POLICE POWER

2 Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986]

Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose
from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M.
Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L.
Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C.
Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon
City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch
139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812-
13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and
People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano,
Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations
on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The
motions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs.
Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.

Issue: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.

Held: Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police power. It
is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered
by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at putting a
stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or
dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property,
but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every
presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has
overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe
and let it fall heavily on the offending statute.

Ichong vs. Hernandez

G.R. No. L-7995, 31 May 1957

FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No.
1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1) a
prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business. Lao H. Ichong,
in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime
Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; and (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist; (2)
Whether the law was enacted in interest of national economic survival and security; (3) Does the law deny the
equal protection of the laws and the due process of law?; (4) Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?; (5) Whether there was a defect in the title of the law; (6) Whether there was a violation of
international treaties and obligations.

HELD: The Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control. The enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The law
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in
the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment
of the population affected. Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed
or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. Hence, the petition was denied, with
costs against petitioner.

4 Tablarin v. Gutierrez (J) [GR 78164, 31 July 1987]

Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission
into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin,
et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully
hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary
Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical
schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding
with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April
1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court
denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the
Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional.

Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of
1959" defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b)
the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice
of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain
minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate
steps to make quality education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." The regulation of the practice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public (TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM POTENTIALLY DEADLY EFFECTS OF INCOMPETENCE AND
IGNORANCE). The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to
the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-
A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the
trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P
12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and,
since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on
the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the present condition
demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them
for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power
which is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing .
The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend
to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments
are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert
said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation
and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection
under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held:
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not
only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral
welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread
of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it
substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the
enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations
or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently
restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking.
The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property,
as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies
are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all
members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and
inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot
see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this
area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of the
Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The
P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

IMMENENT DOMAIN

15 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October 1919]

Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue within Block 3 of the district of Binondo) be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila
[Chinese Community of Manila] alleged in its answer that it was a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of
the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said
parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of
communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction
of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully
satisfy the City's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it
had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the Chinese
Community for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said
expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the
expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in
the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new
monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the Chinese Community and to all
those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the
City was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street
purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. Ildefonso
 Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said
expropriation was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria
Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as
that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting. Judge Simplicio del
Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all
of the defendants (Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

Issue: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be expropriated for the construction
of a public improvement.

Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that the city (Manila) may
condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the city of Manila, however, contains no procedure
by which the said authority may be carried into effect. Act 190 provides for how right of eminent domain may
be exercised. Section 241 of said Act provides that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any
province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation
having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner
prescribed by Section 242 to 246. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the
courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in
accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in question is public (a cemetery used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church) and seems to have been established under governmental authority, as
the Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a
public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. To disturb
the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in
cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends,
should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. While
cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command
of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to
believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such
circumstances, should be violated.

15 Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [GR L-18841, 27 January 1969]
En Banc, Reyes JBL [J]: 10 concur

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and
instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on
1 July 1947, under Executive Order 94, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director of
Posts. Sometime in 1933, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), and the RCA Communications,
Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's
domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the
PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as
follows: 25% to PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT and 70% for RCA, and
again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from
European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it on a 24-month
notice to the other. On
2 February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February 1956. Soon after its creation
in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties.
At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection.
The PLDT, on the other hand, was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications.
Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone service. The Bureau of
Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement,
with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. On 5 March 1958, the Republic, through the Director of
Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents.
They actually inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. On 7 April 1958,
PLDT complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their
Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the
Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the
general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped
by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of
the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States. On 12 April 1958, the
Republic commenced suit against PLDT, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI, Civil Case 35805), praying in
its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with the Republic, through the Bureau, for the
use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court
might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against PLDT to restrain the severance of the existing
telephone connections and/or restore those severed. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement ; that
under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing
government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought
to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was
neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would
result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed
both the complaint and the counterclaims. Both parties appealed.

Issue: Whether interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be an valid object for
expropriation, i.e. the exercise of eminent domain.

Held: Although parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to
the principal terms and conditions of the contract -- the freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions being of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by
violence, intimidation or undue influence -- and thus the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract
with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs
of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use
of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much
different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6,
Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public
utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation
would be for public use.

16 Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR L-72126, 29 January 1988]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters
and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to
enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes,
pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter
concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by
then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the
Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the
matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove
or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to
expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of
Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the
Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the
approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council
of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of
expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January
1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00,
which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a
writ of possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the
taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall
hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court
on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon
motion for reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that
there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for
the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration
the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's
heavy equipment and finished products. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to
the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.

Issue: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMC’s property for the purpose of a connecting
road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.

Held: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of
just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The foundation of the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is
a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to require into the legality
of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The
government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. With due recognition then of the
power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
protection clause will not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no genuine
necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and
Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road
and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be
expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does
not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire
of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better
attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an
establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot
also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion of traffic because as observed by the
Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore,
will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely
no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has
not been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another
connecting road.

17 City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]
First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and
 Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and
Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date
of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but
7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition,
the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch
XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
(Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being
no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino
agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and
City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead
of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic
Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within
the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general
law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner
as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay
by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

Masikip v. City of Pasig

0
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by statute

FACTS:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to
expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it
was “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community.”

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to
Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to
expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:

Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to
the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on
condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in
government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other
public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent
power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Provided:

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in
Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The records
show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan.