THREE WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY*

ARTHUR F. HOLMESt

HIS paper is concerned with Dr. Zuur- non-linguistic philosophers. The ideal of
deeg's view of the nature of philoso- philosophy as a deductive, purely rational
phy in general and of an analytic philos- science, seems for example to be foreign to
ophy of religion in particular.' It will be Socrates,to Aristotle-perhaps also to Plato
argued that it is possible to avoid the di- -foreign to Kant, to Mill, to Scottish real-
lemma he presents. Whereas he implies ism and its twentieth-centuryheirs. But it
that all philosophers accept either the ide- is understandable that one confessing the
alist conception of philosophy as a deduc- Christian faith should find it objectionable
tive and conclusive superscience or else a and be tempted to "discover"its workings
linguistic-analytic conception, the attempt in less ambitious metaphysicians. In effect,
will here be made to slip between the horns it would replace creaturely modesty with
of this dilemma and to employ a third godlike self-confidence and the conflicts of
method of doing philosophy, more tradi- religion with the higher synthesis of philos-
tional than either of the others. Accord- ophy-as was implied in Hegel's dialectical
ingly, we shall examine (1) his criticism view of history. Accordingly, Professor
of the idealist conception, (2) his modifi- Zuurdeeg asserts that "convictional world
cation of the analytic conception, and (3) views replace convictors," so that "many
the third alternative to be developed. people no longer believe, strictly speaking,
1. The "idealist" is said to take philos- in a God but in a Weltanschauung."3We
ophy as a means of establishing "by the learn that "man-speaking-metaphysically
use of reason, the true meaning of life, the regards philosophy as a savior," because
real value of things, the intrinsic nature "a closed system demands a philosophy-
of the universe, the Absolute, or God." It savior."4
is a "higher"way, calling people to a high- It must be emphasized that these ob-
er life, and harmonizing all realms of ex- jections, themselves convictional, presup-
perience.2 It should be noted that this is pose that the "idealist" regards philosophy
not simply philosophy "in the grand style" per se not only as building world views but
seeking a broad, interrelated overview; it also as giving demonstrative certainty to
suggests a dogmatic system, complete and thought and ultimate value to life. It may
inflexible; it is a means of establishing and be agreed that philosophy does not provide
attaining, by pure reason, the absolute na- demonstrative certainty, does not give in-
ture of reality and value. controvertible conclusions. But is it nec-
It may be noted that such a conception essarily the case that even the idealist finds
of philosophy describes only some, not all, life's ultimate value in the system, per se,
* A paper read at a meeting of the Northern that he looks to philosophy for life and
Illinois PhilosophicalSociety, November,1960. hope? Did the nineteenth-centuryGerman
t Arthur F. Holmes is associate professorand philosophersaim to save men by means of
directorof philosophyat WheatonCollege,Whea- their world views? Or did they seek in
ton, Illinois. A native of Dover, England, he their world views to express the nature and
served in the Royal Air Force during World War structure of the reality and values that do
II, then completedundergraduatework at Whea- save-whether a historical dialectic, a crea-
ton, followed by an M.A. degreein theology. He tive will, or whatever? They may have
has the Ph.D. degreein philosophy from North-
western University. He has written for Chris- erroneouslylooked to history, to nature, or
tianity Today and other journals. to transcendentalspirit for help-but even
206

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 THREEWAYSOF DOINGPHILOSOPHY 207
Hegel viewed his philosophy as only the uncritically the truth of their own particu-
expression of spirit. Hegel did not try to lar positions. But this dilemma can be
"save" men; his philosophy did not pre- avoided if one avoids uncritical assertions,
tend to do so; "salvation" presumably lies unscrutinized presuppositions, provincial
in the historical unfolding of the Absolute outlooks, unanalyzed contentions. In other
as it absorbs its every particular expres- words, the value-centric predicament need
sion. To say that Hegel's dialectic absorbs not be fatal to progress in philosophy pro-
religion into philosophy does not mean that vided the philosopherrecognizeshis Lebens-
his philosophy becomes a religion. Dr. welt as being prephilosophical and seeks
Zuurdeeg, then, seems to have mistaken the philosophical rigor which it needs.
the fact that some philosophersdiscuss the Such rigor we have learned to expect from
purported sources of man's hope for the British analysis, and it must now be ques-
supposition that philosophy itself is their tioned whether Zuurdeeg really expects
source of hope. He confuses their philoso- help in this regard from this source.
phy of religion with religion itself. 2. The analytic conception of philoso-
A philosophy of religion, as part of a phy, to which Dr. Zuurdeeg draws atten-
philosophical Weltanschauung,is admitted- tion, stresses the analysis of language in
ly something of a credo. It expresses the terms of either logical syntax or ordinary
values and convictions of its advocates. usage. This conception, adequate in the
Zuurdeeg is correct in regarding this as case of mathematical and scientific lan-
inevitable: Wilhelm Dilthey's Weltan- guage, he regards as insufficient when one
schauungslehremakes it plain that man op- investigates the convictional languages of
erates in a value-centric predicament; religion, morals, and Weltanschauungen,
philosophic reasoning cannot be isolated where a man's value-centric predicament
from the motives of the philosopher or the becomes apparent. "We have to analyze
crises of his culture. It is the task of the not only the language itself, but also the
philosopher of religion to explore actual re- language situation."5Logical analysis must
ligions, his own included. This is not only give way to situational analysis. The man
inevitable, it is also desirable. It is part of who speaks becomes more important than
the cultural function of philosophy-not to what he speaks, for his language is simply
build a God-substitutebut to conceptualize the means of "establishing his existence."
and clarify the Lebenswelt, including the Accordingly,Zuurdeegintroduces the prin-
perspective provided by the philosopher's ciples of situational analysis-the nature
own values and convictions, and to expli- of conviction and the convictor, the act of
cate this viewpoint, with the perspectives assent and the role of the confessional
it gives, in all possible phases of life and group, the "power"exerted by language in
experience. This, it may be emphasized, is society, etc.
desirable. Conceptualization, clarification, All such investigations are tremendously
and explicitness are indispensableprerequi- important. The only question is whether
sites for analysis, for evaluation, and for they constitute the work of philosophy or
action. The world view is not an end in it- that of psychology and sociology. Is this
self; but it is a very desirable means to a philosophical approach to, and criticism
other ends. of, values, or is it a sociological one? Is
This value-centric predicament, how- this a philosophy of religion or an ap-
ever, places men on the horns of a dilem- proach to the psychology and sociology of
ma. Either their philosophies will vary as religion? Is this a philosophical or a psy-
widely as their basic values and an ir- chological examination of world views?
reducible philosophical relativism like that And if it is psychological rather than phil-
of Dilthey results, or else they fall prone osophical analysis, can it provide the rig-
to dogmatism, even naiYvet6,in asserting orous self-criticism necessary to the avoid-

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208 THE JOURNALOF RELIGION
ance of both relativism and dogmatism? truth value of religious, moral, and meta-
Undoubtedly, the philosopher should be physical language.
aware of relevant psychological and socio- This, of course, raises the further ques-
logical contributions. The psychological re- tion of the relation between convictional
lation between values, interests, and needs and indicative language. Professor Zuur-
provides basis for work in value theory. deeg asserts that we communicate convic-
The psychology of belief has interested tions by witness rather than by analogical
philosophers ever since the days of David predication; we validate them by living
Hume and Thomas Reid. John Henry and not by scientific or historical evidence
Newman's Grammar of Assent should be or philosophical argument. Convictions
read by philosophers even today. It gives stand immune from any logical validation
insight into the relationship between be- or invalidation.6 But can this actually be
lieving and thinking, or, if one prefers, be- what is meant? Is there no philosophical
tween convictional and scientific language. reason for preferring monotheism to poly-
Such psychological analysis has its philo- theism, or even Christianity to Marxism?
sophical implications, but it is still psy- Is a young child's conviction, created by
chology rather than philosophy. It seems, fairyland convictors, that the moon is a
therefore, that Dr. Zuurdeeg is psycho- ball of green cheese immune from scien-
analyzing us rather than joining in the tific attack? Is the belief in the Easter
philosophical dialogue. As a psychoanalyst Bunny on the same philosophical level as
he may help us to understand ourselves, a belief in God? Is the difference one of
just as the existentialist has done, but he convictional seriousness alone? Both Cas-
has neither established criteria for the sirer and Urban have pointed out that
philosophicalevaluation of world views nor linguistic science is opposed to the positiv-
engaged in the philosophical discussion of ist tendency of regardingcertain sentences
values and religion. He may be simply as either exclusively emotive or exclusive-
continuing the tradition of Dilthey's Welt- ly indicative. The language situation is
anschauungslehreor Jasper's Psychology of never that simple. And if sentences are not
World Views, but he has failed to expose merely either emotive or indicative but
values and faith to scientific thought and are, rather, both in varying degrees, then,
philosophic analysis. to the extent that convictional statements
If this is the case, it means that philos- are indicative or predicational-to that ex-
ophers are asked to abdicate their historic tent-they are amenable to logical, his-
task in areas where convictions show up. torical, or scientific investigation, and phi-
This would be a sad day not only for phi- losophy will have to be reinstated in a more
losophy but also for conviction. Followed traditional role.
consistently, it would dim the light of rea- To segregate convictional language from
son and of clear thought; it would lead to the logical and scientificsounds like Kierke-
fuzzy thinking, distorted values, and un- gaard's overstatement of his case against
co-ordinatedactivity. Without philosophical the idealistic conception of philosophy.
analysis and criticism man forfeits the Such exaggerations are by no means new
means of avoiding the dogmatism or else in the history of thought. Tertullian's re-
the relativism that stems from our value- action against gnostic rationalismproduced
centric predicament. His hopes for a phil- a polemic against philosophy in general.
osophically respectable and logically de- Pascal, reacting against Cartesian ration-
fensible world view are dashed to the alism, became convinced of the equipol-
ground. In addition, without logical analy- lence of all philosophical arguments re-
sis he tends to lose cognitive meanings and garding God. But the verdict of history
thus the means of communication.He loses seems to be that these men were the vic-
the right to predication and with it the tims of their convictions and their histori-

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 THREE WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY 209
cal situations because they lacked the phil- examined the metaphysical foundations of
osophical criticism which would have both morals. It may not have succeeded in build-
unfrocked the dogmatism of "Q.E.D. ra- ing a dogmatic Weltanschauung, a closed
tionalism" and prevented their own fi- system that establishes beyond doubt the
deistic skepticism. Likewise existentialism. intrinsic nature of the universe, nor in
In rejecting Hegelian essentialism, Kierke- opening the way to a new scientifically
gaard overstated his case and propounded oriented metaphysic. But neither did it
an antimetaphysical position. It is signifi- wholly forsake philosophy "in the grand
cant that he did so by ridicule and rhetoric, style." We may not agree with Kant's
not by logical analysis. That his was in- epistemological reconstruction or with his
deed an overstatement is made evident by moral phenomenology.But neither dare we
the fact that his successors now probe the assume that other such attempts at a third
essence of existence and give us new ontol- philosophic method cannot be made.
ogies. Heidegger, to cite one example, does J. F. Herbart regardedhimself as a suc-
not fall into the essentialist trap. He treats cessor of Kant. For him, too, dogmatism
the term "being" not in abstraction but in and skepticism were not the only alterna-
terms of its history. But he also avoids tives. The business of philosophy, he as-
the existentialist's antiphilosophical over- serts, is to probe and refine the general
statement. The point is that, when he ex- concepts of experience and the sciences, to
amines concepts such as freedom, angst, analyze their meaning and interrelations,
existenz, and sein, he cannot help but phi- and, insofar as is possible, to develop them
losophize and ontologize.7 We must there- into a harmoniouswhole.
fore desegregate convictional and scien- The same could be said of many twen-
tific language, value and fact, religion and tieth-century realists in their appeal to
metaphysics. common sense, to the unavoidable presup-
3. The point of the foregoing comments positions of human life and thought. Like
should now become clear. It is by no means G. E. Moore they seek to analyze the pur-
evident that the idealist and linguistic ported truisms of common sense. They re-
analysis conceptions of philosophy, as Pro- ject both the idealistic and the skeptical
fessor Zuurdeeg speaks of them, are the views of philosophy. Their analysis is
only alternatives in the field. To eliminate more in the tradition of Herbart than of
the one does not establish the other. These Hume. They analyze concepts, not lan-
are not the only options. It may be ques- guage per se. And although their con-
tioned whether before the revolution in ceptual analysis employs semantical and
philosophy they could ever have been so phenomenological devices, yet they per-
regarded. In fact, in the Preface to the sistently deal with a world of independent
second edition of his first Critique, Im- realities. This is the third method of doing
manuel Kant indicates three types of phi- philosophy.
losophy. What he calls "dogmatism" may It may be objected that the appeal to
be seen not only in Leibniz and Wolff but common sense, to the basic commitments
also in the Hegelians. It is what has here of human life and thought, confuses the
been called the "idealist" method. "Skep- logical with the convictional. It should,
ticism" may be seen not only in Hume but rather, be said that this simply affirmsthat
also in linguistic analysts who, like Hume, philosophy begins in an existential matrix
preclude metaphysics. Kant's "critical" rather than ex nihilo and so recognizes the
philosophy, however, did not abandon essential interdependenceof knowledge and
metaphysics, nor did it abdicate to either values, which is precisely what the exis-
semantics or psychoanalysis. It worked on tentialists have taught us and what Dr.
epistemological reconstruction as the pro- Zuurdeeg recognizes. Even Kant's "pure
legomenon to any future metaphysics. It reason" was not wholly free from its con-

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210 THE JOURNALOF RELIGION
victions. He had his Lebenswelt: he had and values. It has been designated by such
been raised a Pietist; he had his values phrases as "common sense," "natural be-
and distrusted the encroaching mechanistic lief," "linguistic situation," etc., although
world view. Yet what he did, he did not such designations presently seem to be
only under the motivation of his convic- either ambiguous or else too narrow. "Lin-
tions but also under the relentless scrutiny guistic situation," I suggest, is too narrow;
of an incisive and intellectually honest so is "ordinary language"; they assume
mind. He realized that, if his convictions that subsequent methodology is purely lin-
were to withstand the encroachments of guistic-that some form of the study of
scientific thought, he must establish their language is the key to an understanding
philosophical legitimacy. of man and his world. "Common sense"
Was Kant right? With respect to his sounds healthy, but it smacks of a naive
own presuppositions and conclusions, one realismwhich refuses to be refined.Dewey's
may think not (unless a Kantian). But phrase "existential matrix" is perhaps as
with respect to his refusal to be either a inclusive and apt as any.
dogmatist or a skeptic, he was completely b) The procedure of philosophy is con-
right. Professor Zuurdeeg most commend- ceptual analysis, rather than just the nom-
ably rejects the dogmatist conception of inalists' scrutiny of words and their ex-
philosophy. But, less commendably, he tensional meaning. Conceptual analysis is
sees no alternative to a philosophical skep- a philosophical examination of the exis-
ticism in convictional matters. Of course, tential matrix with its beliefs, ideas, atti-
he prefers to speak of an "analytic" rather tudes, and values; the critical scrutiny of
than a "skeptical" philosophy. Yet as phi- the intensional meaning of both "common
losophy, we have argued, it is skeptical; sense" views and more relative concepts;
as psychology, it may well be analytic. the relentless activity of an incisive and
We have also suggested that, as psycho- intellectually honest mind. Conceptual
logical analysis, it is prevented from be- analysis will draw on psychological and
coming philosophical and metaphysical by sociological considerations, to be sure, just
its exclusive emphasis on language situa- as it will take into account matters of fact
tions. Situational analysis is unsatisfactory drawn from the natural sciences. It may
by itself. Traditional philosophic questions make use of phenomenological considera-
are of perennial concern and are neither tions, as do H. H. Price and R. W. Sellars,
fully resolved nor even fully understood and of linguistic and logical techniques, as
by such means. One might also argue that did G. E. Moore. It will draw upon the
linguistic analysis is also unsatisfactory be- lessons of history, including the history of
cause it is too limited-a fact which led philosophy, as did Aristotle. But through-
Zuurdeegto his innovations. out, its immediate purpose is the analysis
At this point it will help to pause and of concepts-understanding, sharpening,re-
delineate more carefully the nature of this fining, and sifting them-to render them
third way of doing philosophy, prefacing philosophically respectable. This, in fact,
such a statement with the reminder that seems to be what generally happens in the
the so-called idealist and linguistic meth- intellectual awakeningof a maturing mind.
ods are both relatively recent in the history It is the agonizing yet gratifying experi-
of philosophy. Our "third way" is more ence, in non-technical form, of many a
traditional as well as still applicable. We college student. Dr. Zuurdeeg, on the con-
shall observe (a) its starting point, (b) its trary, regards analysis as dominantly, per-
procedure,and (c) its outcome. haps exclusively, linguistic. His view of
a) The starting point of philosophy is philosophy seems unduly restricted.
the existential matrix, the Lebenswelt with c) The intended outcome of conceptual
its precritical beliefs, concepts, attitudes, analysis is a body of philosophically re-

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 THREE WAYS OF DOING PHILOSOPHY 211

spectable concepts. Analysis illuminates the concepts and beliefs of a given reli-
their interrelationships.By means of what gious group. Philosophy is concerned with
Broad calls synopsis and synthesis,8 it de- more than one religion and more with
velops a self-consistent, coherent concep- analysis and synthesis than with exposi-
tual framework.In the case of a Kant this tion and defense. Insofar as the philosopher
may mean a reconstructed epistemology. of religion himself possesses particular re-
The outcome is metaphysics-not a Q.E.D. ligious convictions, these will find inevita-
system infallibly describing the structure ble expression in his philosophy. Since they
of the universe or establishing the intrinsic are elements in his Lebenswelt, they mo-
nature of the Absolute, but a more modest tivate his thinking and give direction to
conceptual and categorial frameworkwhich his investigation; they provide a perspec-
enables one to think and talk consistently tive from which religion and life appear
and effectively about the world of science meaningful, intelligible, and valuable, and
and man, about fact and value, in the from which they may be synthesized into
light of the "guiding image," as John Wild an integrated whole.
calls it, contributed by the existential ma- This is another way of saying that ob-
trix of our inquiry. It is a metaphysic jectivity is an ideal never completely re-
stimulated by one's existential matrix, self- alized in the value-centricpredicament.In-
consistent logically, and adequately ex- tellectual honesty, however,can be realized.
plaining all relevant facts. The philosopher It recognizes how and where convictions
is responsible not only to his own religious and perspective affect one's interpretations
roots but to every area of scientific thought. and conclusions. It conducts the entire en-
Not all metaphysical questions are even terprise under the sort of relentless self-
partially answered in advance by one's re- scrutiny employed by Kant. It liberates
ligious convictions. Possible viewpoints and the thinker from the poverty of narrow
hypotheses are as likely to be accepted or horizons and the bigotry of unsympathetic
rejected on logical, historic, or scientific attitudes.9
grounds, as on religious ones, even though Finally, does this conception of the phi-
many persons find religious grounds the losophy of religion cast light on the reli-
weightiest. Call it "speculativephilosophy," gious language question? Inasmuch as it is
if one will, it can hardly be castigated as concerned with linguistic and situational
a dogmatic, deductive system on the "ide- analysis only as a means to the under-
alistic" model. Nor do I see here any abuse standing of religious concepts, beliefs, and
of scientific-type language, rooted in anxie- attitudes, the focus of attention is accord-
ty and purely convictional, the result of ingly shifted from the nature of religious
some pseudo-scientific status-seeking. On
language to the nature of religious con-
the contrary, the metaphysician is honest-
cepts, beliefs, and experience. Religious
ly interested in truth as well as values, in
science as well as religion, in objectivity language, expressive of religiousbeliefs and
as well as subjectivity. Professor Zuur- experience, is certainly convictional and
deeg's concept of philosophy, it seems, is emotive, but it is also indicative and pred-
too restricted in its outcome, as well as in icational. The Apostles' Creed is as clear
its starting point and procedure. an example as any. As soon as we rein-
Pursuing, then, this notion of a third troduce predication, we are compelled to
way of doing philosophy, just what is the reintroduce two further aspects of tradi-
philosophy of religion? It is the work of tional religious philosophy: the study of
analyzing, refining, sifting, interrelating, analogical predication and the truth value
and systematizing the basic concepts and of religious language. These are aspects of
beliefs employed in religious life and religious philosophy which Dr. Zuurdeeg's
thought. Theology expounds and defends situational analysis altogether overlooks.'0

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212 THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

NOTES
1. W. F. Zuurdeeg,An Analytical Philosophy 7. Cf. the criticism in S. M. Thompson's re-
of Religion (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, view of Zuurdeeg'svolume in Review of Meta-
1958). physics, XIII, 305-19.
2. Pp. 13-14. Cf. "The Nature of Theological 8. "Some Methods of SpeculativePhilosophy,"
Language,"Journal of Religion, XL, 1. Arist. Soc. Suppl., XXI, 1-32.
3. P. 113. 9. See the writer's comments on "The Theist
4. Pp. 135ff. and His Premises,"Basic CollegeQuarterly(East
5. Pp. 17 ff. ElsewhereDr. Zuurdeegspeaks of Lansing,Mich.: MichiganState University,Sum-
"the historicaldimensionof language."See his re- mer, 1959), pp. 4-6.
view of Wittgenstein'sThe Blue and Brown Books 10. Cf. S. M. Thompson,"Philosophyand The-
in Journal of Religion, XL, 54-55. ology: A Reply to Professor W. F. Zuurdeeg,"
6. Pp. 29-30. Journal of Religion,XL, 9-17.

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