic aggression by buttressing
22 Yogesh J. Raut and David Trafimow

self-esteem: An experimental field study. Psychological Science, 20(12),

1536-1542.
Thomaes, S., Bushman, B. J., Orobio de Castro, B. and Stegge, H. (2009).
What makes narcissists bloom? A framework for research on the etiology
and development of narcissism. Development and Psychopathology, 21
(4), 1233-1247.
Tracy, J. P., Cheng, J. T., Robins, R. W. and Trzesniewski, K. H. (2009).
Authentic and hubristic pride: The affective core of self-esteem and
narcissism. Self and Identity, 8, 196-213.
Twenge, J. M. (2005). When does social rejection lead to aggression? The
influence of situations, narcissism, emotion, and replenishing connections.
In: K. D. Williams, J. P. Forgas and W. von Hippel (Eds.), The social
outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying (pp. 201-
212). New York: Psychology Press.
Twenge, J. M., Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M. and Stucke, T. S. (2001). If you
can’t join them, beat them: Effects of social exclusion on aggressive
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1058-1069.
Twenge, J. M. and Campbell, W. K. (2003). “Isn’t it fun to get the respect that
we’re going to deserve?”: Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 261-272.
Twenge, J. M. and Campbell, W. K. (2009). The narcissism epidemic: Living
in the age of entitlement. New York: Free Press.
Tyler T. R. and Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups.
In: L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol.
25, pp. 115-192). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Vazire, S. and Funder, D. C. (2006). Impulsivity and the self-defeating
behavior of narcissists. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10,
154-165.
Westen, D. (1990). The relations among narcissism, egocentrism, self-concept,
and self-esteem: Experimental, clinical, and theoretical considerations.
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 13, 183-239.
Wink, P. (1991) Two faces of narcissism. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 61(4), 590-597.
Young, S. M. and Pinsky, D. (2006). Narcissism and celebrity. Journal of
Research in Personality, 40(5), 463-471.
Zeigler-Hill, V. (2006). Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-
esteem: Implications for narcissism and self-esteem instability. Journal of
Personality, 74, 119-143.
 Narcissism or Justice: Is It in the Eye of the Beholder? 23

Zitek, E. M., Jordan, A. H., Monin, B. and Leach, F. R. (2010). Victim

entitlement to behave selfishly. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 98(2), 245-255.

N.G.