G.R. No. 187317. April 11, 2013.

*
CARLITO C. ENCINAS, petitioner, vs. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR.
and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG,** respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum-shopping exists

when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.―In Yu v. Lim, 631 SCRA 172 (2010),
this Court enumerated the requisites of forum-shopping as follows: Forum-shopping
exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3)
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; In order that res judicata may bar the institution of
a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity
of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.―Res judicata means “a
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment.” It lays down the rule that an existing final judgment or decree on the
merits, rendered without fraud or collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction, on

_______________

* EN BANC.

** Should be designated as Fire Officer (FO) 1 Alfredo P. Agustin and FO1 Joel S. Caubang.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 241

Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

the points and matters in issue in the first suit. In order that res judicata may bar the
institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of
parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
Same; Same; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; A judgment may be
considered as one rendered on the merits “when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objections”; or when the judgment is rendered “after a
determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.”―A judgment may be
considered as one rendered on the merits “when it determines the rights and liabilities
of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or
dilatory objections”; or when the judgment is rendered “after a determination of
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal or merely technical point.” In this case, there is no “judgment
on the merits” in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP
Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding
investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were
determined therein with finality.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers.―The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only
to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. In
administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-
judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the
contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of
the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
Administrative Agencies; Bureau of Fire Protection; The Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine
whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented, further administrative action
—in the form of a formal charge—should be taken against petitioner.―Indeed, the
public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented, further action
should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly, in the
instant case, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact-finding function to determine
whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented, further administrative
action―in the form of a formal charge―should be taken against petitioner. In
neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of
the parties before them.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Findings of fact of administrative
bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.―At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the
findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence. These factual
findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are
accorded not only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon
this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded
or misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated. This rule is rooted
in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts. By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those matters.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Even convicted criminals are not excluded from
testifying as long as, having organs of sense, they “can perceive and perceiving can
make known their perceptions to others.”―We rule that the alleged dismissal of
respondents from the service would not suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In
People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 (1993), this Court had occasion to rule that
even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself suffice to discredit a witness; the
testimony of that witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way
the testimonies of other witnesses must be examined for their relevance and
credibility. In Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, 514 SCRA 475 (2007), this Court echoed
its previous pronouncement that even convicted criminals are not excluded from
testifying as long as, having organs of sense, they “can perceive and perceiving can
make known their perceptions to others.”
Administrative Law; Affidavit of Desistance; The subsequent desistance by
respondents does not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an
administrative proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust.―Even assuming that an Affidavit of
Desistance was indeed executed by respondents, petitioner is still not exonerated
from liability. The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative
proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case
until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the
personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have
been committed against the public service. The subsequent desistance by
respondents does not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an
administrative proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust. A complaint for malfeasance or
misfeasance against a public servant of whatever rank cannot be withdrawn at any
time for whatever reason by a complainant, as a withdrawal would be “anathema to
the preservation of the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their government, its
agencies and instrumentalities.” Administrative proceedings “should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only
witnesses therein.”
Same; Grave Misconduct; Petitioner’s act of demanding money from
respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment constitutes
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

grave misconduct.―We rule that petitioner’s act of demanding money from

respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment constitutes grave misconduct.
We have defined grave misconduct as follows: Misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or
to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
(Emphasis supplied) Furthermore, petitioner’s acts likewise constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In Philippine Retirement Authority v.
Rupa, 363 SCRA 480 (2001), this Court elaborated on the specific acts that
constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
considering that no concrete description is provided under the Civil Service Law
and, rules. The Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of public
funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice,
failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in public
documents, and falsification of court orders.
Same; Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Penalties;
Grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first
offense; On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is
likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty of suspension of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense.―As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. The penalty of dismissal includes
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil
service examinations. On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty of suspension
of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal
for the second offense.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 245
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

Ferrer & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

Bayani P. Dalangin for respondents.

SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision
dated 20 November 20081 and Resolution dated 30 March 20092 issued by
the Court of Appeals (CA). Affirming the findings of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), the CA found petitioner Carlito C. Encinas (petitioner)
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service—offenses proscribed by Section 46(b)(4) and (27), Book V
of Executive Order No. 292, respectively, or the Administrative Code of
1987―and affirmed his dismissal.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva
Ecija. They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner―who
was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija―informed them that unless
they gave him five thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their
station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas. Respondent
Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo
Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug
Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay
petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain “Myrna,” respondents
came up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (P2,000),
prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week.
When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 24-35. In the case entitled ‘‘Carlito C. Encinas v. FO1 Alfredo P. Agustin
and FO1 Joel S. Caubang,” docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104074.
2 Id., at p. 37.
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang to

Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively.3
Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with the
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) on 27
March 2000 for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of
1990.4 The record is not clear as to why this Complaint was later docketed by
the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.5 The BFP Complaint provides in pertinent
part:

Chief Inspector Carlito C. Encinas relieved us from our present assignment and
transferred us to different far places without any cause and due process of law
based from the BFP Manual (Republic Act 6975)
The reason why he relieved us was due to our failure to give the money he was
asking from both of us in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in exchange
for our present assignment to be retained. x x x.

On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents

likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga
(CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City,6 their Joint
Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint).7 This time, they accused petitioner of
violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The relevant portion of the
CSCRO Complaint provides:

_______________
3 Id., at pp. 39-40.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 79-81.
5 Resolution dated 05 July 2005; Id., at p. 82.
6 Id., at p. 28.
7 Rollo, pp. 38-40.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

6. That we executed this affidavit to file a complaint against C. Insp. Carlito C.

Encinas BFP for violation of Section 4 (C) R.A. 6713, that is “Justness and
sincerity.―Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times.
They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights
of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.”

The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the above-quoted

provision as Section 4(c), but it should be denoted as Section 4(A)(c).
On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was conducted in
connection with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged
with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service. He was required to file an answer within five (5) days from notice.8
The Formal Charge specifically reads in part:

WHEREFORE, Carlito C. Encinas is hereby formally charged with the offenses

of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit to this
Office a written answer under oath, together with the affidavits of his witnesses and
documentary evidence, if any, and a statement whether or not he elects a formal
investigation. He is advised of his right to the assistance of his counsel of his own
choice.9

Although it was not specifically mentioned in the records, the offenses of

dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service can be found in Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V, respectively, of
the Admin-

_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 41-42.
9 Id., at p. 42.
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

istrative Code of 1987.10 The record does not indicate whether petitioner was
formally charged with violation of R.A. No. 6713.
BFP Complaint
In answer to the BFP Complaint against him, petitioner claimed that in an
alleged Confidential Investigation Report dated 31 July 2000 (Confidential
Report), no copy of which was attached to the record,11 the investigating body
recommended that charges against him be dropped for insufficiency of evidence.
Instead, it recommended that respondents be charged with conducting
unauthorized fire safety inspection and engaging in the sale of fire extinguishers,
both in violation of the rules.
It appears on record that the Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP
issued a Resolution dated 05 July 2005,12 recommending that the administrative
complaint against petitioner be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.13 The
IAS ruled that the reassignment of respondents was within the ambit of authority
of the head of office. Thus, said reassignment may

_______________
10 “Section 46. Discipline: General Provisions.―(a) No officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
(1)Dishonesty;
xxxx
(4)Misconduct;
xxxx
(27)Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; x x x”
11 Rollo, p. 43, petitioner referred to the Confidential Report in his Answer dated 11
December 2000, but a copy of this report was not attached to the Rollo or CA Rollo.
12 CA Rollo, p. 82-84.
13 Id., at pp. 83-84.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 249
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

have been ordered as long as the exigencies of the service so required.14 The
Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states in pertinent part:

The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority, CSC

Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993, the commission ruled as follows:
“That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of the duly authority [sic]
representative when the exigencies of the service so require but subject to the
condition that there will be no reduction in rank, status or salary, further on
Bongbong vs Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court ruled held [sic] that “on
general principle petitioner may be transferred as to the exigencies of the service
require.” x x x
In view of the documents on record, the undersigned investigator finds no
sufficient ground to warrant the filing of appropriate administrative offense against
the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most respectfully
recommends that the administrative complaint against C/INSP CARLITO
ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

CSCRO Complaint
In his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service,15 petitioner claimed that the
CSCRO Complaint was an offshoot of the reassignment of respondents. He
alleged that they were reassigned after it was discovered that they had
conducted a fire safety inspection of establishments within Nueva Ecija without
any mission order. In relation to this operation, they supposedly sold fire
extinguishers to the owners of the establishments they had inspected.16 He cited

_______________
14 Id., at p. 84.
15 Rollo, pp. 43-44.
16 Id., at p. 43.
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

the alleged Confidential Report in which the investigating body recommended

the dropping of charges against him.17 He further added that, in view of his
exemplary and faithful service, the then-incumbent governor even requested the
continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija.18 In his
Position Paper,19 petitioner claimed that respondents’ transfer had been made in
compliance with the directive of Supt. Simeon C. Tutaan (Supt. Tutaan) and
pursuant to law.20
CSCRO Ruling
Subsequently, the CSCRO issued its Decision dated 30 July 2004,21 finding
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from service.
The CSCRO ruled that respondents, through their respective testimonies,
were able to establish the fact that petitioner demanded from them the amount
of P5,000 in exchange for their non-reassignment to far-flung fire stations.22 The
fact that they did not present any document to show that petitioner received
P2,000 did not preclude a finding of administrative liability.23 The consistency of
their oral testimonies already constituted substantial evidence. Granting that they
committed illegal acts prior to their reassignment, this allegation nevertheless did
not rebut their claims that petitioner had extorted money from them. The
admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave instructions for their reassignment did

_______________
17 Id., at p. 43.
18 Id., at p. 44.
19 CA Rollo, pp. 46-49.
20 Id., at p. 49.
21 Id., at pp. 35-38.
22 Id., at p. 37.
23 Id.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 251
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

not disprove the accusation of extortion, but merely established that there was
indeed an order to reassign them.24
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.25 He argued that the Sworn
Statements of his witnesses should have been given weight instead of
respondents’ testimonies. He explained that Mrs. Angelina Calanoc (Mrs.
Calanoc), owner of Reynand Gas Dealer, confirmed that respondents had
conducted a physical inspection of her establishment, after which they
recommended that she pay conveyance permit fees as a requisite for the
issuance of a Fire Safety Certificate.26 Also, Carlito Umali confirmed that he
had indeed accompanied petitioner when the latter investigated the Complaint
filed by Mrs. Calanoc against respondents.27 Furthermore, Myrna
Villanueva―the owner of the house where respondents supposedly paid
petitioner P2,000―claimed that she did not know them personally or recall
either petitioner or respondents ever visiting her house.28 Likewise, Supt.
Tutaan confirmed that he had instructed petitioner to cause the transfer of
respondents.29 The latter also argued that the BFP Complaint had already been
dismissed by virtue of the Confidential Report, and that the dismissal had
already served as a bar to the further prosecution of any administrative charge
against him.30
The Motion, however, was subsequently denied by the CSCRO in its Order
dated 19 May 2006.31 It affirmed its previous ruling that the statements of
petitioner’s witnesses were incompetent and immaterial, having failed to
disprove

_______________
24 Id.
25 Rollo, pp. 45-55.
26 Id., at pp. 48, 57.
27 Id., at pp. 47, 58-59.
28 Id., at pp. 47-48, 60.
29 Id., at p. 48.
30 Id., at pp. 52-53.
31 Order dated 19 May 2006; CA Rollo, pp. 33-34.
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

that petitioner had indeed extorted money from respondents.32 It likewise

rejected the argument of res judicata proffered by petitioner and ruled that the
dismissal of the BFP Complaint by virtue of the Confidential Report was not a
judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal. Furthermore, the
Confidential Report was the result of the recommendation of a fact-finding
committee formed to determine the veracity of the Complaint charging petitioner
with extortion, unjustified transfer of BFP personnel, and malversation of
funds.33 Res judicata cannot be raised as a defense, since the dismissal of the
BFP Complaint did not constitute a bar by former judgment.34
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum35 with the CSC main
office. In his Appeal, he argued that respondents were guilty of forum-shopping
for having filed two (2) separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO
on the one hand, and before the BFP/DILG on the other.36 Petitioner argued
that respondents failed to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping to either
Complaint.37 Moreover, the CSCRO should not have entertained the
Complaint filed before it, considering that it already knew of the then-pending
investigation conducted by the BFP/DILG.38
Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO only had appellate jurisdiction or
authority to decide cases brought before it by the head of agency or, in this
case, the BFP.39 He explained that the administrative Complaint was
investigated and heard by the BFP/DILG. The BFP department head or fire
director, Rogelio F. Asignado, by virtue of the Resolution

_______________
32 Id., at p. 33.
33 Id., at p. 34.
34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 64-78.
36 Id., at p. 65.
37 Id.
38 Id., at p. 67.
39 Id.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 253
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

dated 05 July 2005, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.40 On

the basis of the dismissal of the case, and there being no appeal or petition filed
pertaining thereto, the CSCRO Complaint should have been dismissed as
well.41 Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO erred in concluding that the
resolution of the fact-finding committee was not a judgment on the merits.42 The
BFP being an agency of the government, any decision or resolution it arrives at
is also a judgment on the merits.43
Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous arguments on the appreciation of
the testimonies of his witnesses.44 He alleged that on 09 June 2006, respondent
Agustin executed an Affidavit of Desistance in the former’s favor and was no
longer interested in pursuing the case against him.45
In answer to the Appeal Memorandum, the CSCRO argued that there was
no forum-shopping, considering that the BFP Complaint was based on a
different cause of action.46 The Complaint, which pertained to the alleged illegal
transfer of personnel under R.A. No. 6975, was docketed for preliminary
investigation of the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
or R.A. No. 3019.47 The CSCRO further argued that there could be no res
judicata, since the dismissal of the BFP Complaint by virtue of the Resolution
dated 05 July 200548 was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a
competent tribunal. The dismissal was, instead, the result of

_______________
40 Id., at p. 65.
41 Id., at p. 68.
42 Id., at p. 69.
43 Id., at p. 70.
44 Id., at pp. 70-76.
45 Id., at p. 76.
46 Id., at p. 27.
47 Id.
48 Rollo, p. 27; CSC Resolution erroneously quoted the date as “July 5, 2006.”
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

the recommendation of the preliminary investigators of the Internal Audit Service

(IAS) of the BFP.49
CSC Ruling
Petitioner’s appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its Resolution No.
080941 dated 19 May 2008 (CSC Resolution).50 It ruled that there was no
forum-shopping committed by respondents, and that substantial evidence
existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The CSC explained that the CSCRO Complaint was for violation of R.A.
No. 6713, while the BFP Complaint was for violation of R.A. No. 6975.51 It
further ruled that, although both Complaints were anchored on a similar set of
facts, there was no identity of causes of action: thus, even if they were
successively filed before different fora, no forum-shopping existed.52 Although
an investigation was then ongoing at the BFP when the CSCRO took
cognizance of the case, no forum-shopping resulted. A perusal of the
proceedings conducted at the BFP shows that only a preliminary investigation
was initiated by the IAS-BFP, a fact-finding committee that recommended the
dismissal of the case, which was accordingly approved by the fire director. The
approval of this recommendation cannot be regarded as one based on merits.
Otherwise, it would bar the filing of another case, particularly, with the
CSCRO.53
With regard to petitioner’s administrative liability, the CSC found that
because of the nature of the case―extortion of money―hardly any
documentary evidence could be gathered to prove the act complained of. As
expected, the CSCRO

_______________
49 Id., at p. 27.
50 Id., at pp. 25-32.
51 Id., at p. 30.
52 Id.
53 Id.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 255
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

based its findings on the written and oral testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses, as well as on the circumstances surrounding the incident.
Respondents clearly established that petitioner had demanded P5,000 in
exchange for their reassignment.54 The CSC further ruled that it was contrary to
human nature for respondents, who were merely rank-and-file employees, to
impute such a grave act to their boss. Their disparity in rank would show that
respondents could not have fabricated their charges.55 It further ruled that the
withdrawal of the complaint would not result in their outright dismissal or
absolve the person complained of from administrative liability.56
Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA. His main
argument was that the CSC erred in not dismissing respondents’ Complaint
despite the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping and respondent’s
actual forum-shopping, as well as the lack of substantial evidence to hold him
administratively liable.57
In his Rule 43 Petition, petitioner claimed that a certificate of non-forum
shopping attached to a complaint is a mandatory requirement as stated in
Section 8, Rule I of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.58 He argued
that the causes of action in the two Complaints were similar. With regard to the
proceedings before the CSC, aside from respondents’ sole charge of violation
of R.A. No. 6713, also included were charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. Petitioner reasoned that
the additional offenses charged were equivalent to a violation of R.A. No. 6975,
so the issues investigated were substantially the same.59

_______________
54 Id., at p. 31.
55 Id.
56 Id., at p. 32.
57 Id., at p. 13.
58 Id., at p. 14.
59 Id., at p. 15.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

In relation to his administrative liability, petitioner argued that the testimonies

of respondents should not be given weight, as their credibility had been
rendered questionable by their dismissal from the service.60 Also, they had
already withdrawn their Complaints against him, as stated in their Affidavit of
Desistance (Affidavit),61 in which they admitted that the cases were filed out of
a misapprehension of facts and a misunderstanding between the parties.62
Significantly, respondent Caubang denounced the supposed execution of the
Affidavit. He claimed that he did not sign it, and that his purported signature
therein was a forgery.63
CA Ruling
Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision,64 denied petitioner’s appeal.
The CA ruled that it was not the letter-complaint filed by respondents that
commenced the administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was the
formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely
triggered the CSCRO’s fact-finding investigation. Considering that the
Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a
certification of non-forum-shopping.65
The CA similarly ruled that respondents’ act of simultaneously filing
Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did not constitute
forum-shopping. While it was conceded that the two Complaints were founded
on the same set of facts involving the same parties, they were nonetheless based
on different causes of action―more specifically, the BFP Complaint was for
alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019,

_______________
60 Id., at p. 18.
61 Id., at p. 88.
62 Id., at pp. 19, 88.
63 Id., at pp. 95-98.
64 Rollo, pp. 24-35.
65 Id., at p. 29.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 257
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

while the CSC Complaint was for violation of the provisions of R.A. No.
6713.66 Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.67
With regard to the administrative liability of petitioner, the CA found that
substantial evidence supported the CSC’s findings.68 It likewise ruled that the
testimonies of the witnesses of petitioner were incompetent and immaterial, as
these could prove something else entirely, but did not disprove petitioner’s
extortion.69 Also, the withdrawal of a complaint does not result in outright
dismissal or discharge a person from any administrative liability.70
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,71 but the CA denied it in its
assailed Resolution dated 30 March 2009.72
Petitioner is now before this Court arguing the following: (1) the CA erred in
affirming the CSC Resolution and in ruling that respondents were not guilty of
forum-shopping; and (2) substantial evidence does not exist to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
In their Comment, respondents counter that a certificate of non-forum
shopping is not required if the one who files the formal charge is the head of
agency.73 They further argue that the case filed with the BFP was in the nature
of violation under R.A. No. 3019, whereas the case filed before the CSC was
in violation of R.A. No. 6713. A single act may result in two or more unlawful
transgressions punishable under differ-

_______________
66 Id., at p. 30.
67 Id.
68 Id., at p. 31.
69 Id., at p. 33.
70 Id.
71 CA Rollo, pp. 149-158.
72 Rollo, p. 37.
73 Id., at p. 75.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

ent laws.74 As to the matter of administrative liability, the CSC’s findings,

especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon this Court.75
Issues
Based on the submissions of both parties, the following main issues are
presented for resolution by this Court:
I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.
II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit. We rule that petitioner is administratively
liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service under the Administrative Code of 1987; thus, we affirm his dismissal
from service.
Discussion
I.
Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping.
Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for filing two
allegedly identical Complaints in violation of the rules on forum-shopping.76 He
explains that dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best

_______________
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id., at p. 16.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

interest of the service―charges included in the CSCRO Complaint―were

charges that were equivalent to the BFP Complaint, the subject of which was
his alleged violation of R.A. 6975 or illegal transfer of personnel.77
We do not agree with petitioner. In Yu v. Lim,78 this Court enumerated the
requisites of forum-shopping as follows:

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.79
(Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of
the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO
Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” It lays down the rule that an
existing final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or
collusion by a court of competent jurisdiction upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other
actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction, on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.80

_______________
77 Id.
78 G.R. No. 182291, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 172.
79 Id.
80 Selga v. Brar, G.R. No. 175151, 21 September 2011, 658 SCRA 108.
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be
between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of
subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.81
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits “when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections”; or when the judgment is
rendered “after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point.”82
In this case, there is no “judgment on the merits” in contemplation of the
definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05
July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with
finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only
to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers.83 Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in
nature,84

_______________
81 Chu v. Sps. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011, 657 SCRA 379.
82 Cabreza v. Cabreza, G.R. No. 181962, 16 January 2012, 663 SCRA 29.
83 Heirs of Derla v. Heirs of Derla, G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011, 648 SCRA 638.
84 Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158; 405 SCRA 264 (2003).
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 261
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial

character.85
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and
evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented;
and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.86 The
exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the
matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of
the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the
adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.87 In Bedol v.
Commission on Elections,88 this Court declared:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the

power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act
in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative

_______________
85 See United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma, 351 Phil. 244, 260; 288
SCRA 15, 26 (1998); Executive Judge Basilia v. Judge Becamon, 487 Phil. 490; 420 SCRA 608
(2004); Atty . De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253; 341 SCRA 67 (2000); Salazar v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 127965, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 447; National Housing Authority v. Pascual, G.R.
No. 158364, 28 November 2007, 539 SCRA 102; DOLE Phil., Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 30
November 2006, 509 SCRA 332.
86 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, 379 Phil 165; 322 SCRA
160 (2000).
87 Doran v. Executive Judge Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 151344, 26 Sep tember 2006, 503 SCRA 106.
88 G.R. No. 179830, 03 December 2009, 606 SCRA 554.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative
body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies
the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to
evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.89
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the
conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-
finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 itself that the
purpose of the BFP proceedings was to determine whether there was sufficient
ground to warrant the filing of an appropriate administrative offense
against petitioner. To recall, the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states:

The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority, CSC

Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993, the commission ruled as follows:
“That reassignment may be ordered by the head of office of the duly authority [sic]
representative when the exigencies of the service so require but subject to the
condition that there will be no reduction in

_______________
89 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, 379 Phil. 165; 322 SCRA
160 (2000), citing Ruperto v. Torres [100 Phil. 1098 (1957), unrep orted].
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 263
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

rank, status or salary, further on Bongbong vs Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the
supreme court ruled held [sic] that “on general principle petitioner may be
transferred as to the exigencies of the service require.” x x x
In view of the documents on record, the undersigned investigator finds no
sufficient ground to warrant the filing of appropriate administrative offense
against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office (IAS) most respectfully
recommends that the administrative complaint against C/INSP CARLITO
ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.90 (Emphases
supplied)

The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at

determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to
proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public
prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime
has been committed.
The ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals91 is analogously
applicable to the case at bar. In that case, we ruled that the preliminary
investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was
definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding:

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from
other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as “an
organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.”
xxxx

_______________
90 CA Rollo, p . 84.
91 G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 413 Phil. 159; 360 SCRA 618 (2001).
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-
court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not
the fiscal. (Emphases supplied)

This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano,92 in which this

Court clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor inspects the records and premises,
investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the formers’
jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and production
of documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signifies the exercise of power
and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties,
viz.:

This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals,

Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties, and
its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court.” [This] is not the case
when a public prosecutor

_______________
92 G.R. No. 166758, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 112.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 265
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an

information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary
of Justice [reviews] the former’s order[s] or resolutions” on determination of
probable cause.
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts
preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial powers.
Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an administrative
body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities of
persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require
the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. This power
is distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of
power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned
parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public
prosecutor apart from the court. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct

of a preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence
presented, further action should be taken through the filing of a criminal
complaint in court. Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP exercised its
investigative or fact-finding function to determine whether, based on the facts
and the evidence presented, further administrative action―in the form of a
formal charge―should be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is there in
adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint
cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore, the argument of forum-shopping is
unavailing in this case.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

II.
The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial
evidence to hold petitioner administratively liable
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the findings are based on a
misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of respondents from service allegedly
placed their credibility in question.93
We do not agree. We find petitioner administratively liable for his act of
demanding P5,000 from respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment.
At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of
administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.94 These factual findings carry
even more weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded
not only great respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this
Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded
or misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated.95 This rule is
rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts.96 By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over

_______________
93 Rollo, p. 18.
94 Catmon Sales International Corporation v. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, 15
January 2010, 610 SCRA 236.
95 Id.
96 Raniel v. Jochico, G.R. No. 153413, 02 March 2007, 517 SCRA 221.
 VOL. 696, APRIL 11, 2013 267
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment on those matters.97
This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC and the CA,
absent any compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached by the
administrative agencies involved―after their own thorough investigations and
hearings, as well as their consideration of the evidence presented before them
and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA―must now be
regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.
We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the service would not
suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In People v. Dominguez,98 this Court
had occasion to rule that even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself
suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of that witness must be assayed and
scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimonies of other witnesses must be
examined for their relevance and credibility.99 In Gomez v. Gomez-Samson,100
this Court echoed its previous pronouncement that even convicted criminals are
not excluded from testifying as long as, having organs of sense, they “can
perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others.”101
This pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as what petitioner is
alleging is not any past criminal conviction of respondents, but merely their
dismissal from service.102 Scrutinizing the testimonies of respondents, we find,
as did both the CSC and the CA, that these testimonies carry more

_______________
97 Sps. Ricardo, Jr. v. Cinco, G.R. No. 174143, 28 November 2011, 661 SCRA 311.
98 G.R. No. 100199, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 170.
99 Id.
100 G.R. No. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA 475.
101 Id., at p. 511.
102 See Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA 475.
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

weight than petitioner’s self-serving statements and blanket denials.

Respondents, through their testimonies, were able to establish that petitioner
told them that unless they paid him P5,000, they would be reassigned to far-
flung areas. The consistency of their testimonies was further bolstered by the
fact that they had been cross-examined by petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner was
unable to rebut their claims other than by mere denials. Even the admission of
Supt. Tutaan that he gave the instructions to reassign respondents cannot
disprove the latter’s claims. As regards the testimonies of the witnesses of
petitioner, we hold that even these testimonies are irrelevant in disproving the
alleged extortion he committed, as these were mainly related to respondents’
supposed illegal activities, which are not the issue in this case.
Even assuming that an Affidavit of Desistance was indeed executed by
respondents, petitioner is still not exonerated from liability. The subsequent
reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the
court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution.
Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the
parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed
against the public service.103 The subsequent desistance by respondents does
not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an administrative proceeding
is to protect the public service based on the time-honored principle that a public
office is a public trust.104 A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance against a
public servant of whatever rank cannot be withdrawn at any time for whatever
reason by a complainant, as a withdrawal would be “anathema to the
preservation of the faith and confidence

_______________
103 Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October 2008,
567 SCRA 342.
104 See Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October
2008, 567 SCRA 342.
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

of the citizenry in their government, its agencies and instrumentalities.”105

Administrative proceedings “should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.”106
In view of the foregoing, we rule that petitioner’s act of demanding money
from respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment constitutes grave
misconduct. We have defined grave misconduct as follows:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such
as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.107 (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, petitioner’s acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the

best interest of the service. In Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa108 this
Court elaborated on the specific acts that constitute the grave offense of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that no
concrete description is provided under the Civil Service Law and, rules. The
Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of public funds,
abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice,
failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in
public documents, and falsification of court orders.109

_______________
105 Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827; 397 SCRA 1 (2003) citing Esmeralda-Baroy v.
Peralta, 350 Phil. 431; 287 SCRA 1 (1998).
106 Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827; 397 SCRA 1 (2003) citing Reyes-Domingo v.
Morales, 396 Phil. 150; 342 SCRA 6 (2000).
107 Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 203-204.
108 415 Phil. 713; 363 SCRA 480 (2001).
109 Id.
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that petitioner’s offense
is of the same gravity or odiousness as that of the aforementioned acts and
would likewise amount to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable
by dismissal even for the first offense.110 The penalty of dismissal includes
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service and bar from taking
civil service examinations.111 On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty
of suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense and dismissal for the second offense.112
Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the
penalty of dismissal from the service―the penalty corresponding to the most
serious offense―was properly imposed.113
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated 20 November 2008 and the Resolution dated 30 March
2009 issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104074 are hereby AFFIRMED.

_______________
110 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52(A) 3 [Sec. 4 (A)
(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service dated 18 November 2011
(Revised Rules)]
111 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 58 (Sec. 52 of the
Revised Rules).
112 Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52 (A) 20 [Sec.
46(B)(8) of the Revised Rules].
113 “If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to
be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest
shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.” [Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 55 (Sec. 50 of the Revised Rules)].
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Encinas vs. Agustin, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del

Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
Bersamin and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., No part.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.―An affidavit of desistance is not looked upon with favor on appeal

following a conviction let alone as being the sole consideration for the reversal of
that conviction. (People vs. Cabudbod, 585 SCRA 499 [2009])
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits “when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections”; or when the judgment is
rendered “after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.”
(Cabreza, Jr. vs. Cabreza, 663 SCRA 29 [2012])
――o0o――